HAVELOCK’S CAMPAIGN: ALLAHABAD TO LUCKNOW.
If there be one name that stands out in brighter colours than any other
connected with the mutiny in India, perhaps it is that of Henry
Havelock. There are peculiar reasons for this. He came like a brilliant
meteor at a time when all else was gloomy and overshadowed. Anson had
died on the way to Delhi; Barnard had died in the camp before that city;
Reed had retired, broken down by age and sickness; Wilson had not yet
shewn whether he could work out victory at the great Mogul capital;
Wheeler was falling, or had fallen, a miserable victim to the treachery
of Nena Sahib; Henry Lawrence was no more; Hewett and Lloyd were under a
cloud, for mismanagement as military commanders—all this had rendered
the British nation grieved and irritated; and men fiercely demanded
‘Who’s to blame?’—as if it were necessary to seek relief by wreaking
vengeance on some persons or other. It was a crisis that pressed heavily
on Viscount Canning; but it was at the same time a crisis that insured
fervid gratitude to any general who could achieve victories with small
means. Such a general was Havelock. The English public knew little of
him, although he was well known in India. Commencing his career as a
soldier in 1816, Henry Havelock had borne his full share in all a
soldier’s varied fortune. He went to India in 1823; engaged in the
Burmese war in 1824; took part in a mission to the court of Siam in
1826; was promoted from lieutenant to captain in 1838; took an active
share in the stirring scenes of the Afghan campaign, which brought him a
brevet majority, and the order of C. B.; acted as Persian interpreter to
generals Elphinstone, Pollock, and Gough; fought at Gwalior in 1843;
became brevet lieutenant-colonel in 1844; fought with the bravest in
1845 at Moodkee, Ferozshah, and Sobraon; and in 1846 received the
appointment of deputy adjutant-general of the Queen’s troops at Bombay.
An Indian climate during so many years having told—in its customary sad
way—on his constitution, Henry Havelock returned for a sojourn in
England. Returning to Bombay in 1851, he became brevet colonel; and in
after years he was appointed quarter-master-general, and then
adjutant-general, of the whole of the Queen’s troops in India. When the
war with Persia broke out, he took command of one of the divisions in
1857; and when that war was ended, he returned to Bombay. All this was
known to official persons in India, but very few of the particulars were
familiar to the general public in the home-country; hence, when
Havelock’s victories were announced, the public were surprised as if by
the sudden appearance of a great genius. That he bore so heavy a
responsibility, or suffered such intense mental anxiety, as Wheeler at
Cawnpore, Inglis at Lucknow, or Colvin at Agra, is not probable; for he
had not hundreds of helpless women and children under his charge; but
the astonishing victories he achieved with a mere handful of men, and
the moral influence he thereby acquired for the British name throughout
the whole of the Doab, well entitled him to the outburst of grateful
feeling which the nation was not slow to exhibit. The only danger was,
lest this hero-worship should render the nation blind for a time to the
merits of other generals.
Neill and Havelock, who worked so energetically together in planning the
relief of Lucknow, were brought from other regions of India to take part
in the operations on the Ganges. Neill, as colonel of the 1st Madras
European Fusiliers, accompanied that regiment to Calcutta, and thence
proceeded up the country to Benares, where his contest with the rebels
first began. Havelock, landing at Bombay from Persia, set off by steam
to go to Calcutta; he was wrecked on the way near Ceylon, and
experienced much perilous adventure before he could proceed on his
journey. At Calcutta—where he arrived, in the same steamer which brought
Sir Patrick Grant, on the 17th of June—he received the appointment of
brigadier-general,[57] to command such a force as could be hastily
collected for the relief, first of the Europeans at Cawnpore, and then
of those at Lucknow; and it was towards the close of June that he made
his appearance at Allahabad.
Sufficient has been stated in former chapters to shew what was the state
of affairs at that time. Lucknow, Cawnpore, Agra, and Delhi were either
in the hands of the rebels, or were so beset by them that no British
commander was able to assist his brother-officers. Oude, the Doab, and
Rohilcund were in deplorable anarchy; and it depended either upon
Viscount Canning at Calcutta, or Sir John Lawrence at Lahore, to send
aid to the disturbed districts. Lawrence, as we have seen, and as we
shall see again in a future chapter, with admirable energy and
perseverance, sent such assistance as enabled Wilson to conquer Delhi;
while Canning, under enormous difficulty, sent up troops to Allahabad by
scores and fifties at a time, as rapidly as he could collect them at
Calcutta.
Brigadier Neill preceded Havelock in the operations connected with the
repression of the mutiny in the Doab and adjacent regions. His own
regiment, the 1st Madras European Fusiliers, had been ordered to proceed
to Persia in the spring, but had received counter-orders in consequence
of the sudden termination of the war in that country. While at Bombay,
uncertain whether commands might be received to proceed to China, the
regiment heard the news of a revolt among the Bengal troops; and very
speedily, both Persia and China were forgotten in matters of much
greater exigency and importance. After making the voyage back from
Bombay to Madras, the regiment proceeded to Calcutta, and the men were
then sent up the country as rapidly as possible to Benares, some by road
and the rest by steamers. Neill himself reached that city on the 3d of
June, and was immediately engaged, as we have already seen (p. 154), in
disarming a mutinous regiment, and in maintaining order in the vicinity.
After six days of incessant work at Benares, the brigadier, hearing of
the mutiny at Allahabad, started off on the 9th to render service in
that region. With what a powerful hand he put down the rebels; with what
stern and prompt firmness he retained possession of that important city,
the ‘key to Upper India’—has already been briefly shewn.[58] The various
corps of the Madras Fusiliers reached Benares and Allahabad by degrees;
and fragments of other European regiments were sent up as fast as
possible, as the nucleus of a little army forming at Allahabad.
The 1st of July may be taken as the day that marked the commencement of
General Havelock’s career in relation to the Indian Revolt. He and his
staff arrived at Allahabad on that day, after a rapid journey from
Calcutta. A few hours before his arrival, the first relieving column had
been sent off by Neill towards Cawnpore: consisting of 200 Madras
Fusiliers, 200 of the 84th foot, 300 Sikhs, and 120 irregular cavalry,
under Major Renaud; and a second, of larger proportions, was to follow
in a week or ten days’ time. The immediate object held in view, in the
march of both columns, was to liberate Sir Hugh Wheeler and his hapless
companions at Cawnpore; and, if this were accomplished, the second work
to be done was to advance and relieve Sir Henry Lawrence and the British
at Lucknow. It was not at that time known that, before the second column
could start from Allahabad, both Wheeler and Lawrence had been numbered
with the dead. Neill superseded the officer previously in command at
Allahabad; Havelock superseded Neill in command of the relieving force;
we shall have to speak of Outram superseding Havelock; and we have
already spoken of Patrick Grant superseding Reed, and of Colin Campbell
superseding Grant. All these supersessions were in virtue of military
routine, depending either on seniority, or on the exercise of a right to
make appointments. If these various officers had been unsuccessful, the
system of supersession would have been attacked by adverse judges as the
cause of the failure; but there was so much nobility of mind displayed
by four or five of the gallant men here named, that the vexation often
caused by supersession was much alleviated; while the nation at large
had ample reason to admire and be thankful for the deeds of arms that
accompanied generosity of feeling.
On the 3d, an auxiliary force under Captain Spurgin, left Allahabad for
Cawnpore, irrespective of the two columns. It consisted only of 100
Madras Europeans armed with rifles, 12 artillerymen, and two 6-pounder
guns; it went by steamer up the Ganges, partly in order to control the
mutineers on the banks, but in part also on account of the paucity of
means for land-conveyance. No steamer had had much success in that part
of the Ganges; and hence great interest was felt in the voyage of the
_Brahmaputra_. As a first difficulty, the engineers, having no coals,
were obliged to forage for wood every day on shore. On the second day of
the trip, this foraging had to be protected by half the force, against a
body of 500 insurgents on the Oude bank, provided with a large piece of
ordnance; the wood was not obtained without a regular battle, in which
50 English ‘thrashed’—to use a very favourite term among the
soldiers—just ten times their number of rebels, and captured their gun.
On they went, struggling against the rapid stream of the Ganges, and
never making more than two miles an hour. The enemy hovered on the
banks, and sent several round shot into the little iron steamer—a sort
of irritation that kept the crew and soldiers well on the alert. Day
after day passed in this way, Captain Spurgin timing his movements so as
to accord with the march of the land-columns. The steamer reached
Cawnpore on the 17th, just a fortnight after the departure from
Allahabad—a degree of slowness not altogether dependent on the
difficulty of the navigation, but partly due to the necessity of not
advancing more rapidly than the columns could fight their way on shore.
The dismal news gradually reached Allahabad that some dreadful calamity
had occurred at Cawnpore. This information led Havelock to modify his
plans and quicken his movements; and, full of heart, he transmitted to
Calcutta the telegram already quoted, to the effect that ‘1000
Europeans, 1000 Goorkhas, and 1000 Sikhs, with 8 or 10 guns, will thrash
everything.’ Among the troops he collected was a handful of volunteer
cavalry, consisting chiefly of officers who had been left without
command by the mutiny of their respective native regiments, or had
narrowly escaped massacre; the number amounted only to a score; but it
comprised just the sort of men who would be ready for any enterprise at
such a time.
Major Renaud had every reason to be satisfied with the gallantry of the
Madras Fusiliers—to which corps he belonged—and of the other troops who
aided in forming his small column, in various minor operations during
the first nine days of the march from Allahabad. He everywhere pacified
the country by punishing the ringleaders in mutiny and rebellion
wherever and whenever they fell into his hands. Suddenly, however, he
found himself placed in an awkward position on the 10th. Cawnpore had
fallen; the British at that station had either been killed or thrown
into prison; and the rebel force thus freed from occupation had rapidly
pushed down to the vicinity of Futtehpoor—a town which had been in the
hands of the rebels since the 9th of June (see p. 172). That force was
at least 3500 strong, with 12 guns; whereas Renaud had at that time only
820 men and 2 guns. General Havelock, becoming aware of this state of
things, saw that his force ought to join that of Renaud as quickly as
possible. He marched twenty miles on the 11th, under a frightful sun, to
Synee; then, after resting a few hours, he and his troops resumed their
march at eleven o’clock in the evening, overtook Renaud during the
night, and marched with him by moonlight to Khaga, five miles short of
Futtehpoor. His little army consisted of about 2000 men, made up of a
curious collection of fragments from various regiments; and as it was
destined to achieve great results with limited resources, it may be
interesting to tabulate the component elements of this admirable little
band.[59] Havelock’s information proved to be better than that of the
enemy, for when he sent forward Colonel Tytler with a reconnaissance,
the enemy supposed they had only Renaud’s small force to contend with;
they fired on the colonel and his escort, and pushed forward two guns
and a force of infantry and cavalry. When the enemy began to cannonade
his front and threaten his right and left, Havelock saw that the time
was come to undeceive them: he would have preferred to give his worn-out
soldiers a few hours’ rest; but this was not now to be thought of, as,
to use his own words, ‘it would have injured the _morale_ of the troops
to permit them thus to be bearded.’ The work before him was sufficiently
formidable; for there was only the main trunk-road by which to approach
Futtehpoor easily; the fields on either side were covered with a depth
of two or three feet of water; there were many enclosures of great
strength, with high walls; and in front of the city were many villages,
hillocks, and mango-groves which the enemy occupied in force. Havelock
placed his eight guns on and near the main road, protected by 100
riflemen of the 64th; the infantry came up at deploying distance,
covered by rifle-skirmishers; and the cavalry moved forward on the
flanks. The struggle was literally decided in ten minutes. The enemy saw
a few riflemen approach; but they knew little of the Enfield rifle; and
were panic-stricken with the length and accuracy of its range; they
shrank back in astonishment; and then Captain Maude, who had dashed over
the swamps with his artillery, poured into them a fire so rapid and
accurate as to complete their discomfiture. Three guns were abandoned at
once, and Havelock steadily advanced, with the 64th commanding the
centre, the 78th the right, the 84th and the Sikhs the left. He drove
the enemy before him at every point, capturing their guns one by one;
the garden enclosures, the barricades on the road, the city wall, the
streets of Futtehpoor, all were gained in turn. The enemy retreated
right through the city, till they reached a mile beyond it; but they
then attempted to make a stand. This attempt gave Havelock some trouble,
because his infantry were almost utterly exhausted by fatigue, and
because the few irregular horse shewed symptoms of a tendency to go over
to the enemy unless narrowly watched. Again the guns and rifles came to
the front, and again they attacked in a manner so irresistible as to put
the enemy effectively to flight. Havelock thus became master of
Futtehpoor, and parked 12 captured guns. It was with a justifiable pride
that the general, in sending his list of ‘casualties,’ remarked that it
was ‘perhaps the lightest that ever accompanied the announcement of such
success. Twelve British soldiers were struck down by the sun, and never
rose again;’ but not one was either killed or wounded in the action; his
casualties, 6 killed and 3 wounded, were among his native troops. The
truth seems to be, that the enemy were dismayed, first by finding that
Havelock had joined Renaud, and then by the wonderful range of the
Enfield rifles. ‘Our fight was fought neither with musket, nor bayonet,
nor sabre, but with Enfield rifles and cannon; so we took no prisoners.
The enemy’s fire scarcely reached us; ours, for four hours, allowed him
no repose.’ It was with good cause that he thanked and congratulated his
troops on the following day, in a ‘morning order,’ short but pithy.[60]
While encamped at Kullenpore or Kullianpore, on the 14th, to which he
had marched after a sojourn at Futtehpoor sufficient to afford his
troops that rest which had become absolutely necessary, Havelock sent
off a brief telegram, announcing that his capture of artillery at
Futtehpoor would enable him to substitute nine excellent field-guns for
six of lighter calibre, and also to bring into action two light
6-pounders.
This, then, was the brigadier-general’s first victory over the rebels;
it elated his own troops, and checked the audacity of those to whom he
was opposed. Neill, meanwhile, was anxiously watching at Allahabad. He
had worked hard to organise and send off the first portion of the force
under Renaud, the second under Spurgin, and the third under Havelock. He
had received from Renaud, on the 4th of the month, information which
rendered only too probable the rumour that an act of black treachery on
the part of Nena Sahib at Cawnpore had been followed by a wholesale
destruction of hapless fugitives in boats on the Ganges. Neill was thus
especially anxious that Renaud should advance at once with the first
column, and Spurgin with the detachment up the river; but Havelock saw
reason why those officers should somewhat delay their advance until he
could come up to them, in order that all might if possible enter
Cawnpore together.
Havelock, after marching and resting on the 13th and 14th, came up again
with the enemy on the 15th. When approaching the small stream called the
Pandoo Nuddee, it became important to him to ascertain what was the
state of the bridge which carried the high road over that river, at a
spot about twenty miles from Cawnpore. The stream was too deep to be
fordable at that season: hence the importance of obtaining command of
the bridge. His intelligencers ascertained that the enemy intended to
dispute his passage at the village of Aong, four miles short of the
Nuddee; by means of two guns commanding the high road, skirmishers on
the right and left of those guns, and cavalry to hover on the flanks of
any advancing force. This information being obtained, Havelock sent
forward his skirmishers on the right and left of the road; then his
volunteer cavalry on the road itself; then the ten guns in line, mostly
on the left of the road; and then the infantry in line—the 64th and 84th
on the right flank; the 78th, Fusiliers, and Sikhs, on the left. The
struggle ahead was not a severe one, for the enemy receded as the
British under Colonel Tytler advanced; but Havelock was much harassed by
the attempts of the hostile cavalry to get into his rear and plunder his
baggage: attempts that required much exertion from his infantry to
resist, seeing that the thickly wooded country interfered with the
effect of cannon and musketry. The enemy after a time abandoned guns,
tents, ammunition, and other materials of war, and made a hasty retreat
through the village.
This difficulty over, Havelock prepared for another struggle at the
Pandoo Nuddee, which it was necessary for him to cross as speedily as
possible. He rested and refreshed his troops for a few hours, and
advanced the same afternoon, on a fiercely hot July day. The enemy had
not destroyed the bridge, but had placed two guns in épaulement to
command it at the opposite side of the stream. Captain Maude disposed
his artillery so as to bring a converging fire upon the two guns of the
enemy; while the Madras Fusiliers commenced a fire with Enfield rifles
to pick off the gunners. The two guns were fired directly down the road
at the advancing British column; but after Maude had somewhat checked
this fire, the Fusiliers gallantly closed, rushed upon the bridge, and
captured both guns—an exploit in which Major Renaud was wounded. The
mutineers precipitately retreated. Thus did the brigadier-general
achieve two victories in one day—those of Aong and Pandoo Nuddee. True,
the victories were not great in a military sense; but they were effected
over a numerous force by a mere handful of troops, who fought after
wearying marches under a solar heat such as residents in England can
with difficulty imagine. Havelock had only 1 man killed during these two
actions; 25 were wounded. The loss of the enemy was at least ten times
greater; but the chief result of the battles was the dismay into which
Nena Sahib was thrown.
General Havelock, like other commanders at that critical time, found the
native Bengal troops in his force not to be trusted. Their conduct in
presence of the enemy on the 12th excited his suspicion; it was, indeed,
worse than doubtful; and on the 14th he found it necessary to disarm and
dismount his sowars of the 13th Irregulars and 3d Oude Irregulars—at the
same time threatening with instant death any one of their number who
should attempt to escape. One of the officers at Allahabad who joined
the volunteer cavalry, and had opportunity of observing the conduct of
the irregulars at the battle of Futtehpoor, wrote thus concerning it:
‘On seeing the enemy, Palliser called to the men to charge, and dashed
on; but the scoundrels scarcely altered their speed, and met the enemy
at the same pace that they came down towards us. Their design was
evident; they came waving their swords to our men, and riding round our
party, making signs to them to go over to their side. When our men thus
hung back, a dash out would certainly have ended in our being cut up.’
During a subsequent skirmish, ‘our rear-men turned tail and left us,
galloping back as hard as their horses could go; and we were forced to
commence a regular race for our necks.... I write this with shame and
grief; but it was no fault of Palliser’s or ours.’ Havelock saw the
necessity of disarming and dismounting such fellows.
The scene of operations now approaches Cawnpore, that city of
unutterable horrors! It was a desperate struggle that Nena Sahib made to
retain the supremacy he had obtained at Cawnpore. He probably cared
little for kings of Delhi or for greased cartridges, provided he could
maintain a hold of sovereign power. When he had broken faith with Sir
Hugh Wheeler, and had carried his treachery to the extent of
indiscriminate slaughter in the Ganges boats, he naturally hoped to
become leader of the rebellious sepoys. In this object, however, he did
not wholly succeed; he and his immediate followers were Mahrattas; the
mutineers were mostly Hindustanis; and the latter made little account of
the Nena’s claim to sovereignty. Had the issue depended upon the
infantry sepoys, who were in chief part Hindoos, and who chiefly looked
for plunder, his projects might speedily have come to an end; but the
cavalry sepoys, being mostly Mohammedans, and exhibiting a more deadly
hatred towards the British, more readily joined him in a combined plan
of operations, and drew the sepoys to act with them. Leaving Delhi to be
held by the large body of mutineers, Nena Sahib took upon himself the
office of crushing any British force that might make its appearance from
Allahabad. When he heard that Renaud had started with his little band,
he got together a force of sowars, sepoys, Mahrattas, artillery, and
rabble; having motives of fear as well as of self-interest to induce him
to prevent the advance of his opponent. Not knowing that Renaud had been
joined by Havelock, the Mahratta chieftain sent bodies of troops
sufficient, as he believed, to check the advance; but when the gallant
general swept everything before him, the arch-fiend of Bithoor saw that
the matter was becoming serious. He had had experience of the
indomitable resistance, under accumulated suffering, of the hapless Sir
Hugh Wheeler and his companions; but now a British general had to be
encountered in the open field. So far as is known, it appears that as
soon as he heard of the passage of the Pandoo Nuddee by Havelock, Nena
Sahib ordered the slaughter of all the captives yet remaining alive at
Cawnpore—in order either that the dead might tell no tales, or that he
might wreak vengeance on the innocent for the frustration of his plans.
Having committed this bloody deed, he went out with an army, and took up
a position at Aherwa, the point at which the road to the cantonment
branches out from the main trunk-road to Cawnpore city. Nena Sahib
commanded five villages, with numerous intrenchments, armed with seven
guns; and in the rear was his infantry. Havelock, after advancing
sixteen miles from the Pandoo Nuddee to Aherwa during the night of the
15th, and after measuring the strength of this force, saw that his
troops would be shot down in alarming numbers before the guns could be
silenced and the intrenchments carried; he resolved, therefore, on a
flank-movement on the enemy’s left. As a preliminary, he left his camp
and baggage under proper escort at Maharajpoor, a few miles in the rear;
and gave his sunburnt and exhausted troops two or three hours’ rest in a
mango-grove during mid-day of the 16th, until the fierce heat should
have somewhat abated. The hour of struggle having arrived, Havelock
quietly wheeled his force round to the left flank of the enemy’s
position, behind a screen of clumps of mango. When the enemy detected
this manœuvre, great sensation was displayed; a body of horse was soon
sent to the left, and cannon opened fire in that direction. Then came a
series of operations in which the superb qualities of British infantry
were strikingly displayed. Villages were attacked and captured one after
another, by fragments of regiments so small that one marvels how the
enemy could have yielded before them. One such exploit is thus narrated
in Havelock’s own language: ‘The opportunity had arrived, for which I
have long anxiously waited, of developing the prowess of the 78th
Highlanders. Three guns of the enemy were strongly posted behind a lofty
hamlet, well intrenched. I directed this regiment to advance; and never
have I witnessed conduct more admirable. They were led by Colonel
Hamilton, and followed him with surpassing steadiness and gallantry
under a heavy fire. As they approached the village, they cheered and
charged with the bayonet, the pipes sounding the pibroch. Need I add
that the enemy fled, the village was taken, and the guns captured?’
After three or four villages had thus changed hands, the enemy planted a
24-pounder gun on the cantonment road in such a position as to work much
mischief upon Havelock, whose artillery cattle were so worn out with
heat and fatigue that they could not drag the guns onward to a desired
position. The Nena appearing to have in project a renewed attack,
Havelock resolved to anticipate him; he cheered on his infantry to a
capture of the 24-pounder; they rushed along the road amid a storm of
grape-shot from the enemy, and never slackened till they had reached the
gun and captured it. Especially was the 64th, led by Major Stirling,
conspicuous in this bold enterprise. The enemy lost all heart; they
retreated, blew up the magazine of Cawnpore on their way, and then went
on to Bithoor.
[Illustration:
Plan of action near Cawnpore, July 16, 1857.
]
Thus was fought the battle of Cawnpore, the conquest of which place had
for so many weeks been anxiously looked forward to by the British. True,
they had heard, and under too great a variety of detail to warrant
disbelief, that Sir Hugh Wheeler and his gallant companions had been
most treacherously murdered by the ruthless chieftain of Bithoor; but
yet a hope clung to them that some of their compatriots at least might
be alive at Cawnpore. On this 16th of July, Havelock’s small force was
lessened by the loss of 6 killed and 98 wounded or missing—a loss
wonderfully slight under the circumstances, but serious to him. Captain
Currie of the 84th received a wound so desperate that he sank under it
in a few hours; Major Stirling was slightly wounded; Captain Beatson,
attacked with cholera on the morning of the fight, held up with heroic
bearing during the whole day, but died soon afterwards. The enemy lost
seven guns on this day, of which three were 24-pounders.
Some of the Europeans bore an almost incredible amount of hard labour on
this day of fierce July heat. One, a youth of eighteen who had joined
the volunteer cavalry, had been on picket all the preceding night, with
no refreshment save biscuit and water; he then marched with the rest
sixteen miles during the forenoon; then stood sentry for an hour with
the enemy hovering around him; then fought during the whole afternoon;
then lay down supperless to rest at nightfall, holding his horse’s
bridle the while; then mounted night-guard from nine till eleven
o’clock; and then had his midnight sleep broken by an alarm from the
enemy. It was on this occasion, too, that Lieutenant Marshman Havelock,
son of the general, to whom he acted as aid-de-camp, performed a
perilous duty in such a way as to earn for himself the Victoria Cross—a
badge of honour established in 1856 for acts of personal heroism. The
general thus narrated the incident, in one of his dispatches: ‘The 64th
regiment had been much under artillery-fire, from which it had severely
suffered. The whole of the infantry were lying down in line, when,
perceiving that the enemy had brought out the last reserved gun, a
24-pounder, and were rallying round it, I called up the regiment to rise
and advance. Without any other word from me, Lieutenant Havelock placed
himself on his horse, in front of the centre of the 64th, opposite the
muzzle of the gun. Major Stirling, commanding the regiment, was in
front, dismounted; but the lieutenant continued to move steadily on in
front of the regiment at a foot-pace, on his horse. The gun discharged
shot until the troops were within a short distance, when it fired grape.
In went the corps, led by the lieutenant, who still steered steadily on
the gun’s muzzle until it was mastered by a rush of the 64th.’ It is
difficult for civilians adequately to comprehend the cool courage
required in an act like this; where a soldier walks his horse directly
up in front of a large piece of cannon which is loaded and fired at him
and his comrades as rapidly as possible.
What the British troops saw when they entered Cawnpore, has already
engaged our attention (pp. 142-145). None could ever forget it to their
dying day. It was on the 17th of July that Havelock, after a night’s
rest for his exhausted troops, entered the city, and learned the hideous
revelations of the slaughter-room and the well. What steps were
immediately taken in Cawnpore, has been noticed in the chapter just
cited; and the dismal story need not be repeated. The general could not
wait to attend to those matters at that time; he had still to learn what
were the movements of Nena Sahib after the battle of the preceding
day—whether the Mahratta intended or not to make a stand in his palace
at Bithoor. Sending forward part of his troops therefore on the
afternoon of the 17th, he found the enemy in a very strong position.
Their force consisted of the insurgent 31st and 42d Bengal infantry from
Saugor, the 17th from Fyzabad, sepoys from various other regiments,
troops of the cavalry regiments, and a portion of Nena Sahib’s
Mahrattas—about 4000 men in all. The plain in front of Bithoor,
diversified by thickets and villages, had two streams flowing through
it, not fordable, and only to be crossed by two narrow bridges. The
enemy held both bridges, and defended them well. The streams prevented
Havelock from turning the enemy’s flanks; and when his infantry
assaulted the position, they were received with heavy rifle and musketry
fire. After an hour of very severe struggle, he effected a crossing,
drove them back, captured their guns, and chased them towards Sorajpore.
He had no cavalry to maintain a pursuit—indeed the want of cavalry was
felt sadly by him in every one of his battles. This contest cost the
enemy about 250 men, the British about one-fifth of the number; in this
last-named list was included only one officer, Captain Mackenzie of the
78th Highlanders, who was slightly wounded.
Here, then, was one part of the enterprise accomplished. Cawnpore had
been recaptured, and the road cleared of rebels between that place and
Allahabad. It was on the 30th of June that Renaud had left the
last-named place with the first division, and on the 3d of July that
Spurgin had set off with the detachment by steamer. It was on the 7th
that Havelock had placed himself at the head of the second division, and
marched forth to overtake the two others—carrying with him the
recollection of a scowl from many of the Mussulman inhabitants of the
city. He had seen, as he went along, evidences of Renaud’s stern energy,
in the number of rebellious sepoys hanging from gibbets and trees by the
roadside. He and his troops had made ordinary Indian marches the first
three or four days, in alternate rain and fierce heat, and within sight
of destroyed bungalows and devastated homesteads; but when the news from
Renaud arrived, forced marches were made. Then came the battle of
Futtehpoor on the 12th, that of Aong on the morning of the 14th, that of
Pundoo Nuddee on the afternoon of the same day, that of Cawnpore on the
16th, and that of Bithoor on the 17th—five victories in six days,
spreading the fame of Havelock far and wide throughout the surrounding
districts. The future tactics had then to be resolved upon. Cawnpore had
been recovered, although the garrison could not be saved; but there was
another British garrison, another group of suffering British women and
children, to be thought of—at Lucknow. The general well knew how
desperate was the work before him, with the reduced and sickened force
at his command; but he was not the man to shrink from making an attempt,
at least, to relieve Brigadier Inglis and his companions. Feeling the
urgent need of more troops, and the imperative necessity of holding
Cawnpore safely while he himself advanced into Oude, Havelock had
already sent to Allahabad, requesting Neill to come if possible in
person to Cawnpore, and to bring reinforcements with him. It was easier
for Neill to respond to the first of these two appeals than to the
second; he would have gone anywhere, borne any amount of fatigue, to
share in the good work; but he found himself already reduced to so few
troops at Allahabad as to be barely able to maintain that place.
Nevertheless, after counting heads and measuring strength, he ventured
to draft off 227 men of the 84th foot from his little force; he started
them forth on the 15th, partly by bullock-trains, to reach Cawnpore on
the 20th. He himself set out on the 16th—the day of the battle of
Cawnpore—leaving Allahabad under the command of Captain Drummond Hay of
the 78th Highlanders, until Colonel O’Brien could arrive. After a rapid
journey, Neill reached Cawnpore, took military command of that place and
its neighbourhood, and assisted Havelock in the preparations necessary
for crossing the Ganges into Oude. One great necessity was perceived on
the instant by both generals; English soldiers, with all their good
qualities, are prone to drink; and Havelock soon found, to use his own
words, that ‘half his men would be needed to keep the other half from
getting drunk’ if they had easy access to liquor; he therefore bought up
all spare beverages in Cawnpore, and placed them in the hands of the
commissariat. A calamity much grieved the little army at this time.
Major Renaud, who had so successfully brought forward the first column
from Allahabad, sank under the effects of a wound he had received. A
bullet had hit him above the knee, forcing part of the scabbard of his
sword into the wound, and causing much suffering; amputation seemed to
afford some relief, but only for a time; he died soon after the arrival
of Neill, who had highly valued him as a trusty officer in his own
Madras Fusiliers.
Glancing at a map, we see that the high road from Cawnpore to Lucknow is
broken at its very commencement by the river Ganges, which, at this
point, varies from five hundred to two thousand yards in width. There
is, of course, no bridge here; and as the stream is usually very rapid,
the transport of troops necessarily becomes slow, difficult, and
dangerous work. Havelock began to cross on the 20th of July, but many
days elapsed before the task was completed. The _Brahmaputra_ steamer,
which brought Spurgin’s detachment to Cawnpore on the 17th, was, with a
few open boats, the only available resource for this work. By the 23d,
about 1100 of his troops had crossed over into Oude—every boat-load
having to battle against a broad and swift current. All possible baggage
was left behind, each man taking with him a very small supply of
clothing and food.
On the 20th, Havelock sent a short telegram to the
commander-in-chief—announcing that Nena Sahib’s followers appeared to be
deserting him; that he had fled from Bithoor; that the British had
re-entered that place on the 19th; and that the palace had been reduced
to ashes, and 13 guns captured. On the next day a further communication
was sent to the effect that three more guns, and a number of animals,
had been brought along from Bithoor, and that the magazine had been
blown up. Subsequent events proved that the Nena, though forced to flee,
still retained a body of troops under his command.
When the brigadier-general, on the 23d of July, had so far succeeded in
transporting his gallant little army over the majestic Ganges; and when
his sanguine hopes had led him to believe that he could conquer Lucknow
in two or three days, then arose in his mind the important strategic
question—What next? Should he remain in Oude after the capture of
Lucknow, and effect the thorough reconquest of that province; or should
he hastily recross the Ganges, march to Agra, liberate Colvin and the
other Europeans in the fort, pick up any available force there, and
advance to aid in the siege of Delhi? Sir Patrick Grant, who was
commander-in-chief at that time, was solicited by telegram for an answer
to this query. He strenuously recommended that Havelock, once in Oude,
should remain there if possible. ‘If he merely relieves the beleaguered
garrison of Lucknow, and, after accomplishing that object, instantly
recrosses the Ganges into our own provinces, it will be thought and
believed throughout India that he had signally failed to reconquer Oude,
and that he was driven out of the province by force of arms. The
insurgents, though beaten before Lucknow, would assuredly collect again,
and follow up the retiring army, prevent supplies from coming into camp,
and reduce our troops to great straits and hazards when recrossing the
Ganges—the passage of which, even when wholly unopposed, the
brigadier-general describes as having been a very difficult and tedious
operation.’ This exactly coincided with Havelock’s own view; and he
therefore turned a deaf ear to all applications for aid made to him by
the commanders at Agra and Delhi.
It was not until the 25th that Havelock, after seeing his army safely
across the river, made the passage himself from the Doab into Oude.
Neill, with a very small number of troops, prepared to hold Cawnpore
safely during Havelock’s absence. He re-established British power
throughout the place; offered government rewards for bringing in
captured rebels and public property; appointed Captain Bruce to the post
of superintendent of the police and intelligence departments; purchased
troop-horses in the neighbouring districts; and made arrangements for
keeping the road open and unmolested between Cawnpore and Allahabad. All
this he did, besides taking care of Havelock’s sick and wounded, with a
force of only 300 men—such was the result of the bravery of a soldier
and the skill of a commander, when combined in the same person.
When Havelock had advanced six miles from the Ganges, at a place called
Mungulwar, he was met by a messenger who had succeeded in eluding the
vigilance of the insurgents at Lucknow, and had brought a plan of that
city prepared by Major Anderson, together with some brief but valuable
information from Brigadier Inglis. The details were partly written in
Greek character, as a measure of precaution. Havelock now saw the full
importance and difficulty of the work before him. His own little band
was reduced to 1500 men, supported by 10 badly equipped and manned guns.
On the other hand, he learned that the enemy had intrenched and covered
with guns the long bridge across the Sye (Saee) at Bunnee, and had made
preparations for destroying it if the passage were forced. Nor was his
rear less imperiled than his front; for Nena Sahib had collected 3000
men and several guns, with which he intended to get between Havelock and
the Ganges, to cut off his retreat. Nothing but the anxious dangers and
difficulties of the Europeans at Lucknow would have induced the gallant
man to advance under such perilous odds. He said in one of his
dispatches to the government on the 28th: ‘The communications convince
me of the extreme delicacy and difficulty of any operation to relieve
Inglis; it shall be attempted, however, at every risk.’ Could he have
known how anxiously the beleaguered British in the Residency at Lucknow
was looking for him, his heart would have bled for them; Major Anderson
had sent him a military plan, but the messenger was too much imperiled
to bring any lengthened narrative.
The battle of Onao or Oonao was one of the most surprising of the series
in which Havelock was engaged. His passage towards Lucknow was disputed
on the 29th by the enemy, who had taken up a strong position. Their
right was protected by a swamp which could neither be forced nor turned;
their advanced corps was in a garden enclosure which assumed the form of
a bastion; and the rest of their force was posted in and behind a
village, the houses of which were loopholed and defended by 15 guns. The
passage between the village and the town of Onao was very narrow; but
along this passage the attack had to be made—because the swamp precluded
an advance on the one flank, while the flooded state of the country
equally rendered the other impassable. The attack was commenced by the
78th Highlanders and the 1st Fusiliers, who, with two guns, soon drove
the enemy out of the bastioned enclosure; but when they approached the
village, they were exposed to a hot fire from the loopholed houses. A
party of the 84th foot advanced in aid; and then a determined struggle
ensued; the village was set on fire, but still the enemy resisted with a
bravery worthy of a better cause. At length the passage between the town
and the village was forced; and then the enemy were seen drawn up in
great strength in an open plain—infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Nevertheless Havelock attacked them, captured their guns, and put the
horse and foot to flight. During all this time a large detachment of
Nena Sahib’s troops, under Jupah Singh, threatened the left flank of the
British, in the not unreasonable hope of being able to annihilate such a
handful of men. No sooner had Havelock given his troops two or three
hours’ rest, than he advanced from Onao to Busherutgunje. This was a
walled town, with wet ditches, a gate defended by a round tower, four
pieces of cannon on and near the tower, loopholed and strengthened
buildings within the walls, and a broad and deep pond or lake beyond the
town. Havelock sent the Highlanders and Fusiliers, under cover of the
guns, to capture the earthworks and enter the town; while the 64th made
a flank movement on the left, and cut off the communication from the
town by a chaussée and bridge over the lake. His few horse could do
nothing for want of open ground on which to manœuvre; but his guns and
his infantry soon captured the place and drove the enemy before them. In
these two battles on one day, he had 12 killed and 76 wounded; while the
enemy is supposed to have lost half as many men as Havelock’s whole
force. He also captured 19 guns, but as he had no gunners to work them,
or horses to draw them, they were destroyed—two by spiking, and
seventeen by shot. In a dispatch relating to this day’s hard work, the
general, after describing the brief but desperate contest among the
loopholed houses, said: ‘Here some daring feats of bravery were
performed. Private Patrick Cavanagh, of the 64th, was cut literally in
pieces by the enemy, while setting an example of distinguished
gallantry. Had he lived I should have deemed him worthy of the Victoria
Cross; it could never have glittered on a more gallant breast.’ This
mode of noticing the merit of private soldiers endeared Havelock to his
troops. Cavanagh had been the first to leap over a wall from behind
which it was necessary to drive the enemy; he found himself confronted
by at least a dozen troopers, two or three of whom he killed; but he was
cut to pieces by the rest before his comrades could come to his aid.
It must have been with a pang of deep regret that the general, hitherto
successful in every encounter, found it necessary, on the 31st of July,
to make his first retrograde movement. He never scrupled to attack
thousands of the enemy with hundreds of his own troops, in open battle;
the odds, whether five to one or ten to one, did not deter him; but when
his whole force, his miniature army of operations, became reduced to
little more than the number for one full regiment, the question arose
whether any men would be left at all, after fighting the whole distance
to Lucknow. He had no means for crossing the Sye river or the great
canal, as the enemy had taken care either to destroy or to guard all the
bridges; and in every military requirement—except courage—his force was
becoming daily weaker. Besides officers and men who had been killed or
wounded in fair fight, numbers had been struck down by the sun; while
others, through exposure to swamps and marshes, had been seized with
cholera, diarrhœa, and dysentery; insomuch that Havelock was losing at
the rate of fifty men a day. In addition to all this, as he could leave
no men behind him to keep open the communication with Cawnpore, he was
obliged to take all his sick and wounded with him. His little band being
now reduced by battle and disease to 1364 men, he determined on receding
two short marches, to wait until reinforcements of some kind could reach
him. Colonel Tytler, his quartermaster-general, strongly confirmed the
necessity of this retreat. He saw no possibility of more than 600 men
reaching Lucknow alive and in fighting condition; and they would then
have had two miles of street-fighting before reaching the Residency. He
recommended a retreat from Busherutgunje to Mungulwar; and this retreat
was made under the earnest hope that aid would arrive soon enough to
permit an advance to Lucknow within a week—aid most urgently needed,
seeing that the garrison at that place was becoming very short of
provisions. The troops, of course, were a little disheartened by this
retrograde movement. They rested in Busherutgunje from the early morning
of the 30th to the afternoon, when they received the order to retreat.
It was not till after the reasons were explained to them, that his
gallant companions in arms could at all reconcile themselves to this
order from the general. They marched back that evening to Onao, and the
following morning to Mungulwar.
The month of August began under dispiriting circumstances to Havelock.
His chance of reaching Lucknow was smaller than ever; although greater
than ever was the need of the garrison at that place for his assistance.
He sent back his sick and wounded from Mungulwar to Cawnpore, across the
Ganges, and committed them to Neill’s keeping. He explained to that
general the reasons for his retreat, and asked for further
reinforcements if such were by any means obtainable. Neill was able
simply to send a few dozens of men, bringing Havelock’s effective number
up to about 1400. With these he set about reorganising his little band
during the first three days of the month—counting each man as if he had
been a gem above price. Every native had been got rid of; all his troops
were British; and therefore, few as they were, he felt entire reliance
on them. On the 4th he sent out his handful of volunteer cavalry to
reconnoitre the Lucknow road, to see what had become of the enemy. The
troopers dashed through Onao without interruption; but on approaching
Busherutgunje they saw ample evidence that the enemy were endeavouring
to block up the line of communication, by occupying in force a series of
hamlets between the town and the lake beyond it. The cavalry, having
thus obtained news critically important to the general, galloped back
the same evening to Onao, where they were joined by Havelock and his
force from Mungulwar. After a night’s bivouac at Onao, the British
marched forth in early morn, and met their old enemy for a second time
at Busherutgunje. Havelock, after a reconnaissance, resolved to deceive
the enemy by a show of cavalry in front, while he sent round guns and
infantry to turn their flanks. This manœuvre completely succeeded; the
enemy were surprised, shelled out of the town, and pursued by the
bayonet and the rifle through the whole of the hamlets to an open plain
beyond. They suffered much, but safely drew off all their guns except
two. Though a victory for Havelock, shewing the high qualities of his
men, it was not one that cheered him much. The enemy were still between
him and Lucknow, and he would have to encounter them again and again,
with probably great reinforcements on their side, ere he could succeed
in the object he had at heart. The morning of the 6th of August rose
gloomily to him; for he was forced to a conclusion that an attack on
Lucknow was wholly beyond his force. He returned from Busherutgunje
through Onao to his old quarters at Mungulwar; and when encamped there,
wrote or telegraphed to the commander-in-chief that he must abandon his
long-cherished enterprise until strengthened. All his staff-officers
joined in the opinion that to advance now to Lucknow would be ‘to court
annihilation,’ and would, moreover, seal the doom of the heroic Inglis
in that city—seeing that that officer could not possibly hold out
without the hopeful expectation, sooner or later, of relief from
Cawnpore. ‘I will remain,’ added Havelock in his notification, ‘till the
last moment in this position (Mungulwar), strengthening it, and hourly
improving my bridge-communication with Cawnpore, in the hope that some
error of the enemy may enable me to strike a blow against them, and give
the garrison an opportunity of blowing up their works and cutting their
way out.’ Havelock’s army now only just exceeded 1000 effective men—a
number absurd to designate as an army, were it not for its brilliant
achievements. Between Mungulwar and Lucknow it was known that there were
three strong posts, defended by 50 guns and 30,000 men. Every village on
the road, too (this being, in the turbulent province of Oude), was found
to be occupied by zemindars deadly hostile to the British. Neill had
only 500 reliable troops at Cawnpore, of whom one-half were on the
sick-list. Who can wonder, then, that even a Havelock shrank from an
advance to Lucknow at such a time?
[Illustration:
Plan of action near Bithoor, August 16, 1857.
]
From the evening of the 6th to the morning of the 11th was the small
overworked column encamped at Mungulwar—fighting against cholera as a
more dreaded opponent than rebellious sepoys, and keeping a guarded
watch on the distrusted Oudians around. On the 11th, however, this
sojourn was disturbed; and the British found themselves called upon to
meet the enemy for the third time at the town of Busherutgunje. Early in
the morning Havelock received information that 4000 rebels, with some
guns, had advanced from Nawabgunge to that place. It did not suit his
views to have such a hostile force in position within a few hours’ march
of him; he therefore put his column in motion. His advanced guard drove
the enemy’s parties out of Onao; but when he marched onward to the
vicinity of Busherutgunje, he found the enemy far more numerous than he
had expected—spread out to a great distance right and left, and strongly
intrenched in the centre. Havelock saw reasons for postponing his attack
till the following day. He returned to Onao, where his troops bivouacked
on the wet ground amid much discomfort, and after a very scanty supper.
Such men, however, were not likely to make the worst of their troubles;
they rose on the 12th, ready to vanquish the enemy in their usual style.
In the two former battles of Busherutgunje, the enemy had depended
chiefly on defences in and behind the town; but in this instance they
had adopted the plan of intrenching the village of Boursekee Chowkee, in
advance of the town. Havelock was much retarded in bringing his battery
and supporting troops across the deep and wide morasses which protected
the enemy’s front, during which operation the enemy’s shot and shell
caused him some loss; but when these obstacles were surmounted, and his
artillery brought into play, the 78th Highlanders, without firing a
shot, rushed with a cheer upon the principal redoubt, and captured two
out of the three horse-battery guns with which it was armed. The enemy’s
extreme left being also turned, they were soon in full retreat. But
here, as before, the victory was little more than a manifestation of
British superiority in the field of battle; the enemy lost six to one of
the British, but still they remained on or near the Lucknow road. The
brigadier, just alike to his humble soldiers and to his
brother-officers, did not fail to mention the names of those who
particularly distinguished themselves. On one occasion it was his own
son Lieutenant Havelock; on another it was Patrick Cavanagh the private;
and now it was Lieutenant Crowe of the 78th Highlanders, who, on this
12th of August, had been the first man to climb into the enemy’s redoubt
at Boursekee Chowkee—an achievement which afterwards brought him the
Victoria cross.
The conqueror for the third time retreated from Busherutgunje to
Mungulwar, of course a little weaker in men than in the morning.
Havelock’s object, in this third retreat, was not merely to reach
Mungulwar, but to recross the Ganges to Cawnpore, there to wait for
reinforcements before making another attempt to relieve Lucknow. The
advance of the 4000 rebels on the 11th had been mainly with the view of
cutting off the little band of heroes during this embarkation; but the
battle of the 12th frustrated this; and by evening of the 13th the whole
of the British had crossed the Ganges from the Oude bank to the Cawnpore
bank, by a bridge of boats and a boat-equipage which Colonel Tytler and
Captain Crommelin had used indefatigable exertions to prepare.
There can be no question that this retreat was regarded by the
insurgents as a concession to their superior strength, as an admission
that even a Havelock could not penetrate to Lucknow at that time; it
elated them, and for the same reason it depressed the little band who
had achieved so much and suffered so severely. The general himself was
deeply grieved, for the prestige of the British name, but more
immediately for the safety of Brigadier Inglis and his companions. But
though grieved, he was too good a soldier to despond: he looked at his
difficulties manfully. Those difficulties were indeed great. While he
was fighting in Oude, bravely but vainly striving to advance to Lucknow,
Nena Sahib had been collecting a motley assemblage of troops near
Bithoor, for the purpose of re-establishing his power in that region. A
whole month had been available to him for this purpose, from the middle
of July to the middle of August; and during this time there had been
assembled the 31st and 42d native infantry from Saugor, the 17th from
Fyzabad, portions of the 34th disbanded at Barrackpore, troops of three
mutinied cavalry regiments, and odds and ends of Mahrattas. The Nena had
imitated Havelock in crossing into Oude, but had afterwards recrossed
into the Doab, with the evident intention of attacking Neill’s weak
force at Cawnpore. Bithoor he reoccupied without difficulty, for Neill
had no troops to station at that place, but now he planned an advance to
Cawnpore itself. As soon as Havelock had brought his column across the
Ganges on the 13th, the two generals concerted a plan; they resolved to
rest the troops on the 14th, attack Nena Sahib’s left wing on the 15th,
and march to Bithoor on the 16th. Neill, with a mere handful of men,
went out of his intrenchment, surprised the enemy’s left, and drove them
with precipitation from the vicinity of Cawnpore. This done, Havelock
laid his plan for a third visit to Bithoor on the 16th. He marched out
with about 1300 men—nearly all that he and Neill possessed between
them—and came up to the enemy about mid-day. They had established a
position in front of Bithoor, which Havelock characterised as one of the
strongest he had ever seen. They had two guns and an earthen redoubt in
and near a plantation of sugar and castor-oil plants, intrenched
quadrangles filled with troops, and two villages with loopholed houses
and walls. Havelock, after surveying the position, sent his artillery
along the main road; consisting of Maude’s battery, which had already
rendered such good service, and Olphert’s battery, recently forwarded
from Allahabad under Lieutenant Smithett. While the guns proceeded along
the main road, the infantry advanced in two wings on the right and left.
After a brief exchange of artillery-fire, the 78th Highlanders and the
Madras Fusiliers advanced in that fearless way which struck such
astonishment and panic into the mutineers; they captured and burned a
village, then forced their way through a sugar-plantation, then took the
redoubt, then captured two guns placed in a battery, and drove the
rebels before them at every point. The battery, redoubt, quadrangles,
villages, and plantations having been thus conquered, the British
crossed a bridge over a narrow but unfordable stream, and pursued the
enemy into and right through the town of Bithoor. Beyond this it was
impossible to pursue them, for Havelock had now scarcely a dozen
troopers, and his infantry were utterly exhausted by marching and
fighting during a fiercely hot day. The 64th and 84th foot, with the
Ferozpore Sikhs, were disabled from taking a full share in the day’s
operations, by a bend or branch of the unfordable stream which
intercepted their intended line of march; the chief glory of the day
rested with the 78th Highlanders and the Madras Fusiliers. Havelock, in
his dispatch relating to this battle, said: ‘I must do the mutineers the
justice to pronounce that they fought obstinately; otherwise they could
not for a whole hour have held their own, even with such advantages of
ground, against my powerful artillery-fire.’ Worn out with fatigue, the
British troops bivouacked that night near Bithoor; and on the 17th they
returned to Cawnpore. They had been fighting for six or seven weeks
under an Indian sun, almost from the day of their leaving Allahabad.
‘Rest they must have,’ said Neill, in one of his pithy telegrams.
Captain Mackenzie, of the Highlanders, was among those who received
wounds on this day.
This may be regarded as terminating the Havelock campaign in the strict
sense of the term; that is, the campaign in which he was undisputed
chief. He was destined, before the hand of death struck him down, to
fight again against the rebellious sepoys, but under curious relations
towards a brother-officer—relations strikingly honourable to both, as
will presently be explained. A wonderful campaign it must indeed be
called. Between the 12th of July and the 17th of August, Havelock had
fought and won three battles in the Doab east of Cawnpore, three in the
vicinity of Cawnpore and Bithoor, and four in Oude—ten battles in
thirty-seven days; and this against an enemy manifold superior in
numbers, and with an army which naturally became weaker by each battle,
until at length its fighting power was almost extinguished.
Precarious, indeed, was the state to which Havelock’s little force was
reduced. Shells, balls, bullets, sabres, heat, fatigue, and disease,
laid his poor fellows low; while his constant cry for reinforcements
was—not unheeded, certainly—but left unsatisfied. The cry was everywhere
the same—‘Send us troops;’ and the reply varied but little: ‘We have
none to send.’ On the 19th of August, he had 17 officers and 466 men
sick at Cawnpore; while those who were not sick were so exhausted as to
be scarcely fit for active service. Havelock and Neill thirsted to
encourage their handful of men by some brilliant achievement; but the
one essential would be the relief of Lucknow, and for this they were not
strong enough. The rebels, encouraged by this state of affairs,
assembled in great force on the Oude side of the Ganges; they threatened
to cross at Cawnpore, at a spot twelve miles lower down, and at
Futtehpoor; while, on the other side, the Gwalior Contingent threatened
the small British force from Calpee. Havelock telegraphed to the
commander-in-chief: ‘I could bring into the field 8 good guns, but the
enemy are reported to have 29 or 30; these are great odds, and my 900
soldiers may be opposed to 5000 organised troops. The loss of a battle
would ruin everything in this part of India.’ After deducting his sick
and wounded, and two detachments to guard the cantonment and the road to
it, he had only 700 men ready for the field—perhaps the smallest ‘army’
that modern warfare has exhibited. Every day the general became more
earnest and urgent in the language of his telegrams; he was quite
willing to ‘fight anything, and at any odds;’ but his failure of victory
would be ruinous at such a critical time. There were 5000 Gwalior troops
threatening his rear on the Jumna; there were 20,000 Oudians watching
him from the other side of the Ganges; there were 12,000 of the enemy on
his left at Furruckabad; and to oppose these 37,000 armed and
disciplined soldiers, he had only 700 effective men! The contrast would
have been ridiculous, but for the moral grandeur which gave almost a
sublimity to the devotedness of this little band. On the 21st, he
announced that unless reinforcements arrived soon, he would be compelled
to abandon all his hopes and plans, and return to Allahabad, whence he
had started on his career of conquest seven weeks before. He
endeavoured, meanwhile, to strengthen his position at Cawnpore, and to
send off sick and wounded to Allahabad, as a temporary relief.
It would not be easy to decide who was beset by most anxiety towards the
close of August—Havelock or Inglis. The former, after his vain attempt
to reach Lucknow, wrote a note on the 4th which happily reached Inglis;
telling him of what had occurred, and adding, ‘You must aid us in every
way, even to cutting your way out, if we can’t force our way in. We have
only a small force.’ This note reached Inglis on the 15th; he wrote a
reply on the 16th, which—after the messenger had been exposed to seven
days of great peril—Havelock received on the 23d. This reply told how
terrible was the position of the Lucknow garrison—120 sick and wounded;
220 women, and 230 children; food and all necessaries scanty; disease
and filth all about them; officers toiling like common labourers from
morning till night; soldiers and civilians nearly worn out with fatigue;
enemy attacking every day, and forming mines to blow up the feeble
intrenchments; and no means of carriage even if the garrison succeeded
in quitting the place. The remaining days of the month were spent by
Havelock inactively but hopefully. True, he was becoming almost invested
by the rebels at Cawnpore, who saw that his handful of men could do
little against them; but, on the other hand, telegraphic communication
was well kept up with Allahabad, Benares, and Calcutta. He learned that
Canning, Campbell, and Outram were busily engaged in sending up every
possible reinforcement to him; and he wrote again and again to Inglis,
urging him to remain firm to the last, in the cheerful trust that aid
would come before the last act of despair—a surrender to the insurgents
at Lucknow. There was mention of nearly 2000 men being either on their
way or about to start from Calcutta, belonging to the 5th, 64th, 78th,
84th, and 90th regiments, the Madras Fusiliers, and the artillery; and
there were confident hopes expressed of great service being rendered by
the Naval Brigade, 500 ‘blue jackets,’ under Captain Peel, who left
Calcutta by steamer on the 20th. The governor-general knew that
Brigadier Inglis had a quarter of a million sterling of government money
under his charge in the Residency of Lucknow; and he sent telegrams to
Havelock and Neill, urging them, if possible, to convey instructions to
Inglis not to care about the money, but rather to use it in any way that
might best contribute to the liberation of his heroic and suffering
companions.
New names now appear upon the scene—those of Outram and Campbell.
Major-general Sir James Outram, after successfully bringing the Persian
war to an end, had been appointed by the governor-general to the
military command of the Dinapoor and Cawnpore divisions; succeeding
Wheeler, who was killed at Cawnpore, and Lloyd, who had fallen into
disgrace at Dinapoor. This was a very important trust, seeing that it
placed under his control all the British officers engaged in the various
struggles at Lucknow, Cawnpore, Allahabad, Benares, Dinapoor, &c. He
arrived at Dinapoor to assume this command on the 18th of August, two
days after the date when Havelock had ended his series of ten battles.
It happened, too, that Sir Colin Campbell arrived in India about the
same time, to fill the office of commander-in-chief of all the armies of
the crown and the Company in India. For a period of two months, Sir
Patrick Grant had superintended military matters, remaining in
consultation with Viscount Canning at Calcutta, and corresponding with
the generals in the various provinces and divisions. Now, however, Sir
Patrick returned to his former post at Madras, and Sir Colin assumed
military command in his stead—remaining, like him, many weeks at
Calcutta, where he could better organise an army than in the upper
provinces. Campbell and Outram, the one at Calcutta and the other at
Dinapoor, speedily settled by telegram that every possible exertion
should be made to send up reinforcements to Havelock and Neill at
Cawnpore; and that those gallant men should be encouraged to hold on,
and not retreat from their important position. Outram had formed a plan
entirely distinct from that in which Havelock was concerned—namely, to
advance from Benares direct to Lucknow _viâ_ Jounpoor, a route
altogether northeast of the Ganges and the Doab; and to relieve
Brigadier Inglis and the devoted garrison of that city. When, however,
it became known that Inglis could not cut his way out of Lucknow without
powerful assistance, and that Havelock himself was in danger at
Cawnpore, Sir Colin Campbell suggested to Sir James Outram a
reconsideration of his plan; pointing out that an advance of a hundred
and fifty miles from Benares to Lucknow, through a country mostly in the
hands of the enemy, would under any circumstances be very perilous; and
submitting that a march by Allahabad to Cawnpore might probably be
better. The great problem in effect was—how could Outram best assist
Havelock and Neill, and how could all three best liberate Inglis from
his difficulties? To solve this problem, the few remaining days of
August, and the month of September, were looked forward to with anxiety.
The plan of operations once agreed upon, Sir James Outram engaged in it
as quickly as possible. On the 1st of September, having made the
necessary military arrangements for the safety of the Dinapoor region,
he arrived at Allahabad, making a brief sojourn at Benares on his way.
He took with him 90 men of H.M. 90th foot—a small instalment of the
forces with which he hoped to strengthen Havelock’s little band. Three
days afterwards, 600 men of the same regiment reached Allahabad by
steamers—a slow and sure way which the government was forced to adopt
owing to the miserable deficiency in means of land-transport. No time
was lost in making these valuable troops available. Reckoning up the
various fragments of regiments which had arrived at Allahabad since
Havelock took his departure from that place two months before, Outram
found them to amount to something over 1700 men; he set off himself on
the 5th with a first column of 673 men; Major Simmonds started on the
same day with a second column of 674; about 90 more followed on the 6th;
and 300 remained to guard Allahabad, and to form the nucleus for further
reinforcements. On the 7th, Outram was at Hissa, progressing at a rate
that would probably carry him to Cawnpore by the 15th—all his men
eagerly hoping to have a brush with the ‘Pandies,’ and to aid in
augmenting the gallant little band under Havelock.
While Sir James was on his march, he received information that a party
of insurgents from Oude were about to cross the Ganges into Doab, at a
place called Koondun Puttee, between Allahabad and Futtehpoor, and about
twenty miles from the last-named town. Seeing the importance of
frustrating this movement, he made arrangements accordingly. Being at
Thureedon on the 9th of September, he placed a small force under the
charge of Major Vincent Eyre, who had lately much distinguished himself
at Arrah; consisting of 100 of H.M. 5th, and 50 of the 64th regiments,
mounted on elephants, with two guns, tents, two days’ cooked provisions,
and supplies for three days more. These troops, not sorry at being
selected for such a novel enterprise, started off and reached Hutgong by
dusk on the 10th, where they were joined by 40 troopers of the 12th
Irregular Horse under Captain Johnson. Eyre, after resting his men, made
a moonlight march to Koondun Puttee, where he arrived at daybreak. The
enemy, in surprise, rushed hastily to their boats, with a view of
recrossing the Ganges into Oude; but this escape was not allowed to
them. The sword, musket, rifle, and cannon brought them down in such
numbers that hardly any saw Oude again. The number of the enemy was
about 300; a number not large, but likely to prove very disastrous if
they had obtained command of the road between Allahabad and Cawnpore.
Havelock evidently attached much importance to this service, for he said
in his dispatch: ‘I now consider my communications secure, which
otherwise must have been entirely cut off during our operations in Oude;
and a general insurrection, I am assured, would have followed throughout
the Doab had the enemy not been destroyed—they being but the
advanced-guard of more formidable invaders.’ This work achieved, the
different columns continued their march, until at length they safely
reached Cawnpore.
[Illustration:
BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEILL.
]
The three generals—Outram, Havelock, and Neill—met on the 15th of
September at Cawnpore, delighted at being able to reinforce each other
for the hard work yet to be done. And now came a manifestation of noble
self-denial, a chivalrous sacrifice of mere personal inclination to a
higher sense of justice. Outram was higher in rank as a military
officer, and held a higher command in that part of India; he might have
claimed, and officially was entitled to claim, the command of the
forthcoming expedition; but he, like others, had gloried in the deeds of
Havelock, and was determined not to rob him of the honour of relieving
Lucknow. On the 16th, Sir James Outram issued an order,[61] in which,
among other things, he announced that Havelock had been raised from
brigadier-general to major-general; that that noble soldier should have
the opportunity of finishing what he had so well begun; that Outram
would accompany him as chief-commissioner of Oude, and would fight under
him as a volunteer, without interfering with his command; and that
Havelock should not be superseded in the command by Outram until the
relief of Lucknow should have been achieved. It was a worthy deed,
marking, as Havelock well expressed it, ‘characteristic generosity of
feeling;’ he announced it to his troops by an order on the same day, and
‘expressed his hope that they would, by their exemplary and gallant
conduct in the field, strive to justify the confidence thus reposed in
them.’
The two generals wished at once to ascertain from Calcutta what were the
views of Viscount Canning and Sir Colin Campbell concerning any ulterior
proceedings at Lucknow. Outram sent a telegram to Canning to inquire
whether, if Lucknow were recaptured, it should be held at all hazards,
as a matter of success and prestige. The governor-general at once sent
back a reply: ‘Save the garrison; never mind our prestige just now,
provided you liberate Inglis; we will recover prestige afterwards. I
cannot just now send you any more troops. Save the British in the
Residency, and act afterwards as your strength will permit.’ The two
generals proceeded to act on these instructions. Just two months had
elapsed since Havelock had made his appearance at Cawnpore as a victor;
and it was with great pain and anxiety that he had been forced to allow
those two months to pass away without sending one single soldier, one
single ration of food, to the forlorn band who so wonderfully stood
their ground in the Residency at Lucknow. Now, however, he looked
forward with brighter hopes; Outram was with him, under relations most
friendly and honourable; and both generals were fully determined to
suffer any sacrifice rather than leave Inglis and his companions
unrelieved.
Outram himself planned the organisation of the new force for operations
in Oude; but he placed Havelock at the head of it, and took care that
Neill should have a share in the glory.[62] It consisted of two brigades
of infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, and an engineer
department.
It was on the 19th of September that the two generals crossed with this
army into Oude, making use for that purpose of a bridge of boats over
the Ganges, most laboriously constructed by Captain Crommelin. The
enemy, assembled near the banks, retired after a nominal resistance to
Mungulwar. The heavy guns and the baggage were crossed over on the 20th.
On the 21st the British again came up with the enemy, turned their right
flank, drove them from their position, inflicted on them a severe loss,
and captured four guns. With the heroism of a true soldier, Sir James
Outram headed one of the charges that brought about this victory;
serving as a volunteer under Havelock. The enemy were not permitted to
destroy the Bunnee bridge over the Sye; and thus the victors were
enabled to pursue their route towards Lucknow. On the 23d, Havelock
again found himself in presence of the enemy, who had taken up a strong
position; their left posted in the enclosure of the Alum Bagh—a place
destined to world-wide notoriety—and their centre and right on low
hills. Alum Bagh is so near Lucknow that firing in the city could be
distinctly heard; and Havelock therefore gave a volley with his largest
guns, to tell the beleaguered garrison that aid was near. The British,
in order to encounter the enemy, had to pass straight along the high
road between morasses, during which they suffered much from artillery;
but when once enabled to deploy to the right and left, they gradually
gained an advantage, and added another to the list of their
victories—driving the enemy before them, but at the same time suffering
severely from the large numbers and the heavy firing of those to whom
they were opposed. They had been marching three days under a perfect
deluge of rain, irregularly fed, and badly housed in villages. Havelock
determined, therefore, to pitch camp, and to give his exhausted troops
one whole day’s rest on the 24th.
At last came the eventful day, the 25th of September, when the
beleaguered garrison at Lucknow were to experience the joy of seeing
those whose arrival had been yearned for during so long and anxious a
period. Early on that morning, after depositing his baggage and tents
under an escort in the Alum Bagh, Havelock pursued his march. The 1st
brigade, with Outram attached to it as a volunteer, drove the enemy from
a succession of gardens and walled enclosures; while the other brigades
supported it. From the bridge of the Char Bagh over the canal, to the
Residency at Lucknow, was a distance in a straight line of about two
miles; and this interval was cut by trenches, crossed by palisades, and
intersected by loopholed houses. Progress in this direction being so
much obstructed, Havelock resolved to deploy along a narrow road that
skirted the left bank of the canal. On they went, until they came
opposite the palace of Kaiser or Kissurah Bagh, where two guns and a
body of insurgents were placed; and here the fire poured out on them was
so tremendous that, to use the words of the general, ‘nothing could live
under it;’ his troops had to pass a bridge partly under the influence of
this fire; but immediately afterwards they received the shelter of
buildings adjacent to the palace of Fureed Buksh. Darkness now coming
on, it was at one time proposed that the force should halt for the night
in and near the court of this palace; but Havelock could not bear the
idea of leaving the Residency for another night in the hands of the
enemy; he therefore ordered his trusty Highlanders, and little less
trusty Sikhs, to take the lead in the tremendous ordeal of a
street-fight through the large city of Lucknow. It was a desperate
struggle, but it was for a great purpose—and it succeeded. On that
night, within the British Residency, Havelock and Outram clasped hands
with Inglis, and listened to the outpourings of full hearts all around
them. The sick and the wounded, the broken-down and the emaciated, the
military and the civilians, the officers and the soldiers, the women and
the children—all within the Residency had passed a day of agonised
suspense, unable to help in their own deliverance; but when at length
Havelock’s advanced column could be seen in a street visible from the
buildings of the Residency—then broke forth such a cheer as none can
know but those placed in similar circumstances.
When General Havelock penned a hasty dispatch narrating the events of
this day, he said: ‘To form a notion of the obstacles overcome, a
reference must be made to the events that are known to have occurred at
Buenos Ayres and Saragossa. Our advance was through streets of
flat-roofed and loopholed houses, each forming a separate fortress. I am
filled with surprise at the success of operations which demanded the
efforts of 10,000 good troops.’ The advantage cost him dearly. Sir James
Outram received a flesh-wound in the arm early in the day, but nothing
could subdue his spirit; though faint from loss of blood, he continued
till the end of the operations to sit on his horse, from which he only
dismounted at the gate of the Residency. Greatest loss of all was that
of the gallant and energetic Brigadier-general Neill, who from the 3d of
June to the 25th of September had been almost incessantly engaged in
conflicts with the enemy, in and between the cities of Benares,
Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Lucknow. He fell, to fight no more. From the
time when he left his native home in Ayrshire, a stripling sixteen years
of age, he had passed thirty years of his life in service, and had been
a trusty and trusted officer.[63] But although the loss of Neill was the
most deplored, on account of the peculiar services which he had
rendered, Havelock had to lament the melancholy list of gallant officers
who had equally desired to shew themselves as true soldiers on this
day.[64] No less than ten officers were either killed or wounded in the
78th Highlanders alone—shewing how terrible must have been the work in
which that heroic regiment led. The whole list of casualties comprised
119 officers and men killed, 339 wounded, and 77 missing. Of these last
Havelock said: ‘I much fear that, some or all, they have fallen into the
hands of a merciless foe.’ Thus was the force reduced by more than five
hundred men in one day.
On the evening of this day, the 25th of September, Major-general
Havelock, within the Residency at Lucknow, gave back to Sir James Outram
the charge which had so generously been intrusted to him. He became
second in command to one who had all day fought chivalrously under him
as a volunteer. Here, then, this chapter may end. It was the last day of
Havelock’s campaign as an independent commander. What else he did before
disease ended his valuable life; what the Lucknow garrison had effected
to maintain their perilous position during so many weary weeks; what
were the circumstances that rendered necessary many more weeks of
detention in the Residency; by whom and at what time they were really
and finally relieved—are subjects that will engage our attention in
future pages.
-----
Footnote 57:
It may be useful to note, for readers unfamiliar with military
matters, the meaning of the words _brevet_ and _brigadier_. A brevet
is a commission, conferring on an officer a degree of rank _next
above_ that which he holds in his particular regiment; without,
however, conveying the power of receiving the corresponding pay.
Besides being honorary as a mark of distinction, it qualifies the
officer to succeed to the full possession of the higher rank on a
vacancy occurring, in preference to one not holding a brevet. In the
British army brevet rank only applies to captains, majors, and
lieutenant-colonels. A _brigadier_ is a colonel or other officer of a
regiment who is made temporarily a general officer for a special
service, in command of a brigade, or more than one regiment. It is not
a permanent rank, but is considered as a stepping-stone to the office
of major-general. Many Indian officers who were colonels when the
Indian mutiny began, such as Henry Lawrence and Neill, were appointed
brigadier-generals for a special service, and rose to higher rank
before the mutiny was ended.
Footnote 58:
Chapter ix., pp. 159-161.
Footnote 59:
_British Troops_:
H.M. 64th foot (from Persia), 435 men; Major Stirling.
H.M. 78th Highlanders (from Persia), 284 men; Col. Hamilton.
H.M. 84th foot (from Pegu), 190 men; Lieut. Ayrton.
1st Madras Fusiliers (from Madras), 376 men; Major Renaud.
Voluntary cavalry (from Allahabad), 20 men; Capt. Barrow.
Royal artillery (from Ceylon), 98 men; Capt. Maude.
————
1403
_Native Troops_:
Regiment of Ferozpore (Sikhs), 448 men; Capt. Brasyer.
13th Irr. Cav., and 3d Oude Cav., 95 men; Lieut. Palliser.
Artillery, 18 men;
————
561
Colonel Tytler and Captain Beatson officiated as
quarter-master-general and adjutant-general of the force, irrespective
of particular regiments.
Footnote 60:
‘Brigadier-general Havelock thanks his soldiers for their arduous
exertion of yesterday, which produced, in four hours, the strange
result of a whole army driven from a strong position, eleven guns
captured, and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the
loss of a single British soldier!
‘To what is this astonishing effect to be attributed? To the fire of
the British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all that
the brigadier-general has ever witnessed in his not short career; to
the power of the Enfield rifle in British hands; to British pluck,
that good quality that has survived the revolution of the hour; and to
the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous cause—the cause of
justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India.’
Footnote 61:
‘The important duty of first relieving the garrison of Lucknow has
been intrusted to Major-general Havelock, C.B.; and Major-general
Outram feels that it is due to this distinguished officer, and to the
strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that
object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement.
‘Major-general Outram is confident that the great end for which
General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and so gloriously
fought will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.
‘The major-general, therefore, in gratitude for and admiration of the
brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant
troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion, and will
accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as
chief-commissioner of Oude, tendering his military services to General
Havelock as a volunteer.
‘On the relief of Lucknow, the major-general will resume his position
at the head of the forces.’
Footnote 62:
‘FIRST INFANTRY BRIGADE.
‘The 5th Fusiliers; 84th regiment; detachments 64th foot and 1st
Madras Fusiliers:—Brigadier-general Neill commanding, and nominating
his own brigade staff.
‘SECOND INFANTRY BRIGADE.
‘Her Majesty’s 78th Highlanders; her Majesty’s 90th Light Infantry;
and the Sikh regiment of Ferozpore:—Brigadier Hamilton commanding, and
nominating his own brigade staff.
‘THIRD (ARTILLERY) BRIGADE.
‘Captain Maude’s battery; Captain Olphert’s battery; Brevet-Major
Eyre’s battery:—Major Cope to command, and to appoint his own staff.
‘CAVALRY.
‘Volunteer cavalry to the left; Irregular cavalry to the
right:—Captain Barrow to command.
‘ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.
‘Chief-engineer, Captain Crommelin; assistant-engineers, Lieutenants
Leonard and Judge.
‘Major-general H. Havelock, C.B., to command the force.’
Footnote 63:
The Queen afterwards gave to the brigadier-general’s wife the title
which she would have acquired in the regular way if her gallant
husband had lived a few weeks longer—that of Lady Neill.
Footnote 64:
_Officers Killed._—Brigadier-general Neill; Brigade-major Cooper;
Lieutenant-colonel Bazely; Captain Pakenham; Lieutenants Crump,
Warren, Bateman, Webster, Kirby, Poole, and Moultrie.
_Officers Wounded._—Major-general Sir J. Outram; Lieutenant-colonel
Tytler; Captains Becher, Orr, Hodgson, Crommelin, Olphert, L’Estrange,
Johnson, Lockhart, Hastings, and Willis; Lieutenants Sitwell,
Havelock, Lynch, Palliser, Swanston, Birch, Crowe, Swanson, Grant,
Jolly, Macpherson, Barry, Oakley, Woolhouse, Knight, Preston, Arnold,
and Bailey. Some of the wounded officers afterwards died of their
wounds.