PREFACE
[Sidenote: 144th Olympiad, B.C. 204-200.]
Perhaps a _resumé_ of events in each Olympiad may arrest the attention
of my readers both by their number and importance, the transactions in
every part of the world being brought under one view. However, I think
the events of this Olympiad especially will do so; because in it the
wars in Italy and Libya came to an end; and I cannot imagine any one
not caring to inquire what sort of catastrophe and conclusion they had.
For everybody, though extremely interested in details and particulars,
naturally longs to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was
in this period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of
their character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to them
before was now become a matter of clear and universal knowledge, even
to those who did not care to take part in public business. Therefore,
as I wished to make my narrative worthy of its subject, I have not, as
in former instances, included the history of two years in one book....
_Elected Consul for_ B.C. _205 (see 11, 33) Scipio had Sicily assigned
as his provincia, with leave to cross to Africa if necessary (Livy,
28, 45). He sent Laelius to Africa in B.C. 205, but remained himself
in Sicily. Next spring (B.C. 204) he crossed to Africa with a year’s
additional imperium. In the course of this year he ravaged the
Carthaginian territory and besieged Utica (Livy, 29, 35), and at the
beginning of_ B.C. _203 his imperium was prolonged till he should have
finished the war (id. 30, 1)._
[Sidenote: The proposal of Syphax.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 203. Cn. Servilius Caepio, C. Servilius Geminus Coss.
Livy, 30, 1.]
+1.+ While the Consuls were thus engaged,[55] Scipio in Libya learnt
during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting out a fleet;
he therefore devoted himself to similar preparations as well as to
pressing on the siege of Utica. He did not, however, give up all hopes
of Syphax; but as their forces were not far apart he kept sending
messages to him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the
Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was getting
tired of the girl[56] for whose sake he had joined the Carthaginians,
and of his alliance with the Punic people generally; for the Numidians,
he knew, were naturally quick to feel satiety, and constant neither
to gods nor men. Scipio’s mind, however, was distracted with various
anxieties, and his prospects were far from seeming secure to him;
for he shrank from an engagement in the open field on account of
the enemy’s great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an
opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his messengers to
Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had constructed their
huts in their winter camp of various kinds of wood and boughs without
any earth; while the old army of the Numidians made theirs of reeds,
and the reinforcements which were now coming in from the neighbouring
townships constructed theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the
trench and palisade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore
made up his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be most
unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself, would be by
fire. He therefore turned his attention to organising such an attack.
Now, in his communications with Scipio, Syphax was continually harping
upon his proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate Italy and the
Romans Libya; and that the possessions held by either between these two
countries should remain in _statu quo_. Hitherto Scipio had refused to
listen to this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth
of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed was not
impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became much bolder than
before in his communications with Scipio; the numbers of the messengers
sent backwards and forwards, and the frequency of their visits,
were redoubled; and they sometimes even stayed several days in each
other’s camps without any thought of precaution. On these occasions
Scipio always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of tried
experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves in rough and
common clothes, that they might examine and investigate in security
the approaches and entrances to both the entrenchments. For there were
two camps, one that of Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry
and three thousand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from
it of the Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty
thousand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its huts
were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as I said before,
the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and earth, but used simply
reeds and thatch in their construction.
[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 203.]
[Sidenote: Scipio’s ruse to deceive Syphax.]
+2.+ By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the
reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon the enemy; and he began
launching his ships, and getting the engines on them into working
order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea. With
his land forces he once more occupied the high ground overlooking
the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it by trenches. He
wished the enemy to believe that he was doing this for the sake of
carrying on the siege; but he really meant it as a cover for his
men, who were to be engaged in the undertaking described above, to
prevent the garrison sallying out, when the legions were separated
from their lines, assaulting the palisade which was so near to them,
and attacking the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst
of these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, “in case
he agreed to his proposals, the Carthaginians would assent, and not
say again that they would deliberate on the terms?” He ordered these
legates at the same time not to return to him, until they had received
an answer on these points. When the envoys arrived, the Numidian king
was convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the agreement,
partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that they would not
go away until they got his answer, and partly because of the anxiety
expressed as to the disposition of the Carthaginians. He therefore sent
immediately to Hasdrubal, stating the facts and urging him to accept
the peace. Meanwhile he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed
the Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where they
were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in the same way,
while in reality he was pushing on his preparations with the utmost
care. When a message was returned from the Carthaginians bidding
Syphax complete the treaty of peace, the Numidian king, in a state of
great exaltation, communicated the news to the envoys; who immediately
departed to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what had
been done. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general at once sent fresh
envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was quite satisfied and was anxious
for the peace; but that the members of his council differed from him,
and held that they should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly
arrived and informed the Numidians of this. Scipio sent this mission to
avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he should perform any act
of hostility while negotiations for peace were still going on between
the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he would be
free to act in whatever way he chose without laying himself open to
blame.
[Sidenote: Scipio discloses his project.]
+3.+ Syphax’s annoyance at this message was great, in proportion to
the hopes he had previously entertained of making the peace. He had an
interview with Hasdrubal, and told him of the message he had received
from the Romans; but though they deliberated long and earnestly as to
what they ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to
what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipation whatever
as to the need of taking precautions, or of any danger threatening
them, but were all eagerness and excitement to strike some blow, and
thus provoke the enemy to descend into the level ground. Meanwhile
Scipio allowed his army generally, by the preparations he was making
and the orders he was issuing, to imagine that his aim was the capture
of Utica; but summoning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he
imparted to them his design, and ordered them to cause their men to get
their supper early, and then to lead the legions outside the camp as
soon as the buglers gave the usual signal by a simultaneous blast of
their bugles. For it is a custom in the Roman army for the trumpeters
and buglers to sound a call near the commander’s tent at supper time,
that the night pickets may then take up their proper positions.
Scipio next summoned the spies whom he had sent at different times to
reconnoitre the enemy’s quarters, and carefully compared and studied
the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the hostile camps and
the entrances to them, employing Massanissa to criticise their words
and assist him with his advice, because he was acquainted with the
locality.
[Sidenote: Destruction of the camp of Syphax by C. Laelius and
Massanissa, and of Hasdrubal.]
+4.+ Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio left a
sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of the men on
the march towards the end of the first watch, the enemy being about
sixty stades distant. Arrived in the neighbourhood of the enemy,
about the end of the third watch, he assigned to Gaius Laelius and
Massanissa half his Roman soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders
to attack the camp of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like
brave men and do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding
that, as the darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a
night attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and a
firm heart. The rest of the army he took the command of in person, and
led against Hasdrubal. He had calculated on not beginning his assault
until Laelius’s division had set fire to the enemy’s huts; he therefore
proceeded slowly. The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions, which
attacked the enemy simultaneously. The construction of the huts being
as though purposely contrived to be susceptible of a conflagration, as
I have already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set
light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely, and
soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts to each
other, and the amount of combustible material which they contained.
Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve; but Massanissa, knowing
the localities through which those who fled from the fire would be
sure to retreat, stationed his own soldiers at those spots. Not a
single Numidian had any suspicion of the true state of the case,
not even Syphax himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental
conflagration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously out
of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a carouse
and with the cup actually at their lips. The result was that numbers
of them got trampled to death by their own friends at the exits from
the camp; many were caught by the flames and burnt to death; while all
those who escaped the flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were
killed, without knowing what was happening to them or what they were
doing.
+5.+ At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the proportions
of the conflagration and the hugeness of the flame that was rising,
imagined that the Numidian camp had been accidentally set on fire. Some
of them therefore started at once to render assistance, and all the
rest hurried outside their own camp unarmed, and stood there gazing
in astonishment at the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to
his best wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and
either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into the camp,
set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic army was thus very
like that which had just befallen the Numidians, fire and sword in
both cases combining to destroy them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up
all idea of combating the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of
the two that the fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as
he had supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of
the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his own life,
although there was now little hope left of doing so. For the fire was
spreading rapidly and was catching everywhere; while the camp gangways
were full of horses, beasts of burden, and men, some of them half
dead and devoured by the fire, and others in a state of such frantic
terror and mad excitement that they prevented any attempts at making
a defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they created
rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of Syphax was the
same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that of the other officers.
The two former, however, did manage to escape, accompanied by a few
horsemen: but all those myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden,
either met a miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they
escaped the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously
at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not only
without their arms, but without so much as their clothes to cover them.
The whole place was filled with yells of pain, confused cries, terror,
and unspeakable din, mingled with a conflagration which spread rapidly
and blazed with the utmost fierceness. It was the combination and
suddenness of these horrors that made them so awful, any one of which
by itself would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts
of men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to exaggerate
the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass in horror everything
hitherto recorded. Of all the brilliant achievements of Scipio this
appears to me to have been the most brilliant and the most daring....
[Sidenote: Hasdrubal at Anda, see Appian, 8, 24.]
[Sidenote: The Senate, however, resolves to continue their resistance.]
[Sidenote: Dismay at Carthage.]
+6.+ When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed or in
headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his Tribunes to activity, and at once
started in pursuit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed inclined
to stand his ground, though told of Scipio’s approach, trusting in the
strength of the town [of Anda]; but when he saw that the inhabitants
were in a mutinous state, he shrank from meeting the attack of Scipio,
and fled with the relics of his army, which consisted of as many as
five hundred cavalry and about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants
of the town thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and
were spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns to
the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his original
entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had entertained of the
course which the campaign would take, the Carthaginians were deeply
depressed. They had expected to shut up the Romans on the promontory
near Utica, which had been the site of their winter quarters, and
besiege them there with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With
this view all their preparations had been made; and when they saw,
quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not only driven
from the open country by the enemy, but were in hourly expectation
of an attack upon themselves and their city, they became completely
disheartened and panic-stricken. Their circumstances, however, admitted
of no delay. They were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt
some measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt
and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they ought to
send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their one hope of safety
being now centred in that general and his forces. Others were for an
embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce and discuss with him the terms of a
pacification and treaty. Others again were for keeping up their courage
and collecting their forces, and sending a message to Syphax; who, they
said, was at the neighbouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting the
remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one which ultimately
prevailed. The Government of Carthage accordingly set about collecting
troops, and sent a despatch to Syphax begging him to support them and
abide by his original policy, as a general with an army would presently
join him.
+7.+ Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the siege of Utica.
But when he heard that Syphax was still in position, and that the
Carthaginians were once more collecting an army, he led out his forces
and pitched his camp close under the walls of Utica. At the same
time he divided the booty among the soldiers....[57] The merchants
who purchased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable
bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with high hopes
of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and they therefore thought
little of the spoils already obtained, and made no difficulties in
selling them to the merchants.
[Sidenote: Syphax is persuaded by Sophanisba to stand by the
Carthaginians still.]
[Sidenote: The Carthaginians again take the field.]
The Numidian king and his friends were at first minded to continue
their retreat to their own land. But while deliberating on this,
certain Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who had been hired
as soldiers by the Carthaginians, arrived in the vicinity of Abba.
Encouraged by this additional strength the Numidians stopped on their
retreat. And when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and
wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would remain and
not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the Numidian king gave
way and consented to her prayer. The approach of these Celtiberes
did a great deal also to encourage the hopes of the Carthaginians:
for instead of four thousand, it was reported at Carthage that they
were ten thousand, and that their bravery and the excellency of their
arms made them irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour,
and by the boastful talk which was current among the common people,
the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once more take the field
redoubled. And finally, within thirty days, they pitched a camp in
conjunction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are called the
Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less than thirty thousand.
[Sidenote: Syphax and Hasdrubal escape.]
[Sidenote: The Celtiberes, on the centre, are cut to pieces after a
gallant resistance.]
[Sidenote: The Roman wings are both victorious.]
[Sidenote: The battle on the Great Plains. 24th June, B.C. 203.]
+8.+ When news of these proceedings reached the Roman camp Scipio
immediately determined to attack. Leaving orders, therefore, to the
army and navy, which were besieging Utica, as to what they were to
do, he started with all his army in light marching order. On the
fifth day he reached the Great Plains, and during the first day after
his arrival encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades
from the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up his
army[58] at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with his cavalry
forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing attacks carried on by
both sides during the next two days, on the fourth both armies were
deliberately brought out into position and drawn up in order of battle.
Scipio followed exactly the Roman system, stationing the maniples of
hastati in the front, behind them the principes, and lastly the triarii
in the rear. Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right
wing, the Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal
stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman cohorts, the
Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. At the very
first charge the Numidians reeled before the Italian cavalry, and the
Carthaginians before those under Massanissa; for their many previous
defeats had completely demoralised them. But the Celtiberes fought
gallantly, for they had no hope of saving themselves by flight, being
entirely unacquainted with the country; nor any expectation of being
spared if they were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to
Scipio: for they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice
and of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the
Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at Scipio’s
hands during the campaigns in Iberia. When, however, the two wings gave
way these men were surrounded by the principes and triarii, and cut to
pieces on the field almost to a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who
yet did very effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during
the whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not been
for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would have pressed the
fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy would have escaped. As it
was, owing to the delay caused by these men, Syphax and his cavalry
effected their retreat to his own kingdom in safety; while Hasdrubal
with the survivors of his army did the same to Carthage.
[Sidenote: Scipio receives the submission of the country, while Laelius
goes in pursuit of Syphax.]
+9.+ After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty and
prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of war to consult as to what to
do next. It was resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the army
should stay in the country and visit the various towns; while Laelius
and Massanissa, with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions,
should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or make any
preparations. This being settled the commanders separated; the two
latter going with their division in pursuit of Syphax, Scipio on a
round of the townships. Some of these were terrified into a voluntary
submission to the Romans, others he promptly took by assault. The whole
country was ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries
and contributions, under which it had been groaning from the protracted
wars in Iberia.
[Sidenote: A panic at Carthage.]
In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great enough before,
a still wilder state of excitement prevailed, after this second
disaster, and the disappointment of the hopes of success which they
had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who claimed the
highest character for courage urged that they should go on board their
ships and attack the besiegers of Utica, try to raise the blockade, and
engage the enemy at sea, who were not in a forward state of preparation
in that department; that they should recall Hannibal, and without
delay test to the utmost this one more chance: for both these measures
offered great and reasonable opportunities of securing their safety.
Others declared that their circumstances no longer admitted of these
measures: what they had to do was to fortify their town and prepare to
stand a siege; for chance would give them many occasions of striking
a successful blow if they only held together. At the same time they
advised that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making
a treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they might
extricate themselves from the danger. After a long debate, all these
proposals were adopted together.
+10.+ Upon this decision being come to, those who were to sail to Italy
went straight from the council chamber to the sea, while the Navarch
went to prepare the ships. The rest began to take measures for securing
the city, and remained in constant consultation on the measures
necessary for the purpose.
Meanwhile Scipio’s camp was getting gorged with booty; for he found no
one to resist him, and everybody yielded to his attacks. He therefore
determined to despatch the greater part of the booty to his original
camp; while he advanced with his army in light marching order to
seize the entrenchment near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the
view of the inhabitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more
than anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their
courage.
The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and provisioned their ships,
and were engaged in getting under sail and carrying out their plan of
operations, when Scipio arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying
at his approach, occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades
from Carthage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and
visible from nearly every point of Carthage.
[Sidenote: Scipio recalled to Utica by the fear of an attack upon his
fleet.]
Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Carthaginians were
putting out to sea on board their ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the
enemy thus putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his own fleet,
Scipio was rendered exceedingly anxious, because no one there was
prepared for such an attack, or had anything in readiness to meet the
danger. He therefore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to
support his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well fitted
out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls, and generally
for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but not in the least in the
trim for a sea-fight; while the enemy’s fleet had been under process
of rigging for this purpose the whole winter. He therefore gave up all
idea of putting to sea to meet the enemy and accepting battle there;
but anchoring his decked ships side by side he moored the transports
round them, three or four deep; and then, taking down the masts and
yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of these,
keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the light craft to
sail in and out....
PTOLEMY PHILOPATOR, B.C. 222-205
+11.+ Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe, and the
friend of king Philopator....
[Sidenote: The extraordinary influence of women of low character at
Alexandria.]
Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer to Ptolemy
Philadelphus, were set up at Alexandria, draped in a single tunic and
holding a cup in the hands. And are not the most splendid houses there
those which go by the names of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine? And yet
Mnesis was a flute-girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a public
prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of king Ptolemy
Philopator, an influential personage,—she who was the ruin of the whole
kingdom?...
[Sidenote: The feeble character of Ptolemy Philopator.]
+12.+ The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have chosen to give
a sketch of Egyptian history here, going back a considerable period;
whereas, in the case of the rest of my history, I have recorded the
events of each year in the several countries side by side? I have
done so for the following reasons: Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am
now speaking, after the conclusion of the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria,[59] abandoned all noble pursuits and gave himself up
to the life of debauchery which I have just described. But late in
life he was compelled by circumstances to engage in the war I have
mentioned,[60] which, over and above the mutual cruelty and lawlessness
with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched battle, sea
fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I thought, therefore,
that it would be easier for me as a writer, and more intelligible
to my readers, if I did not touch upon everything year by year as
it occurred, or give a full account of transactions which were
insignificant and undeserving of serious attention; but should once for
all sum up and describe the character and policy of this king.