secure, by treaties, that protection and security for the person
and property of their subjects abroad against the injustice they
were liable to, and which they could not obtain from the laws of
the countries where they might happen to be. Treaties were also
required for the regulation of neutral commerce during war, and for
defining clearly what goods could not be carried by neutrals for
the belligerents. For all such purposes treaties were, of course,
essential; but, when they came to be used, with the further object
of teaching different nations how to conduct their own business,
a practice arose which, however useful at the time in assisting a
change of system, could not long endure. Regulations as to the duties
chargeable on certain articles, or for the privileges of certain
ships, according as they were built by, or belonged to, particular
countries, inducing constant misrepresentation and tending to create
grave differences between nations, were soon found to be neither
the best nor the wisest means for producing economic or friendly
commerce. Moreover, the whole system of treaties so constructed was
attended with a mode of bargaining, in which the clever diplomatist
might frequently gain unfair advantages for the people he represented.
Such a course of action was so obviously undignified in the conduct
of national affairs, that all merchants of high standing in different
countries at length protested against it. Statesmen, also, began to
discover that, as a rule, it was better for commerce to flow on with
no interference from treaties or other legislation—that, as a matter
of fact, it prospers best unaided; and, further, that such a state of
things, while unsatisfactory so far as the intercourse between nations
is concerned, was also discreditable, alike to the nations entertaining
such propositions, and to the ministers or officers by whom they were
proposed.
As the whole of the treaties, with their numerous protocols and
appendices, their labyrinths of “clever clauses” and mysterious
paragraphs, have been published,[28] and can be examined by those
of my readers who are interested in such diplomatic intricacies, it
is only necessary to give here the general purport of them, as I
shall have occasion to notice, hereafter, in reviewing the progress
of merchant shipping, those more directly affecting that interest;
but, that my readers may understand more clearly the nature of these
treaties, I furnish the text of that with France.[29] It gives the
general conditions embodied in such documents, and the extent of the
concessions England was prepared to make with those countries which
were willing to reciprocate with her.
[Sidenote: Reciprocity treaties only, partially, of value,]
The results of these “Reciprocity Treaties,” however, as shown in
the note,[30] were, for the time, satisfactory to both countries, in
so far as they materially tended to increase intercourse, while they,
certainly, proved advantageous, in the long run, to the shipowners
of England. But they were full of inconsistencies, and, as the trade
between nations increased, it became simply impossible to carry them
out satisfactorily.
Nor was it, indeed, likely that people of different nations, who
had been thus far “educated” to the advantages derivable from free
intercourse, would continue to endure the absurd clauses of treaties
prohibiting them from using corn, cotton, sugar, and numerous other
necessaries of life, piled in heaps as these often were in their stores
and warehouses, merely because they had been imported in other ships
than those of Great Britain, or of the countries where they had been
produced.
[Sidenote: and do not check the anomalies of Protection.]
The fact was, that while these treaties did create a sort of uniformity
before unknown, and so far increased the facilities of intercourse,
they did not obviate the most glaring hardships and inconveniences of
the previous system of protection. An American vessel, for instance,
might bring American cotton to England direct; but if this cotton had
been landed at any foreign port, neither the ships of that country nor
of any other could have conveyed it thence to our shores; while the
corn of Russia, if landed in Prussia, or in the ports of any other
nation, was prohibited in England, however great might be the demand
for it at the time.
Nevertheless, when it was first proposed in 1821 to allow British ships
to import non-prohibited articles from any part of the world, the
proposal was, for the time, effectually resisted by our shipowners,
on the plea that the cheaply built and navigated vessels of other
countries would carry the produce of America and Asia into continental
ports, and leave to British ships only the small profit to be derived
from its conveyance across the English Channel!
[Sidenote: Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the Shipowners, who seek
protection against Colonial shipping.]
But though it was abundantly clear that great changes were necessary
beyond the treaties which had been effected (an enlightened class of
merchants and manufacturers having now arisen who required that they
should be entirely unfettered in the conduct of their own affairs, and
that they should be at liberty to import and export whence, whither,
and how they pleased) it was no easy thing to induce Government even
to consider the advisability of taking a further step in advance and
repealing laws so long in force. No important changes were, therefore,
contemplated until 1844, when a Committee of the House of Commons
was appointed to inquire into the working of those treaties and
the condition of the commercial marine of the country: indeed, the
appointment of even this Committee appears to have originated from
complaints preferred by our shipowners, as one of the duties imposed
upon it was the consideration of the best mode of encouraging and
extending the employment of British shipping. Curiously enough, the
chief complaint of the shipowners, in this instance, was against the
privileges granted to colonial-built ships, the owners of which were,
of course, on the same footing as those of vessels built in the United
Kingdom. It was alleged that the latter, as costing a great deal more,
were unable to compete successfully with the less costly ships of North
America, and, therefore, legislative protection was sought, on the
ground that the competition of these ships had materially lowered the
rates of freight.
The Committee of 1844 was appointed at the instance of Mr. Lyall,
a shipowner, and one of the Members for London; and, although it
sat during the whole Session, it reported that, from unforeseen
circumstances, it had been prevented from going fully into the matter,
and requested re-appointment in the following Session, which was
acceded to. But, as about this time, after a long period of depression,
prosperity returned to the shipping interest, employment for ships
having become better, while, in many important trades, the rates
of freight had advanced, the inquiry by the Committee, under such
auspicious circumstances, was allowed to drop. It was, however, plain
enough from the temper of Parliament, that no recurrence would be
permitted to anti-colonial protective measures.
[Sidenote: Reciprocity must lead to free navigation.]
The General Shipowners’ Society[31] attributed this prosperity to the
guano trade, which had recently arisen on the coast of Africa; but
other and _far_ more influential causes had been at work. The
treaties of reciprocity had, with all their imperfections, no doubt,
tended materially to increase our intercourse with foreign nations,
while the admission of their ships to our own ports, strange as it may
appear, had greatly increased the employment for our own. Though our
shipowners resolutely denied that these measures had anything whatever
to do with the increased prosperity, more enlightened men had arrived
at entirely different conclusions, and were convinced that the policy
of reciprocity, however unsatisfactory in many respects, was not
merely a step in the right direction, but was the best, and perhaps
then the only, mode of breaking down, bit by bit, the huge fabric of
protection, the growth of more than two centuries: indeed, it was clear
that the “Great Maritime Charter of England,” as the Act of Cromwell
had been somewhat ostentatiously denominated, could only be destroyed
by degrees. This vast tree, if it may be so described, had taken too
deep root in the soil of England to be overthrown at one blow; and the
Reciprocity Treaties undoubtedly served as wedges for its destruction.
In the meantime, Sir Robert Peel had made great changes in the Tariff.
Commencing with the coarser sorts of manufactures, he had relinquished
all duties on the importation of wool, linen, and cotton, and had
reduced the duties on the finer qualities of the same goods from twenty
to ten per cent., and on manufactured silks from thirty to fifteen per
cent., making equally important reductions in the duties imposed on
various other articles.
[Sidenote: New Class of Statesmen, well supported by the People
outside.]
But a new class of men had now arisen to extend the principles of
Free-trade, and to force home the wedges of unfettered commerce with
heavier blows than Canning, Huskisson, or even Peel, had ever done.
The people, led in this instance by men from among themselves, of
the industrial classes; and, guided by the voice of Wisdom, were now
trumpet-tongued proclaiming their rights and demanding justice, on
conditions which, however large, were yet so unanswerable, that, before
long, the proudest of our aristocracy and the most exalted of our
statesmen paid their homage to the “unadorned eloquence” resounding
throughout the land.
[Sidenote: Exertions of Lord John Russell,]
Though Lord John Russell, an honest adherent from his youth to the
enlightened policy of Charles James Fox, followed in their footsteps,
and struggled onwards amid innumerable difficulties, it was impossible
for him to force his way, almost alone against the class to which
he belonged, and through the rank grass and tangled brushwood which
surrounded this huge old tree. Indeed, almost every member of the
ancient aristocracy except himself was opposed to the course he had
resolved to pursue; and although the Parliamentary Reform Bill of
1832 carried on his motion, and, in a great measure, by his early and
unwearied exertions, had returned to the House of Commons many men
ready to render him every assistance, the power of that House was still
insufficient to effect, to anything like the extent he had in view,
the laudable and, indeed, noble object of his ambition, a thoroughly
unfettered commerce. On the people, however, he could fully rely:
they were now inquiring more earnestly than they had ever done how it
was that the food necessary for their existence was so heavily taxed,
and why they were not allowed to buy that food where they pleased,
and to import it on the most economical terms. If their knowledge of
geography, as they were sometimes sneeringly told, extended no further
than what they had learned from the Sacred writings, that grand old
historical record taught them, that Egypt produced grain at less cost
and in far greater abundance, than England; so great, indeed, that its
granaries had once supplied the wants of Rome and of the Ancient World.
When, therefore, they learned that that grain could not be had, because
a comparatively small number of men—landowners and shipowners—who,
from their wealth, exercising great influence in Parliament, were of
opinion that the importation of food from other and cheaper countries
meant ruin to them, the people, in mass, unequivocally desired to
know, in a more detailed and more satisfactory manner than they had
hitherto been told, “_the reasons Why_.” The question they had
now asked, through their leaders, was one which demanded an answer.
First promulgated in the workshops of Lancashire, it spread in all
directions. It was whispered in Belgravia; loudly proclaimed by the
toiling millions; talked about by the cottagers in every valley and by
the shepherds on every hillside; till, at length, it was adopted, in
the most earnest manner, by the middle classes, the bone and sinew of
Great Britain.
[Sidenote: who leads the way against Protection.]
With such overwhelming aid, Lord Russell and his exploring party were
enabled to penetrate the dense forest of protection, and reach the
roots of the huge and rank old tree, which not merely overshadowed the
rich soil of their native land, but spread its branches over their
seaports, so as to prevent the importation from other lands of articles
necessary for their existence. They saw that, under its shadow, no
herbs grew except such as, from their position, were favoured by a ray
of the hazy sunlight of protection; healthy shrubs, luxuriant in their
nature, withered and decayed wherever its branches extended.
[Sidenote: Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League]
The chief of the new class of politicians, who had arisen was no common
man: he was one whose clear judgment, while it embraced existing wants,
penetrated far into the future. Richard Cobden, the son of a Sussex
yeoman, and, practically, one of themselves, who had been trained to
commerce,[32] saw perhaps more clearly than any one else the pernicious
effects of all protective laws. Supported by an overwhelming array of
facts, he arranged them in a manner so clear, and made them known in
so pleasing and homely a style of eloquence, as to command attention
and carry conviction to every man who was open to reason. In a word,
he was the first to thoroughly convince the people of Great Britain
that they had a _right_ to be allowed to purchase the necessaries
of life wherever they could obtain them, and to dispose of their
manufactures wherever they could sell them, on the most advantageous
terms.
[Sidenote: John Bright.]
In directing the attention of the masses to this all-important question
he sought the aid of men who had sprung from the people and had
been trained to commerce; and he found many able and truly earnest
colleagues, but none more so than John Bright, a man of greater, though
perhaps not more convincing eloquence than his own, who like himself
had no object in view, as the whole experience of his life has proved,
than the good of his country. While Cobden and Bright proclaimed, with
overwhelming force, the policy of Charles James Fox, which Huskisson
and Canning had first practically put in operation, and which Lord John
Russell was now zealously pursuing in Parliament,[33] an Association,
under their leadership, was being formed out of doors destined to give
the fullest freedom to commerce. The first object of the Anti-Corn-Law
League was to lower the price of bread, which with every deficient
harvest approached a famine price, and thus enable the working classes
of every grade to compete with greater prospects of success and to the
best advantage, in the production of those articles most in demand in
their own and other countries, and, at the same time, to secure them
more steady employment and a higher rate of wages. With this object,
its members set themselves heartily to work, proclaiming their views
at public meetings in almost every city and town in Great Britain,
and, in the course of their labours, making many converts to their
policy among the higher classes, among whom Charles Villiers ought to
take high rank, for he was unwearied in his exertions on behalf of the
people. Nor did they lack some associates among even the shipowners
of England, who, seeing that the free importation of corn from other
countries would afford greatly increased employment for their ships,
readily joined the league. It is certain, however, that many of this
class did not at the time perceive that, though the immediate object
of the association was to cut down the chief branch of the huge old
tree of protection, other branches, such as those interfering with free
navigation, must likewise be pulled down as the supplement to free
importation of corn: probably they did not reflect that, should the
Free-traders abolish the protection then afforded to the proprietors
of land, a protective system for the maritime interest alone could no
longer be maintained.
[Sidenote: Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6.]
But an event happened which, although in itself a grievous national
misfortune, brought about, at an earlier period than might otherwise
have been the case, the abolition of the Corn Laws, as well as the
suspension, for a time, of the Navigation Laws. This calamity was the
failure of the potato crop in Ireland in 1845 by “a pestilence so
minute that it eluded the power of the finest microscope, so mysterious
that it defied the researches of the most searching philosophy,
but strong enough to overturn governments, general enough to alter
established commerce, powerful enough to cause the migration of
nations.”[34]
The whole crop of potatoes in Ireland having been destroyed, the price
of grain rose at one bound from 45_s._ 9_d._ to 60_s._ the quarter,
and Cabinet Councils assembled in November to consider the propriety
of throwing open the ports of the United Kingdom. As the Cabinet was
divided on the subject, Sir Robert Peel, impressed with the dangers of
the approaching crisis, resigned office, and Lord John Russell, whose
celebrated letter on that occasion must long be remembered, was called
upon to form a new Administration; but personal jealousy among the
Whigs[35]—a jealousy which lasted many years—prevented the formation of
a ministry by the opposition party. Nor was Lord Stanley, who had been
a member of Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet, more successful in a similar
attempt: hence, with the exception of his Lordship, the members of that
Cabinet resumed their former places.
On the 4th December, 1845, it was intimated through the ‘Times’
newspaper, which had for some months previously avoided the question of
total repeal, that Sir Robert Peel would propose the entire abolition
of the Corn Laws. The Queen’s speech, as well as the speech of Sir
Robert Peel on the Address, more distinctly announced the policy of
the reconstructed Administration, and, having called attention to
the measures of commercial reform already adopted, which had tended
so materially to the greatness of this country and the welfare and
happiness of its inhabitants,[36] he called on the agriculturists to
submit to some sacrifice on their part, proposing a sliding-scale of
duties on corn until February 1849, with the condition, however, that
wheat and other cereal produce should, after that date, be imported
from foreign countries at a duty of 1_s._ a quarter.
[Sidenote: Sir Robert Peel carries the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and
resigns.]
It is not the province of this work to describe the struggles of
parties during this momentous period, and it is therefore sufficient
to state that the measures of Sir Robert Peel, supported as they were
out of doors by the vigorous action of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and
in Parliament by the Liberal party, were carried by large majorities
through the Commons and were, ultimately, passed by the Lords. But,
meantime the Irish Arms Bill had furnished the Opposition with a
temporary accession of members to defeat that measure, and consequently
with the means of overthrowing Sir Robert’s Administration, so that
the night of his triumph on the great question of the repeal of the
Corn Laws was a witness also of his downfall; and, in the records of
the debates of that ever-memorable evening, may be read the words now
so familiar to our ears:—“It may be,” he remarked, in his concluding
speech, “that I shall be sometimes remembered with good-will in those
places which are the abodes of men whose lot it is to labour and earn
their daily bread by the sweat of their brow; in such places, perhaps,
my name may be remembered with expressions of good-will, when those
who inhabit them recruit their exhausted strength with abundant and
untaxed food, the sweeter because no longer leavened with the spirit of
injustice.”
FOOTNOTES:
[23] In a little book, ‘Political Arithmetic,’ by Sir William Petty,
written about 1675, and published in 1691, the author of it remarks,
“The extent of the shipping of Europe being about two millions of tons,
I suppose the English have five hundred thousand—_the Dutch nine
hundred thousand_, the French an hundred thousand, the Hamburgers
and the subjects of Dantzic two hundred and fifty, and Spain, Portugal,
Italy, &c., two hundred and fifty thousand!” the value of which the
author reckoned “at 8_l._ per tun” (ton).
[24] See a review of the ‘History of the Navigation Laws of England
from the Earliest Times,’ by a Barrister, a most able exposition, from
the pen (I understand) of Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart., now (1875)
Chancellor of the Exchequer, published by Ridgway, London, 1849.
[25] McPherson’s ‘Annals of Commerce,’ vol. iv. p. 26.
[26] See _ante_, vol. ii. p. 354.
[27] See Mr. Huskisson’s Speech on Colonial Policy, March 21, 1825.
[28] Hertslet’s Treaties.
[29] Appendix, No. I., p. 563.
[30] In 1814 there were entered inwards 1,290,248 tons of British
shipping, and 599,287 tons of foreign shipping.
In 1824 there were entered inwards 1,797,320 tons of British shipping,
and 759,441 tons of foreign shipping.
In 1846 there were entered inwards 4,294,733 tons of British shipping,
and 1,806,282 tons of foreign shipping.
The clearances at the respective dates were about the same in amount
and proportion.
[31] See these Reports of 16th July, 1845.
[32] I first became intimate with Cobden in 1852, and our friendship
continued unbroken until his untimely death in 1865. He was the most
agreeable companion, and the most convincing reasoner I ever met.
Though his name has long been a household word, yet as his life has
not been written (I hope it may soon be given to the world), many of
my readers may not be aware of his _career as a man of business_.
He was often my companion for days together where I now pen these
notes, and, though I possess many pleasing reminiscences in connexion
with his most useful life and numerous letters from him, for he had
the pen of a ready writer, I prefer leaving these to be dealt with
by his biographer, when his executors consider that the time has
arrived to publish his life. But I think I ought not to withhold from
my readers the account he gave me of his commercial career, more
especially as an erroneous impression prevails in public that, though
great as a statesman, he was unsuccessful as a man of business. This
letter referred to the question of Limited Liability which we had
frequently discussed. It is written in his happiest style; and if I
could to advantage (but I cannot), I would not alter a single word.
“It is singular,” he remarks in another letter of his now before me,
approving of some comments I had made, “how much better we all write
when we are expressing ourselves with unrestrained freedom to a friend,
than when we are polishing off our sentences for the great public. I
find it always in my own case, and the reason is simply that we are
more _natural_, and therefore kindle a warmer sympathy in the
breast of the reader. It is this which makes the private memoirs and
correspondence of great men much more interesting than their public
performances.” For these reasons, I venture to give to the public the
letter he writes about himself and his business career unaltered,
except where I have omitted the names of two noble Lords still living.
“Midhurst, 24th March, 1856.
“MY DEAR LINDSAY,
“I can see no flaw in your indictment, and do not think there
is a shade of difference in our views upon partnership matters.
But I would rather talk than write to you on the subject. It
has always appeared to me that the fundamental fallacy which
overrules all the objections to limited liability is the fear
that capitalists will not be able to take care of their money
without a little help from Parliament. I think they may be
safely trusted. You and I agree also in the practical view of
the question—that legislators and theorists overrate the extent
to which the actual possession of capital affords a guarantee to
the creditor. It is the character, experience, and connexions
of the man wanting credit, his knowledge of his business, and
opportunities of making it available in the struggle of life,
that weigh with the shrewd capitalists far more than the actual
command of a few thousands more or less of money in hand. I began
business in partnership with two other young men, and we only
mustered a thousand pounds amongst us, and more than half of it
was borrowed. We all got on the ‘Peveril of the Peak’ coach, and
went from London to Manchester in the, at that day, marvellously
short space of twenty hours. We were literally so ignorant of
Manchester houses that we called for a directory at the hotel, and
turned to the list of ‘calico printers,’ theirs being the business
with which we were acquainted, and they being the people from
whom we felt confident we could obtain credit. And why? Because
we knew we should be able to satisfy them that we had advantages
from our large connexions, our knowledge of the best branch of
the business in London, and our superior taste in design, which
would insure success. We introduced ourselves to Fort Brothers
and Co., a rich house, and told our tale, honestly concealing
nothing. In less than two years from 1830 we owed them forty
thousand pounds for goods which they had sent to us in Watling
Street, upon no other security than our characters and knowledge
of our business. I frequently talked with them in later times upon
the great confidence they showed in men who avowed that they were
not possessed of 200_l._ each. Their answer was that they
would always prefer to trust young men with connexions and with a
knowledge of their trade, if they knew them to possess character
and ability, to those who started with capital without these
advantages, and that they had acted on this principle successfully
_in all parts of the world_. We did not disappoint them or
ourselves. In 1834-1835 our stock takings showed a net balance of
20,000_l._ a year profit. Then I began to write pamphlets
and to talk politics, and from that moment I ceased to make
money, and in 1846, when the League finished its labours, my
children must have been beggars, had not my neighbours, who knew
my circumstances, originated the subscription which restored me
independence. I took the money without shame, because I had earned
it. If money had been my sole object in life I should have been a
more successful man by sticking to my calicoes, for my partners
have grown richer than I by doing so, and young men taken into
the concern since I left have made fortunes. I may add that the
original formation of the partnership, and the whole scheme of the
business, sprung exclusively from myself. But what has this to do
with your bill? I never detect myself falling into a twaddle about
things personal and past without suspecting that I am growing
old and garrulous. I doubt the policy of your presenting a bill
to the House. Your strength lies in your principle—_perfect
freedom_—which you can argue with more force when not compelled
to enter upon details. If you have any suggestions as to the
clauses of the Bill, would it not be better to do as you did
with the Shipping Bill by giving the Board of Trade the benefit
of your hints? It may be necessary to concede something for the
sake of carrying any measure, but I doubt whether any concession,
beyond a registration, which may be shown to be a convenience
to all parties, will not be unsoundness. If it be necessary to
tamper with sound principles for the sake of pleasing the Lords,
let the proposal come from their party. I suspect we shall be
weaker in both Houses in dealing with the question of private
partnership upon free-trade principles than with that of Joint
Stock Associations. Upon the latter question, people of the —— and
—— school of political economy, whose principles are, if pushed
home, a little socialistic, took a great interest, because they
have an amiable faith in the power of association amongst the
working classes. But I doubt whether they will throw much zeal
into the question of private partnership. By the way, don’t put
the question in the House in the form of a problem A. B. C. D.
&c. It does in a written argument, and even then demands a severe
attention; but I find that that mode of stating the case in the
House does not succeed.
“I shall be happy to renew the discussion when we meet, and remain
very sincerely yours,
“RD. COBDEN.”
[33] Though not within the province of this work, it should be
remembered that Fox stoutly opposed Pitt’s great Free-trade Treaty
with France, in 1756, and that Lord John Russell did not come out as a
thorough and earnest Free-trader until 1840-41.
[34] Alison’s ‘History of Europe,’ vol. vii. p. 168.
[35] This difference reached its climax in 1845, when Lord Grey wished
to exclude Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office, and Lord Russell
insisted on his being nominated for that department.
[36] The exports of Great Britain rose from 47,000,000_l._ in 1842
to 60,000,000_l._ in 1845, and the imports from 65,000,000_l._ to
85,000,000_l._, and, in the same period, the entries of British
mercantile shipping rose from 4,627,440 tons to 6,031,557 tons. (See
Porter’s ‘Progress of the Nation.’)
CHAPTER IV.
Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the
Equalization of the Sugar Duties—He suspends the Navigation
Laws, January 1847—Mr. Ricardo’s motion, February 1847—Reply of
Mr. Liddell—Mr. Ricardo’s motion carried—Committee appointed,
February 1847—Meeting of the shipowners, August 12, 1847—Their
arguments—What constitutes “British ships”—State of Navigation
Laws in 1847—Rules in force in the Plantation Trade—Their
rigorous character—Their history from 1660 to 1847—First
infringement of the principle of confining the American trade to
British vessels—Absurdity and impotency of these laws—State of
the law before the Declaration of American Independence—Trade
with Europe—Modifications of the law—East India Trade and
shipping—Trade with India in foreign and in United States ships
even from English ports—Coasting trade—Summary of the Navigation
Laws.
[Sidenote: Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the
Equalization of the Sugar Duties.]
[Sidenote: Suspends the Navigation Laws, January 1847.]
The first measure introduced by Lord John Russell, when he succeeded
Sir Robert Peel as Prime Minister,—the equalization of the Sugar
Duties—was one almost as important to the interests of merchant
shipping as the repeal of the Corn Laws. A change so great, affecting,
indirectly, the general as well as the fiscal policy of the empire,
was even more remarkable than the abolition of the Corn Laws. It was
strenuously opposed by the Protectionist party, but Sir Robert Peel,
having given his support to Government, the Bill was carried by a large
majority. This measure in itself afforded much additional employment
to shipping; and in the course of the debate upon it, Lord John Russell
made the memorable declaration that he “did not propose in any respect
to alter the existing Navigation Laws.”[37] He was, however, obliged
immediately afterwards to suspend the operation of these Laws till
the 1st September following, so as to facilitate the importation of
grain and flour. Indeed, some such measure was absolutely necessary,
as the crops of Germany and France had in many instances failed, and
the French Government had also been compelled to suspend for a time
their Navigation Laws, in order to obtain supplies of food from other
countries.
As the necessity of increasing, at all events for a limited period, the
facilities for importing grain from foreign countries and the admission
of sugar more freely into breweries and distilleries, so as to augment
the supply of food, had been pointed out in the Royal Speech, no
opposition was offered to this temporary suspension of the Navigation
Laws; but it was stoutly maintained by the Protectionists that the
suspension must be limited to the period fixed in the Bill. The
Free-traders, however, on the other hand, could not see the necessity
of any limitation, and, though the Ministry did not feel strong enough
to undertake the task of a total abolition of the Navigation Laws, one
of its principal supporters gave notice that, on an early day, he would
formally call the attention of Parliament to this important subject.
[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo’s motion, February 1847.]
Accordingly, on the 9th February, 1847, Mr. John Lewis Ricardo
brought forward his motion,[38] “That a Select Committee be appointed
to inquire into the operation and policy of the Navigation Laws.”
Intense interest was excited among shipowners; the fact of Mr. Ricardo
proposing the motion was deemed highly ominous, as he was known to
hold very advanced opinions on Free-trade, and to be prepared to
go further in that direction than perhaps any other member of the
House. He was, indeed, at that time, one of the most formidable
exponents of the Free-trade doctrines. His speech,[39] delivered in
a tone of much confidence, propounded, as indisputable facts, what
were then rather startling assertions. After briefly recapitulating
the history of the Navigation Act, which had been held to be perfect
till 1821-22, he pointed out that Mr. Wallace in those years, and
Mr. Huskisson in 1824-25, had broken into the exclusive principle on
which the Navigation Act rested. He then referred, at great length, to
the labours of the Committee on British Shipping in 1844, and boldly
asserted that that inquiry was instituted by the shipowners to prove
the efficacy of the existing laws, and was allowed to drop because they
had no case for further encouragement. He specially singled out the
opinions of the late Mr. Joseph Somes, one of the largest shipowners of
that time, who went so far as to demand a tax on Colonial shipping; and
he successfully combatted this by contending that the colonists already
suffered severely by the Navigation Laws. Millions upon millions, he
said, were spent upon internal communications;[40] Parliament was
looking with great jealousy lest a half-penny or a penny too much
should be charged for inland transit; yet, when goods arrived by sea,
there was a law which increased the cost of carriage over the greater
part of their journey. He then referred to the opinions expressed by
Mr. G. F. Young, one of the leading opponents of any change in the
laws of shipping, who had also advocated a tax on Colonial vessels,
stating, in his evidence in 1844-45, that he “considered the whole
system of Navigation Laws as relating more to the encouragement of
maritime commerce than to any other object, and that, therefore, many
sacrifices of pecuniary interests ought to be made for it,” adding, “I
have no doubt that private interests ought to be sacrificed for the
general interests of the country. If the Legislature should decide that
it was no longer necessary to keep up the Navigation Laws as a means
of national security, no doubt the consumers of foreign articles could
purchase at a cheaper rate, since this would be the natural consequence
of admitting imports in the ships of foreign nations.”
Fortified by these quotations from his opponent’s evidence, Mr. Ricardo
boldly came to the point by asserting it must be clear that, by every
ton of shipping driven from the ports of England, there was lost
the benefit of the sale of an equivalent amount of our merchandise,
and that, thereby, our workmen were deprived of their wages, our
manufacturers of their profit, and our Government of revenue. If the
Spaniards wanted earthenware, the French sugar, and we wine, “why on
earth,” he exclaimed, “should we forbid the natural course of the
transaction!” He pointed out the roundabout and expensive way whereby
such exchanges of produce must be carried,[41] instancing a case where
American hides brought from Marseilles to Rotterdam, not finding a
market there, were taken back to Marseilles; and when sent thence to
Liverpool, were seized as imported in a French bottom, and released
only on the condition that they should be sent back to New York! Such
interruptions of commerce, Mr. Ricardo rightly contended, were alike
inconvenient and wasteful. He next pointed out discrepancies in the
working of the Act, with the various Orders in Council made under it,
asserting, at the same time, that freights were artificially enhanced
by protection. He espoused, too, the cause of the colonists, who now
demanded as a matter of justice, that trade should be as free in
shipping as it was in sugar. Could, Mr. Ricardo demanded, any ground
of political expediency or any national advantage be shown to justify
the retention of these laws? He admitted that the authority of Adam
Smith would be adduced against him,[44] but denied that Adam Smith
had brought forward evidence to support his argument. He allowed that
a defensive navy was of the first importance for the welfare of the
country, and that the commercial marine was the nucleus and nursery of
that branch of the public service; but he emphatically contended that
the way to encourage the commercial navy was to free the commerce of
the country from all restrictions, impediments, and obstructions. He
held that England could compete successfully with the United States
and all the world in building ships, and he produced a variety of
statistical statements showing the difference between protected and
unprotected tonnage, one of which is especially worthy of notice.[45]
“These facts,” added Mr. Ricardo, “speak for themselves, showing the
unprotected tonnage has just doubled the increase of the protected
tonnage.” He concluded by remarking that commerce was the parent of the
merchant marine, and that if the parent were nourished the child would
flourish.
[Sidenote: Reply of Mr. Liddell.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo’s motion carried.]
Mr. Thomas Milner Gibson, then Vice-President of the Board of Trade,
with whose concurrence the motion had been made, gave the Government’s
sanction to the motion, and recommended on their part that the
Committee should be appointed. His proposal, however, was strongly
opposed by the Hon. H. T. Liddell (now Earl Ravensworth), who asked
what could be gained by a Committee, as the Navigation Laws were
already suspended until the 1st of September next. He quoted the
opinion of Mr. Huskisson,[46] who, in making certain recommendations
with relation to the reciprocity treaties, had said: “The object of
the Navigation Laws was twofold: first, to create and maintain the
great commercial marine of this country for the purposes of national
defence; and secondly, an object not less important in the eyes of
statesmen, to prevent any one other nation from engrossing too large
a portion of the navigation of the world.” Mr. Huskisson, he stated,
held that, in those two branches of our maritime system, the fisheries
and the coasting trade, there appeared no motive for alteration, and
that the laws referring to them must remain unchanged, so long as we
were desirous of upholding our great commercial marine. With reference
to the European trade, he also declared that the altered state of the
world compelled England to enter into some new treaties; that, in so
far as exclusion was within their reach, they were bound to grant and
enforce a monopoly in favour of the British shipowner—not, indeed,
for his especial advantage, but because the commercial marine was
the foundation of our naval power, and the maintenance of that power
the paramount duty of all governments. It was Mr. Liddell’s opinion,
however, that the reciprocity treaties had ever been distasteful to
British shipowners, and, that they had suffered in their carrying
trade from unequal competition with other countries; but that it was
now too late to think of giving them up or of altering a policy to
which the country had pledged itself. With regard to the comparative
expenses of British and foreign ships, it suited, he said, the case
of the Repealers to make this comparison of expenses with the ships
of the United States alone; but why not look to the Baltic States,
with the trade of which the whole of the eastern parts of this island
were directly connected? It was proved, he urged, before a Committee
of the House, that the relative cost of a British and Russian ship,
both as regards construction and current expenses, was much in favour
of the latter, and he called, therefore, on the House not to fritter
away the great interests committed to its charge. He, in a long and
closely-reasoned speech, strenuously opposed the appointment of the
Committee. The motion was supported by Mr. Hume, Mr. Bright, Mr.
Labouchere, Lord Sandon, and Mr. Mitchell, and opposed by Lord G.
Bentinck, Alderman Thompson, Captain Harris, Mr. Hudson, and Mr.
Disraeli; but, Sir Robert Peel having given a very decided opinion in
favour of inquiry, and Lord John Russell having supported the proposal
on the part of the Government, Mr. Ricardo’s motion was carried by 155
to 61.
[Sidenote: Committee appointed, February 1847.]
[Sidenote: Meeting of Shipowners’ Society, August 12, 1847.]
This was the first blow aimed with serious effect against the existence
of the Navigation Laws; and, though the Free-trade party affected
slightly to disguise their intentions by only asking for inquiry, their
zealous partisans out of doors made no scruple in avowing that the
total abolition of the Navigation Laws was the real object of their
agitation. Circumstances connected with this inquiry led the General
Body of Shipowners to hold a special meeting on the 12th August, 1847,
but, curiously enough, they did not advance a single remark on the
increasing activity of their own business, brought about as this had
been in a great measure by the legislation to which I have referred. It
cannot be questioned that, if British shipowners had suffered severely
in previous years, the reductions in the tariff since 1842, together
with the demand for shipping to bring supplies of food for the starving
populace of Ireland, had greatly increased their actual business and
their future prospects. Nor were other causes wanting to enhance and to
ensure this prosperity. A new trade had been developed by the discovery
of vast deposits of guano in the islands of the Pacific (of far greater
importance than those on the coasts of Africa), and this alone required
a large amount of tonnage; while the rapidly increasing consumption
of sea-borne coals secured for them another source of remunerative
employment. In spite of these obvious advantages, shipowners, however,
expressed no feelings of satisfaction, though these new channels
of trade afforded them a profitable employment for their vessels:
they probably feared that by so doing the Free-traders would at once
introduce a measure for the repeal of the Navigation Laws. Nor were
their fears groundless. Parliament having thrown out the idea that
protection as a principle could not be maintained, the shipowner had to
show that his case, as the advocate of maritime commerce generally, was
an exception to this rule.
[Sidenote: Their arguments.]
The Shipowners’ Society of London alleged, with no mean tact and
ability, that their members, as a section of the community, advanced
no claim to special privileges, and demanded no exemption on abstract
grounds, from any burdens to which other interests were subjected. But
they argued that, if for objects of supposed national benefit wherein
they had no special advantage, the State imposed on them burdens and
restrictions, common justice prescribed that they should be protected
from the competition of those who were not so tied down, otherwise they
would not be able to compete with the shipowners of foreign nations.
They further argued, and not without reason, that, by the Registry
Laws they were compelled to use the most costly ships in the world;
by the Navigation Laws to employ exclusively the highest paid and
most expensively fed seamen, those of native birth; and, by a variety
of laws, presumed, also, to be of essential importance, they were
specially taxed, and, at the same time, were prevented from conducting
their pursuits in the way most conducive to their own profit. Clinging,
however, tenaciously as they did to the principle of the Navigation
Laws, they could hardly expect that their view in favour of protection
to their own interest would be entertained; and this, too, at a period
when every vessel at their command was fully employed; when they were
realizing large profits, and when, indeed, ships could scarcely be
found to convey from other countries sufficient food to meet the wants
of the people.
The Committee[47] who were appointed on Mr. Ricardo’s motion had
examined during the session a great number of witnesses, and in the
course of their inquiry made no less than five reports, limiting
themselves, however, to the evidence taken, the substance of which I
shall hereafter lay before my readers.
[Sidenote: What constitutes “British Ships.”]
But before I do so, it is necessary, even at the risk of wearying
my readers, that I should give the meaning which has been usually
attached to “British ships,” especially as this has varied in different
trades and, from time to time, in the same trade, and explain, in as
condensed a manner as possible, the more important changes in the
old Navigation Laws, not already noticed or sufficiently described.
Originally, a “British ship” was held to be one owned by the people
of England, Ireland, &c., or, if built in the Plantations, owned by
the people thereof, being British subjects. In 1786, an Act was passed
(26 Geo. III., c. 60), by which it was provided for the future that
no ships should be entitled to the privilege of “British ships” but
such as were British built as well as British owned and navigated;
exceptions, however, being made in favour of foreign ships built before
May, 1786, and belonging, at that date, to English owners. Ships of
this class might engage in all such voyages as were previously open
to British-owned ships though not necessarily of British build. From
the time that these ships of 1786, or of older date, became worn out,
the term “British ship” acquired the sense in which it was used, up
to 1847, except as regards the coasting trade, for which this further
provision was made, that no foreigner was permitted to serve in her as
a seaman.
It is also necessary to notice the effect of some clauses in the Act
of 34 Geo. III., cap. 68, which provided that no ship, registered or
required to be registered as a British ship, could import or export any
articles whatsoever, unless duly navigated by British subjects. Thus
a restriction, previously unknown, was placed on our export trade to
foreign parts, and on the import from Europe of other articles than
those enumerated in the Act of Navigation.
On further examination of the Navigation Act, it will be seen that
exceptions from its general rules occur in two instances (Levant and
East India goods) in favour of certain imports in British-_built_
ships; while, in two other instances (Spanish and Portuguese colonial
goods, bullion and prize goods), they were in favour of importations in
British-_owned_ shipping.
Lastly, provision was made in the 10th and 11th sections of the “Act
for the Prevention of Frauds” (13 & 14 Car. II., cap. 2) with reference
to the purchase of foreign-built ships, and for securing that such
ships should be wholly owned by English persons, before they could
avail themselves of the privileges conferred by the Act on such ships.
Such were the leading conditions of the “Act of Navigation” so far as
regards “British ships;” but the “Statute of Frauds” further enacted
(sect. 6, par. 2) that no foreign-built ship (that is to say, no ship
built anywhere except in England, &c., or in his Majesty’s dominions in
Asia, Africa, or America), except ships purchased before a given day
and prize ships, should enjoy the privilege of a “British ship,” though
owned and manned by “British subjects”; and such ships were deemed as
aliens’ ships, and were liable therefore to all duties applicable to
this class of vessels.
By a subsequent Act (15 Car. II., cap. 7, sect. 6) no goods from
Europe were to be imported into the British possessions except in
British-built shipping; and, by the Plantation Act (7 & 8 Will. III.,
cap. 22, sect. 2) all importations into, and exportations from,
these possessions must be in British-owned, and British-built, and
British-navigated vessels. Prize ships, if British owned, were, and
always have been, entitled to the privileges of British vessels; the
system of registering vessels having been first prescribed by the
last-named Act.
Having thus stated the principles regulating “British ships,” I must
now proceed to notice in some detail the more important changes in the
Navigation Laws.
[Sidenote: State of Navigation Laws in 1847. Rules in force in the
Plantation Trade.]
These Laws, in 1847, resting as they did on the Act of Parliament
then in force, so far as regards _The Plantation Trade_ provided
(_Rule 1_) that “No goods shall be _exported_ from the United
Kingdom to any British possession in Asia, Africa, or America, nor to
the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, or Sark, except in British
ships” (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 7). But vessels belonging to the
United States may carry goods from this country to the principal
British settlements in the East Indies (59 Geo. III., cap. 54, sect.
6). The Sovereign had the power to conclude treaties, allowing the
same privilege to the ships of other foreign countries, and some such
treaties were actually concluded: _e.g._ with Austria and in fact
Russia (see 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 90, sect. 9).
_Rule 2._ “No goods shall be carried from any British possession
in Asia, Africa, or America, to any other of such possessions, nor from
one part of such possessions to another part of the same, except in
British ships” (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 10).
_Rule 3._ “No goods shall be _imported_ into any British
possession in Asia, Africa, or America, in any foreign ships, unless
they be ships of the country producing these goods, and from which
they are usually imported”[48] (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 11). But
an Order in Council might declare that goods, &c., the growth of any
foreign country, might be imported into Hong Kong from the same or any
other foreign country, in vessels belonging to the same or any other
foreign country, and however navigated (see 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect.
12).
Her Majesty might also, by Order in Council, declare that goods of any
sort, or the produce of any place, not otherwise prohibited by the Law
of Navigation, might be imported into any port or ports of the British
possessions abroad, to be named in such Order, from any place, _in a
British ship_, and from any place not being a part of the British
dominions, in a foreign ship of any country, and however navigated, to
be warehoused for _exportation_ only (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect.
23).
[Sidenote: Their rigorous character.]
_Rule 4._ The privileges of trading allowed to foreign ships under
_Rule 3_ were limited to the ships of those countries which,
_having colonial possessions_, should grant the like privileges of
trading with those possessions to British ships, or which, not having
colonial possessions, “shall place the commerce and navigation of this
country, and of its possessions abroad, on the footing of the ‘most
favoured nation’: unless her Majesty, by Order in Council, shall in any
case deem it expedient to grant the whole, or any of such privileges,
to the ships of any foreign country, although the conditions aforesaid
shall not in all respects be fulfilled by such foreign country” (8 & 9
Vict., cap. 93, sect. 4).
_Rule 5._ “No goods shall be _imported_ into, nor shall any goods
(except the produce of the fisheries, in British ships) be _exported_,
from any of the British possessions in America by sea, from or to any
place other than the United Kingdom, or some other of such possessions,
except into or from the several ports in such possessions called ‘Free
Ports.’” (See 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 93, sect. 2.) The 62nd section of
the Act applied this principle to the Mauritius, as well as to the
American possessions; while, under the 90th section, the trade of other
colonies was regulated by the Queen. Goods could be imported by inland
navigation into any place where there was a custom-house. The rule was
not to extend “to prohibit the importation or exportation of goods into
or from any ports or places in Newfoundland, or Labrador, in British
ships;” and by the 2nd section, certain articles might be imported
from Guernsey and Jersey into places where the fishery was carried on,
though the same were not free ports. These five rules comprise the Law
as it stood in 1847. But it is also as well to give some account of its
previous history and its various modifications.
[Sidenote: Their history from 1660 to 1847.]
The Act of 1660 established two rules applicable to the Plantation
trade, which were deemed of the highest importance to the country:
first, that the whole trade of the Plantations should be carried on
in “British” ships only; and secondly, that the principal productions
of these Plantations should be allowed to be exported only to the
mother country, or some other Plantation. A third general rule was
introduced, a year or two later, by the Act of 15 Car. II., cap.
7, sect. 6, viz., that no goods of the produce of Europe should be
imported into any of the Plantations in Asia, Africa, or America
(except Tangier[49]), in any vessels whatsoever, but such as were
_bonâ fide_ and without fraud laden and shipped in England, Wales,
or the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, in English-built vessels.[50]
In the year 1825, on the general consolidation of the Customs Laws, the
above limitations of the right of exportation were removed, and the law
with regard to the _Plantation trade_ was placed nearly on the
footing on which it stood in 1847. In fact, the further consolidations
of 1833 and 1845 made little change in the previous regulations. With
regard to _Rule 3_, viz., that goods, the produce of Europe, were
only to be imported into the colonies from the United Kingdom, this was
subject, originally, to a few exceptions: thus, salt might be taken to
the fisheries from any port of Europe; and wines of Madeira and the
Azores might be imported thence, &c. A relaxation of the rule was first
made in favour of Irish linens, various subsequent alterations having
been introduced, till at length, in 1825, the law with reference to
such importations was placed on nearly the same footing as prevailed in
1847; that is to say, the importation and exportation of all classes
of goods into or from the “Free Ports” in different colonies were,
generally, legalised, subject to certain prohibitions against the
importation of particular articles, some of which were afterwards
removed, while others (_e.g._ those against pirated books,
counterfeit coin, &c., and the restrictions on gunpowder, arms, &c.)
remained. A tariff of differential duties on foreign goods, of which
duties one-tenth (subsequently increased to one-fourth) was to be
remitted, when the goods were imported through an English warehouse,
was, at the same date, enforced.
The principle of this tariff and of the practice of remission were
retained; but legislation was constantly effecting small changes, to
meet the wishes or, rather, the demands of colonial legislatures which
perhaps, naturally, looked only to their own interests.
Such may be taken as the intermediate history of the Navigation Law as
it affected the Plantation or Colonial trade.
[Sidenote: First infringement of the principle of confining the
American trade to British vessels.]
The first decided infringement of the general principle of confining
the trade to British ships took place on the conclusion of the treaty
with America, the effect of which has been described.
In 1808, when the King of Portugal emigrated to Brazil, the same
privileges, as had been granted to the United States, were extended
to the inhabitants of the Portuguese possessions in South America, by
the Act (48 Geo. III., cap. 11) which allowed the produce of those
territories to be imported thence into Great Britain and Ireland in
vessels built in those territories, or made prize by Portuguese ships,
and owned and navigated by Portuguese subjects resident in the said
territories. After the conclusion of the treaty with Portugal in 1810,
a further Act (51 Geo. III., cap. 47) extended the above facilities
to all Portuguese-built vessels or prizes owned and navigated by
Portuguese subjects, without requiring that they should be residents in
America.
[Sidenote: Absurdity and impotency of these laws.]
On the revision of the Customs Laws in 1822 (3 Geo. IV., cap. 43,
sect. 3), the principle and the above exceptions in favour of the
United States and Portuguese colonies were preserved, and were further
extended to countries in America or the West Indies, being, or having
been, under the dominion of Spain. It must be remembered that, as
respects the principle that the produce of Asia, Africa, and America
was only to be imported into England from the place of its origin, the
old law recognised the doctrine of the 5th section of the Navigation
Act, that goods _manufactured_ in any country should be held to
be _the produce of that country_, even though made from materials
produced elsewhere.
[Sidenote: State of the law before the Declaration of American
Independence.]
At the commencement of the American War of Independence, the chief
regulations as to trade, the operations of which have been already
described, were that the Americans could neither import nor export in
any but British ships; they could not carry important articles of their
own produce to any part of Europe other than Great Britain; and they
could not import any goods from any part of Europe other than Great
Britain.[51]
[Sidenote: Trade with Europe.]
With regard to the _trade with Europe_, the law in 1847 declared
that the several sorts of goods hereinafter enumerated, being the
produce of Europe, viz., masts, timber, boards, tar, tallow, hemp,
flax, currants, raisins, figs, prunes, olive-oil, corn or grain,
wine, brandy, tobacco, wool, shumach, madders, madder-roots, barilla,
brimstone, bark of oak, cork, oranges, lemons, linseed, rape-seed and
clover-seed, could not be imported into the United Kingdom, _to be
used therein_, except in British ships, or in ships of the country
of which the goods were the produce, or in ships of the country from
which they were usually imported, 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 2. But
such goods, not being otherwise prohibited, might, by the 22nd section
of that Act, be warehoused for exportation, though brought in other
ships; a privilege confirmed by the 3 & 4 Vict., cap. 95.
[Sidenote: Modifications of the law.]
Some embarrassing questions having, from time to time, arisen as to the
right of importing the produce of particular European States in ships
built in countries incorporated into those States subsequent to the
passing of the Navigation Act, as, for instance, the question whether
Prussian produce might be imported in ships built in East Friesland, it
was enacted, 22 Geo. III., cap. 78, that the enumerated articles might
be imported in ships, the property of subjects under the same sovereign
as the country of which goods were the produce, although the country
or place where such ship was built or to which it belonged, was not
under the dominion of such sovereign at the time of the passing of the
Navigation Act. It will be observed that this statute not only effected
its immediate purpose of putting the dominions and sovereign of any
one country on the same footing in respect to the Navigation Law, but
also extended the right of importing, originally confined to ships
“built in” the country of export, to ships “belonging to” such country.
Several alterations of an unimportant character were made, bearing
upon these points; but, in the consolidation of 1825, the proviso was
introduced into the Navigation Act, and still retained in 1847, “that
the country of every ship shall be deemed to include all places which
are under the same dominion as the place to which such ship belongs.”
In the meantime, however, the Act of 1822 (3 Geo. IV., cap. 43,
sect. 6) had made an important alteration in the law, by allowing
importations of the enumerated goods, either in ships of the country
of which the goods were the produce, or in ships of the country whence
these goods were usually imported. At the same time, the prohibitions
against the importation of articles from the Netherlands, Germany,
Turkey, and Russia were taken off.[52]
In 1822 tallow and tobacco were also added to the list of enumerated
articles: and, since that time, wool, shumach, madder, barilla,
brimstone, bark, cork, oranges, lemons, linseed, rape-seed, and
clover-seed have likewise been added; while salt, pitch, rosin,
potashes, wine, and sugar were struck out.
The only alteration of any consequence in the European trade, since the
consolidation of 1825, was that made to carry out the Austrian Treaty
of 1838, which will be noticed hereafter.
[Sidenote: East India trade and shipping.]
The trade, however, with the East Indies has always been exceptional,
and deserves special notice, as the exclusive right of trading within
certain limits, long enjoyed by the Company, together with the peculiar
nature of the Company’s jurisdiction, produced some anomalies.
The two points most worthy of notice are, first, the concession of
the rights of British ships to ships not fulfilling all the usual
requisites of the law; and secondly, the admission of certain foreign
ships to an equality in some respects with British ships.
On the first point, the statute 21 Geo. III., cap. 65, sect. 33,
provided that ships belonging to the East India Company should be
held to be British owned, although the Stock of the Company was held
by a considerable number of foreigners. Other statutes (35 Geo. III.,
cap. 118; 42 Geo. III., cap. 20) allowed to ships built within the
territories of the Company, or in places in the East Indies under
British protection and owned by the Company, the privileges of British
ships in trade with India, though such ships were neither British built
nor duly registered. When the exclusive privileges of the Company
were broken in upon (53 Geo. III., cap. 155) the same privilege was
extended to similarly circumstanced vessels, the property of private
individuals, by Order in Council. But when the Registry Laws were
extended to India, from this time nothing but British-built ships were
to be entitled to the privileges of British vessels (54 Geo. III.,
cap. 35; 53 Geo. III., cap. 116). Exceptions were made in favour of
ships under 350 tons burden, and of others, the property of British
subjects, and built or building before 1st January, 1816: but these
classes of ships were only to be employed in trade within the limits
of the Company’s Charter. Subsequent changes were made; and, by the
Act 3 & 4 Vict., cap. 56, in force in 1847, the Governor-General in
Council had power given him to declare all ships built within the
limits of the Charter, and owned by those of Her Majesty’s subjects for
whom he had power to legislate, entitled to the privileges of British
ships within those limits. By the fourth section of the same Act, the
Governor-General had, also, the power of conferring the same privileges
on ships belonging to States in subordinate alliance, or having
subsidiary treaties with the East India Company.
[Sidenote: Trade with India, in Foreign and United States Ships,]
With regard to the navigation of East India ships, it is sufficient
to notice, that, by the 20th section of 4 Geo. IV., cap. 80 (still in
force in 1847), as well as by the 17th section of the Navigation Act (8
& 9 Vict., cap. 88), Lascars and other natives of Asia were not to be
deemed British seamen. But by section 21 of the same Act, any number of
Lascars might be employed; provided only that there were four British
seamen to every hundred tons of the vessel’s burden: by section 23,
however, it appears that British seamen need not be employed in certain
voyages within the limits of the Charter.
On the subject of privileges granted to vessels of foreign countries
in the trade with India, reference must be made to Act 37 Geo. III.,
cap. 117 (still unrepealed in 1847), which authorised the Directors
of the East India Company, subject to the approval of the Board of
Control, to make such regulations as they thought fit with respect to
the trade to be carried on in ships of countries on friendly terms with
England. The case, however, of America was peculiar, in this sense,
that her ships were enabled to clear out from English ports to China,
while English merchants could not send a British ship to that country!
Thus, the Act of 59 Geo. III., cap. 54, sect. 6, allowed United
States ships “to clear out from any port of the United Kingdom for
the principal settlements of the _British_ dominions in the East
Indies,—_videlicet_, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Prince of Wales
Island,—with any articles which could be legally exported from the
United Kingdom to the said settlements in British-built ships, subject
to the same regulations, &c., as applied to British-built ships.”
[Sidenote: even from English ports.]
It was under the security of this clause that the traders of the United
States sent their vessels to the port of London, to clear out, not
for the special ports mentioned in the above Act, but for China, the
only exclusive trade at that time retained by the East India Company.
Whether the omission of the word China in the Act was an inadvertence,
or whether it was, in fact, a violation of the law for United States
vessels to go to Canton as well as to the other places within the
limits of the Company’s Charter detailed in this Act, the authorities
of the Board of Trade did not care to distinguish.[53]
[Sidenote: Coasting Trade.]
As regards the COASTING TRADE, the law—8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88,
sect. 8—in force in 1847, declared that no goods nor passengers could
be carried coastwise from one part of the United Kingdom to another,
or from the United Kingdom to the Isle of Man, and _vice versâ_,
except in British ships, although the original Navigation Act of 1660
did not prevent foreign-built vessels from engaging in the coasting
trade. The prohibition in the ancient Act extended only to such as
were _foreign owned_, 12 Car. II., cap. 18, sect. 8. By the Act
of 1 James, cap. 18, an extra duty of 5_s._ per ton for every
voyage was laid upon all foreign-built ships engaged in this trade.
Subsequently, by 34 Geo. III., cap. 68 (extended to Irish ships by
42 Geo. III., cap. 61), it was enacted, that vessels engaged in the
coasting trade should be wholly navigated by British subjects; and
this provision was still in force in 1847 by virtue of the definition
of a “British ship,” given in the 12th section of the Act of 8 & 9
Vict., cap. 88. The absolute restriction of the coasting trade to
British-built ships was not introduced till the consolidation in 1825.
The trade of the Isle of Man was put on the footing of a coasting trade
in 1844.
Such is an abridged history of the law of Navigation during the
intermediate period between 1660 and 1847, comprising the four great
divisions of the trade and navigation of the United Kingdom.
No one can rise from a study of these laws without a feeling of
amazement at the trouble our ancestors gave themselves “to beggar their
neighbours,” under the erroneous impression which too long prevailed,
that, by their ruin, our own prosperity could be most effectively
achieved. It is, therefore, not surprising that, under such legislative
measures, maritime commerce was for centuries slow in growth, and that
British merchants and shipowners frequently suffered quite as much
through the instrumentality of laws meant for their protection as their
foreign competitors, against whom these regulations were levelled.
[Sidenote: Summary of the Navigation Laws.]
For the convenience of reference it may be useful to give before
closing this chapter a condensed recapitulation of the principles of
these extraordinary laws, as they stood in 1847, so that my readers
may more clearly understand the discussions in the Lords and Commons
preceding their repeal:—
1st. Certain enumerated articles of European produce could only be
imported into the United Kingdom, for consumption, in British ships,
or in ships of the country of which the goods were the produce, or in
ships of the country from which they were usually imported.
2ndly. No produce of Asia, Africa, or America could be imported for
consumption into the United Kingdom from _Europe_ in any ships;
and such produce could only be imported from any other place in British
ships, or in ships of the country of which the goods were the produce
and from which they were usually imported.
3rdly. No goods could be carried coastwise from one part of the United
Kingdom to another in any but British ships.
4thly. No goods could be exported from the United Kingdom to any of the
British possessions in Asia, Africa, or America (with some exceptions
with regard to India), in any but British ships.
5thly. No goods could be carried from any one British possession
in Asia, Africa, or America to another, nor from one part of such
possession to another part of the same in any but British ships.
6thly. No goods could be imported into any British possession in Asia,
Africa, or America, in any but British ships, or in ships of the
country of which the goods were the produce, provided, also, in such
case, that such ships brought the goods from that country.
7thly. No foreign ships were allowed to trade with any of the British
possessions unless they had been specially authorised to do so by Order
in Council; and
8thly. Powers were given to the Queen in Council which enabled her
to impose differential duties on the ships of any foreign country
which did the same with reference to British ships; and also to place
restrictions on importations from any foreign countries which placed
restrictions on British importations into such countries.
It will be remarked, that in the regulations respecting the trade of
Europe the restrictions only applied to _imports_. Exports were
not affected; in fact, so far as the Navigation Act was concerned,
foreign ships might export any goods from this country. British
manufacturers had naturally required that no impediment should be
placed upon the exportation of British goods. This was perhaps the only
sensible clause in the whole paraphernalia of these laws.[54]
FOOTNOTES:
[37] I daresay at that time Lord Russell had not studied the question
sufficiently. I arrive at this conclusion from a note I received from
his Lordship in the present year (1875), in which he says, referring to
the repeal of the Navigation Laws:—“I felt convinced by the reasoning
of all writers, of whom the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir
Stafford Northcote, was one of the most able, that the Navigation Laws
ought to be repealed. I was not frightened by Lord Derby’s sinister
predictions, and events have proved me right.” Sir Stafford Northcote
at the time was, I think, private secretary to Mr. Labouchere,
the President of the Board of Trade under Lord John Russell’s
Administration, and it is curious to learn that his Lordship, then the
Prime Minister and leader of the great Whig party, should have been
made a convert to the necessity of _further_ progress by the young
Conservative. Of course these writings could not have been read by Lord
Russell at the time when he made the “declaration” to which I refer in
the text.
[38] It seems worth while to give here in a note the dates of the
several steps taken in the repeal of the Navigation Laws, with the
references to _Hansard_, where the several speeches can be
consulted:—
1. Committee moved for by Mr. Ricardo, February 9, 1847. (Hansard,
lxxxix. p. 1007.) Carried by 155 to 94. Committee appointed February
16. 2. Lord John Russell proposes to suspend Navigation Laws with
reference to the importation of corn, June 14. (Ibid., xciii. p. 472.)
3. Discussion on Navigation Bill, July 2. (Ibid., p. 1138.) 4. Motion
of the Earl of Hardwicke for a Committee, February 25, 1848. (Ibid.,
xcvi. p. 1313.) 5. Committee of whole House on Navigation Bill, May 15,
1848. (Ibid., xcviii. p. 988.) 6. Motion of Mr. Herries in reply to Mr.
Labouchere, May 29, 1848. (Ibid., xcix. p. 9.) 7. After five nights’
debate Mr. Labouchere’s motion is carried by 299 to 177, June 9, 1848.
(Ibid., p. 664.) 8. Mr. Labouchere moves resolution for Navigation
Bill, February 14, 1849 (Ibid., cii. p. 682), which is agreed to
(Ibid., p. 741). The Bill is read a first time, February 16. (Ibid., p.
759.) 9. Second reading, March 9, 1849 (Ibid., cii. p. 464), which is
carried, March 12, by 266 to 210. (Ibid., p. 625.) 10. Third reading,
April 23 (Ibid., civ. p. 622), and Bill carried by 275 to 214 (Ibid.,
p. 702). 11. Bill introduced into the House of Lords, May 7. (Ibid., p.
1316.) Carried May 9, by 173 to 163. (Ibid., cv. p. 83.)
[39] Hansard, February 9, 1847, p. 1007.
[40] The preceding eighteen months had seen the height of the railway
mania.
[41] The Spaniard, he said, would take in a cargo of sugar at Cuba
which he would deliver at a _French_ port, and take in wine for
us; but _we_ had so arranged that when he arrived at our ports
he would be met by a custom-house officer, who would tell him that he
could not be permitted to land his cargo. “Why?” the Spaniard would
inquire. “I understood you wanted wine.” “So we do,” the officer would
reply. Then the Spaniard would say, “I will exchange my wine for your
earthenware.” “That will not do,” replies the officer. “It must be
brought by Frenchmen on a French ship.” “But the French do not want
your earthenware”[42]. “We cannot help that; we must not let you
violate our Navigation Laws”[43].
[42] They did very much; for Mr. Garratt, the partner of Alderman
Copeland, said at the time to a friend of mine, that he would ruin
every earthenware potter in France if they would allow British
earthenware to be admitted free of duty.
[43] The Spaniard was no doubt under a misapprehension. The _French
wines_ could _not_ have been brought into our ports in a
_Spanish_ ship; wine being an enumerated article which was
excluded, “except in _British ships_, or ships of the country of
which the goods are the produce.” (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, s. 2.)
[44] We give the words of Adam Smith, p. 203 _et seq._ of his
‘Wealth of Nations,’ by McCulloch. _Ed._ 1850. “There seem to be
two cases in which it will be advantageous to lay some burden upon
foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry. The first is, when
some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the
country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much
upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The Act of Navigation,
therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of
Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some
cases by absolute prohibition, and in others by heavy burdens upon the
shipping of foreign countries.” Adam Smith, at great length, expounds
the principle of the Navigation Laws, admitting at the same time that
they are not favourable to the growth of the opulence arising from
foreign commerce. “As defence, however,” he adds, “is of much more
importance than opulence, the Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest
of all the commercial regulations of England.”
In another passage, Adam Smith says: “To expect, indeed, that freedom
of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as
absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established
in it.” P. 207. Same Edition.
[45] The first return of vessels engaged in the colonial trade refers
to a year when protection (with the exception of the few Reciprocity
Treaties then in force) was at its height; and the second to a year
when it had been greatly relaxed. It ran thus:—
Inward Outward
Tons. Tons.
1826 Protected 939,321 839,558
Unprotected 1,011,309 897,867
--------- ---------
Total 1,950,630 1,737,425
--------- ---------
1844 Protected 1,460,882 1,551,251
Unprotected 2,186,581 2,301,571
--------- ---------
Total 3,647,463 3,852,822
--------- ---------
In 1826 the total amount inwards and outwards, } 1,778,879
protected, was }
In 1844 Ditto ditto 3,012,133
Showing an increase of 1,233,254 tons, or 69·32 per cent.
In 1826 the total amount inwards and outwards, } 1,909,176
unprotected, was }
In 1844 Ditto ditto 4,448,152
Showing an increase of 2,578,976 tons, or 135·07 per cent.
[46] The speech in question (an admirable one) was delivered _12th
May, 1826_. _Vide_ Hansard, ‘Navigation Laws,’ vol. xv. p. 1144.
[47] The Committee consisted of Mr. Ricardo, Sir Robert Peel, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Villiers, Sir Howard Douglas,
Admiral Dundas, Mr. Lyall, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Hume,
Mr. Liddell, Sir George Clerk, and Mr. Milner Gibson.
[48] This section was originally specially aimed at the Dutch, who had
few native productions of their own.
[49] Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, was at that time an important British
possession.
[50] Our space only admits of an abridgment, but the reader will find
all details about the Navigation Law in a paper by Mr. J. S. (now Sir
John Shaw) Lefevre, published in the Appendix to the Report of the
Committee of the House of Commons appointed in 1847.
[51] Those of my readers who are curious to study the laws whereby we
hoped to bring the “rebellious colonies to order,”—vain hope!—or who
may desire to know how the parent treated its own offspring when the
children felt themselves strong enough to do for themselves, may read,
as I have done, though perhaps not to much advantage, 14 Geo. III.,
cap. 19; 15 Geo. III., cap. 18; and 16 Geo. III., cap. 5: all passed
in rapid succession under the melancholy delusion that they would have
the effect of a Pope’s Bull!—and that, too, on an enlightened but
oppressed people, who had resolved to govern themselves! My readers
may then turn to 23 Geo. III., cap. 26, and 23 Geo. III., cap. 39,
where an attempt was made to mend matters by some sort of regulation
of trade between the two countries, whereby Great Britain resolved to
have the lion’s share; and then to 25 Geo. III., cap. 1; 27 Geo. III.,
cap. 7; and 28 Geo. III., cap. 6, where certain modifications were
made, or rather could be made by “Order in Council,” and where “thirty
enumerated articles” the “growth, produce, or manufactures of the
States,” might be “carried into the British West Indies from the United
States,” but then “_only_ by British subjects in British ships”!
If my readers are disposed to go further—though I cannot recommend the
research—into this wretched system of legislation, they may refer to 31
Geo. III. cap. 38, where the Governors of the West India Islands were
allowed to relax certain prohibitions “in case of public emergency;”
and to 51 Geo. III., cap. 47, sect. 6, and 58 Geo. III., cap. 27,
where we seem to have gained a little more wisdom by extending certain
“privileges”!—_rights_ (?)—to an independent and industrious
people.
[52] The grounds of these important modifications of our Navigation
System were stated in Mr. Huskisson’s Speech, 12th May, 1826.
[53] The Americans acted on the section of the Act, which says, “any
articles which may be legally exported from the United Kingdom to the
said settlements.” Thus Canton was deemed a foreign place with regard
to the American Trade; but, in that it was included within the limits
of the East India Company’s Charter, American vessels could trade there
though English vessels could not!
[54] Mr. Lefevre, of the Board of Trade, said he did not know the
reason of this; but as a matter of fact, Venice, Spain, France, and the
Hanseatic League had Navigation Laws _before_ we had, and would
not have our goods _except in their own ships_. So necessity, not
wisdom, compelled us to make this allowance.
CHAPTER V.
Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity
Treaties—Austria, July 1838—Zollverein States, August 1841—Russia,
1843—Various anomalies, &c., then in existence—Curious effects
of Registry Laws, as regarded individuals or corporate
bodies—Ship _Equador_—Decision of the Queen’s Bench,
December 1846—Further details: owner to reside in the United
Kingdom—Naturalisation of goods brought to Europe—Waste of
capital caused thereby; and obstructions to trade—Story of the
cochineal—But the Navigation Laws not always to blame—Special
views of the Canadians—Montreal, its shipping and trade—Navigation
of the St. Lawrence—Free-trade with the United States desired
by the farmers of Canada—Negotiations proposed—Canadians urge
the abolition of Protection—Views of Western Canada—Canadians,
really, only for partial Free-trade—Improvements of their internal
navigation—Welland Canal—Cost of freight the real question—Loss
to Canada by New York line—General summary of results as to
Canada—West Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians—Divergent
views of capitalists at home—Liverpool and Manchester opposed.
[Sidenote: Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws.]
[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaties.]
[Sidenote: Austria, July 1838.]
The first instance of privileges being granted to ships of certain
countries to import goods from ports in other countries was in the
case of Austrian ships. The 4th clause of the treaty of 1838 between
Austria and England provided, that all Austrian vessels from ports of
the Danube, as far as Galatz inclusive, should, with their cargoes, be
admitted into the ports of the United Kingdom and into all possessions
of Her Britannic Majesty, exactly in the same manner as if the said
vessels had come direct from ports strictly Austrian, with all the
privileges and immunities granted under the Treaty of Navigation
and Commerce. In August 1840, an Act was passed to give effect to
this treaty, the 3rd clause of which, running as follows, was very
important:—“And whereas, by the application of _steam_ power[55]
to inland navigation, and the facility thereby afforded of ascending
rivers in suitable vessels with imported goods, new prospects of
commercial adventure are opened up to many States situate wholly or
chiefly in the interior of Europe, and whose most convenient ports
are not within their own dominions; and, consequently, the trade of
this country with such States might be greatly extended if the ships
of such States were permitted to use, for the purposes of such trade,
some ports of other States, in like manner as if such ports were
within their own dominions; and, accordingly, treaties of commerce
and navigation beneficial to the shipping and trade of this country
might be made with such States if Her Majesty were enabled to carry
such treaties into effect. Be it therefore enacted, notwithstanding
the Navigation Act, that it shall be lawful for Her Majesty from
time to time to declare, by the Order in Council, to be published as
aforesaid, that any port or ports to be named in such order, being the
most convenient port or ports for shipping the produce of any State,
to be also named in such order, shall, although not situated within the
dominions of such State, be port or ports for the use of such State in
the trade of such ships with all ports of the British dominions, &c.,
in as full and ample a manner as if such port or ports were within
the dominions of such State, &c.; and so long as such order shall be
declared to be in force, it shall be lawful to import, &c., any goods
in the ships of such State, which, by the laws in force at the time of
such importation, might then be imported in such ships from a port of
the country to which they belonged, and so to import such goods upon
the like terms as the same could there be imported from the national
ports of such ships.” Subsequently to this Act, several Conventions
of Navigation, to some of which I have already briefly referred, were
carried out, whereby the privileges just described were granted to
various other nations.
[Sidenote: Zollverein States, August 1841.]
[Sidenote: Russia, 1843.]
The first was with Prussia, on behalf of the Zollverein States,[56]
whereby the mouths of the Meuse, Elbe, Weser, and Ems, and those of all
the navigable rivers between the Elbe and the Meuse were made free;
thus offering means of communication between the sea and the territory
of any of the Zollverein States thus opened as ports for ships of the
Zollverein, so far as relates to trade with the United Kingdom or
the British possessions. A little later, in 1843, a similar treaty
was made with Russia, by which Russian vessels, arriving from the
mouth of the Vistula or Niemen, or any other river, the outlet of any
navigable stream, having its source in Russia and passing through the
Czar’s dominions, were admitted, as if coming from Russian or Finnish
ports. With Oldenburg there was also a treaty relating to the Elbe,
Ems, Weser, and Meuse, and also with Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Lastly,
like arrangements were made with Hanover, giving very nearly the same
privileges as those to Mecklenburg-Schwerin. At a later period, orders
were given to allow the same indulgence to ships of Oldenburg, the
Hanse Towns, and Holland, as had been given to Hanover; so that, at
this time, England had relaxed her Navigation Laws to the extent of
calling ports, places not geographically belonging to Austria, Russia,
Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, the Zollverein, Hanover, or the Hanse Towns;
a concession of vast importance, especially as regarded the import of
corn.
[Sidenote: Various anomalies, &c., then in existence.]
In fact, the Navigation Laws, as they stood in 1847, were full of
anomalies, and were altogether unsuited for the state of things at
which nations had now arrived. The 7th clause of the Act 7 & 8 Vict.,
cap. 88, directed, that “no goods shall be _exported_ from the
United Kingdom to any _British possession_ in _Asia_, Africa,
or America, nor to the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, or Sark,
except in British ships.” Goods, the produce of colonies in Asia,
Africa, and America, could, however, be brought in vessels of any flag
to the Channel Islands, but, from these, they must be brought in a
British ship; and there was also the further anomaly, as we have shown,
of United States vessels being allowed to clear out with produce and
manufactures of the United Kingdom to the East Indies.
[Sidenote: Curious effects of the Registry Laws]
[Sidenote: as regarded individuals or corporate bodies.]
Power was then, also, granted to the Queen in Council to allow any
foreign nation to trade with British colonies; and this privilege was
granted to a considerable number. To some it was accorded without
restriction; to others, such as France and Spain, who were rivals,
restricted powers were given; while the privilege, granted to the
United States of trading with British colonies, was afterwards
accorded to Columbia, Rio de la Plata (including the States since
formed), Mexico, Hayti, Chili, France to a limited extent, and the
Spanish Colonies; and, further, all countries within what were called
the limits of the East India Company’s Charter, that is, all foreign
countries west of Cape Horn, and east of the Cape of Good Hope, had
liberty to trade with the British possessions within the same limits.
(Order in Council, 16 July, 1827.) French ships under this order were,
however, only allowed to import into British colonies such goods, the
produce of France, as were enumerated in the table annexed to the order
(Orders, 1 June, 1826; 16 Dec., 1826), this order not including wine,
the staple of France, a distinction deliberately adopted and confirmed.
But, besides these perplexing anomalies, and others to which I shall
presently call attention, the execution of the Navigation Law, as it
was in 1847, was full of difficulties arising from the Registry Law,
and the naturalisation of goods brought to Europe, &c. With respect
to the Registry Law, there was a clause (the 13th) of the Navigation
Act which stated “that no ship shall be admitted to be a British
ship unless duly registered;” and that this might be properly done,
the owner had to declare “that no foreigner has any right, share, or
interest in the ship.” The following remarkable case will show how
completely the spirit of this old law was neutralised in the case of
Joint-Stock Companies.
[Sidenote: Ship _Equador_.]
[Sidenote: Decision of Queen’s Bench, December 1846.]
An application was made to the Collector at Liverpool for the registry
of a ship called the _Equador_, belonging to the Pacific Steam
Navigation Company. In the first instance, the Company required
registry as a Joint-Stock Company, and three members, who had been
duly elected and appointed trustees, attended at the Custom-House,
Liverpool, to subscribe the requisite declaration of registry, in
conformity with the provisions of the 13th and 36th sections of the
Act 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 89 (the Registry Act). By the 13th section, the
trustees of a Joint-Stock Company, in common with all other owners
of British ships (_excepting those owned by corporate bodies_),
were required to declare “that no foreigner, directly or indirectly,
hath any share or part interest in the said ship or vessel.” The
trustees in question stated that they could not make that declaration,
because, in point of fact, foreigners did hold shares in that ship,
and also in the other vessels belonging to the said Company; and they
requested the Collector and Controller at Liverpool to expunge from
the declaration the words above recited; but those officers, having
no legal authority to comply with this request, refused to make this
alteration. The Company then addressed the Board of Customs, requesting
that they would direct their officers at Liverpool to expunge from
the declaration the words above recited; but the Board, acting under
advice, refused compliance with the request. The Company’s secretary
then demanded registry on behalf of the Company as a “corporate body,”
and claimed to make the declaration, contained in the 13th section of
the Act aforesaid, which applies to corporate bodies. That declaration
does not, like the other declaration, exclude foreign interest; and
if, in the first instance, the Company had claimed registry as a
corporate body, the probability is, that it would have been granted as
a matter of course, without raising the question of foreign interest.
But the Collector and Controller at Liverpool, with a full knowledge
that foreigners were proprietors of the vessel, and adverting to the
13th and other sections of the Registry Act, refused registry; and
the Commissioners of Customs, acting upon their solicitor’s opinion,
supported the Liverpool officers in their refusal to grant the
registry. The Company then moved for a mandamus in the Court of Queen’s
Bench; and, after the usual proceedings in such cases, it was decided
by the Court that as the Company applied for registration in its
corporate capacity, the Court could not take notice of its constituent
members, whether they were actually foreigners or not; or, in other
words, that an English Incorporated Company was a British subject for
the purposes of the Registry Act.
[Sidenote: Further details: owner to reside in the United Kingdom.]
The result of this remarkable decision was that foreigners, when
incorporated, could own a ship, but not individually. In an extreme
case, a ship might, ultimately, become the sole property of foreigners
exclusively, and yet be entitled to be registered as a British ship,
as a corporate body remains permanently. So that the law created the
curious anomaly that a foreigner could not have a share in a British
vessel, but might be the owner of all the shares of a corporate body
which owned, for instance, the _Great Eastern_. Another difficulty
arose with reference to the residence in or out of England of the
owner of a ship. The Free-trade party contended that if a foreigner
were disposed to come here and build a ship, there was no disadvantage
either to British shipbuilders or British shipowners, or British
sailors, especially as he could hold all the shares of a ship. On
the other hand, it was contended that this was an extreme case, not
likely often to occur, and the principle, if acted upon, of allowing
individual ownership, might give considerable power to foreigners to
the prejudice of British subjects; in fact, that the violation of this
principle went to the very basis of the Navigation Law, which it would
destroy. To such a point was real British ownership carried out, that,
as the Act required owners of British ships to reside in the United
Kingdom, the owner of a British registered ship, if he resided at
Paris,[57] would lose his privileges as such.
Other difficulties arose from the indefinite character of the law:
thus, gin could be brought into England, but brandy could not, in
_any_ foreign ships. American vessels could not bring corn
from Holland; while, on the other hand, American corn landed in
Holland could not be brought to England in a Bremen ship; and these
difficulties were, in the case of corn, considerably increased by
the difficulty of pronouncing upon the actual origin of the corn, as
none but the most experienced dealers in grain could decide such a
question, and, even with them, it must often have been mere guess work.
A case occurred in which timber from Memel was sent to British North
America, and, afterwards, brought to England at the low differential
duty then existing. The law, at that time, permitted the produce of
British possessions abroad to be imported, without its being described
as _the produce_ of those possessions; a tolerated evasion, it
is clear, of the Navigation Law. But in the case of a ship arriving
from Hayti, bringing a cargo of Haytian produce, the master described
his ship as a Swedish ship, there being, in point of fact, no Haytian
ships. In this case, the goods were liable to forfeiture; but they were
allowed to be warehoused for exportation, and the vessel was permitted
to depart. A Swedish ship was clearly inadmissible under the 16th
Section of the Navigation Act.
[Sidenote: Naturalisation of goods brought to Europe.]
Perhaps one of the greatest absurdities attending the practical working
of the Navigation Law was that which related to the “naturalisation”
of goods, the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, which, when once
landed in Europe, were, by this Act, not admissible into the ports of
Great Britain, even in British ships, for home consumption.
Two remarkable cases came under my own experience, so curiously
illustrative of the laxity and stringency of the law respectively, as
to deserve especial notice. In the first case, thirty-five casks of
annatto, the produce of Cayenne, a French colony, were in course of
transit in a French ship to Bordeaux. This valuable dye could have
been brought _direct_ from Cayenne in a British ship for home
consumption to England; but, if once brought from the French colony in
a French ship, and _landed_ in Europe, it was clearly inadmissible
under the clause, “that goods, the produce of Asia, Africa, and
America, shall not be imported from Europe into the United Kingdom to
be used therein.”
The value of annatto is apt to fluctuate suddenly from very low to
enormously high prices, just as the fashion for the colour varies.
Annatto on this occasion rose to a high price; and a London agent,
knowing that thirty-five casks of it were on their way to Europe, set
his wits to work to bring this French colonial produce into a port in
England, in spite of the Navigation Laws. The agent was thoroughly
acquainted with every branch of the law, and asked himself what
constituted _a landing in_ Europe? Having satisfied himself on
this point, he arranged with an eminent house at Bordeaux to purchase
the annatto for arrival, land the cotton, which constituted the chief
part of the cargo, and charter a small vessel, and send on the annatto
to London in this _British ship_. This was done; and, when the
vessel was on the point of arrival, he sought the Commissioners of
Customs, and frankly avowed his proceedings. Mr. Dean, one of the
chief officers, admitted that, many years previously, especially
during the war in 1810, similar transhipments had been allowed, under
the authority of the officers of the Crown,—a mere transhipment, and
certain formalities performed at the French Customs, not being “a
landing in Europe,”—and the thirty-five casks of annatto were admitted
at a profit to the partners of nearly 3000_l._[58]
[Sidenote: Waste of capital caused thereby,]
In the second case, the rigour of the law led to the greatest
absurdity. About the year 1839, the price of coffee was very high in
the London market, while large quantities of the finest Java and Dutch
colonial coffee were warehoused in store in Amsterdam. This produce
was clearly inadmissible under the clause already quoted, having
been, beyond all dispute, “landed in Europe.” In what way could this
coffee be brought into the London market in the teeth of the existing
stringent Navigation Laws? The same agent, who represented one of the
oldest Dutch houses, contracted to deliver a cargo of Dutch coffee at
a given price at a distant period. He then chartered a British ship,
which he sent to Amsterdam, took in a cargo of coffee, and the ship
thus laden with Dutch colonial produce was sent to the Cape of Good
Hope. At that colony the coffee was landed, or, at all events, was
supposed to be landed, fresh papers were made out, and the coffee
consigned to London as “naturalised” produce, and, coming direct
from a British colony in a British ship, was, of course, admissible
for home consumption. To despatch many thousand tons of coffee and
other produce half across the globe from Europe, for no other purpose
than to be brought back again, in order to comply with the rigorous
provisions of the old Navigation Laws, which, in point of fact, were
nullified as regards goods, while the shipowners alone reaped the
advantage of this useless and protracted voyage, was surely a climax
of absurdity! Nevertheless, it is within my own personal experience
that a large amount of business was transacted in this way, all the
expenses incurred being, in an economical point of view, a total waste
of capital.
[Sidenote: and obstructions to trade.]
[Sidenote: Story of the cochineal.]
Again, on the part of the old law, the want of adaptability to
the changing conditions of different markets was often a serious
difficulty. Thus, it often happened that the state of these markets in
different parts of the world presented favourable mercantile prospects;
but no suitable vessel could be found to carry the goods to the market
where they were required. For instance, hostilities being about to
break out between France and the United States in 1834, the price of
French brandy rose enormously in America, while, at the same time, the
large quantities of that article then in England rendered it unsaleable
in the London market. At the time there was not an American vessel to
be chartered in the Thames, and the American Navigation Laws precluded
the brandy from being carried in a British vessel. On the other hand,
palm-oil, at times, could not be brought from the United States, there
being no British vessel available for charter on the spot. In such
cases, the merchants complained in their letters in doleful terms,
“I have lost my commission, and some British vessel the freight.”
Instances of such occurrences were multiplied from all parts of the
world. Much was said at the time about the difficulty of bringing
cochineal from the Canary Islands, where the cactus, on which it feeds,
had recently been cultivated for this purpose. Though it might be
absurd to raise such complaints, as the smallest possible inconvenience
resulted from the state of the law as it affected this particular
article, the principle applied to the whole colonial system; and, as
Spain refused to allow British ships to carry British goods to the
Canaries, it was urged that our colonial system ought to be altered, so
as to induce Spain to modify hers. Cochineal produced in the Canaries,
and landed at Cadiz in Europe, like other articles, had to be sent
elsewhere out of Europe to be naturalised, in order to come in for home
consumption.
[Sidenote: But the Navigation Laws not always to blame.]
Perhaps, practically, these anomalies did not, to any large extent,
occasion impediments to business beyond retarding its extension,
because every merchant was so well acquainted with the provisions of
the Navigation Laws (which were as much studied for their evasion as
otherwise), that less inconvenience resulted[59] than might have been
expected. The law, however, assumed so many complex forms with time,
new discoveries, treaty obligations, and perpetual minor alterations,
that, irrespectively of the advantages or disadvantages of a total
change, arguments could be raised for a complete abrogation of every
existing Act, if it were only to commence anew and remodel the law, so
as to avoid the habitual and vexatious discussions and disputes with
the Customs to which the system gave rise.
[Sidenote: Special views of the Canadians.]
As regarded the operation of the Navigation Laws with reference
to Canada, it was far more complicated than even that between the
mother-country, her colonies in the West Indies, and the United States.
While some of the shipowners of England had, as we have seen, gone
so far as even to demand protection against the shipping of English
colonists, the Canadians were busily occupied with efforts in an
entirely opposite direction. They were not inclined, by a system of
protection, to force their trade in any particular channel: for, so far
as regarded the carrying-trade of the North-Western American States,
the Canadians obviously could only secure its passage through their
territory by holding out superior advantages in the way of cheapness
of transit. For this purpose they had already done everything that
great enterprise and expenditure could accomplish. They succeeded as
far as possible; and, at length, possessed a line of communication at
once more rapid and more cheap from the interior to the sea than any
existing in the United States. The whole question then was confined
to the comparative advantages of shipment from Quebec or Montreal, or
from New York. If those ports could be nearly equalised in respect
to freights to England, Canada would succeed in her object; if the
disparity continued as it did then, all her efforts would have been
unavailing.
[Sidenote: Montreal, its shipping and trade.]
It was, generally, represented that the high rate of freight between
Montreal and the United Kingdom was owing to the limited number of
ships employed in the import trade of Canada. In the spring and latter
end of the summer, ships, composing what was called the spring and fall
fleet, arrived; and, so long as they were in port wanting freight, the
rate was comparatively moderate; but in the interval, being the middle
of summer, when most of the western produce arrived for shipment,
an inferior class of ships only were at hand, which delivered their
cargoes in bad condition, and, at the same time, charged exorbitant
rates, according to the quantity of produce for shipment. The rate of
freight is said to have fluctuated in Montreal in one and the same
season between 3_s._ 6_d._ and 7_s._ 6_d._ per barrel; and it is stated
that the higher rate, from 6_s._ to 7_s._ 6_d._ per barrel, had been
paid in Montreal, while freights were offered in foreign ships at New
York as low as 1_s._ and 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel; indeed, at this time,
an offer of 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel extra would have brought any number
of ships round from the American sea-ports, but the Navigation Laws
interposed. It was clearly seen that such fluctuations in the rates
of freight, together with the employment of inferior vessels, could
not have occurred were the Canadian merchants able to select in the
American ports such ships as were seeking freight to Europe.
During the temporary suspension of the Navigation Laws in 1847,
twenty-two ships arrived from Bremen at the port of Montreal laden with
emigrants intended for the United States, that route being chosen as
easier and cheaper. These ships on their return took cargoes for the
United Kingdom; and it was evident that, if the same facilities were
continued, the great German emigration to the United States would to
some extent pass through Canada. This was but one instance of many
which might be reasonably expected, if foreign vessels could resort to
the Canadian ports. These ships were well fitted for the carriage of
wheat and flour; and the competition produced by their presence would
not only tend to reduce the freight from Canada to an equality with
those from the States, but the good condition of the cargoes delivered
would be assured; the shippers would, in this way, be saved from the
use of inferior vessels, the damage caused by which was thought not to
be over-estimated at an average of five per cent. on such shipments.
[Sidenote: Navigation of the St. Lawrence.]
Again: the American merchants of the West were anxious to avail
themselves of the facilities afforded by the River St. Lawrence.
Thus, if their vessels were permitted to come down to Montreal and
Quebec, there to meet American or foreign ships to take their cargoes
on freight to Europe or elsewhere, it was naturally thought that an
extensive and profitable commerce through Canada would immediately
follow; the lower ports, by these means, at once assuming the position,
as commercial depôts, to which their geographical position on that
great river outlet of Northern America seemed to entitle them.
[Sidenote: Free-trade with the United States desired by the farmers of
Canada.]
Connected with this important subject of the free navigation of the
St. Lawrence west of Quebec, which the Americans were desirous of
procuring, a corresponding desire prevailed on the part of the Canadian
farmers to avail themselves of the American home market, whenever it
offered superior prices to those derived from exportation to Europe.
The price of wheat and flour in the Eastern States, required for
home consumption, was often much higher than the price in Canada for
exportation, and when this happened, it would obviously have been
greatly to the advantage of the Canadian agriculturist if he could
have exported his produce to the United States. This he was prevented
from doing by a protective duty of a quarter of a dollar per bushel
upon wheat. Efforts had been made in the United States to abolish this
duty; but the advocates of its abolition were constantly defeated by
the Protection cries of the American farmers, or by a difficulty as to
the “most favoured” nation-clause in treaties with Foreign Powers, the
more so, as a relaxation in favour of Canada was, naturally, capable of
extension to any or all nations with whom the United States had such
treaties subsisting. Here is a clear instance how commercial treaties,
even of a liberal character, become as much “entangling alliances” as
the political conventions of “amity and friendship” have so frequently
been. Indeed, the “favoured” nation-clause, however well intended and
beneficial in the highest degree in certain cases, has often been a
source of dispute to those States who either have accepted or enforced
it, and, even more so, to those countries which have been compelled
to adopt it. The interests of great nations vary so much at different
periods that inflexible rules in politics or commerce must frequently
operate very prejudicially, and cannot be maintained with entire
consistency for the true interests of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Negotiations proposed.]
It was thought that if the free navigation of the St. Lawrence were
offered to the American Government in return for the abolition of the
protecting duty, one measure to be co-existent with the other, Congress
would be inclined to abolish the protective duty; while the abolition,
being a matter of reciprocal arrangement, all difficulty arising from
the commercial relations of the United States with foreign countries
might thus be avoided.
[Sidenote: Canadians urge the abolition of Protection.]
The more advanced section of the Free-trade party of Canada pressed
this proposal on the executive government, together with the abolition
of all protection conferred by the Navigation Laws, which it was
asserted was, after all, purely nominal, and only to secure other
advantages. They pronounced the so-called Protection to be in its
effects upon Canada practically mischievous, contending that, if
the trade was nearer from Canadian waters to the canals and ports
of the United States, British shipowners would have to compete with
foreigners in the ports of that country; that, if they could do this
successfully there, they could do so in the Canadian ports; but if
not, under existing circumstances, the trade of Canada could not
afford to maintain a mere legal monopoly: moreover, if the supposed
Protection only led to the desertion of the cities and sea-ports of
Canada, without subserving the interests of British shipowners, it was
hoped that useless restrictions, irreconcilable with the withdrawal of
protective duties in the United States in favour of Canadian produce,
would be at once removed.
[Sidenote: Views of Western Canada.]
The Canadians could not indeed fail to perceive, when the question was
raised in the mother-country, that a great portion of the exportable
produce of Western Canada, probably by far the greater part, was at
that very moment on its way to ports in the United States; that little
was expected at Montreal; that the canals constructed on the St.
Lawrence were almost idle; that importing ships coming to Montreal
were without their usual full freight; that the principal importations
into Western Canada were effected through the United States; and
that the trade of the city of Montreal was in consequence rapidly
decreasing. On the other hand, they observed the greatly-increasing
consumption and importation into their country of articles formerly
imported wholly through that port. Hence they inferred, that the
opening of Canadian sea-ports to vessels of all nations, with
permission to send colonial produce to England in any vessels, as
well as the opening the River St. Lawrence above Quebec to Americans,
would probably restore trade to its original channel, and increase the
commerce and revenues of Canada beyond precedent.
[Sidenote: Canadians really only for partial Free-trade.]
Such were the hopes entertained by the Canadians of a modification in
the restrictive system. But even the boldest of their Free-traders
shrunk for a time from the notion of an unconditional surrender of the
natural advantages the navigation of the St. Lawrence conferred upon
Canada. Hence they proposed to themselves to reserve their full rights,
and confined their advocacy to such changes in the law relating to
navigating the St. Lawrence above Quebec as would enable them to make
terms with the Americans. They had then no idea of throwing open to
foreigners generally the use of their great rivers without an ample
equivalent: they contented themselves with asking for powers from the
Imperial Legislature to enable them to negotiate from time to time on
the subject, and to make the navigation of the river a matter of treaty
and regulation; preserving their own sovereignty, with power to resume
the exclusive use of it at the conclusion of any agreement.
[Sidenote: Improvements of their internal navigation.]
Hitherto the enterprise and energies of the colonies had been almost
exclusively directed to the important objects of improving the internal
navigation of the St. Lawrence from Lake Erie to Quebec, so as to place
it in such a state of cheapness and efficiency as would make that route
more advantageous as a port of embarkation for a sea voyage than any
route through the United States.
[Sidenote: Welland Canal.]
In the case of the Welland Canal, Canadians could not fail to perceive
that the passage of American vessels down and up had contributed to
render it profitable. Indeed, the Welland Canal was used extensively
by American vessels, as it was a short communication between the two
great lakes, and, at the same time, admitted of the passage of large
vessels, which, instead of entering the American Erie Canal at Buffalo,
proceeded down Lake Ontario to Oswego, where goods are transferred to
the canal-boats for transport to New York. In this way a large portion
of the revenue from the Welland Canal was derived from the American
trade, arising from the free navigation of a part of the internal
waters of Canada, and thus Western Canada enjoyed the benefit of a
navigation supported to a considerable extent by foreign commerce.
[Sidenote: Cost of freight the real question.]
It was observed, further, that, if products from the Western States
could be transported to the sea more cheaply through Canada than
through America, the Canadian route would of course be preferred,
and thus the Canadian canals would engross the carrying trade of
the North-Western States of America. But if, on the other hand,
the advantage of the perfect inland navigation was more than
counterbalanced by the rates of freight from Quebec and Montreal to
Europe, the people of Western Canada, having no protection in the
English markets by using the Canadian lines of communication, would
send the whole of their produce by way of New York, and import such
articles of foreign consumption as they required by the same route.
So long as the colony enjoyed Protection in the British market
no injury to its commerce could arise, because the extent of the
protection was generally sufficient to prevent the owners from
divesting the Canadian produce of its British character, and it could
not become available for the home market of America, unless on the
payment of a heavy duty. Even with regard to American produce, the
provision in the old Corn Law giving to American wheat and flour the
same protection as Canadian if exported through Canada, with the
payment of 3_s._ per quarter duty in the province, was, at most
times, a sufficient inducement for many Americans to make shipments to
Montreal, as well as for the Canadians to make purchases in the United
States. When, however, by the repeal of the Corn Laws all protection
was removed, the question became one of mere cheapness of transport;
and taking an average of the preceding four years, the difference in
freight was no less than 3_s._ per barrel of flour in favour of
New York over Montreal.[60] Even when the benefits enjoyed by Canada
in her internal navigation, estimated at 1_s._ 6_d._ per
barrel, were deducted, there would still remain in favour of New York,
1_s._ 6_d._ on each barrel of flour—an advantage quite sufficient to
turn the whole export trade into that channel.
[Sidenote: Loss to Canada by New York line.]
As the United States then admitted the transit of Canadian produce
through their territory, the loss it encountered at New York arose from
the necessity of complying with the Navigation Laws, which forbade
its being imported into England in foreign ships (8 & 9 Vict., cap.
88, sect. 4). At the same time, it must, also, be noticed that, as
freight in British ships from New York to England was no higher than
the freight in American ships, this restriction, confessedly, had no
appreciable influence on the question of transmission through Canada or
the United States.
For some time, previously, the import trade of Western Canada, which,
by means of protecting duties in favour of British ships and British
goods, was forced to come by the St. Lawrence, had been changing its
direction, and Montreal, which supplied the whole western country,
was becoming deserted by the western merchants. The new Customs Law
of that province, while it equalised duties, enabled the consumer
to purchase in the cheapest market, and, thus, vastly increased the
evil to former importing cities; hence, a very large proportion of
the export trade also of Canada had now taken the direction of New
York. There was, therefore, naturally a serious apprehension, lest the
great public works of the St. Lawrence would cease to be useful and
profitable, and, that the commercial connection so many years existing
between Western and Eastern Canada would thus be altogether cut off.
It has been unnecessary to refer to the export trade in timber from
Canada, as this stood on exceptional grounds. Indeed, a general
opinion prevailed that the export of timber from Quebec would probably
be carried on, under any circumstances, in British ships specially
employed in that branch of trade.
[Sidenote: General summary of results as to Canada.]
From these important considerations it was concluded:—
1st. That, as Canada then enjoyed but a remnant of Protection in
England, she ought to be released from any restrictions _for the
benefit of the shipowner_.
2nd. That, without the free navigation of the St. Lawrence and a repeal
of the Navigation Laws so far as British North American Colonies were
concerned, there was reason to apprehend that New York would become the
emporium of the trade of Canada, and further, that, thus, a community
of interests, commercial and political, would be created with the
United States.
3rd. That, in such a case, the repeal of these laws would not
materially injure the British shipowner, the question simply being
whether competition for trade should take place in the harbours of the
United States or in the River St. Lawrence.
Lastly, That the repeal of these laws would have a tendency to
perpetuate, and not to destroy, the relations existing between Canada
and the mother-country.
[Sidenote: West Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians.]
[Sidenote: Divergent views of capitalists at home.]
For these reasons, an organisation of merchants in Montreal, and in
various towns in Canada, who had leagued themselves as Free-traders
and had been very active in disseminating their views, as well as in
enforcing them, with all the influence they could command, on the
colonial Governor, and on the English Executive and both Houses of
Parliament, now demanded the total repeal of the British Navigation
Laws. They did not, however, stand alone in their desire for
unrestricted navigation. The West Indies, as soon as they found that
the British Parliament had taken away the protection afforded to them
by the differential duties, were as loud in their complaints as the
Canadians, the more so, as having been deprived of all protection on
their sugars by Lord John Russell’s Equalization Act of 1847, it became
indispensable to get their produce conveyed to market at the cheapest
possible rate of freight, so as to compete, with any chance of success,
with their foreign rivals. They therefore denounced the Navigation Laws
in no measured terms; and when Montreal petitioned that its corn should
be admitted into the ports of Great Britain in ships of any nation
their merchants thought proper to charter, the West Indians preferred
the same request, in order to secure the lowest cost of transport for
their sugar. While, therefore, the colonists were urging the adoption
of the principle of an entire free trade with the colonies, many
capitalists of England, and, especially, the shipowners, viewed with
great alarm the total abandonment of what was known as our “colonial
system,” and declared their apprehension that such a change would
throw the carrying trade into the hands of the United States. Clinging
to Protection, they said, in their memorials to Parliament, “that
the only remaining thing connected with our whole important and most
magnificent colonial system, which enabled us to baffle the efforts
of the whole world united against us, was that part of the system
under which the produce of the colonies was obliged to be brought to
this country in British ships.” These alarmists declared that such a
relaxation as the colonists now demanded would ruin them inevitably.
Regarding every concession which had been made to the Americans during
the preceding half century, having as it had for its object increased
intercourse with the West Indies, as a pernicious policy, tending to
injure British colonies and to encourage American trade, they alleged
that the protection of the colonies had not been carried far enough;
that British shipowners could not exist without Protection; that
the uncertainty prevailing with respect to the Navigation Laws was
productive of injury to the country, as no persons would embark capital
in shipping; and, further, that, as regarded the West Indies, it was
not the _general_ wish of the colonists that the Navigation Laws
should be repealed.
[Sidenote: Views of Manchester and Liverpool.]
In this controversy, the important cities of Manchester and Liverpool
each took also a very different view. The great Free-traders of the
former desired the unconditional repeal of the Navigation Laws,
feeling convinced that their cotton and corn would then be brought
to them at cheaper rates, and that they would be able to deliver
to much greater advantage in distant markets the products of their
manufacturers; but the shipowners of Liverpool, almost as a body
(though there were a few important exceptions), were exceedingly
adverse to any material change in these laws, as they regarded with
great and natural jealousy the then triumphant progress of American
shipping.
FOOTNOTES:
[55] I give this clause at length, because it is about the first step
towards a change in our Navigation Laws, which had become necessary
to render them practicable, after steam had been introduced for the
propulsion of our ships. This mighty instrument of civilisation, about
which I shall have a great deal to say hereafter, drove itself through
numerous Acts of Parliament, and showed how vain were legislative
measures when opposed to the progress of science.
[56] The Zollverein States are, Prussia at the head: Anhalt-Bernburg,
Anhalt-Dessau, Anhalt-Kothen, Baden, Bavaria, Brunswick,
Frankfort, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Homburg,
Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Lippe-Detmold,
Luxemburg with Limburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburg and
Kniphausen, Reuss (Old line), Reuss (New line), Saxony, Saxe-Altenburg,
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar, Eisenach, Schwarzburg,
Rudolfstadt-Schwarzburg, Sonderhausen, Waldeck, Wurtemburg. The
Zollverein embraces an area of 131,615 geographical square miles, with
a population of 28½ millions, being 63·08 per cent. of the whole area
of Germany as it then existed, and 64·35 per cent. of its population.
The several States entered voluntarily into the regulation.