BOOK XV

_A slight success on the part of the Carthaginian fleet at Utica (14,

10) had been more than outweighed by the capture of Syphax by Laelius

[Livy, 39, 11]. Negotiations for peace followed, and an armistice, in

the course of which occurred the incident referred to in the first

extract of this book._

[Sidenote: Some transports under Cn. Octavius wrecked in the Bay of

Carthage, and taken possession of by the Carthaginians in spite of the

truce. Autumn of B.C. 203. See Livy, 30, 24.]

[Sidenote: Speech of the Roman envoys.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal leaves Italy, 23d June, B.C. 203.]

+1.+ The Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes of

war, and with them an extraordinary quantity of provisions, Scipio

was extremely enraged, not so much at the loss of the provisions,

as by the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained a vast supply of

necessaries; and still more at the Carthaginians having violated the

sworn articles of truce, and commenced the war afresh. He therefore at

once selected Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to go

to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and at the same

time to announce that the Roman people had ratified the treaty; for he

had lately received a despatch from home to that effect. Upon their

arrival in Carthage these envoys first had an audience of the Senate,

and then were introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions

they spoke with great freedom on the situation of affairs, reminding

their hearers that “Their ambassadors who had come to the Roman camp

at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers, had not been

content with appealing to the gods and kissing the ground, as other

people do, but had thrown themselves upon the earth, and in abject

humiliation had kissed the feet of the assembled officers; and then,

rising from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the

existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and acknowledged

that they deserved every severity at the hands of the Romans; but

intreated to be spared the last severities, from a regard to the

vicissitudes of human fortune, for their folly would be the means of

displaying the generosity of the Romans. Remembering all this, the

general and the officers then present in the council were at a loss to

understand what had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and

to venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it was

this—they trusted in Hannibal and the forces that had arrived with him.

But they were very ill advised. All the world knew that he and his army

had been driven these two years past from every port of Italy, and had

retreated into the neighbourhood of the Lacinian promontory, where they

had been so closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely

been able to get safe away home. Not that, even if they had come back,”

he added, “as conquerors, and were minded to engage us who have already

defeated you in two consecutive battles, ought you to entertain any

doubt as to the result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The

certainty of defeat were a better subject for your reflections: and

when that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to your

aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity of the victors

for your misfortunes? You must needs expect to be debarred from all

hope of mercy from gods and men alike by your perfidy and folly.”

[Sidenote: Treacherous attempt on the lives of the Roman envoys.]

+2.+ After delivering this speech the envoys retired. Some few of the

citizens were against breaking the treaty; but the majority, both of

the politicians and the Senate, were much annoyed by its terms, and

irritated by the plain speaking of the envoys; and, moreover, could

not make up their minds to surrender the captured transports and

the provisions which were on board them. But their main motive was

a confident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal.

The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an answer.

Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to bring on the war

at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged the following act of

treachery. They gave out that it was necessary to make provision for

conducting the envoys back to their camp in safety. They therefore at

once caused two triremes to be got ready to convoy them; but at the

same time sent a message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels

ready at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as soon

as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoys, he might bear

down upon their ships and sink them; for the Carthaginian fleet was

stationed at the time close under Utica. Having made this arrangement

with Hasdrubal, they despatched the envoys, with instructions to

the officers of the convoys to leave them and return, as soon as

they had passed the mouth of the River Macara; for it was from this

point that the enemy’s camp came into sight. Therefore, according

to their instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the

officers of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys

and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger, and felt

no other annoyance at this proceeding than as regarding it as a mark

of disrespect. But no sooner were they left thus alone, than three

Carthaginian vessels suddenly started out to attack them, and came

up with the Roman quinquereme. They failed, indeed, to stave her in,

because she evaded them; nor did they succeed in boarding her, because

the men resisted them with great spirit. But they ran up alongside of

the vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed to

wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable number of

them; until at last the Romans, observing that their forage parties

along the shore were rushing down to the beach to their assistance, ran

their ships upon land. Most of the marines were killed, but the envoys

had the unexpected good fortune to escape with their lives.

[Sidenote: Renewal of hostilities.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s cavalry reinforced by Tychaeus.]

+3.+ This was the signal for the recommencement of the war in a fiercer

and more angry spirit than before. The Romans on their part, looking

upon themselves as having been treated with perfidy, were possessed

with a furious determination to conquer the Carthaginians; while the

latter, conscious of the consequences of what they had done, were

ready to go all lengths to avoid falling under the power of the enemy.

With such feelings animating both sides, it was quite evident that the

result would have to be decided on the field of battle. Consequently

everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia, Sicily, and

Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation, watching with

conflicting feelings to see what would happen. But meanwhile Hannibal,

finding himself too weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian named

Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, and was reputed to possess the

most warlike cavalry in Libya, urging him “to lend his aid, and not

let the present opportunity slip; as he must be well aware that, if

the Carthaginians won the day, he would be able to maintain his rule;

but if the Romans proved victorious, his very life would be in danger,

owing to the ambition of Massanissa.” This prince was convinced by

these arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen.

[Sidenote: B.C. 202. Scipio traverses the Carthaginian territory, and

summons Massanissa to his aid.]

+4.+ Having secured his fleet, Scipio left Baebius in command of it in

his place, while he himself went a round of the cities. This time he

did not admit to mercy those who voluntarily surrendered, but carried

all the towns by force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his

anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To Massanissa he sent

message after message, explaining to him how the Punic government had

broken the terms, and urging him to collect the largest army he was

able and join him with all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been

made, Massanissa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his

own army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accompanied by

some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not only recover his

own kingdom, but secure the addition of that of Syphax also, by the

assistance of the Romans. And this purpose was eventually effected.

[Sidenote: Scipio orders the Carthaginian envoys to be released.]

It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome arrived at the

naval camp. Those of them who had been sent by the Roman government,

Baebius at once caused to be escorted to Scipio, while he retained

those who were Carthaginians. The latter were much cast down, and

regarded their position as one of great danger; for when they were

informed of the impious outrage committed by their countrymen on the

persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could be no doubt

that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon themselves. But when

Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived commissioners that the senate

and people accepted with enthusiasm the treaty which he had made with

the Carthaginians, and were ready to grant everything he asked, he

was highly delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home

with all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do so,

in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen made a great point

of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he considered in his own

mind, not what the Carthaginians deserved to have done to them, but

what it was becoming in Romans to inflict. Therefore, though he did

not relax his own indignation and anger at what they had done, he

yet endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, “to maintain the good

traditions of his sires.” The result was that, by this superiority in

his conduct, a very decided impression was made upon the spirits of the

Carthaginians and of Hannibal himself.

[Sidenote: Hannibal moves to Zama.]

[Sidenote: Arrival of Massanissa.]

+5.+ When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their territory

being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal begging him to act

without delay, to come to close quarters with the enemy, and bring the

matter to the decision of battle. He bade the messengers in answer “to

confine their attention to other matters, and to leave such things to

him, for he would choose the time for fighting himself.” Some days

afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and pitched his camp

near ZAMA, a town about five days march to the west of Carthage. From

that place he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength

of the Roman general’s encampment. These spies were caught and brought

to Scipio, who, so far from inflicting upon them the usual punishment

of spies, appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp

thoroughly and without reserve; and when this had been done, he asked

the men whether the appointed officer had been careful to point out

everything to them. Upon their replying that he had, he gave them

provisions and an escort, and despatched them with injunctions to be

careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen. On their return to

his camp, Hannibal was so much struck with the magnanimity and high

courage of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal

interview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say that he

was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue. When the

herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once expressed his consent,

and said that he would himself send him a message when it suited him to

meet, naming the time and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with

this answer. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand infantry

and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio received him with cordiality,

and congratulated him on having added to his sway all those who had

previously been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed his camp

to Naragara: selecting it as a place which, among other advantages,

enabled him to get water within a javelin’s throw.

+6.+ From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general, informing him

that he was ready to meet him, and discuss matters with him. On hearing

this, Hannibal moved his quarters to within thirty stades of Scipio,

and pitched his camp on a hill, which seemed a favourable position

for his present purpose, except that water had to be fetched from a

considerable distance, which caused his soldiers great fatigue.

[Sidenote: Meeting of Scipio and Hannibal.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech.]

Next day both commanders advanced from their camps attended by a few

horsemen. Presently they left these escorts and met in the intervening

space by themselves, each accompanied by an interpreter. Hannibal was

the first to speak, after the usual salutation. He said that “He wished

that the Romans had never coveted any possession outside Italy, nor

the Carthaginians outside Libya; for these were both noble empires,

and were, so to speak, marked out by nature. But since,” he continued,

“our rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those for

Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of misfortune, we

have gone so far that the one nation has endangered the very soil of

its native land, and the other is now actually doing so, all that there

remains for us to do is to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the

gods, and to put an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of

obstinate hostility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have

learnt by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in

the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side and now

to the other on the slightest pretext, treating mankind like young

children.

+7.+ “But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipio. For you are still

a young man, and everything has succeeded to your wishes both in Iberia

and Libya, and you have as yet never experienced the ebb tide of

Fortune; I fear, therefore, that my words, true as they are, will not

influence you. But do look at the facts in the light of one story, and

that not connected with a former generation, but our own. Look at me!

I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae, became master of

nearly all Italy; and presently advancing to Rome itself, and pitching

my camp within forty stades of it, deliberated as to what I should do

with you and your country; but now I am in Libya debating with you,

a Roman, as to the bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With

such a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain

high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human weakness on

the situation; and the way to do that is among good things to choose

the greatest, among evils the least. What man of sense, then, would

deliberately choose to incur the risk which is now before you. If you

conquer, you will add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of

your country; while, if you are worsted, you will have been yourself

the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and glories you have

already won. What then is the point that I am seeking to establish by

these arguments? It is that the Romans should retain all the countries

for which we have hitherto contended—I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and

Iberia; and that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war

with Rome for these; and also that all the islands lying between Italy

and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am persuaded that such a treaty

will be at once safest for the Carthaginians, and most glorious for you

and the entire people of Rome.”

[Sidenote: Scipio’s reply.]

+8.+ In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said “That neither

in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the Romans the aggressors, but

notoriously the Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal

himself. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving the

victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked blow, but

to those who only acted in self-defence. That he was as ready as any

one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty of Fortune, and tried his

best to confine his efforts within the range of human infirmity. But

if,” he continued, “you had yourself quitted Italy before the Romans

crossed to Libya with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do

not think that you would have been disappointed in your expectation.

But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary, and we

have crossed into Libya and conquered the country, it is clear that

matters stand on a very different footing. But above all, consider

the point which affairs have reached now. Your countrymen have been

beaten, and at their earnest prayer we arranged a written treaty, in

which, besides the offer now made by you, it was provided that the

Carthaginians should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender

all their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give hostages

for their performance of these articles. These were the terms which

I and they mutually agreed upon; we both despatched envoys to our

respective Senates and people,—we consenting to grant these terms, the

Carthaginians begging to have them granted. The Senate agreed: the

people ratified the treaty. But though they had got what they asked,

the Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy towards

us. What course is left to me? Put yourself in my place and say. To

withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty? Are we to do this, say

you, not in order that by reaping the reward of treachery they may

learn in future to outrage their benefactors, but in order that by

getting what they ask for they may be grateful to us? Why, only the

other day, after obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because

your presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once treated

us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circumstances, if a

still severer clause were added to the conditions imposed, it might

be possible to refer the treaty back to the people; but, if I were to

withdraw any of these conditions, such a reference does not admit even

of discussion. What then is the conclusion of my discourse? It is, that

you must submit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or

conquer us in the field.”

[Sidenote: The momentous issues depending on the battle of Zama, B.C.

202.]

+9.+ After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without coming to

any terms; and next morning by daybreak both generals drew out their

forces and engaged. To the Carthaginians it was a struggle for their

own lives and the sovereignty of Libya; to the Romans for universal

dominion and supremacy. And could any one who grasped the situation

fail to be moved at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these,

or generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly trained in

all the operations of war, it would be impossible to find, or any other

occasion on which the prizes proposed by destiny to the combatants

were more momentous. For it was not merely of Libya or Europe that the

victors in this battle were destined to become masters, but of all

other parts of the world known to history,—a destiny which had not to

wait long for its fulfilment.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s order of battle.]

Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order: the

_hastati_ first, with an interval between their maniples; behind them

the _principes_, their maniples not arranged to cover the intervals

between those of the _hastati_ as the Roman custom is, but immediately

behind them at some distance, because the enemy was so strong in

elephants. In the rear of these he stationed the _triarii_. On his left

wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with the Italian cavalry, on the right

Massanissa with all his Numidians. The intervals between the front

maniples he filled up with maniples of _velites_, who were ordered to

begin the battle; but if they found themselves unable to stand the

charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of the

whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which went straight

through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with the elephants, to

step aside into the lateral spaces between the maniples.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s speech to his men.]

+10.+ These dispositions made, he went along the ranks delivering an

exhortation to the men, which, though short, was much to the point

in the circumstances in which they were placed. He called upon them,

“Remembering their former victories, to show themselves to be men of

mettle and worthy their reputation and their country. To put before

their eyes that the effect of their victory would be not only to make

them complete masters of Libya, but to give them and their country

the supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the result

of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting gallantly

would have the record of having died for their country, while those

that saved themselves by flight would spend the rest of their days as

objects of pitying contempt and scorn. For there was no place in Libya

which could secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into

the hands of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face

could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you,” he added,

“learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune puts before us the most

glorious of rewards, in whichever way the battle is decided, should

we not be at once the most mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we

abandon the most glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to

life deliberately choose the worst of misfortunes? Charge the enemy

then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to conquer or to

die! For it is men thus minded who invariably conquer their opponents,

since they enter the field with no other hope of life.”

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s order of battle.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech to the “army of Italy.”]

+11.+ Such was Scipio’s address to his men. Meanwhile Hannibal

had put his men also into position. His elephants, which numbered

more than eighty, he placed in the van of the whole army. Next his

mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of Ligurians,

Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them the native Libyans

and Carthaginians; and on the rear of the whole the men whom he had

brought from Italy, at a distance of somewhat more than a stade. His

wings he strengthened with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on

the left wing, and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right. He ordered

each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their hopes of

victory on him and the army he had brought with him; while he bade

their officers remind the Carthaginians in plain terms what would

happen to their wives and children if the battle should be lost. While

these orders were carried out by the officers, Hannibal himself went

along the lines of his Italian army and urged them “to remember the

seventeen years during which they had been brothers-in-arms, and the

number of battles they had fought with the Romans, in which they had

never been beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above

all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless successes, let

them place before their eyes the battle of the River Trebia against

the father of the present Roman commander; and again the battle in

Etruria against Flaminius; and lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius,

with none of which was the present struggle to be compared, whether in

regard to the number or excellence of the enemy’s men. Let them only

raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the enemy; they would see

that they were not merely fewer, but many times fewer than those with

whom they had fought before, while, as to their soldierly qualities,

there was no comparison. The former Roman armies had come to the

struggle with them untainted by memories of past defeats: while these

men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been beaten in

Italy, and fled before him again and again. They ought not therefore,”

he said, “to undo the glory and fame of their previous achievements,

but to struggle with a firm and brave resolve to maintain their

reputation of invincibility.”

Such were the addresses of the two commanders.

[Sidenote: A stampede of the elephants.]

[Sidenote: Flight of the Carthaginian cavalry.]

+12.+ All arrangements for the battle being complete, and the two

opposing forces of Numidian cavalry having been for some time engaged

in skirmishing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the word to the

men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But as they heard the horns

and trumpets braying all round them, some of the elephants became

unmanageable and rushed back upon the Numidian contingents of the

Carthaginian army; and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to

deprive the Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support. The rest

of the elephants charged the Roman velites in the spaces between the

maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the enemy

suffered severely themselves; until, becoming frightened, some of

them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans letting them pass

harmlessly along, according to Scipio’s orders, while others ran away

to the right under a shower of darts from the cavalry, until they

were finally driven clear off the field. It was just at the moment of

this stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced the Carthaginian

cavalry into headlong flight, and along with Massanissa pressed them

with a vigorous pursuit. While this was going on, the opposing lines

of heavy infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step

and proud confidence, except Hannibal’s “army of Italy,” which remained

in its original position. When they came within distance the Roman

soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as usual their war-cry, and

clashing their swords against their shields: while the Carthaginian

mercenaries uttered a strange confusion of cries, the effect of which

was indescribable, for, in the words of the poet,[61] the “voice of all

was not one”—

“nor one their cry:

But manifold their speech as was their race.”

[Sidenote: The fight of the heavy infantry.]

+13.+ The whole affair being now a trial of strength between man

and man at close quarters, as the combatants used their swords and

not their spears, the superiority was at first on the side of the

dexterity and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound

a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however, trusting to

the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of their arms, still

kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping close up with them and

encouraging them to advance; while the Carthaginians did not keep

up with their mercenaries nor support them, but showed a thoroughly

cowardly spirit. The result was that the foreign soldiers gave way:

and, believing that they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own

side, fell upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and

began killing them; whereby many of the Carthaginians were compelled

to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as they were being

cut down by their mercenaries they had, much against their inclination,

to fight with their own men and the Romans at the same time; and as

they now fought with desperation and fury they killed a good many both

of their own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their

charge threw the maniples of the _hastati_ into confusion; whereupon

the officers of the _principes_ caused their lines to advance to oppose

them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries and Carthaginians

had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the sword of the _hastati_.

Those who survived and fled Hannibal would not allow to enter the ranks

of his army, but ordered his men to lower their spears and keep them

back as they approached; and they were therefore compelled to take

refuge on the wings or make for the open country.

[Sidenote: Final struggle between Hannibal’s reserves, his “army of

Italy,” and the whole Roman infantry.]

[Sidenote: The battle is decided by the return of the Roman and

Numidian cavalry.]

+14.+ The space between the two armies that still remained in position

was full of blood, wounded men, and dead corpses; and thus the rout

of the enemy proved an impediment of a perplexing nature to the

Roman general. Everything was calculated to make an advance in order

difficult,—the ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying piled up in

bloody heaps, and with the corpses arms flung about in every direction.

However Scipio caused the wounded to be carried to the rear, and the

_hastati_ to be recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and

drew them up where they were in advance of the ground on which the

fighting had taken place, opposite the enemy’s centre. He then ordered

the _principes_ and _triarii_ to take close order, and, threading

their way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the _hastati_

on either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and got into

line with the _hastati_, the two lines charged each other with the

greatest fire and fury. Being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage,

and arms, the battle was for a long time undecided, the men in their

obstinate valour falling dead without giving way a step; until at last

the divisions of Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit,

arrived providentially in the very nick of time. Upon their charging

Hannibal’s rear, the greater part of his men were cut down in their

ranks; while of those who attempted to fly very few escaped with their

life, because the horsemen were close at their heels and the ground

was quite level. On the Roman side there fell over fifteen hundred, on

the Carthaginian over twenty thousand, while the prisoners taken were

almost as numerous.

+15.+ Such was the end of this battle, fought under these famous

commanders: a battle on which everything depended, and which assigned

universal dominion to Rome. After it had come to an end, Scipio pushed

on in pursuit as far as the Carthaginian camp, [Hannibal escapes to

Adrumetum.] and, after plundering that, returned to his own. Hannibal,

escaping with a few horsemen, did not draw rein until he arrived safely

at Adrumetum. He had done in the battle all that was to be expected of

a good and experienced general. First, he had tried by an interview

with his opponent to see what he could do to procure a pacification;

and that was the right course for a man, who, while fully conscious of

his former victories, yet mistrusts Fortune, and has an eye to all the

possible and unexpected contingencies of war. Next, having accepted

battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with the

Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, could not

have been surpassed. For though the Roman line is hard to break, yet

each individual soldier and each company, owing to the uniform tactic

employed, can fight in any direction, those companies, which happen

to be in nearest contact with the danger, wheeling round to the point

required. Again, the nature of their arms gives at once protection and

confidence, for their shield is large and their sword will not bend:

the Romans therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer.

+16.+ Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these

difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He provided

himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in the van, for

the express purpose of throwing the enemy’s ranks into confusion and

breaking their order. Again he stationed the mercenaries in front and

the Carthaginians behind them, in order to wear out the bodies of the

enemy with fatigue beforehand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by

the numbers that would be killed by them; and moreover to compel the

Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay where they

were and fight, as the poet says[62]—

“That howsoe’er unwilling fight he must.”

But the most warlike and steady part of his army he held in reserve

at some distance, in order that they might not see what was happening

too closely, but, with strength and spirit unimpaired, might use their

courage to the best advantage when the moment arrived. And, if in spite

of having done everything that could be done, he who had never been

beaten before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. For

there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the brave; and there

are others again, when a man

“Though great and brave has met a greater still.”[63]

And this we might say was the case with Hannibal on this occasion....

[Sidenote: Scipio’s answer to the envoys from Carthage after Zama, who

made extravagant displays of sorrow.]

+17.+ Manifestations of emotion which go beyond what is customary

among a particular people, if they are thought to be the result of

genuine feeling evoked by extraordinary disasters, excite pity in the

minds of those who see or hear them; and we are all in a manner moved

by the novelty of the spectacle. But when such things appear to be

assumed for the purpose of taking in the spectators and producing a

dramatic effect, they do not provoke pity, but anger and dislike. And

this was the case in regard to the Carthaginian envoys. Scipio deigned

to give a very brief answer to their prayers, saying that “They, at

any rate, deserved no kindness at the hands of the Romans, since they

had themselves confessed that they were the aggressors in the war,

by having, contrary to their treaty obligations, taken Saguntum and

enslaved its inhabitants, and had recently been guilty of treachery and

breaking the terms of a treaty to which they had subscribed and sworn.

It was from a regard to their own dignity, to the vicissitudes of

Fortune, and to the dictates of humanity that the Romans had determined

to treat them with lenity and behave with magnanimity. And of this

they would be convinced if they would take a right view of the case.

For they ought not to consider it a hardship if they found themselves

charged to submit to any punishment, to follow a particular line of

conduct, or to give up this or that; they ought rather to regard it

as an unexpected favour that any kindness was conceded to them at

all; since Fortune, after depriving them of all right to pity and

consideration, owing to their own unrighteous conduct, had put them

in the power of their enemies.” After this preamble he mentioned the

concessions to be made to them, and the penalties to which they were to

submit.

[Sidenote: Terms imposed on Carthage after the battle of Zama, B.C.

202-201.]

+18.+ The following are the heads of the terms offered them:—_The

Carthaginians to retain the towns in Libya, of which they were

possessed before they commenced the last war against Rome, and the

territory which they also heretofore held, with its cattle, slaves,

and other stock: and from that day should not be subject to acts of

hostility, should enjoy their own laws and customs, and not have a

Roman garrison in their city._ These were the concessions favourable

to them. The clauses of an opposite character were as follows:—_The

Carthaginians to pay an indemnity to the Romans for all wrongs

committed during the truce; to restore all captives and runaway slaves

without limit of time; to hand over all their ships of war except ten

triremes, and all elephants; to go to war with no people outside Libya

at all, and with none in Libya without consent from Rome; to restore

to Massanissa all houses, territory, and cities belonging to him or

his ancestors within the frontiers assigned to that king; to supply

the Roman army with provisions for three months, and with pay, until

such time as an answer shall be returned from Rome on the subject of

the treaty; to pay ten thousand talents of silver in fifty years, two

hundred Euboic talents every year; to give a hundred hostages of their

good faith,—such hostages to be selected from the young men of the

country by the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or

older than thirty years._

[Sidenote: A scene in the Carthaginian assembly. Hannibal persuades

them to accept the treaty.]

+19.+ This was the nature of Scipio’s answer to the envoys, who

hastened home and communicated its terms to their countrymen. It was

then that the story goes that, upon a certain Senator intending to

speak against accepting the terms and actually beginning to do so,

Hannibal came forward and pulled the man down from the tribune; and

when the other senators showed anger at this breach of custom, Hannibal

rose again and “owned that he was ignorant of such things; but said

that they must pardon him if he acted in any way contrary to their

customs, remembering that he had left the country when he was but

fourteen, and had only returned when now past forty-five. Therefore

he begged them not to consider whether he had committed a breach of

custom, but much rather whether he were genuinely feeling for his

country’s misfortunes; for that was the real reason for his having

been guilty of this breach of manners. For it appeared to him to be

astonishing, and, indeed, quite unaccountable, that any one calling

himself a Carthaginian, and being fully aware of the policy which

they had individually and collectively adopted against the Romans,

should do otherwise than adore the kindness of Fortune for obtaining

such favourable terms, when in their power, as a few days ago no

one—considering the extraordinary provocation they had given—would have

ventured to mention, if they had been asked what they expected would

happen to their country, in case of the Romans proving victorious.

Therefore he called upon them now not to debate, but unanimously to

accept the terms offered, and with sacrifices to the gods to pray with

one accord that the Roman people might confirm the treaty.” His advice

being regarded as both sensible and timely, they resolved to sign the

treaty on the conditions specified; and the senate at once despatched

envoys to notify their consent....

_The intrigues of Philip V. and Antiochus the Great to divide the

dominions of the infant king of Egypt, Ptolemy Epiphanes, B.C. 204._

[Sidenote: Shameless ambition of Philip and Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 197. B.C. 191.]

+20.+ Is it not astonishing that while Ptolemy Philopator was alive and

did not need such assistance, these two kings were ready with offers of

aid, but that as soon as he was dead, leaving his heir a mere child,

whose kingdom they were bound by the ties of nature to have defended,

they then egged each other on to adopt the policy of partitioning the

boy’s kingdom between themselves, and getting rid entirely of the heir;

and that too without putting forward any decent pretext to cover their

iniquity, but acting so shamelessly, and so like beasts of prey, that

one can only compare their habits to those ascribed to fishes, among

which, though they may be of the same species, the destruction of the

smaller is the food and sustenance of the larger. This treaty of theirs

shows, as though in a mirror, the impiety to heaven and cruelty to man

of these two kings, as well as their unbounded ambition. However, if

a man were disposed to find fault with Fortune for her administration

of human affairs, he might fairly become reconciled to her in this

case; for she brought upon those monarchs the punishment they so well

deserved, and by the signal example she made of them taught posterity

a lesson in righteousness. For while they were engaged in acts of

treachery against each other, and in dismembering the child’s kingdom

in their own interests, she brought the Romans upon them, and the very

measures which they had lawlessly designed against another, she justly

and properly carried out against them. For both of them, being promptly

beaten in the field, were not only prevented from gratifying their

desire for the dominions of another, but were themselves made tributary

and forced to obey orders from Rome. Finally, within a very short time

Fortune restored the kingdom of Ptolemy to prosperity; while as to the

dynasties and successors of these two monarchs, she either utterly

abolished and destroyed them, or involved them in misfortunes which

were little short of that....

[Sidenote: The intrigues and tyranny of Molpagorus at Cius, in

Bithynia.]

+21.+ There was a certain man at Cius named Molpagoras, a ready speaker

and of considerable ability in affairs, but at heart a mere demagogue

and selfish intriguer. By flattering the mob, and putting the richer

citizens into its power, he either got them put to death right out, or

drove them into exile and distributed their confiscated goods among

the common people, and thus rapidly secured for himself a position of

despotic power....

[Sidenote: The causes of the ruin of Cius.]

The miseries which befel the Cians were not so much owing to Fortune or

the aggressions of their neighbours, as to their own folly and perverse

policy. For by steadily promoting their worst men, and punishing all

who were opposed to these, that they might divide their property among

themselves, they seemed as it were to court the disasters into which

they fell. These are disasters into which, somehow or another, though

all men fall, they yet not only cannot learn wisdom, but seem not even

to acquire the cautious distrust of brute beasts. The latter, if they

have once been hurt by bait or trap, or even if they have seen another

in danger of being caught, you would find it difficult to induce to

approach anything of the sort again: they are shy of the place, and

suspicious of everything they see. But as for men, though they have

been told of cities utterly ruined by their policy, and see others

actually doing so before their eyes, yet directly any one flatters

their wishes by holding out to them the prospect of recruiting their

fortunes at the cost of others, they rush thoughtlessly to the bait:

although they know quite well that no one, who has ever swallowed

such baits, has ever survived; and that such political conduct has

notoriously been the ruin of all who have adopted it.

[Sidenote: Capture of Cius by Philip V. B.C. 202.[64]

+22.+ Philip was delighted at taking the city, as though he had

performed a glorious and honourable achievement; ] for while displaying

great zeal in behalf of his brother-in-law (Prusias), and overawing all

who opposed his policy, he had secured for himself in fair warfare a

large supply of slaves and money. But the reverse of this picture he

did not see in the least, although it was quite plain. In the first

place, that he was assisting his brother-in-law, who, without receiving

any provocation, was treacherously assailing his neighbours. In the

second place, that by involving a Greek city without just cause in the

most dreadful misfortunes, he was sure to confirm the report, which

had been widely spread, of his severity to his friends; and by both of

these actions would justly gain throughout Greece the reputation of a

man reckless of the dictates of piety. In the third place, that he had

outraged the envoys from the above-mentioned states,[65] who had come

with the hope of saving the Cians from the danger which threatened

them, and who, after being day after day mocked by his professions,

had been at length compelled to witness what they most abhorred. And

lastly, that he had so infuriated the Rhodians, that they would never

henceforth listen to a word in his favour: a circumstance for which

Philip had to thank Fortune as well as himself.

[Sidenote: The anger of the Rhodians at the fall of Cius.]

+23.+ For it happened that just when his ambassador was defending

his master before the Rhodians in the theatre,—enlarging on “the

magnanimity of Philip,” and announcing that “though already in a manner

master of Cius, he conceded its safety to the wishes of the Rhodian

people; and did so because he desired to refute the calumnies of his

enemies, and to establish the honesty of his intentions in the eyes of

Rhodes,”—just then a man entered the Prytaneum who had newly arrived

in the island, and brought the news of the enslavement of the Cians

and the cruelty which Philip had exercised upon them. The Prytanis

coming into the theatre to announce this news, while the ambassador was

absolutely in the middle of his speech, the Rhodians could scarcely

make up their minds to believe a report which involved such monstrous

treachery.

[Sidenote: It causes a breach with the Aetolians.]

He had then betrayed himself quite as grossly as the Cians; and so

blind or misguided had he become as to the principles of right and

wrong, that he boasted of actions of which he ought to have been most

heartily ashamed, and plumed himself upon them as though they were

to his credit. But the people of Rhodes from that day forth regarded

Philip as their enemy, and made their preparations with that view. And

no less by this course had he gained the hatred of the Aetolians. He

had but lately made terms with, and held out the hand of friendship to

that nation: no excuse for a breach had arisen; and the Lysimachians,

Calchedonians, and Cianians were friends and allies of the Aetolians.

Nevertheless only a short time before he had separated Lysimachia

from the Aetolian alliance, and induced it to submit to him: then he

had done the same to Calchedon: and lastly he had enslaved the Cians,

though there was an Aetolian officer actually in Cius and conducting

the government. Prusias, however, in so far as his policy was

accomplished, was delighted; but inasmuch as another was in possession

of the prizes of the operations, while he himself got as his share

nothing but the bare site of a city, was extremely annoyed, but was yet

unable to do anything....

[Sidenote: Philip at Thasos, B.C. 202-201.]

+24.+ During his return voyage Philip engaged in one act of treachery

after another, and among others put in about midday at the town of

Thasos, and though it was on good terms with him, took it and enslaved

its inhabitants....

The Thasians answered Philip’s general Metrodorus, that they would

surrender their city, on condition that he would guarantee them freedom

from a garrison, tribute, or billeting of soldiers, and the enjoyment

of their own laws. Metrodorus having declared the king’s consent to

this, the whole assembly signified their approval of the words by a

loud shout, whereupon they admitted Philip into the town....

All kings perhaps at the beginning of their reign dangle the name of

liberty before their subjects’ eyes, and address as friends and allies

those who combine in pursuing the same objects as themselves; but when

they come to actual administration of affairs they at once cease to

treat these as allies, and assume the airs of a master. Such persons

accordingly find themselves deceived as to the honourable position they

expected to occupy, though as a rule not as to the immediate advantage

which they sought. But if a king is meditating undertakings of the

greatest importance, and only bounding his hopes by the limits of the

world, and has as yet had nothing to cast a damp upon his projects,

would it not seem the height of folly and madness to proclaim his own

fickleness and untrustworthiness in matters which are of the smallest

consequence, and lie at the very threshold of his enterprise?...

EGYPT

+24+ (_a_). My plan being to narrate under each year all the events in

the several parts of the world which were contemporary, it is clear

that in some cases it will be necessary to mention the end before the

beginning; when, that is to say, that particular part of the subject

calls for mention, first, as being in place in the general course of my

narrative, and the events which embrace the end of an episode fit in

sooner than those which belong to its beginning and first conception....

[Sidenote: The previous career of Sosibius.]

+25.+ Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, was a

creature of extraordinary cunning, who long retained his power, and

was the instrument of many crimes at court: he contrived first the

murder of Lysimachus, son of Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemy and Berenice;

secondly, that of Maga, son of Ptolemy and Berenice the daughter of

Maga; thirdly, that of Berenice the mother of Ptolemy Philopator;

fourthly, that of Cleomenes of Sparta; and fifthly, that of Arsinoe the

daughter of Berenice....

[Sidenote: B.C. 205. The death of Ptolemy Philopator announced, and

Epiphanes crowned.]

Three or four days after the death of Ptolemy Philopator, having caused

a platform to be erected in the largest court of the palace, Agathocles

and Sosibius summoned a meeting of the foot-guards and the household,

as well as the officers of the infantry and cavalry. The assembly

being formed, they mounted the platform, and first of all announced

the deaths of the king and queen, and proclaimed the customary period

of mourning for the people. After that they placed a diadem upon the

head of the child, Ptolemy Epiphanes, proclaimed him king, and read a

forged will, in which the late king nominated Agathocles and Sosibius

guardians of his son. They ended by an exhortation to the officers to

be loyal to the boy and maintain his sovereignty. They next brought in

two silver urns, one of which they declared contained the ashes of the

king, the other those of Arsinoe. And in fact one of them did really

contain the king’s ashes, the other was filled with spices. Having

done this they proceeded to complete the funeral ceremonies. It was

then that all the world at last learnt the truth about the death of

Arsinoe. For now that her death was clearly established, the manner of

it began to be a matter of speculation. Though rumours which turned out

to be true had found their way among the people, they had up to this

time been disputed; now there was no possibility of hiding the truth,

and it became deeply impressed in the minds of all. Indeed there was

great excitement among the populace: no one thought about the king; it

was the fate of Arsinoe that moved them. Some recalled her orphanhood;

others the tyranny and insult she had endured from her earliest days;

and when her miserable death was added to these misfortunes, it excited

such a passion of pity and sorrow that the city was filled with

sighs, tears, and irrepressible lamentation. Yet it was clear to the

thoughtful observer that these were not so much signs of affection for

Arsinoe as of hatred towards Agathocles.

[Sidenote: Agathocles propitiates the army and gets rid of the rivals.]

The first measure of this minister, after depositing the urns in the

royal mortuary, and giving orders for the laying aside of mourning,

was to gratify the army with two months’ pay; for he was convinced that

the way to deaden the resentment of the common soldiers was to appeal

to their interests. He then caused them to take the oath customary at

the proclamation of a new king; and next took measures to get all who

were likely to be formidable out of the country. Philammon, who had

been employed in the murder of Arsinoe, he sent out as governor of

Cyrene, while he committed the young king to the charge of Oenanthe and

Agathocleia. Next, Pelops the son of Pelops he despatched to the court

of Antiochus in Asia, to urge him to maintain his friendly relations

with the court of Alexandria, and not to violate the treaty he had

made with the young king’s father. Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, he sent

to Philip to arrange for a treaty of inter-marriage between the two

countries, and to ask for assistance in case Antiochus should make a

serious attempt to play them false in any matter of importance.

He also selected Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus, as ambassador to Rome:

not with a view of his seriously prosecuting the embassy, but because

he thought that, if he once entered Greece, he would find himself

among friends and kinsfolk, and would stay there; which would suit his

policy of getting rid of eminent men. Scopas the Aetolian also he sent

to Greece to recruit foreign mercenaries, giving him a large sum in

gold for bounties. He had two objects in view in this measure: one was

to use the soldiers so recruited in the war with Antiochus; another

was to get rid of the mercenary troops already existing, by sending

them on garrison duty in the various forts and settlements about the

country; while he used the new recruits to fill up the numbers of the

household regiments with new men, as well as the pickets immediately

round the palace, and in other parts of the city. For he believed that

men who had been hired by himself, and were taking his pay, would have

no feelings in common with the old soldiers, with whom they would be

totally unacquainted; but that, having all their hopes of safety and

profit in him, he would find them ready to co-operate with him and

carry out his orders.

Now all this took place before the intrigue of Philip, though it was

necessary for the sake of clearness to speak of that first, and to

describe the transactions which took place, both at the audience and

the dispatch of the ambassadors.

[Sidenote: The debauchery of Agathocles.]

To return to Agathocles: when he had thus got rid of the most eminent

men, and had to a great degree quieted the wrath of the common soldiers

by his present of pay, he returned quickly to his old way of life.

Drawing round him a body of friends, whom he selected from the most

frivolous and shameless of his personal attendants or servants, he

devoted the chief part of the day and night to drunkenness and all

the excesses which accompany drunkenness, sparing neither matron,

nor bride, nor virgin, and doing all this with the most offensive

ostentation. The result was a widespread outburst of discontent; and

when there appeared no prospect of reforming this state of things, or

of obtaining protection against the violence, insolence and debauchery

of the court, which on the contrary grew daily more outrageous, their

old hatred blazed up once more in the hearts of the common people, and

all began again to recall the misfortunes which the kingdom already

owed to these very men. But the absence of any one fit to take the

lead, and by whose means they could vent their wrath upon Agathocles

and Agathocleia, kept them quiet. Their one remaining hope rested upon

Tlepolemus, and on this they fixed their confidence.

[Sidenote: Tlepolemus, governor of Pelusium, determines to depose

Agathocles, B.C. 205-204.]

[Sidenote: Agathocles will anticipate him.]

As long as the late king was alive Tlepolemus remained in retirement;

but upon his death he quickly propitiated the common soldiers, and

became once more governor of Pelusium. At first he directed all his

actions with a view to the interest of the king, believing that

there would be some council of regency to take charge of the boy and

administer the government. But when he saw that all those who were

fit for this charge were got out of the way, and that Agathocles was

boldly monopolising the supreme power, he quickly changed his purpose;

because he suspected the danger that threatened him from the hatred

which they mutually entertained. He therefore began to draw his troops

together, and bestir himself to collect money, that he might not be

an easy prey to any one of his enemies. At the same time he was not

without hope that the guardianship of the young king, and the chief

power in the state might devolve upon him; both because, in his own

private opinion, he was much more fit for it in every respect than

Agathocles, and because he was informed that his own troops and those

in Alexandria were looking to him to put an end to the minister’s

outrageous conduct. When such ideas were entertained by Tlepolemus, it

did not take long to make the quarrel grow, especially as the partisans

of both helped to inflame it. Being eager to secure the adhesion of

the generals of divisions and the captains of companies, he frequently

invited them to banquets; and at these assemblies, instigated partly by

the flattery of his guests and partly by his own impulse (for he was a

young man and the conversation was over the wine), he used to throw out

sarcastic remarks against the family of Agathocles. At first they were

covert and enigmatic, then merely ambiguous, and finally undisguised,

and containing the bitterest reflections. He proposed the health of

the scribbler of pasquinades, the sackbut-girl and waiting-woman; and

spoke of his shameful boyhood, when as cupbearer of the king he had

submitted to the foulest treatment. His guests were always ready to

laugh at his words and add their quota to the sum of vituperation. It

was not long before this reached the ears of Agathocles: and the breach

between the two thus becoming an open one, Agathocles immediately

began bringing charges against Tlepolemus, declaring that he was a

traitor to the king, and was inviting Antiochus to come and seize the

government. And he brought many plausible proofs of this forward, some

of which he got by distorting facts that actually occurred, while

others were pure invention. His object in so doing was to excite the

wrath of the common people against Tlepolemus. But the result was the

reverse; for the populace had long fixed their hopes on Tlepolemus, and

were only too delighted to see the quarrel growing hot between them.

The actual popular outbreak which did occur began from the following

circumstances. Nicon, a relation of Agathocles, was in the lifetime of

the late king commander of the navy....

[Sidenote: A fragment from the earlier history of Agathocles.]

+26.+ (_a_) Another murder committed by Agathocles was that of Deinon,

son of Deinon. But this, as the proverb has it, was the fairest of

his foul deeds. For the letter ordering the murder of Arsinoe had

fallen into this man’s hands, and he might have given information

about the plot and saved the Queen; but at the time he chose rather

to help Philammon, and so became the cause of all the misfortunes

which followed; while, after the murder was committed, he was always

recalling the circumstances, commiserating the unhappy woman, and

expressing repentance at having let such an opportunity slip: and this

he repeated in the hearing of many, so that Agathocles heard of it, and

he met with his just punishment in losing his life....

THE DEATH OF AGATHOCLES AND HIS FAMILY

[Sidenote: Agathocles pretends a plot of Tlepolemus against the king,

B.C. 202.]

+26.+ (_b_) The first step of Agathocles was to summon a meeting of the

Macedonian guards. He entered the assembly accompanied by the young

king and his own sister Agathocleia. At first he feigned not to be able

to say what he wished for tears; but after again and again wiping his

eyes with his chlamys he at length mastered his emotion, and, taking

the young king in his arms, spoke as follows: “Take this boy, whom his

father on his death-bed placed in this lady’s arms” (pointing to his

sister) “and confided to your loyalty, men of Macedonia! That lady’s

affection has but little influence in securing the child’s safety: it

is on you that that safety now depends; his fortunes are in your hands.

It has long been evident to those who had eyes to see, that Tlepolemus

was aiming at something higher than his natural rank; but now he has

named the day and hour on which he intends to assume the crown. Do

not let your belief of this depend upon my words; refer to those who

know the real truth and have but just come from the very scene of his

treason.” With these words he brought forward Critolaus, who deposed

that he had seen with his own eyes the altars being decked, and the

victims being got ready by the common soldiers for the ceremony of a

coronation.

[Sidenote: Anger of the populace and soldiers against Agathocles.]

When the Macedonian guards had heard all this, far from being moved by

his appeal, they showed their contempt by hooting and loud murmurs,

and drove him away under such a fire of derision that he got out

of the assembly without being conscious how he did it. And similar

scenes occurred among other corps of the army at their meetings.

Meanwhile great crowds kept pouring into Alexandria from the up-country

stations, calling upon kinsmen or friends to help the movement, and

not to submit to the unbridled tyranny of such unworthy men. But what

inflamed the populace against the government more than anything else

was the knowledge that, as Tlepolemus had the absolute command of all

the imports into Alexandria, delay would be a cause of suffering to

themselves.

+27.+ Moreover, an action of Agathocles himself served to heighten

the anger of the multitude and of Tlepolemus. For he took Danae, the

latter’s mother-in-law, from the temple of Demeter, dragged her through

the middle of the city unveiled, and cast her into prison. His object

in doing this was to manifest his hostility to Tlepolemus; but its

effect was to loosen the tongues of the people. In their anger they no

longer confined themselves to secret murmurs: but some of them in the

night covered the walls in every part of the city with pasquinades;

while others in the day time collected in groups and openly expressed

their loathing for the government.

[Sidenote: Terror of Agathocles.]

[Sidenote: Arrest of Moeragenes.]

Seeing what was taking place, and beginning to fear the worst,

Agathocles at one time meditated making his escape by secret flight;

but as he had nothing ready for such a measure, thanks to his own

imprudence, he had to give up that idea. At another time he set himself

to drawing out lists of men likely to assist him in a bold _coup

d’état_, by which he should put to death or arrest his enemies, and

then possess himself of absolute power. While still meditating these

plans he received information that Moeragenes, one of the bodyguard,

was betraying all the secrets of the palace to Tlepolemus, and was

co-operating with him on account of his relationship with Adaeus, at

that time the commander of Bubastus. Agathocles immediately ordered

his secretary Nicostratus to arrest Moeragenes, and extract the truth

from him by every possible kind of torture. Being promptly arrested by

Nicostratus, and taken to a retired part of the palace, he was at first

examined directly as to the facts alleged; but, refusing to confess

anything, he was stripped. And now some of the torturers were preparing

their instruments, and others with scourges in their hands were just

taking off their outer garments, when just at that very moment a

servant ran in, and, whispering something in the ear of Nicostratus,

hurried out again. Nicostratus followed close behind him, without a

word, frequently slapping his thigh with his hand.

[Sidenote: Moeragenes rouses the soldiers.]

+28.+ The predicament of Moeragenes was now indescribably strange.

There stood the executioners by his side on the point of raising

their scourges, while others close to him were getting ready their

instruments of torture: but when Nicostratus withdrew they all stood

silently staring at each other’s faces, expecting him every moment

to return; but as time went on they one by one slipped away, until

Moeragenes was left alone. Having made his way through the palace,

after this unhoped-for escape, he rushed in his half-clothed state

into a tent of the Macedonian guards which was situated close to the

palace. They chanced to be at breakfast, and therefore a good many

were collected together; and to them he narrated the story of his

wonderful escape. At first they would not believe it, but ultimately

were convinced by his appearing without his clothes. Taking advantage

of this extraordinary occurrence, Moeragenes besought the Macedonian

guards with tears not only to help him to secure his own safety, but

the king’s also, and above all their own. “For certain destruction

stared them in the face,” he said, “unless they seized the moment when

the hatred of the populace was at its height, and every one was ready

to wreak vengeance on Agathocles. That moment was _now_, and all that

was wanted was some one to begin.”

+29.+ The passions of the Macedonians were roused by these words, and

they finally agreed to do as Moeragenes advised. They at once went

round to the tents, first those of their own corps, and then those of

the other soldiers; which were all close together, facing the same

quarter of the city. The wish was one which had for a long time been

formed in the minds of the soldiery, wanting nothing but some one to

call it forth, and with courage to begin. No sooner, therefore, had a

commencement been made than it blazed out like a fire: and before four

hours had elapsed every class, whether military or civil, had agreed to

make the attempt.

[Sidenote: Agathocles despairs.]

[Sidenote: Oenanthe in the temple of Demeter.]

At this crisis, too, chance contributed a great deal to the final

catastrophe. For a letter addressed by Tlepolemus to the army as well

as some of his spies, had fallen into the hands of Agathocles. The

letter announced that he would be at Alexandria shortly, and the spies

informed Agathocles that he was already there. This news so distracted

Agathocles that he gave up taking any measures at all or even thinking

about the dangers which surrounded him, but departed at his usual

hour to his wine, and kept up the carouse to the end in his usual

licentious fashion. But his mother Oenanthe went in great distress to

the temple of Demeter and Persephone, which was open on account of a

certain annual sacrifice; and there first of all she besought the aid

of those goddesses with bendings of the knee and strange incantations,

and then sat down close to the altar and remained motionless. Most of

the women present, delighted to witness her dejection and distress,

kept silence: but the ladies of the family of Polycrates, and certain

others of the nobility, being as yet unaware of what was going on

around them, approached Oenanthe and tried to comfort her. But she

cried out in a loud voice: “Do not come near me, you monsters! I know

you well! Your hearts are always against us; and you pray the goddess

for all imaginable evil upon us. Still I trust and believe that, God

willing, you shall one day taste the flesh of your own children.” With

these words she ordered her female attendants to drive them away, and

strike them with their staves if they refused to go. The ladies availed

themselves of this excuse for quitting the temple in a body, raising

their hands and praying that she might herself have experience of those

very miseries with which she had threatened her neighbours.

[Sidenote: A mob assembles.]

+30.+ The men having by this time decided upon a revolution, now

that in every house the anger of the women was added to the general

resentment, the popular hatred blazed out with redoubled violence. As

soon as night fell the whole city was filled with tumult, torches, and

hurrying feet. Some were assembling with shouts in the stadium; some

were calling upon others to join them; some were running backwards

and forwards seeking to conceal themselves in houses and places least

likely to be suspected. And now the open spaces round the palace, the

stadium, and the street were filled with a motley crowd, as well as

the area in front of the Dionysian Theatre. Being informed of this,

Agathocles roused himself from a drunken lethargy,—for he had just

dismissed his drinking party,—and, accompanied by all his family,

with the exception of Philo, went to the king. After a few words of

lamentation over his misfortunes addressed to the child, he took him

by the hand, and proceeded to the covered walk which runs between the

Maeander garden and the Palaestra, and leads to the entrance of the

theatre. Having securely fastened the two first doors through which

he passed, he entered the third with two or three bodyguards, his own

family, and the king. The doors, however, which were secured by double

bars, were only of lattice work and could therefore be seen through.

By this time the mob had collected from every part of the city in

such numbers, that, not only was every foot of ground occupied, but

the doorsteps and roofs also were crammed with human beings; and

such a mingled storm of shouts and cries arose, as might be expected

from a crowd in which women and children were mixed with men: for in

Alexandria, as in Carthage, the children perform as conspicuous a part

in such commotions as the men.

[Sidenote: Cries for the king.]

+31.+ Day now began to break and the uproar was still a confused babel

of voices; but one cry made itself heard conspicuously above the rest,

it was a call for THE KING. The first thing actually done was by the

Macedonian guard: they left their quarters and seized the vestibule

which served as the audience hall of the palace; then, after a brief

pause, having ascertained whereabouts in the palace the king was, they

went round to the covered walk, burst open the first doors, and, when

they came to the next, demanded with loud shouts that the young king

should be surrendered to them. Agathocles, recognising his danger,

begged his bodyguards to go in his name to the Macedonians, to inform

them that “he resigned the guardianship of the king, and all offices,

honours, or emoluments which he possessed, and only asked that his

life should be granted him with a bare maintenance; that by sinking to

his original situation in life he would be rendered incapable, even

if he wished it, of being henceforth oppressive to any one.” All the

bodyguards refused except Aristomenes, who afterwards obtained the

chief power in the state.

[Sidenote: Aristomenes.]

This man was an Acarnanian, and, though far advanced in life when he

obtained supreme power, he is thought to have made a most excellent and

blameless guardian of the king and kingdom. And as he was distinguished

in that capacity, so had he been remarkable before for his adulation

of Agathocles in the time of his prosperity. He was the first, when

entertaining Agathocles at his house, to distinguish him among his

guests by the present of a gold diadem, an honour reserved by custom

to the kings alone; he was the first too who ventured to wear his

likeness on his ring; and when a daughter was born to him he named her

Agathocleia.

[Sidenote: The guards insist on the surrender of the king.]

But to return to my story. Aristomenes undertook the mission, received

his message, and made his way through a certain wicket-gate to the

Macedonians. He stated his business in few words: the first impulse

of the Macedonians was to stab him to death on the spot; but some of

them held up their hands to protect him, and successfully begged his

life. He accordingly returned with orders to bring the king or to

come no more himself. Having dismissed Aristomenes with these words,

the Macedonians proceeded to burst open the second door also. When

convinced by their proceedings, no less than by the answers they had

returned, of the fierce purpose of the Macedonians, the first idea of

Agathocles was to thrust his hand through the latticed door,—while

Agathocleia did the same with her breasts which she said had suckled

the king,—and by every kind of entreaty to beg that the Macedonians

would grant him bare life.

[Sidenote: The king conducted to the stadium.]

+32.+ But finding that his long and piteous appeals produced no effect,

at last he sent out the young king with the bodyguards. As soon as they

had got the king, the Macedonians placed him on a horse and conducted

him to the stadium. His appearance being greeted with loud shouts and

clapping of hands, they stopped the horse, and dismounting the child,

ushered him to the royal stall and seated him there. But the feelings

of the crowd were divided: they were delighted that the young king

had been brought, but they were dissatisfied that the guilty persons

had not been arrested and met with the punishment they deserved.

Accordingly, they continued with loud cries to demand that the authors

of all the mischief should be brought out and made an example. The

day was wearing away, and yet the crowd had found no one on whom to

wreak their vengeance, when Sosibius, who, though a son of the elder

Sosibius, was at that time a member of the bodyguard, and as such had

a special eye to the safety of the king and the State,—seeing that the

furious desire of the multitude was implacable, and that the child

was frightened at the unaccustomed faces that surrounded him and the

uproar of the crowd, asked the king whether he would “surrender to

the populace those who had injured him or his mother.” The boy having

nodded assent, Sosibius bade some of the bodyguard announce the king’s

decision, while he raised the young child from his seat and took him

to his own house which was close by to receive proper attention and

refreshment. When the message from the king was declared, the whole

place broke out into a storm of cheering and clapping of hands. But

meanwhile Agathocles and Agathocleia had separated and gone each to

their own lodgings. Without loss of time soldiers, some voluntarily and

others under pressure from the crowd, started in search of them.

[Sidenote: Death of Agathocles, his sister, and Oenanthe.]

+33.+ The beginning of actual bloodshed, however, was this. One of

the servants and flatterers of Agathocles, whose name was Philo, came

out to the stadium still flustered with wine. Seeing the fury of the

multitude, he said to some bystanders that they would have cause to

repent it again, as they had only the other day, if Agathocles were

to come there. Of those who heard him some began to abuse him, while

others pushed him about; and on his attempting to defend himself, some

tore his cloak off his back, while others thrust their spears into him

and wounded him mortally. He was dragged into the middle of the crowd

breathing his last gasp; and, having thus tasted blood, the multitude

began to look impatiently for the coming of the other victims. They

had not to wait long. First appeared Agathocles dragged along bound

hand and foot. No sooner had he entered than some soldiers rushed at

him and struck him dead. And in doing so they were his friends rather

than enemies, for they saved him from the horrible death which he

deserved. Nicon was brought next, and after him Agathocleia stripped

naked, with her two sisters; and following them the whole family. Last

of all some men came bringing Oenanthe, whom they had torn from the

temple of Demeter and Persephone, riding stripped naked upon a horse.

They were all given up to the populace, who bit, and stabbed them, and

knocked out their eyes, and, as soon as any one of them fell, tore him

limb from limb, until they had utterly annihilated them all: for the

savagery of the Egyptians when their passions are roused is indeed

terrible. At the same time some young girls who had been brought up

with Arsinoe, having learnt that Philammon, the chief agent in the

murder of that Queen, had arrived three days before from Cyrene, rushed

to his house; forced their way in; killed Philammon with stones and

sticks; strangled his infant son; and, not content with this, dragged

his wife naked into the street and put her to death.

Such was the end of Agathocles and Agathocleia and their kinsfolk.

[Sidenote: The contemptible character of Agathocles.]

+34.+ I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and embellishments

which the chroniclers of this event have added to their narrative

with a view of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, making

more of their comments on the story than of the story itself and the

main incidents. Some ascribe it entirely to Fortune, and take the

opportunity of expatiating on her fickleness and the difficulty of

being on one’s guard against her. Others dwell upon the unexpectedness

of the event, and try to assign its causes and probabilities. It was

not my purpose, however, to treat this episode in this way, because

Agathocles was not a man of conspicuous courage or ability as a

soldier; nor particularly successful or worth imitating as a statesman;

nor, lastly, eminent for his acuteness as a courtier or cunning as an

intriguer, by which latter accomplishments Sosibius and many others

have managed to keep one king after another under their influence

to the last day of their lives. The very opposite of all this may

be said of this man. For though he obtained high promotion owing to

Philopator’s feebleness as a king; and though after his death he had

the most favourable opportunity of consolidating his power, he yet soon

fell into contempt, and lost his position and his life at once, thanks

to his own want of courage and vigour.

[Sidenote: See 12, 15.]

+35.+ To such a story then no such dissertation is required, as was in

place, for instance, in the case of the Sicilian monarchs, Agathocles

and Dionysius, and certain others who have administered governments

with reputation. For the former of these, starting from a plebeian

and humble position—having been, as Timaeus sneeringly remarks, a

potter—came from the wheel, clay, and smoke, quite a young man to

Syracuse. And, to begin with, both these men in their respective

generations became tyrants of Syracuse, a city that had obtained at

that time the greatest reputation and the greatest wealth of any in the

world; and afterwards were regarded as suzerains of all Sicily, and

lords of certain districts in Italy. While, for his part, Agathocles

not only made an attempt upon Africa, but eventually died in possession

of the greatness he had acquired. It is on this account that the story

is told of Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of the Carthaginians,

that being asked whom he considered to have been the most skilful

administrators and most distinguished for boldness combined with

prudence, he replied, “the Sicilians Agathocles and Dionysius.” Now, in

the case of such men as these, it is certainly right to try to arrest

the attention of our readers, and, I suppose, to speak of Fortune and

the mutability of human affairs, and in fact to point a moral: but in

the case of such men as we have been speaking of, it is quite out of

place to do so.

+36.+ For these reasons I have rejected all idea of making too much of

the story of Agathocles. But another and the strongest reason was that

all such wonderful and striking catastrophes are only worth listening

to once; not only are subsequent exhibitions of them unprofitable

to ear and eye, but elaborate harping upon them soon becomes simply

troublesome. For those who are engaged on representing anything either

to eye or ear can have only two objects to aim at,—pleasure and profit;

and in history, more than in anything else, excessive prolixity on

events of tragic interest fails of both these objects. For, in the

first place, who would wish to emulate extraordinary catastrophes? And

next, no one likes to be continually seeing and hearing things that

are unnatural and beyond the ordinary conceptions of mankind. We are,

indeed, eager to see and hear such things once and for the first time,

because we want to know that a thing is possible which was supposed to

be impossible: but when once convinced on that point no one is pleased

at lingering on the Unnatural; but in fact would rather not come across

it at all oftener than need be. In fact, the dwelling upon misfortunes

which exceed the ordinary limits is more suitable to tragedy than to

history. But perhaps we ought to make allowances for men who have

studied neither nature nor universal history. They think, I presume,

that the most important and astonishing events in all history are

those which they happen to have come across themselves or to have

heard from others, and they therefore give their attention exclusively

to those. They accordingly do not perceive that they are making a

mistake in expatiating on events which are neither novel,—for they have

been narrated by others before,—nor capable of giving instruction or

pleasure. So much on this point....

ANTIOCHUS

[Sidenote: Disappointments as to the character of Antiochus the Great.]

+37.+ King Antiochus, at the beginning of his reign, was thought to

be a man of great enterprise and courage, and great vigour in the

execution of his purposes; but as he grew older his character evidently

deteriorated in itself, and disappointed the expectation of the

world....