factory.
[58] The opinion of the Attorney- and the Solicitor-General were taken
upon the point, and they admitted the article for consumption.
[59] Merchants were sometimes, however, misled. An American, who had a
smart U.S. brig, once showed a friend of mine his invoice of a cargo of
Peruvian cotton, which had reached Gibraltar from Peru. Counting his
profits on a sale in England, where he had ordered her to come, he was
wofully disappointed when told of the unlucky _third section_,
which forbade its importation. The fortune he had counted upon
realising melted away at once.
[60] Mr. Burton of Montreal, a merchant of great experience, gave it in
evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons of 1844 that the
difference of rates were as follows:—
Per barrel. Per barrel.
In 1844, from Montreal, 4_s._ 6_d._ From New York, 1_s._ 8_d._
In 1845, ” 4_s._ 8_d._ ” ” 2_s._ 0_d._
In 1846, ” 5_s._ 1½_d._ ” ” 2_s._ 6½_d._
In 1847, ” 6_s._ 0_d._ ” ” 2_s._ 0_d._
------------ ------------
Average 5_s._ 1_d._ 2_s._ 1_d._
------------ ------------
CHAPTER VI.
Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee: Mr. J. S. Lefevre,
Mr. Macgregor, Mr. G. R. Porter—Their extreme views not conclusive
to the Committee—Evidence adduced by the shipowners—Ships built
more cheaply abroad—Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young, and his general
conclusions—Mr. Richmond’s evidence—Asserts that shipping is a
losing trade—Replies to the charges against shipowners—Views
as to captains of merchant ships—Praises their nautical skill
and capacity—His character of common seamen—Attacks Mr.
Porter—Offers valuable details of ship-building—Is prepared
to go all lengths in favour of Protection—His jealousy of the
Northern Powers—Evidence of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in
London—General effect of the Navigation Laws on the Customs—With
the Northern Ports and America—Difficulty about “manufactured”
articles—Anomalies of the coasting and internal trade—Committee’s
last meeting, July 17—General dissatisfaction with the results of
the inquiry—Commercial panic and distress of 1847—Suspension of
Bank Charter Act.
[Sidenote: Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee.]
Having now laid before my readers the substance of the state of the
Navigation Laws at the time of the appointment of Mr. Ricardo’s
Committee in February 1847, I shall proceed to state generally the
principal facts put forth by the leading witnesses on the side of the
Free-traders and of the Protectionists respectively.
[Sidenote: Mr. J. S. Lefevre.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Macgregor.]
On the side of the former, Mr. John S. Lefevre, Mr. Macgregor, and
Mr. G. R. Porter, officers of the Board of Trade, and decidedly
inclined to the total repeal of the Navigation Laws, were the chief
witnesses brought forward to make out a case against the existing
system. Of these, the first—a distinguished mathematician as well as a
lawyer of sound learning—was eminently fitted to work out, calmly and
dispassionately, the intricate points connected with the complex system
then prevalent. The other two were strong partisans. Mr. Macgregor,
a somewhat superficial person, gave the most off-hand answers to
questions, though profoundly ignorant of their tendency, therein
committing the most egregious blunders, and urging many inaccuracies
about the Reciprocity Treaties, their effect on commerce, and the
injury Great Britain had sustained through her ancient Navigation Laws.
On the question of the maritime relations between this country and the
United States, Mr. Macgregor gave evidence, also, at great length, a
considerable portion of which was, however, erroneous as to matters of
fact, while many of his conclusions were fallacious.
[Sidenote: Mr. G. R. Porter.]
Mr. G. R. Porter, Secretary of the Statistical Department, and well
known as entertaining the strongest convictions that the Navigation
Laws were as injurious to the shipowners themselves as they had been
to the nation, was an industrious hard-working man, but he was at
the same time committed by many previous publications to the most
extreme opinions on Free-trade: of real practical commerce he had
no experience. Mr. Porter had, however, studied the whole question
with care, and, while enthusiastic in favour of an entire change,
and sanguine with regard to the beneficial results to follow from
the repeal of these laws, he gave strong and valid reasons for his
bold opinions. Their repeal, he showed, would tend, materially, to
develop and increase the warehousing system of Great Britain, making
it, in fact, a vast depôt for supplying the wants of the people of
all nations. Not that the existing laws presented any impediment to
warehousing goods, but that facilities would be afforded for making
advances on foreign produce by the removal of restrictions. In answer
to numerous and varied questions from those members of the Committee
who were opposed to his views, he gave a clear and decided opinion
that the trade of England had not been benefited in any one of its
branches, shipowning included, by the Navigation Laws: and he could not
for a moment admit that these laws had operated beneficially even for
the “encouragement of a commercial marine.” He rested his arguments on
the economical principle that the shipping trade of this country, as
a trade, could be conducted on no other principles than those whereby
trade, generally, was carried on; he contended that no more ships
would be built than it was expected would be required, so as to yield
a profit to the persons who built them; that, in the long run, there
could be no larger amount of profit derived from shipowning than from
any other trade, as other persons would, of course, come in to share
the profit with the existing shipowners; and that, unless shipping
yielded the ordinary rate of profit to be derived from the commerce
of the country, deficiencies in shipping from losses would not be,
from time to time, supplied. It was well known, he remarked, that
the trade of the country had gone on increasing; that, from year to
year, more ships had been built; and, further, that, though shipowners
had certainly been at times loud in their complaints and fears as to
their future prospects, they had still continually added to the amount
of their tonnage. Mr. Porter then put in the strongest light the
groundless fears they had so long entertained by quoting their Report
for 1833,[61] wherein they state that “the long-continued and still
existing depression of the shipping interest, the partial production,
and great aggravation of distress caused by continual changes in
our navigation system; the utter impossibility of the successful
maintenance of an unrestricted competition with foreign navigation; the
gross injustice of the imposition of peculiar and exclusive burdens on
maritime commerce for purposes purely national, while exposed to that
competition; the declining quality and estimation of British tonnage;
the embarrassment, decay, and ruin of the British shipowner, may now
be viewed as incontrovertible positions.” In reply to this desponding
statement, Mr. Porter directed attention to the official returns,
showing that in 1833 the amount of British tonnage on the register was
2,634,577 tons, whereas in 1846 it was no less than 3,817,112 tons,
an increase of 1,182,535 tons. So that, to the melancholy “facts” of
the shipowners in 1833, Mr. Porter opposed his prosperous “figures” of
1846. Such discordant views could not by any means be reconciled; but
shipowners of all countries and in all ages have ever had the most evil
forebodings on the subject of the withdrawal of protection.
Mr. Porter did not fail to hold out the threat that Prussia, at the
head of the Zollverein States of Germany, would still further carry out
its restrictive principles, and impose differential duties on foreign
shipping; and that Hamburg and Bremen were, at that time, deliberating
whether they should join the Zollverein under one flag, as far as
concerned shipping. He, nevertheless, expressed the most sanguine hopes
that, when foreign nations discovered beyond all doubt, that England
was advancing in the path of Free-trade, they would gladly follow her
example, and that commerce throughout the whole of Europe and the world
would be unshackled.
It appeared, further, from his evidence, that Mr. Porter was for
a complete abrogation of the English Navigation Laws, without any
reservations as to reciprocity, and that, from the general conviction
that these restrictive laws were rather injurious than beneficial to
us, independently of the policy of other nations.
[Sidenote: Their extreme views not conclusive to the Committee.]
It cannot, however, be said that, in 1847, the repeal party had
succeeded in convincing the majority of even the Committee of the
soundness of their opinions. The shipowners, as a body, endeavoured to
controvert, and with considerable show of success for the time, the
theories propounded by the Free-trade party, so strenuously supported
by the officers of the Board of Trade. The cold imperturbable evidence
of Mr. (now Sir) John Shaw Lefevre, who was intimately connected with
the Free-trade party, contrasted strikingly with the impetuosity of
such men as Mr. Macgregor, and even with the testimony of Mr. Porter.
[Sidenote: Evidence adduced by the shipowners.]
The shipowners, on the other hand, put forward their most practical and
intelligent witnesses[62] to prove that the repeal of the Navigation
Laws would cause an immediate depreciation of thirty per cent. in the
value of their property, and of shipping, generally, throughout the
United Kingdom; that, if the British shipowner were deprived of his
privileges, already greatly curtailed by the system of reciprocity,
it would be decidedly to his advantage to invest his capital in
foreign ships, and to navigate them by foreign seamen: Englishmen,
they alleged, would own, in conjunction with foreigners (if possible),
foreign ships, in order to secure the privileges still attaching to
foreign flags, since British ships would still be excluded from many
foreign ports, even though the Navigation Laws were abrogated. It was
shown, as they conceived incontestably, that a ship could be built
at Dantzig at a much less cost than in England,[63] and that, if the
foreign trade were thrown open without restriction, no one would think
of building British ships; the result being, that a great number of
persons dependent on shipping—shipwrights and others—must be thrown out
of employment, with great general distress ensuing. The difficulty of
manning the Royal Navy, under such untoward circumstances (a standard
argument), was, of course, dwelt on with great force as an unmitigated
national evil. It was further urged, that the relaxation of the laws,
so far as to allow Asiatic and African produce to be admitted to Great
Britain for home consumption from ports in Europe, in all bottoms,
must deprive the British shipowner of his most valuable privilege, and
destroy the very essence of the ancient law.
[Sidenote: Ships built more cheaply abroad.]
The argument, that these laws ought to be abrogated in the interests of
the consumer was met by the counter-assertion, that any difference of
freight, if such indeed existed, would make no appreciable difference
in the price of consumable articles. Even the excessively high freight
of 8_s._ per barrel from the United States, which had been paid
on an emergency, would, they held, amount to only one halfpenny per
pound on the flour, so that when freight was reduced to its usual rate,
a very slight increase of value was the consequence. The witnesses
against repeal spoke of various other articles[64] in a similar manner,
arguing that the reduction would be so small that it could never reach
the consumer.
[Sidenote: Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young,]
Of all the witnesses examined before the Committee, no one was more
opposed to the repeal than Mr. George Frederick Young, a shipbuilder
and shipowner in the port of London. He was quite as strong a partisan
in favour of leaving things as they were as Mr. Ricardo and Mr. Porter
were in favour of Free-trade. He would admit no further innovations of
any kind, contending, that, even the reciprocity system had been in the
highest degree detrimental to the interests of the British shipowners:
indeed, he asserted that if the Navigation Laws were repealed, it
would be seen that the interests of the merchants would be quite as
much compromised as those of shipowners, as it was under the operation
of these laws that importations were so largely directed into the
emporium of England. He apprehended that this repeal would substitute
certain conveniently-located foreign ports as depôts for imported
produce for the supply of England, in lieu of British ports. He
fortified this opinion by elaborate calculations, showing an enormous
difference in the warehousing charges at Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and
Hamburg, leading, as he apprehended, to this inevitable conclusion,
that a British merchant would find it more to his interest to establish
depôts at those places, than to import commodities for the supply of
his own country, to be lodged in the St. Katherine or West India Docks,
or in other similar establishments.
With regard to the subject of the Whale Fisheries, and the way in which
they might be affected by a repeal of the Navigation Laws, Mr. Young
pointed out that the trade of the northern and southern fisheries
had been for many years past a declining one: but this decline, he
said, though in a great degree traceable to other causes, received
an accelerated impetus from the course pursued by the Legislature in
discouraging these trades, while the Americans, on the other hand,
had received from their Legislature every possible support. So far
as regards the relative cost of navigating British ships, Mr. Young
brought forward a mass of figures[65] for the purpose of showing that
the difference in every case was in favour of foreign shipowners, but
more especially in the case of those of the United States, Holland, the
Hanse Towns, Sweden, and Prussia.
[Sidenote: and his general conclusions.]
By the various reciprocity treaties Mr. Young considered the Navigation
Laws were virtually repealed with regard to those countries with whom
we had concluded such conventions: but, while maintaining that these
treaties had proved highly prejudicial to Great Britain, he did not
recommend a retrograde policy; and we gladly admit that, whatever
opinions might be entertained of the ardent Protectionist principles
he propounded, his political adversaries bore full testimony to the
ability with which he advocated his cause during the days he was under
examination, and to the large amount of practical knowledge he brought
to bear on the subject. He displayed, too, great tact, and, I must add,
great patriotism, viewing the contemplated change in the light he did,
when he wound up his evidence by asserting, unequivocally, that the
Navigation Laws were framed for the paramount and political purpose of
assisting in the defence of this country, as well as for encouraging
maritime commerce; that these objects, in his judgment, could never
have been obtained and maintained without these great Acts; and that
he fully and completely declared his concurrence in the opinion given
by Adam Smith, which we have already quoted. “I have no hesitation in
declaring,” remarked Mr. Young, in concluding his evidence, “my perfect
conviction, that it has been, through the operation of our navigation
system entirely, that the maritime power of this country has been
raised to its present height, that the country has been defended, and
all the evils which would have resulted from its being made the seat of
war have been providentially averted.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Richmond’s evidence.]
[Sidenote: Asserts that shipping is a losing trade.]
As considerable uneasiness had been felt by those who advocated the
policy of Protection with reference to the competition which might be
anticipated from the shipping of the three Hanse Towns—Lubeck, Bremen,
and Hamburg—although on inquiry it was shown that the whole tonnage
of sea-going ships belonging to these ports was only about 150,000
tons register, it is advisable here to refer to the testimony of Mr.
William Richmond, who was deputed by the shipowners of the borough
of Tynemouth to appear before the Committee.[66] This gentleman had
been a shipowner for nearly fifty years, and, at his advanced age,
was reluctant to appear: but zeal for a cause to which he had devoted
great energy during a long life, together with the importance of the
subject, induced him to come forward to rescue, so far as he could, the
shipowners from “impending destruction.” It is unnecessary, however,
here to follow him through his elaborate history of the Navigation
Laws, but, as an exponent of the views of many shipowners in the
north of England, the points he urged most strongly ought not to be
overlooked. Strange, however, to say, his first contention was that,
for the preceding twenty-five years, the shipping trade had been a
losing one, those employed in the Baltic during the whole of that
time having made no money whatever. When, naturally, he was asked
to explain how it had come to pass that a losing trade should be so
long maintained, Mr. Richmond entered into details, which, though not
satisfying the Committee as to the whole force of his assertion, threw
considerable light on the actual state of the merchant shipping at that
period.[67]
[Sidenote: Replies to charges against the ship owners.]
It had been charged against shipowners, as we have seen,[68] that
their ships were unseaworthy, while the masters had been condemned
in no measured terms. These accusations he indignantly repelled; his
explanation as to the permanence of a losing trade being substantially
this—that a distinct class of men existed who were shipowners, and
not merchants, whose fathers had been shipowners for successive
generations, and had left them ships as their only inheritance; and
that, as they could not readily divest themselves of this property, and
had no means of buying ships of an improved description fit to compete
with vessels of more modern date,[69] their commercial career generally
ended with the Gazette.
[Sidenote: Views as to captains of merchant ships.]
With regard to the qualifications of captains of merchant vessels, Mr.
Richmond said that sixty years ago, when he went to sea, very young
in life, it was customary for respectable and even wealthy people,
in the maritime districts, to send their children to sea: indeed,
no matter whether they were shipowners or merchants, agriculturists
or manufacturers, one of the family was sent to sea, because it was
considered a line in which there was a fair chance of prospering. “But
no respectable people send their children to sea now,” he exclaimed,
“as it is a profession which, in all probability, would lead them to
beggary.”
[Sidenote: Praises their nautical skill and capacity.]
In nautical skill, Mr. Richmond held the British captain of the present
day fully equal to the captain of former days; while he, also, thought,
that the ruder the man, on his admission into the hardy profession he
was to adopt, the more advantageous it might be to him, at least in
the discharge of the rougher part of his professional duties. In the
pursuit of freights abroad, on the “seeking system,” these captains,
he admitted, might be inferior to some continental captains; but the
business of chartering a ship belonged more strictly to the shipbroker;
the captain, in his opinion, being in a relation not unlike that of the
driver of a coach.
[Sidenote: His character of common seamen.]
With regard to British seamen, he considered that they, like all other
classes, had become more temperate of late years, but were always less
a spirit-drinking people than the Germans. The bad accommodation for
the common sailor on board merchant ships might destroy his comforts,
but not his morals; and honourable testimony had been given by an
American captain,[70] that he would prefer the English seaman to any
in the world, even to Americans. Every person, he thought, must concur
with him in the opinion that our seamen were, what they had ever been,
“a danger-defying, skilful, thoughtless, improvident, and perhaps a
turbulent race:” and Mr. Richmond appealed confidently to Admiral
Dundas, who sat on the Committee, whether he would not rather go into
action with 100 British seamen than 200 seamen of any other nation?
[Sidenote: Attacks Mr. Porter.]
It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the elaborate and
curious tables[71] Mr. Richmond prepared to show that there were as
many ships as formerly, and that their increase had kept pace with the
population between 1816 and 1846. Having explained these tables, he
then, in no very measured terms, charged Mr. Porter with “cushioning,”
or covering up for an unfair comparison, the merchant navies of
surrounding nations, and especially that of the United States. He
accused that gentleman distinctly of giving unfairly all the ships
engaged in the foreign, coasting, and colonial trade of England, in
his return of British tonnage; while the ships of the United States,
engaged in the foreign trade _only_, were given in that of the
American tonnage. By these means, an attempt was made to prove that a
large mass of tonnage of foreign nations was “cushioned” up, or kept
out of sight of the English people, because it would alarm them, if
they were to see such an immense tonnage of foreign vessels rising
around them, “as the day would come when they would knock at our doors.”
[Sidenote: Offers valuable details of ship-building.]
Elaborate tables of the prices of articles used in ship-building,
furnished by Mr. Richmond, on the authority of the most competent
persons engaged in the respective branches of this trade, will be found
in his evidence; and, here it may be desirable, as a record of facts,
to give an extract from a communication from the principal agent of
Lloyd’s, which Mr. Richmond read to the Committee, in reply to a query
with reference to the cost of new first-class ships, as it appears
that sales were effected at the prices therein named.[72]
The price per ton declined 1_l._ per ton, according to the years
for which the vessel was classed; and according to the North Country
Club Rules, 3_l._ 10_s._ per ton may be added to these prices
for a Baltic outfit—that is, for a ship when ready for a Baltic voyage.
As a corollary to these prices, which were, indeed, much lower than the
London rates (bad as well as good ships being built in Sunderland),
a list was given of the shipbuilders who had failed in Sunderland
within the short period from 1841 down to 1847. The list comprised no
less than 40 names—a melancholy catalogue—many of them were men whose
fathers and grandfathers had moved in good circles: yet these men had
all failed owing to the depression of business then prevalent.
[Sidenote: Is prepared to go all lengths in favour of Protection.]
On the question of _Reciprocity_, about which there was,
subsequently, so much discussion, Mr. Richmond declared, that there
could be no prosperity in England till the Reciprocity Treaties,
as well as all the Orders in Council enforcing them, were totally
repealed. He looked with extreme jealousy at the beautiful and
well-appointed ships frequenting Newcastle from Russian and Swedish
Finland: but, he saw that no fairer class of merchant ships came to
any port; their dimensions, their rigging, everything about them
was admirable; while their commanders and officers inspired respect
from their general competency. Their log-books were beautifully kept
in English: and, from the education the younger population, who were
destined for the sea, received, no better disciplined nor more orderly
or sedate crews could be seen than on board these ships.
[Sidenote: His jealousy of the Northern Powers.]
No doubt, these northern maritime countries could be regarded in no
other light than that of formidable rivals. Therefore Mr. Richmond and
his fellow-shipowners saw with alarm any efforts made to throw open
the trade of the Empire, as the increasing success of these foreign
rivals must obviously dispossess English shipowners of an immense
portion of the carrying trade. Mr. Richmond, therefore, demanded, that
not only the Reciprocity Treaties should be annulled, but that the
law of Charles II. should be adopted, which enacted that “no goods
or commodities whatsoever of the growth, production, or manufacture
of Africa, Asia, or America, or of any part thereof, or which are
described, or laid down, in the usual maps or cards of those places,
be imported into England, Ireland, or Wales, the islands of Guernsey,
Jersey, or the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, _in any other ship or
ships_, but in such as do truly, and without fraud, belong only to
the people of England,” &c.
Such were the extreme views promulgated by many of the advocates of
Protection. Indeed, the majority of the shipowners, especially of the
eastern ports, would not have hesitated to retaliate on the vessels of
the northern nations with hostile tonnage duties. Nor was their feeling
less hostile against France, though the trade with that country was
insignificant except for the conveyance of coals; as, in all the French
contracts, it was stipulated that coal should be transported thither in
either French or English vessels. The extreme Protectionists asserted
that the Spaniards and Italians were monopolising a large portion of
the trade from Liverpool; and that American merchants, in sending an
order for goods to be executed in England, “gave special orders that
they should be shipped on board an American liner.”
[Sidenote: Evidence of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in London.]
As, however, the object of this work is rather to show the practical
working of the old Navigation Laws than to dwell on the political
opinions propounded in this controversy, it is desirable to allude
to the evidence given by Mr. Braysher, at that time the Collector of
Customs in London,[73] who stated that in the discharge of his duties
it was requisite to see that the Navigation Act was duly enforced.
[Sidenote: General effect of the Navigation Laws on the Customs.]
[Sidenote: With the Northern ports,]
Some curious results were developed in the course of his evidence
with regard to the working of these laws. Thus the second clause of
the Act relating to the trade between Europe and England gave certain
privileges in the carrying of twenty-nine “enumerated” articles, all
of which, with two exceptions, were raw materials, and, therefore,
only importable from Europe in British ships. The intention of the law
had been, originally, to permit the importation of raw materials only;
and, till recently, all manufactured goods were either positively or
virtually prohibited by the imposition of the high duties. It appeared,
however, that butter and cheese, and also the spirit named geneva,
could be imported in foreign ships, but no advantage was taken of
this privilege. The timber trade differed, as that article could be
imported in a ship of the country where it grew, or in a ship of the
country from which it was usually brought, but this privilege, with
these exceptions, was given entirely to British vessels. Nevertheless,
British ships did not generally bring timber from the Baltic ports to
England; while in the unprotected trade of butter and cheese, which was
considerable, British shipowners, by means of steamers, monopolised the
chief part of it.[74] The inference from these circumstances was drawn
that Protection had very little to do in controlling the course of
this trade. Russia was, however, an exception, as the vast proportion
of that trade was carried on by British ships; and this, necessarily,
arose from the provisions of the second clause of the Navigation Act,
because tallow, hemp, flax and pitch, the chief produce of Russia,
could only be brought in British or Russian ships; and, as there was
not a sufficient Russian mercantile marine to maintain the trade,
a virtual monopoly of it fell to British ships, partly through the
Navigation Law and partly through the relative circumstances of the
merchant marine of the two countries.
[Sidenote: and America.]
Much stress was laid on the fact that goods, the produce of “America,”
could not be brought from Europe; thus, by this clause, American cotton
once landed at Havre[76] could not be brought over for the consumption
of the manufacturers, whatever demand might exist for the article. It
was, however, proved that this clause was framed long prior to the
American independence, and, hence, had no special reference to cotton,
nor, indeed, any political tendency.
[Sidenote: Difficulty about “manufactured” articles.]
It appeared, however, unquestionable, taking the two Navigation Laws
together, the American Law and that of England, so far as the trade
between the United States and Great Britain was concerned, that we had
decidedly the worst of it. Again: the fifth clause of the Navigation
Act was the cause of much question at the Customs, and occasioned
great inconvenience; this clause ran thus: that all “manufactured”
goods shall be deemed to be the produce of the country of which they
are the “manufacture.” Thus, coffee imported at Hamburg from its place
of growth in Asia or America was roasted and ground there; but,
when merchants attempted to bring it into England as a manufactured
article, the claim was refused by the law officers of the Crown.
Again, mahogany, cut into veneers, was at first not allowed to be a
manufactured article; but this decision was afterwards reversed, and
veneers were deemed manufactures. In like manner, ostrich feathers,
brought from Africa and manufactured in France, offered a very doubtful
case, and was, in fact, left undecided, though the impression was,
on the whole, adverse to their admission. Refined sugar was deemed a
manufacture; and, thus, while _raw_ sugar, the growth of Brazil
or Cuba, could not come in from Holland, it could, when refined, be
imported. A recent Act required that refined sugar should not only be
the produce, but the growth of the country from which it was imported,
thereby causing a new difficulty, and showing that the law discouraged
the refining of sugar in Holland, and discouraged it at the place of
growth.
[Sidenote: Anomalies of coasting and internal trade.]
Again: it was shown that, from the earliest period, foreign ships which
could not carry goods from London to Plymouth, could, nevertheless,
carry passengers, as such a trade was not considered by the Customs
authorities to be trading _coastwise_. Nay, it further appeared
that foreign vessels could have engaged in the internal trade of the
country, there being no legal impediment to prevent a Dutch vessel from
plying, either with goods or passengers, between London and Gravesend.
The like principle might have prevailed on any of the rivers of the
kingdom; but a foreign vessel would not have been allowed to carry
goods from one _port_ to another. The interdiction against foreign
vessels carrying “passengers” was only inserted for the first time in
the 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88 (1845), and, previously to this period, there
was no law to prevent a foreign steamer carrying passengers between
two English ports; while, even in 1847, a vessel built in Norway could
have plied in the Thames. Foreigners, however, either were ignorant of
the law, or did not avail themselves of it, considering it a barren
advantage.
With Mr. Braysher’s evidence may be brought to a close the extracts
necessary to be given from the mass of conflicting statements and
documents laid before Mr. Ricardo’s Committee, and I may now proceed
with the general history of the measures pursued and subsequently
adopted.
[Sidenote: Committee’s last meeting, July 17.]
[Sidenote: General dissatisfaction with the results of the inquiry.]
On the 17th of July, the Committee of the House of Commons held its
last sitting; and as a dissolution of Parliament was impending, the
Committee, after having published four successive reports, strictly
confined to the minutes of the evidence taken before them, came to
the conclusion of closing the inquiry. The Protectionist shipowners
complained that this abrupt termination of the inquiry was brought
about with the view of suppressing the evidence of Mr. D. C. Aylwin,
an intelligent merchant connected with the Calcutta trade, who was
in attendance to give counter-testimony to many of the Free-trade
witnesses. It was also patent that, during the investigation, while
twenty-five witnesses had been examined in favour of the repeal of the
Navigation Laws, on the other hand, for their defence and maintenance,
only nine persons had been called to give their testimony. It was
therefore urged that the proceedings of the Committee and the abrupt
termination of the inquiry were anything but fair, the more so that no
practical results had been obtained, though the evidence procured was,
ultimately, of considerable importance.
Thus ended this important inquiry in a manner scarcely satisfactory
to either party; nor was the investigation again revived in the
committee-rooms of the House of Commons, the scene of the contest
being transferred elsewhere. On the 23rd July, 1847, Parliament was
dissolved; and at the subsequent general election the Free-trade
party was triumphant everywhere, Mr. Cardwell gaining his election at
Liverpool, while Mr. Cobden was returned in his absence for the West
Riding of Yorkshire, as well as for Stockport; Mr. C. P. Villiers,
on whose motion the Corn Laws had been repealed, being also doubly
returned for South Lancashire and Wolverhampton, both these elections
affording thereby unmistakable evidences of the feeling of the
country in favour of unfettered commerce. With so great an accession
of strength to the Whig Government, further progress in Free-trade
measures became inevitable, and the greatest uneasiness prevailed among
shipowners as to their future destiny.
[Sidenote: Commercial panic]
Though events of a calamitous character to general commerce intervened,
the shipping interest escaped, and, indeed, flourished. Beyond the
large quantities of corn necessary to import, so as to meet the urgent
wants of the famishing people of Ireland, it was found by the end of
December, 1846, that the deficiency of grain in France, Belgium, and
Germany, as well as in the south of Europe, was greater than had been
apprehended, and, consequently, prices rose throughout the Continent,
the average reaching 75_s._ per quarter in England.[77] Suddenly,
large quantities of shipping were again required to execute orders
received from France and Belgium for purchases made at advanced prices.
The alarm lest the scarcity should still further increase became
general; and, in consequence of this, together with apprehensions for
the home crops, the average price of wheat rose in May (29th), 1847,
to 102_s._ 5_d._[78] Such prices naturally led to great speculation;
while the efforts made to bring corn from the most distant regions
gave an enormous impulse to the carrying trade, both in Europe and
elsewhere.[79]
[Sidenote: and distress of 1847.]
[Sidenote: Suspension of Bank Charter Act.]
But a frightful reaction soon followed. Corn was poured into the ports
of Great Britain from all parts of the world with astonishing rapidity.
The docks of Liverpool exhibited a quantity of flour that, perhaps,
had never been, at any previous period or in any country, imported by
merchant vessels to one market. Prices fell to 56_s._ per quarter
for wheat, and heavy commercial disasters ensued. Money advanced in
value; in August and December the pressure for it increased to a
panic. The Bank rate of interest rose to 10 per cent.; and the discount
of the best paper became almost impossible. Numerous failures followed;
and as representations were made that the credit of the country itself
was seriously threatened, Government, on the 25th October, reluctantly
stepped forward to arrest further disasters, and took upon themselves
the responsibility of risking the violation of the provisions of the
Bank Charter Act of 1844; Lord Russell, as First Lord of the Treasury,
and Sir Charles Wood, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, advising the
Bank to enlarge the amount of its discounts and advances to a minimum
of 8 per cent., promising if any infringement of the law should result
that Government would secure a Bill of indemnity for the Bank on the
meeting of Parliament.
The measures taken by Government produced a salutary effect on
commercial circles; and as no actual infringement of the Bank Act of
1844 had occurred, Ministers, considering the purpose they had in view
by their letter of October 25th fully answered, intimated that it was
unnecessary any longer to continue in force this letter of relief and
indemnity.
FOOTNOTES:
[61] See ‘Report of the London Shipowners’ Society, 1833.’
[62] The chief of these was Mr. G. F. Young, who, it must be admitted,
made out a very startling, and, at the time, apparently a very strong
case against repeal, or even reciprocity; while Mr. Richmond, Mr.
W. Philippe, Mr. W. Imrie of Liverpool, Mr. Duncan Dunbar, Mr. J.
Macqueen, and others, brought forward an immense array of facts in
support of their allegations.
[63] It was stated that a vessel built in Dantzig, according to the
following detailed specification, would cost 10_l._ 17_s._ 6_d._ per
ton, and in the United States 12_l._ per ton; but that a similar vessel
could not be produced in any part of Great Britain under 15_l._ per
ton. Say 757 tons, and first class: length on deck, 140 feet; length
of keel, 129 feet; breadth of beam, 32 feet; depth of hold, 22 feet;
height of ’tween decks laid, 7 feet; the frame to be of oak; bottom
planking to the bilge, elm; topsides, wales, &c., pine; ceiling, pine;
to have a top-gallant forecastle, fitted for the accommodation of the
crew; round house aft, fitted for the accommodation of the captain and
officers; the deck otherwise flush; single bulwarks and monkey-rail;
patent windlass; caboose fitted with cooking stove; small capstan in
the forecastle; a small capstan abaft the mainmast; three anchors; two
chain cables of 120 fathoms each; masts, spars, studding-sail booms,
and spare spars complete; patent fids and tressels; roller blocks;
one long boat; one cutter; one gig with oars, &c., complete, copper
fastened to the wales; ship rigged; cordage standing and running
rigging complete; two hawsers; two suits of sails complete; the ship
to be fastened with iron hanging-knees from the upper deck, and with
diagonal iron knees from lower-deck beams to the bilge; patent pumps on
deck, and also bilge pumps; all the timber, cordage, sail-cloth, and
ironwork, to be of the best materials.
[64] It was contended that as the whole freight of sugar was only
3_l._ per ton from the West Indies or Cuba, equal to one-third
of a penny per lb., while the duty was 14_s._ per cwt., or
1½_d._ per lb., any reduction in the freight could not reach
the consumer. Such was, also, the case with other articles of large
consumption. The average freight of tea was 4_l._ 15_s._
per ton, of 50 cubic feet, equal to 1-5/10_d._ per lb., the duty
2_s._ 2_d._ per lb. The average freight on tobacco from New
Orleans had been 50_s._ per hogshead, or equal to 7/15ths of a
penny per lb.; from Virginia, 35_s._ per hogshead, or one-third
of a penny per lb.; the duty being 3_s._ per lb. Taking flour
from the United States at 4_s._ per barrel, freight would be a
farthing a lb. The freight upon indigo at 4_l._ 15_s._ per
ton, of 50 cubic feet, would be equal to 11/16 a lb. The freight on
coffee at 4_l._ per ton is equal to about one-third of a penny
per lb., the duty on foreign being 6_d._, and on coffee from
the British possessions 4_d._ per lb. On cotton the average
freight for the previous ten years from Bombay, 3_l._ 5_s._
4_d._ per ton, of 50 cubic feet, which is equivalent to 7/16ths
of a penny per lb.; from the United States it was estimated at 5/8ths
of a penny per lb. At these rates, it was urged that it would require
a microscopic coinage to secure it to the consumer; it would all be
absorbed. Supposing the freight to be reduced one-third, below which
no British shipowner could live, leaving a fair freight to pay for the
expenses of the ship, and a small profit, and supposing the freight to
be so reduced from the foreigner sailing cheaper than we could, it was
contended that no benefit could result to the consumer: on the other
hand, by its retention, you retain, also, that which it is of the most
vital interest for any country to retain, its national defences.
[65] Taking a hypothetical calculation of the result of a voyage of
twelve months’ duration of a British ship of 500 tons, and of a ship of
equal tonnage of the above-mentioned nations respectively, and taking
the items of wages, insurance, interest on capital, calculated at 5
per cent., and depreciation of the property, which experience warrants
at 10 per cent. per annum, the total amount of those items, on a ship
of 500 tons built in England, and costing 8750_l._, would be
2623_l._ 10_s._ on such a voyage; on a ship of the United
States, costing, as estimated, 7250_l._, it would be 2191_l._
10_s._; that on a Dutch ship, costing 7000_l._, it would be
2110_l._; that on a Bremen ship, costing 5500_l._, it would
be 1626_l._; that on a Swedish ship, costing the same amount,
it would be 1550_l._; and that on a Prussian ship, costing
4720_l._, it would be 1329_l._; making a difference in favour
of an American ship of 432_l._; of a Dutch ship of 513_l._ 10_s._; of
a Bremen ship of 997_l._ 10_s._; of a Swedish ship of 1073_l._ 10_s._;
and of a Prussian ship of 1294_l._ 10_s._ These gross disbursements
resolved into their elements, as regards wages, stood thus. The
wages on a British ship were calculated at 786_l._; the wages of an
American ship of the same size, viz., 500 tons, 669_l._; in a Dutch
ship, 640_l._; in a Bremen ship, 471_l._; in a Swedish ship, 395_l._;
and in a Prussian ship, 331_l._ 10_s._ The items of these wages, as
regards British ships, were, an English captain, 10_l._ a month [that
is the amount of wages, but the emoluments of a British captain would
be very much more than that]; chief mate, 6_l._ per month; second
mate, 4_l._ per month; boatswain, 3_l._ 10_s._ per month; carpenter,
5_l._ per month; cook, 2_l._ 10_s._; nine able seamen, at 45_s._ each,
20_l._ 5_s._; eight ordinary seamen, at 30_s._ each, 12_l._; and three
apprentices, at 15_s._ each, 2_l._ 5_s._; making a monthly amount of
65_l._ 10_s._, which multiplied by 12, gives the amount stated, 786_l._
[66] Mr. Colquhoun, now Sir Patrick Colquhoun, Q.C., at one time
Plenipotentiary of the Hanse Towns at Constantinople, also gave
evidence (see 3980, &c.); but, from a point of view entirely different
from that of Mr. Richmond. The Hanse Towns, as carriers for the
large continent of Germany, were naturally opposed to a system which
circumvented their sphere of action, while Holland took the opposite
view.
[67] Mr. Richmond was one of my constituents when I represented the
Borough of Tynemouth, and, though he strongly opposed my return to
Parliament, I have a pleasing recollection of him as a courteous man,
and a fine specimen of the old school of Protectionists. In reply to
a question of how it was that, in spite of such gloom and ruin, the
shipowners of that borough continued to build more vessels, he replied,
“Sir, do not you know that _Hope_ is the last thing that forsakes
the human breast?”
[68] See _ante_, p. 42-8, Reports from their Consuls.
[69] Evidence of Captain Briggs.
[70] Evidence of Captain Briggs.
[71] These tables occupy much space. _Vide_ ‘Report,’ p. 690.
House of Commons Inquiry.
[72]
Per Ton.
£ _s._
A ship 12 years, A 1 Class, 300 tons old measure, }
built complete, sold for } 12 12
” 10 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 10 10
” 9 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 9 0
” 8 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 8 0
” 7 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 7 0
” 6 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 6 0
[73] _Vide_ Evidence of Mr. Braysher, 2297.
[74] It followed from the system, that there was coincidently a
protected trade and an unprotected trade. The _protected_ trade
included in 1847 the whole coast of Africa and Cape of Good Hope, St.
Helena and Ascension, Mauritius, British India, the British North
American Colonies, the Australian Colonies, the British West Indies,
the Fisheries, and the Channel Islands. The _unprotected_ trade
included Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Prussia, Germany, Holland,
Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Gibraltar and Malta[75],
Turkey, the Morea and Egypt, Tripoli, Barbary and Marocco, China,
Sumatra and Java, the foreign West Indies, the United States of
America, Mexico and the States of South America, the Ionian Islands,
the Cape de Verde and the South Sea Islands. In these two categories,
protected and unprotected, the whole of the British trade was then
comprehended.
[75] Gibraltar and Malta, although colonies of the British Crown, were
considered as not in Europe, or foreign countries, with reference to
the Navigation Laws, and our Customs Regulations.
[76] On April 3, 1848, Mr. Bright urged on Mr. Labouchere the propriety
of importing cotton from Havre, then abundant there; but he replied
that the Minister could not abrogate the Navigation Laws; Hansard, vol.
xvii. p. 1202.
[77] See Tooke’s ‘History of Prices,’ vol. v. p. 95.
[78] Mr. Tooke says in a note that the highest price in Mark Lane had
been reached on the 17th May, when 115_s._ per quarter was paid
for wheat; a very fine parcel was sold in the Uxbridge Market, at
125_s._
[79] The total quantity of grain imported of all kinds into this
country was 3,790,957 quarters in 1846; but the total imports in
1847 reached 9,436,677 quarters, while the imports of meal and
flour in these two years amounted to 3,347,565, and 8,633,991 cwts.
respectively. That year my firm alone (W. S. Lindsay and Co.)
chartered, in their capacity as shipbrokers, vessels to bring from
the Black Sea, Egypt, America, and elsewhere, no less than 1,250,000
quarters of grain of different sorts.
CHAPTER VII.
New Parliament, November 18, 1847—Speech from Throne—Mr. Robinson
and Shipowners deceived—Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord
Palmerston—Mr. Bancroft’s declaration—Official letter from Mr.
Bancroft to Lord Palmerston, November 3, 1847—Lord Palmerston’s
reply, November 17, practically giving prior information to the
Americans—Lord Clarendon tells the Shipowners’ Society that the
laws will not be altered, December 26, 1846; and repeats this
assurance, March 15, 1847—Interview between Lord Palmerston and
Mr. Bancroft, published in ‘Washington Union’—Excites great
indignation when known in England, January 1848—Parliament
re-assembles, February 3, 1848—Lord Palmerston admits the
correspondence with America—The Earl of Hardwicke’s proposal,
February 25, 1848—Earl Grey grants a Committee—Evidence of
the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee—Mr. Young proposes
some modifications, the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal
Party—Claim in favour of direct voyages—Government insists
on Total Repeal—Detailed views of Admiral Sir George Byam
Martin—Importance of keeping up the merchant navy—Arguments
from his personal experience as to its value as a nursery
for seamen—Working of the system of apprenticeship, and of
impressment—Evidence of Admiral Berkeley, and of Mr. R. B.
Minturn—Details about American ships—Reciprocity treaties so far
as they affect Americans—Their whale fishery.
[Sidenote: New Parliament, November 18, 1847.]
On the 18th of November, 1847, the new Parliament was opened by
commission. It had been thus early called together to consider the
distress caused by the recent commercial embarrassments and the severe
pressure still prevailing in Ireland, notwithstanding an abundant
harvest, together with the importation of an unprecedented quantity of
grain, flour, and provisions.
[Sidenote: Speech from Throne.]
The Speaker having been chosen, the Speech from the Throne, delivered
by the Marquess of Lansdowne, contained the following important
paragraph:—“Her Majesty recommends to the consideration of Parliament
the laws which regulate the navigation of the United Kingdom, with a
view to ascertain whether any changes can be adopted which, without
danger to our maritime strength, may promote the commercial and
colonial interests of the empire.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Robinson and Shipowners deceived.]
The guarded terms in which this paragraph was couched lulled the
suspicions of some of the leaders of the Protectionist party. Mr.
Robinson, a merchant connected with the Newfoundland trade, and an
influential member of Lloyd’s, was, at that time, in Parliament for the
borough of Poole. On the debate on the Address, he said, “_that with
respect to the Navigation Laws, he had looked with much attention to
the precise words in her Majesty’s Speech on this subject, and he did
not object to them_. He did not object to inquiry into those laws,
with a view to consider any or what relaxation or modification might be
made applicable to the existing state of things, and the maintenance of
the maritime interests of Great Britain and her dependencies.”
[Sidenote: Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord Palmerston.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Bancroft’s declaration.]
But though Mr. Robinson and the party of whose views he was then the
exponent may have deluded themselves into a belief that Government
had no intention of bringing any measure into Parliament for the
abrogation of the Navigation Laws, it is, now, beyond doubt that
the administration of Lord Russell, whatever might have been his
Lordship’s individual opinions, had resolved to introduce and support,
with all its power, a very sweeping measure. In the autumn of 1847 the
American Minister put himself in communication and had interviews with
Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at which Mr.
Labouchere was present.[80] On one of these occasions, Mr. Bancroft
informed them that the American Government, believing it was the
disposition of Parliament to make a large and liberal alteration in the
Navigation Laws, was anxious to co-operate with the English Ministers
in that great work, and, in conjunction with them, to set an example
which he hoped would be productive of important and salutary effects.
Mr. Bancroft’s language was singularly expressive and emphatic. In one
of the interviews he said to the English Ministers: “We are ready to
do anything you like; if you can do but little, we must do little; if
you can do much, we will do much; IF YOU SHALL DO ALL, WE SHALL DO
ALL.”[81]
This important declaration (whether or not Mr. Bancroft had any
authority for making it in all its fulness) became at a future period
the subject of incessant comment and controversy. It is important,
therefore, that the facts, as they occurred, should be clearly
stated. There can be no doubt that this conversation took place in
the month of October 1847, but what Mr. Bancroft meant must probably
ever remain a matter of conjecture. If, however, language is of any
value in conveying the views or intention of the person who speaks,
it may fairly be presumed that the _positive_ expression “little”
had reference to the carriage of European produce, indifferently, in
either American or British ships to the ports of the United States,
and the general produce of the world from American ports in the like
manner to ports of Great Britain. The equivalent the Americans could
give in return for the _comparative_ “much,” presuming this to mean
unrestricted trade with British colonies, is difficult to conjecture;
seeing that the Americans have no colonies, and, in point of fact, no
equivalent whatever to give. As regards the _superlative_ “_all_, in
return for _all_,” it could only have had reference to the coasting
trade so jealously guarded at that time by _both_ countries; and,
in the sequel, it will be evident how far this magnanimous offer
corresponded with the tenacious policy then and to this day adhered to
by the United States Government.
Lord Palmerston, entertaining a strong feeling in favour of the repeal
of the Navigation Laws, at once perceived what use could be made of the
concurrence of the United States Government in a LARGE measure
of reform. He accordingly requested Mr. Bancroft to put his views in a
formal communication, which was done as follows:—
[Sidenote: Official letter from Mr. Bancroft to Lord Palmerston,
November 3, 1847.]
“American Legation, 3rd November, 1847.
“The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America, has the honour to inquire of
Viscount Palmerston, her British Majesty’s Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, if her Majesty’s Government is inclined
to remove existing restrictions on international commerce.
“_Universal reciprocity, in the widest sense_, is held by
the American Government as the only thoroughly appropriate basis
for intercourse between two great nations. The prohibition of the
indirect trade has but restrained enterprise: it has done good to
neither country. To abrogate it would at once set free dormant
commercial wealth without injuring any one.
“Should her Majesty’s Government entertain similar views, the
undersigned is prepared on the part of the American Government to
propose that British ships may trade from any port of the world to
any port in the United States, and be received, protected, and,
in respect to charges and duties, be treated like American ships,
if, reciprocally, American ships may in like manner trade from any
port in the world to any port under the dominion of her British
Majesty.
“The removal of commercial restrictions, while it would be of
mutual advantage to the material interests of both countries,
could not but give openings to still further relations of amity
between them, and, by its influence on the intercourse of nations,
create new guarantees for the peace of the world.
“The undersigned, &c.
(Signed) “GEORGE BANCROFT.”
The following reply was given by Lord Palmerston:—
[Sidenote: Lord Palmerston’s reply, November 17,]
“Foreign Office, 17th November, 1847.
“SIR,
“I have lost no time in communicating to my colleagues your note
of the 3rd inst. on the subject of the Navigation Laws which
regulate the commerce of the British Empire and that of the United
States with each other.
“This question has already engaged the serious attention of
her Majesty’s Ministers, and we observe with pleasure that the
sentiments we entertain with regard to it are shared by the
Government of a country, with which we are so closely united by
the ties of an extensive commerce and of a common origin.
“We do not, however, think that we should be justified in advising
the Crown to enter into an engagement which would be at variance
with some of the most important principles of the existing
Navigation Law without the previous sanction of Parliament; but
it is our intention to propose to Parliament, without unnecessary
delay, measures which would enable us to place our commercial
intercourse in regard to the matters to which your note refers
on the most liberal and comprehensive basis with respect to all
countries which shall be willing to act in a corresponding spirit
towards us.
(Signed) “PALMERSTON.”[82]
[Sidenote: practically giving prior information to the Americans.]
[Sidenote: Lord Clarendon tells Shipowners’ Society that the laws will
not be altered, December 26, 1846, and repeats this assurance, March
15, 1847.]
It thus appears that the English Ministers communicated their
intentions formally and explicitly to the American Government, and,
through that Government to the American people, a day before they
chose to inform the English Parliament and the nation, somewhat
vaguely, in the Queen’s Speech, of the course they might, eventually,
be led to pursue. A year previously, on the 21st of December, 1846,
the Shipowners’ Society of London had had an interview with Lord
Clarendon at the Board of Trade. On that occasion, as appears from the
Minutes of the Society, they were graciously received, and assured in
distinct language, that no intention was entertained on the part of
her Majesty’s Government of making any alteration in these laws. Three
months later, on the 15th March, 1847, these gentlemen, entertaining
a feeling of mistrust in the then governing powers, went again to the
Board of Trade and asked the same question, and were once more assured
that there was no intention on the part of Government to interfere with
the fundamental principles of the Navigation Laws; that an individual
member, Mr. Ricardo, had indeed mooted the subject of a committee,
which Government could not refuse, but that the committee should be
a fair one, with Mr. Milner Gibson[83] as chairman, as they were
desirous to give satisfaction to all parties interested. So far no
intention was expressed of tampering with these laws; and we have seen
that Mr. Robinson, on scrutinising the terms of the Queen’s Speech in
November, acquiesced in its propriety, no suspicion having entered his
mind, that, already, these laws were foredoomed by Ministers, still
less that, the very day before Parliament met, they had communicated
their intentions to a foreign maritime Power—a nation, too, which, at
that moment, was straining every nerve to wrest from us the supremacy
of the ocean. Under such circumstances as these, the following article,
first published in the ‘Washington Union,’[84] created intense
astonishment. Nor is it surprising that it should have done so:—
[Sidenote: Interview between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Bancroft published
in ‘Washington Union.’]
“_Repeal of the Navigation Laws._—A correspondence has taken place
between the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs and our Minister
at that Court relative to the repeal of the Navigation Laws of Great
Britain. Mr. Bancroft applied to Viscount Palmerston early in November
to learn whether Ministers would consent to establish with the United
States a perfect system of reciprocity, in making all vessels of
either country, fitting out from any port of the world, free to trade
to any port of the other nation, whether home or colonial. Viscount
Palmerston, after the lapse of some weeks (_it was just fourteen
days_), replied that, although her Majesty’s Ministers did not feel
at liberty to advise her Majesty at once to make such a change in the
commercial system as was asked by Mr. Bancroft without the consent of
Parliament, yet as soon as that body should meet, a measure would be
introduced which would embrace all the views put forth by Mr. Bancroft
in his note. It is not doubted that Parliament will at once act
favourably on the Bill. The importance to the United States of such a
measure can scarcely be exaggerated. The British colonial system has
been a most grievous restriction on our commerce, and its annihilation,
as promised by Lord Palmerston, will open to our enterprising merchants
the lucrative trade of the East and West Indies, and of the other
British settlements from which they have been hitherto debarred.
This will be the greatest stride yet taken by Free-trade: and it is
_not to be doubted that all Europe will follow the example of Great
Britain_! The liberal commercial treaty made by Hanover with the
United States has been in no small degree instrumental in disposing
the British Government to this wise measure. The Rhine provinces have
recently imitated the example of Hanover towards the United States; and
everywhere silently but steadily our commercial relations are being put
upon the most advantageous footing. The repeal by Great Britain of the
laws restricting the trade of the United States with her colonies will
be far more beneficial to this country than any commercial treaty ever
made by our Government.”
Such was the announcement put forth in the American journals
semi-officially, and the reader will judge how far this “puff direct”
of the American executive was borne out by facts, or the dates and
tenor of the correspondence given between the American Minister in
England and the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The
spirit of the most perfect liberality, and, I must add, _complete
reciprocity_, seemed to pervade all Mr. Bancroft’s professions
when communicating with Lord Palmerston and Mr. Labouchere, promising
“little, much, and all,” according as the same could be obtained from
Parliament. In his special despatch, he described the concessions his
Government was prepared to grant, as universal reciprocity in its
widest sense, which, if it meant anything at all, meant the opening to
our ships of their extensive coasting trade in return for the opening
of our still more extensive colonial trade to the ships of the United
States; or, if such was not his meaning, it meant that, _when_ we
opened our coasting trade, they would do so likewise. But the latter
portion of his despatch, and the semi-official announcement in the
‘Washington Union,’ contain, in other respects, many vague generalities
and, as subsequently appeared, the Government of the United States
never had any intention of opening its coasting trade to the ships of
Great Britain.
[Sidenote: Excites great indignation when known in England, January
1848.]
When the correspondence transpired in January 1848, it created great
astonishment, if not alarm and indignation, throughout the country,
especially among shipowners and all persons who considered that their
best interests were interwoven with the maintenance of the Navigation
Laws. The Conservative press loudly reproached Lord Palmerston for
having made known the intentions of Government with regard to this
important measure to the American Minister before communicating them to
Parliament; nor could the Liberals approve of the course that had been
adopted.
[Sidenote: Parliament re-assembles on February 3, 1848.]
[Sidenote: Lord Palmerston admits the correspondence with. America.]
On the evening of the 3rd February, 1848, the day of the re-assembling
of Parliament, there was considerable excitement in the House of
Commons, and, amidst it, Mr. Robinson asked the Foreign Minister
whether any correspondence or communication had taken place between him
and the Minister of the United States about the Navigation Laws; and,
if so, whether he would lay it upon the table? Lord Palmerston, with
the ready tact for which he was distinguished, and with the smiling
coolness so characteristic of him, especially in times of excitement,
at once and frankly avowed that there had been such a correspondence;
looking, with a twinkle in his eye and a smile on his lip, at Mr.
Robinson, as if to inquire in turn, and “if there has been, what is
there to make such a fuss about?” adding that the correspondence would,
at once, be laid on the table.
This announcement, perhaps more from the manner in which it was made
than from the fact accompanying it, that Ministers intended immediately
to submit to Parliament a proposition on the subject, quieted the
House, but, at the same time, awakened the shipowners out of doors to
what they considered their dangerous situation. They felt conscious
that, in the House of Commons, a Free-trade majority would sanction any
measure the Government might have the courage to propose. On the other
hand, in the House of Lords, where popular passions prevailed less,
they hoped to find a less prejudiced tribunal; hence, they prudently
resolved to change the “venue,” and to appeal to the Upper House for
the perpetuation of Protection. With this view they selected Lord
Hardwicke as their mouthpiece and champion; and, in order to complete
the inquiry commenced by the Lower House in the preceding session,
resolved to move the appointment of a Committee of the Lords to inquire
into the policy and operation of the Navigation Laws; the shipowners
being sanguine that there, at least, they would be able to make out a
satisfactory case, and counteract the one-sided evidence they conceived
had been given by the repeal party before the Committee of the Commons.
[Sidenote: The Earl of Hardwicke’s proposal, February 25, 1848.]
Accordingly Lord Hardwicke on the 25th February, pursuant to notice,
moved the appointment of a Select Committee of the Lords.[85]
Recapitulating in his speech the events of the preceding year, and,
dwelling in terms of indignation on the dissimulation which, he said,
had been practised, he charged Ministers with having deceived the
country; and stigmatised the whole evidence before the Committee of the
Commons as one-sided and unfair. He complained that a distinguished
officer of the Royal Navy, Sir James Stirling, had given his evidence
in favour of the abolition of the Navigation Laws; but that, before he
could be cross-examined, the Committee were informed, that the duty of
the gallant officer required his absence, and that he had sailed from
England. His Lordship then entered into numerous details, pronouncing
Mr. Porter’s evidence to be false; he, and the statistical officers of
the Board of Trade, “being learned in that description of theory which
was so popular now-a-days;” whereby forty-seven vessels of 7101 tons,
which had, in 1846, entered inwards from French ports, were converted,
by multiplying the number of entries inwards, into 228,186 tons, and
by treating the clearances outwards in a similar manner magnified to
such an extent that they represented 556,824 tons; while the _Prince
Ernest_, a passenger and mail boat, employed between Calais and
Dover, of 145 tons, figured in the Custom House returns as 24,215 tons
of British shipping![86]
[Sidenote: Earl Grey grants a Committee.]
Earl Grey, in granting the committee, took care to express an opinion,
that no further inquiry was necessary. He defended the course taken by
his colleague, Lord Palmerston, contending that no understanding had
been come to with the Government of the United States with regard to
the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and that the correspondence implied
nothing more, than that a mutual relaxation of existing restrictions
would be beneficial to the maritime commerce of both countries: he
concluded by defending Mr. Porter’s returns, and added, that “their
Lordships would find that, on strict examination, the allegations of
falseness would vanish altogether.”
[Sidenote: Evidence of the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee.]
The contest being thus transferred for the time to a Committee of the
Lords, the shipowners feeling sure of success before this tribunal,
brought forward a large amount of evidence, much of which was
instructive, though somewhat conflicting. Mr. G. F. Young, who again
took the leading part, insisted that if foreign ships were allowed to
trade indiscriminately with British possessions, and took part in the
indirect trade with foreign countries, it would be impossible that
British ships could obtain an equivalent, because by far the greater
proportion of foreign States do not possess any colonies. But, even
if they had anything to offer in return, he had little faith in
“reciprocity;” because every nation, _except England_, appears
to exhibit, with respect to its maritime commerce, an intense feeling
of nationality, and a fixed determination to support its commercial
marine. Sweden, he said, admits any article used in the construction
and equipment of Swedish-built ships duty free, and remits to such
vessels, for the first year after they are built, the export duties on
goods charged to others. Russia adopted a somewhat similar policy by
exempting all vessels built in that country from the payment of her
port-charges, for the first three years after they were launched. But
Mr. Young failed to see that, while all such concessions as these must
be made good by extra taxes on the people of the respective countries,
they were at the same time prejudicial to their own shipping, in that
they encouraged the production of cheap and inferior vessels.
Numerous arguments of a similar character were adduced, some based on
facts, others on conjectures; and not a few adverted to heavy losses
the British shipowner contemplated from causes which never had and
never could have any real existence. Prussia, for instance, he said,
confines the trade in the importation of salt to her own ships, which
was true; America, invariably, gave the preference to her own ships, a
statement either conjectural or, in some degree, supported by the fact
that her merchants often found it to their interest as traders, and,
not through any feeling of “intense nationality,” to employ on certain
trades their own ships in preference to those of any other nation.
He further alleged that British shipowners would be irretrievably
ruined by the admission of foreign ships, an assertion, of course,
speculative, or purely imaginary. While maintaining that the evils
of the Navigation Laws had been greatly overrated, he thought the
advantages of these restrictive laws were equally exaggerated. He,
however, attached the very greatest importance to the “Long Voyage
clause,” considering that it was far from clear that the interests of
the country required its repeal, or that it could be safely repealed
without the most injurious consequences to British navigation; in a
word, he thought no other clause in the Navigation Act so essential to
the maintenance of British navigation.
[Sidenote: Mr. Young proposes some modifications,]
He could not, however, fail to see that the impossibility of bringing
American cotton from Havre, cochineal from Teneriffe, or hides from
Buenos Ayres (about which great complaints had been raised), occasioned
great inconvenience. The cochineal from Teneriffe was no doubt, as
explained elsewhere, absurdly exaggerated as a grievance, but it
involved other articles, and could not be maintained on principle.
Mr. Young, therefore, to remedy this evil, suggested a modification
of the third clause of the Navigation Act, by introducing some words
with respect to the produce of distant quarters of the world, as that
which regulated by the second clause the importations from Europe;
namely, by the limitation of the restriction to certain articles to
be specifically enumerated; the enumerated articles being made to
comprise all those bulky commodities, the retention of the importation
of which to British shipping was of the last importance, while
the surrender of the remainder would not materially affect British
maritime commerce, and ought therefore, in his opinion, to be conceded
to general convenience. The effect of this would be to exclude from
the restriction such minor articles as are not the staple produce of
those countries, and which, though not entering largely into British
consumption, might occasionally be required as part of assorted
cargoes. Another relaxation Mr. Young proposed, guarding himself,
however, by stating that he had no authority to do so from any
constituted body of shipowners, was to introduce in like manner, in
perfect accordance with the general principle of the Navigation Laws,
a permission to import the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, not
only from the country of production, but, from the country within those
distant parts of the world in which the produce might be found. Under
such a regulation, he explained that if it should happen that the hides
of Buenos Ayres were found at New York, it would enable those hides to
be imported into England either in British ships or in American ships;
and it would enable tea, the produce of China, in like manner to be
imported from New York, or any part of Asia, Africa, or America.
[Sidenote: the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal party.]
This was, perhaps, the first concession which the anti-repeal party
had made with regard to the Navigation Laws. They vainly thought it
would tend to settle the whole question. They saw that the relaxation
proposed, if fully carried out, while meeting many of the cases of real
grievance complained of by commission merchants, would practically
retain most important advantages they would never consent to
relinquish, but which they would as certainly lose if they were to
allow the importation of goods, the produce of distant quarters of the
globe, in foreign ships direct into Great Britain from the place of
production.
This modification of the Navigation Laws was, doubtless, important, and
was said to be in strict harmony with the principle then regulating the
importation of goods from the various countries of Europe, which, in
1825, was permitted by Mr. Huskisson to be made from the place where
found, the earlier restriction having been that the importation must be
from the place of production.
The shipowners would still have retained to British shipping the
advantage of the direct voyage, which was, after all, their great
point. In consenting to the plan, they urged that, in the end, the
interest of the consumer would be equally secured with that of the
shipowner, by giving that encouragement afforded by the Navigation Act
to direct rather than indirect importation. The opponents of repeal
exhibited great alarm lest, if indirect importations were permitted,
these would take place from distant ports of the world into the nearer
ports of Europe, and be there warehoused: and they expressed the
fear that the people of this country would then consume considerable
proportions of the productions of tropical climates, burdened with
the expenses of previous importation into the ports of continental
nations, in addition to what was then paid under the limited direct
importation!! It was only, he said, with the view of remedying palpable
absurdities, such as that of the hides brought from Buenos Ayres to
Hamburg, that Mr. Young suggested a modification of the existing law,
which he thought would not merely meet that case, but also remove the
greater part of the inconveniences complained of arising from the
operation of the Navigation Laws.
[Sidenote: Government insists on Total Repeal.]
But these concessions were not sufficient for the requirements of
Government. They, or rather the Free-trade party, which had by this
time greatly increased in power and influence, had long felt that
the principle on which the Navigation Laws were framed was entirely
wrong, and consequently, that they could not accept any modification
short of total and unconditional repeal. But they knew, also, they
had still a powerful party to contend against, and that it was
necessary to fortify their opinions by as strong an array of facts
as could be collected. These were not, however, easily obtainable;
nor could the advantages derivable from free navigation be proved by
experience. No nation as yet had put this to the test; and, in fact,
experience would hitherto have shown that the experiment of throwing
open British ports to vessels of all nations, so that they might
enter and depart, unconditionally, would have been alike unwise and
dangerous. Nevertheless, Government felt its views to be sound, and
that the change contemplated would benefit shipowners as well as the
nation, but, in the absence of facts, experience alone could support
the opinions thus formed and used as arguments in favour of the
Government policy. The inferiority, in many respects, of the masters
of our merchant ships, compared with those of other nations, which
competition, they said, would improve, as well as the vessels under
their charge, was one of their strongest points.
But Government had to meet many other arguments on which no experience
existed; and, not the least of these was the question of manning the
navy, embracing the all-important one of the maintenance of the British
fleet.
[Sidenote: Detailed views of Admiral Sir George Byam Martin.]
Among other witnesses who came before the Lords’ Committee, Admiral Sir
George Byam Martin was a stout advocate for upholding the Navigation
Laws. He contended that these laws gave encouragement to the British
shipowner by exclusive advantages in the colonial and coasting trade,
which he regarded as a compensation for the obligation of building
his ships in some parts of the Queen’s dominions, and of employing a
certain number of apprentices. If manufacturers really felt that these
laws in any degree cramped their commercial enterprise, they ought
also, he thought, to be content to yield somewhat for the maintenance
of a service to which they all owed their protection and safety. The
Admiral held that the Navigation Laws gave protection to British
seamen, by securing to them employment in a calling for which they
qualified themselves by a long and severe apprenticeship. There were
only, he said, four main objects presented to the shipowner to give him
hope of a satisfactory competition with the cheap carriers of other
countries:
1st. That by the abrogation of the Navigation Laws he would be left at
liberty to build his ships in cheap foreign countries.
2ndly. That he would be allowed to take foreign seamen, without
limitation of number.
3rdly. That he would no longer be compelled to take apprentices; and
4thly. As a further temptation to the shipowner to be reconciled to the
change, his men would no longer be liable to impressment.
None, however, of these points could, in the opinion of Admiral Martin,
be conceded without loss to the public service.
If the abrogation of the Navigation Laws left the shipowner at liberty
to build his ships in foreign countries, and he availed himself of
that licence, it would inevitably diminish the shipwright class in
this kingdom; yet on this class, the admiral argued, the safety of
England had greatly depended during the late and former wars, and this
he thought would be even more the case in any future wars in which the
country may be plunged.
“During the war which ended in 1815, we had,” remarked the admiral,
“800 pennants flying, and even so many as 900 ships were in commission
for a considerable time. Great exertions were necessary on the part of
the shipwrights to keep up the repairs of such a fleet, and to build
new ships to supply the decay and the casualties constantly going on.
But numerous as our fleet was then, it was likely to be on a much
larger scale hereafter; for, in addition to our usual fleets, there
must, of necessity, be an immense number of steamers in a great measure
as an addition, though not as a substitute for sailing ships.”[87]
The number of shipwrights in the King’s yards throughout the war, he
estimated, might be taken at an average of 3714 and 875 apprentices,
making a total of 4589 working shipwrights, besides 550 in the
colonial yards. Notwithstanding this great shipwright strength, and
the efforts exacted from them, the Admiralty was obliged to seek every
possible assistance from the private shipbuilders,[88] and to these
persons Admiral Martin maintained protection was due, considering how
much they had done for the country when we had enemies to deal with in
every quarter.
I need not dwell upon all the other points of Admiral Martin’s
evidence; but that which relates to the merchant service and manning
the navy must not be omitted.
[Sidenote: Importance of keeping up the merchant navy.]
[Sidenote: Arguments from his personal experience as to its value as a
nursery for seamen.]
If the Navigation Laws were done away, Admiral Martin believed, the
shipowner who would go to foreign countries for cheap ships would,
from the same motive, take foreign seamen, such as Danes, Swedes,
Norwegians, or Dutchmen, who would be content with small wages and a
cheap scale of dietary. In this way, a large number of British seamen
would be deprived of the employment they now enjoyed owing mainly
to the Navigation Laws; and, in such a case, the naval service must
suffer in proportion, especially, when, in time of war, seamen are
most urgently required. It had been said, and it was a “marvellous
assertion,” that the merchant service contributes so little towards the
supply of the navy—that, so far as concerned this point, there need be
no hesitation in abandoning the Navigation Laws. An assertion more
completely contradicted by all experience, Admiral Martin confidently
stated, had never been uttered. The merchant service, he held, was
everything to the navy, while the navy, he was convinced, could not
exist without it. He was unable, adequately, to express his surprise at
these loose assertions, for every person who remembered the muster of
the navy immediately preceding the war in 1793, could not fail to know
that the glorious victory of the 1st of June, 1794, under Lord Howe,
was gained by the merchant seamen of the kingdom. We had not then, he
said, 20,000 men, and these were scattered over the globe when the
war broke out; it was, therefore, the merchant service that enabled
us rapidly to man some sixty sail of the line, and double that number
of frigates and smaller vessels. By promptly bringing together about
35,000 or 40,000 seamen of the mercantile marine, Admiral Gardner was
able at once to proceed to the West Indies with seven sail of the line,
nine frigates and sloops of war; Lord Hood to man twenty-two sail of
the line, and a large number of frigates and sloops, with which he
occupied Toulon and took Corsica; while, by its aid, other squadrons
were sent to America and to the East Indies to protect our interests
in those quarters. The command of seamen from the merchant service
also enabled Lord Howe to occupy the Channel with twenty-seven sail
of the line and numerous frigates, thereby affording security to our
own homes, and the means of protecting our colonies and commerce by
detached squadrons.
[Sidenote: Working of the system of apprenticeship,]
Notwithstanding these proofs of naval energy on the first outburst
of the late war, and of the important help derived from the merchant
service, the number of men obtained was, after all, inadequate to
the wants of the country. The merchant service, suddenly drained
of so many thousands, could, afterwards, give only a comparatively
small and occasional supply as ships arrived from foreign ports, or
as apprentices grew out of their time. Now this continued, though
insufficient succour to the navy, Admiral Martin thought, could never
have been maintained throughout so long a war but for the provident
provisions of the Navigation Laws in making it compulsory on shipowners
to take a certain number of apprentices, and thus to keep up a constant
replenishment of seafaring men.[89]
He expressed himself of quite a different opinion to those who were
sanguine in believing the abrogation of the Navigation Laws would
increase our shipping; and stoutly combated the notion that we could
retain the same quantity of tonnage after we had entered on a system
of rivalry with foreign countries in cheap carrying. But, assuming
that we retained 4,000,000 tons[90] of shipping, it might be well to
see how the comparison stood with respect to the supply of men derived
from the 1,500,000 in 1793, and what might be expected from the present
4,000,000 tons. In 1793, and up to 1835, the Act of Queen Anne secured
a replenishment of seafaring men by apprentices of more than double
the number, when we had only 1,500,000, to what the Act of 1835 did in
1848 with 4,000,000. Consequently, in that respect, nothing was gained
by the increased tonnage. By the Act of Queen Anne, vessels of 30 tons
were obliged to take an apprentice; whereas under the Act of 1835 a
vessel of 200 tons takes only one apprentice. Under the Act of Queen
Anne, vessels of 400 tons took five apprentices; under the Act of 1835,
only two. Formerly ships of 1400 tons were obliged to take fifteen
apprentices; whereas, under the present Act, the largest ship built was
only required to take five: so that the lesser amount of tonnage in
1793 gave a larger supply of fresh hands than the 4,000,000 tons.
The admiral did not fail to point out, in comparing the two periods,
that the increase to 4,000,000 exhibited a noble proof of our
commercial growth under the protection of the Navigation Laws, and
seemed to warn us of what we hazarded in giving up 4,000,000 of
shipping tonnage to be scrambled for by all the nations of the world.
[Sidenote: and of impressment.]
A more important and alarming view of the subject was the
encouragement held out to the shipowner to believe that, among
other changes contemplated, his men would be no longer subject to
impressment. If that were to be the case, asked, pertinently, Admiral
Martin, what was the use of increased numbers, the presumed result of
increased tonnage, if the men were locked up, and, thus, were not at
once available for the navy?[91]
It is unnecessary to repeat Admiral Martin’s further remarks
concerning apprentices. I may, however, state that he considered
the complaints against them but a “plausible grievance” of a few
shipowners. Apprentices, he held, were not much expense, for though
they ate as much as men, they soon became active and useful in the
ship, performing a man’s duty without wages. They were, besides, the
cheapest people to shipowners, who in war time were glad enough to have
their full number of them, because, as apprentices, they were in fact
so many hands protected from impressment. The number of fresh hands
required to keep up the stock of seamen was very considerable; for the
hard life of sailors tells early on human strength, and the perils
of their pursuit contributes much to the waste of life. The Admiral,
therefore, held that law which compelled shipowners to take apprentices
was a most valuable part of the Navigation Laws, and ought not on any
account to be given up: and that a constant influx of young blood into
the sea service was essential to the interests of a naval country, and
any diminution of the present number of apprentices in proportion to
the existing tonnage would, in his opinion, be detrimental to the navy,
and hazardous to our national security.
With regard to the quality of the supply from the commercial to the
military navy of this country, and to the comparative value of those
who had been brought up in the merchant service, or of those who
entered the navy for the first time, Admiral Martin unhesitatingly
said, that the real practical seaman was the north country sailor; but
that the coasting sailor and the South Sea-fishery sailor were now
very scarce, if we had not lost the latter altogether.
[Sidenote: Evidence of Admiral Berkeley,]
Captain Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley, R.N., who also gave
evidence, entered into various explanations concerning the effect of
bounties, and of the impressment of seamen, and approved the practice
by which seamen in foreign parts could enter her Majesty’s ships
without being deemed deserters: he admitted, however, that if he were a
captain in a merchant vessel “he might probably think it a hard case.”
He took care to remark that “the fault was not always with the men;”
and, at the same time, gave a different testimony to that of Sir James
Stirling about the proportion of merchant seamen who served on board
men-of-war. In his opinion, two-fifths of the navy had been brought
up in the merchant service; while a good many who had commenced life
in it as boys, had subsequently gone into the merchant service. With
respect to the registry system, he remarked that in the Jews’ shops at
Shadwell, and in similar places at Bristol, sailors could purchase as
many register-tickets as they wanted, and, for half the amount of the
fine, that would be asked of them if they went to the Custom House.[93]
[Sidenote: and of Mr. R. B. Minturn.]
Mr. Robert B. Minturn, an eminent merchant and shipowner of New
York, was the last witness examined before the Committee of the
Lords. He was owner of portions of many ships, and part owner in
the lines of packets between New York and London, and between New
York and Liverpool. He traded also with India and China, and was
also owner of whalers which went to the South Seas. Like most others
of the high-class merchants trading to foreign countries, he was
neither concerned in the inland trade of the United States nor the
coasting trade. Having furnished evidence as to the progress of
American tonnage, he stated that the New York packets, which were
universally acknowledged to be the best description of ships built in
the United States, having all of them a portion of live oak in them,
cost, exclusively of their cabins, about $70 per ton, equal to about
14_l._ 10_s._ per ton, sterling. In this estimate it must be
remarked that the American tonnage differs from our own.[94]
[Sidenote: Details about American ships.]
The American classification of ships also differs from that at
Lloyd’s. There the rating depends on the age, the material, its
quality, together with the quantity of the fastenings, whether copper
or iron, and the mode of workmanship. The oak used in New York comes
principally from Virginia, the live oak entirely from Florida; and the
sheathing-copper and iron are those supplied from England, iron from
other countries then paid a duty of 30 per cent.: sheathing-copper was
free of duty, but cake or pig-copper, from which bolts are manufactured
in America, paid 5 per cent. Sails were, till recently, brought from
England, Holland, and Russia; but hemp-canvas was then being made
in America. Cotton sail-cloth had for a long time been used to a
considerable extent.
Shipwrights’ wages in the United States were then $2½ a day, about
10_s._ 6_d._ sterling. In New York, these artificers work
only ten hours per day on new work, and nine hours on old work; but
repairs of ships were more expensive in England than in the United
States. In the equipment, as we have seen, of American ships, great
attention was paid to lessening manual labour by capstans, winches,
and other contrivances; and as they were much more lightly rigged in
proportion to their tonnage, they were sailed with fewer men; the
average number being about two and a half sailors to every 100 tons in
a packet ship ranging from 900 to 1200 tons; but in a common American
freighting ship, where despatch was of less importance, the proportion
is even smaller. For instance, the _Henry Clay_, already
mentioned, 1207 tons, American, and 1467 tons, English, had thirty
seamen, two boys, and a carpenter, besides the captain, four mates,
cook, and steward: 40 all told.
With regard to the payment of the American captains, it is not the
practice to pay them by time, but by some advantage in the voyage. In
foreign freighting voyages the captains depend chiefly on the primage,
which is 5 per cent. upon the amount of the freight. That is usually
their chief source of emolument; but they, generally, receive also $30
a month wages. This, of course, gives them an interest in prosecuting
the voyage successfully, and in stimulating their men to exertion;
but, with great good taste, Mr. Minturn excused himself from making a
comparison between American and other ships; he strenuously, however,
denied that any national feeling influenced the merchants in the least
degree with respect to the freighting their goods from England in
American bottoms.
[Sidenote: Reciprocity treaties]
[Sidenote: so far as they affect Americans.]
With regard to the effect on America of the reciprocity treaties to
which I have already alluded, and which came into operation shortly
prior to 1830, it would appear that though the Government of the United
States proposed to all foreign nations that, if they would open their
ports to American shipping, they might enjoy all the benefits of their
foreign trade, the shipowners were distrustful of the operation of
this Free-trade system, as it was chiefly embraced by the States of
the north of Europe, which had no commerce to offer in return. Hence
efforts were continually made to rescind these treaties; but the
experience of their operation has been that the American commerce has
increased in a much greater ratio since that period than it had done
before. The reciprocity treaties have not, indeed, promoted the growth
of American tonnage; but, on the other hand, they have not retarded it;
and if the shipowners in the United States do not avow their error,
at all events their opposition has now ceased. Mr. Minturn was far
from acknowledging that the Americans had gained by these treaties;
indeed, he gave a positive opinion that they had nothing to do with the
increase of United States shipping. No new markets had been opened,
but commerce with all the world had increased, and probably nowhere so
much as with England. The chief extension of the commerce of the United
States with South America was with the Brazils, which was enhanced
owing to the consumption of coffee, the duty on which had been taken
off, the result being that the American consumption had doubled within
ten years.
The temperance system adopted on board the American vessels had
resulted in the greatest possible advantage, both in the efficiency
and discipline of the crews; and, with these, in the increased safety
of the ship and consequent diminution in the rates of insurance.
Indeed, Mr. Minturn stated that American underwriters attached so
much importance to it, that at the commencement of this reform they
encouraged it by offering to return 10 per cent. on the premium, on all
vessels that performed a voyage without the use of ardent spirits.
Such are a few of the leading points of evidence furnished to the
Lords’ Committee, who adjourned _sine die_ on the 6th July, 1848.
FOOTNOTES:
[80] I take this from Mr. Labouchere’s account given many months
afterwards. See Hansard, vol. xcviii. p. 1008.
[81] These are the exact words given by Mr. Labouchere in his speech,
May 15, 1848.
[82] _Vide_ ‘Parliamentary Papers,’ vol. lix., 1847-8, p. 33.
[83] Vice-President of the Board of Trade.
[84] This paper was the Government organ.
[85] See Hansard, vol. xcvi. p. 1313.
[86] ‘Parliamentary Paper, 1847,’ No. 28.
[87] How completely this prediction has been falsified by the
substitution of steam vessels for all the old sailing line-of-battle
ships!
[88] The first ship of the line built by contract was in 1755, when
Messrs. Wells built the _Elizabeth_, of 74 guns; and, since that
time, private shipbuilders have contributed greatly to the public
wants. They built and repaired (chiefly in the last war) 93 sail of
line-of-battle ships, and 466 frigates and smaller vessels, making
a total of 559 vessels of war. In the last war Napoleon I. had as
building ports, Venice, Genoa, Toulon, Rochefort, L’Orient, Cherbourg,
Antwerp, and, practically also, all the ports of Holland.
[89] One of the most remarkable incidents of the manning of a ship of
war is that of Sir Edward Pellew and H.M.S. _Nymphe_. When war was
declared by the French in February, 1793, it was unexpected; and the
navy was on a peace establishment of only 16,000 sailors and marines.
It was necessary at once to increase this number to 60,000. Pellew,
finding it impossible to get seamen for his frigate, at once put eighty
Cornish miners on board his ship, and a few months later fought and
won the celebrated action with the _Cleopatra_—most of his crew
never having seen a shot fired before. (See Osler’s ‘Life of Viscount
Exmouth.’)
[90] There belonged, in round numbers, to the United Kingdom and her
colonies and possessions on the 1st January, 1875, 7,500,000 tons of
merchant vessels: of these about 2,000,000 tons were steam vessels; and
as each of these will perform the work of four sailing vessels, it may
be said that we now possess in our merchant service an equivalent to
13,500,000 registered tons of sailing shipping, so that in twenty-five
years we have more than trebled Admiral Martin’s highest estimate.
[91] The question of impressment is too important to be passed over
without any notice. Every well-constituted mind holds the principle
of impressment in abhorrence; but every reflecting statesman is
aware of the immense importance of such a power, especially as it
is never brought into use but when the country is in actual peril.
Admiral Martin, in his evidence, furnished his experience of what
impressment had practically done for us in times past, he having been
in three armaments, 1787, 1790, and 1791, on all of which occasions
the equipment of the fleet was like magic[92], and the effect of the
prompt display of the gigantic naval strength of this country in each
case saved the expenditure of thousands of lives and millions of
money. If these objects be worthy of national regard, we must submit
to the mortification of sanctioning even so great a trespass on the
liberty of the subject. The event of 1790, Admiral Martin thought,
deserves especial mention as showing distinctly what the nation gained
by impressment, and the results of a great naval demonstration. A
quarrel had at that time arisen, though, perhaps, from an insignificant
cause, with the Court of Spain; it became, however, of the greatest
importance, owing to the threatened alliance of France, then under the
control of the National Assembly, with the Court of the Escurial. On
the 2nd of May, the King in Council authorized the issue of warrants
of impressment of seafaring men, and, in the middle of June, Admiral
Barrington put to sea with a large division of the fleet. It was
insisted that this could never have been accomplished except by the
power of impressment; and Admiral Martin, doubtless, expressed the
general opinion of his profession in stating as his sincere belief that
“if we lost the power of impressment we should lose the country.” Yet,
while urging the necessity of preserving the power of impressment, he
also maintained that nothing should be left undone which could tend to
render the practice as infrequent as possible, and that every exertion
should be made to render the service itself attractive to the seamen.
[92] In 1787, we equipped a fleet to support the Stadtholder. In 1790,
we had a misunderstanding with Spain about Nootka Sound; and in 1791,
we raised a naval armament to check the ambition of Russia.
[93] By the law then in force every seaman, before he could be employed
on board a merchant ship, was required to produce a certificate from
the officer of the Registrar of Seamen, called a register-ticket,
showing that he was duly qualified for his duties, either as able or
ordinary seaman; but the system was found to be impracticable, and was
so grossly abused that it has since been abolished.
[94] In the United States the old English measurement is still adhered
to, and the poops of ships are not measured, which accounts for much of
the difference observable in the measurement of British and American
ships. For example, the _Henry Clay_, of 1207 tons American
measurement, where the poop was not included, measured 1467 tons by the
new English mode, on which light, dock, and other dues are charged. The
ship _Queen of the West_, 1106 tons American, measured for light
dues in Liverpool, 1270 tons English. The effect of this would be that
the calculation of $70 per ton would be diminished in a corresponding
ratio if taken in English tonnage, and with the poops included. The
estimate of $70 per ton, that is, American measurement, applies to
the cost of a ship with her spars and sails, rigging, and everything
complete ready to receive a cargo, but without her sea stores.
CHAPTER VIII.
Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848—Protectionist principles stated—Extent
of shipping trade—National defences endangered—Mr. Labouchere’s
reply—Alderman Thompson—Mr. Gladstone’s views—Mr. Hudson—Lord
George Bentinck—Mr. Hume—Mr. Cobden—Mr. Disraeli—Sir Robert
Peel—The resolution carried by 117, but abandoned for a
time—Temper of the Shipowners—Efforts of Ministers to obtain
reciprocity by a circular from the Foreign Office—Reply thereto
of America—Mr. Buchanan’s letter—Reply of other Powers—Progress
of Free-trade views—Parliament of 1849—Death of Lord George
Bentinck, September 21, 1848—Mr. Labouchere’s new resolution,
February 14, 1849—Proposed change in coasting trade—Mr. Bancroft
recalcitrates—Hence, withdrawal of the coasting clauses—The
debate—Alderman Thompson, &c.—Mr. Ricardo—Meeting of Shipowners’
Society—Their report—The manning-clause grievance—Policy
proposed—Agitation in the country.
Although the shipowners appear to have placed much confidence in the
House of Lords, they saw that unless they could convince the Commons
that the repeal of the Navigation Laws would be prejudicial to the
interests of England, they would have no hope of maintaining the
_status quo_: and, further, that no modification would satisfy
the demands of the Free-traders, who, strong in their principles,
consequently repudiated all compromise with Protectionists.
[Sidenote: Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848.]
One of the most earnest leaders of the latter class had just
re-entered the House of Commons after a long absence from it. Mr.
Herries had been Chancellor of the Exchequer so long before as 1828.
He was an able and honest Conservative; sound in his principles
and earnest in everything he undertook. To him, therefore, the
Protectionist shipowners in their hour of trial appealed for aid; nor
did they appeal in vain. Mr. Herries was heart and soul with them. He
saw nothing but ruin and desolation in the abolition of these ancient
laws. They had, in his judgment, been tampered with and weakened by
Huskisson, and now they were about to be destroyed by such men as
Cobden, Bright, Ricardo, and Milner Gibson, backed, alas! “by his old
friend and colleague, Sir Robert Peel.” No wonder, therefore, that
he buckled on his armour with vigour for the fight; and, soon after
the debate on the resolution of the Government, he submitted, though
on a separate occasion, the following counter-resolution:—“That it
is essential to the national interests of the country to maintain
the fundamental principles of the existing Navigation Laws, subject
to such modifications as may be best calculated to obviate any
proved inconvenience to the commerce of the United Kingdom and its
dependencies without danger to our national strength.”
This resolution had been framed with great care. It had been the
subject of unusual consideration by the Shipowners’ Society of London,
then the oracle of all the other Protectionist societies in England,
whose object was the maintenance of the Navigation Laws; and, in their
opinion, the maritime greatness of England depended upon its success.
If defeated, “Rule Britannia” would for ever be expunged from our
national songs; the glories of Duncan and Nelson would “wither like the
aspen-leaf, and fade like the Tyrian dye;” and, as none but “Yankees,
Swedes, Danes, and Norwegian sailors would be found in our ports, who,
they demanded, would there be to fight our battles and defend our
sea-girt shores?” These were, then, no mere words of course; they were
the honest expressions of the thoughts of earnest men, who, however
mistaken in their views, or perhaps in some instances blinded by what
they conceived to be self-interest, firmly believed that the power and
greatness of their native land depended on the preservation of the
Navigation Laws.
The counter-declaration of Mr. Herries was therefore introduced
with the sole object of getting rid of the Ministerial measure,
failing that, of modifying it in such a manner as not to abrogate
the principle of these laws. Hence he embodied in his speech all the
leading arguments of the advocates of a restrictive policy. Thus,
after alluding to the proceedings of the committee of the previous
year, Mr. Herries found fault with Government for having, without
further inquiry, announced in the Speech from the Throne their evident
intentions, however vaguely worded, of making an entire change in the
maritime policy of Great Britain. Six months had elapsed and Ministers
had proposed no measure; while the House of Lords, acting more wisely,
had instituted the further inquiry then going on, a portion of the
evidence taken having been already laid before the House of Commons.
If, argued Mr. Herries, the Lords should, from the evidence taken
before them, resolve on the maintenance of those laws and on the
rejection of the Government measure, such a course might occasion
embarrassment. He complained that while the British shipowner would
be exposed to foreign competition by the removal of all protection,
the heavy burden of being required to man his ship agreeably with
the rules of the Navigation Laws was still retained. Criticising in
succession the various pleas in behalf of Prussia, America, and our
West Indian Colonies, for the repeal or modification of the present
code, he remarked that Prussia had nothing to give us in return for
the concessions she sought, and that her warnings and threats of
withdrawing such advantages as she had already conceded were of trivial
moment. America, in the most friendly way, no doubt, requested to
participate in our foreign and colonial trade, in return for reciprocal
concessions to be made to us: but America had no colonies; and it was
wholly out of her power to give us any equivalent for the advantages
she would be sure to acquire by the abolition of our Navigation Laws.
“Why did not ‘free’ America,” he exclaimed, “show us an example, and
abolish her laws, which were quite as stringent as ours?”
[Sidenote: Protectionist principles stated.]
As to the West Indies, Mr. Herries gave many details in proof of
his assertion that the petition against the Navigation Laws from
the Jamaica House of Assembly but imperfectly represented the real
sentiments of either that body or of the island at large. Had its
promoters been aware that, by the abrogation of these laws, freights
from the foreign islands (whence sugar was brought to England, as
well as from the British Islands) would be materially lowered, they
never would have assented to it. To facilitate importations from Cuba
by an alteration of the Navigation Laws would only aggravate the
disadvantages from which they were at present suffering. Relying on
the authority of Mr. Huskisson, he quoted him for a definition of that
Protective principle he was willing to stand by; a principle which
would reserve our colonial, coasting, and fishing trade wholly to
ourselves, while protecting our foreign trade, so far as was consistent
with our relations and engagements with foreign countries. If the
House were agreed on the general principle of protecting our marine,
Mr. Herries argued that it might, in committee, remove those anomalies
which in some quarters were so much the object of censure and ridicule.
[Sidenote: Extent of the shipping trade.]
He reminded the House that the tonnage of the vessels belonging to this
kingdom and her colonies then amounted to 3,900,000 tons; the number of
sailors employed in our mercantile marine, to 230,000; and the capital
embarked in shipping, to little less than 40,000,000_l._; while
the trades immediately connected therewith, or subservient to the
shipping interest, employed a capital of from 16,000,000_l._ to
17,000,000_l._ In this way there was between 50,000,000_l._
and 60,000,000_l._ of property which would be immediately affected
by the proposed change. In this branch of national industry about
50,000 artisans, whose wages amounted to 5,000,000_l._ a-year,
were employed; while the cost of victualling the ships he estimated at
9,000,000_l._, and the freights the mercantile marine earned per
annum at nearly 30,000,000_l._[95]
[Sidenote: National defences endangered.]
These were enormous interests, he exclaimed, and ought not to be dealt
with lightly; but when, in addition to all this, it was considered that
the existence of these interests lay at the foundation of our national
defences, and, that without these defences, we could not maintain our
present position as a nation, surely there were ample reasons, if
not for resisting all change, at least for adopting such changes as
appeared necessary, not in the reckless way now proposed, by a sweeping
resolution for the entire abolition of the Navigation Laws, but by
improving, altering, and modifying them in such a manner as would be
consistent with the great interest they were framed to protect. He
therefore prayed the House not to assent to experimental changes, which
might impair the strength of the right arm this nation had hitherto
put forth to awe and control the world, and convert it into a palsied
limb, with which the meanest of our rivals might successfully grapple.
[Sidenote: Mr. Labouchere’s reply.]
Mr. Labouchere followed in an elaborate speech, in general support of
the Ministerial measure, but at the same time admitting that the real
point for the decision of the House was fairly raised by Mr. Herries’
resolution. “Would they, however,” he asked, “be content with patchwork
legislation? Was it in fact right to maintain the principle of the
Navigation Laws? or were they prepared to consider the propriety of
departing from those principles, so as to conciliate the wants of
commerce and the exigencies of the case before them, with a view of
adapting them to the spirit of the times, and of meeting the just
demands of other countries, the wishes of our own colonies, and the
interests of our expanding trade?” Of course, if Mr. Herries carried
his resolution, it would be fatal to the measure of the Government.
[Sidenote: Alderman Thompson.]
Alderman Thompson, an opulent merchant extensively engaged in the
iron trade, supported the Protectionist view of the question. He
ridiculed the plan submitted by Sir James Stirling for manning the
navy as “Utopian,” proposing as this plan did to train up a race of
seamen exclusively for the navy, and, therefore irrespectively of the
commercial marine. “Would Mr. Hume,” he asked, directing his remarks
towards that gentleman, “sanction a vote for 120,000 men during peace?”
He warned the House against the effect on our colonial shipping trade
should it be thus thrown open to the Americans, whose ships, he said,
already supplied our West Indian settlements with the whole of the
lumber required by them, though under the disadvantage of returning
from their ports in ballast. Various speakers on both sides followed
during several adjourned debates: Dr. Bowring, Mr. Moffatt, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Milner Gibson, on the side of repeal; Mr.
H. J. Baillie, Mr. Scott, Mr. Robinson, the Marquess of Granby, and Mr.
Henley on that of Protection.
[Sidenote: Mr. Gladstone’s views.]
On the 2nd June, Mr. Gladstone, then sitting with Sir Robert Peel on
the cross-benches, resumed the debate in a most exhaustive speech. His
views were not in exact accordance with either party in the debate,
but he took the affirmative side on the broad question of repeal as a
matter of reasonable expediency, although, on the specific scheme of
Government he gave only a qualified opinion, as he would have preferred
a more gradual measure. He wished Government had adhered to the uniform
course of precedents, making large concessions conditional upon
reciprocal action by other Powers. He objected to the discretionary
power of the Queen in Council, with a view of extorting reciprocity,
a discretion at once too large and too delicate: if it were really
intended that this power should be a living and practical one, to
be put in force in case of need, he thought it would be wiser and
safer to undo, bit by bit, the system we have got, than to sweep it
away in order to reconstruct it piecemeal; and then, perhaps shortly
afterwards, to pull it down again. With that keen foresight for which
he has ever been distinguished, he particularly censured that part
of the plan which reserved the coasting trade. He contended that the
American coasting trade was of the highest value, and equivalent to
a colonial trade. “Let us give her our coasting trade, and we are
entitled, not merely in policy but in justice, to ask her for her
coasting trade. But let us give her the colonial trade without the
coasting trade, and we give her the valuable boon, while we withhold
the worthless; but we cannot say to her, ‘Give us all, for we have
given you all.’” Mr. Gladstone relied on the sincerity of the American
diplomatist, and therefore, urged this point as one of the highest
importance, Mr. Bancroft’s offer appearing to him a forcible argument
for including the coasting trade in any future arrangement. In
conclusion, he expressed the hope that when England and America had
concurred in setting an example to the world of free navigation, other
nations would be induced to imitate it by a moral force it would be
difficult to resist; and that we should live to see the ocean, that
great highway of nations, as free as the ships that traverse its bosom,
or the winds that blow over it.
Though Mr. Gladstone would have preferred securing such reciprocal
privileges as other nations had power to confer before throwing
open our ports to their ships, his speech was in effect a splendid
declamation in favour of Free-trade principles, as applied to
navigation; and his argument pointed to the conclusion that, even if
other nations were not prepared for reciprocity, it would still be for
the interests of Great Britain to repeal her restrictive laws.
[Sidenote: Mr. Hudson.]
Mr. Hudson, as the representative of Sunderland, apart from his own
Conservative principles, made an earnest appeal to the House against
Free-trade in navigation, and hoped it would not be led away by any
fanciful notions. Captain Berkeley, on the other hand, expressed an
opinion rather favourable to the Government measure, though, should
it become law, he feared, with most of his brother naval officers,
that there would be a difficulty in manning the Royal Navy. But Mr. J.
Clay, though an extreme Free-trader, refused to support the Government
till all restrictions on shipowners, who had great influence at Hull,
which he so long represented, were removed. Mr. Newdegate opposed the
Government scheme in an elaborate speech; and the then member for South
Shields, though sitting opposite, followed in the same line with a
brief but argumentative address. Lord Ingestrie and Mr. R. Hildyard
likewise denounced the measure; while Lord John Hay predicted eventual
success by its adoption. A division was then taken, after three nights’
debate (May 29th, June 1st and 2nd), on the question that the debate be
now adjourned, which was carried by a majority of 163—the numbers being
236 to 73.
On the 8th of June the debate was resumed by Sir J. Walsh, who had
carried the adjournment, when Mr. Miles and Sir Charles Burrell spoke
on the same side against repeal. The most prominent speakers on the
Free-trade side were Mr. Cardwell, Sir George Clerk, and Sir Charles
Wood; Mr. Cardwell thinking the time had arrived for a judicious
relaxation of the Navigation Laws, and Sir Charles Wood noticing the
very general concurrence in favour of some change. The debate, however,
did not close, though the subject seemed exhausted, but was adjourned
for the fourth time, and the last night called forth some of the most
powerful speeches which had yet been delivered on the question.
[Sidenote: Lord George Bentinck.]
Lord George Bentinck resumed the debate on the 9th of June, and
defended the shipmasters against the aspersions cast upon them by Mr.
James Wilson, who had described them as unable to obtain freights from
Rio Janeiro, on account of the bad character they bore for carelessness
in the carriage or delivery of goods entrusted to their charge, and
concluded one of the best speeches he ever delivered by pointing out
the danger of repeal, as the seamen could not in future be pressed into
our service when the day of difficulty and danger might arise. “Let us
cherish our brave seamen,” exclaimed the noble Lord; “show them that,
alike in peace and in war, we will provide for them; that we scorn to
weigh in the balance with the comforts, the prosperity, and happiness
of our gallant defenders, the miserable saving of 2_s._ 6_d._
per ton upon the freight of our shipping, and the eighteenth part of
a farthing per pound on our sugar and coffee, and then we may again,
as heretofore, boldly challenge and safely defy all the nations of the
earth.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Hume.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Cobden.]
Mr. Hume supported the Ministerial measure, and pressed upon the
Government the necessity of removing every burden on British ships to
which foreigners were not liable. Admiral Bowles spoke on the opposite
side; and Mr. Cobden, following, asked, why should not the sailor in
his ship, as well as the workman in his factory, or the labourer on
his farm, be able to compete with foreigners? He then appealed to the
evidence, showing, as this did, that we could build better ships than
foreign nations, and at as cheap a rate, quality considered; sail
them as well; take greater care of their cargoes; and secure greater
punctuality and despatch; adding, that our sailors had the greatest
natural aptitude for the sea of any in the world. The only drawbacks,
he continued, were of a moral kind, insubordination and drunkenness;
but these would yield to better culture. We heard a great outcry about
the burdens of the landowner, such as county-rates, highway-rates,
poor-rates, and church-rates; but the shipowner paid none of these,
being exempted from any such burdens. Therefore, on the score of
taxation, the shipowner and the sailor were infinitely better able to
compete with the foreigner than any other class of the community. Mr.
Cobden then reviewed the position of the shipbuilder, the shipowner,
and the sailor, and contended that they had no need to fear competition
with the foreigner. He regretted that the power of retaliation should
be given to the Queen in Council, not that he believed it would ever be
acted upon, and, after repudiating the boastful language so frequently
held respecting England’s naval supremacy, he asked, “was this a
time to be always singing ‘Rule Britannia’?” concluding his remarks
by stating, with great wisdom, that constant assertion of maritime
supremacy was calculated to provoke kindred passions in other nations;
whereas, if Great Britain enunciated the doctrines of peace, she would
invoke similar sentiments from the rest of the world.
[Sidenote: Mr. Disraeli.]
Mr. Disraeli, at that time exhibiting no mean promise of future
distinction, delivered an eloquent speech, illustrated with that
brilliant rhetoric, sarcastic humour and point, for which he has been
ever famous in debate. There was nothing, he said, more fatal to
national interests than the recklessness of ignorance. He would not,
indeed, sing “Rule Britannia,” for fear of distressing Mr. Cobden,
but he did not think the House would _encore_ “Yankee Doodle.”
Mr. Labouchere had described this as the age of “commerce, peace, and
internal improvement;” on the contrary, it was, in his opinion, the age
of no trade, of intended war, and of communists tearing up railways.
Naples is in a state of siege, he exclaimed; Paris in insurrection;
Vienna in revolt; Berlin barricaded; four pitched battles have been
fought in Europe in eight weeks, and the Baltic and the Adriatic are
alike blockaded, so that Mr. Cobden himself could scarcely be so devout
a believer as he pretended in the quiet of nations without arms. “At
least,” concluded Mr. Disraeli, “I will not incur the responsibility
by my vote of endangering that empire gained by so much valour,
and guarded by so much vigilance—that empire broader than both the
Americas, and richer than the farthest Ind, which was foreshadowed
in its infancy by the genius of a Blake, and consecrated in its
culminating glory by the blood of a Nelson—the empire of the seas.”
[Sidenote: Sir Robert Peel.]