Governor Harrison was admittedly the highest authority on the

northwestern Indians. He kept his fingers constantly on the pulse of

Indian sentiment and opinion and often said that he could forecast

by the conduct of his Indians, as a mariner forecasts the weather by

the aid of a barometer, the chances of war and peace for the United

States so far as they were controlled by the cabinet in London. The

remark, though curious, was not surprising. Uneasiness would naturally

be greatest in regions where the greatest irritation existed and which

were under the least control. Such a danger spot was the Territory of

Indiana. It occupied a remote and perilous position, for northward

and westward the Indian country stretched to the Great Lakes and the

Mississippi, unbroken save by the military posts at Fort Wayne and Fort

Dearborn (now Chicago) and a considerable settlement of whites in the

vicinity of Detroit. Some five thousand Indian warriors held this vast

region and were abundantly able to expel every white man from Indiana

if their organization had been as strong as their numbers. And the

whites were no less eager to expel the Indians.

No acid ever ate more resistlessly into a vegetable substance than the

white man acted on the Indian. As the line of American settlements

approached the nearest Indian tribes shrunk and withered away. The

most serious of the evils which attended the contact of the two

hostile races was the introduction by the whites of whiskey among the

Indians. “I can tell at once,” wrote Harrison about this time, “upon

looking at an Indian whom I may chance to meet, whether he belongs

to a neighboring or a more distant tribe. The latter is generally

well-clothed, healthy, and vigorous; the former half-naked, filthy,

and enfeebled by intoxication.” Another cause of Indian resentment was

that the white man, though not permitted to settle beyond the Indian

border, could not be prevented from trespassing far and wide on Indian

territory in quest of game. This practice of hunting on Indian lands

in direct violation of law and of existing treaties had, indeed, grown

into a monstrous abuse and did more than anything else, perhaps, to fan

the flame of Indian hostility toward the whites. Every autumn great

numbers of Kentucky settlers used to cross the Ohio River into the

Indian country to hunt deer, bear, and buffalo for their skins, which

they had no more right to take than they had to cross the Alleghanies

and shoot the cows and sheep belonging to the Pennsylvania farmers. As

a result of this systematic slaughter of the game, many parts of the

Northwest Territory became worthless to the Indians as hunting-grounds,

and the tribes that owned them were forced either to sell them to the

government for supplies or for an annuity or to remove elsewhere. The

Indians had still another cause for complaint. According to the terms

of the treaties, if an Indian killed a white man the tribe was bound

to surrender the murderer for trial in an American court; while, if

a white man killed an Indian, the murderer was also to be tried by a

white jury. The Indians surrendered their murderers, and the white

juries at Vincennes unhesitatingly hung them; but, though Harrison

reported innumerable cases of wanton and atrocious murders of Indians

by white men, no white man was ever convicted by a territorial jury

for these crimes. So far as the white man was concerned, it was a case

of “Heads I win, tails you lose.” The opinion that prevailed along the

frontier was expressed in the frequent assertion that “the only good

Indian is a dead one,” and in the face of such public opinion there

was no chance of the Indian getting a square deal.

As a result of these outrages and injustices, the thoughts of the

Indians turned longingly toward the days when this region was held by

France. Had Napoleon carried out his Louisiana scheme of 1802, there

is no possible doubt that he would have received the active support

of every Indian tribe from the Gulf to the Great Lakes; his orders

would have been obeyed from Tallahassee to Detroit. When affairs in

Europe compelled him to abandon his contemplated American campaign,

the Indians turned to the British for sympathy and assistance--and the

British were only too glad to extend them a friendly hand. From Maiden,

opposite Detroit, the British traders loaded the American Indians

with gifts and weapons; the governor-general of Canada intrigued with

the more powerful chieftains and assured himself of their support in

the war which was approaching; British emissaries circulated among

the tribes, and by specious arguments inflamed their hostility toward

Americans. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, had our people

and our government treated the Indians with the most elementary justice

and honesty, they would have had their support in the War of 1812, the

whole course of that disastrous war would probably have been changed,

and the Canadian boundary would, in all likelihood, have been pushed

far to the northward. By their persistent ill treatment of the Indians

the Americans received what they had every reason to expect and what

they fully deserved.

During the first decade of the nineteenth century there was really

no perfect peace with any of the Indian tribes west of the Ohio, and

Harrison’s abilities as a soldier and a diplomatist were taxed to

the utmost to prevent the skirmish-line, as the chain of settlements

and trading-posts which marked our westernmost frontier might well

be called, from being turned into a battle-ground. Harrison’s most

formidable opponent in his task of civilizing the West was the Shawnee

chieftain Tecumseh, perhaps the most remarkable of American Indians.

Though not a chieftain by birth, Tecumseh had risen by the strength of

his personality and his powers as an orator to a position of altogether

extraordinary influence and power among his people. So great was his

reputation for bravery in battle and wisdom in council that by 1809

he had attained the unique distinction of being, to all intents and

purposes, the political leader of all the Indians between the Ohio and

the Mississippi.

With the vision of a prophet, Tecumseh saw that if this immense

territory was once opened to settlement by whites the game upon which

the Indians had to depend for sustenance must soon be exterminated

and that in a few years his people would have to move to strange and

distant hunting-grounds. Taking this as his text, he preached a gospel

of armed resistance to the white man’s encroachments at every tribal

council-fire from the land of the Chippewas to the country of the

Creeks. And he had good reasons for his warnings, for the Indians were

being stripped of their lands in shameless fashion. In fact, the Indian

agents were deliberately ordered to tempt the tribal chiefs into debt

in order to oblige them to sell the tribal lands, which did not belong

to them, but to their tribes. The callousness of the government’s

Indian policy was frankly expressed by President Jefferson in a letter

to Harrison in 1803:

“To promote this disposition to exchange lands which they have to

spare and we want for necessaries which we have to spare and they

want we shall push our trading houses and be glad to see the good and

influential individuals among them in debt; because we observe that

when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay they become

willing to lop them off by a cession of lands.”

The tone of cynicism, inhumanity, and greed which characterizes

that letter makes it sound more like the utterance of a usurious

money-lender than an official communication to a Territorial governor

from the President of the United States. It is hard to believe that it

was penned by the same hand which wrote the Declaration of Independence.

Jefferson’s Indian policy was continued by his successor, for in 1809

Governor Harrison, acting under instructions from President Madison,

concluded a treaty with the chiefs of the Delaware, Pottawatomie,

Miami, Eel River, Wea, and Kickapoo tribes, whereby, in consideration

of eight thousand two hundred dollars paid down and annuities amounting

to two thousand three hundred and fifty more, he obtained the cession

of _three million acres of land_. Think of it, my friends! Perhaps the

most fertile land in all the world sold at the rate of _three acres for

a cent_! It was like stealing candy from a child. Do you wonder that

Tecumseh declared the treaty void, denounced as traitors to their race

the chiefs who made it, and asserted that it was not in the power of

individual tribes to deed away the common domain? This was the basis of

Tecumseh’s scheme for a general federation of all the Indians, which,

had it not been smashed in its early stages, would have drenched our

frontiers with blood and would have set back the civilization of the

West a quarter of a century.

Throughout his campaign of proselytism Tecumseh was ably seconded by

one of his triplet brothers, Elkswatana, known among the Indians as

“the prophet.” The latter, profiting by the credulity and superstition

of the red men, obtained a great reputation as a medicine-man and seer

by means of his charms, incantations, and pretended visions of the

Great Spirit, thus making himself a most valuable ally of Tecumseh in

the great conspiracy which the latter was secretly hatching. Meanwhile

the relations between the Americans and their neighbors across the

Canadian border had become strained almost to the breaking point, the

situation being aggravated by the fact that the British were secretly

encouraging Tecumseh in spreading his propaganda of resistance to the

United States and were covertly supplying the Indians with arms and

ammunition for the purpose. The winter of 1809-10, therefore, was

marked by Indian outrages along the whole length of the frontier. And

there were other agencies, more remote but none the less effective, at

work creating discontent among the Indians. It seems a far cry from

the prairies to the Tuileries, from an Indian warrior to a French

Emperor, but when Napoleon’s decree of what was virtually a universal

blockade imposed terrible hardships on American shipping as well as

on the British commerce at which it was aimed, even the savage of the

wilderness was affected. It clogged and almost closed the chief markets

for his furs, and prices dropped so low that Indian hunters were hardly

able to purchase the powder and shot with which to kill their game.

At the beginning of 1810, therefore, the Indians were ripe for any

enterprise that promised them relief and independence.

In the spring of 1808 Tecumseh, the prophet, and their followers had

established themselves on the banks of the Wabash, near the mouth of

the Tippecanoe River, about seven miles to the north of the present

site of Lafayette, Indiana. Strategically, the situation was admirably

chosen, for Vincennes, where Harrison had his headquarters, lay one

hundred and fifty miles below and could be reached in four and twenty

hours by canoe down the Wabash; Fort Dearborn was a hundred miles to

the northwest; Fort Wayne the same distance to the northeast; and,

barring a short portage, the Indians could paddle their canoes to

Detroit in one direction or to any part of the Ohio or the Mississippi

in the other. Thus they were within striking distance of the chief

military posts on the frontier and within easy reach of their British

friends at Malden. On this spot the Indians, in obedience to a command

which the prophet professed to have received in a dream from the Great

Spirit, built a sort of model village, where they assiduously tilled

the soil and shunned the fire-water of the whites. For a year or more

after the establishment of Prophet’s Town, as the place was called,

things went quietly enough, but when it became known that Harrison had

obtained the cession of the three million acres in the valley of the

Wabash already referred to, the smouldering resentment of Tecumseh and

his followers was fanned into flame, the Indians refusing to receive

the “annuity salt” sent them in accordance with the terms of the treaty

and threatened to kill the boatmen who brought it, whom they called

“American dogs.”

Early in the following summer Harrison sent word to Tecumseh that he

would like to see him, and on August 12, 1810, the Indian chief with

four hundred armed warriors arrived at the governor’s headquarters at

Vincennes. The meeting between the white man who stood for civilization

and the red man who stood for savagery took place in a field outside

the stockaded town. The youthful governor, short of stature, lean

of body, and stern of face, sat in a chair under a spreading tree,

surrounded by a group of his officials: army officers, Territorial

judges, scouts, interpreters, and agents. Opposite him, ranged in a

semicircle on the ground, were Tecumseh, his brother, the prophet,

and a score or more of chiefs, while back of them, row after row

of blanketed forms and grim, bepainted faces, sat his four hundred

fighting men. Tecumseh had been warned that his braves must come to the

conference unarmed, and to all appearances they were weaponless, but

no one knew better than Harrison that concealed beneath the folds of

each warrior’s blanket was a tomahawk and a scalping-knife. Nor, aware

as he was of the danger of Indian treachery, had he neglected to take

precautions, for the garrison of the town was under arms, the muzzles

of field-guns peered through apertures in the log stockade, and a few

paces away from the council, ready to open fire at the first sign of

danger, were a score of soldiers with loaded rifles.

In reply to Harrison’s formal greeting, Tecumseh rose to his feet,

presenting a most striking and impressive figure as he stood, drawn to

his full height, with folded arms and granite features, the sunlight

playing on his copper-colored skin, on his belt and moccasins of beaded

buckskin, and on the single eagle’s feather which slanted in his hair.

The address of the famous warrior statesman consisted of a recital of

the wrongs which the Indian had suffered at the hands of the white

man. It was a story of chicanery and spoliation and oppression which

Tecumseh told, and those who listened to it, white men and red alike,

knew that it was very largely true. He told how the Indians, the

real owners of the land, had been steadily driven westward and ever

westward, first beyond the Alleghanies, and then beyond the Ohio, and

now beyond the Missouri. He told how the white men had attempted to

create dissension among the Indians to prevent their uniting, how they

had bribed the stronger tribes and coerced the weaker, how again and

again they had tried to goad the Indians into committing some overt act

that they might use it as an excuse for seizing more of their land. He

told how the whites, jeering at the sacredness of treaty obligations,

systematically debauched the Indians by selling them whiskey; how they

trespassed on the Indians’ lands and slaughtered the game on which the

Indians depended for support; of how, when the Indians protested, they

were often slaughtered, too; and of how the white men’s courts, instead

of condemning the criminal, usually ended by congratulating him. He

declared that things had come to a pass where the Indians must fight or

perish, that the Indians were one people and that the lands belonging

to them as a race could not be disposed of by individual tribes, that

an Indian confederacy had been formed which both could and would fight

every step of the white man’s further advance. As Tecumseh continued,

his pronunciation became more guttural, his terms harsher, his gestures

more excited, his argument changed into a warlike harangue. He played

upon the Indian portion of his audience as a maestro plays upon a

violin, until, their passions mastering their discretion, they sprang

to their feet with a whoop, brandishing their tomahawks and knives.

In the flutter of an eyelash everything was in confusion. The waiting

soldiers dashed forward like sprinters, cocking their rifles as they

ran. The officers jerked loose their swords, and the frontiersmen

snatched up their long-barrelled weapons. But Harrison was quickest

of all, for, drawing and cocking a pistol with a single motion, he

thrust its muzzle squarely into Tecumseh’s face. “Call off your men,”

he thundered, “or you’re a dead Indian!” Tecumseh, realizing that he

had overplayed his part and appreciating that this was an occasion when

discretion was of more avail than valor, motioned to his warriors, and

they silently and sullenly withdrew.

But it was no part of Tecumseh’s plan or of the British who were behind

him to bring on a war at this time, when their preparations were as

yet incomplete; so the following morning Tecumseh, who had little to

learn about the game of diplomacy, called on Harrison, expressed with

apparent sincerity his regret for the violence into which his young

men had been led by his words, and asked to have the council resumed.

Harrison well knew the great ability and influence of Tecumseh and was

anxious to conciliate him, for, truth to tell, the Americans were no

more prepared for war at this time than were the Indians. When asked

whether he intended to persist in his opposition to the cessions of

territory in the valley of the Wabash, Tecumseh firmly asserted his

intention to adhere to the old boundary, though he made it clear that,

if the governor would prevail upon the President to give up the lands

in question and would agree never to make another treaty without the

consent of all the tribes, he would pledge himself to be a faithful

ally of the United States. Otherwise he would be obliged to enter into

an alliance with the English. Harrison told him that the American

Government would never agree to his suggestions. “Well,” rejoined

Tecumseh, as though he had expected the answer he received, “as the

Great Chief is to decide the matter, I hope the Great Spirit will put

sense enough into his head to induce him to direct you to give up the

land. True, he is so far off that he will not be injured by the war. It

is you and I who will have to fight it out while he sits in his town

and drinks his wine.”

It only needed this open declaration of his hostile intentions by

Tecumseh to convince Harrison that the time had come to strike,

and strike hard. If the peril of the great Indian league of which

Tecumseh had boasted was to be averted, it must be done before that

confederation became too strongly organized to shatter. There was no

time to be lost. Harrison promptly issued a call for volunteers to take

part in a campaign against the Indians, at the same time despatching a

messenger to Washington requesting the loan of a regiment of regulars

to stiffen the raw levies who would compose the major part of the

expedition. News of Harrison’s call for men spread over the frontier

States as though disseminated by wireless, and soon the volunteers came

pouring in: frontiersmen from Kentucky and Tennessee in fur caps and

hunting-shirts of buckskin; woodsmen from the forests of Michigan and

Wisconsin, long-barrelled rifles on their shoulders and powder-horns

slung from their necks; militiamen from Indiana and Illinois, and

grizzled Indian-fighters from the towns along the river and the

backwoods settlements, who volunteered as much from love of fighting

as from hatred of the Indians. Then, one day, almost before Harrison

realized that they had started, a column of dusty, footsore soldiery

came tramping into Vincennes with the unmistakable swing of veterans.

It was the 4th Regiment of United States Infantry, commanded by Colonel

John Parker Boyd, who, upon receiving orders from Washington to hurry

to Harrison’s assistance, had put his men on flatboats at Pittsburg,

where the regiment was stationed, floated them down to the falls of

the Ohio, and marched them overland to Harrison’s headquarters at

Vincennes, accomplishing the four-hundred-mile journey in a time which

made that veteran frontiersman open his eyes with astonishment when he

heard it.

Boyd[C] was one of the most picturesque figures which our country

has ever produced. Born in Newburyport in 1764, the last British

soldier had left our shores before he was old enough to realize the

ambition of his life by obtaining a commission in the American army.

But his was not the disposition which could content itself with the

tedium of garrison life in time of peace; so, before he had passed

his four-and-twentieth birthday he had handed in his papers and taken

passage for India. The closing years of the eighteenth century saw

fighting going on from one end of Hindustan to the other. The British

were fighting the French, and the Hindus were fighting the Mohammedans,

so that men with military training found there a profitable market for

their services and their swords.

After serving for a time as cavalry instructor in the armies of the

Peishwa, as the ruler of the Mahratta tribes was called, Boyd obtained

a commission as colonel in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad,

distinguished himself in a series of whirlwind raids which he led into

the territory of the Sultan of Mysore during the campaign which ended

with the death of that tyrant in a last desperate stand at the gates of

his capital of Seringapatam, and was rewarded by the Nizam giving him

the command of a brigade of ten thousand turbaned troopers. Having by

this time accumulated a modest fortune as a result of the lavish pay he

had received from his princely employers, he resigned from the Nizam’s

service and organized an army of his own. The horses, elephants, and

guns were his personal property, and he rented his army to those native

princes who stood in need of its services and were able to pay for

them, very much as a garage rents an automobile.

Foreseeing the eventual conquest of India by the British and realizing

that it would mean the end of independent soldiering in that country,

he sold his army, elephants and all, to an Italian soldier of fortune

and turned his face toward his native land once more. At that time

soldiering was neither a very popular nor a very profitable profession

in the United States, so that Boyd, whose reputation as a daring leader

and a rigid disciplinarian had preceded him, had no difficulty in again

obtaining a commission under his own flag and in the service of his

own country, being offered by the government and promptly accepting

the colonelcy of the 4th Regiment of foot. An October evening in 1811,

then, saw him riding into Vincennes at the head of his travel-weary

regulars, in response to Governor Harrison’s request for reinforcements.

The road to glory · 第 3 / 15 段