CHAPTER XIII.

PREPARATIONS: CALCUTTA AND LONDON.

Before entering on a narrative of the great military operations

connected with the siege of Delhi, and with Havelock’s brilliant advance

from Allahabad to Cawnpore and Lucknow, it will be necessary to glance

rapidly at the means adopted by the authorities to meet the difficulties

arising out of the mutiny—by the Indian government at Calcutta, and by

the imperial government in London. For, it must be remembered

that—however meritorious and indispensable may have been the services of

those who arrived in later months—the crisis had passed before a single

additional regiment from England reached the scene of action. There was,

as we have seen in the note appended to the preceding chapter, a certain

definite amount of European military force in India when the mutiny

began; there were also certain regiments of the Queen’s army known to be

at different spots in the region lying between the Cape of Good Hope on

the west and Singapore on the east; and it depended on the mode of

managing those materials whether India should or should not be lost to

the English. There will therefore be an advantage in tracing the manner

in which the Calcutta government brought into use the resources

immediately or proximately available; and the plans adopted by the home

government to increase those resources.

It is not intended in this place to discuss the numerous questions which

have arisen in connection with the moral and political condition of the

natives of India, or the relative fitness of different forms of

government for the development of their welfare. Certain matters only

will be treated, which immediately affected the proceedings of those

intrusted with this grave responsibility at so perilous a time. Three

such at once present themselves for notice, in relation to the Calcutta

government—namely, the military measures taken to confront the

mutineers; the judicial treatment meted out to them when conquered or

captured; and the precautions taken in reference to freedom of public

discussion on subjects likely to foster discontent.

First, in relation to military matters. England, by a singular

coincidence, was engaged in two Asiatic wars at the time when the Meerut

outbreak marked the commencement of a formidable mutiny. Or, more

strictly, one army was returning after the close of a war with Persia;

while another was going out to begin a war with China. It will ever

remain a problem of deep significance what would have become of our

Indian empire had not those warlike armaments, small as they were, been

on the Indian seas at the time. The responsible servants of the Company

in India did not fail to recognise the importance of this problem—as

will be seen from a brief notice of the plans laid during the earlier

weeks of the mutiny.

On the 13th of May, three days after the troubles began at Meerut, Mr

Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Provinces, telegraphed to

Calcutta, suggesting that the returning force from Persia should be

ordered round to Calcutta, in order to be sent inland to strengthen the

few English regiments by which alone the Revolt could be put down. On

the next day, Viscount Canning, knowing that the Queen’s 43d foot and

the 1st Madras Fusiliers were at Madras, telegraphed orders for those

two regiments to be forwarded to Calcutta—seeing that the Bengal

presidency was more likely than that of Madras to be troubled by

mutinous sepoys. On the same day orders were sent to Pegu to bring the

depôt of the Queen’s 84th foot to Calcutta, the bulk of the regiment

being already in or near that city. On the 16th, a message was sent to

Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, requesting him to send round to Calcutta two

of the English regiments about to return from Persia; another message

was sent to Pegu, summoning every available soldier of the Queen’s 35th

foot from Rangoon and Moulmein; and orders were issued that all

government river-steamers and flats in India should be held ready for

army use. On the 17th, Lord Harris at Madras telegraphed to Canning,

recommending him to stop the army going to China under Lord Elgin and

General Ashburnham, and to render it immediately available for Indian

wants. It was on this day, too, that Sir John Lawrence announced his

intention of disarming the Bengal sepoys in the Punjaub, and of raising

new Punjaub regiments in their stead; and that Mr Frere, commissioner of

Sinde, was ordered by Lord Elphinstone to send the 1st Bombay Europeans

from Kurachee up the Indus to Moultan, and thence to Ferozpore. On the

18th, Canning telegraphed to Elphinstone, naming the two regiments—the

Queen’s 78th foot and the 2d Europeans—which were to be sent round to

Calcutta, together with artillery; on the same day Elphinstone

telegraphed to Canning that he would be able to send the Queen’s 64th as

well as 78th foot; and on the same day the authorities at Sinde arranged

for sending a Beloochee regiment up from Hydrabad to Ferozpore. On the

19th, the Madras Fusiliers started for Calcutta; and on the same day Sir

Henry Lawrence, to strengthen his military command in Oude, was raised

from the rank of colonel to that of brigadier-general. Without dwelling,

day by day, on the proceedings adopted, it will suffice to say that,

during the remaining period of May, the Madras Fusiliers, which were

destined to render such good service under the gallant Neill, arrived at

Calcutta; that the Queen’s 64th and 78th made their voyage from Bombay

to Calcutta; and that steamers were sent to Ceylon to bring as many

royal troops as could be spared from that island.

When June arrived, the same earnest endeavours were made to bring troops

to bear upon the plague-spots of mutiny. Orders were sent to transfer a

wing of the Queen’s 29th foot from Pegu, the 12th Lancers from Bombay,

and cavalry horses from Bushire and elsewhere, to Calcutta. Later in the

month, messages were transmitted to Madras, commanding the sending to

Calcutta of everything that had been prepared there for the service of

the expedition to China; such as tents, clothing, harness, and

necessaries; but it was at the same time known that the regiments on

that service available for India could be very few for a considerable

time to come—the only certain news being of the 5th Fusiliers, which

left Mauritius on the 23d of May, and the 90th foot, which left England

on the 18th of April. Towards the close of the month, an arrangement was

made for accepting the aid of an army of Nepaulese from Jung Bahadoor,

to advance from Khatmandoo through Goruckpore towards Oude—a matter on

which Lord Canning was much criticised, by those who thought the

arrangement ought to have been made earlier. As soon as news reached

Calcutta of the death of General Anson, Sir Patrick Grant,

commander-in-chief of the Madras army, was summoned from Madras to hold

the office of commander-in-chief of the army of Bengal, subject to

sanction from the home authorities. When he had accepted this

provisional appointment, and had arrived at Calcutta, Sir Patrick wrote

a ‘memorandum,’ expressing his views of his own position towards the

supreme government. It was to the effect that—seeing that there was in

fact no native army to rely upon; that the European army was very small;

and that this army had to operate on many different points, in portions

each under its own commandant—it would be better for the

commander-in-chief to remain for a while at Calcutta, than to move about

from station to station. If near the seat of government, he would be in

daily personal communication with the members of the supreme council; he

would learn their views in relation to the innumerable questions likely

to arise; and he would be in early receipt of the mass of intelligence

forwarded every day to Calcutta from all parts of India. On these

grounds, Sir Patrick proposed to make Calcutta his head-quarters. All

the members of the council—Canning, Dorin, Low, J. P. Grant, and

Peacock—assented at once to these views; the governor-general added: ‘I

am of opinion, however, that as soon as the course of events shall tend

to allay the general disquiet, and to shew to what points our force

should be mainly directed, with the view of crushing the heart of the

rebellion, it will be proper that his excellency should consider anew

the question of his movements.’

As it was difficult in those days of interrupted dâks and severed wires

to communicate intelligence between Calcutta and Lahore, the general

officers in the Punjaub and Sirhind made the best readjustment of

offices they could on hearing of Anson’s death; but when orders could be

given from Calcutta, Sir Henry Barnard, of the Sirhind division, was

made commander of the force against Delhi; General Penny, from Simla,

replaced General Hewett at Meerut; General Reid, of the Peshawur

division, became temporary commander in the west until other

arrangements could be made; and Brigadier Cotton was appointed to the

command at Peshawur, with Colonel Edwardes as commissioner. Later in the

month, when Henry Lawrence was hemmed in at Lucknow, Wheeler beleaguered

at Cawnpore, and Lloyd absorbed with the affairs of Dinapoor brigade,

commands were given to Neill and Havelock, the one from Madras and the

other from the Persian expedition; while Outram, who had been commander

of that expedition, also returned to assume an important post in India.

Several colonels of individual regiments received the appointment of

brigadier-general, in command of corps of two or more regiments; and in

that capacity became better known to the public than as simple

commandants of regiments.

When the month of July arrived, the British troops in India, though

lamentably few for the stern work to be done, were nevertheless

increasing in number; but it is doubtful whether, at the end of the

month, the number was as large as at the beginning; for many desperate

conflicts had taken place, which terribly thinned the European ranks.

The actual reinforcements which arrived at Calcutta during eight months,

irrespective of any plans laid in England arising out of news of the

mutiny, consisted of about twenty regiments, besides artillery. Some of

these had been on the way from England before the mutiny began; the 84th

foot arrived in March from Rangoon; none arrived in April; in May

arrived the 1st Madras Fusiliers; in June, the 35th, 37th, 64th, and

78th Queen’s regiments, together with artillery belonging to all the

three presidential armies; in July, the 5th Fusiliers, the 90th foot,

and a wing of the 29th; in August, the 59th foot, a military train, a

naval brigade from Hong Kong, and royal marines from the same place; in

September, the 23d Welsh Fusiliers, 93d Highlanders, four regiments of

Madras native infantry (5th, 17th, 27th, and 36th), and detachments of

artillery and engineers; in October, the 82d foot, the 48th Madras

native infantry, and recruits for the East India Company’s service—all

these, be it again remarked, were troops which reached Calcutta without

any reference to the plans laid by the home government to quell the

mutiny; those which came from England started before the news was known;

the rest came from Rangoon, Moulmein, Madras, Bombay, Ceylon, Mauritius,

Hong Kong, Cape of Good Hope, &c. A few observations may be made in

connection with the above list—that some of these regiments were native

Madras troops, on whom reliance was placed to fight manfully against the

Bengal sepoys; that some of the Madras companies advanced inland to

Bengal, without taking the sea-voyage to Calcutta; that no cavalry

whatever were included in the list; and that the list does not include

the regiments which advanced from Bombay or Kurachee towards the

disturbed districts.

Cavalry, just adverted to, was the arm of the service in which the

Indian government was throughout the year most deficient. During a long

period of peace the stud-establishments had been somewhat neglected; and

as a consequence, there were more soldiers able and willing to ride,

than horses ready to receive them. In the artillery and baggage

departments, also, the supply of horses was very deficient. When news of

this fact reached Australia, the colonists bestirred themselves to

ascertain how far they could assist in remedying the deficiency. The

whole of New South Wales was divided into eight districts, and

committees voluntarily undertook the duty of ascertaining how many

available horses fit for cavalry were obtainable in each district.

Colonel Robbins was sent from Calcutta to make purchases; and he was

enabled to obtain several hundred good strong horses at prices

satisfactory both to the stock-farmers and to the government. The good

effected by the committees consisted in bringing together the possible

sellers and the willing buyer.

By what means the troops, as they arrived at Calcutta from various

quarters, were despatched to the scene of action in the upper provinces,

and by what difficulties of every kind this duty was hampered—need not

be treated here; sufficient has been said on this subject in former

pages.

We pass to the second of the three subjects marked out, in reference to

the proceedings at Calcutta for notice—the arrangements for preventing

the mutiny of native troops, or for punishing those who had already

mutinied: a very important and anxious part of the governor-general’s

duty.

Unfortunately for all classes in India, there was a hostile feeling

towards the governor-general, entertained by many of the European

inhabitants unconnected with the Company; they accused him of favouring

the natives at the expense of the English. There was also a sentiment of

deep hatred excited against the natives, owing to the barbarous

atrocities perpetrated by the mutinous sepoys and the rabble budmashes

on the unfortunate persons at the various military and civil stations of

the Company during the course of the Revolt. There was at the same time

a certain jealousy existing between the military and civil officers in

India. These various feelings conspired to render the supreme government

at Calcutta, and especially Viscount Canning as its head, the butt for

incessant ridicule and the object of incessant vituperation. When the

mutiny was many months old, the Calcutta government gave a full reply to

insinuations which it would have been undignified to rebut at the time

when made, and which, indeed, would have fallen with little force on the

public mind while convulsed with passion at the unparalleled news from

India.

It was repeatedly urged upon the governor-general to proclaim martial

law wherever the Europeans found or fancied themselves in peril; to

encounter the natives with muskets and cannon instead of courts of

justice; and to adopt these summary proceedings all over India. In

reply, Viscount Canning states that this was actually done wherever it

was necessary, and as soon as it could answer any good purpose. Martial

law was proclaimed in the Delhi province in May; in the Meerut province

about the same time; in Rohilcund on the 28th of the same month; in the

Agra province in May and the early part of June; in the Ajmeer district

on the 12th of June; in Allahabad and Benares about the same date; in

Neemuch also at the same time; in the Patna district on the 30th of

June; and afterwards in Nagpoor. In the Punjaub and Oude, governed by

special regulations, it was not necessary that martial law should be

proclaimed, but the two Lawrences acted as if it was. Martial law, where

adopted, was made even more stringent than in European countries; for

there only military men take part in courts-martial; whereas in India,

the military officers at the disposal of the government being too few

for the performance of such duties at such a time, an act of the

Calcutta legislature was passed directly after the news from Meerut

arrived, authorising military officers to establish courts-martial for

the trial of mutineers and others, and empowering them to obtain the aid

at such courts, not only of the Company’s civil servants, but of

indigo-planters and other Europeans of intelligence and of independent

position. On the 30th of May, to meet the case of a rebellious populace

as well as a mutinous soldiery, another act was passed authorising all

the local executive governments to issue special commissions for the

summary trial of delinquents, with power of life and death in addition

to that of forfeiture of property—without any tedious reference to the

ordinary procedures of the law-courts. On the 6th of June a third act

was passed, intended to reach those who, without actually mutinying or

rebelling, should attempt to excite disaffection in the native army, or

should harbour persons guilty of that offence; general officers were

empowered to appoint courts-martial, and executive bodies to appoint

special commissions, to try all such offenders at once and on the spot,

and to inflict varying degrees of punishment according to the offence.

Some time afterwards a fourth act gave an extended application of these

stringent measures to India generally. In all these instances Europeans

were specially exempted from the operation of the statutes. The enormous

powers thus given were largely executed; and they were rendered still

more formidable by another statute, enabling police-officers to arrest

without warrant persons suspected of being mutineers or deserters, and

rendering zemindars punishable if they failed to give early information

of the presence of suspicious persons on their respective estates. ‘Not

only therefore,’ says the governor-general in council, ‘is it not the

case that martial law was not proclaimed in districts in which there was

a necessity for it; but the measures taken for the arrest, summary

trial, and punishment of heinous offenders of every class, civil as well

as military, were far more widely spread and certainly not less

stringent than any that could have resulted from martial law.’

The outcry against Viscount Canning became so excessively violent in

connection with two subjects, that the Court of Directors sought for

explanations from him thereon, superadded to the dispatches forwarded in

the regular course. The one referred to the state of Calcutta; the other

to the proceedings of special commissioners in the Allahabad district. A

petition was presented from about two hundred and fifty inhabitants of

Calcutta, praying that martial law should at once be proclaimed

throughout the whole of the Bengal presidency; on the ground that the

whole native population was in a disaffected state, that the native

police were as untrustworthy as the native soldiery, and that the

Company’s civil authorities were wholly unable to cope with an evil of

so great magnitude. The governor-general in council declined to accede

to this request. He urged in reply—that there was no evidence of the

native population of Bengal being in so disaffected a state as to render

martial law necessary; that such law had already been enforced in the

northwest provinces, where the mutineers were chiefly congregated; that

in Bengal the native police, aided by the European civilians, would

probably be strong enough to quell ordinary disturbances; that, as all

his European troops were wanted to confront the mutinous sepoys, he had

none to spare for ordinary police duties; and that in Calcutta

especially, where a zealous volunteer guard had been organised, the

peace might easily be preserved by ordinary watchfulness on the part of

the European inhabitants. This reply was in many quarters interpreted

into a declaration that the natives would be petted and favoured more

than the Europeans.

The second charge, as stated above, related to the proceedings in

the Allahabad district. When the power of appointing special

commissions for trying the natives was given, the civilians in that

region entered on the duty in a more stern manner than anywhere

else. In about forty days a hundred and seventy natives were tried,

of whom a hundred were put to death. When a detailed report of the

proceedings reached Calcutta, grave doubts were entertained whether

the offences generally were proportionate to the punishment. Many

persons had been put to death for having plundered property in their

possession, without being accused of having actually been engaged in

mutiny; some were put to death for obtaining by threats salary that

was not due to them from the revenue establishments; several others

for ‘robbing their masters,’ and some for ‘plundering salt;’ six

were condemned to death in one day for having in their possession

more rupees than they could or would account for. The question

forced itself on Lord Canning’s attention, whether such offences and

such punishments as these were intended to be met by the

extraordinary tribunals established in time of danger. The culprits

might have been and probably were rogues; but it did not follow that

they deserved death at the hands of civilians, irrespective of

military proceedings. The Calcutta authorities considered, from all

the information that reached them, that these large powers ‘had been

in some cases unjustly and recklessly used; that the indiscriminate

hanging, not only of persons of all shades of guilt, but of those

whose guilt was at the least very doubtful, and the general burning

and plunder of villages, whereby the innocent as well as the guilty,

without regard to age or sex, were indiscriminately punished, and in

some instances sacrificed,’ were unjustifiable. It further became

manifest that ‘the proceedings of the officers of government had

given colour to the rumour, which was industriously spread and

credulously received in all parts of the country, that the

government meditated a general bloody prosecution of Mohammedans and

Hindoos in revenge for the crimes of the sepoys, and only awaited

the arrival of European troops to put this design into execution.’

This led the governor-general to issue a resolution on the 31st of

July, containing detailed instructions for the guidance of civil

officers in the apprehension, trial, and punishment of natives

charged with or suspected of offences. This resolution was

interpreted by the opponents of Viscount Canning as a check upon all

the heroes who were fighting the battles of the British against the

mutinous natives; but it was afterwards clearly shewn that the

resolution applied, and was intended to apply, only to the civil

servants, among whom such vast powers were novel and often

susceptible of abuse; it did not cramp the energies of generals or

military commanders who might feel that martial law was necessary to

the successful performance of their duties. So obstructive, however,

was the bitter hostility felt in many quarters against the supreme

government at Calcutta, that it led to a ready belief in charges

which were afterwards shewn to be wholly untrue. When the Northwest

Provinces had fallen into such utter anarchy by the mutiny, that the

rule of the lieutenant-governor was little better than a name, a new

government was formed called the Central Provinces, comprising the

regions of Goruckpore, Benares, Allahabad, the Lower Doab,

Bundelcund, and Saugor, and placed under the lieutenant-governorship

of Mr Grant, who had until that time been one of the members of the

supreme council. A rumour reached London, and was there credited

three months before Viscount Canning knew aught concerning it, that

‘Mr Grant had liberated a hundred and fifty mutineers or rebels

placed in confinement by Brigadier-general Neill.’ As a consequence

of this rumour, it was often asserted in London that Mr Grant was

more friendly to the native mutineers than to the British soldiery.

Knowing the gross improbability of such a story, Viscount Canning at

once appealed to the best authority on the subject—Mr Grant himself.

It then appeared that the lieutenant-governor had never pardoned or

released a single person seized by Neill or any other military

authority; that he had never commuted or altered a single sentence

passed by such authorities; that he had never written to or even

seen Neill; that he had neither found fault with, nor commented

upon, any of that general’s proceedings—in short, the charge was an

unmitigated, unrelieved falsehood from beginning to end. As a mere

_canard_, the governor-general would not have noticed it; but the

calumny assumed historical importance when it affected public

opinion in England during a period of several months.

We now arrive at the third subject marked out—the attitude of the Indian

government towards the European population. It has been shewn in former

chapters that, when the mutinies began, addresses were presented from

various classes of persons at Calcutta, some expressing alarm, but all

declaratory of loyalty. Similar declarations were made at Madras and

Bombay—two cities of which we have said little, because they were

happily exempt from insurgent difficulties. A few lines will suffice to

shew the relation between these two cities and Calcutta, as seats of

presidential government. Madras is situated on the east coast, far down

towards Ceylon—perhaps the worst port in the world for the arrival and

departure of shipping, on account of the peculiar surf that rages near

the shore. Fort St George, the original settlement, is the nucleus

around which have collected the houses and buildings which now

constitute Madras. As Calcutta is called ‘Fort William’ in official

documents, so is Madras designated ‘Fort St George.’ The principal

streets out of the fort constitute ‘Black Town.’ Bombay, on the opposite

coast, boasts of a splendid harbour that often excites the envy of the

Madras inhabitants. The city is built on two or three islands, which are

so connected by causeways and other constructions as to enclose a

magnificent harbour. Nevertheless Madras has the larger population, the

numbers being seven hundred and twenty thousand against five hundred and

sixty thousand. So far as this Chronicle is concerned, both cities may

pass without further description. Each was a metropolis, in all that

concerned military, judicial, and civil proceedings; and each remained

in peace during the mutiny, chiefly owing to the native armies of Madras

and Bombay being formed of more manageable materials than that of

Bengal. Lord Harris at the one city, and Lord Elphinstone at the other,

received numerous declarations of loyalty from the natives; and were

enabled to render military service to the governor-general, rather than

seek aid from him.

In Calcutta, there was more difficulty than in Madras and Bombay. The

government had to defend itself against Europeans as well as natives. It

has already been stated that great hostility was shewn towards this

government by resident Europeans not belonging to the Company’s service.

On the one side, the Company was accused of regarding India as a golden

egg belonging to its own servants; on the other, the Company sometimes

complained that missionaries and newspapers encouraged disaffection

among the natives. This had been a standing quarrel long before the

mutiny broke out. As ministers of religion, missionaries of various

Christian denominations were allowed to pursue their labours, but

without direct encouragement. They naturally sympathised with the

natives; but, however pure may have been their motive, it must be

admitted that the missionaries often employed language that tended to

place the Company and the natives in the antagonistic position of the

injurers and the injured. In September 1856 certain missionaries in the

Bengal presidency presented a memorial, setting forth in strong terms

the deplorable social condition of the natives—enumerating a series of

abuses and defects in the Indian government; and recommending the

appointment of a commission of inquiry, to comprise men of independent

minds, unbiassed by official or local prejudices. The alleged abuses

bore relation to the police and judicial systems, gang-robberies,

disputes about unsettled boundaries, the use of torture to extort

confession, the zemindary system, and many others. The memorialists

asserted that if remedies were not speedily applied to those abuses, the

result would be disastrous, as ‘the discontent of the rural population

is daily increasing, and a bitter feeling of hatred towards their rulers

is being engendered in their minds.’ Mr Halliday, lieutenant-governor of

Bengal, in reply to the memorial, pointed out the singular omission of

the missionaries to make any even the most brief mention of the numerous

measures undertaken by the government to remove the very evils

complained of; thereby exhibiting a one-sided tendency inimical to the

ends of justice. He declined to accede to the appointment of a

commission on these grounds: That without denying the existence of great

social evils, ‘the government is in possession of full information

regarding them; that measures are under consideration, or in actual

progress, for applying remedies to such of them as are remediable by the

direct executive or legislative action of the government; while the cure

of others must of necessity be left to the more tardy progress of

national advancement in the scale of civilisation and social

improvement.’ He expressed his ‘absolute dissent from the statement

made, doubtless in perfect good faith, that the people exhibit a spirit

of sullen discontent, on account of the miseries ascribed to them; and

that there exists amongst them that bitter hatred to the government

which has filled the memorialists, as they declare, with alarm as well

as sorrow.’ The British Indian Association, consisting of planters,

landed proprietors, and others, supported the petition for the

appointment of a commission, evidently with the view of fighting the

missionaries with their own weapons, by shewing that the missionaries

were exciting the natives to disaffection. Mr Halliday declined to rouse

up these elements of discord; Viscount Canning and the supreme council

supported him; and the Court of Directors approved of the course

pursued.

In the earlier weeks of the mutiny, or rather before the mutiny had

actually begun, the colonel of a regiment at Barrackpore, as has already

been shewn, brought censure upon himself by taking the duties of a

missionary or Christian religious teacher among his own troops. Whatever

judgment may be passed on this officer, or on those who condemned him,

it is at least important to bear in mind that, throughout the whole

duration of the mutiny and the battles consequent on it, one class of

theorists persisted in asserting that the well-meant exertions of pious

Christians had alarmed the prejudices of the native soldiers, and had

led to the Revolt. Right or wrong, this theory, and the line of conduct

that had led to it, greatly increased the embarrassments of the

governor-general, and rendered it impossible for him to pursue a line of

conduct that would please all parties.

Much more hostile, however, was the feeling raised against him in

relation to an important measure concerning newspapers—turning against

him the bitter pens of ready writers who resented any check placed upon

their licence of expression. On the 13th of June, the legislative

council of Calcutta, on the motion of the governor-general, passed an

act whereby the liberty of the press in India was restricted for one

year. The effect of this law was to replace the Indian press, for a

time, very much in the position it occupied before Sir Charles

Metcalfe’s government gave it liberty in 1835. Sir Thomas Munro and

other experienced persons had, long before this last-named date,

protested against any analogy between England and India, in reference to

the freedom of the press. Sir Thomas was connected with the Madras

government; but his observations were intended to apply to the whole of

British India. In 1822 he said: ‘I cannot view the question of a free

press in this country without feeling that the tenure by which we hold

our power never has been and never can be the liberties of the people.

Were the people all our own countrymen, I would prefer the utmost

freedom of the press; but as they are, nothing could be more dangerous

than such freedom. In place of spreading useful knowledge among the

people and tending to their better government, it would generate

insubordination, insurrection, and anarchy.... A free press and the

dominion of strangers are things which are incompatible, and which

cannot long exist together. For what is the first duty of a free press?

It is to deliver the country from a foreign yoke, and to sacrifice to

this one great object every meaner consideration; and if we make the

press really free to the natives as well as to Europeans, it must

inevitably lead to this result.’ Munro boldly, whether wisely or not,

adopted the theory of India being a conquered country, and of the

natives being more likely to write against than for their English

rulers, if allowed unfettered freedom of the press. He pointed out that

the restrictions on this freedom were really very few; extending only to

attacks on the character of government and its officers, and on the

religion of the natives. In reply to a suggestion that the native press

might be placed under restriction, without affecting the Indo-British

newspapers read by Europeans, he said: ‘We cannot have a monopoly of the

freedom of the press; we cannot confine it to Europeans only. There is

no device or contrivance by which this can be done.’ In fine, he

declared his opinion that if the native press were made free, ‘it must

in time produce nearly the same consequences here which it does

everywhere else; it must spread among the people the principles of

liberty, and stimulate them to expel the strangers who rule over them,

and to establish a national government.’ When the liberty of the press

was made free and full in 1835, the Court of Directors severely censured

Sir Charles Metcalfe’s government for having taken that step without

permission from London, and directed that the subject should be

reconsidered; but Lord Auckland, who succeeded Sir Charles as

governor-general, pointed out what appeared to him the difficulty of

rescinding the liberty when once granted; and the directors yielded,

though very unwillingly. The minute, in which the alteration of the law

was made in 1835, was from the pen of Mr (afterwards Lord) Macaulay; but

this eminent person at the same time admitted that the governor-general

had, and ought to have, a power suddenly to check this liberty of the

press in perilous times. The members of the supreme council at Calcutta,

in their minutes on this subject, asserted the power and right of the

government to use the check in periods of exigency.

[Illustration:

General View of MADRAS.—From a Drawing by Thomas Daniell.

]

Viscount Canning, conceiving that all his predecessors had recognised

the possible necessity of curbing the liberty of the press, considered

whether the exigency for so doing had arrived. He found that it would be

of little use to control the native press unless that of the English

were controlled also; because he wished to avoid invidious distinctions;

and because some of the newspapers, though printed in the English

language, were written, owned, and published by natives, almost

exclusively for circulation among native readers. The natives, it was

found, were in the habit of procuring English newspapers, not only those

published in India, but others published in England, and of causing the

political news relating to their own country to be translated and read

to them. This might not be amiss if the government were made responsible

for such articles only as emanated from it; but the natives were often

greatly alarmed at articles and speeches directed against them, or

against their usages and religion, in the Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay

newspapers—not by the government, but by individual writers. The

newspaper press in India, whether English or native, has generally been

distinguished by great violence in the mode of opposing the government;

this violence, in times of peace, was disregarded by those against whom

it was directed; but at a time when a hundred thousand native troops

were more or less in mutiny, and when Mohammedan leaders were

endeavouring to enlarge this military revolt into a national rebellion,

Viscount Canning and his colleagues deemed it right to place a

restriction on the liberty of the press, during the disturbed state of

India.

[Illustration:

BOMBAY.—From a View in the Library of the East India Company.

]

Very little has hitherto been known in England concerning the native

newspapers of India; for few except the Company’s servants have come in

contact with them. Their number is considerable, but the copies printed

of each are exceedingly limited. In the Agra government alone, a few

years ago, there were thirty-four native papers, of which the aggregate

circulation did not reach _two thousand_, or less than sixty each on an

average. Some appeared weekly, some twice a week. Some were printed in

Persian, others in Oordoo, others in Hindee. About twenty more were

published in various towns in the northwest regions of India. A few were

sensible, many more trivial, but nearly all abusive of the government.

As estimated by an English standard, the extremely small circulation

would have rendered them wholly innocuous; but such was not the case in

the actual state of affairs. The miserably written and badly

lithographed little sheets of news had, each, its group of men seated

round a fluent reader, and listening to the contents; one single copy

sufficed for a whole regiment of sepoys; and it was observed, during a

year or two before the Revolt, that the sepoys listened with unwonted

eagerness to the reading of articles grossly vituperative of the

government. The postal reform, effected by the Marquis of Dalhousie,

exceeding in liberality even that of England itself, is believed to have

led to an unexpected evil connected with the dissemination of seditious

intelligence in India. To save expense, he placed natives instead of

Europeans in most of the offices connected with this service; and it

appears probable, from facts elicited during the mutiny, that Hindoo and

Mohammedan postmasters were far too well acquainted with the substance

of many of the letters which passed through their hands.

It may be well here to state that Lord Harris, governor of the

presidency of Madras, dwelt on the unfair tone of the British press in

India, before the actual commencement of the mutiny at Meerut. On the 2d

of May he made a minute commencing thus: ‘I have now been three years in

India, and during that period have made a point of keeping myself

acquainted with the tenor of the larger portion of the British press,

throughout the country; and I have no hesitation in asserting my

impression to be that it is, more particularly in this presidency,

disloyal in tone, un-English in spirit, and wanting in principle—seeking

every opportunity, whether rightly or wrongly, of holding up the

government to opprobrium.’ He denied that any analogy could be furnished

from the harmlessness of such attacks in the home country; because, in

England, ‘every man is certain of having an opportunity of bringing his

case before the public, either by means of rival newspapers or in

parliament.’ This facility is not afforded in India; and thus the

newspaper articles are left to work their effects uncompensated. ‘I do

not see how it is possible for the natives, in the towns more

especially, with the accusations, misrepresentations, and calumnies

which are constantly brought before them, to come to any other

conclusion than that the government of their country is carried on by

imbecile and dishonest men.’

The legislative statute of the 13th of June may be described in a few

words. All printing-presses, types, and printing-machinery throughout

British India were, by virtue of this act, to be registered, and not

used without licence from the government. Magistrates were empowered to

order a search of suspected buildings, and a seizure of all unregistered

printing-apparatus and printed paper found therein. All applications for

a printing-licence were to be made on oath of the proprietor, with full

particulars on certain specified matters. The licence might be refused

or granted; and, if granted, might be at any time revoked. A copy of

every paper, sheet, or book was required to be sent to the authorities,

immediately on being printed. The government, by notice in the

government gazette, might prohibit the publication of the whole or any

part of any book or paper, either in the whole or any part of India; and

this was equally applicable whether the book or paper were printed in

India or any other country. The penalty—for using unlicensed

printing-machinery, or for publishing in defiance of a gazette order—was

a fine of 5000 rupees (£500), or two years’ imprisonment, or both. This

punishment was so rigorous, that the instances were very few in which

the press disobeyed the new law; it produced great exasperation in some

quarters; but the proprietors of newspapers generally placed such a

check upon editors and writers as to prevent the insertion of such

articles as would induce the government to withdraw the

printing-licence.

So alien are such restrictions to the genius of the English people, that

nothing but dire necessity could have driven the Calcutta government to

make them. They must be judged by an Indian, not an English standard. It

is well to remark, however, as shewing the connection of events, that

this statute was one cause of the violent attacks made against Lord

Canning in London; the freedom, checked in India, appeared in stronger

form than ever when several of the writers came over to England, or sent

for printing in England books or pamphlets written in India. When one of

these editors arrived in London, he brought with him a petition or

memorial, signed by some of the Europeans at Calcutta not connected with

the government, praying for the removal of Viscount Canning from the

office held by him.

Having thus passed in review three courses of proceeding adopted by the

Indian government consequent on the outbreak—in reference to military

operations, to judicial punishments, and to public opinion—we will now

notice in a similarly rapid way the line of policy adopted by the home

government to stem the mutiny, and by the British nation to succour

those who had suffered or were suffering by it.

It was on the 27th of June that the government, the parliament, and the

people of England were startled with the news that five or six native

regiments had revolted at Meerut and Delhi, and that the ancient seat of

the Mogul Empire was in the hands of mutineers and rebels. During some

weeks previously, observations had occasionally been made in parliament,

relating to the cartridge troubles at Barrackpore and Berhampore; but

the ministers always averred that those troubles were slight in

character. The Earl of Ellenborough, who had been governor-general from

1842 to 1844, and who possessed extensive knowledge of Indian affairs

generally, had also drawn attention occasionally to the state of the

Indian armies. While India was in commotion, but six or seven weeks

before England was aware of that fact, the earl asked the ministers (on

May 19th) what arrangements had been made for reinforcing the British

army in India. Lord Panmure, as war-minister, replied that certain

regiments intended for India had been diverted from that service and

sent to China; but that four other regiments would be ready to depart

from England about the middle of June, to relieve regiments long

stationed in the East Indies; irrespective of four thousand recruits for

the Company’s service. On the 9th of June Lord Ellenborough expressed

suspicions that a mutinous feeling was being engendered among the

sepoys, by a fear on their part that their religion was about to be

tampered with; this expression of opinion led to various counter-views

in both Houses of parliament.

Two or three paragraphs may here be usefully given, to shew to how great

an extent the number and distribution of European troops in India had

been a subject of consideration among the governing authorities, both at

Calcutta and in London. Towards the close of 1848 the Marquis of

Dalhousie drew attention to the propriety, or even necessity, of

increasing the European element in the Indian armies; and, to this end,

he suggested that an application should be made to the crown for three

additional regiments of the royal army. This was attended to; three

regiments being promptly sent. In March 1849, consequent on the

operations in the Punjaub, application was made for two more Queen’s

regiments; which was in like manner quickly responded to. All these

additions, be it observed, were to be fully paid for by the Company.

These five regiments, despatched during the early months of 1849,

comprised 220 commissioned officers, and 5335 non-commissioned, rank and

file. In 1853, after the annexation of Pegu, the marquis wrote home to

announce that that newly-acquired province could not be securely held

with a less force than three European regiments, eight native regiments,

and a proportionate park of artillery; and he asked: ‘Whence is this

force to be derived?’ The British empire in India was growing; the

European military element, he urged, must grow with it; and he demanded

three new regiments from England to occupy Pegu, seeing that those

already in India were required in the older provinces and presidencies.

There were at that time five regiments of European cavalry in India, all

belonging to the Queen’s army; and thirty regiments of European

infantry, of which twenty-four were Queen’s, and the remaining six

belonging to the Company. As the crown retained the power of drawing

away the royal regiments from India at any time of emergency, the

marquis deemed it prudent that the three additional regiments required

should belong to the Company, one to each presidential army, and not to

the royal forces. The Company, by virtue of the act passed that year

(1853), obtained permission to increase the number of European troops

belonging absolutely to it in India; and, that permission being

obtained, three additional regiments were planned in the year, to

comprise about 2760 officers and men. Only two out of the three,

however, were really organised. When the war with Russia broke out in

1854, a sudden demand was made for the services of several of the

Queen’s regiments in India—namely, the 22d, 25th, 96th, and 98th foot,

and the 10th Hussars; at the same time, as only the 27th and 35th foot

were ordered out to India, the royal troops at the disposal of the

governor-general were lessened by three regiments. This step the Marquis

of Dalhousie, and his colleagues at Calcutta, most earnestly deprecated.

A promise was made that two more regiments, the 82d and 90th foot,

should be sent out early in 1855; but the marquis objected to the

weakening of the Indian army even by a single English soldier. In a long

dispatch, he dwelt upon the insufficiency of this army for the

constantly increasing area of the British army in India. The European

army in India, the Queen’s and the Company’s together, was in effect

only two battalions stronger in September 1854 than it had been in

January 1847; although in that interval of nearly eight years the

Punjaub, Pegu, and Nagpoor, had been added to British India. The army

was so scattered over this immense area, that there was only one

European battalion between Calcutta and Agra, a distance of nearly eight

hundred miles. The marquis earnestly entreated the imperial government

not to lessen his number, already too small, of European troops—not only

because the area to be defended had greatly increased; but because many

of the princes of India were at that time looking with a strange

interest at the war with Russia, as if ready to side with the stronger

power, whichever that might be. There were symptoms of this kind in

Pegu, in Nepaul, and elsewhere, which he thought ought not to be

disregarded. No document penned by the marquis throughout his eight

years’ career in India was more energetic, distinct, or positive than

this; he protested respectfully but earnestly against any further

weakening of the European element in his forces. The home government,

however, had engaged in a war with a great power which needed all its

resources; the withdrawal of the regiments was insisted on; and the

governor-general was forced to yield.

The year 1855 presented nothing worthy of comment in relation to the

Indian armies; but in February 1856, just on surrendering the reins of

government to Viscount Canning, the Marquis of Dalhousie drew up a

minute bearing on this subject. At that time, fifteen months before the

commencement of the mutiny at Meerut, there were thirty-three regiments

of European infantry in India.[34] The marquis sketched a plan for so

redistributing the forces as to provide for the principal stations

during peace, and also for a field-army in case of outbreak in Cabool,

Cashmere, Nepaul, Ava, or other adjacent states; he required two

additional regiments to effect this, and shewed how the whole

thirty-five might most usefully be apportioned between the three

presidencies.[35] He suggested that this number of 24 Queen’s regiments

of foot should be a _minimum_, not at any time reducible by the imperial

government without consent of the Indian authorities; he remembered the

Crimean war, and dreaded the consequence of any possible future war in

depriving India of royal troops. These were suggestions, made by the

Marquis of Dalhousie when about to leave India; they possessed no other

authority than as suggestions, and do not appear to have been taken

officially into consideration until the mutiny threw everything into

confusion. During the later months of 1856, Viscount Canning, the new

governor-general, drew the attention of the Court of Directors to the

fact that the English officers in the native regiments had become far

too few in number; some were appointed to irregular corps, others to

civil duties, until at length the regiments were left very much

under-officered. As a means of partially meeting this want, the

directors authorised in September that every regular native infantry or

cavalry regiment should have two additional officers, one captain and

one lieutenant; and that each European regiment in the Company’s service

should have double this amount of addition. In the same month it was

announced by the military authorities in London that the two royal

regiments, 25th and 89th, _borrowed_ from India for the Russian war in

1854, should be replaced by two others early in 1857; and that at the

same time two additional regiments of Queen’s foot should be sent out,

to relieve the 10th and 29th, which had been in India ever since 1842.

The year of the mutiny, 1857, witnessed the completion of the military

arrangement planned in 1856, and the organisation of others arising out

of the complicated state of affairs in Persia, China, and India. About

the middle of February, the second division of the army intended for the

Persian expedition left Bombay, making, with the first division, a force

of about 12,000 men under the command of Sir James Outram. About 4000 of

that number were European troops.[36] Viscount Canning, speculating on

the probability that a third division would be needed, pointed out that

India could not possibly supply it; and that it would be necessary that

the home government should send out, not only the four regiments already

agreed on, but three others in addition, and that the 10th and 29th

regiments should not return to Europe so early as had been planned.

There was another complication, arising out of the Chinese war; the 82d

and 90th foot, intended to replace the two regiments withdrawn from

India during the Crimean war, were now despatched to the Chinese seas

instead of to India; and the directors had to make application for two

others. Early in May, before any troubles in India were known to the

authorities in London, it was arranged that the plan of 1856 should be

renewed—two Queen’s regiments to be sent out to replace those withdrawn

for the Crimean war; and two others to relieve the 10th and

29th—bringing the royal infantry in India to the usual number of

twenty-four regiments. Of these four regiments, two were to proceed to

Calcutta, one to Madras, and one to Kurachee. They were to consist of

the 7th Fusiliers, the 88th and 90th foot, and the 3d battalion of the

Rifle Brigade. It was also planned that the 2d and 3d Dragoons should go

out to India to relieve the 9th Lancers and 14th Dragoons. Furthermore,

it was arranged that these six regiments should take their departure

from England in June and July, so as to arrive in India at a favourable

season of the year; and that with them should go out drafts from

Chatham, in number sufficient to complete the regiments already in India

up to their regular established strength. So far as concerned Persia,

the proposed third division was not necessary; the Shah assented to

terms which—fortunately for British India—not only rendered this

increased force unnecessary, but set free the two divisions already

sent.

Such was the state of the European element in the Indian army at, and

some time before, the commencement of the mutiny. It was on the 27th of

June, we have said, that the bad news from Meerut reached London. Two

days afterwards, the Court of Directors ordered officers at home on

furlough or sick-leave to return to their regiments forthwith, so far as

health would permit. They also made a requisition to the government for

four full regiments of infantry, in addition to those already decided

on; to be returned, or replaced by other four, when the mutiny should be

ended. On the 1st of July—shewing thereby the importance attached to the

subject—the government announced, not only its acquiescence in the

demand, but the numbers or designations of the regiments marked

out—namely, the 19th, 38th, and 79th foot, and the 1st battalion of the

1st foot. It was also agreed to that the four regiments intended to have

been relieved—namely, the 10th and 29th foot, and the 9th and 14th

Dragoons—should _not_ be relieved at present, but that, on the contrary,

drafts should go out to reinforce them. Another mail arrived, making

known further disasters; whereupon the directors on the 14th of July

made another application to government for _six_ more regiments of

infantry, and eight companies of royal artillery—the artillerymen to be

sent out from England, the horses from the Cape of Good Hope, and the

guns and ammunition to be provided in India itself. Two days

afterwards—so urgent did the necessity appear—the government named the

six regiments which should be sent out in compliance with this

requisition—namely, the 20th, 34th, 42d, 54th, and 97th foot, and the 2d

battalion of the Rifle Brigade; together with two troops of

horse-artillery, and six companies of royal (foot) artillery.

Summing up all these arrangements, therefore, we find the following

result: Two regiments of royal infantry—7th Fusiliers and 88th foot—were

to go to India, to replace two borrowed or withdrawn from the Company in

1854; two others—the 90th foot and the 3d battalion of the Rifle

Brigade—to relieve the 10th and 29th foot, and two regiments of

cavalry—the 2d and 3d Dragoons—to relieve the 9th Lancers and 14th

Dragoons, but the four relieved regiments not to return till the mutiny

should be quelled; four regiments of infantry—the 19th, 38th, and 79th

foot, and the 1st battalion of the 1st foot—to go out in consequence of

the bad news received from India at the end of June; six regiments of

infantry—the 20th, 34th, 42d, 54th, 97th, and 2d battalion of the Rifle

Brigade—together with several troops and companies of artillery, were to

go out in consequence of the still more disastrous news received in the

middle of July; drafts were to go out to bring up to the full strength

the whole of the Queen’s regiments in India; and, lastly, recruits were

to go out, to bring up to the full complement the whole of the European

regiments belonging to the Company. These various augmentations to the

strength of armed Europeans in India amounted to little less than

twenty-four thousand men, all placed under orders by the middle of July.

Various discussions bearing on the military arrangements for India, took

place in the two houses of parliament. Lord Ellenborough frequently

recommended the embodiment of the militia and the calling out of the

yeomanry, in order that England might not be left defenceless by sending

a very strong royal army to India. The Earl of Hardwicke suggested that

all the troops at Aldershott camp, about sixteen thousand in number,

should at once be sent off to India. These, and other members of both

Houses, insisted on the perilous position of India; whereas the

ministers, in their speeches if not in their proceedings, treated the

mutiny as of no very serious importance. Differences of opinion existed

to a most remarkable extent; but the president of the Board of Control,

Mr Vernon Smith, subjected himself at a later period to very severe

criticism, on account of the boldness of the assertions made, or the

extent of the ignorance displayed, in the earlier stages of the mutiny.

When the news from Meerut and Delhi arrived, he said in the House of

Commons: ‘I hope that the House will not be carried away by any notion

that we exaggerate the danger because we have determined upon sending

out these troops. It is a measure of security alone with respect to the

danger to be apprehended. I cannot agree with the right honourable

gentleman (Mr Disraeli) that our Indian empire is imperiled by the

present disaster. I say that our Indian empire is _not_ imperiled; and I

hope that in a short time the disaster, dismal as it is, will be

effectually suppressed _by the force already in that country_....

Luckily the outrage has taken place at Delhi; because it is notorious

that that place _may be easily surrounded_; so that if we could not

reduce it by force, we could by famine.... Unfortunately, the mail left

on the 28th of May; and I cannot, therefore, apprise the House that the

fort of Delhi has been razed to the ground; but I hope that ample

retribution has by this time been inflicted on the mutineers.’ That

other persons, military as well as civil, felt the mutiny to be a wholly

unexpected phenomenon, is true; but this minister obviously erred by his

positive assertions; his idea of ‘easily surrounding’ a walled city

seven miles in circuit was preposterous; and there was displayed an

unpardonable ignorance of the state of the armies in that country in the

further assertion that ‘there are troops in India equal to _any_

emergency.’

A question of singular interest and of great importance arose—how should

the reinforcements of troops be sent to India? But before entering on

this, it will be well to notice the arrangements made for providing a

commander for them when they should reach their destination. As soon as

it was known in London, early in July, that General Anson was dead, the

government appointed Sir Colin Campbell as his successor. The

provisional appointment of Sir Patrick Grant as commander of the forces

in India was approved as a judicious step on the part of the Calcutta

government; but, rightly or wrongly, the permanent appointment to that

high office had come to be considered a ministerial privilege in London;

and thus Sir Colin was sent out to supersede Sir Patrick. Fortunately,

the general selected carried with him the trust and admiration of all

parties. For a time, it is true, there was a disposition to foster a

Campbell party and a Grant party among newspaper writers. One would

contend that Sir Colin, though a brave and good soldier, and without a

superior in command of a brigade, had nevertheless been without

opportunity of shewing those powers of combination necessary for the

suppression of a wide-spread mutiny, perhaps the reconquest of an

immense empire; whereas Sir Patrick was just the man for the occasion,

possessing the very experience, temper, and other qualities for dealing

with the native soldiers. On the other hand, it was contended that

Campbell was something more than a mere general of brigade, having

successfully commanded masses of troops equal in extent to armies during

the Punjaub war; whereas Grant, being by professional education and

military sympathies a Bengal officer—although afterwards commander at

Madras—had imbibed that general leaning towards the sepoys which

rendered such officers unfit to deal sternly with them in time of

disaffection. Happily, this controversy soon came to an end; Sir Colin

was pronounced by the public verdict to be the right man, without any

disparagement to Sir Patrick; and it was judiciously suggested by the

Earl of Ellenborough that the last-named general might, with great

advantage to the state, be made a military member of the supreme council

at Calcutta, to advise the governor-general on army and military

subjects. The nation recognised in Sir Colin the soldierly promptness

which had distinguished Wellington and Napier, and which he illustrated

in the following way: On the morning of Saturday the 11th of July, the

news of General Anson’s death reached London; at two o’clock on the same

day a cabinet council was held; immediately after the council an

interview took place between the minister of war and the commander of

the forces; consequent on this interview, Sir Colin Campbell was offered

the post of commander-in-chief in India; he accepted it; he was asked

how soon he could take his departure; his reply was ‘To-morrow;’ and,

true to his word, he left England on the Sunday evening—taking very

little with him but the clothes on his back. Men felt that there would

be no unnecessary amount of ‘circumlocution’ in the proceedings of such

a general—a veteran who had been an officer in the army forty-nine

years; and who, during that long period, had served in the Walcheren

expedition; then in the Peninsular battles and sieges of Vimieira,

Corunna, Barossa, Vitoria, San Sebastian, and Bidassoa; then in North

America; then in the West Indies; then in the first Chinese war; then in

the second Sikh war; and lastly in the Crimea.

Sir Colin Campbell, as a passenger remarkably free from luggage and

baggage of every kind, was able to take advantage of the quickest route

to India—by rail to Folkestone, steam to Boulogne, rail to Marseille,

steam to Alexandria, rail and other means to Suez, and thence steam to

Calcutta. Whether the troops could take advantage of this or any other

kind of _swift_ conveyance, was a question whereon public authorities

and public advisers soon found themselves at variance. There were four

projects—to proceed through France to Alexandria and Suez; to reach

Alexandria by sea from Southampton; to steam from England to Calcutta

round the Cape of Good Hope; and to take this last-named route by

sailing-ships instead of steamers. A few words may usefully be said on

each of these four plans.

As the overland route through France is the quickest, some advisers

urged that it would therefore be the best; but this was by no means a

necessary inference. It would require an immense amount of changing and

shifting. Thrice would the men of the various regiments have to enter

railway-trains—at London or some other English station, at Boulogne, and

at Alexandria—perhaps also a fourth time at Paris; thrice would they

have to leave railway-trains—at Folkestone, at Marseille, and at Cairo

or some other place in Egypt; thrice would they have to embark in

steamers—at Folkestone, at Marseille, and at Suez; and thrice would they

have to disembark—at Boulogne, at Alexandria, and at Calcutta. The

difficulties incidental to these many changes would be very great,

although of course not insuperable. There would, in addition, be

involved a delicate international question touching the passage of large

bodies of troops through the territories of another sovereign. The

Emperor of France, at a time of friendly alliance, would possibly have

given the requisite permission; but other considerations would also have

weight; and it is, on the whole, not surprising that the route through

France was left unattempted.

It does not follow, however, from difficulties in the French route, that

the sea-route to Alexandria would be unavailable; on the contrary, that

mode of transit found many advocates. The distance from Southampton to

Alexandria is about three thousand miles; and this distance could

obviously be traversed, in a number of days easy of estimate, by a

steamer requiring no transhipment of cargo. Another steamer would make

the voyage from Suez to Calcutta; and an overland passage through Egypt

would complete the route. This is a much shorter route to Calcutta than

that _viâ_ the Cape of Good Hope, in the ratio of about eight thousand

miles to twelve thousand; it is adopted for the heavy portion of the

India mail; and many persons thought it might well be adopted also for

the transmission of troops. The ministers in parliament, however,

explained their reasons for objecting to this route. These objections

referred principally to steamers and coal, of which there were no more

in the Indian seas than were necessary for the mail service. The matter

was argued thus: The first mail from England, after the news of the

mutiny, left on the 10th of July; it would reach Bombay about the 10th

of August; a return mail would start from Bombay on the 16th of August,

describing the arrangements made for receiving at Suez any troops sent

by the Egyptian route; that letter would reach London about the 16th of

September; and if troops were sent off immediately, with everything

prepared, they could not have reached India till towards the end of

October—four months after the receipt of the first disastrous news from

Meerut. A vessel by the Cape route, if sent off _at once_, would reach

as soon. This argument depended wholly on the assumption that it would

be necessary to spend three months in sending and receiving messages,

before the troops could safely be started off from Southampton to

Alexandria. Some of those who differed from the government on this point

admitted that only a small number of troops could be conveyed by this

route, owing to the unfinished state of the land-conveyance from

Alexandria to Suez.[37] The thirty miles of sandy desert to be

traversed, either by marching or in vehicles, would necessarily entail

much difficulty and confusion if the number of troops were large,

especially as neither the isthmus nor its railway belonged to England.

Then, again, there are questions concerning calms, storms, monsoons,

trade-winds, shoals, and coral reefs, which were warmly discussed by the

advocates of different systems; some of whom contended that the Red Sea

cannot safely be depended on by ship-loads of troops during the second

half of the year; while others argued that the dangers of the route are

very slight. On the one side, it was represented that, by adopting the

Suez route, there would be many changes in the modes of travel, many

sources of confusion wherever those changes were made, many

uncertainties whether there would be steamers ready at Suez, many doubts

about the supply of coal at Aden and elsewhere, many perils of wreck in

and near the Red Sea, much deterioration of health to the troops during

the hot weather in that region, and much embarrassment felt by Viscount

Canning if the troops came to him faster than he could transfer them up

the country. Certain of these government doubts were afterwards admitted

to be well founded; others were shewn to be erroneous; and though a few

regiments were sent by the Suez route later in the year, it became

pretty generally admitted, that if only one or two regiments had taken

that route _early in July_, the benefit to India would have been very

great, and the difficulties not more than might have been easily

conquered.

Next for consideration was the Cape route. Those who admitted that the

overland journey was suited only for a _small_ body of troops, and not

for an army of thirty thousand men, had yet to settle whether

sailing-ships or steamers were best fitted for this service. In some

quarters it was urged: ‘Employ our screw war-steamers; we are at peace

in Europe, and can send our soldiers quickly by this means to India,

without the expense of chartering steamers belonging to companies or

private persons. If sufficient bounties are offered, in one week we

could obtain seamen enough to man twenty war-steamers. Take the main

and lower-deck guns out of the ships; place fifteen hundred troops in

each of the large screw line-of-battle ships; and man each ship with

half the war complement, the soldiers themselves serving as marines.’

To this it was replied that line-of-battle ships would be dearer

rather than cheaper than chartered vessels, because they could not

lessen the charge by back-cargoes. Sir Charles Napier contended,

moreover, that screw war-steamers could not be fitted out as

troop-ships in less than three months after the order was given; and

that great difficulty would be found in raising men for them. The

government was influenced by these or similar considerations; for no

troops were sent out in war-vessels—possibly owing to a prudential

wish to keep all war-ships ready for warlike exigencies.

There remained, lastly, the question whether, the Cape route being

adopted, it would be better to hire steam-ships or sailing-ships for

conveying troops to India. Eager inquiries on this question were made in

parliament soon after the news of the outbreak arrived. The ministers,

in reference to the superiority of steamers over sailing-ships, stated

that, from the difficulty in procuring steamers of the requisite kind,

and the delay caused by the number of intermediate points at which they

would have to touch for coal, steamers would probably not reach the

Indian ports more quickly than sailing-ships. Lord Ellenborough admitted

that, when he was in India, sailing-vessels were found better than

steamers for India voyages in the autumnal half of the year; but this

left untouched the important improvements effected in steam-navigation

during the intervening period of fourteen years. The battle was much

contested. Sir Charles Wood, First Lord of the Admiralty, pointed out

that fast sailing-ships often went from England to Calcutta in 90 to 100

days; that auxiliary screws had been known to take from 90 to 120 days;

and therefore that we were not certain of quicker voyages by steam than

by sail, even (which was doubtful) if coal enough were procurable at the

Cape. This roused the advocates of steaming, who complained that the

minister had compared quick sailing-ships with slow steamers. Mr Lindsey

asserted that the average duration of twenty-two sail-voyages was 132

days; and that the steam-average would not exceed 94 days. Another

authority averred that the average of ninety-eight sail-voyages was 130

days; and that of seven screw-steam voyages, 93 days.

Such were a few of the points brought under consideration, in connection

with the schemes for sending troops to India. We mention them here,

because they bore intimately on the mutiny and its history. A compromise

between the various schemes was effected by the government, in this

way:—The ten thousand troops intended to be sent out, as reinforcements,

reliefs, and recruits, _before_ the news of the disasters reached

England, were despatched as originally intended, in ordinary

sailing-vessels; the four thousand additional troops, immediately

applied for by the Company, were despatched, half in screw-steamers, and

half in fast-sailing clippers; while the six thousand supplied on a

still later requisition were sent almost wholly in steamers. It was not

until late in the year, when the slowness of most of the voyages had

been made manifest, that the superiority of steaming became

unquestionable—provided the various coal-depôts could be kept well

supplied. Setting aside all further controversy as to the best mode of

transit, the activity of the movements was unquestionable. In May and

June few of the regiments and ships were ready, and therefore few only

were despatched; but after that the rapidity was something remarkable.

In July more than thirty troop-laden ships departed from our shores,

carrying numbers varying from 131 to 438 soldiers each. August was a

still more busy month, in relation both to the number of ships and the

average freight of each; there being forty troop-laden ships, carrying

from 208 to 1057 soldiers each. In July not a single steam-ship was

included in the number; but in August nearly half were steamers. The

most remarkable shipments were those in the _James Baines_ clipper

sailing-ship (1037 men of the 42d and 92d foot), the _Champion of the

Seas_ clipper (1032 men of the 42d and 20th foot) and the _Great

Britain_ screw-steamer (1057 men of the 8th Hussars and 17th Lancers).

In these three splendid ships the troops were conveyed with a degree of

comfort rarely if ever before attained in such service. While the

necessary arrangements were in progress for shipping off the twenty-four

thousand men chosen by the middle of July, other plans were being

organised for despatching further regiments; insomuch that, by the end

of the year, very nearly forty thousand men had been sent off to the

scene of mutiny. In what order and at what times these troops reached

their destination, may usefully be noted in a later page. Towards the

close of the year the Suez route was adopted for a few regiments; and

the rapidity of passage was such as to lead to much expression of regret

that that route had not been adopted earlier—although an opinion

continued to prevail on the part of the government and the Company that

it would not have been practicable to send the bulk of the army by that

means.

Another important question arose during the year, how these troops ought

to be clothed, and their health secured. English soldiers complain of

their tightly buttoned and buckled garments in hot weather, even in an

English climate; but in an Indian summer the oppression of such clothing

is very grievous; and much anxiety was manifested, when it became known

that thirty or forty thousand troops were to set out for the East, as to

the dress to be adopted. The War-office issued a memorandum on the

subject, chiefly with the view of allaying public anxiety;[38] but it

became afterwards known that, owing to blunders and accidents similar to

those which so disastrously affected the Crimean army, the light

clothing, even if sufficient in quantity, was not in the right place at

the right time; and our gallant men were only kept from complaining by

their excitement at the work to be done. It must at the same time be

admitted that, owing to the slowness of the voyages, the majority of the

reinforcements did not land in India till the intense heat of summer had

passed. In reference to the important question of the health of the

troops, Dr James Harrison, of the Company’s service, drew up a series of

rules or suggestions, for the use of officers in the management of their

troops. These rules, which received the approval of Sir Colin Campbell,

bore relation to the hours of marching; the length of each march; the

kind of beverage best for the soldier before starting; the

marching-dress in hot weather; the precautions against sitting or lying

in wet clothes; the necessity for bathing; the best choice of food and

the best mode of cooking; the stimulants and beverages, &c.

It would be difficult to enumerate all the modes in which the

government, the legislature, and the press, sought to meet the

difficulties and remedy the evils arising out of the Indian mutiny; nor

would such an enumeration be necessary, further than concerned the

really practicable and adopted measures. At a time when each mail from

India increased the sum-total of disastrous news, each grievance found

its own peculiar expositor, who insisted that _that_ particular

grievance had been the main cause of the mutiny, and that a remedy must

be found in that particular direction. Nevertheless, in a series of

short paragraphs to close the present chapter, it may be possible to

sketch the general character of the plans and thoughts that occupied the

public mind.

Railways were not forgotten. It was strongly urged that if Indian

railways had been begun earlier, and carried to a further stage towards

completion, the mutiny either could not have happened at all, or might

have been crushed easily by a small force having great powers of

locomotion. The disorders in India did not prevent the forwarding of

schemes for new lines of railway—such as the Sinde Railway, from

Kurachee to Hydrabad, there to be connected with steamers up the Indus

to Moultan; the Punjaub Railway, from Moultan to Lahore, there to join

the grand trunk railway; the Oude Railway, to supply Lucknow with a

series of lines radiating in various directions; and the East Bengal

Railway, to accommodate the region eastward of Calcutta. But besides

these, the mutiny gave a new impetus to schemes for carrying railways

across Western Asia towards India; either from Scutari (opposite

Constantinople) to Bagdad, or from Antioch to the Euphrates, with a

railway or a steam-route thence through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf.

Some parts of these schemes were very wild; the projectors, in every

case, required guaranteed interest from government, on the ground that

the particular railway advocated would form a new and quick route from

England to India available for government purposes; but as no guarantee

was forthcoming, the schemes remained in abeyance.

Electric telegraphs did not fail to occupy a portion of public favour;

and there is no question that their benefit was immense. Every lessening

of the time for transmitting a message from India to London, or _vice

versâ_, was so much gained to those responsible for quelling the mutiny.

In the middle of 1857, small portions of submarine cable were immersed

in the Mediterranean; but by the end of the year the islands of Corsica,

Sardinia, Malta, and Corfu were all connected, greatly shortening the

time for transmitting a telegram from Alexandria to Marseille.

Superadded to this, the usefulness of the telegraph encouraged the

projectors of new lines—from Corfu to Alexandria; from Antioch to the

Euphrates and the Persian Gulf; from Suez down the Red Sea to Aden and

Kurachee. Rival companies occupied much of the public attention; and,

had the British government been favourably disposed towards a guarantee

or subsidy, engineers were not wanting who would have undertaken to

connect London with Calcutta by an unbroken wire.

River-steaming was advocated as one of the great things needed for

India. One scheme was for an Indus flotilla. Supposing a hundred miles

of railway to be constructed from Kurachee to Hydrabad, then the Indus

would be reached at a point whence it is navigable to Moultan for five

hundred and seventy miles; and it was proposed for this service to

establish a flotilla of fifteen steamers, fitted up for passengers and a

little cargo, and each towing two flat-bottom barges for the conveyance

of troops and heavy cargo. Irrespective of the success or failure of any

particular project, the establishment of steamers on the Indus was

unquestionably a practical good to which India had a right to look

forward; for, as a glance at a map will shew, the Indus instead of the

Ganges seems the natural route of communication from Europe to the upper

provinces of India. The Ganges provinces also would undergo an immense

development of resources by the increase of steam-navigation on that

noble river.

Gun-boats for India did not fail to find advocates. It was deemed almost

a certainty that if light-draught vessels of this description had been

on two or three of the Indian rivers, especially the Ganges and the

Jumna, the mutineers would have met with formidable opponents; and even

if the mutiny were quelled, a few gun-boats might act as a cheap

substitute for a certain number of troops, in protecting places near the

banks of the great rivers. Impressed with this conviction, the East

India Company commissioned Messrs Rennie to build a small fleet of

high-pressure iron gun-boats; each to have one boiler, two engines, two

screw-propellers, and to carry a twelve-pounder gun amidships. The boats

were seventy-five feet long by twelve wide, and were so constructed as

to be stowed away in the hold of a ship for conveyance from England to

India.

The means of locomotion or communication—railways, electric telegraphs,

river-steamers, river gun-boats—formed only one portion of the schemes

which occupied public thought during the first six months of the mutiny.

Still more attention was paid to men—men for fighting in India and for

defending our home-coasts. Shortly before the bad news began to arrive

from India, a council order announced that the militia would _not_ be

called out in 1857; two months afterwards, in reply to a question in the

House of Commons, Viscount Palmerston would not admit that circumstances

were so serious as to necessitate a change in this arrangement; he

thought that recruiting would be cheaper than the militia, as a means of

keeping up the strength of the army. In August, however, the ministers

obtained an act of parliament empowering them to embody some of the

militia during the recess, if the state of public affairs should render

such a step necessary. A system of active recruiting commenced, and was

continued steadily during several months. These recruits were intended,

not to increase the number of regiments, but to add a second battalion

to many regiments, and to increase the number of men in each battalion;

some of the regiments were, by this twofold process, raised from 800 or

1000 to 2000 or 2400 men each. Volunteers, also, came forward from

France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and other foreign countries; but these

were mostly adventurers who sought officers’ commissions in India, and

their services were not needed. The government made an attempt to

encourage enlisting by offering commissions in the army to any private

gentlemen who could bring forward a certain number of men each—a project

not attended with much success. At certain crises, when the news from

India was more than usually disastrous, appeals to patriotism shewed

themselves in the newspapers—‘A Young Englishman;’ ‘Another Young

Englishman;’ ‘A True Briton;’ ‘One of the Middle Class;’ or ‘A Young

Scotsman’—would write to the journals, pour out his patriotism or his

indignation, and shew what he would do if he only had the power. One

proposed that clerks and shopmen out of situations should be embodied

into a distinct volunteer corps; another said that, as he was a

gentleman, and wished to avenge the foul murder of innocent women and

children, he thought that he and such as he ought to be encouraged by

commissions in the Indian army; another suggested that, if government

would use them well, many young men would volunteer to serve in India,

to return to their former mode of life when the mutiny was over. Some,

rather in sarcasm than in earnest, suggested that drapers’ shopmen

should drop the yard-measure, and go to India to fight; leaving to women

the duty of serving muslins, and laces, and tapes. There was a certain

meaning in all the suggestions, as expressive of honest indignation at

the atrocities in India, especially those at Cawnpore; but, in its

practical result, volunteering fell to the ground; and even the militia

was not much appealed to. Various improvements were made in the

condition of the common soldier; and recruits for the regular army came

forward with much readiness.

We must now mention those who offered their monetary instead of their

personal services in alleviation of the difficulties experienced in our

Indian empire. Long before the mutinies in India had arrived at their

greatest height, the question was anxiously debated both in that country

and in England, what would be the worldly condition of the numerous

families driven from their homes and robbed of all they possessed by the

sepoys and marauders at the various stations? Every mail brought home

fresh confirmation of the fact that the number of families thus

impoverished was rapidly increasing; while on the other hand it was

known that the East India Company could not reimburse the sufferers

without much previous consideration. For, in the first place, it would

have to be considered whether any distinction ought to be made between

the two classes of Europeans in India—the civil and military servants of

the Company, and those who, independent of the Company, had embarked

capital in enterprises connected with indigo factories, opium farms,

banks, printing-presses, &c.; and then would come a second inquiry

whether the personal property only, or the commercial stock in trade

also, should be considered as under the protection of the government. It

was felt that immediate suffering ought not to wait for the solution of

these questions; that when families had been burnt out or driven out of

their homes, penniless and almost unclothed, immediate aid was needed

from some quarter or other. This was admitted in the Punjaub, where Sir

John Lawrence organised a fund for the relief of the necessitous; and it

was admitted at Calcutta, where Lord and Lady Canning headed a

subscription for providing shelter, raiment, and food to the hundreds of

terrified fugitives who were constantly flocking to that capital. By the

time the principal revolts of June were known in England, the last week

of August had arrived; and then commenced one of those wonderful efforts

in which London takes the lead of all the world—the collection of a

large sum of money in a short time to ameliorate the sufferings arising

out of some great calamity.

It was on the 25th of August that the lord-mayor presided at a meeting

at the Mansion House to establish a fund for the relief of the sufferers

by the Indian mutiny. The sum subscribed at the meeting did not much

exceed a thousand pounds; but the whole merits of the case being set

forth in newspapers, contributions poured in from all quarters, in the

same noble spirit as had been manifested during the Crimean disasters.

The high-born and the wealthy contributed large sums; the middle classes

rendered their aid; country committees and town committees organised

local subscriptions; large sums, made up of many small elements, were

raised as collections after sermons in the churches and chapels; and

when the Queen’s subjects in foreign and colonial regions heard of this

movement, they sought to shew that they too shared in the common English

feeling. Thousands swelled to tens of thousands, these to a hundred

thousand, until in the course of a few months the fund rose to three or

four hundred thousand pounds. In order to give system to the operations,

thirty-five thousand circulars were issued, by the central committee in

London, to all the authorities in church and state, to the ambassadors

and ministers at foreign courts, to the governors of British colonies,

and to the consuls at foreign ports.

This Mutiny Relief Fund was administered by four committees—General,

Financial, Relief, and Ladies’ Committees. The General Committee settled

the principles on which the fund was to be administered, determined the

amount and destinations of the remittances to India, and controlled the

proceedings of the subordinate committees. The Financial Committee

supervised the accounts, the investments of the money, and the

arrangement of remittances. The Relief Committee decided on applications

for relief, on the administration of relief by donation or by loan, and

on the application of means for the maintenance and education of

children. The Ladies’ Committee took charge of such details as pertained

more particularly to their own sex. Each of these committees met once a

week. The first remittance was a sum of £2000 to Calcutta, to relieve

some of the families who had been driven by the mutineers to seek

shelter in that city. This was followed by frequent large remittances to

the same place, and to Agra, Delhi, Lucknow, Bombay, and Lahore.

Committees, formed in Calcutta and Bombay, corresponded with the head

committee in London, and joined in carrying out plans for the

expenditure of the fund. The donations and loans to persons who had

arrived in England were small in amount; most of the aid being afforded

to those who had not been able to leave India. The money was put out at

interest as fast as the amount in hand exceeded the immediate

requirements. At one time the government made an offer to appoint a

royal commission for the administration of the fund; but this was

declined; and there has been no reason for thinking that the

transference of authority would have been beneficial. It was soon found

that there were five classes of sufferers who would greatly need

assistance from this fund—families of civil and military officers whose

bungalows and furniture had been destroyed at the stations; the families

of assistants, clerks, and other subordinate _employés_ at the stations;

European private traders and settlers, many of whom had been utterly

impoverished; many missionary families and educational establishments;

and the families of a large number of pensioners, overseers, artificers,

indigo-workers, schoolmasters, shopkeepers, hotel-keepers, newspaper

printers, &c. To apportion the amount of misery among these five classes

would be impossible; but the past chapters of this work have afforded

examples, sufficiently sad and numerous, of the mode in which all ranks

of Europeans in India were suddenly plunged into want and desolation. At

Agra, when the fort had been relieved from a long investment or siege by

the rebels, almost the entire Christian population was not only

houseless, but the majority were without the most essential articles of

furniture or clothing; nearly all were living in cellars and vaults. At

many other stations it was nearly as bad; at Lucknow it was still worse.

India speedily raised thirty thousand pounds on its own account,

irrespective of aid from England; and most of this was expended at

Calcutta in providing as follows: Board and lodging on arrival at

Calcutta for refugees without homes or friends to receive them; clothing

for refugees; monthly allowances for the support of families who were

not boarded and lodged out of the fund; loans for purchasing furniture,

clothing, &c.; free grants for similar purposes; passage and diet money

on board Ganges steamers; loans to officers and others to pay for the

passage of their families to England; free passage to England for the

widows and families of officers; and education of the children of

sufferers. These were nearly the same purposes as those to which the

larger English fund was applied. The East India Company adopted a wholly

distinct system in recognising the just claims of the officers more

immediately in its service, and of the widows and children of those who

fell during the mutiny—a system based on the established emoluments and

pensions of all in the Company’s service.

* * * * *

It will thus be seen that the news of the Indian Revolt, when it reached

London by successive mails, led to a remarkable and important series of

suggestions and plans—intended either to strengthen the hands of the

executive in dealing with the mutineers, or to succour those who had

been plunged into want by the crimes of which those mutineers were the

chief perpetrators.

Note.

At the end of the last chapter a table was given of the number of

troops, European and native, in all the military divisions of India,

on the day when the mutiny commenced at Meerut. It will be

convenient to present here a second tabulation on a wholly different

basis—giving the _designations_ of the regiments instead of the

_numbers_ of men, and naming the _stations_ instead of the

_divisions_ in which they were cantoned or barracked. This will be

useful for purposes of reference, in relation to the gradual

annihilation of the Bengal Hindustani army. The former table applied

to the 10th of May 1857; the present will apply to a date as near

this as the _East India Register_ will permit—namely, the 6th of

May; while the royal troops in India will be named according to the

_Army List_ for the 1st of May—a sufficiently near approximation for

the present purpose. A few possible sources of error may usefully be

pointed out. 1. Some or other of the India regiments were at all

times moving from station to station; and these movements may in a

few cases render it doubtful whether a particular corps had or had

not left a particular station on the day named. 2. The station named

is that of the head-quarters and the bulk of the regiment:

detachments may have been at other places. 3. The Persian and

Chinese wars disturbed the distribution of troops belonging to the

respective presidencies. 4. The disarming and disbanding at

Barrackpore and Berhampore are not taken into account; for they were

not known in London at the time of compiling the official list. 5.

The _Army List_, giving an enumeration of royal regiments in India,

did not always note correctly the actual stations at a particular

time. These sources of error, however, will not be considerable in

amount.

REGIMENTS AND STATIONS OF BENGAL ARMY—MAY 1857.

GENERAL ANSON, Commander-in-chief.

_European Cavalry._

6th Carabiniers (Queen’s), Meerut.

9th Lancers (Queen’s), Umballa.

_Native Regular Cavalry._

1st Regiment, Mhow.

2d Regiment, Cawnpore.

3d Regiment, Meerut.

4th Regiment, Umballa.

5th Regiment, Peshawur.

6th Regiment, Nowgong.

7th Regiment, Lucknow.

8th Regiment, Lahore.

9th Regiment, Sealkote.

10th Regiment, Ferozpore.

_Irregular and Local Cavalry._

1st Bengal Ir. C., Jelum.

2d Bengal Ir. C., Goordaspore.

3d Bengal Ir. C., Jhansi.

4th Bengal Ir. C., Hansi.

5th Bengal Ir. C., Sonthal.

6th Bengal Ir. C., Moultan.

7th Bengal Ir. C., Peshawur.

8th Bengal Ir. C., Sultanpore.

9th Bengal Ir. C., Hosheapore.

10th Bengal Ir. C., Goordaspore.

11th Bengal Ir. C., Berhampore.

12th Bengal Ir. C., Segowlie.

13th Bengal Ir. C., Bareilly,

14th Bengal Ir. C., Jhansi.

15th Bengal Ir. C., Oude.

16th Bengal Ir. C., Rawul Pindee.

17th Bengal Ir. C., Shumshabad.

18th Bengal Ir. C., Peshawur.

1st Gwalior Contingent Cavalry, Gwalior.

2d Gwalior Contingent Cavalry, Augur.

1st Punjaub Cavalry, Dera Ismael.

2d Punjaub Cavalry, Dera Ismael.

3d Punjaub Cavalry, Bunnoo.

4th Punjaub Cavalry, Kohat.

5th Punjaub Cavalry, Asnee.

1st Oude Irregular Cavalry, Secrora.

2d Oude Irregular Cavalry, Lucknow.

3d Oude Irregular Cavalry, Pertabghur.

Nagpoor Irregular Cavalry, Taklee.

_European Infantry._

8th Ft. (Qun.’s), Cawnpore.

10th Ft. (Qun.’s), Wuzeerabad.

24th Ft. (Qun.’s), Sealkote.

27th Ft. (Qun.’s), Sealkote.

29th Ft. (Qun.’s), Thayet Mhow.

32d Ft. (Qun.’s), Kussowlie.

35th Ft. (Qun.’s), Calcutta.

52d Ft. (Qun.’s), Lucknow.

53d Ft. (Qun.’s), Dugshai.

60th Ft. (Qun.’s), Jullundur.

61st Ft. (Qun.’s), Wuzeerabad.

70th Ft. (Qun.’s), Ferozpore.

75th Ft. (Qun.’s), Rawul Pindee.

81st Ft. (Qun.’s), Lahore.

87th Ft. (Qun.’s), Peshawur.

1st Europeans (East India Company’s), Dugshai.

2d Europeans (East India Company’s), Umballa.

3d Europeans (East India Company’s), Agra.

_Native Regular Infantry._

1st Regiment, Cawnpore.

2d[39] Regiment, Barrackpore.

3d Regiment, Phillour.

4th Regiment, Noorpore.

5th Regiment, Umballa.

6th Regiment, Allahabad.

7th Regiment, Dinapoor.

8th Regiment, Dinapoor.

9th Regiment, Allygurh.

10th Regiment, Futteghur.

11th Regiment, Allahabad.

12th Regiment, Nowgong and

Jhansi.

13th Regiment, Lucknow.

14th Regiment, Moultan.

15th Regiment, Meerut.

16th[39] Regiment, Meean Meer.

17th Regiment, Goruckpore.

18th Regiment, Bareilly.

19th Regiment, Berhampore.

20th Regiment, Meerut.

21st Regiment, Peshawur.

22d Regiment, Fyzabad.

23d Regiment, Mhow.

24th Regiment, Peshawur.

25th Regiment, Thayet Mhow.

26th Regiment, Meean Meer.

27th Regiment, Peshawur.

28th Regiment, Shahjehanpoor.

29th Regiment, Jullundur.

30th Regiment, Agra.

31st Regiment, Barrackpore.

32d Regiment, Sonthal.

33d Regiment, Hosheapore.

34th Regiment, Barrackpore.

35th Regiment, Sealkote.

36th[40] Regiment, Jullundur.

37th[40] Regiment, Benares.

38th[41] Regiment, Delhi.

39th[41] Regiment, Jelum.

40th[41] Regiment, Dinapoor.

41st Regiment, Seetapoor.

42d Regiment, Saugor.

43d Regiment, Barrackpore.

44th Regiment, Agra.

45th Regiment, Ferozpore.

46th Regiment, Sealkote.

47th[41] Regiment, Prome.

48th Regiment, Lucknow.

49th Regiment, Meean Meer.

50th Regiment, Nagode.

51st Regiment, Peshawur.

52d Regiment, Jubbulpoor.

53d Regiment, Cawnpore.

54th Regiment, Delhi.

55th Regiment, Nowsherah.

56th Regiment, Cawnpore.

57th Regiment, Ferozpore.

58th Regiment, Rawul Pindee.

59th Regiment, Umritsir.

60th Regiment, Umballa.

61st Regiment, Jullundur.

62d Regiment, Moultan.

63d Regiment, Barrackpore.

64th Regiment, Peshawur.

65th[41] Regiment, Dinapoor.

66th[42] Regiment, Almora.

67th[41] Regiment, {Etawah.

{Minpooree.

68th Regiment, Bareilly.

69th Regiment, Moultan.

70th Regiment, Barrackpore.

71st Regiment, Lucknow.

72d Regiment, Agra.

73d Regiment, Jumalpore.

74th Regiment, Cawnpore.

_Irregular and Local Infantry._

1st Oude Irregular Infantry, Persadpore.

2d Oude Irregular Infantry, Secrora.

3d Oude Irregular Infantry, Gonda.

4th Oude Irregular Infantry, Lucknow.

5th Oude Irregular Infantry, Durriabad.

6th Oude Irregular Infantry, Fyzabad.

7th Oude Irregular Infantry, Lucknow.

8th Oude Irregular Infantry, Sultanpore.

9th Oude Irregular Infantry, Seetapoor.

10th Oude Irregular Infantry, Mullaong.

1st Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.

2d Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.

3d Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.

4th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.

5th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Seepree.

6th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Lullutpore.

7th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Augur.

1st Punjaub Infantry, Kohat.

2d Punjaub Infantry, Kohat.

3d Punjaub Infantry, Kohat.

4th Punjaub Infantry, Dera Ghazi.

5th Punjaub Infantry, Bunnoo.

6th Punjaub Infantry, Dera Ismael.

1st Sikh Infantry, Hazara.

2d Sikh Infantry, Kangra.

3d Sikh Infantry, Khan.

4th Sikh Infantry, Umballa.

1st Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, Seetabuldee.

2d Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, Chandah.

3d Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, Raypoor.

Regiment of Guides (foot and horse), Peshawur.

Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzi, Shubkuddur.

Regiment of Loodianah (Sikhs), Benares.

Regiment of Ferozpore (Sikhs), Mirzapore.

Ramgurh Light Infantry, Dorunda.

Hill Rangers, Bhagulpore.

Nusserree Rifles, Simla.

Pegu Light Infantry, Myan Owng.

Sirmoor Rifles, Almora.

Kumaon Battalion, Deyra.

Assam Light Infantry, 1st, Debroogurh.

Assam Light Infantry, 2nd Gowhatti.

Mhairwarra Battalion, Bewar.

Aracan Battalion, Akyab.

Hurrianah Light Infantry, Hansi.

Silhet Light Infantry, Cherrah.

Malwah Bheel Corps, Sirdarpore.

Mewar Bheel Corps, Khairwarah.

Sebundee Corps, Darjeeling.

_Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners._

Horse-artillery, 1st Brigade:

3 European Troops. }

2 Native Troops. } Head-quarters:

Horse-artillery, 2d Brigade: } Meerut.

3 European Troops. } Jullundur.

1 Native Troop. } Peshawur.

Horse-artillery, 3d Brigade: } Umballa.

3 European Troops. } Cawnpore.

1 Native Troop. } Sealkote.

Foot-artillery, 6 European Battalions. } Dumdum.

(4 Companies each.) }

Foot-artillery, 3 Native Battalions. }

(6 Companies each.) }

Engineers, } Head-quarters:

Sappers and Miners, 8 Companies, } Roorkee.

_Mixed Corps—Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery._

Shekhawuttie Battalion, Midnapore.

Jhodpore Legion, Erinpoora.

Malwah Contingent, Mehidpore.

Bhopal Contingent, Sehore.

Kotah Contingent, Kurrowlee.

REGIMENTS AND STATIONS OF MADRAS ARMY—MAY 1857.

SIR PATRICK GRANT, Commander-in-chief.

_European Cavalry._

12th Lancers (Queen’s), Madras.

_Native Cavalry._

1st Madras Light Cavalry, Trichinopoly.

2d Madras Light Cavalry, Sholapore.

3d Madras Light Cavalry, Bangalore.

4th Madras Light Cavalry, Kamptee.

5th Madras Light Cavalry, Bellary.

6th Madras Light Cavalry, Jaulnah.

7th Madras Light Cavalry, Secunderabad.

8th Madras Light Cavalry, Bangalore.

_European Infantry._

74th Foot (Queen’s), Madras.

84th Foot (Queen’s), Burmah.[43]

1st Europeans (East India Company’s), [Persia].

2d Europeans (East India Company’s), Burmah.

3d Europeans (East India Company’s), Secunderabad.

_Native Infantry._

1st Regiment,[44] Secunderabad.

2d Regiment, Quilon.

3d Regiment, Cananore.

4th Regiment, Burmah.

5th[44] Regiment, Berhampore.

6th Regiment, Burmah.

7th Regiment, Moulmein.

8th Regiment, Rangoon.

9th Regiment, Samulcottah.

10th Regiment, Rangoon.

11th Regiment, Cananore.

12th Regiment, Madras.

13th Regiment, Moulmein.

14th Regiment, Singapore.

15th Regiment, Burmah.

16th[44] Regiment, Mangalore.

17th Regiment, Madras.

18th Regiment, Madras.

19th Regiment, Bangalore.

20th Regiment, French Rocks.

21st Regiment, Paulghaut.

22d Regiment, Secunderabad.

23d Regiment, Russelcondah.

24th[44] Regiment, Secunderabad.

25th Regiment, Trichinopoly.

26th[44] Regiment, Kamptee.

27th Regiment, Vellore.

28th Regiment, Hosungabad.

29th Regiment, Penang.

30th Regiment, Cuddapah.

31st Regiment, Vizianagram.

32d Regiment, Kamptee.

33d Regiment, Kamptee.

34th Regiment, Trichinopoly.

35th Regiment, Hurryhur.

36th[44] Regiment, Madras.

37th[45] Regiment, Burmah.

38th[44] Regiment, Singapore.

39th Regiment, Madras.

40th Regiment, Cuttack.

41st Regiment, Secunderabad.

42d Regiment, Secunderabad.

43d Regiment, Vizagapatam.

44th Regiment, Burmah.

45th Regiment, Rangoon.

46th Regiment, Henzana.

47th Regiment, Bellary.

48th Regiment, Moulmein.

49th[44] Regiment, Secunderabad.

50th Regiment, Bangalore.

51st Regiment, Pallamcottah.

52d Regiment, Mercara.

_Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners._

Horse-artillery, 4 European Troops. }

Horse-artillery, 2 Native Troops. } Head-quarters:

Foot-artillery, 4 European Battalions, } St Thomas’s Mount,

(4 Companies each.) } Bangalore,

Foot-artillery, 1 Native Battalion. } Kamptee, Saugor,

(6 Companies.) } Secunderabad.

Engineers, Head-quarters: Fort St George.

Sappers and Miners, Head-quarters: Dowlaishweram.

REGIMENTS AND STATIONS OF BOMBAY ARMY—MAY 1857.

SIR HENRY SOMERSET, Commander-in-chief.

_European Cavalry._

14th Light Dragoons (Queen’s), Kirkee.

_Native Regular Cavalry._

1st Lancers, Nuseerabad.

2d Light Cavalry, Rajcote.

3d Light Cavalry, [Persia.]

_Native Irregular Cavalry._

1st Sinde Irregular Horse, Jacobabad.

2d Sinde Irregular Horse, Jacobabad.

Poonah Irregular Horse, [Persia.]

Gujerat Irregular Horse, Ahmedabad.

South Mahratta Irregular Horse, [Persia.]

Cutch Irregular Horse, Bhooj.

_European Infantry._

64th Foot (Queen’s), [Persia.]

78th Foot (Queen’s), Poonah.

86th Foot (Queen’s), Kurachee.

1st Fusiliers (East India Company’s), Kurachee.

2d Light Infantry (East India Company’s), [Persia.]

3d Light Infantry (East India Company’s), Poonah.

_Native Regular Infantry._

1st Regiment,[46] Baroda.

2d[46] Regiment, Ahmedabad.

3d Regiment, Sholapore.

4th[47] Regiment, [Persia.]

5th Regiment, Bombay.

6th Regiment, Poonah.

7th Regiment, Poonah.

8th Regiment, Baroda.

9th Regiment, Surat.

10th Regiment, Nuseerabad.

11th Regiment, Bombay.

12th Regiment, Deesa.

13th Regiment, Hydrabad.

14th Regiment, Kurachee.

15th Regiment, Bombay.

16th Regiment, Shikarpore.

17th Regiment, Bhooj.

18th Regiment, [Aden.]

19th Regiment, Mulligaum.

20th Regiment, [Persia]

21st Regiment, Neemuch.

22d Regiment, Satara.

23d Regiment, [Persia.]

24th Regiment, Ahmednuggur.

25th Regiment, Ahmedabad.

26th Regiment, [Persia.]

27th Regiment, Kolapore.

28th Regiment, Dharwar.

29th Regiment, Belgaum.

_Native Irregular Infantry._

1st Belooch Battalion, Kurachee.

2d Belooch Battalion, [Persia.]

Khandeish Bheel Corps, Dhurrungaum.

Rutnagherry Rangers, Rutnagherry.

Sawunt Waree Corps, Sawunt

Waree.

Satara Local Corps, Satara.

Kolapore Infantry Corps, Kolapore.

_Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners._

Horse-artillery, 1 European Brigade. }

(4 Troops.)[48] } Head-quarters:

Foot-artillery, 2 European Battalions. } Bombay.

(4 Companies each.) } Ahmedabad.

Foot-artillery, 2 Native Battalions. } Ahmednuggur.

(6 Companies each.) }

Engineers, Head-quarters: Bombay,

Sappers and Miners, Head-quarters: Poonah and

Aden.

[Illustration:

Jumma Musjid, Agra.—Mosque built by Shah Jehan in 1656.

]

-----

Footnote 34:

┌───────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────┐

│Presidency.│ Queen’s │Company’s │Total.│

│ │Regiments.│Regiments.│ │

├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤

│Bengal, │ 16│ 3│ 19│

│Madras, │ 4│ 3│ 7│

│Bombay, │ 4│ 3│ 7│

├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤

│ │ 24│ 9│ 33│

└───────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────┘

Footnote 35:

┌───────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────┐

│Presidency.│ Queen’s │Company’s │Total.│

│ │Regiments.│Regiments.│ │

├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤

│Bengal, │ 15│ 4│ 19│

│Madras, │ 5│ 4│ 9│

│Bombay, │ 4│ 3│ 7│

├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤

│ │ 24│ 11│ 35│

└───────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────┘

Footnote 36:

_First Division_, under Major-general Stalker—

Natives, 3550

Europeans, 2270

————

5820

_Second Division_, under Brigadier-general Havelock—

Natives, 4370

Europeans, 1770

————

6140

Footnote 37:

In August 1857, of the whole railway distance marked out from

Alexandria through Cairo to Suez, 205 miles in length, about 175 miles

were finished—namely, from Alexandria to the crossing of the Nile, 65

miles; from the crossing of the Nile to Cairo, 65 miles; from Cairo

towards Suez, 45 miles. The remainder of the journey consisted of 30

miles of sandy desert, not at that time provided with a railway, but

traversed by omnibuses or vans.

Footnote 38:

‘According to existing regulations of some years’ standing, every

soldier on his arrival in India is provided with the following

articles of clothing, in addition to those which compose his kit in

this country:

‘Mounted Men.—4 white jackets, 6 pair of white overalls, 2 pair of

Settringee overalls, 6 shirts, 4 pair of cotton socks, 1 pair of white

braces.

‘Foot-soldiers.—4 white jackets, 1 pair of English summer trousers, 5

pair of white trousers, 5 white shirts, 2 check shirts, 1 pair of

white braces.

‘These articles are not supplied in this country, but form a part of

the soldier’s necessaries on his arrival in India, and are composed of

materials made on the spot, and best suited to the climate.

‘During his stay in India, China, Ceylon, and at other hot stations,

he is provided with a tunic and shell-jacket in alternate years; and

in the year in which the tunic is not issued, the difference in the

value of the two articles is paid to the soldier, to be expended (by

the officer commanding) for his benefit in any articles suited to the

climate of the station.

‘The force recently sent out to China and India has been provided with

white cotton helmet and forage-cap covers.

‘Any quantity of light clothing for troops can be procured on the spot

in India at the shortest notice.’

Footnote 39:

Grenadiers.

Footnote 40:

Volunteers.

Footnote 41:

Volunteers.

Footnote 42:

Goorkhas.

Footnote 43:

Removed to Calcutta.

Footnote 44:

Rifles.

Footnote 45:

Grenadiers.