[Sidenote: The various views held in Greece as to the Roman policy.]
+1.+ There was a great deal of talk of all sorts in Greece, first as
to the Carthaginians when the Romans conquered them, and subsequently
as to the question of the pseudo-Philip. The opinions expressed
in regard to the Carthaginians were widely divided, and indicated
entirely opposite views. Some commended the Romans for their wise
and statesmanlike policy in regard to that kingdom. For the removal
of a perpetual menace, and the utter destruction of a city which had
disputed the supremacy with them, and could even then if it got an
opportunity have still been disputing it,—thus securing the supremacy
for their own country,—were the actions of sensible and far-sighted
men. Others contradicted this, and asserted that the Romans had no
such policy in view when they obtained their supremacy; and that
they had gradually and insensibly become perverted to the same
ambition for power, which had once characterised the Athenians and
Lacedaemonians; and though they had advanced more slowly than these
last, that they would from all appearances yet arrive at the same
consummation. For in old times they had only carried on war until
their opponents were beaten, and induced to acknowledge the obligation
of obedience and acceptance of their orders; but that nowadays they
had given a foretaste of their policy by their conduct to Perseus,
in utterly destroying the Macedonian dynasty root and branch, and
had given the finishing stroke to that policy by the course adopted
in regard to the Carthaginians; for though this latter people had
committed no act of irretrievable outrage, they had taken measures
of irretrievable severity against them, in spite of their offering
to accept any terms, and submitting to any injunctions that might be
placed upon them. Others again said that the Romans were generally a
truly civilised people; and that they had this peculiarity, on which
they prided themselves, that they conducted their wars openly and
generously, not employing night surprises or ambuscades, but scorning
every advantage to be gained by stratagem and deceit, and regarding
open and face-to-face combats as alone becoming to their character:
but that in the present instance their whole campaign against the
Carthaginians had been conducted by means of stratagem and deceit.
Little by little,—by holding out inducements here, and practising
concealment there,—they had deprived them of all hopes of assistance
from their allies. This was a line of conduct more appropriate by
rights to the intriguing chicanery of a monarchy, than to a republican
and Roman policy. Again, there were some who took the opposite line
to these. They said that if it were really true that, before the
Carthaginians had made the surrender, the Romans had behaved as
alleged, holding out inducements here, and making half revelations
there, they would be justly liable to such charges; but if, on the
contrary, it was only after the Carthaginians had themselves made the
surrender,—acknowledging the right of the Romans to take what measures
they chose concerning them,—that the latter in the exercise of their
undoubted right had imposed and enjoined what they determined upon,
then this action must cease to be looked on as partaking of the nature
of impiety or treachery. And some denied that it was an impiety at all:
for there were three ways in which such a thing could be defined, none
of which applied to the conduct of the Romans. An impiety was something
done against the gods, or one’s parents, or the dead; treachery
was something done in violation of oaths or written agreements; an
injustice something done in violation of law and custom. But the Romans
could not be charged on any one of these counts: they had offended
neither the gods, their parents, nor the dead; nor had they broken
oaths or treaties, but on the contrary charged the Carthaginians with
breaking them. Nor again had they violated laws, customs, or their own
good faith; for having received a voluntary surrender, with the full
power of doing what they pleased in the event of the submitting party
not obeying their injunctions, they had, in view of that eventuality
having arisen, applied force to them.
[Sidenote: The pretended Philip, son of Perseus, B.C. 149.]
+2.+ Such were the criticisms commonly made on the dealings of the
Romans with the Carthaginians. But as to the Pseudo-Philip, the report
at first appeared quite beneath consideration. A Philip suddenly
appears in Macedonia, as though he had dropped from the skies, in
contempt of Macedonians and Romans alike, without having the least
reasonable pretext for his claim, as every one knew that the real
Philip had died in Alba in Italy two years after Perseus himself. But
when, three or four months afterwards, a report arrived that he had
conquered the Macedonians in a battle in the territory of the Odomanti
beyond the Strymon, some believed it, but the majority were still
incredulous. But presently, when news came that he had conquered the
Macedonians in a battle on this side of the Strymon, and was master of
all Macedonia; and when letters and envoys came from the Thessalians to
the Achaeans imploring help, as though the danger were now affecting
Thessaly, it seemed an astonishing and inexplicable event; for there
was nothing to give it the air of probability, or to supply a rational
explanation of it.
Such was the view taken of these things in Greece....
[Sidenote: Polybius sent for to negotiate with Carthage, B.C. 149.]
+3.+ A despatch from Manius Manilius to the Achaeans having reached the
Peloponnese, saying that they would oblige him by sending Polybius of
Megalopolis with all speed to Lilybaeum, as he was wanted on account of
certain public affairs, the Achaeans decided to send him in accordance
with the letter of the consul. And as I felt bound to obey the Romans,
I put everything else aside, and sailed at the beginning of summer.
But when we arrived at Corcyra, we found another despatch from the
consul to the Corcyreans had come, announcing that the Carthaginians
had already surrendered all the hostages to them, and were prepared to
obey them.[240] Thinking, therefore, that the war was at an end, and
that there was no more occasion for our services, we sailed back to the
Peloponnese....
+4.+ It should not excite surprise that I sometimes designate
myself by my proper name, and at other times by the common forms of
expression—for instance, “when _I_ had said this,” or “we had agreed to
this.” For as I was much personally involved in the transactions about
to be related, it becomes necessary to vary the methods of indicating
myself; that I may not weary by continual repetition of my own name,
nor again by introducing the words “of me,” or “through me,” at every
turn, fall insensibly into an appearance of egotism. I wished, on the
contrary, by an interchangeable use of these terms, and by selecting
from time to time the one which seemed most in place, to avoid, as
far as could be, the offensiveness of talk about one’s self; for such
talk, though naturally unacceptable, is frequently inevitable, when one
cannot in any other way give a clear exposition of the subjects. I am
somewhat assisted in this point by the accident that, as far as I know,
no one up to our own time has ever had the same name as myself.[241]...
+5.+ The statues of Callicrates[242] were carried in under the cover
of darkness, while those of Lycortas were brought out again by broad
daylight, to occupy their original position: and this coincidence drew
the remark from every one, that we ought never to use our opportunities
against others in a spirit of presumption, knowing that it is extremely
characteristic of Fortune to subject those who set a precedent to the
operation of their own ideas and principles in their turn....
The mere love of novelty inherent in mankind is a sufficient incentive
to any kind of change....
[Sidenote: Mission to Bithynia to investigate the quarrel between
Nicomedes (II.) and his father Prusias II. See _supra_, 32, 28, B.C.
148.]
+6.+ The Romans sent envoys to restrain the impetuosity of Nicomedes
and to prevent Attalus from going to war with Prusias. The men
appointed were Marcus Licinius, who was suffering from gout, and was
quite lamed by it, and with him Aulus Mancinus, who, from a tile
falling on his head, had so many and such great scars on it, that
it was a matter of wonder that he escaped with his life, and Lucius
Malleolus who was reputed the stupidest man in Rome. As the business
required speed and boldness, these men seemed the least suitable
possible for the purpose that could be conceived; and accordingly they
say that Marcus Porcius Cato remarked in the Senate that “Not only
would Prusias perish before they got there, but that Nicomedes would
grow old in his kingdom. For how could a mission make haste, or if it
did, how could it accomplish anything, when it had neither feet, head,
nor intelligence?”...
[Sidenote: Character of Prusias II.]
+7.+ King Prusias was exceedingly repulsive in personal appearance,
though his reasoning powers were somewhat superior: but externally he
seemed only half a man, and was cowardly and effeminate in all matters
pertaining to war. For not only was he timid, but he was averse to
all hardships, and in a word was utterly unmanned in mind and body
throughout his whole life; qualities which all the world object to
in kings, but the Bithynians above all people. Moreover, he was also
exceedingly dissolute in regard to sensual pleasures; was completely
without education or philosophy, or any of the knowledge which they
embrace; and had not the remotest idea of what virtue is. He lived the
barbaric life of a Sardanapallus day and night. Accordingly, directly
his subjects got the least hope of being able to do so, they conceived
an implacable resolution not only to throw off allegiance to the king,
but to press for vengeance upon him.[243]...
+8.+ Museium is a place near Olympus in Macedonia....
[Sidenote: Limits to the belief of the direct interference of
Providence in human affairs.]
[Sidenote: The inexplicable conduct of the Macedonians.]
+9.+ As I blame those who assign fortune and destiny as the moving
causes in common events and catastrophes, I wish now to enter as
minutely on the discussion of this subject as the nature of an
historical work will admit. Those things of which it is impossible or
difficult for a mere man to ascertain the causes, such as a continuous
fall of rains and unseasonable wet, or, on the contrary, droughts
and frosts, one may reasonably impute to God and Fortune, in default
of any other explanation; and from them come destruction of fruits,
as well as long-continued epidemics, and other similar things, of
which it is not easy to find the cause. On such matters then, we, in
default of a better, follow the prevailing opinions of the multitude,
attempting by supplications and sacrifices to appease the wrath of
heaven, and sending to ask the gods by what words or actions on our
part a change for the better may be brought about, and a respite be
obtained for the evils which are afflicting us. But those things, of
which it is possible to find the origin and cause of their occurrence,
I do not think we should refer to the gods. I mean such a thing as the
following. In our time all Greece was visited by a dearth of children
and generally a decay of population, owing to which the cities were
denuded of inhabitants, and a failure of productiveness resulted,
though there were no long-continued wars or serious pestilences among
us. If, then, any one had advised our sending to ask the gods in regard
to this, what we were to do or say in order to become more numerous
and better fill our cities,—would he not have seemed a futile person,
when the cause was manifest and the cure in our own hands? For this
evil grew upon us rapidly, and without attracting attention, by our men
becoming perverted to a passion for show and money and the pleasures
of an idle life, and accordingly either not marrying at all, or, if
they did marry, refusing to rear the children that were born, or at
most one or two out of a great number, for the sake of leaving them
well off or bringing them up in extravagant luxury. For when there are
only one or two sons, it is evident that, if war or pestilence carries
off one, the houses must be left heirless: and, like swarms of bees,
little by little the cities become sparsely inhabited and weak. On this
subject there is no need to ask the gods how we are to be relieved from
such a curse: for any one in the world will tell you that it is by the
men themselves if possible changing their objects of ambition; or, if
that cannot be done, by passing laws for the preservation of infants.
On this subject there is no need of seers or prodigies. And the same
holds good of all similar things. But in regard to events of which
the causes are impossible or difficult to discover, it is reasonable
to feel a difficulty. And in this class may be reckoned the course of
Macedonian history. For the Macedonians had enjoyed many important
favours at the hands of the Romans, having been as a nation liberated
from arbitrary government and imports, and having obtained undisputed
freedom in the place of slavery; and having been individually relieved
to a great extent from intestine factions and civil bloodshed.[244]...
They had been worsted by the Romans formerly when fighting on the side
of Demetrius[245] and again on that of Perseus; yet when engaged on the
side of a man of odious character,[246] and in support of his claims
to the throne, they displayed great courage and conquered a Roman
army. These facts may well seem a puzzle to us, for it is difficult to
discover their cause. And accordingly one would be inclined to say in
such matters that what had happened was a heaven-sent infatuation, and
that the wrath of God had fallen upon the Macedonians. And this will be
rendered evident from what remains to be told....
[Sidenote: Death of Massanissa B.C. 148. His fortunate career and
physical vigour.]
+10.+ Massanissa, king of the Numidians in Africa, was the best man of
all the kings of our time, and the most completely fortunate; for he
reigned more than sixty years in the soundest health and to extreme old
age,—for he was ninety when he died. He was, besides, the most powerful
man physically of all his contemporaries: for instance, when it was
necessary to stand, he would do so without moving a foot all day long;
and again, when he had once sat down to business he remained there the
whole day; nor did it distress him the least to remain in the saddle
day and night continuously; and at ninety years old, at which age he
died, he left a son only four years old, called Sthembanus, who was
afterwards adopted by Micipses, and four sons besides. Owing, again,
to the affection existing between these sons, he kept his whole life
free from any treasonable plot and his kingdom unpolluted by any family
tragedy. But his greatest and most divine achievement was this: Numidia
had been before his time universally unproductive, and was looked upon
as incapable of producing any cultivated fruits. He was the first and
only man who showed that it could produce cultivated fruits just as
well as any other country whatever, by cultivating farms to the extent
of ten thousand plethra for each of his sons in different parts of it.
On this man’s death, then, so much may reasonably and justly be said.
Scipio arrived at Cirta on the third day after his departure, and
settled everything properly and fairly.[247]...
A little while before his death he was seen, on the day following a
great victory over the Carthaginians, sitting outside his tent eating
a piece of dirty bread, and on those who saw it expressing surprise at
his doing so, he said.[248]...