[Sidenote: The siege of Carthage, B.C. 147. Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio
Africanus Aemilianus, C. Livius Drusus.]
[Sidenote: Interview between Hasdrubal and King Gulussa.]
+1.+ Hasdrubal, the general of the Carthaginians, was a vain
ostentatious person, very far from possessing real strategic ability.
There are numerous proofs of his want of judgment. In the first place
he appeared in full armour in his interview with Gulussa, king of
the Numidians, with a purple dyed robe over his armour fastened by
a brooch, and attended by ten bodyguards armed with swords; and in
the next place, having advanced in front of these armed attendants
to a distance of about twenty feet, he stood behind the trench and
palisade and beckoned the king to come to him, whereas it ought to
have been quite the other way. However, Gulussa, after the Numidian
fashion, being not inclined to stand on ceremony, advanced towards him
unattended, and when he got near him asked him “Whom he was afraid of
that he had come in full armour?” And on his answering, “The Romans,”
Gulussa remarked: “Then you should not have trusted yourself to the
city, when there was no necessity for your doing so. However, what do
you want, and what do you ask me to do?” To which Hasdrubal replied:
“I want you to go as our ambassador to the Roman commander, and to
undertake for us that we will obey every injunction; only I beg of you
both to abstain from harming this wretched city.” Then said Gulussa:
“Your demand appears to me to be quite childish! Why, my good sir,
what you failed to get by your embassies from the Romans, who were
then quietly encamped at Utica, and before a blow had been struck,—how
can you expect to have granted you now, when you have been completely
invested by sea and land, and have almost given up every hope of
safety?” To which Hasdrubal replied that “Gulussa was ill informed; for
they still had good hopes of their outside allies,”—for he had not yet
heard about the Mauretani, and thought that the forces in the country
were still unconquered,[249]—“nor were they in despair as to their own
ultimate safety. And above all, they trusted in the support of the
gods, and in what they might expect from them; for they believed that
they would not disregard the flagrant violation of treaty from which
they were suffering, but would give them many opportunities of securing
their safety. Therefore he called on the Roman commander in the name
of the gods and of Fortune to spare the city; with the distinct
understanding that, if its inhabitants failed to obtain this grace,
they would be cut to pieces to the last man sooner than evacuate it.”
After some more conversation of the same sort, these men separated for
the present, having made an appointment to meet again on the third day
from that time.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s scorn of the proposal, B.C. 147.]
[Sidenote: Comparison between Hasdrubal and Diaeus.]
[Sidenote: The selfish and tyrannical conduct of Hasdrubal.]
[Sidenote: He offers Hasdrubal personal security for delivering the
town.]
+2.+ On Gulussa communicating to him what had been said, Scipio
remarked with a laugh: “Oh, then, it was because you intended to
make this demand that you displayed that abominable cruelty to our
prisoners![250] And you trust in the gods, do you, after violating
even the laws of men?” The king went on to remind Scipio that above
all things it was necessary to finish the business speedily; for,
apart from unforeseen contingencies, the consular elections were now
close at hand, and it was only right to have regard to that, lest,
if the winter found them just where they were, another Consul would
come to supersede him, and without any trouble get all the credit of
his labours. These words induced Scipio to give directions to offer
Hasdrubal safety for himself, his wife and children, and ten families
of his friends and relations, and permission to take ten talents of
his private property and to bring out with him whichever of his slaves
he chose. With these concessions therefore Gulussa went to his meeting
with Hasdrubal on the third day, who again came forward with great pomp
and at a dignified step, clothed in his purple robe and full suit of
armour, so as to cast the tyrants of tragedy far into the shade. He
was naturally fat, but at that time he had grown extremely corpulent,
and had become more than usually red from exposure to the sun, so that
he seemed to be living like fat oxen at a fair; and not at all like
a man to be in command at a time of such terrible miseries as cannot
easily be described in words. When he met the king, and heard the offer
of the Consul, he slapped his thigh again and again, and appealing to
the gods and Fortune declared that “The day would never come on which
Hasdrubal would behold the sun and his native city in flames; for to
the nobly-minded one’s country and its burning houses were a glorious
funeral pile.” These expressions force us to feel some admiration for
the man and the nobility of his language; but when we come to view his
administration of affairs, we cannot fail to be struck by his want
of spirit and courage; for at a time when his fellow-citizens were
absolutely perishing with famine, he gave banquets and had second
courses put on of a costly kind, and by his own excellent physical
condition made their misery more conspicuous. For the number of the
dying surpassed belief, as well as the number who deserted every day
from hunger. However, by fiercely rebuking some, and by executing as
well as abusing others, he cowed the common people: and by this means
retained, in a country reduced to the lowest depths of misfortune, an
authority which a tyrant would scarcely enjoy in a prosperous city.
Therefore I think I was justified in saying that two leaders more like
each other than those who at that time directed the affairs of Greece
and Carthage it would not be easy to find. And this will be rendered
manifest when we come to a formal comparison of them....
[Sidenote: The ill-luck which occasioned the fall of Greece.]
[Sidenote: The fall of Greece was even more lamentable than that of
Carthage.]
+3.+ My thirty-eighth book embraces the consummation of the misfortunes
of Greece. For though Greece as a whole, as well as separate parts of
it, has on several occasions sustained grave disasters, yet to none
of her previous defeats could the word “misfortune” be more properly
applied, than to those which have befallen her in our time. For it is
not only that the _sufferings_ of Greece excite compassion: stronger
still is the conviction, which a knowledge of the truth of the several
occurrences must bring, that in all she undertook she was supremely
unfortunate. At any rate, though the disaster of Carthage is looked
upon as of the severest kind, yet one cannot but regard that of Greece
as not less, and in some respects even more so. For the Carthaginians
at any rate left something for posterity to say on their behalf; but
the mistakes of the Greeks were so glaring that they made it impossible
for those who wished to support them to do so. Besides, the destruction
of the Carthaginians was immediate and total, so that they had no
feeling afterwards of their disasters: but the Greeks, with their
misfortunes ever before their eyes, handed down to their children’s
children the loss of all that once was theirs. And in proportion as
we regard those who live in pain as more pitiable than those who lose
their lives at the moment of their misfortunes, in that proportion must
the disasters of the Greeks be regarded as more pitiable than those of
the Carthaginians,—unless a man thinks nothing of dignity and honour,
and gives his opinion from a regard only to material advantage. To
prove the truth of what I say, one has only to remember and compare the
misfortunes in Greece reputed to be the heaviest with what I have just
now mentioned.
[Sidenote: Comparison between the fall of Greece under the Romans with]
[Sidenote: the Persian invasion, B.C. 480.]
[Sidenote: The defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami, B.C. 405,]
[Sidenote: of the Spartans at Leuctra, B.C. 371.]
[Sidenote: The destruction of Mantinea, B.C. 362,]
[Sidenote: and of Thebes, B.C. 335.]
+4.+ Now, the greatest alarm that fortune ever brought upon the Greeks
was when Xerxes invaded Europe: for at that time all were exposed to
danger though an extremely small number actually suffered disaster. The
greatest sufferers were the Athenians: for, with a prudent foresight
of what was coming, they abandoned their country with their wives and
children. That crisis then caused them damage; for the Barbarians
took Athens and laid it waste with savage violence: but it brought
them no shame or disgrace. On the contrary, they gained the highest
glory in the eyes of all the world for having regarded everything as
of less importance, in comparison with taking their share in the same
fortune as the other Greeks. Accordingly, in consequence of their
exalted conduct, they not only immediately recovered their own city
and territory, but soon afterwards disputed the supremacy in Greece
with the Lacedaemonians. Subsequently, indeed, they were beaten by the
Spartans in war, and forced to submit to the destruction of their own
city walls: but even this one might assert to be a reproach to the
Lacedaemonians, for having used the power put into their hands with
excessive severity, rather than to the Athenians. Then the Spartans
once more, being beaten by the Thebans, lost the supremacy in Greece,
and after that defeat were deprived of their outside rule and reduced
to the frontiers of Laconia. But what disgrace was there in having
retired, while disputing for the most honourable objects, to the limits
of their ancestral dominion? Therefore, these events we may speak of
as failures, but not as misfortunes in any sense. The Mantineans again
were forced to leave their city, being divided out and scattered into
separate villages by the Lacedaemonians; but for this all the world
blamed the folly, not of the Mantineans, but of the Lacedaemonians.
The Thebans, indeed, besides the loss of their army, saw their country
depopulated at the time when Alexander, having resolved on the invasion
of Asia, conceived that by making an example of Thebes he should
establish a tenor that would act as a check upon the Greeks, while his
attention was distracted upon other affairs: but at that time all the
world pitied the Thebans as having been treated with injustice and
harshness, and no one was found to justify this proceeding of Alexander.
[Sidenote: The tyranny of the later kings of Macedonia.]
[Sidenote: But the last fall of Greece was embittered by the fact that
it came from the folly of the Greeks themselves]
[Sidenote: rather than of their leaders.]
+5.+ Accordingly after a short time they obtained assistance, and
once more inhabited their country in security. For the compassion of
foreigners is no small benefit to those who are unjustly dispossessed;
since we often see that, with the change of feeling among the many,
Fortune also changes; and even the conquerors themselves repent, and
make good the disasters of those who have fallen under undeserved
misfortunes. Once more, at certain periods the Chalcidians and
Corinthians and some other cities, owing to the advantages of their
situation, were attacked by kings of Macedonia, and had garrisons
imposed on them: but when they were thus enslaved all the world were
eager to do their best to liberate them, and loathed their enslavers
and regarded them continually as their enemies. But above all, up to
this time it was generally single states that were depopulated, and
in single states that reverses were met with, in some cases while
disputing for supremacy and empire, and in others from the treacherous
attacks of despots and kings: so that, so far from their losses
bringing them any reproach, they escaped even the name of misfortune.
For we must look on all those who meet with incalculable disasters
whether private or public as the victims of losses, and those only
to be “unfortunate,” to whom events through their own folly bring
dishonour. Instances of this last are the Peloponnesians, Boeotians,
Phocians, ... and Locrians, some of the dwellers on the Ionian gulf,
and next to these the Macedonians, ... who all as a rule did not
merely suffer loss, but were “unfortunate,” with a misfortune of the
gravest kind and for which they were themselves open to reproach:
for they displayed at once want of good faith and want of courage,
brought upon themselves a series of disgraces, lost all that could
bring them honour, ... and voluntarily admitted into their towns the
Roman fasces and axes. They were in the utmost panic, in fact, owing
to the extravagance of their own wrongful acts, if one ought to call
them their own; for I should rather say that the peoples as such were
entirely ignorant, and were beguiled from the path of right: but that
the men who _acted_ wrongly were the authors of this delusion.
+6.+ In regard to these men, it should not be a matter of surprise if
we leave for a while the ordinary method and spirit of our narrative
to give a clearer and more elaborate exposition of their character.
I am aware that some may be found, regarding it as their first duty
to cast a veil over the errors of the Greeks, to accuse us of writing
in a spirit of malevolence. But for myself, I conceive that with
right-minded persons a man will never be regarded as a true friend
who shrinks from and is afraid of plain speech, nor indeed as a good
citizen who abandons the truth because of the offence he will give
to certain persons at the time. But a writer of public history above
all deserves no indulgence whatever, who regards anything of superior
importance to truth. For in proportion as written history reaches
larger numbers, and survives for longer time, than words spoken to
suit an occasion, both the writer ought to be still more particular
about truth, and his readers ought to admit his authority only so far
as he adheres to this principle. At the actual hour of danger it is
only right that Greeks should help Greeks in every possible way, by
protecting them, veiling their errors or deprecating the wrath of the
sovereign people,—and this I genuinely did for my part at the actual
time: but it is also right, in regard to the record of events to be
transmitted to posterity, to leave them unmixed with any falsehood:
so that readers should not be merely gratified for the moment by a
pleasant tale, but should receive in their souls a lesson which will
prevent a repetition of similar errors in the future. Enough, however,
on this subject....
_In the autumn of_ B.C. _150 the corrupt Menalcidas of Sparta was
succeeded as Achaean Strategus by Diaeus, who, to cover his share
in the corruption of Menalcidas, induced the league to act in the
matter of some disputed claim of Sparta in a manner contrary to the
decisions of the Roman Senate. The Spartans wished to appeal again to
Rome; whereupon the Achaeans passed a law forbidding separate cities
to make such appeals, which were to be only made by the league. The
Lacedaemonians took up arms: and Diaeus professing that the league was
not at war with Sparta, but with certain factious citizens of that
city, named four of its chief men who were to be banished. They fled to
Rome, where the Senate ordered their restoration. Embassies went from
Achaia and from Sparta to Rome to state their respective cases; and on
their return gave false reports,—Diaeus assuring the Achaeans that the
Senate had ordered the Spartans to obey the league; Menalchidas telling
the Spartans that the Romans had released them from all connexion with
the league. War then again broke out (B.C. 148). Metellus, who was in
Macedonia on the business of the Pseudo-Philip, sent legates to the
Achaeans forbidding them to bear arms against Sparta, and announcing
the speedy arrival of commissioners from Rome to settle the dispute.
But the Achaean levies were already mustered under the Strategus
Damocritus, and the Lacedaemonians seem to have almost compelled them
to fight. The Spartans were beaten with considerable loss: and on
Damocritus preventing a pursuit and a capture of Sparta, the Achaeans
regarded him as traitor and fined him fifty talents. He was succeeded
in his office of Strategus by Diaeus (autumn B.C. 148-B.C. 147) who
promised Metellus to await the arrival of the commissioners from
Rome. But the Spartans now assumed their freedom from the league and
elected a Strategus of their own, Menalchidas; who provoked a renewal
of the war by taking the town of Iasos on the Laconian frontier. In
despair of resisting the attack of the Achaeans, and disowned by his
fellow-citizens, he took poison. The Roman commissioners arrived, led
by L. Aurelius Orestes, in B.C. 147, and summoning the magistrates of
the Achaean towns and the Strategus Diaeus before them at Corinth,
announced the decision of the Senate—separating Lacedaemon, Corinth,
Argos, Heraclea near Aete, and Orchomenus in Arcadia from the Achaean
league, as not being united by blood, and only being subsequent
additions. The magistrates, without answering, hastily summoned the
league congress. The people, on hearing the Roman decision, pillaged
the houses of the Lacedaemonian residents in Corinth, and savagely
attacked all who were or who looked like Spartans. The Roman envoys
endeavoured to restrain the popular fury. But they were somewhat
roughly handled themselves; and the people could not be persuaded to
release the Spartans whom they had arrested: though they let all others
go, and sent an embassy to Rome, which, however, meeting the former
embassy on its return, and learning the hopelessness of support in
Rome, returned home. It is this outbreak which is referred to in the
next fragment. See Pausanias, vii. 12-14; Livy_, Ep. 51.
[Sidenote: On the report of L. Aurelius Orestes of the disturbance at
Corinth, B.C. 147,]
[Sidenote: the Senate send a fresh commission to warn the Achaeans.]
+7.+ When the commissioners with L. Aurelius Orestes arrived in Rome
from the Peloponnese, they reported what had taken place, and declared
that they had a narrow escape of actually losing their lives. They made
the most of the occurrence and put the worst interpretation upon it;
for they represented the violence which had been offered them as not
the result of a sudden outbreak, but of a deliberate intention on the
part of the Achaeans to inflict a signal insult upon them. The Senate
was therefore more angry than it had ever been, and at once appointed
Sextus Julius Caesar and other envoys with instructions to rebuke and
upbraid the Achaeans for what had occurred, yet in terms of moderation,
but to exhort them “not to listen to evil councillors, not to allow
themselves to be betrayed into hostility with Rome, but even yet to
make amends for their acts of folly by inflicting punishment on the
authors of the crime.” This was a clear proof that the Senate gave
its instructions to Aurelius and his colleagues, not with the view
of dismembering the league, but with the object of restraining the
obstinacy and hostility of the Achaeans by terrifying and overawing
them. Some people accordingly imagined that the Romans were acting
hypocritically, because the Carthaginian war was still unfinished; but
this was not the case. The fact is, that they had long regarded the
Achaean league with favour, believing it to be the most trustworthy of
all the Greek governments; and though now they were resolved to give it
an alarm, because it had become too lofty in its pretensions, yet they
were by no means minded to go to war or to have a serious quarrel with
the Achaeans....
[Sidenote: Arrival of Sextus Julius and the commissioners in Achaia.]
[Sidenote: Conference at Aegium. The envoys are conciliatory.]
[Sidenote: Action of Diaeus ans Critolaus and their party.]
+8.+ As Sextus Julius Caesar and his colleagues were on their way
from Rome to the Peloponnese, they were met by Thearidas and the
other envoys, sent by the Achaeans to make their excuse and give the
Senate an explanation of the intemperate acts committed in regard to
Aurelius Orestes. But Sextus Julius persuaded them to turn back to
Achaia, on the ground that he and his colleagues were coming with full
instructions to communicate with the Achaeans on all these points.
When Sextus arrived in the Peloponnese, and in a conference with the
Achaeans in Aegium spoke with great kindness, he made no mention of
the injurious treatment of the legates, and scarcely demanded any
defence at all, but took a more lenient view of what had happened than
even the Achaeans themselves; and dwelt chiefly on the subject of
exhorting them not to carry their error any further, in regard either
to the Romans or the Lacedaemonians. Thereupon the more sober-minded
party received the speech with satisfaction, and were strongly moved
to obey the suggestions, because they were conscious of the gravity of
what they had been doing, and had before their eyes what happened to
opponents of Rome; but the majority, though they had not a word to say
against the justice of the injunctions of Sextus Julius, and were quite
silent, yet remained deeply tainted with disaffection. And Diaeus and
Critolaus, and all who shared their sentiments,—and they consisted of
all the greatest rascals in every city, men at war with the gods, and
pests of the community, carefully selected,—took, as the proverb has
it, with the left hand what the Romans gave with the right, and went
utterly and entirely wrong in their calculations. For they supposed
that the Romans, owing to the troubles in Libya and Iberia, feared a
war with the Achaeans and would submit to anything and say anything.
Thinking, therefore, that the hour was their own, they answered the
Roman envoys politely that “They would, nevertheless, send Thearidas
and his colleagues to the Senate; while they would themselves accompany
the legates to Tegea, and there in consultation with the Lacedaemonians
would provide for some settlement of the war that would meet the views
of both parties.” With this answer they subsequently induced the
unhappy nation to follow the senseless course to which they had long
before made up their mind. And this result was only what might have
been expected from the inexperience and corruption of the prevailing
party.
[Sidenote: Conference at Tegea. Critolaus contrives to avoid a
settlement.]
+9.+ But the finishing stroke to this ruinous policy was given in the
following manner. When Sextus and his colleagues arrived at Tegea,
and invited the attendance of the Lacedaemonians, in order to arrange
terms between them and the Achaeans, both as to the satisfaction to be
given for previous complaints and for putting a stop to the war, until
the Romans should send commissioners to review the whole question,
Critolaus and his party, having held a conference, decided that all
the rest should avoid the meeting, and that Critolaus should go alone
to Tegea. When Sextus and his fellow-commissioners therefore had
almost given them up, Critolaus arrived; and when the meeting with the
Lacedaemonians took place, he would settle nothing,—alleging that he
had no authority to make any arrangement without the consent of the
people at large; but that he would bring the matter before the Achaeans
at their next congress, which must be held six months from that time.
Sextus and his fellow-commissioners, therefore, convinced of the ill
disposition of Critolaus, and much annoyed at his conduct, dismissed
the Lacedaemonians to their own country, and themselves returned to
Italy with strong views as to the folly and infatuation of Critolaus.
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 147-146. Critolaus propagates his anti-Roman
views;]
[Sidenote: and suspends cash payments.]
After their departure Critolaus spent the winter in visiting the cities
and holding assemblies in them, on the pretext that he wished to inform
them of what he had said to the Lacedaemonians at Tegea, but in reality
to denounce the Romans and to put an evil interpretation on everything
they said; by which means he inspired the common people in the various
cities with feelings of hostility and hatred for them. At the same
time he sent round orders to the magistrates not to exact money from
debtors, nor to receive prisoners arrested for debt, and to cause loans
on pledge to be held over until the war was decided. By this kind of
appeal to the interests of the vulgar everything he said was received
with confidence; and the common people were ready to obey any order he
gave, being incapable of taking thought for the future, but caught by
the bait of immediate indulgence and relief.
[Sidenote: Fresh legates are sent from Macedonia to Achaia in the
winter of B.C. 147-146.]
[Sidenote: Riotous scene at Corinth.]
+10.+ When Quintus Caecilius Metellus heard in Macedonia of the
commotion and disturbance going on in the Peloponnese, he despatched
thither his legates Gnaeus Papirius and the younger Popilius Laenas,
along with Aulus Gabinius and Gaius Fannius; who, happening to arrive
when the congress was assembled at Corinth, were introduced to the
assembly, and delivered a long and conciliatory speech, much in the
spirit of that of Sextus Julius, exerting themselves with great zeal
to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to an open breach with Rome,
either on the pretext of their grievance against the Lacedaemonians,
or from any feeling of anger against the Romans themselves. But the
assembled people would not hear them; insulting words were loudly
uttered against the envoys, and in the midst of a storm of yells and
tumult they were driven from the assembly. The fact was that such a
crowd of workmen and artisans had been got together as had never been
collected before; for all the cities were in a state of drivelling
folly, and above all the Corinthians _en masse_; and there were only a
very few who heartily approved of the words of the envoys.
[Sidenote: Critolaus makes no secret of his hostility to Rome.]
Critolaus, conceiving that he had attained his purpose, in the midst
of an audience as excited and mad as himself began attacking the
magistrates, abusing all who were opposed to him, and openly defying
the Roman envoys, saying that he was desirous of being a friend of the
Romans, but had no taste for them as his masters. And, finally, he
tried to incite the people by saying that, if they quitted themselves
like men, they would have no lack of allies; but, if they betrayed
womanish fears, they would not want for masters. By many other such
words to the same effect, conceived in the spirit of a charlatan and
huckster, he roused and excited the populace. He attempted also to make
it plain that he was not acting at random in these proceedings, but
that some of the kings and republics were engaged in the same policy as
himself.
[Sidenote: Critolaus carries his point, and induces the Achaeans to
proclaim war against the Lacedaemonians.]
+11.+ And when some of the Gerusia wished to check him, and restrain
him from the use of such expressions, he ordered the soldiers
surrounding him to retire, and stood up fronting his opponents, and
bade any one of them come up to him, come near him, or venture to touch
his chlamys. And, finally, he said that “He had restrained himself now
for a long time; but would endure it no longer, and must speak his
mind. The people to fear were not Lacedaemonians or Romans, but the
traitors among themselves who co-operated with their foes: for there
were some who cared more for Romans and Lacedaemonians than for their
own country.” He added, as a confirmation of his words, that Evagoras
of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea betrayed to Gnaeus Papirius and
his fellow-commissioners all the secret proceedings in the meetings
of the magistrates. And when Stratius acknowledged that he had had
interviews with those men, and should do so again, as they were friends
and allies, but asserted that he had told them nothing of what was
said in the meetings of the magistrates, some few believed him, but
the majority accepted the accusation as true. And so Critolaus, having
inflamed the people by his accusations against these men, induced
the Achaeans once more to decree a war which was nominally against
the Lacedaemonians, but in effect was against the Romans; and he got
another decree added, which was a violation of the constitution,
namely, that whomsoever they should elect as Strategi should have
absolute power in carrying on the war. He thus got for himself
something like a despotism.
[Sidenote: The Roman envoys retire from Corinth.]
Having carried these measures, he began intriguing to bring on an
outbreak and cause an attack upon the Roman envoys. He had no pretext
for doing this; but adopted a course which, of all possible courses,
offends most flagrantly against the laws of gods and man. The envoys,
however, separated; Gnaeus Papirius went to Athens and thence to Sparta
to watch the turn of events; Aulus Gabinius went to Naupactus; and the
other two remained at Athens, waiting for the arrival of Caecilius
Metellus. This was the state of things in the Peloponnese....