CHAPTER XIV.

THE SIEGE OF DELHI: JUNE AND JULY.

While these varied scenes were being presented; while sepoy regiments

were revolting throughout the whole breadth of Northern India, and a

handful of British troops was painfully toiling to control them; while

Henry Lawrence was struggling, and struggling even to death, to maintain

his position in Oude; while John Lawrence was sagaciously managing the

half-wild Punjaub at a troublous time; while Wheeler at Cawnpore, and

Colvin at Agra, were beset in the very thick of the mutineers; while

Neill and Havelock were advancing up the Jumna; while Canning was doing

his best at Calcutta, Harris and Elphinstone at Madras and Bombay, and

the imperial government at home, to meet the trying difficulties with a

determined front—while all this was doing, Delhi was the scene of a

continuous series of operations. Every eye was turned towards that

place. The British felt that there was no security for their power in

India till Delhi was retaken; the insurgents knew that they had a

rallying-point for all their disaffected countrymen, so long as the

Mogul city was theirs; and hence bands of armed men were attracted

thither by antagonistic motives. Although the real siege did not

commence till many weary weeks had passed, the plan and preparations for

it must be dated from the very day when the startling news spread over

India that Delhi had been seized by rebellious sepoys, under the

auspices of the decrepit, dethroned, debauched representative of the

Moguls.

It was, as we have already seen (p. 70), on the morning of Monday the

11th of May, that the 11th and 20th regiments Bengal native infantry,

and the 3d Bengal cavalry, arrived at Delhi after a night-march from

Meerut, where they had mutinied on the preceding evening. At Delhi, we

have also seen, those mutineers were joined by the 38th, 54th, and 74th

native infantry. It was on that same 11th of May that evening saw the

six mutinous regiments masters of the imperial city; and the English

officers and residents, their wives and children, wanderers through

jungles and over streams and rivers. What occurred within Delhi on the

subsequent days is imperfectly known; the few Europeans who could not or

did not escape were in hiding; and scanty notices only have ever come to

light from those or other sources. A Lahore newspaper, three or four

months afterwards, gave a narrative prepared by a native, who was within

Delhi from the 21st of May to the 23d of June. Arriving ten days after

the mutiny, he found the six regiments occupying the Selimgurh and

Mohtabagh, but free to roam over the city; where the sepoys and sowars,

aided by the rabble of the place, plundered the better houses and shops,

stole horses from those who possessed them, ‘looted’ the passengers who

crossed the Jumna by the bridge of boats, and fought with each other for

the property which the fleeing British families had left behind them.

After a few days, something like order was restored, by leaders who

assumed command in the name of the King of Delhi. This was all the more

necessary when new arrivals of insurgent troops took place, from

Allygurh, Minpooree, Agra, Muttra, Hansi, Hissar, Umballa, Jullundur,

Nuseerabad, and other places. The mutineers did not, at any time, afford

proof that they were really well commanded; but still there _was_

command, and the defence of the city was arranged on a definite plan. As

at Sebastopol, so at Delhi; the longer the besiegers delayed their

operations, the greater became the number of defenders within the place,

and the stronger the defence-works.

It must be remembered, in tracing the history of the siege of Delhi,

that every soldier necessary for forming the siege-army had to be

brought from distant spots. The cantonment outside the city was wholly

in the hands of the rebels; and not a British soldier remained in arms

in or near the place. Mr Colvin at Agra speedily heard the news, but he

had no troops to send for the recapture. General Hewett had a British

force at Meerut—unskilfully handled, as many persons thought and still

think; and it remained to be seen what arrangements the

commander-in-chief could make to render this and other forces available

for the reconquest of the important city.

Major-general Sir Henry Barnard was the medium of communication on this

occasion. Being stationed at Umballa, in command of the Sirhind military

division, he received telegraphic messages on the 11th of May from

Meerut and Delhi, announcing the disasters at those places. He

immediately despatched his aid-de-camp to Simla, to point out the urgent

need for General Anson’s presence on the plains instead of among the

hills. Anson, hearing this news on the 12th, first thought about his

troops, and then about his own movements. Knowing well the extreme

paucity of European regiments in the Delhi and Agra districts, and in

all the region thence eastward to Calcutta, he saw that any available

force to recover possession of Delhi must come chiefly from Sirhind and

the Punjaub. Many regiments were at the time at the hill-stations of

Simla, Dugshai, Kussowlie, Deyrah Dhoon, Subathoo, &c., where they were

posted during a time of peace in a healthy temperate region; but now

they had to descend from their sanitaria to take part in stern

operations in the plains. The commander-in-chief sent instant orders to

transfer the Queen’s 75th foot from Kussowlie to Umballa, the 1st and 2d

Bengal Europeans from Dugshai to Umballa, the Sirmoor battalion from

Deyrah Dhoon to Meerut, two companies of the Queen’s 8th foot from

Jullundur to Phillour, and two companies of the Queen’s 81st foot,

together with one company of European artillery, from Lahore to

Umritsir. These orders given, General Anson himself left Simla on the

evening of the 14th, and arrived at Umballa early on the 15th. Before he

started, he issued the proclamation already adverted to, announcing to

the troops of the native army generally that no cartridges would be

brought into use against the conscientious wishes of the soldiery; and

after he arrived at Umballa, fearing that his proclamation had not been

strong enough, he issued another, to the effect that no new cartridges

whatever should be served out—thereby, as he hoped, putting an end to

all fear concerning objectionable lubricating substances being used; for

he was not aware how largely hypocrisy was mixed up with sincerity in

the native scruples on this point.

Anson and Barnard, when together at Umballa, had to measure well the

forces available to them. The Umballa magazines were nearly empty of

stores and ammunition; the artillery wagons were in the depôt at

Phillour; the medical officers dreaded the heat for troops to move in

such a season; and the commissariat was ill supplied with vehicles and

beasts of burden and draught. The only effectual course was found to be,

that of bringing small detachments from many different stations; and

this system was in active progress during the week following Anson’s

arrival at Umballa. On the 16th, troops came into that place from

Phillour and Subathoo. On the 17th arrived three European regiments from

the Hills,[49] which were shortly to be strengthened by artillery from

Phillour. The prospect was not altogether a cheering one, for two of the

regiments at the station were Bengal native troops (the 5th and 60th),

on whose fidelity only slight reliance could be placed at such a

critical period. In order that no time might he lost in forming the

nucleus of a force for Delhi, some of the troops were despatched that

same night; comprising one wing of a European regiment, a few horse, and

two guns. On successive days, other troops took their departure as

rapidly as the necessary arrangements could be made; but Anson was

greatly embarrassed by the distance between Umballa and the station

where the siege-guns were parked; he knew that a besieging army would be

of no use without those essential adjuncts; and it was on that account

that he was unable to respond to Viscount Canning’s urgent request that

he would push on rapidly towards Delhi.

On the 23d of May, Anson sketched a plan of operations, which he

communicated to the brigadiers whose services were more immediately at

his disposal. Leaving Sir Henry Barnard in command at Umballa, he

proposed to head the siege-army himself. It was to consist[50] of three

brigades—one from Umballa, under Brigadier Halifax; a second from the

same place, under Brigadier Jones; and a third from Meerut, under

Brigadier Wilson. He proposed to send off the two brigades from Umballa

on various days, so that all the corps should reach Kurnaul, fifty miles

nearer to Delhi, by the 30th. Then, by starting on the 1st of June, he

expected to reach Bhagput on the 5th, with all his Umballa force except

the siege-train, which might possibly arrive on the 6th. Meanwhile

Major-general Hewett was to organise a brigade at Meerut, and send it to

Bhagput, where it would form a junction with the other two brigades.

Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur being a somewhat important post, as a key to the

Upper Doab, it was proposed that Brigadier Wilson should leave a small

force there—consisting of a part of the Sirmoor battalion, a part of the

Rampore horse, and a few guns—while he advanced with the rest of his

brigade to Bhagput. Lastly, it was supposed that the Meerut brigade, by

starting on the 1st or 2d of June, could reach the rendezvous on the

5th, and that then all could advance together towards Delhi. Such was

General Anson’s plan—a plan that he was not destined to put in execution

himself.

It will be convenient to trace the course of proceeding in the following

mode—to describe the advance of the Meerut brigade to Bhagput, with its

adventures on the way; then to notice in a similar way the march of the

main body from Umballa to Bhagput; next the progress of the collected

siege-army from the last-named town to the crest or ridge bounding Delhi

on the north; and, lastly, the commencement of the siege-operations

themselves—operations lamentably retarded by the want of a sufficient

force of siege-guns.

[Illustration:

SIR HENRY BARNARD.

]

Major-general Hewett, at Meerut, proceeded to organise a brigade in

accordance with the plan laid down by General Anson: retaining at his

head-quarters a force sufficient to protect Meerut and its

neighbourhood. It was on the 27th of May that this brigade was ready,

and that Colonel Archdall Wilson was placed in command of it—a gallant

officer afterwards better known as Brigadier or General Wilson. The

brigade was very small; comprising less than 500 of the 60th Rifles, 200

of the Carabiniers, one battery and a troop of artillery. They started

on the evening of the 27th; and after marching during the cooler hours

of the 28th and 29th, encamped on the morning of the 30th at

Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur (Ghazee-u-deen Nuggur, Guznee de Nuggur). This was a

small town or village on the left bank of the river Hindoun, eighteen

miles east of Delhi, important as commanding one of the passages over

that river from Meerut, the passage being by a suspension-bridge.

On that same day, the 30th of May, Brigadier Wilson was attacked by the

insurgents, who had sallied forth from Delhi for this purpose, and who

were doubtless anxious to prevent a junction of the Meerut force with

that from Kurnaul. The enemy appeared in force on the opposite side of

the river, with five guns in position. Wilson at once sent a body of

Rifles to command the suspension-bridge; while a few Carabiniers were

despatched along the river-bank to a place where they were able to ford.

The insurgents opened fire with their five heavy guns; whereupon the

brigadier sent off to the attacked points all his force except

sufficient to guard his camp; and then the contest became very brisk.

The Rifles, under Colonel Jones, were ordered to charge the enemy’s

guns; they rushed forward, disregarding grape and canister shot, and

advanced towards the guns. When they saw a shell about to burst, they

threw themselves down on their faces to avoid the danger, then jumped

up, and off again. They reached the guns, drove away the gunners, and

effected a capture. The enemy, beaten away from the defences of the

bridge, retreated to a large walled village, where they had the courage

to stand a hand-to-hand contest for a time—a struggle which no native

troops could long continue against the British Rifles. As evening came

on, the enemy fled with speed to Delhi, leaving behind them five guns,

ammunition, and stores. Colonel Coustance followed them some distance

with the Carabiniers; but it was not deemed prudent to continue the

pursuit after nightfall. In this smart affair 11 were killed, 21 wounded

or missing. Captain Andrews, with four of his riflemen, while taking

possession of two heavy pieces of ordnance on the causeway, close to the

toll-house of the bridge, were blown up by the explosion of an

ammunition-wagon, fired by one of the sepoy gunners.

The mutineers did not allow Brigadier Wilson to remain many hours quiet.

He saw parties of their horse reconnoitring his position all the morning

of the 31st; and he kept, therefore, well on the alert. At one o’clock

the enemy, supposed to be five thousand in number, took up a position a

mile in length, on a ridge on the opposite side of the Hindoun, and

about a mile distant from Wilson’s advanced picket. Horse-artillery and

two 18-pounders were at once sent forward to reply to this fire, with a

party of Carabiniers to support; while another party, of Rifles,

Carabiniers, and guns, went to support the picket at the bridge. For

nearly two hours the contest was one of artillery alone, the British

guns being repeatedly and vainly charged by the enemy’s cavalry; the

enemy’s fire then slackening, and the Rifles having cleared a village on

the left of the toll-bar, the brigadier ordered a general advance. The

result was as on the preceding day; the mutineers were driven back. The

British all regretted they could not follow, and cut up the enemy in the

retreat; but the brigadier, seeing that many of his poor fellows fell

sun-stricken, was forced to call them back into camp when the action was

over. This victory was not so complete as that on the preceding day; for

the mutineers were able to carry off all their guns, two heavy and five

light. The killed and wounded on the side of the English were 24 in

number, of whom 10 were stricken down by the heat of the sun—a cause of

death that shews how terrible must have been the ordeal passed through

by all on such a day. Among the officers, Lieutenant Perkins was killed,

and Captain Johnson and Ensign Napier wounded.

After the struggle of the 31st of May, the enemy did not molest Wilson

in his temporary camp at Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur. He provided for his

wounded, refitted his brigade, and waited for reinforcements. On the

morning of the 3d of June he was joined by another hundred of the 60th

Rifles from Meerut, and by a Goorkha regiment, the Sirmoor battalion,

from Deyrah Dhoon; and then lost no time in marching to the rendezvous.

The route taken was very circuitous, hilly, and rugged; and the brigade

did not reach the rendezvous head-quarters at Bhagput till the morning

of the 6th.

We have now to trace the fortunes of the Umballa force. It was on the

23d of May, as has been shewn, that General Anson put forth the scheme

for an advance towards Delhi, in which the brigade from Meerut was to

take part. He left Umballa on the 24th, and reached Kurnaul on the 25th.

All the proposed regiments and detachments from Umballa had by that time

come in to Kurnaul except two troops of horse-artillery; but as the

siege-train was far in arrear, Anson telegraphed to Calcutta that he

would not be in a position to advance from Kurnaul towards Delhi until

the 31st of the month. On the 26th, the commander-in-chief’s plans were

ended by the ending of his life; an attack of cholera carried him off in

a few hours. He hastily summoned Sir Henry Barnard from Umballa; and his

last words were to place the Delhi force under the command of that

officer. At that time news and orders travelled slowly between Calcutta

and the northwest; for dâks were interrupted and telegraph wires cut;

and it was therefore necessary that the command should at once be given

to some one, without waiting for sanction from the governor-general.

Viscount Canning heard the news on the 3d of June, and immediately

confirmed the appointment of Sir Henry to the command of the siege-army;

but that confirmation was not known to the besiegers till long

afterwards. Major-general Reed, by the death of Anson, became

provisional commander-in-chief; and he left Rawul Pindee on the 28th of

May to join the head-quarters of the siege-army, but without superseding

Barnard. It was a terrible time for all these generals: Anson and

Halifax had both succumbed to cholera; Reed was so thoroughly broken

down by illness that he could not command in person; and Barnard was

summoned from a sick-bed by the dying commander-in-chief.

Sir Henry Barnard did not feel justified in advancing from Kurnaul until

heavier guns than those he possessed could arrive from the Punjaub. On

the 31st, a 9-pounder battery—those already at hand being only

6-pounders—came into camp; and the march from Kurnaul to Paniput

commenced on that evening. Sir Henry expected to have met Brigadier

Wilson at Raee, where there was a bridge of boats over the Jumna; but

through some misconstruction or countermanding of orders, Wilson had

taken a much more circuitous route by Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur, and could not

join the Umballa brigade at the place or on the day expected. Barnard,

after a brief sojourn and a slight change of plan, sent out elephants to

aid in bringing forward the Meerut brigade, and advanced with the

greater portion of his own force to Alipore (or Aleepore), where he

arrived on the morning of the 5th of June. The chief artillery force

being with the Meerut brigade, Sir Henry waited for Wilson, who effected

a junction with him on the 6th; and on the 7th, the united forces were

reorganised, at a point so near Delhi that the troops looked forward

eagerly to a speedy encounter with the enemy.

Many of the soldiers who thus assembled at a place distant only a few

miles from the famous city, which they all hoped soon to retake from the

hands of the enemy, had marched great distances. Among the number was

the corps of Guides, whose march was one of those determined exploits of

which soldiers always feel proud, and to which they point as proof that

they shrink not from fatigue and heat when a post of duty is assigned to

them. This remarkable corps was raised on the conclusion of the Sutlej

campaign, to act either as regular troops or as guides and spies,

according as the exigencies of the service might require. The men were

chosen for their sagacity and intelligence, as well as for their courage

and hardihood. They were inhabitants of the Punjaub, but belonged to no

one selected race or creed; for among them were to be found

mountaineers, borderers, men of the plains, and half-wild warriors.

Among them nearly all the dialects of Northern India were more or less

known; and they were as familiar with hill-fighting as with service on

the plains. They were often employed as intelligencers, and in

reconnoitring an enemy’s position. They were the best of all troops to

act against the robber hill-tribes, with whom India is so greatly

infested. Among the many useful pieces of Indian service effected by Sir

Henry Lawrence, was the suggestion of this corps; and Lord Hardinge,

when commander-in-chief, acted on it in 1846. The corps was at first

limited to one troop of cavalry and two companies of artillery, less

than three hundred men in all; but the Marquis of Dalhousie afterwards

raised it to three troops and six companies, about eight hundred and

fifty men, commanded by four European officers and a surgeon. The men

were dressed in a plain serviceable drab uniform. Their pay was eight

rupees per month for a foot-soldier, and twenty-four for a trooper.

These, then, were the Guides of whom English newspaper-readers heard so

much but knew so little. They were stationed at a remote post in the

Punjaub, not far from the Afghan frontier, when orders reached them to

march to Delhi, a distance of no less than 750 miles. They set off,

horse and foot together, and accomplished the distance in twenty-eight

days—a really great achievement in the heat of an Indian summer; they

suffered much, of course; but all took pride in their work, and obtained

high praise from the commander-in-chief. One of the English officers

afterwards declared that he had never before experienced the necessity

of ‘roughing’ it as on this occasion. Captain Daly commanded the whole

corps, while Captain Quintin Battye had special control of that portion

of it which consisted of troopers.

The Guides, as has just been shewn, were an exceptional corps, raised

among the natives for a peculiar service. But the siege-army contained

gallant regiments of ordinary troops, whose marching was little less

severe. One of these was the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers; a British

regiment wholly belonging to the Company, and one which in old times was

known as Lord Lake’s ‘dear old dirty shirts.’ On the 13th of May it was

at Dugshai, a sanatarium and hill-station not far from Simla. Major

Jacob rode in hastily from Simla, announced that Meerut and Delhi were

in revolt, and brought an order for the regiment to march down to

Umballa forthwith, to await further orders. At five o’clock that same

day the men marched forth, with sixty rounds in pouch, and food in

haversack. After a twenty-four miles’ walk they refreshed on the ground,

supping and sleeping as best they could. At an hour after midnight they

renewed their march, taking advantage—as troops in India are wont to

do—of the cool hours of the night; they marched till six or seven, and

then rested during the heat of the day at Chundeegurh. From five till

ten in the evening they again advanced, and then had supper and three

hours’ rest at Mobarrackpore. Then, after a seven hours’ march during

the night of the 14th-15th, they reached Umballa—having accomplished

sixty miles in thirty-eight hours. Here they were compelled to remain

some days until the arrangements of the general in other directions were

completed; and during this detention many of their number were carried

off by cholera. At length four companies were sent on towards Kurnaul on

the 17th, under Captain Dennis; while the other companies did not start

till the 21st. The two wings of the regiments afterwards effected a

junction, and marched by Paniput, Soomalka, and Sursowlie, to Raee,

where they arrived on the 31st of May. Under a scorching sun every day,

the troops were well-nigh beaten down; but the hope of ‘thrashing the

rebels at Delhi’ cheered them on. One officer speaks of the glee with

which he and his companions came in sight of a field of onions, ‘all

green above and white below,’ and of the delightful relish they enjoyed

during a temporary rest. The regiment, after remaining at Raee till the

morning of the 5th of June, was then joined by its commandant, Colonel

Welchman. Forming now part of Brigadier Showers’ brigade, the 1st

Europeans marched to Alipore, where its fortunes were mixed up with

those of the other troops in the besieging army.

Many at Calcutta wondered why Barnard did not make a more rapid advance

from Paniput and Raee to Alipore; and many at Raee wondered why Wilson

did not come in more quickly from Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur. The brigadier was

said to have had his plans somewhat changed by suggestions from one of

the Greatheds (Mr H. H. Greathed was agent, and Lieutenant W. H.

Greathed, aid-de-camp, for the lieutenant-governor of the Northwest

Provinces in the camp of the siege-army); while Sir Henry was anxious

both to secure Wilson’s co-operation as soon as he started, and to

preserve the health of his men during the trying season of heat. It is

greatly to the credit of him and all the officers, that the various

regiments, notwithstanding their long marches and fierce exposure to

heat, reached Delhi in admirable health—leaving cholera many miles

behind them. Having been joined by a siege-train on the 6th of June, and

by Brigadier Wilson’s forces on the 7th, Barnard began at once to

organise his plans for an advance. The reinforcements brought by Wilson

were very miscellaneous;[51] but they had fought well on the banks of

the Hindoun, and were an indispensable aid to the general. Major-general

Reed arrived from Rawul Pindee at midnight, not to take the command from

Barnard, but to sanction the line of proceedings as temporary

commander-in-chief.

It was at one o’clock on the morning of the 8th of June that the

siege-army set out from Alipore, to march the ten miles which separate

that village from Delhi. Some of the reinforcements, such as the Guides,

had not yet arrived; but the troops which formed the army of march on

this morning, according to Sir Henry’s official dispatch, were as noted

below.[52] They advanced to a village, the name of which is variously

spelt in the dispatches, letters, and maps as Badulla Serai,

Bardul-ki-Serai, Badulee-ke-Serai, Bardeleeke Serai, Budleeka Suraee,

&c., about four miles from Delhi. Here the fighting began; here the

besiegers came in contact with the enemy who had been so long sought.

When within a short distance of the village, the sepoy watch-fires were

seen (for day had scarcely yet broken). Suddenly a report was heard, and

a shot and shell came roaring down the road to the advancing British

force; and then it became necessary to plan a mode of dealing with the

enemy, who were several thousands in number, in a strongly intrenched

position, with artillery well served. Sir Henry Barnard intrusted

Brigadiers Showers, Graves, and Grant with distinct duties—the first to

advance with his brigade on the right of the main trunk-road; the second

to take the left of the same road; and the third to cross the canal,

advance quietly, and recross in the rear of the enemy’s position at such

a time as a signal should direct them to effect a surprise. The guns

were placed in and on both sides of the road. When the hostile forces

met, the enemy opened a severe fire—a fire so severe, indeed, that the

general resolved to stop it by capturing the battery itself. This was

effected in a gallant manner by the 75th foot and the 1st Europeans; it

was perilous work, for the troops had to pass over open ground, with

very little shelter or cover. Several officers were struck down at this

point; but the most serious loss was produced by a cannon-shot which

killed Colonel Chester, adjutant-general of the army. The battery was

charged so determinedly that the artillerymen were forced to flee,

leaving their guns behind them; while the advance of the other two

brigades compelled them to a general flight. Colonel Welchman, of the

1st Fusiliers, in his eagerness galloped after three of the mutineers

and cut one of them down; but the act would have cost him his own life,

had not a private of his regiment come opportunely to his aid.

A question now arose, whether to halt for a while, or push on towards

Delhi. It was between five and six o’clock on a summer morning; and

Barnard decided that it would be advisable not to allow the enemy time

to reassemble in or near the village. The men were much exhausted; but

after a hasty taste of rum and biscuit, they resumed their march.

Advancing in two columns, Brigadiers Wilson and Showers fought their way

along the main trunk-road; while Barnard and Graves turned off at

Azadpore by the road which led through the cantonment of Delhi—a

cantonment lately in the hands of the British authorities, but now

deserted. This advance was a continuous fight the whole way: the rebels

disputing the passage inch by inch. It then became perceptible that a

rocky ridge which bounds Delhi on the north was bristling with bayonets

and cannon, and that the conquest of this ridge would be a necessary

preliminary to an approach to Delhi. Barnard determined on a rapid

flank-movement to turn the right of the enemy’s position. With a force

consisting of the 60th Rifles under Colonel Jones, the 2d Europeans

under Captain Boyd, and a troop of horse-artillery under Captain Money,

Sir Henry rapidly advanced, ascended the ridge, took the enemy in flank,

compelled them to flee, and swept the whole length of the ridge—the

enemy abandoning twenty-six guns, with ammunition and camp-equipage. The

Rifles rendered signal service in this movement; taking advantage of

every slight cover, advancing closer to the enemy’s guns than other

infantry could safely do, and picking off the gunners. Brigadier Wilson

and his companions were enabled to advance by the main road; and he and

Barnard met on the ridge. From that hour the besieging army took up its

position before Delhi—never to leave it till months of hard fighting had

made them masters of the place. During the struggle on the ridge, two

incidents greatly exasperated the troops: one was the discovery that a

captured cart, which they supposed to contain ammunition, was full of

the mangled limbs and trunks of their murdered fellow-Christians; the

other was that two or three Europeans were found fighting for and with

the rebels—probably soldiers of fortune, ready to sell their services to

the highest bidders. Every European—and it was supposed that Delhi

contained others of the kind—so caught was sure to be cut to pieces by

the enraged soldiery, with a far more deadly hatred than sepoys

themselves could have inspired. This day’s work was not effected without

serious loss. Colonel Chester, we have said, was killed; as were

Captains Delamain and Russell, and Lieutenant Harrison. The wounded

comprised Colonel Herbert; Captains Dawson and Greville; Lieutenants

Light, Hunter, Davidson, Hare, Fitzgerald, Barter, Rivers, and Ellis;

and Ensign Pym. In all, officers and privates, there were 51 killed and

133 wounded. Nearly 50 horses were either killed or wounded.

Here, then, in the afternoon of the 8th of June, were the British posted

before Delhi. It will be necessary to have a clear notion of the

relative positions of the besiegers and the besieged, to understand the

narrative which is to follow. Of Delhi itself an account is given

elsewhere, with a brief notice of the defence-works;[53] but the gates

and bastions must here be enumerated somewhat more minutely, as the plan

of the siege mainly depended on them. A small branch or nullah of the

Jumna is separated from the main stream by a sand-bank which forms an

island; the junction or rejoining of the two takes place where the Jumna

is crossed by a bridge of boats, and where the old fort called the

Selimgurh was built. Beginning at this point, we trace the circuit of

the wall and its fortifications. From the Selimgurh the wall borders—or

rather bordered (for it will be well to speak in the past tense)—the

nullah for about three-quarters of a mile, in a northwest direction,

marked by the Calcutta Gate, a martello tower, the Kaila Gate, the

Nuseergunje Bastion, and the Moree or Moira Bastion. The wall then

turned sharply to the west, or slightly southwest; and during a length

of about three-quarters of a mile presented the Moree Bastion just

named, the Cashmere Gate, the Moree Gate, and the Shah Bastion. To this

succeeded a portion about a mile in length, running nearly north and

south, and marked by the Cabool Gate, a martello tower, Burn Bastion,

the Lahore Gate, and the Gurstin Bastion. Then, an irregular polygonal

line of two miles in length carried the wall round to the bank of the

Jumna, by a course bending more and more to the east; here were

presented the Turushkana Gate, a martello tower, the Ajmeer Gate, the

Akbar Bastion, another martello tower, the Ochterlony Bastion, the

Turcoman Gate, a third and a fourth martello towers, and the Delhi Gate.

Lastly, along the bank of the river for a mile and a half, and separated

from the water at most times by a narrow sandy strip, was a continuation

of the wall, broken by the Wellesley and Nawab Bastions, the Duryagunje

Gate, a martello tower, the Rajghat Gate, the wall of the imperial

palace, and the defence-wall entirely surrounding the Selimgurh. Such

were the numerous gates, bastions, and towers at that period; many parts

of the wall and bastions were formed of masonry twelve feet thick, and

the whole had been further strengthened by the rebels during four weeks

of occupation. Outside the defences was a broad ditch twenty feet deep

from the ground, or thirty-five from the top of the wall.

The position taken up by the besiegers may be thus briefly described.

The camp was pitched on the former parade-ground of the deserted

encampment, at a spot about a mile and a half from the northern wall of

the city, with a rocky ridge acting as a screen between it and the city.

This ridge was commanded by the rebels until the afternoon of the 8th;

but from that time it was in the hands of the besiegers. The British

line on this ridge rested on the left on an old tower used as a

signal-post, often called the Flagstaff Tower; at its centre, upon an

old mosque; and at its right, upon a house with enclosures strongly

placed at the point where the ridge begins to slope down towards the

plain. This house, formerly occupied by a Mahratta chief named Hindoo

Rao, was generally known as Hindoo Rao’s house. Owing to the ridge being

very oblique in reference to the position of the city, the right of the

line was of necessity thrown much forward, and hence Hindoo Rao’s house

became the most important post in the line. Near this house, owing to

its commanding position, the British planted three batteries; and to

protect these batteries, Rifles, Guides, and Sirmoor Goorkhas were

posted within convenient distance. Luckily for the British, Hindoo Rao’s

house was ‘pucka-built,’ that is, a substantial brick structure, and

bore up well against the storm of shot aimed at it by the rebels.

When the British had effected a permanent lodgment on the ridge, with

the camp pitched in the old cantonment behind the ridge as a screen, the

time had arrived when the detailed plan for the siege was to be

determined, if it had not been determined already. Some military critics

averred that Sir Henry Barnard, only acquainted in a slight degree with

that part of India, displayed indecision, giving and countermanding

orders repeatedly, and leaving his subordinates in doubt concerning the

real plan of the siege. Others contended that the sudden assumption of

command on the death of General Anson, the small number of troops, and

the want of large siege-guns, were enough to render necessary great

caution in the mode of procedure. The truth appears to be, that the

rebels were found stronger in Delhi, than was suspected before the

siege-army approached close to the place; moreover, they had contested

the advance from Alipore more obstinately than had been expected—shewing

that, though not equal to British soldiers, it would not be safe to

despise their prowess. The plan of attack would obviously depend upon

the real or supposed defensive measures of the besieged. If the rebels

risked a battle outside the walls, they might very likely be defeated

and followed into the city and palace; but then would come a disastrous

street-fighting against enemies screened behind loopholed walls, and

firing upon besiegers much less numerous than themselves. Or the

half-crumbled walls might easily be scaled by active troops; but as

these troops would be a mere handful against large numbers, their

success would be very doubtful. A third plan, suggested by some among

the many advisers of that period, was to make an attack by water, or on

the river-side. The Jumna is at certain times so shallow at Delhi as to

be almost fordable, and leaving a strip of sand on which batteries might

be planted; these batteries might breach the river-wall of the palace,

and so disturb the garrison as to permit a large body of the besiegers

to enter under cover of the firing; but a rise in the river would

fatally affect this enterprise. A fourth plan suggested was to attack

near the Cashmere Gate, on the north side of the city; the siege-army

would in this case be protected on its left flank by the river, and

might employ all its force in breaching the wall between the gate and

the river; the guns would render the mainguard untenable; when the

assault was made, it would be on a part where there is much vacant

ground in the interior; and the besieging troops would have a better

chance than if at once entangled among the intricacies of loopholed

houses. Any project for starving out the garrison, if it ever entered

the mind of any soldier, was soon abandoned; the boundary was too

extensive, the gates too many, and the besiegers too few, to effect

this.

[Illustration:

Hindoo Rao’s House—Battery in front.

]

During the early days after the arrival of the British, indications

appeared of an intention to blow open the Cashmere Gate, and effect a

forcible entry into the city at once; but these indications soon ceased;

and the besiegers found themselves compelled rather to resist attacks

than to make them; for the enemy, strong in numbers, made repeated

sorties from the various gates of the city, and endeavoured to dislodge

the British. One such sortie was made about noon on the 9th, within

twenty-four hours after the arrival of the besiegers; the enemy were,

however, easily repulsed, and driven in again. The corps of Guides met

with a loss on this day which occasioned much regret. Among those who

accompanied the hardy men all the way from the Afghan frontier was

Captain Quintin Battye, a young officer much beloved as commandant of

the cavalry portion of the corps. They arrived on the 8th; and on the

next day poor Battye was shot through the body; he lived twenty-four

hours in great agony, and then sank. The Guides had a large share in

this day’s work; many of them fell, in dislodging the enemy from a rocky

position which they temporarily occupied. On the 10th a little

skirmishing took place, but not so serious as on the preceding day; it

was found, however, that the white shirts of the men were a little too

conspicuous; and they underwent an extemporaneous process of dyeing to

deepen the colour. On the 12th, early in the morning, the enemy made a

sudden attack on both flanks; but all points were speedily defended.

They were first driven back on the left; then, after a repulse on the

right, they advanced a second time under the cover of thickly wooded

gardens near the Subzee Mundee—a suburb of Delhi about a mile and a

quarter northwest of the Cabool Gate. Major Jacob was then sent against

them with some of the Bengal Europeans; he beat them back till they got

beyond the suburb, and then returned to the camp. This morning’s affair

was supposed to have cost the enemy 250 men; the British loss was very

small. On this day, the British had the mortification of seeing two

regiments of Rohilcund mutineers, the 60th native infantry and the 4th

native cavalry, enter Delhi with bands playing and colours flying; the

defiant manner was quite as serious an affair as the augmentation of the

strength of the garrison. On the 13th a large enclosure in advance of

the British left, known as Metcalfe House, was occupied by them, and the

erection of a battery of heavy guns and mortars commenced.

Not a day passed without some such struggles as have just been adverted

to. The besieging of the city had not really commenced, for the British

had not yet a force of artillery sufficient for that purpose; indeed,

they were now the besieged rather than the besiegers; for the enemy came

out of the city—horse, foot, and guns—and attempted to effect a surprise

on one part or other of the position on the ridge. Against the battery

at Metcalfe House a sortie was made on the 15th, and another was made on

the same day at the right of the line. On the 17th an exciting encounter

took place. A shot from the city struck the corner of Hindoo Rao’s

house, and glancing off, killed Lieutenant Wheatley of the Goorkhas. It

was then suspected that the enemy, besides their attacks on this house

in front, were throwing up a battery outside the western gates of the

town, at a large building known as the Eedghah, formerly used as a

serai. Thereupon a force was immediately organised, consisting of

horse-artillery, cavalry, Goorkhas, and Rifles, to drive them away from

that position. They passed through the Subzee Mundee to the Eedghah,

drove out the enemy, and captured the only gun which had yet been placed

there. One of the officers on this duty had a finger shot off, a bullet

through the wrist, another through the cheek, and another which broke

the collar-bone; yet he recovered, to fight again.

On the 19th of June it came to the knowledge of Brigadier Grant that the

enemy intended to attack the camp in the rear; and as the safety of the

camp had been placed under his keeping, he made instant preparations to

frustrate the insurgents. These troops are believed to have been

augmentations of the insurgent forces, consisting of the 15th and 30th

native regiments from Nuseerabad. The brigadier advanced with six guns

and a squadron of lancers to reconnoitre, and found the enemy in

position half a mile in rear of the Ochterlony Gardens, northwest of the

camp. Troops quickly arrived, and a rapid exchange of fire began, the

enemy being strong in artillery as well as in infantry. Just as the dusk

of the evening came on, the enemy, by a series of skilful and vigorous

attacks, aided by well-served artillery, very nearly succeeded in

turning the flank of the British, and in capturing two guns; but both

these disasters were frustrated. The dusk deepened into darkness; but

the brigadier felt that it would not do to allow the enemy to occupy

that position during the night. A charge was made with great impetuosity

by horse and foot, with so much success, that the enemy were driven back

quite into the town. The brigadier had to regret the loss of Colonel

Yule of the 9th Lancers, who was knocked off his horse, and not found

again by his men till next morning; when they were shocked to see him

dead and mangled, with both thighs broken, a ball through the head just

over the eyes, his throat cut, and his hands much gashed. He had been on

leave of absence in Cashmere, but directly he heard of the work to be

done, travelled night and day till he reached his regiment just before

its arrival at Delhi. Lieutenant Alexander was also among the killed.

Captain Daly of the Guides, and six other officers, were wounded. All

the officers of the Guides, but one, received wounds. Altogether, the

day’s fighting resulted to the British in the loss of 19 killed and 77

wounded; and it was a source of much regret that a few of these fell by

the hands of their own comrades, while fighting in some confusion as

darkness approached. No less than sixty horses fell. The brigadier did

not fail to mention the names of three private soldiers—Thomas Hancock,

John Purcell, and Roopur Khan—who behaved with great gallantry at a

critical moment.

Sir Henry Barnard, for very cogent reasons, watched every movement on

the part of the mutineers who sallied forth from Delhi. On the 22d, he

saw a body of them come out of the city; and as they were not seen to

return at night, he suspected a masked attack. At six in the evening, he

sent out a party of infantry, Guides, and Sappers, to demolish two

bridges which carried the great road across a canal westward of the

camp, and over which the enemy were in the habit of taking their

artillery and columns when they wished to attack the camp in the rear;

this was a work of six hours, warmly contested but successfully

accomplished. On the 23d, Sir Henry, expecting a valuable convoy from

the Punjaub, adopted prompt measures for its protection. He sent out a

strong escort, which safely brought the convoy into camp. Scarcely had

this been effected, when his attention was drawn to the right of his

position, near Hindoo Rao’s house. It was afterwards ascertained that

the enemy, remembering the 23d of June as the centenary of the battle of

Plassy, had resolved to attempt a great victory over the British on that

day; incited, moreover, by the circumstance that two festivals, one

Mussulman and the other Hindoo, happened to occur on that day; and they

emerged from the city in vast force to effect this. They commenced their

attack on the Subzee Mundee side, having a strong position in a village

and among garden-walls. Here a combat was maintained during the whole of

the day, for the rebels continued their attacks with much pertinacity;

they lodged themselves in loopholed houses, a serai, and a mosque,

whence they could not be dislodged till they had wrought much mischief

by musketry. At length, however, they were driven back into the city.

The value of the precaution taken on the preceding evening, in

destroying the bridges, was made fully evident; for the rebels were

unable to cross the canal to get to the rear of the camp. The 1st

Europeans had a desperate contest in the Subzee Mundee, where

street-fighting, and firing from windows and house-tops, continued for

many hours. The British troops suffered terribly from the heat of the

midsummer sun, to which they were exposed from sunrise to sunset. Many

officers were brought away sun-struck and powerless. The Guides fought

for fifteen hours uninterruptedly, with no food, and only a little

water. At one o’clock, when the enemy were strengthened by large

reinforcements from the city, the Guides found themselves without

ammunition, and had to send back to the camp for more; but as great

delay occurred, they were in imminent peril of annihilation. Fortunately

a corps of Sikhs, who had arrived at camp that morning, rushed forward

at a critical moment, and aided the Guides in driving back the enemy.

One of the incidents of the day has been thus narrated, shewing how

little scruple a Goorkha felt when he met a sepoy: ‘In the intense heat,

a soldier of the 2d Europeans and a Goorkha sought the shade and

protection of a house near the Subzee Mundee, a window of which looked

into a lane where they were seated. Not long had they rested when, from

the open window, was seen to project the head of a sepoy. Now all

Hindoos have what ladies at home call “back-hair,” and this is usually

turned up into a knot; by this the unlucky wretch was at once seized,

and before he could even think of resistance, his head was at a stroke

severed from his body by the sharp curved knife of the Goorkha!’ This

day’s work was in every way very severe, and shewed the besiegers that

the rebels were in great strength. Lieutenant Jackson was killed;

Colonel Welchman, Captain Jones, and Lieutenant Murray, wounded. The

total loss of the day was 39 killed and 121 wounded. The enemy’s loss

was very much larger; indeed, one of the estimates raised the number up

to a thousand. The loss appears to have somewhat dispirited the

mutineers, for they made very few attacks on the following three days.

But although there was a temporary cessation, Sir Henry Barnard, in his

official dispatches, shewed that he was much embarrassed by this

condition of affairs. His forces were few; those of the enemy were very

large; and the attacks were rendered more harassing by the uncertainty

of the point on which they would be made, and the impossibility of

judging whether they were about to be made on more points than one. The

onslaughts could only be successfully repulsed by the untiring and

unflinching gallantry of a small body of men. The enemy, instead of

being beleaguered within Delhi, were free to emerge from the city and

attack the besiegers’ position. The British did not complain: it was not

their wont; but they suffered greatly from this harassing kind of

warfare. Reinforcements were slowly coming in; in the last week of June

the Europeans numbered about three thousand; and they were well

satisfied with the native corps who fought by their side—the Guides, the

Goorkhas, and the Sikhs—all of whom joined very heartily in opposing the

rebel sepoys. The siege-material at this time consisted of five

batteries, mounting about fifteen guns and mortars, placed on various

points of the ridge; the bombardment of the city by these guns was not

very effective, for the distance averaged nearly a mile, and the guns

were not of large calibre.

The interval from the 23d to the 30th of June passed much in the same

way as the two preceding weeks; the British siege-guns wrought very

little mischief to the city; while the enemy occasionally sallied forth

to attack either the camp or the works on the ridge. It was often

asserted, and facts seemed to corroborate the statement, that when

mutinous regiments from other places appeared before Delhi, they were

not afforded reception and shelter until they had earned it by making an

attack on the British position; and thus it happened that the besiegers

were opposed by a constantly increasing number of the enemy. The

defenders of the garrison fitted up a large battery on the left of the

Cashmere Gate, one at the gate itself, one at the Moree Gate, one at the

Ajmeer Gate, and one directly opposite Hindoo Rao’s house; against these

five batteries, for a long time, the British had only three; so that the

besieged were stronger than the besiegers in every way. The gunners,

too, within Delhi, were fully equal to those of the siege-army in

accuracy of aim; their balls and shells fell near Hindoo Rao’s house so

thickly as to render that post a very perilous one to hold. One shell

entered the gateway, and killed eight or nine officers and men who were

seeking shelter from the mid-day heat.

[Illustration:

The General and his Staff at the Mosque Picket before Delhi.

]

It was pretty well ascertained, before June was half over, that Delhi

was not to be taken by a _coup de main_; and when Sir John Lawrence

became aware of that fact, he sent reinforcements down from the Punjaub

as rapidly as they could be collected. Every sepoy regiment that was

either disbanded or disarmed lessened his own danger, for he trusted

well in his Sikhs, Punjaubees, and Guides; and on that account he was

able to send Europeans and artillery. The reserve and depôt companies of

the regiments already serving before Delhi were sent down from the hills

to join their companions. A wing of H.M. 61st foot, a portion of the

8th, artillery from Jullundur, and artillerymen from Lahore, followed

the Guides and Sikhs, and gradually increased the besieging force. Then

came Punjaub rifles and Punjaub light horse; and there were still a few

Hindustani cavalry and horse-artillery in whom their officers placed

such unabated confidence that they were permitted to take part in the

siege-operations, on the ground that there were Europeans enough to

overawe them if they became unruly. These reinforcements of course came

in by degrees: we mention them all in one paragraph, but many weeks

elapsed before they could reach the Delhi camp. Fortunately, supplies

were plentiful; the country between Delhi and the Sutlej was kept pretty

free from the enemy; and the villagers were glad to find good customers

for the commodities they had to sell. It hence arose that, during the

later days of June, the British were well able to render nugatory all

sallies made by the enemy; they had food and beverages in good store;

and they were free from pestilential diseases. On the other hand, they

suffered intensely from the heat; and were much dissatisfied at the

small progress made towards the conquest of the city. Some expressed

their dissatisfaction by adverse criticisms on the general’s tactics;

while others admitted that a storming of Delhi would not be prudent

without further reinforcements. As to the heat, the troops wrote of it

in all their letters, spoke of it in all their narrations. One officer,

who had seventy-two hours of outpost-duty on a plain without the

slightest shelter, described his sensation in the daytime as if ‘a hot

iron had been going into his head.’ On a certain day, when some

additional troops arrived at camp after a twenty-two miles’ march, they

had scarcely lain down to rest when they were ordered out to repel an

attack by the enemy: they went, and gallantly did the work cut out for

them; but some of them ‘were so exhausted that they sank down on the

road, _even under fire_, and went off to sleep.’

July arrived. Brigadier Chamberlain had recently joined the camp, and

reinforcements were coming in; but on the other hand the rebels were

increasing their strength more rapidly than the British. The enemy began

the month by an attack which tried the prowess of the Guides and

Punjaubees, in a manner that brought great praise to those corps. In the

afternoon of the 1st, Major Reid, who was established with the

head-quarters of the Sirmoor battalion at Hindoo Rao’s house, observed

the mutineers turning out in great force from the Ajmeer and Turcoman

Gates, and assembling on the open plain outside. Then, looking round on

his rear right, he saw a large force, which was supposed to have come

out of Delhi on the previous day; comprising thirteen guns and mortars,

besides cavalry and infantry. The two forces joined about a mile from

the Eedghah Serai. At sunset 5000 or 6000 infantry advanced, passed

through the Pahareepore and Kissengunje suburbs, and approached towards

the British lines, taking cover of the buildings as they passed. The

extreme right of the line was attacked at the Pagoda picket, which was

held only by 150 Punjaubees and Guides, under Captain Travers. Major

Reid sent him a message to reserve his fire till the enemy approached

near, in order to husband his resources; while 150 British were being

collected to send to his aid. Throughout the whole night did this little

band of 300 men resist a large force of infantry and artillery, never

yielding an inch, but defending the few works which had been constructed

in that quarter. At daybreak, the enemy renewed the attacks with further

troops; but Reid brought a few more of his gallant fellows to repel

them. Evening, night, morning, noon, all passed in this way; and it was

not until the contest had continued twenty-two hours that the enemy

finally retired into the city. There may have been sufficient military

reasons why larger reinforcements were not sent to Major Reid from the

camp behind the ridge; but let the reasons have been what they may, the

handful of troops fought in the ratio of hundreds against thousands, and

never for an instant flinched during this hard day’s work. Major Reid

had the command of all the pickets and defence-works from Hindoo Rao’s

house to the Subzee Mundee. During the first twenty-eight days of the

siege, his positions were attacked no fewer than twenty-four times; yet

his singular medley of troops—Rifles, Guides, Sikhs, Punjaubees,

Goorkhas, &c.—fought as if for one common cause, without reference to

differences of religion or of nation. The officers, in these and similar

encounters, often passed through an ordeal which renders their survival

almost inconceivable. An artillery officer, in command of two

horse-artillery guns, on one occasion was surprised by 120 of the

enemy’s cavalry; he had no support, and could not apply his artillery

because his guns were limbered up. He fired four barrels of his revolver

and killed two men; and then knocked a third off his horse by throwing

his empty pistol at him. Two horsemen thereupon charged full tilt, and

rolled him and his horse over. He got up, and seeing a man on foot

coming at him to cut him down, rushed at him, got inside his sword, and

hit him full in the face with his fist. At that moment he was cut down

from behind; and was only saved from slaughter by a brother-officer, who

rode up, shot one sowar and sabred another, and then carried him off,

bleeding but safe.

On the 2d, the Bareilly mutineers—or rather Rohilcund mutineers from

Bareilly, Moradabad, and Shahjehanpoor, consisting of five regiments and

a battery of artillery—crossed the Jumna and marched into Delhi, with

bands playing and colours flying—a sight sufficiently mortifying to the

besiegers, who were powerless to prevent it; for any advance in that

direction would have left the rear of their camp exposed. It afterwards

became known that the Bareilly leader was appointed general within

Delhi. The emergence of a large body of the enemy from the city on the

night of the 3d of July, induced Sir Henry Barnard to send Major Coke to

oppose them; with a force made up of portions of the Carabiniers, 9th

Lancers, 61st foot, Guides, Punjaubees, horse and foot artillery. Coke

started at two in the morning of the 4th. He went to Azadpore, the spot

where the great road and the road from the cantonment met. He found that

the enemy had planned an expedition to seize the British depôt of stores

at Alipore, and to cut off a convoy expected to arrive from the Punjaub.

When the major came up with them near the Rohtuk road, he at once

attacked them. During many hours, his troops were confronted with

numbers greatly exceeding their own; and what with the sun above and

swamps below, the major’s men became thoroughly exhausted by the time

they returned to camp. The rebels, it was true, were driven back; but

they got safely with their guns into Delhi; and thus was one more added

to the list of contests in which the besiegers suffered without

effecting anything towards the real object of the siege. The enemy’s

infantry on this occasion seem to have comprised the Bareilly men. An

officer of the Engineers, writing concerning this day’s work, said: ‘The

Bareilly rascals had the impudence to come round to our rear, and our

only regret is that one of them ever got back. I was out with the force

sent against them, and cannot say that I felt much pity for the

red-coated villains with “18,” “28,” and “68” on their buttons.’ This

officer gives expression to the bitter feeling that prevailed generally

in the British camp against the ‘Pandies’[54] or mutinous sepoys, for

their treachery, black ingratitude, and cruelty. ‘This is a war in its

very worst phase, for generosity enters into no one’s mind. Mercy seems

to have fled from us; and if ever there was such a thing as war to the

knife, we certainly have it here. If any one owes these sepoys a grudge,

I think I have some claim to one; but I must say that I cannot bring

myself to put my sword through a wounded man. I cannot say that I grieve

much when I see it done, as it invariably is; but grieve or not as you

please—he is a clever man who can now keep back a European from driving

his bayonet through a sepoy, even in the agonies of death.’ These were

the motives and feelings that rendered the Indian mutiny much more

terrible than an ordinary war. In allusion to sentiments at home, that

the British soldiers were becoming cruel and blood-thirsty, the same

officer wrote to a friend: ‘If you hear any such sentiments, by all

means ship off their propounder to this country at once. Let him see one

half of what _we_ have seen, and compare our brutality with that of the

rebels; then send him home again, and I think you will find him pretty

quiet on the subject for the rest of his life.’

A new engineer officer, Colonel Baird Smith, arrived to supersede

another whose operations had not met with approval. The colonel took

into consideration, with his commander, a plan for blowing in the Moree

and Cashmere Gates, and escalading the Moree and Cashmere Bastions; but

the plan was abandoned on account of the weakness of the siege-army.

The 5th of July was marked by the death of Major-general Sir Henry

Barnard, who had held practical command of the Delhi field-force during

about five weeks, and had during that time borne much anxiety and

suffering. He knew that his countrymen at Calcutta as well as in England

would be continually propounding the question, ‘Why is Delhi not yet

taken?’ and the varied responsibilities connected with his position

necessarily gave him much disquietude. During the fierce heat of the 4th

he was on horseback nearly all day, directing the operations against the

Bareilly mutineers. Early on the following morning he sent for Colonel

Baird Smith, and explained his views concerning the mode in which he

thought the siege-operations should be carried on; immediately

afterwards he sent for medical aid; and before many hours had passed, he

was a corpse. Many of his friends afterwards complained that scant

justice was done to the memory of Sir Henry Barnard; in the halo that

was destined to surround the name of Wilson, men forgot that it was his

predecessor who had borne all the burden of collecting the siege-force,

of conducting it to the ridge outside Delhi, and of maintaining a

continued series of conflicts almost every day for five or six weeks.

Major-general Reed, invalid as he was, immediately took the command of

the force after Barnard’s death; leaving, however, the active direction

mainly to Brigadier Chamberlain. It became every day more and more

apparent that, notwithstanding reinforcements, the British artillery was

too weak to cope with that of the enemy—whose artillerymen, taught by

those whom they now opposed, had become very skilful; and whose guns

were of heavier metal. The besiegers’ batteries were still nearly a mile

from the walls, for any nearer position could not be taken up without

terrible loss. To effect a breach with a few 18-pounders at this

distance was out of the question; and although the field-guns were

twenty or thirty in number, they were nearly useless for battering down

defences.

The attacks from the enemy continued much as before, but resistance to

them became complicated by a new difficulty. There were two regiments of

Bengal irregular cavalry among the troops in the siege-army, and there

were a few ‘Poorbeahs’ or Hindustanis in the Punjaub regiments. These

men were carefully watched from the first; and it became by degrees

apparent that they were a danger instead of an aid to the British. Early

in the month a Brahmin subadar in a Punjaubee regiment was detected

inciting his companions-in-arms to murder their officers, and go over to

Delhi, saying it was God’s will the Feringhee ‘raj’ should cease. One of

the Punjaubees immediately revealed this plot to the officers, and the

incendiary was put to death that same evening. The other Poorbeahs in

the regiment were at once paid up, and discharged from the

camp—doubtless swelling the number of insurgents who entered Delhi.

Again, on the 9th, a party of the enemy’s cavalry, while attempting an

attack on the camp, was joined by some of the 9th irregulars belonging

to the siege-army, and with them tried to tempt the men of the native

horse-artillery. They were beaten back; and the afternoon of the same

day, the 9th of July, was marked by one of the many struggles in the

Subzee Mundee, all of which ended by the enemy being driven into Delhi.

If the rebel infantry had fought as well as the artillery, it might have

gone hard with the besiegers, for the sallies were generally made in

very great force. The rebels counted much on the value of the Subzee

Mundee; as a suburb, it had been rendered a mass of ruins by repeated

conflicts, and these ruins precisely suited the sepoy mode of fighting.

The sepoys found shelter in narrow streets and old houses, and behind

garden-walls, besides being protected by heavy guns from the city. In

this kind of skirmishing they were not far inferior to their opponents;

but in the open field, and especially under a charge with the bayonet,

they were invariably beaten, let the disparity of numbers be what it

might. All the officers, in their letters, spoke of the terrible

efficacy of the British bayonet; the sepoys became paralysed with terror

when this mode of attack was resorted to. On one occasion they were

constructing a defensive post at the Eedghah; the British attacked it

and drove in the entrance; there was no exit on the other side, and the

defenders were all bayoneted in the prison-house which they had thus

unwittingly constructed for themselves.

On the morning of the 14th, the mutineers poured out in great numbers,

and attacked the batteries at Hindoo Rao’s house, and the picket in the

Subzee Mundee. The troops stationed at those places remained on the

defensive till three o’clock in the afternoon, struggling against a

force consisting of many regiments of insurgent infantry, a large body

of cavalry, and several field-pieces. It was indeed a most determined

attack, supported, moreover, by a fire of heavy artillery from the

walls. Why it was that so many hours elapsed before succour was sent

forth, is not very clear; but the troops who had to bear the brunt of

this onslaught comprised only detachments of the 60th and 75th foot,

with the Goorkhas of the Sirmoor battalion and the infantry of the

Guides. A column was formed, however, at the house above named, under

Brigadier Showers, consisting of the 1st Punjaub infantry, the 1st

Europeans, and six horse-artillery guns. Then commenced a double

contest; Showers attacking the enemy at the picket-house, and Major Reid

at Hindoo Rao’s house. After a fierce struggle the enemy were driven

back into the city, and narrowly escaped losing some of their guns. It

was a day’s work that could not be accomplished without a serious loss.

None of the officers, it is true, were killed in the field; but the list

of wounded was very large, comprising Brigadier Chamberlain (at that

time adjutant-general of the army), and Lieutenants Roberts, Thompson,

Walker, Geneste, Carnegie, Rivers, Faithful, Daniell, Ross, Tulloch,

Chester, Shebbeare, Hawes, Debrett, and Pollock. Tho wounding of so many

subalterns shews how actively different companies of troops must have

been engaged. Altogether, the operations of this day brought down 15 men

killed and 193 officers and men wounded.

The heat was by this time somewhat alleviated by rains, which, however,

brought sickness and other discomforts with them. Men fell ill after

remaining many hours in damp clothes; and it was found that the fierce

heat was, after all, not so detrimental to health. Many young officers,

it is true, lately arrived from England, and not yet acclimatised, were

smitten down by sun-stroke, and a few died of apoplexy; but it is

nevertheless true that the army was surprisingly healthy during the hot

weather. One of the Carabiniers, writing in the rainy season, said: ‘The

last three days have been exceedingly wet; notwithstanding which we are

constantly in the saddle; no sooner has one alarm subsided than we are

turned out to meet the mutineers in another quarter.’ An officer of

Sappers, employed in blowing up a bridge, said: ‘We started about two

P.M., and returned about twelve at night drenched through and thoroughly

miserable, it having rained the whole time.’

The state of affairs in the middle of July was peculiar. It seemed to

the nation at home that the army of Delhi ought to be strong enough to

retake the city, especially when a goodly proportion of the number were

Europeans. Yet that this was not the case, was the opinion both of Reed

and of Wilson; although many daring spirits in the army longed to breach

the walls and take the place by storm. Twelve hundred wounded and sick

men had to be tended; all the others were kept fully employed in

repelling the sallies of the enemy. Major-general Reed, who ought never

to have assumed the command at all—so broken-down was he in health—gave

in altogether on the 17th, after the wounding of Chamberlain; he named

Brigadier Wilson, who had brought forward the Meerut brigade, as his

successor. The new commander immediately wrote to Sir John Lawrence a

letter (in French, as if distrusting spies), in which he candidly

announced that it would be dangerous and disastrous to attempt a storm

of the city; that the enemy were in great force, well armed, strong in

position, and constantly reinforced by accessions of insurgent

regiments; that they daily attacked the British, who could do little

more than repel the attacks; that his army was gradually diminishing by

these daily losses; that it would be impossible to take Delhi without at

least one more European regiment and two more Sikh regiments from the

Punjaub; and that if those additions did not speedily reach him, he

would be obliged to raise the siege, retreat to Kurnaul, and leave the

country all around Delhi to be ravaged by the mutineers. This letter

shewed the gravity with which Brigadier Wilson regarded the state of

matters at that critical time. Lawrence fully recognised the importance

of the issue, for he redoubled his exertions to send 900 European

Fusiliers and 1600 Punjaubees to the camp.

General Reed’s resignation was twofold. He resigned the provisional

command-in-chief of the Bengal army as soon as he was officially

informed of the assumption of that office by Sir Patrick Grant; and he

resigned the command of the Delhi field-force to Brigadier Wilson,

because his health was too far broken to permit him to take part in

active duties. It was the virtual ending of his part in the wars of the

mutiny; he went to the hills, in search of that health which he could

never have recovered in the plains.

Among the many contests in the second half of the month was one near

Ludlow Castle, a name given to the residence of Mr Fraser, the

commissioner of Delhi, one of those foully murdered on the 11th of May.

This house was within half a mile of the Cashmere Gate, near the river;

the enemy were found to be occupying it; but their works were attacked

and destroyed by a force under Brigadier Showers; while Sir T.

Metcalfe’s house, further northward, was taken and strengthened as a

defensive post by the British.

Mr Colvin, writing from Agra to Havelock on the 22d of July, giving an

account of such proceedings at Delhi as had come to his knowledge, made

the following observations on the character which the struggle had

assumed: ‘The spirit by which both Hindoos and Mohammedans act together

at Delhi is very remarkable. You would well understand a gathering of

Mohammedan fanatical feeling at that place; but what is locally, I find,

known by the name of “Pandyism,” is just as strong. Pandies are, among

the Hindoos, all Brahmins. What absurd, distorted suspicions of our

intentions (which have been so perfectly innocent towards them) may have

been first worked upon, it is scarcely possible to say; but the thing

has now got beyond this, and it is a struggle for mastery, not a

question of mistrust or discontent. Mohammedans seem to be actively

misleading Hindoos for their own purposes. Sir Patrick Grant will not

know the Bengal army again. The Goorkhas, Sikhs, and Punjaubee

Mohammedans have remained quite faithful, and done their duty nobly at

Delhi; the bad spirit is wholly with the Poorbeahs.’ Mr Greathed,

Colvin’s commissioner with the siege-army, made every attempt to

ascertain, by means of spies and deserters, what were the alleged and

what the real motives for the stubborn resistance of the mutineers to

British rule. He wrote on this subject: ‘The result of all questionings

of sepoys who have fallen into our hands, regarding the cause of the

mutiny, is the same. They invariably cite the “cartouche” (cartridge) as

the origin; no other cause of complaint has been alluded to. His majesty

of Delhi has composed a couplet, to the effect that the English, who

boast of having vanquished rods of iron, have been overthrown in

Hindostan by a single cartridge. A consciousness of power had grown up

in the army, which could only be exercised by mutiny. The cry of the

cartridges brought the latent spirit of revolt into action.’ Mr Muir of

Agra, commenting on these remarks, said: ‘I fully believe this to be the

case with the main body of the sepoys. There were ringleaders, no doubt,

who had selfish views, and possibly held correspondence with the Delhi

family, &c.; but they made use of the cartridge as their argument to

gain over the mass of the army to the belief that their caste was

threatened.’

[Illustration:

GENERAL WILSON.

]

It will be unnecessary to trace day by day the struggles outside Delhi.

They continued as before; but the frequency was somewhat lessened, and

the danger also, for the defence-works on the ridge had been much

strengthened. Every bridge over the canal was blown up, except that on

the main road to Kurnaul and Umballa; and thus the enemy could not

easily attack the camp in the rear. It was not yet really a siege, for

the British poured very few shot or shell into the city or against the

walls. It was not an investment; for the British could not send a single

regiment to the southwest, south, or east of the city. It was little

more than a process of _waiting_ till further reinforcements could

arrive.

At the close of July, Brigadier Wilson forwarded to the government a

very exact account of the state of his army, shewing what were his

resources for maintaining the siege on the one hand, and repelling

attacks by the enemy on the other. We present the chief particulars in a

foot-note, in an altered and more condensed form.[55] It appears that

out of this army of something more than 8000 men, above 1100 were

rendered non-effective by sickness or wounds; that of the whole number

of effectives, just about one-half were Europeans, belonging either to

the Queen’s or to the Company’s army; and that no European corps, except

perhaps the Lancers, comprised more than a fractional percentage of a

full regiment. A return sent in about the middle of the month had

comprised 300 men of the 4th and 17th Bengal irregular cavalry; but the

omission of this element at the end of the month shewed that those

dangerous companions had been got rid of. The corps of Guides and

Goorkhas had in a fortnight diminished from an aggregate number of 923

to 571—so rapidly had those gallant men been brought down by balls,

bullets, and cholera. Ranked among the artillery and engineers were many

hundred syces and bildars, natives who merely aided in certain labouring

operations; and among the Sappers and Miners the Punjaubees were only

just learning their trade.

[Illustration:

Engineer Officers in Battery before Delhi.

]

The casualty list of officers was a very serious one. From the time when

Brigadier Wilson encountered the enemy at Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur at the end

of May, till he made up his report at the end of July, the officers who

were killed or wounded were 101 in number. Anson, Barnard, Reed,

Chamberlain, Halifax, Graves—nearly all the general officers except

Wilson and Showers, were either dead or in some way disabled; and these

frequent changes in command doubtless affected the organisation and

movements of the army.

Brigadier Wilson made every attempt, while doing the best he could with

his own forces, to ascertain the number and components of those

possessed by the enemy. Military commanders always aim at the

acquisition of such knowledge, effected by a species of espionage which,

however opposed to general feeling at other times, is deemed quite fair

in war. From the 11th of May, when the troubles began in Delhi, to the

end of July, there arrived in the city mutinous regiments from Meerut,

Hansi, Muttra, Lucknow, Nuseerabad, Jullundur, Ferozpore, Bareilly,

Jhansi, Gwalior, Neemuch, Allygurh, Agra, Rohtuk, Jhuggur, and

Allahabad. The list given in a note[56] is taken from the official

dispatch, which was itself a record of information obtained from various

native sources; but after making allowance for the fact that portions

only of many of the regiments had entered Delhi, and that the numbers

had been considerably lessened by the thirty or more encounters which

had taken place outside the walls, the military authorities brought down

the supposed number to a much lower limit than had before been

named—namely, 4000 disciplined cavalry, and 12,000 infantry, besides

3000 undisciplined levies. The rebels retained the formidable defensive

artillery which they found in Delhi, and brought thirty field-guns also

with them; but these guns were lessened in number one-half by successive

seizures made by the British.

The condition and proceedings of the rebels within the city could, of

course, be known only imperfectly. The old king was looked up to by all

as the centre of authority, but it is probable that his real power was

small. Where regiments had arrived from so many different quarters, we

may suppose that the apportionment of military command was no easy

matter; and indeed there was, throughout, little evidence that the rebel

force had one head, one leader whose plans were obeyed by all. The

_Lahore Chronicle_ some time afterwards printed a narrative by a native,

of a residence in Delhi from the 13th to the 30th of July. Such

narratives can seldom be relied on; but so far as it went, this

revelation spoke of great discord among the leaders; great discontent

among the troops because their pay was in arrear; great perplexity on

the part of the old king because he had not funds enough to pay so large

an army; and great plundering of the citizens by the rude soldiery, who

deemed themselves masters of the situation. ‘When the sepoys,’ said this

native, ‘find out a rich house in the city, they accuse the owner after

the following manner, in order to plunder his property. They take a loaf

of bread and a bottle of grog with them, and make a noise at the door

and break it in pieces, get into the house, take possession of the cash

and valuables, and beat the poor householder, saying: “Where is the

Englishman you have been keeping in your house?” When he denies having

done so, they just shew him the bread and the bottle, and say: “How is

it that we happened to find these in your house? We are quite sure there

was an Englishman accommodated here, whom you quietly sent elsewhere

before our arrival.” Soon after, the talk is over, and the poor man is

disgracefully put into custody, where there is no inquiry made to prove

whether he is innocent or guilty; he cannot get his release unless he

bribes the general.’ The known attributes of oriental cunning give a

strong probability to this curious story.

* * * * *

Here, for the present, we take leave of the siege of Delhi, and of the

stage at which it had arrived by the end of July. Much has to be

narrated, in reference to other places, other generals, other

operations, before the final capture of the imperial city will call for

description.

[Illustration:

Bullock-wagon.

]

-----

Footnote 46:

Grenadiers.

Footnote 47:

Rifles.

Footnote 48:

The first troop of horse-artillery was called Leslie’s Troop.

Footnote 49:

The troops at Umballa on the 17th comprised:

Queen’s 75th foot. } Weak: only 1800

1st Bengal European Fusiliers. } bayonets in all.

2d Bengal European Fusiliers. }

5th Bengal native infantry.

60th Bengal native infantry.

Queen’s 9th Lancers.

4th Bengal cavalry.

Two troops European horse-artillery.

Footnote 50:

1st Umballa { Queen’s 75th foot.

Brigade. { 1st Bengal Europeans.

Brigadier Halifax. { Two squadrons 9th Lancers.

{ One troop horse artillery.

{ 2d Bengal Europeans.

2d Umballa { 60th native infantry.

Brigade. { Two squadrons 9th Lancers.

Brigadier Jones. { One squadron 4th Bengal Lancers.

{ One troop horse-artillery.

{ One wing Queen’s 60th Rifles.

Meerut { Two squadrons Carabiniers.

Brigade. { One light field-battery.

Brigadier Wilson. { One troop horse-artillery.

{ Native Sappers (if reliable).

{ 120 artillerymen.

Footnote 51:

Four guns of Major Tombs’ horse-artillery.

Major Scott’s horse field-battery.

Two 18-pounders, under Lieutenant Light.

Two squadrons of Carabiniers.

Six companies of 60th Rifles.

400 Sirmoor Goorkhas.

Footnote 52:

Head-quarters and six companies of H.M. 60th Rifles.

Head-quarters and nine companies of H.M. 75th foot.

1st Bengal European Fusiliers.

2d Bengal European Fusiliers head-qurs. and six companies.

Sirmoor battalion (Goorkhas), a wing.

Head-quarters detachment Sappers and Miners.

H.M. 9th Lancers.

H.M. 6th Dragoon-guards (Carabiniers), two squadrons.

Horse-artillery, one troop of 1st brigade.

Horse-artillery, two troops of 3d brigade.

Foot-artillery, two companies,

and No. 14 horse-battery.

Artillery recruits, detachment.

Footnote 53:

Chapter iv., pp. 63-65.

Footnote 54:

After the execution of Mungal Pandy at Barrackpore on the 8th of

April, for mutiny, the rebel sepoys acquired the soubriquet of

‘Pandies’—especially those belonging to the Brahmin caste.

Footnote 55:

_Infantry_— Officers

and Men.

H.M. 8th foot, head-quarters, 188

H.M. 61st foot, head-quarters, 296

H.M. 75th foot, head-quarters, 513

H.M. 60th Rifles, head-quarters, 299

1st European Bengal Fusiliers, 520

2d European Bengal Fusiliers, 556

Guide Infantry, 275

Sirmoor battalion, Goorkhas, 296

1st Punjaub Infantry, 725

4th Sikh Infantry, 345

———— = 4023

_Cavalry_—

H.M. Carabiniers, 153

H.M. 9th Lancers, 428

Guide Cavalry, 338

1st Punjaub Cavalry, 148

2d Punjaub Cavalry, 110

5th Punjaub Cavalry, (at Alipore), 116

———— = 1293

_Artillery and Engineers_—

Artillery, European and Native, 1129

Bengal Sappers and Miners, 209

Punjaub Sappers and Miners, 264

———— = 1602

————

6918

Besides these effectives, there were as non-effectives, 765 sick + 351

wounded = 1116.

Footnote 56:

Bengal native infantry: 3d, 9th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 20th, 28th, 29th,

30th, 36th, 38th, 44th, 45th, 54th, 57th, 60th, 61st, 67th, 68th, 72d,

74th, 78th.

Other native infantry: 5th and 7th Gwalior Contingent, Kotah

Contingent, Hurrianah battalion; together with 2600 miscellaneous

infantry.

Native cavalry: Portions of five or six regiments, besides others of

the Gwalior and Malwah Contingents.

[Illustration:

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK.

]