PHILIP V. WAGES WAR WITH ATTALUS, KING OF PERGAMUM, AND THE RHODIANS.
See _supra_ 15, 20-24; Livy, 31, 17, _sqq._
[Sidenote: Philip’s impious conduct in Asia, B.C. 201.]
[Sidenote: Zeuxis, Satrap of Antiochus, fails to help Philip
substantially.]
+1.+ King Philip having arrived at Pergamum, and believing that he
had as good as made an end of Attalus, gave the rein to every kind of
outrage; and by way of gratifying his almost insane fury he vented his
wrath even more against the gods than against man. For his skirmishing
attacks being easily repelled by the garrison of Pergamum, owing to the
strength of the place, and being prevented by the precautions taken
by Attalus from getting booty from the country, he directed his anger
against the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures; in which,
as it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself.
He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their stones
broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had destroyed might be
rebuilt. After spoiling the Nicephorium, cutting down its grove, and
demolishing its ring wall, and levelling with the ground many costly
fanes, he first directed his attack upon Thyatira, and thence marched
into the plain of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him
with the richest spoil. But finding himself again disappointed in this
respect, on arriving at the “Holy Village” he sent a message to Zeuxis,
demanding that he would furnish him with corn, and render the other
services stipulated for in the treaty.[66] Zeuxis, however, though
feigning to fulfil the obligations of the treaty, was not minded to
give Philip real and substantial help....
GREAT SEA-FIGHT OFF CHIOS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE ALLIED FLEETS OF
ATTALUS AND RHODES, B.C. 201
[Sidenote: Philip failing to take Chios sails off to Samos.]
[Sidenote: Attalus and Theophiliscus follow him.]
+2.+ As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and the enemy
were blockading him with an increasing number of decked vessels, he
felt uncertain and uneasy as to the result. But as the state of affairs
left him no choice, he suddenly put to sea quite unexpectedly to the
enemy; for Attalus expected that he would persist in pushing on the
mines he had commenced. But Philip was especially keen to make his
putting to sea a surprise, because he thought that he would thus be
able to outstrip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along
the coast to Samos in security. But he was much disappointed in his
calculations; for Attalus and Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they
saw him putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although,
from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where he
was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simultaneously,
still by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to overtake him,
and attacked,—Attalus the enemy’s right wing, which was his leading
squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus intercepted and surrounded,
Philip gave the signal to the ships of his right wing, ordering them
to turn their prows towards the enemy and engage them boldly; while
he himself retreated under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in
the way, with some light galleys, and thence watched the result of
the battle. The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip’s side,
fifty-three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys
and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty; for he had
not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On the side of the
enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels, besides those which came
from Byzantium, and along with them nine _triemioliae_ (light-decked
vessels), and three triremes.
[Sidenote: Incidents in the battle.]
[Sidenote: Loss of Philip’s flagship and admiral.]
[Sidenote: Deinocrates.]
[Sidenote: Dionysodorus.]
+3.+ The fight having been begun on the ship on which King Attalus was
sailing, all the others near began charging each other without waiting
for orders. Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and having struck it
a well-directed blow below the water-line, after a prolonged struggle
between the combatants on the decks, at length succeeded in sinking
it. Philip’s ten-banked ship, which, moreover, was the admiral’s,
was captured by the enemy in an extraordinary manner. For one of the
_triemioliae_, having run close under her, she struck against her
violently amidships, just beneath the thole of the topmost bank of
oars, and got fast jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to
check the way of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging
suspended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn one way
or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes charged her on both
sides at once, and destroyed the vessel itself and the fighting men on
her deck, among whom fell Democrates, Philip’s admiral. At the same
time Dionysodorus and Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals
of the fleet of Attalus, charged, the one upon a seven-banked,
the other upon an eight-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most
extraordinary adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the first place,
came into collision with an eight-banked ship, and had his ship struck
above the water-line; for the enemy’s ship had its prow built high; but
he struck the enemy’s ship below the water-line,[67] and at first could
not get himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water;
and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought with great
gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent danger. Presently,
upon Attalus coming to his aid, and by a vigorous charge separating
the two ships, Deinocrates unexpectedly found himself free, and the
enemy’s boarders were all killed after a gallant resistance, while
their own vessel being left without men was captured by Attalus. In the
next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious charge, missed his blow; but
running up alongside of the enemy lost all the oars on his right side,
and had the timbers supporting his towers smashed to pieces, and was
thereupon immediately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud
shouts and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along
with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to escape by
swimming to the _triemiolia_ which was coming up to the rescue.
[Sidenote: The skill of the Rhodian sailors.]
+4.+ The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an undecided
one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip’s galleys was
compensated for by Attalus’s superiority in the number of his decked
ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip’s fleet the state of things was
that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of the two, Attalus
had the better hope of victory. As for the Rhodians, they were, at
first starting, as I have said, far behind the enemy, but being much
their superiors in speed they managed to come up with the rear of
the Macedonians. At first they charged the vessels on the stern as
they were retiring, and broke off their oars; but upon Philip’s ships
swinging round and beginning to bring help to those in danger, while
those of the Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the
squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line prow
to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh exertions
by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had not the Macedonians
placed their galleys between the opposing lines of decked ships, the
battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved
a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first
charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became
all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it
difficult to sail through the enemy’s line or to avail themselves
of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept
running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the
rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns,
thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct
charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular manœuvre. By
depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the
water-line, while by staving in the enemy’s ships below the water-line
they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded
in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the
Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to
close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row through the
Macedonian line, and disable the enemy’s ships by breaking off their
oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on
the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning;
and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of
their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number
of the enemy’s ships.
[Sidenote: Further incidents in the fight on the left wing. The Rhodian
admiral Theophiliscus mortally wounded.]
+5.+ But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those of three
quinqueremes: the flagship on which Theophiliscus sailed, then that
commanded by Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by Autolycus,
and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy’s
ship, and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus struck sank
with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades, as the sea poured
into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For
a time they defended themselves gallantly, but at last Autolycus
himself was wounded, and fell overboard in his armour, while the rest
of the marines were killed fighting bravely. While this was going on,
Theophiliscus came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he
could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he yet stove
in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines overboard. Being
quickly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, he lost the
greater number of his marines after a gallant struggle on their part;
and after receiving three wounds himself, and performing prodigies of
valour, just managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance
of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share of the
danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he darted out once more
and ran in upon the enemy, utterly prostrated in body by his wounds,
but more dashing and vehement in spirit than before.
So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable
distance from each other. For the right wing of Philip’s fleet,
continually making for land in accordance with his original plan, was
not far from the Asiatic coast; while the left wing, having to veer
round to support the ships on the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians
at no great distance from Chios.
[Sidenote: Attalus intercepted by Philip, and forced to abandon his
ship.]
[Sidenote: Victory of the Rhodians.]
+6.+ As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the
right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under
cover of which Philip was moored watching the result of the battle,
Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being
sunk by an enemy’s ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with
two quadriremes. The enemy’s ship turning to flight, and making for
the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his ardent desire
to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had
become detached a considerable distance from his own fleet, took four
quinqueremes and three _hemioliae_, as well as all the galleys within
reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced
him in the utmost terror to run his three ships ashore. After this
mishap the king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while
Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board them. For
in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most
splendid articles of the royal equipage to be spread out on the deck of
his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who
arrived on the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes
and such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention
to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus got safe away to
Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it
in the general engagement, was so elated at the unexpected reverse
which had befallen Attalus, that he put to sea again and exerted
himself strenuously in collecting his ships and restoring the spirits
of his men by assuring them that they were the victors. For when they
saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very naturally
thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what
had really happened to the king, set about collecting his own ships
by raising a signal; and this being speedily done, he sailed away
unmolested to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those Macedonians who
were engaged with the Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil
case, were gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after
the other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their
comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their vessels, and
having destroyed others by charging them, sailed away to Chios.
[Sidenote: B.C. 201. The losses in the battle.]
+7.+ In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a ten-banked,
a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and a six-banked ship, ten other
decked vessels, three _triemioliae_, twenty-five galleys and their
crews. In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and about
forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven galleys with their
crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus one _triemiolia_ and two
quinqueremes were sunk, while two quadriremes besides that of the king
were captured. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme
were destroyed, but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty,
Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six
thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians and their allies two thousand
were taken prisoners, and of their opponents six hundred.
[Sidenote: Philip vainly pretends that he won the battle.]
+8.+ Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which Philip claimed
the victory on two pretexts. First, because he had driven Attalus
ashore and had captured his ship; and secondly, because, as he had
anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had the credit of having
taken up his anchorage where the wrecks were floating. He acted in
accordance with this assertion next day by collecting the wrecks, and
causing the corpses which could be recognised to be picked up for
burial, all for the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he
did not himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved
by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next day, while he
was actually engaged on these operations, after communication with
each other they sailed out to attack him, but, on nobody putting out
to meet them, they returned to Chios. Philip indeed had never before
lost so many men either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely
mortified at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the
enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real
sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts. Besides everything
else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too
strongly. For the slaughter and destruction was so great that, on the
day of battle itself the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood,
arms, and wrecks; while on the subsequent days the strands might be
seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. Hence the
extreme consternation of the king could not be confined to himself, but
was shared by all his Macedonians.
[Sidenote: Death of Theophiliscus.]
+9.+ Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having written a
despatch home with an account of the battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to
succeed him in his command, died from his wounds. He had shown great
valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy deserves to be
remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in
time, all the allies would have let the opportunity pass, in terror
at Philip’s audacity. But by beginning the war as he did he forced
his countrymen to seize the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not
to lose time in mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war
energetically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, therefore,
were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such honours as
were incentives, not only to men living at the time, but to future
generations also, to prompt service in their country’s cause....
THE INDECISIVE BATTLE OF CHIOS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER OFF LADE, IN
WHICH PHILIP WAS PARTLY SUCCESSFUL[68]
+10.+ After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of his way, and
Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it is clear that Philip
might have accomplished his voyage to Alexandria. And here we have
evidence stronger than any other of Philip’s infatuation in acting as
he did. What, then, prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what
always occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance many
men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant prospects it
holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason; but when they
approach the moment of action they quite as irrationally abandon their
purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the
embarrassments and difficulties which meet them....
PHILIP’S OPERATIONS IN CARIA, B.C. 201
[Sidenote: The stratagem by which Philip took Prinassus.]
+11.+ Having made some assaults which proved abortive owing to the
strength of the place, Philip went away again, plundering the forts and
villages in the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus and pitched
his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready his pent-houses and
other siege artillery, he began to attempt the town by mines. This
plan proving impracticable, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, he
contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to
be made under ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while
during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up at the
mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, by calculating
the quantity of earth thrown up, might become alarmed. At first the
Prinassians held out bravely: but when Philip sent them a message
informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and
asking them whether they preferred to march out with their lives, or
one and all to perish with their town when he set fire to the props,
then at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered
the city.
[Sidenote: Legends of Iassus and Bargylia.]
+12.+ The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf between the
temple of Poseidon, the territory of Miletus, and the city of Myndus,
called the gulf [of Iassus by some], but by most the gulf of Bargylia,
from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast. The Iassians
boast of being originally colonists from Argos, and more recently
from Miletus, their ancestors having invited to their town the son
of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing to their losses in the war
with the Carians. The size of the town is ten stades. Among the people
of Bargylia it is a common report widely believed that the statue of
the Kindyan Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow
or rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to the
Artemis Astias.[69] All these stories have been repeated by certain
historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole course of my work
set myself against such statements of our historiographers and have
had no toleration for them. For it appears to me that such tales are
only fit to amuse children, when they transgress not only the limits
of probability but even those of possibility. For instance, to say
that certain bodies when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a
state of quite deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he
says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia cast
no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to which I have just
referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend to preserve the reverence
of the vulgar for religion, a certain allowance may be made for some
historians when they record these miraculous legends. But they must not
be allowed to go too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in
such a matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment,
such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned if they
do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in them should be
rejected....
AFFAIRS IN GREECE
[Sidenote: The tyranny of Nabis. See 13, 6-8.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 202-201.]
+13.+ I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, tyrant
of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove the citizens into exile, freed
the slaves, and gave them the wives and daughters of their masters.
How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable sanctuary
for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of
bad characters in Sparta. I will now proceed to tell how in the same
period, being in alliance with Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and
being bound by oaths and treaties to support one and all of those
peoples in case of any one attacking them, he yet in utter contempt of
these obligations determined to make a treacherous attack on Messene....
DIGRESSION ON THE MERITS OF THE HISTORIANS ZENO AND ANTISTHENES OF
RHODES
[Sidenote: The necessity of discussing the histories of Zeno and
Antisthenes.]
+14.+ As some episodical historians have written on the period which
embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights already described, it
is my intention to discuss them briefly. I will not however speak of
them all, but only those whom I suppose to be worthy of commemoration
and full discussion. These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and
Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, for more than
one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged
in practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories with
no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of the business
of politicians. Since then they write of the same events as myself,
I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from the reputation of their
country, and the idea that naval affairs are peculiarly the province
of Rhodians, some students may prefer their authority to mine where I
differ from them.
[Sidenote: Their description of the battle of Lade. See ch. 10.]
Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of Lade as
not less severe than that of Chios, but more fiercely and daringly
contested, both in detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the
victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be inclined to
allow that historians must show some partiality to their own countries;
not however that they should state what is exactly opposite to the
facts regarding them. There are quite enough mistakes which writers
make from ignorance, and which it is difficult for poor human nature
to avoid: but if we deliberately write what is false for the sake
of country, friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do
the same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything
by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their works, so
your politicians often fall into the same discredit by yielding to
the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore readers ought to be
jealously watchful on this head; while writers ought to be on their
guard for their own sakes.
+15.+ The present matter is an example. When coming to details of the
battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it “two quinqueremes of
Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that upon one ship raising its
studding-sail to escape from the conflict, owing to its having being
staved in and shipping sea, many of the vessels near it did the same
and made for the open sea; and that at last the admiral, being left
with only a few vessels, was forced to follow their example. That for
the present they were forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor
on the territory of Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to
Cos; while the enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade
and took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover, the
Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only
Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland of victory on his entrance
to their territory.” And yet, though they give all these particulars,
which all evidently indicate the losing side, they still declare the
Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in
the whole battle; and that too in spite of the fact that the original
despatch from the admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and
Prytanies, still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the
truth, not of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.
[Sidenote: Zeno’s account of the attack of Nabis upon Messene. See ch.
13.]
+16.+ Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt upon Messene.
Zeno says that “Nabis started from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the
tributary called the Hoplites, and advanced along the narrow road past
Poliasium until he arrived at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae,
and so to the river Pamisus.” About which I do not know what to say.
It is just as if one were to say that a man started from Corinth and
marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the Scironean way, and then
came straight to the Contoporian road, and journeyed past Mycenae to
Argos. For such a statement would not be merely slightly wrong but
wholly contradictory. For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east
of Corinth, while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due
south-west; so that it is completely impossible to go by way of the
former to the latter. The same may be said about Lacedaemon; for the
Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north-east of Sparta, while Thalamae,
Pharae, and the Pamisus are to the south-west. Therefore it is not
possible to go to Sallasia, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a
man means to go to Messenia by way of Thalamae.
+17.+ Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis started on his return
from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea. This is another
absurdity; for Megalopolis is between Tegea and Messene, so that it is
impossible that a gate at Messene should be called the “Gate to Tegea.”
The fact is that there is a gate there called the “Tegean Gate,” by
which Nabis commenced his return; and this led Zeno into the mistake
of supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the fact: for
the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis, lies between
that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says that the Alpheus flows
underground from its source for a considerable distance, and comes
up near Lycoa, in Arcadia. The truth is that this river does go down
underground not far from its source, and, after remaining hidden for
about ten stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory
of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining volume,
and watering that whole district in a splendid manner for two hundred
stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by the tributary stream of the
Lusius, and become unfordable and deep....
However, I think that the points I have mentioned, though all of them
blunders, admit of some palliation and excuse; for the latter arose
from mere ignorance, those connected with the sea-fight from patriotic
affection. But is it not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow
as much pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his
subject, as upon the ornaments of style; and shows on many occasions
that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many other famous
writers do? To my mind it is quite right to take great care and pay
great attention to the presentation of one’s facts in correct and
adequate language, for this contributes in no small degree to the
effectiveness of history; still I do not think that serious writers
should regard it as their primary and most important object. Far from
it. Quite other are the parts of his history on which a practical
politician should rather pride himself.
[Sidenote: Zeno’s account of the battle of Panium between Antiochus the
Great and Scopas, B.C. 201.]
+18.+ The best illustration of what I mean will be the following.
This same writer, in his account of the siege of Gaza and Antiochus’s
pitched battle with Scopas in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,[70]
showed such extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that he made it
quite impossible even for professional rhetoricians or mob orators to
outstrip him in theatrical effect; while he showed such a contempt
of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable carelessness and
inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first position in the field
taken up by Scopas, he says that “the right extremity of his line,
together with a few cavalry, rested on the slope of the mountain, while
its left with all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains
below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch, despatched his
elder son Antiochus with a division of his army to occupy the high
ground which commanded the enemy; and that at daybreak he led the rest
of his army across the river which flowed between the two camps, and
drew them up on the plain; arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one
line, facing the enemy’s centre, and his cavalry, some on the right
and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which were the
heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of the younger of the
king’s sons Antiochus. That in advance of this line he stationed the
elephants at certain intervals, and the Tarentines[71] commanded by
Antipater; while he filled up the spaces between the elephants with
archers and slingers. And finally, that he took up his own station
on the rear of the elephants with squadron of household cavalry and
bodyguards.” After this preliminary description he continues: “The
younger Antiochus”—whom he had described as being on the level ground
with the heavy-armed cavalry—“charged down from the high ground and put
to flight and pursued the cavalry under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who
was in command of the Aetolians in the plain on the left wing; but the
two lines, when they met, maintained a stubborn fight.” But he fails to
observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantry were
in front, the two lines could not possibly meet at all.
+19.+ Next he says that “the phalanx, outmatched in agility and forced
backwards by the Aetolians, retired step by step, while the elephants
received the retreating line, and did great service in charging the
enemy.” But how the elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not
easy to understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have
done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once at close
quarters, the animals would no longer have been able to distinguish
friend from foe among those that came in their way. Again, he says that
“the Aetolian cavalry were thrown into a panic during the engagement,
because they were unaccustomed to the look of the elephants.” But, by
his own account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the
right wing remained unbroken; while the other division of the cavalry,
that on the left wing, had all fled before the successful attack of
Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry was it, then, that was on the
centre of the phalanx, and was terrified by the elephants? And where
was the king, or what part did he take in the battle, seeing that he
had with him the very flower of the infantry and cavalry? For not a
word has been told us about these. And where was the elder of the young
Antiochi, who, with a division of the troops, occupied the high ground?
For this prince is not represented even as returning to his quarters
after the battle. And very naturally so. For Zeno started by assuming
two sons of the king named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in
the army on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to him,
Scopas returned first and also last from the field? For he says: “when
he saw the younger Antiochus, after returning from the pursuit, on the
rear of his phalanx, and accordingly gave up all hopes of victory, he
retired.” But afterwards he says that “he sustained the most imminent
peril when his phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and
was the last man to retire from the field.”
[Sidenote: Polybius wrote to Zeno on his geographical mistakes.]
+20.+ These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect very great
discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore, to endeavour to
make one’s self master of all departments of history alike. That
is the ideal; but if that is impossible, one ought at least to be
excessively careful on the most essential and important points in
it. I have been induced to say this because I have observed that in
history, as in other arts and sciences, there is a tendency to neglect
the true and essential, while the ostentatious and the showy secure
praise and emulation as something great and admirable. The fact being
that in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter
qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation. As to
his ignorance of the topography of Laconia, considering that his error
was an important one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno personally.
For I thought it a point of honour not to look upon the mistakes of
others as personal triumphs, as is the way with some writers; but to do
the best I could to secure correctness, not only of my own historical
writings, but of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at
large. When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible to
make the correction, because his history was already published, he was
much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the most friendly
interpretation on my proceeding; and, in regard to this point, I would
beg my own readers, whether of my own or future generations, if I am
ever detected in making a deliberate misstatement, and disregarding
truth in any part of my history, to criticise me unmercifully; but if
I do so from lack of information, to make allowances: and I ask it for
myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and the extent
of ground covered by its transactions....
EGYPT
[Sidenote: Character and extravagance of Tlepolemus.]
+21.+ Tlepolemus,[72] the chief minister in the kingdom of Egypt, was
a young man, but one who had spent all his life in the camp, and with
reputation. By nature aspiring and ambitious, he had done much that
was glorious in the service of his country, but much that was evil
also. As a general in a campaign, and as an administrator of military
expeditions, he was a man of great ability, high natural courage, and
extremely well fitted to deal personally with soldiers. But on the
other hand, for the management of complicated affairs, he was deficient
in diligence and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for
the keeping of money or the economical administration of finance.
And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall, but
seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he had complete
control of the exchequer, he spent the greater part of the day in
playing ball and in matches in martial exercises with the young men;
and directly he left these sports he collected drinking parties, and
spent the greater part of his life in these amusements and with these
associates. But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he
employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing away the
royal treasures among the envoys from Greece and the Dionysian actors,
and, more than all, among the officers and soldiers of the palace
guard. He was utterly incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything
there was at hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil
which he himself thus began continually increased. For every one who
had received a favour expressed his gratitude in extravagant language,
both for the sake of what he had got and of what he hoped to get in
the future. And thus being informed of the universal praise which was
bestowed on him, of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets,
of complimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the
public singers all through the town, he became entirely befooled, and
grew daily more and more puffed up with conceit, and more reckless in
squandering favours upon foreigners and soldiers.
[Sidenote: Tlepolemus suppresses a court intrigue against himself.]
+22.+ These proceedings were very offensive to the other members of the
court; and, therefore, they watched everything he did with a jealous
eye, and conceived a detestation for his insolence, which they began to
compare unfavourably with the character of Sosibius. For the latter was
considered to show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his
age gave reason to expect; and, in his dealings with other persons, to
maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the royal seal
and person. Just at this time, Ptolemy, the son of Sosibius, returned
from his mission to Philip. Before he left Alexandria on his voyage, he
had been full of foolish pride, partly from his own natural disposition
and partly from his father’s success. But upon landing in Macedonia,
and mixing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion that
the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better fashion of their
boots and clothes; he therefore came home, got up in imitation of
all these peculiarities, and fully persuaded that his foreign tour
and association with Macedonians had made a man of him. He therefore
immediately began showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing
against him; and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that
Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the state as
though he were its heir and not its guardian, the quarrel quickly
grew. Meanwhile Tlepolemus, being informed of certain unfriendly
speeches, originating in the jealous observation and malignity of the
courtiers, at first turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise
them; but when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly
express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground of his
maladministration of the government of the kingdom, he grew angry; and,
summoning the council, came forward and said that “they brought their
accusations against him secretly and in private, but he judged it right
to accuse them in public and face to face.”...
After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived Sosibius of
the custody of the seal also, and having got that into his hands,
thenceforth conducted the administration exactly as he chose....
THE WAR IN COELE-SYRIA
[Sidenote: B.C. 332.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 201. Valour of the people of Gaza.]
+22+ (_a_). It seems to me to be at once just and proper to give the
people of Gaza[73] the praise which they deserve. For though they do
not differ as to bravery in war from the rest of the inhabitants of
Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an international agreement, and in
their fidelity to their promises, they far surpass them, and show
altogether a courage in such matters that is irresistible. In the first
place, when all the other people were terrified at the invasion of the
Persians,[74] in view of the greatness of their power, and one and all
submitted themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced
the danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion of Alexander, when
not only did the other cities surrender, but even Tyre was stormed
and its inhabitants sold into slavery; and when it seemed all but
hopeless for any to escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and
violent attack of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood
him, and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Following
the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they omitted nothing
within their power in their determination to keep faith with Ptolemy.
Therefore, just as we distinguish by special mention in our history
individuals of eminent virtue, so ought we, in regard to states as
such, to mention with commendation those which act nobly in any point
from traditional principles and deliberate policy....
ITALY (LIVY, 30, 45)
[Sidenote: Scipio’s return to Rome and triumph, B.C. 201, cp. 15, 19.]
+23.+ Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the events I
have narrated. The expectation of the people concerning him was
proportionable to the magnitude of his achievements: and the splendour
of his reception, and the signs of popular favour which greeted
him were extraordinary. Nor was this otherwise than reasonable and
proper. For after despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or
of averting that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now
looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every fear
and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their enemies.
Their joy therefore knew no bounds; and when Scipio came into the
city in triumph, and the actual sight of the prisoners who formed the
procession brought still more clearly to their memories the dangers of
the past, they became almost wild in the expression of their thanks to
the gods, and their affection for the author of such a signal change.
For among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession
was Syphax, the king of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards died
in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens celebrated games and
festivals for several days running with great splendour, Scipio, in his
magnificent liberality, supplying the cost....
WAR BETWEEN ROME AND PHILIP V.
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 201-200. Coss. P. Sulpicius Galba, Maximus
II., C. Aurelius. Cotta (for B.C. 200).]
[Sidenote: Philip’s anxieties,]
[Sidenote: and the starving state of his army.]
+24.+ At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sulpicius was
elected consul at Rome, king Philip, who was staying at Bargylia, was
rendered exceedingly uneasy and filled with many conflicting anxieties
for the future, when he observed that the Rhodians and Attalus, far
from dismissing their navy, were actually manning additional ships and
paying more earnest attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He
had a double cause, indeed, for uneasiness: he was afraid of sailing
from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would have to encounter danger
at sea; and at the same time he was not satisfied with the state of
things in Macedonia, and therefore was unwilling on any consideration
to spend the winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and
the Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to Rome to
denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the war in Libya was ended.
These considerations caused him overwhelming perplexity; but he was
compelled for the present to remain where he was, leading the life of
a wolf, to use the common expression: for he robbed and stole from
some, and used force to others, while he did violence to his nature by
fawning on others, because his army was suffering from famine; and by
these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, sometimes figs, and
sometimes nothing but a very short allowance of corn. Some of these
provisions were supplied to him by Zeuxis, and some by the people of
Mylae, Alabanda, and Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him
anything, and barked at and plotted against when they did not. Finally,
he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of Philocles, but failed
from the clumsiness with which the scheme was contrived. The territory
of Alabanda he harried as though it were an enemy’s, alleging that it
was imperatively necessary to get food for his troops....
When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus overrunning Asia, being
unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted a present of figs
from the Magnesians, as they had no corn. For which reason, when he
conquered Myus, he granted its territory to the Magnesians in return
for their figs....
[Sidenote: The visit of Attalus to Athens, B.C. 200.]
+25.+ The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both to thank
him for the past, and to urge him to come to Athens to consult with
them on the dangers that still threatened them.[75] The king was
informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors had arrived at
the Peiraeus; and, believing that it was necessary to have an interview
with them, he put to sea in haste. The Athenian people, being informed
of his coming, passed very liberal votes as to the reception and
general entertainment of the king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus
spent the first day in transacting business with the Roman ambassadors,
and was extremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of
their ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with
Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the Athenian
magistrates, he began his progress to the city in great state. For
he was met, not only by all the magistrates and the knights, but by
all the citizens with their children and wives. And when the two
processions met, the warmth of the welcome given by the populace to the
Romans, and still more to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his
entrance into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses
lined the street on both sides: all the temples were then thrown
open; victims were placed ready at all the altars; and the king was
requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted him such high honours
as they had never without great hesitation voted to any of their former
benefactors: for, in addition to other compliments, they named a tribe
after Attalus, and classed him among their eponymous heroes.
[Sidenote: The Athenians vote for war against Philip.]
+26.+ They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king to address
them. But upon his excusing himself, on the plea that it would be
ill-bred for him to appear before the people and recount his own good
services in the presence of those on whom they had been bestowed, they
gave up asking for his personal appearance; but begged him to give them
a written statement as to what he thought was the best thing to do
in view of the existing circumstances. On his consenting to do this,
and writing the document, the magistrates produced the despatch to
the ecclesia. The contents of this written communication were briefly
these: he recalled the good services he had done the people in the
past; enumerated the things he had accomplished in the existing war
against Philip; and lastly exhorted them to activity in this war, and
protested that, if they did not determine resolutely to adopt this
policy of hostility to Philip in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and
himself, and yet afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had
been secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests
of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the people,
influenced both by its contents and by their warm feeling towards
Attalus, were prepared to vote the war: and when the Rhodians also
entered and argued at great length to the same effect, the Athenians
at once decreed the war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a
magnificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of valour, and
voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at Athens, on the ground
of their having, besides other things, restored the Athenian ships
which had been captured with the men on board them. After concluding
this arrangement, the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their
fleet to visit the islands....
[Sidenote: The Romans warn Philip to abstain from attacking Greece, and
to do justice to Attalus, on pain of war.]
+27.+ While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens, Nicanor, by
the command of Philip, made a raid upon Attica, and came as far as
the Academy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald to him and bade him
announce to his master Philip that “The Romans admonished him to make
no war upon any Greek State, and to submit to an arbitration before a
fair tribunal as to the injuries he had inflicted upon Attalus: that,
if he did this, he might have peace with Rome, but, if he refused to
obey, the opposite would immediately follow.” On the receipt of this
message Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of
Epirus and delivered a similar announcement in regard to Philip in the
town of Phoenice; also to Amynandrus in the district of Athamania; also
to the Aetolians in Naupactus, and the Achaeans in Aegium. And having
thus by the mouth of Nicanor given Philip this clear warning, the Roman
envoys themselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a
view to settle their controversies....
[Sidenote: The firmness and vigour of Philip in meeting the danger.]
[Sidenote: 1, 14.]
+28.+ It appears to me that to make a good beginning, and even to
maintain enthusiasm long enough to secure a considerable measure of
success, is an achievement of which many have been found capable; but
to carry a purpose through to its end, and, even though fortune be
adverse, to make up by cool reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm
is within the power of few. From this point of view one cannot but
disparage the inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding
with admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and
his constancy to his purpose,—not meaning to speak in praise of his
character as a whole, but simply commending the vigour with which he
acted on this occasion. I make this distinction to prevent any one
supposing that I contradict myself, because I recently praised Attalus
and the Rhodians and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing
the reverse. This is just such a case as I referred to at the beginning
of my history, when I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise,
and sometimes to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens
that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter men’s
original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the better; and
sometimes too it is the case that from natural temperament men are at
one time inclined to what is right, at another to the reverse. And it
is a variation of this sort that I think occurred to Philip in this
instance. For, irritated by his defeats, and influenced in a great
degree by anger and passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane
or inspired eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour; and it was in
this spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king
Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced to make
these remarks, because I observe that some men, like bad runners in the
stadium, abandon their purposes when close to the goal; while it is at
that particular point, more than at any other, that others secure the
victory over their rivals....
[Sidenote: B.C. 200.]
+29.+ Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in seizing bases of
operation and landing-places in this country (Asia)....
In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to Asia, he
might have a landing-place at Abydos....
[Sidenote: The Dardanelles compared with the Straits of Gibraltar.]
The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advantages of the situation
of those towns it would, I think, be waste of time for me to state
in great detail, because the singularity of those sites has made
them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still I imagine that
it will not be otherwise than useful to remind my readers briefly of
the facts, by way of attracting their attention. A man would best
realise the advantages of these cities, not by regarding their sites by
themselves, but by comparing and contrasting them with those about to
be mentioned. For just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean,—or
as some call it the Atlantic,—into our sea, except by passing between
the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea into
the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel separating
Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had designed these two straits
to counterbalance each other, the passage between the Pillars of
Heracles is many times as broad as that of the Hellespont,—the former
being sixty, the latter two stades; the reason being, as far as one may
conjecture, the great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our
sea: while the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the
Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides by human
habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting mutual intercourse,
sometimes being bridged over by those who determine to cross on foot,
and at all times admitting a passage by sea. But the channel at the
Pillars of Heracles is seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to
the lack of intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote
parts of Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our knowledge
of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is enclosed on both
sides by two European promontories, and possesses a harbour capable of
sheltering ships anchoring in it from every wind; while there is no
possibility of anchoring at any point near the city outside the harbour
mouth, owing to the rapidity and violence of the current setting
through the strait.
[Sidenote: Siege of Abydos.]
+30.+ Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and partly by
an earthwork, Philip began blockading it by land and sea together.
This siege was not at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery
employed, or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers
and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill against
each other; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be remembered
and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary gallantry exhibited
by the besieged. At first, feeling full confidence in themselves,
the inhabitants of Abydos maintained a courageous resistance to the
attempts of Philip; struck and dislodged some of his engines, which he
brought against their walls by sea, with stones from their catapults,
and destroyed others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the
enemy were barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the
siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered an
undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately overpowering
the enemy. But when their outer wall was undermined and fell, and
when moreover the Macedonians by means of these same mines were
approaching the inner wall, which had been erected by the besieged to
cover the breach: then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as
ambassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the city,
on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and Attalus depart
under a truce; and of permitting all free persons to depart as they
could, and wherever each might choose, with the clothes that each was
wearing. But on Philip bidding them “surrender at discretion or fight
like men,” the ambassadors returned to the town.
[Sidenote: Desperate resolution of the people of Abydos.]
+31.+ On being informed of the message the people of Abydos met in
public assembly, and with feelings of utter despair deliberated upon
their position. They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the slaves,
that they might secure their sincere interest and loyalty; next, to
collect all the women into the temple of Artemis, and the children with
their nurses into the gymnasium; and finally to bring together their
silver and gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes
which were of any value into the quadrireme of the Rhodians and the
trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed these resolutions and acted
on the decree with unanimity, they again assembled in public meeting,
and elected fifty of the older and most trusted men, who at the same
time were possessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry
out what had been determined upon; and these they bound on oath in the
presence of the whole of the citizens, that “whenever they saw the
inner wall being captured by the enemy, they would kill the children
and women, and would burn the above-mentioned ships, and, in accordance
with the curses that had been invoked, would throw the silver and gold
into the sea.” After this they brought the priests forward, and all
the citizens swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting
for their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled the
priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this imprecation over
the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves by this solemn agreement,
they left off attempting to countermine the enemy, and resolved that,
directly the interior wall fell, they would fight to the last in the
breach with the enemy’s storming party and there die.
[Sidenote: Comparison of this resolution of the Abydenians with similar
ones of the Phocians and Acarnanians.]
+32.+ This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the
Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian recklessness and Acarnanian
courage.[76] For the Phocians have the reputation of having adopted
a similar resolution as to their families, but not because they
despaired of victory, for they were about to fight a pitched battle
with the Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acarnanians, upon
the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like resolution;
the details of which I have already narrated. But the Abydenians, at a
time when they were closely invested and in all but complete despair of
being saved, elected by a unanimous resolution to meet their fate along
with their children and wives, rather than to live any longer with the
knowledge that their children and wives would fall into the power of
the enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for having,
in the former cases, given victory and safety to those who despaired
of them, while she adopted the opposite decision in regard to the
Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the city was taken, but the
children with their mothers fell into the hands of the enemy.
[Sidenote: How the city was surrendered and the women and children
saved after all.]
+33.+ As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men, according
to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins and fought the enemy with
such desperate courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending the
Macedonians to the front in relays till nightfall, at last abandoned
the contest in despair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not
only did the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead
bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with fury; nor
was it only that they fought gallantly with mere swords and spears;
but when any of these weapons had been rendered useless, or had been
knocked out of their hands, they grappled with the Macedonians, and
either hurled them to the ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae,
and stabbing their faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the
broken ends, threw them into a complete panic. But the fight being
interrupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in the
breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and wounds,
Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the older men together,
and, instigated by hopes of personal safety, lowered the special
eminence and unique glory which their fellow-citizens had acquired. For
they resolved to save the children and women alive, and at daybreak to
send the priests and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat
his mercy and surrender the city to him.
[Sidenote: A Roman envoy arrives to warn Philip to desist.]
[Sidenote: The voluntary death of the Abydenians.]
+34.+ While this was going on, king Attalus, having heard that Abydos
was being besieged, sailed through the Aegean to Tenedos; and similarly
the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus Aemilius, arrived on
board ship at Abydos itself. For the Roman ambassadors, having learnt
at Rhodes the fact of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance
with their commission to deliver their message to Philip personally,
put off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched
this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he explained
to him that “The Senate had resolved to order him not to wage war
with any Greek state; nor to interfere in the dominions of Ptolemy;
and to submit the injuries inflicted on Attalus and the Rhodians to
arbitration; and that if he did so he might have peace, but if he
refused to obey he would promptly have war with Rome.” Upon Philip
endeavouring to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay
hands on him, Marcus interrupted him by saying: “But what about the
Athenians? And what about the Cianians? And what about the Abydenians
at this moment? Did any one of them also lay hands on you first?” The
king, at a loss for a reply, said: “I pardon the offensive haughtiness
of your manners for three reasons: first, because you are a young man
and inexperienced in affairs; secondly, because you are the handsomest
man of your time” (this was true); “and thirdly, because you are a
Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the Romans is that they
should not break their treaties or go to war with me; but if they do,
I shall defend myself as courageously as I can, appealing to the gods
to defend my cause.” With these words they separated. On becoming
master of Abydos, Philip found all the property of the citizens
collected by themselves ready to his hand. But when he saw the numbers
and fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into
wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their children
and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; and resenting these
proceedings he published a proclamation, announcing, that “he gave
three days’ grace to those who wished to hang or stab themselves.”
The Abydenians, already bent on executing their original decree, and
looking upon themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died
for their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms; and,
accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously been put in
chains or some similar restraint, they all without delay hastened to
their death, each family by itself....
[Sidenote: The Rhodians resolve to side with Rome.]
+35.+ After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the Achaean nation
to Rhodes urging the Rhodians to make terms with Philip. But upon these
being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors from Rome, who argued
that they should make no terms with Philip without consulting the
Romans, the Rhodian people voted to listen to the latter and to hold to
their friendship with them....
THE PELOPONNESE—WAR WITH NABIS
[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s device for collecting all the Achaean levies
at Tegea simultaneously, B.C. 200.]
+36.+ Philopoemen calculated the distances of all the cities of the
Achaean league, and from which of them men could arrive at Tegea along
the same roads. He then wrote despatches to each of them, and sent them
to the most distant cities, so dividing them that each city that was
farthest on a particular road should get, not only the one addressed
to itself, but those also of the other cities on the same road. The
contents of these first despatches addressed to the chief magistrate
were as follows: “As soon as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause
all the men of military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for
five days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as soon as
they are thus collected, march them out and lead them to the next city.
As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the despatch addressed to its
chief magistrate and follow the instructions therein contained.” Now,
this second despatch contained exactly the same words as the former,
except of course that the name of the next town was changed to which
they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated right along the
road, in the first place no one knew for what purpose or undertaking
the expedition was directed; and in the next place, every one was
absolutely ignorant where he was going, beyond the name of the next
town, but all marched forward in a state of complete mystification,
taking on the successive contingents as they went. But as of course the
most remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters were
not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each in proportion
to its distance. By which arrangement, without either the Tegeans or
the new arrivals knowing what was going to happen, all the Achaeans
marched into Tegea under arms by all the gates simultaneously.
[Sidenote: A raid upon Laconia.]
+37.+ What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the great number
of the tyrant’s eavesdroppers and spies. On the day then on which the
main body of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he despatched a
band of picked men, so timing their start, that they might pass the
night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid on Laconia. They had
orders that, in case the mercenaries of Nabis left their quarters and
attacked them, they were to retire on Scotita, and in other respects
follow the directions of Didascalondas of Crete; for Philopoemen had
given his confidence to this officer, and full directions as to the
whole expedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the
task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued orders to the
Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from Tegea, and after a rapid
night’s march halted it about the time of the morning watch in the
neighbourhood of Scotita, which is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When
day broke the mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of
the raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the rescue, as
was their custom, and bore down upon them; and when the Achaeans, in
accordance with their instructions, retired, they followed, harassing
them with bold and daring assaults. But as soon as they came to the
place where Philopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut
some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners....
+38.+ Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to hesitate about
undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by every means to rouse
their feeling of hostility....
COELE-SYRIA
+39.+ Ptolemy’s general Scopas marched into the upper region during the
winter and subdued the Jewish nation....
The siege having been conducted in a desultory manner, Scopas fell into
bad repute and was attacked with all the petulance of youth....
[Sidenote: B.C. 200. Antiochus conquers Coele-Syria and the Jews after
beating Scopas at Panium. See _supra_, ch. 18.]
Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea, Samaria, Abila, and
Gadara; and after a while those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred
town called Jerusalem submitted to him also. On the subject of this
town I have a good deal more to say, and especially on account of the
splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to another opportunity.