Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and other
matters—“Coffin ships”—Great improvement of our ships and officers in
recent years—Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks—Return
of lives lost and saved between 1855 and 1873, _note_—Wreck
chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently examined—Danger of
too much Government interference—Loss of life in proportion to
vessels afloat—Causes of loss—More details required—Improvement in
lighthouses, buoys, and beacons—Harbours of Refuge—Extraordinary
scene in the House of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant
Shipping Bill, 1875—Another Bill introduced by Government—Its
conditions—Unusual _personal_ power granted to Surveyors—Propriety or
not, of further legislation considered—Compulsory load-line—Mr. J.
W. A. Harper’s evidence—Mr. W. J. Lamport and others—Opinion of the
Commissioners—Voluntary load-line—Its value questionable—All ships
should be certified as seaworthy—How can this be accomplished?—Opinion
of Mr. Charles McIver, _note_—Registration Associations—Lloyd’s
Register, its great importance—Improvement of seamen by better
education—Evil effects of advance notes, confirmed by the opinion of
the Commissioners—Over-insurance—Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Evidence
of other witnesses—Opinion of the Commissioners—Too much legislation
already—The necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code, and more prompt
punishment in criminal cases—Concluding remarks on the extraordinary
progress of British shipping, and the dangers of over-legislation.
APPENDICES.
PAGE
APPENDIX No. 1 563
” No. 2 567
” No. 3 571
” No. 4 582
” No. 5 590
” No. 6 596
” No. 7 600
” No. 8 611
” No. 9 613
” No. 10 618
” No. 11 620
” No. 12 624
” No. 13 634
” No. 14 637
INDEX 639
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
WRECK CHART, SHOWING WHERE TOTAL, WHERE PARTIAL, AND
WHERE LOSS OF LIFE OCCURRED _Frontispiece_
THE UNITED STATES SAILING CLIPPER “GREAT REPUBLIC” 360
THE TRANSVERSE MIDSHIP SECTION OF BRITISH SAILING SHIP,
“THERMOPYLÆ” 415
DRAWING OF THIS SHIP UNDER FULL SAIL 416
[Illustration:
CHART
OF THE
BRITISH ISLES
SHEWING THE
WRECKS AND CASUALTIES
DURING THE YEAR 1873-4,
distinguishing those attended with
Loss of Life
]
MERCHANT SHIPPING.
CHAPTER I.
Progress of the United States of America—Their
resources—Discriminating duties levied by France, 1820, against
American ships—Rapid rise of New Orleans, and of New York—Boston
ships extend their trade to India and China—Stephen Girard, the
rich and eccentric American shipowner, _note_—Mercantile
marine laws of the United States—Duties of master and
mate—Provision for Seamen—Special Acts relating to them—Power
given to American consuls to deal with seamen on their
ships—Superiority of native American seamen, owing to their
education—Excellent schools and early training for them—Spirit
and character of the “Shipping Articles” as affecting the
seamen—the owners—and the master or consignee—Conditions of wages,
and remedies for their non-payment; and other securities for
seamen—Power of Appeal by them to the Admiralty Courts—Laws with
reference to pilots—Character of American seamen, and especially
of the New Englanders.
[Sidenote: Progress of the United States of America.]
Perhaps no nation, in either ancient or modern times, ever made such
prodigious strides in wealth, population, and power, and, necessarily,
in commerce and navigation, as have the United States of America
during the first half of the present century. Nor is this a matter
for surprise. Practically, the American people had during that period
started in life with the singular advantage, that they commenced their
career with the accumulated wisdom of a long ancestry, with whom,
unlike the nations of ancient times, they have continued to have the
means of easy communication. Therefore, they had the capability of
assuming, almost at once, an important position in the world, and of
exercising no mean influence over its affairs, having few of those
difficulties to encounter, which European nations, in their slow
emergence from a state of political and intellectual darkness, have
taken centuries to surmount.
[Sidenote: Their resources.]
Finding themselves in a safe geographical position, with the most
magnificent harbours on every part of their coast, already prepared by
the hand of nature for their use, with the greatest navigable rivers in
the world, with lakes which are inland seas, and with boundless virgin
soil at their disposal: wanting nothing, in short, but wise laws and
abundant labour, they speedily discovered their strength, and, in their
earlier debates, in Congress gravely discussed the question whether
they should not style themselves the most enlightened people in the
world.[1] Nor, indeed, was this boast altogether vain and baseless,
for the Americans were in a position to adopt, as they might choose,
the whole sum of human knowledge, with the power, at the same time, of
applying this knowledge to the satisfaction of their varying wants.
Their capacity for government, in its application to commerce and
navigation, equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the race whence
they descended; and their system of education, the only true basis
of a nation’s greatness, far surpassed that of Great Britain; hence,
in all diplomatic negotiations, relating either to their political
independence or to their material interests, they have generally
exhibited such marked tact, ability, and acuteness, as has enabled them
frequently to obtain ample redress from foreign nations, and often,
too, without that formal demand which, if not complied with, leads to
war: from their example a few of our diplomatists, who reside abroad,
would do well to take a lesson.
With these elements of knowledge, wealth, and national power, combined
with a martial spirit, readily kindled into action whenever the
necessity arose, the Americans, under an extremely liberal government,
have rapidly and deservedly assumed a proud position among nations.
Not the least interesting and instructive cause of their rise was
the promptitude with which they developed, by the then best known
means, their great natural resources, and none more so than their
maritime commerce, for, within eighty years from their Declaration of
Independence, they rivalled, and, indeed, surpassed in the amount of
their merchant shipping, all other nations.[2]
[Sidenote: Discriminating duties levied by France, 1820, against
American ships.]
Nor was that high position reached without innumerable difficulties
in the shape of laws adverse to her interests. Great Britain excluded
her ships from all her colonies; and, though France had ceded to her
by treaty in 1803, for the sum of fifteen million dollars, the State
of Louisiana, that country for many years afterwards continued to levy
heavy differential duties on all goods imported into France in American
bottoms, while American shipowners had to contend at their port of
export against the predominant interests of a country whose settlers
for a long time greatly outnumbered the native Americans resident in
New Orleans. Indeed, so late as 1820, a long memorial[3] was presented
to Congress from twenty-four captains of American vessels then lying
at New Orleans, stating that they “cannot earn a competent livelihood,
owing to the fatal discriminating duties established in France in
favour of its own vessels in the exclusive importation there of the
staples of the United States.” The memorialists[4] further alleged that
on some articles the duty was “ten times” in favour of French vessels,
and that the “aggregate importation in French vessels at the port of
New Orleans exceeded very much in _quantity_ the amount imported
by American vessels;” being in the proportion of “nearly four to one.”
In confirmation of these statements the memorialists furnished a return
from the Customs which demonstrated that the carrying trade between New
Orleans and France was being then rapidly transferred from American to
French vessels; and they stated that the only reason why the French
did not absorb the whole trade, was that they had not a sufficient
number of vessels to undertake it. The petitioners further insisted
that nothing but “a positive tonnage duty,” graduated according to
the amount of the differential duties levied in France on the chief
American staples, would avail to keep their trade in their own hands.
[Sidenote: Rapid rise of New Orleans]
Nevertheless, in spite of these hostile tariffs, and the war of
retaliating duties which was for some time waged, New Orleans, from
being the natural emporium of the vast tracts of country traversed by
the Mississippi, Missouri, and their tributary streams, and enjoying,
as it does, a greater command of internal navigation than any other
city in either the Old or New World, has made since 1820 the most
astounding strides in its maritime commerce.[5]
[Sidenote: and of New York.]
But in the face of equal difficulties as regards hostile tariffs, New
York, through the great natural resources at her command, and other
causes, surpassed New Orleans in the rapidity of its early commercial
and maritime progress. Although its advancement during the first decade
of the present century was scarcely equal to that of the preceding ten
years, during which it enjoyed unexceptionable prosperity (no other
city in the United States having profited so much, during the earlier
periods, by the war in Europe), its merchants and shipowners suffered
severely between 1806 and 1815 from the disastrous effects of captures,
condemnations, and embargoes. Nor was it until 1825 that New York began
to assume the importance which she has continued to maintain among
the other commercial cities of the Union. In that year an internal
element of prosperity was brought into operation by the construction
of the Erie Canal, which opened for trade the agricultural products
of the fertile valley of the Tennessee, and the whole coasts of the
northern lakes. The introduction of steam-navigation, to which I shall
fully refer hereafter, affording greatly increased facilities for the
conveyance of merchandise to and from New York by means of the numerous
navigable rivers which intersected that and the neighbouring States,
naturally gave an enormous impulse to its navigation, while the coal
from the great Pennsylvania coal basin contributed essentially to its
prosperity.[6]
[Sidenote: Boston ships extend their trade to India and China.]
Nor was the prosperity confined to New York. It extended for many years
to all the ports of the Union. Boston, which, twenty years before the
Declaration of Independence, was only a village containing about twenty
houses, and, so late as 1822, was still governed by a body of “select
men,” according to the custom of New England [the people, till then,
declining to adopt a municipal government], vied with New York in
the Foreign Trade which had arisen, and early in the present century
despatched their vessels on the most distant voyages. Indeed, so early
as 1789, the merchants of Boston and Salem sent various ships direct to
the East Indies and China, and, many years before the “Free Traders”
of Great Britain could enter upon this trade, then monopolised by the
ships of the East India Company, so far as regards Great Britain, the
merchants[7] of Massachusetts supplied, not merely their own people
with the bulk of the teas, spices, silks, sugar and coffee from the
East as well as with nankeens and other cotton clothes, but reshipped
them from Boston to Hamburg and the Northern ports of Europe in
their own vessels, thus deriving large profits from a trade with our
possessions, from which the great bulk of our ships were long excluded
by the stringent restrictions of a pernicious monopoly.[8]
[Sidenote: Mercantile marine laws of the United States.]
We have thus seen with what rapidity the Americans, in their early
career, covered almost every ocean with their ships. As in other
matters, so in the rules and regulations drawn up for the internal
management of their marine, they were able, at the commencement of
their independence, to adopt from other nations such laws, even to
their most minute details, as appeared to them the best fitted for
their position. Thus, one of their earliest Acts, that of 1790,
provides: that, “if a seaman is engaged without the execution of the
shipping paper, the master or mariner shall pay to the seaman the
highest wages that have been given within the three months next before
the time of such shipping;” and the principle of this law has been long
maintained, for the Act of 1840 declares that “any seaman so shipped
may, at any time, leave the service, and demand the highest rate of
wages given to any seaman shipped for the voyage.” In the Bank and
Cod-fisheries, the contract of seamen with the masters and owners is
required to be in writing, expressing the general terms of the voyage;
and in the Whale-fishery, though the shipping paper is not absolutely
required by the law, there is still a regular engagement, generally in
writing, stipulating, among other things, the terms of the voyage, and
the shares or “lays” of each officer and seaman on board the ship.
[Sidenote: Duties of master and mate.]
The several modes in which seamen’s contracts are executed, are the
hiring by the month or by the voyage so long as it shall continue,
or for a share of the profits, or of the freight earned in certain
voyages. The American law invests the master with the sole government
of his ship and the absolute right of direction, subject to the
legal consequences of any abuse of his powers. He may enforce his
authority by the infliction of punishment upon the crew, but, should
he exceed these limits, he is liable, by a Statute of the United
States, to an action for damages in the Civil Courts, and to a criminal
prosecution. The measure of punishment proportioned to the offence is
to be ascertained by the special circumstances of the case; but all
punishments must be inflicted with proper instruments. Hence, while
the master has power to punish a seaman and to imprison him on board,
to prevent a violation of the order and peace of the ship, he must be
prepared to show that such measures were necessary.
The duties of mate, as laid down by the United States, resemble those
of other countries. In the absence or death of the master he takes his
place, exercising a general superintendence over the affairs of the
ship. But his ordinary duties are confined to calling the attention
of the master to everything requiring his notice, to the receipt and
stowage of cargo, and to whatever is necessary for the proper equipment
and sailing of the vessel while at sea. The mate is also required
to keep the log-book, wherein he is bound to enter every matter of
importance, such as the courses steered, the winds, and state of the
weather, with many other minute details connected with the navigation
of the ship. If he is guilty of such negligence as to involve the loss
of his cargo, he alone is responsible; and if he interferes with the
responsibility, of others he renders himself responsible. Thus, if he
undertakes, while in harbour, the removal of any merchandise, resulting
in loss, the amount may be deducted from his wages, it being the rule,
that the wharfinger is responsible for the safe delivery of all goods
on board the vessel.
[Sidenote: Provision for seamen.]
The American law has, also, provided for the proper sustenance of
seamen, by requiring that a certain amount of the provisions shipped be
set apart for this purpose, and, further, that they shall be provided
for during _bonâ fide_ sicknesses occurring during the service of
the ship, and not from the seamen’s own fault, when absent occasionally
or without express permission. All vessels bound for any ports beyond
the limits of the United States are to be provided with a medicine
chest. Provision, moreover, is made for sick and disabled seamen on
shore, the law enjoining on the master or owner of every vessel the
payment towards the maintenance of hospitals on shore, into the hands
of the Collector of Customs of 20 cents per month for every seaman in
their employ. This sum is deducted from the wages of the seamen, and
is required from all seamen alike, whether in the coasting or oversea
trades.
Barratry committed by the master or mariner is treated as in England.
Running away with or destroying the ship, mutiny, piracy, piratical
confederacy, endeavouring to create a revolt, desertion, embezzlement,
negligence, drunkenness, and disobedience, are all regarded as grave
offences, and punished in a greater or less degree.
[Sidenote: Special Acts relating to them.]
By the Act of the 20th February, 1803, it was provided that the master
of any merchant vessel, clearing for a foreign port, should enter into
a bond in the sum of 400_l._ for the production of his crew at
the first port at which he should arrive on his return to the United
States, unless any one or more of the crew had been discharged in a
foreign country, with the consent of the American consul or commercial
agent of the United States, except in the case of death, of absconding,
or of forcible impressment into some other service. This Act, likewise,
provided that, when a vessel was sold abroad, and the crew discharged
by mutual consent, the master should pay to the consul for any seaman
thus discharged three months’ wages over and above those he had earned
up to the time of his discharge; two-thirds thereof to be paid to the
seaman himself, on his engagement to return to the United States, and
the remaining third to be retained towards a fund for the payment
of the passages for seamen, citizens of the United States, who may
be desirous of returning home; and for the maintenance of destitute
American seamen resident at the port of discharge.
[Sidenote: Power given to American consuls]
Although many persons were of opinion that the Act of 1803, requiring,
under the circumstances named, a payment of three months’ extra wages,
and empowering consuls to send seamen home, disabled or otherwise, “in
the most reasonable manner,” frequently led to improper expenditure,
and that a more strict accountability, than then existed, ought to
be enforced, these clauses remained unaltered until 1840, when their
features were changed; consuls and commercial agents of the United
States being by the Act of the 20th July of that year invested with
the power to discharge, when they thought it “expedient,” any seaman,
on the joint application of the master of the ship and the seaman
himself, without requiring payment of any sum beyond the wages due at
the time of discharge.
The Act, however, of 1840 created so many objections of another
kind, that it became necessary, shortly afterwards, to make various
alterations. It was felt that the discretion given to the consuls was
likely to operate unfortunately for all parties concerned. Acting,
as the consuls then very frequently did, in the double capacity of
agent for the United States and consignee of the vessel, they were
too often induced to gratify the wishes of the owner and master to
the injury of the seaman. Consequently, either the American consular
establishments had to be re-organised upon a more independent system,
or the “expediency” clauses had to be abolished. But other and still
more weighty reasons suggested the desirability of adopting the
former course. While, at a later period, the discretionary power
was abolished, except in cases of sickness and insubordination,
arrangements were made to disconnect Government agencies entirely
from commercial operations. Now, all consuls, who must be exclusively
American citizens, are remunerated by fixed salaries, instead of fees
as formerly, and are removed from the possibility of all interested
connexion with shipowners and shipmasters; by being, in nearly every
instance, as is now the case with the consuls of Great Britain,
prohibited from carrying on business on their own account—at least
such business as can in any way interfere with their duties as consul.
[Sidenote: to deal with seamen on their ships.]
But it has been necessary also to make several other material
alterations in the maritime laws. By the Act of 1790, it was provided
that if any seaman deserted, or even absented himself for forty-eight
hours without leave from his ship, he forfeited to the master or owner
of the vessel all the wages due to him, and all his goods and chattels
on board, or in any store where they were deposited at the time of such
desertion or absence, besides other penalties. This forfeiture might be
necessary or proper to check desertion; but it was easy to see, that
it was in the highest degree unwise, that it should be given for the
use of the master or owner of the ship. It tended, indeed, to produce
the very effect and mischief it was intended to prevent. Masters of
American vessels, when nearing a port where a new crew could be shipped
at reduced wages, and when in arrears to their seamen (a fact which
often occurs in long whaling voyages), were apt to adopt a course of
tyrannical conduct, with the desire of compelling desertion; and, on
their arrival, to permit their sailors a temporary absence from the
ship, and then to leave them, under the plea of desertion, as a charge
on the hands of the consul.
One flagrant instance was mentioned by the consul at Lima, of a
supercargo of a vessel, who stated that he had saved in one voyage
alone more than 1000 dollars by the desertion of his hands, as if this
were a fair source of profit to either owner or master.
The simple entry in the log-book of the fact of absence or desertion
was, then, deemed conclusive against the seaman. Hence a very large
sum was necessarily expended by the American Government in providing
for destitute seamen. But this was partly attributable to the general
increase of the United States commerce, and not altogether to the
defective working of the law. While the aggregate amount of the
registered tonnage of the United States in 1830 was about 576,000 tons,
it had reached in 1840, 899,000, showing an increase of 323,000 in ten
years,[9] but the increase of seamen applying for relief at distant
consulates had at that time, it would seem, gone far beyond the general
increase in the amount of shipping.
The whole question of the relations between the men and their
employers, as they existed in the United States, is too wide a subject
to be embraced in the present work. There are, however, some general,
as well as special, points, both as regards the mariners and the law
regulating their conduct, which deserve attention. During the first
half of this century the masters of American vessels were, as a rule,
greatly superior to those who held similar positions in English ships,
arising in some measure from the limited education of the latter,
which was not sufficient to qualify them for the higher grades of the
merchant service. American shipowners required of their masters not
merely a knowledge of navigation and seamanship, but of commercial
pursuits, the nature of exchanges, the art of correspondence, and a
sufficient knowledge of business to qualify them to represent the
interests of their employers to advantage with merchants abroad. On
all such matters the commanders of English ships, with the exception of
the East India Company’s, were at this period greatly inferior to the
commanders of the United States vessels.
“Education,” remarks Mr. Joseph T. Sherwood,[10] “is much prized by
the citizens; many vessels, therefore, are commanded by gentlemen with
a college education, and by those educated in high schools, who, on
leaving those institutions, enter a merchant’s counting-room for a
limited time before they go to sea for practical seamanship, &c., or
are entrusted by their parents, guardians, or friends, with the command
of vessels.”
[Sidenote: Superiority of native American seamen, owing to their
education.]
In confirmation of this opinion, Mr. Consul Peter, of Philadelphia,
states[11]: “A lad intended for the higher grades of the merchant
service in this country, after having been at school for some years and
acquired (in addition to the ordinary branches of school learning) a
competent knowledge of Mathematics, Navigation, Ships’ husbandry, and
perhaps French, is generally apprenticed to some respectable merchant,
in whose counting-house he remains two or three years, or at least
until he becomes familiar with exchanges and such other commercial
matters as may best qualify him to represent his principal in foreign
countries. He is then sent to sea, generally in the capacity of second
mate, from which he gradually rises to that of captain.”
Besides this, however, it must be remembered that American shipowners
offered greater inducements than the English then did to young men of
talent and education to enter the merchant service, as the amount of
wages, alone, was two- and three-fold greater in the former than in the
latter. Again, the American shipmasters were, also, almost invariably
admitted, nay frequently solicited by the managing owners, to take some
shares in the ships placed under their command; and, in cases, where
the master had no capital, the owner often conveyed to him a share of
one-sixth, and sometimes even one quarter, to be paid for out of his
wages and the profits of the ships. Thus young men of good position and
talent were led to enter the American merchant service, and had much
greater inducements than they would then have had in Great Britain to
take a zealous interest in the economy, discipline, and success of the
ship they commanded; and this, not merely from the fact that they were
well recommended, but from the confidential and courteous treatment
they received from their employers. Captains of the larger class of
packets or merchant-ships, therefore, could not only afford to live as
gentlemen, but, if men of good character and fair manners (which they
generally were), they were received into the best mercantile circles on
shore. They were also allowed, besides their fixed salary, a percentage
(usually 2½ per cent.) on all freights, and by various other privileges
(particularly in relation to passengers) they were thus enabled to
save money and to become, in time, merchants and shipowners on their
own account, a custom which prevailed, to a large extent, in the New
England States.
[Sidenote: Excellent schools and early training for them.]
Nor were the interests of the common seamen overlooked. Boys of all
classes, when fit, had the privilege of entering the higher free
schools, in which they could be educated for almost every profession.
An ignorant American native seaman was, therefore, scarcely to be
found; they all, with few exceptions, knew how to read, write, and
cypher. Although, in all nations, a mariner is considered a citizen
of the world, whose home is on the sea, and, as such, can enforce
compensation for his labour in the Courts of any country, his contract
being recognised by general jurisprudence, the cases of disputes
between _native-born_ Americans and their captains have ever
been less frequent both in this country and abroad than between
British masters and seamen, owing, in a great measure, to the superior
education and the more rigorous discipline on board American vessels.
In the United States, the master of the ship was, and is still, usually
employed to hire the seamen; and although, in hiring, he is the agent
of the owners (and they have co-ordinate power), still if they do not
dissent, the engagement entered into by the master with the seamen is
binding on the owners also. The contract is, however, not made with
the person of the master, but with the shipowners; therefore, if there
is no master, the seamen contract to sail under any master who may be
appointed. Thus, on the one side of the contract is the seaman, and, on
the other, the master or owner—the master acting as the owner’s agent,
under ordinary circumstances, although the owner, from his holding the
property in the ship, is more directly affected by the contract.
[Sidenote: Spirit and character of the “Shipping Articles,”]
The master and owner, on their side, agree by the contract, technically
termed “Shipping Articles,” which, if drawn up in the prescribed form
and signed by all the seamen, expresses the conditions of the voyage,
with a promise to pay to the mariners their stipulated wages. It is,
also, implied in it that the voyage shall be legal, and the vessel
provided with the various requisites for navigation; and, further, that
it shall be within defined limits and without deviation, except such
as may be absolutely necessary for the safety of the crew, vessel,
or cargo. It is also a part of the contract that the seamen shall be
treated with humanity, and be provided with subsistence according to
the laws of their country; unless there is in it an express provision
to the contrary, or a condition to conform with the usages of a
particular trade.
[Sidenote: as affecting the seamen;]
The seaman, on his side, by the act of signing the “Shipping Articles,”
contracts to do all in his power for the welfare of the ship; engages
that he has competent knowledge for the performance of the duties of
the station for which he contracts; to be on board at the precise time
which, by American law, constitutes a part of the articles; and to
remain in the service of the ship till the voyage has been completed.
If he does not so report himself on board the vessel, he may be
apprehended and committed to the custody of the law till the ship is
ready to sail. He contracts also to obey all the lawful commands of
the master; to preserve order and discipline aboard, and to submit,
as a child to its parent, for the purpose of securing such order and
discipline during the voyage.[12]
[Sidenote: the owners;]
As in England, the owners have the right of removing a master, who
is part owner of a vessel; but, if he is removed without good cause,
and while at the same time specially engaged, they are liable to him
for damages. Where, however, he has only a general engagement with
a vessel, his relation to the owners is scarcely more than a mere
agency, revocable at any time. On the other hand, the master cannot
leave the ship in which he has contracted to sail without being himself
answerable to the owners.
The authority of a master over his ship is in all essential particulars
the same as that prescribed by British law. With regard to letting the
ship, the same principles prevail on both sides of the Atlantic.[13]
In general the owners are responsible for injuries committed by
the master in that capacity, as in cases of collision, discharges
of mariners, damages to cargo from want of ordinary care, and
embezzlement. The master is answerable for all contracts made by him
in connexion with the navigation of a ship, as also for all damages
arising from his want of skill or care, and for repairs and supplies,
except when furnished on the exclusive credit of the owner.
[Sidenote: and the masters or consignees.]
If the master of a ship is at the same time commander and consignee,
he stands in the twofold relation of agent of the owner and consignor,
and is invested with appropriate duties in both capacities. Inasmuch
as the master and owner are in the eyes of the American law common
carriers, it is the master’s duty to see that his vessel is seaworthy
and provided with a proper crew, to take a pilot, where required by
custom or law, to stow the goods properly, to set sail in fair weather,
to transport the cargo with care, and to provide against all but
inevitable mishaps. In other respects, American and English laws are
almost identical; the admirable decisions of Judge Story, Chancellor
Kent, and Chief Justice Marshall having, however, made some refined
distinctions.
[Sidenote: Conditions of wages,]
[Sidenote: and remedies for their non-payment; and the other securities
for seamen.]
As it was considered the duty of sailors to remain by their vessel
till the cargo was discharged, they had no claim to their wages till
then, but, if these were not paid within ten days after such discharge,
they had a right to an admiralty process against the vessel. Only
one-third of the wages earned can be demanded by the mariner at any
port of delivery during the voyage. There may be on this subject a
special stipulation; but, if the ship be lost or captured, wages earned
up to the last port of delivery may be recovered by the mariner,
on his return home, to the place to which the vessel has carried
freight; freight being by the laws of all nations “the Mother of
Wages:” inasmuch, however, as they depend upon the vessel’s safety
and the earning of the freight, they cannot be insured. In all cases
of capture, the seamen lose their wages, unless the ship is restored.
In cases of rescue, recapture, and ransom, the wages of mariners are
subject to a general average, but in no other case are they liable to
contribute. In cases of shipwreck the rule prevails, as elsewhere,
that, if parts of the ship be saved by the exertions of the seamen,
they hold a lien on those parts for some kind of compensation, but this
is viewed somewhat in the light of salvage. When a seaman dies on
board ship, wages are usually allowed up to the time of his decease,
if the cause of death occurred during the term of his engagement,
and otherwise than by his own fault. In the whale-fishery, the
representatives of a deceased mariner are entitled to that share of
the profits which the term of his service bore to the whole voyage,
according to his contract. If a voyage is broken up by the fault of
the master or owner, full compensation must be given to the seaman;
so also, in cases of wrongful discharge, the seaman usually recovers
full indemnification in American Courts of law. Indeed they have more
effectual remedies for the recovery of their wages than the seamen of
most other countries, from the fact that Americans have followed the
ancient laws already quoted: moreover, they have their remedy against
the master, and can recover their wages from him personally, or from
the owner or owners of the vessel, or from the person who appointed the
master and gave him his authority.
For personal injuries inflicted by the master upon the seamen, such
as assaults, batteries, or imprisonments, the seaman in the United
States has his remedy by an action at common law, or by a libel in
the Admiralty Courts, in what is technically denominated “a cause of
damage.” So, also, in a wrongful discharge, an action would be not only
on the special tort committed, but also for the wages on the original
contract of hiring, the wrongful discharge being void.
[Sidenote: Power of appeal by them to the Admiralty Courts.]
In order to institute suits in the Courts of Admiralty in the United
States it is necessary that the voyage should be on tidal waters, and
that the service on which suit is brought should be connected with
commerce and navigation. The jurisdiction of those Courts in America
extends to personal suits, and includes claims founded in contract and
in wrong, and also those cases where claims, founded in a hypothecary
interest of the nature of a lien, are urged and adjudicated upon.
Their jurisdiction extends, moreover, to those cases in which shares
of fish, taken on the Bank and other Cod-fisheries, and of oil in the
Whale-fishery, are claimed; and, as in English Courts, the seaman may
unite his claims, though founded on distinct contracts, in one suit,
but this only when demanding wages. The Courts of Common Law in the
United States also take cognizance of mariners’ contracts, but they are
not competent to give a remedy so as to enforce the mariner’s lien on
the vessel; hence, they confine their jurisdiction to personal suits
against the master or owner, in accordance with the contract made with
the seaman; but, in cases of tort committed on the high seas, and where
the form of action is trespass, or a special action, the common law has
concurrent jurisdiction.
The laws of the United States[14] expressly provide that the crews of
merchant vessels shall have the fullest liberty to lay their complaints
before their consuls abroad, and shall in no respect be restrained
therein by any master or officer, unless some sufficient and valid
objection exist against their landing, in which case it is the duty of
the master to apprize the consul forthwith, stating the reason why the
seaman is not permitted to land; whereupon, the consul must proceed on
board, and act as the law directs. In all cases where deserters are
apprehended the consul is required to investigate the facts, and, if
satisfied that the desertion was caused by unusual or cruel treatment,
the mariner shall be, in such case, not merely discharged, but shall
receive, in addition to his wages, three months’ pay, and the whole act
is required to be entered upon the crew-list and shipping articles,
with full particulars of the nature of this treatment. Any consul or
commercial agent of the United States neglecting or omitting to perform
his duties, or guilty of malversation or abuse of power, is liable
to an action from the parties aggrieved; and, for corrupt conduct in
office, he is liable to indictment, and on conviction may be fined from
one to ten thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not less than one, or
more than five, years.
[Sidenote: Laws with reference to pilots.]
Although Congress possesses the power to make the laws necessary for
the regulation of _Pilots_, and the whole business of pilotage
is within its authority, there is no general law for these purposes,
and the superintendence of pilots is left to the legislation of the
individual States. By the _Act of 7 August, 1789_, it was enacted
that all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of
the United States should continue to be regulated by the existing laws
of the States respectively, until further legislative proceeding by
Congress. The licensing of pilots and fixing rates of pilotage were
therefore thus arranged at first; but, as some difficulties arose, it
was enacted by the Act 2 March, 1837, that it was lawful for the master
or commander of any vessel coming into, or going out of, any port
situate upon waters forming the boundaries of any two States to employ
any duly licensed or authorised pilot of either State.[15]
[Sidenote: Character of American seamen, especially, of the New
Englanders.]
The native-born American seamen are bold, adventurous, and brave. In
their merchant vessels the proportion of native seamen is estimated
at about one-third, while it was a common remark that “the rest are
rascally Spaniards, surly John Bulls, Zealanders, Malays, anything of
any country.” The American native-born seaman is frequently promoted
to be an officer, and, sometimes, to the command of large ships, but
there are perpetual complaints that the people of the United States
do not “take to the sea” with alacrity. Indeed, it is only in the New
England States that the sailor’s life may be said to belong to the soil
itself, and even the natives of that comparatively barren soil and
rigorous climate become sailors, perhaps less from love of adventure
and from their natural hardiness, than from necessity. When boys
they had, perhaps, widowed mothers to support, younger brothers and
sisters to care for, and, there being no other congenial occupation,
they “go to sea.” When complaining of his “dog’s life,” the American
sailor sits by the hour whittling a stick, and building little boats
for his child, recounting at the same time the perils and hardships
of the sea. Like British seamen, he has always his pet ship, in which
most of his experience has been acquired, and the name of that ship is
oftenest on his lips. It is associated with the story of his loves,
with the memory of his friendships, and he dates all eras from his
several voyages in the vessel of the “one loved name.” As New England
was the great storehouse of American seamen, there the best specimens
of their seafaring population were to be found. We have seen, even
in our time, the puritanical, weather-beaten, Boston skipper—once so
famous—sharp as a north-easter, dressed in knee-breeches and buckles,
with a three-cornered cocked-hat, not forgetting the pigtail, the very
personification of our Commodore Trunnion and Piper of a century ago.
But, though they may have degenerated since then, the seamen engaged in
the deep-sea fisheries are still a remarkably hardy, robust race, and,
hence, have succeeded in that branch of maritime enterprise far more
than our own adventurers of late years.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _See_ Alexander Baring’s pamphlet, 1808.
[2] In 1860, the United States owned a larger amount of tonnage,
including lake and river steamers, than the United Kingdom, and nearly
as much as Great Britain and all her colonies and possessions combined.
[3] State papers, America, ‘Commerce and Navigation,’ vol. ii. p. 413.
[4] The names appended to the petition are nearly all Anglo-Saxon, such
as Rogers, Jones, Howard, &c.
[5] In 1818, the whole of the exports from New Orleans was only in
value a little more than three million sterling; in 1850 it had reached
thirty millions; the shipments of raw cotton alone in that year being
1,600,000 bales. During the year ending June 30, 1874, the exports of
that article to _foreign countries_ were 2,883,785 bales from the
port of New Orleans alone.
[6] In the year ending 30th September, 1822, the tonnage of American
vessels entered inwards at New York was 217,538 tons, cleared 185,666,
against 22,478, and 17,784 tons foreign vessels, respectively. But for
the year ending June 30, 1874, the proportion of entrances at the Port
of New York was: American vessels, 1,124,055 tons; foreign vessels,
3,925,563. The clearances were in somewhat the same proportion.
The chief causes of these extraordinary changes will appear in the
course of this work. In 1850, 2,632,788 tons of American shipping,
and 1,728,214 tons of foreign shipping cleared from the ports of the
United States. In 1860, the relative proportions were, native vessels,
6,165,924 tons: foreign, 2,624,005; but in 1871, while the clearances
of American vessels had fallen to 3,982,852 tons, the clearances of
foreign vessels from the ports of the United States had risen to
9,207,396 tons! I take these startling figures, which I wish my readers
to bear in mind, from the United States’ official reports, for history
is of little value unless it teaches useful lessons.
[7] Among the leading merchants of Boston and Salem then engaged in
this lucrative trade may be mentioned the names of Russell, Derby,
Cabot, Thorndike, Barrell, Brown, Perkins, Bryant, Sturgis, Higginson,
Shaw, Lloyd, Lee, Preble, Peabody, Mason, Jones, and Gray. From 1786 to
1798, Thomas Russell was one of the most enterprising and successful
merchants of Boston. His charities were extensive; he was a warm friend
to the clergy, and a liberal supporter of all religious institutions.
Curiously enough, a member of the families (by the father and mother’s
side), of Perkins and of Bryant and Sturgis (Russell Sturgis), now
fills the place which Joshua Bates so long occupied as a leading
partner in the house of Baring Brothers and Co., of London; Joshua
Bates himself having first come to London as agent for Gray, the last
name on the list I have given. Towards the close, however, of last
century, Brown and Ives of Providence, Peabody of Salem, and T. H.
Smith of New York, with Perkins and Co., and Bryant and Sturgis of
Boston, carried on nearly all the trade with China.
[8]
[Sidenote: Stephen Girard, the rich and eccentric American shipowner.]
Though altogether unlike Mr. Russell and the other shipowners and
merchants of Boston I have just named, I cannot omit to mention, in
connexion with the early history of the Merchant Shipping of the United
States, the name of Stephen Girard, one of the most prosperous and
eccentric of men, who was long known as the “rich shipowner and banker
of Philadelphia.” Born near Bordeaux, in 1750, of obscure parents, he,
at the age of ten or twelve years, embarked as a cabin boy, with only
a very limited knowledge of the elements of reading and writing, on
a vessel bound for the West Indies. Thence he sailed in the service
of an American shipmaster, to whom he had engaged himself, as an
apprentice, for New York. He soon rose to be mate and master, and,
after making a little money, he opened a small store in Philadelphia,
and also carried on a shipping business with New Orleans and St.
Domingo. At the latter place a tragical circumstance occurred strongly
illustrative of the troubles of the time, but which contributed
materially to swell Girard’s fortune. It chanced that at the moment
of the insurrection of St. Domingo, Girard had two vessels lying near
the wharf in one of the ports of that island. On the sudden outbreak,
the planters, instinctively rushed to the harbour and deposited their
most valuable treasures in the ships then there for the purpose of
safety; but returned themselves in order to collect more property. As
the greater part of them were massacred, few remained to claim the
property, and as a large portion of it had been deposited in Girard’s
vessels, for which no claims were made, he thus became its owner. In
1791 he commenced building a class of beautiful ships, long the pride
of Philadelphia, for the trade with Calcutta and China—their names,
however,—the _Montesquieu_, _Helvetius_, _Voltaire_, and _Rousseau_—too
conspicuously reveal the religious dogmas of their owner. By judicious
and successful operations in banking, combined with shipowning, Girard
made so large a fortune that, in 1813, he was considered the wealthiest
trader in the United States. It is told of him that when, in that
year, one of his vessels with a cargo consisting of teas, nankeens,
and silks from China, was seized on entering the Delaware, he ransomed
her from the captors on the spot by a payment of $93,000, paid in
doubloons, and by this transaction added half a million of dollars to
his fortune! But Girard, with all his wealth, ended his career without
a friend or relative to soothe his declining years and close his eyes
in death. His legacies were large and numerous, while the largest of
them were characteristic of the man. Among these may be named his
bequest of 208,000 acres of land and thirty slaves to the city of New
Orleans, and other large tracts of land in Louisiana to the Corporation
of Philadelphia. To the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania he gave $30,000
for internal improvements; but the most extraordinary of his bequests
was $2,000,000, which he left for the erection of an orphan college
at Philadelphia—a magnificent building—and the endowment of suitable
instructors, requiring and enjoining, however, by his will, “that no
ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever shall ever
hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said college;
nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a
visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said
college.” Such was Stephen Girard, master and mariner.
[9] _Vide_ Mr. Calhoun’s report, ‘Executive Documents,’ 2nd
Session, 28th Congress, Document No. 95. 1844-45.
[10] Letter addressed by Mr. Sherwood, British Consul for Maine and
New Hampshire, U.S., to Foreign Office, July 23, 1847, see Par. Paper,
‘Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1848,’ p. 382.
[11] Papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1848,
p. 388.
[12] Act of 20th July, 1840, section 3, U.S. Acts, Boston Ed., vol. v.
p. 394.
[13] For some very nice points of distinction, the reader may consult
‘Arnold’s Marine Insurance,’ Ed. 1857, where the decisions of Judge
Story and Chancellor Kent are laid down with profound learning and
judgment.
[14] Act 20th July, 1840, 16th and 17th sections.
[15] In a note to this Act (Statutes at Large U.S., Boston, 1850) will
be found an admirable exposition of some decisions of the American
Courts respecting the scope of a pilot’s duties. They are excellent,
but too long to insert here.
CHAPTER II.
Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen—Practice in
Denmark—In Norway and Sweden—Russia and Prussia—France—Remarkable
care of seamen in Venice, Scuola di San Nicolo—Character of
this institution, and general working—Variously modified since
first creation—State since 1814—Qualifications of Venetian
shipmasters—Present regulations of Austria—Great Britain—Need
of a public institution for merchant seamen—The “Belvidere” or
Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution, _note_—Mr. Williams,
observations by, on the advantage of a general Seaman’s Fund,
_note_—Institution in Norway—Foreign Office circular of
July 1, 1843—Its value, though unfair and one-sided—Replies to
circular—Mr. Consul Booker—Mr. Consul Baker—Mr. Consul Yeames—The
Consul at Dantzig—The Consuls of Genoa, Ancona, and Naples—Mr.
Consul Sherrard—Mr. Consul MacTavish—Mr. Consul Hesketh—Reports
from the Consuls in South America—General conclusions of Mr.
Murray, Nov. 22, 1847, and suggestions for remedies—Board
of Trade Commission, May 17, 1847—Its results—Shipowners
condemned for the character of their ships and officers—Views of
Government—Necessity of a competent Marine Department.
[Sidenote: Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen.]
Although it can scarcely be said that the character of British seamen
degenerated from the time America declared her independence till
towards the close of the first half of the present century, there is no
doubt that those of other nations were making rapid strides in advance
of them. Indeed, many causes had combined to raise, alike, the position
of the shipowners and seamen of foreign nations, not the least of these
being the protection afforded to our shipowners by the Navigation
Laws, as under that protective system they felt it less necessary to
exert themselves to contend with the foreigner as keenly as, under
other circumstances, they would surely have done. Most foreign nations
had also directed their attention, long before we did, to the necessity
of thorough education for their seafaring population—a policy they have
since maintained. With that object in view, schools were established
at all their principal seaports, where not merely the rudiments of
navigation were taught the youths, but considerable attention was also
devoted to their moral and intellectual improvement.
[Sidenote: Practice in Denmark.]
In Denmark, for instance, the system of education for the higher
grades of the merchant service was particularly strict and effective.
No Danish subject was allowed to act as master of a merchant vessel
unless he had previously made two voyages in the capacity of mate,
while the mates themselves had, and still have, to submit to a general
examination, embracing (1st) a knowledge of dead-reckoning, the nature
and use of logarithms, and the first rudiments of geometry; (2nd) the
nature and use of the compass and log; and (3rd) the form and motions
of the earth, and the geographical lines projected on its surface,
so as to be able to determine the position of different places. It
was also expected that he should understand the nature of Mercator’s
charts, and the mode of laying down the ship’s course on them, together
with such calculations as may be necessary for this purpose. Expertness
in keeping a journal, in the use of the quadrant, and in making the
necessary allowances for currents, lee-way, and the variations of the
compass, were all required, together with some idea of the daily motion
of the celestial bodies, of the sun’s proper motion, and the meaning
of the words “horizon,” “refraction,” “semi-diameter,” “radius,” and
“parallax.” He was also required to know how to use the instruments
for calculating the elevation of the sun and stars, and the distance
between objects on shore! Nor, indeed, was his examination limited to
the more ordinary details of a navigator’s duty. He was expected to be
expert in ascertaining what star enters the meridian at a given time
at the highest and the lowest elevations, as well as in finding the
latitude, both by means of the meridian height of the sun or of a star,
and in determining the time for high and low water. He was further
expected to understand the mode of calculating the time of sunrise and
sunset, and of ascertaining the variations of the compass by means of
one or more bearings in the horizon, and by the azimuth.
[Sidenote: In Norway and Sweden.]
In Norway and Sweden, mates of ships had to undergo a similar
examination before being allowed to act in that capacity, and a still
more rigid examination both as regards seamanship, navigation, and the
general knowledge of business relating to shipping affairs, before
they could command a vessel, together with a knowledge of the Customs
and Navigation Laws, and of the usual averages and exchange. They had
likewise to know something of the elements of shipbuilding, and of the
mode of measuring a ship’s capacity.
[Sidenote: Russia and Prussia.]
In Russia and Prussia the mates and masters of merchant vessels,
besides the qualifications above referred to, were required not merely
to read and write their own language with accuracy, but to have some
knowledge also of English and French.
So early as 1806 a school was founded in Nicolaieff to train masters
and pilots for the commercial marine, which, in 1832, was enlarged and
removed to Cherson, while another and similar establishment was at
the same time founded in St. Petersburg. All coasting vessels are now
bound to have masters who have left these schools with certificates
of competency. But the most important measure for the encouragement
of seamen in Russia, whether employed in river or sea navigation, was
enacted in 1826; families devoted to navigation being then for the
first time incorporated in certain towns along the sea coasts and great
rivers under the designation of “Corporations of Free Mariners.” These
corporations were exempted from the capitation and land taxes, and from
the conscription and quartering of troops, on condition that they sent
their young men to serve for five years as apprentices in the Imperial
fleet.
[Sidenote: France.]
The system, however, of combining the services of seamen for the navy
and the mercantile marine alike has been more thoroughly organised
in France than in any other country. There the State and Commercial
Navy are under the same code of regulations, the members of each being
equally entitled to a pension after a certain length of service: in
fact, all seamen in France are held to be in Government employ; their
names are registered in the office of the Marine Commissioners of the
port to which they belong, and, from the age of eighteen to fifty, they
are liable to be ordered at any time on board a Government ship, to
serve as long as necessary. Hence it is that almost every seaman or
fisherman of France has served in the navy for at least three years. At
the age of fifty, and on the completion of a service at sea of three
hundred months in either the navy or the merchant marine, a seaman
receives a pension according to a certain scale, whereby, however, he
cannot get more than six hundred francs, or less than ninety-six francs
per annum. But these pensions are not really paid by the State, as a
deduction of three per cent. is made from the monthly pay of every
seaman in either service, so as to provide a fund for their payment.
France also provides for her seafaring classes more liberal and
effective means of education than are, perhaps, to be found in any
other country. A professor, paid by Government, resides in each of
its principal ports, who affords to all, seeking to be commanders in
the merchant service, instruction, free of charge, on the different
subjects connected with their profession.[16]
[Sidenote: Remarkable care of seamen in Venice; Scuola di San Nicolo.]
Seaman’s funds, somewhat similar to those in France, have been
established by all other European nations, though the objects in view
have differed. That in England, well known as the Merchant Seaman’s
Fund, was instituted during the early part of the present century,
for the benefit solely of merchant seamen, who were not under any
obligation to serve in ships of war, though, during the great war, they
were too frequently pressed into the service. All these associations
appear to have had their origin with the Italian Republics, and that
of Venice is of considerable historical importance, forming as it did
the basis on which nearly all the others have been engrafted. This
institution, called the _Scuola di San Nicolo_, was originally
founded at that city in the year 1476, in commemoration of the
successful defence of Scutari by the Venetians against the Turks.
Greenwich Hospital, in some respects, resembles it, but the Venetian
institution had attached to it a Merchant Seaman’s Fund, distinctly
intended for the relief of the old and infirm sailors of that service.
The building itself was destroyed in 1806, but the institution still
survives.
[Sidenote: Character of this institution;]
In 1786, the laws relating to this excellent institution having been
carefully revised, required that all seamen, whether Venetians or
foreigners, as a condition of their employment in the Venetian merchant
service, should inscribe their names at the Scuola di San Nicolo.
Foreigners domiciled, who had been employed in the sea service of
Venice for the space of five years, were also entitled to the benefits
of the institution to the same extent as natives.
On the first inscription, each man had to pay three Venetian livres
and two soldi (about 2_s._ 1_d._) as entrance money, and,
subsequently, an annual contribution of one livre and eleven soldi
(1_s._ 1½_d._). In addition to the above, every sailor or
other person of the crew of a vessel was bound to pay twenty soldi
(10_d._) for each voyage out and home.
All who had been inscribed two years, and had punctually paid their
contributions, were entitled to the benefits of the institution, that
is, to medical attendance and lodging in the Hospital of Invalids,
when advanced in years or infirm. Children, it would seem, were only
eligible in cases where the fathers had sailed for ten years beyond the
limits of the Gulf of Venice, or along the Dalmatian coast.
[Sidenote: and general working.]
[Sidenote: Variously modified since first creation.]
The “Scuola di San Nicolo,” as above described, was preserved with all
its laws and rules during the first occupation of the Austrians, from
1797 to 1806, after which it was suppressed by the then Government
of Italy. An invalid fund was then established, which may be called
an institution for the relief of invalid sailors. One-sixtieth was
deducted from all payments made on account of the navy, and assigned
to it; it thus becoming, in reality, a military institution, under
the protection of the Royal Navy. Subsequently additional funds were
assigned to it, in the shape of a percentage on all prizes, the
proportion given depending on whether the prize or its captor were a
ship of war, a privateer, or a merchant vessel.
By a decree of 1811, the endowment of the institution was further
augmented, and the means of giving relief were consequently increased.
Three per cent., instead of one-sixtieth, was granted out of the pay of
the Royal Navy; and merchant seamen were likewise obliged to contribute
their respective shares of pay or prize money. Finally, in addition to
the percentage on prizes, the following casual sources of emolument
were set aside for this institution:—The proceeds of wrecked vessels,
if not claimed within a certain time; the pay due to sailors or others,
who had deserted from vessels in the service of the State; half of the
pay due to deserters from the merchant service; and the amount due on
account of pay, prize-money, &c., to sailors or others dying at sea,
if not claimed within a certain time. The immediate direction of the
establishment was vested in the Comptroller of the Marine, under the
supervision of the Royal Navy Board.
[Sidenote: State since 1814.]
After the return of the Austrian government in 1814, the civil and
military establishment and their administration were separated. Invalid
sailors of the navy were placed on the same footing as soldiers, and
the institution was then kept up and applied solely to the benefit of
the commercial marine, under the title of “The Charitable Institution
for Invalids of the Venetian Commercial Navy.” The administration of
this establishment was vested in the office of Captain of the Port,
under the control of the Government.
Merchant seamen sailing in vessels entered on the registers of the
Venetian provinces contribute to its support at the rate of three per
cent. on their pay, whether captains, officers, or men; this sum to be
paid at the office of the Captain of the Port by the captain or owner
of the vessel, according to the muster-roll of the crew. Instead of the
casual sources of revenue granted by the decree of 1811, above quoted,
this institution is now endowed, in lieu of the moiety of the unclaimed
pay of deserters from the merchant service, with an equivalent sum
together with the amount of all fines levied on seafaring persons
for infringement of the naval laws and regulations. The capital thus
accruing is invested in the public funds, and the interest applied to
the relief of the deserving, according to the following scale:—Captain,
one Austrian livre (about 8_d._ sterling) daily; an officer,
eighty centimes daily; and a sailor, about seventy centimes daily;
their widows receiving respectively one-half the above sums. In
making selections from the candidates for relief, regard is had to
the most aged and infirm. There is no building now appropriated for
the reception of the aged and infirm, but the sick are admitted, on
application, to the Civil Hospital in Venice. Orphan children are not
entitled under the rules to relief: indeed these regulations, like
others of a similar character, seem but provisional; but, as they
embrace the general features of the Austrian and French systems, they
merit attention.
[Sidenote: Qualifications of Venetian shipmasters.]
The law of the Venetian Republic of 1786, relative to the merchant
service, shows the pains taken in former times by the Republic to
secure efficient and well-educated men for the command of their
merchant vessels. It may be inferred that no conditions were imposed
on persons desirous of commanding merchant vessels previously to
this law, as, by one of its provisions, it was not to affect persons
then in employment as captains or masters—a principle adopted by
Great Britain in her recent Mercantile Marine Acts. Those desirous of
becoming captains or masters were required to prove that they were
Venetian subjects; or if foreigners, that they had been naturalised and
had resided in the State without intermission, or had been employed
in the Venetian sea service for fifteen years. In addition to this
it was requisite for the candidates to give proof of being at least
twenty-four years of age; of having served at sea for eight years,
either in a private ship or in one belonging to the State, before they
could command a ship. Every one, too, besides being able to read and
write, was required to satisfy competent examiners that he was versed
in the theory and practice of navigation. A Venetian subject, having an
interest or share in a vessel and being duly qualified, was, however,
entitled to command in preference to any other master.
[Sidenote: Present regulations of Austria.]
The Austrians, following the example of their provinces, now require
candidates for the command of merchant vessels to show that they are
twenty-one years of age, and are domiciled in the Austrian dominions:
that they have served not less than five years in national vessels
other than coasting vessels, and that their general conduct has been
good. They are required to undergo a severe examination before a
commission, consisting of the officer of government charged with the
affairs of navigation and trade, the Professor of mathematics in the
Naval College, the Captain of the port, one member of the Chamber
of Commerce, and two experienced merchant captains. Candidates are
required to answer theoretical and practical nautical questions; to
solve such problems as are set before them, and show that they are
acquainted with naval laws and discipline, before they can take the
command of merchant ships.
[Sidenote: Great Britain.]
Strange to say, Great Britain, the greatest of all maritime nations,
has only, at a comparatively recent period, established a system, to
which I shall hereafter refer, whereby all masters and mates in her
service are now required to undergo an examination: unlike France,
however, she still leaves whatever may be the expense of gaining the
previous and fundamental knowledge to be borne by themselves.
[Sidenote: Need of a public institution for merchant seamen.]
It would weary my readers were I to give further details of the
different modes established in other nations for securing the due
qualifications of masters and seamen, or for providing institutions for
their benefit in sickness and old age. With the exception of Greenwich
Hospital, created for the benefit of seamen serving in the Royal Navy,
England possesses no State institution appropriated exclusively for the
education of our merchant seamen, or for their benefit in sickness or
old age. The Merchant Seaman’s Fund was abolished[17] in 1851; and I
know of no institution in this country where the aged seaman can find
refuge, except one which was recently established, and is maintained by
voluntary subscriptions.[18] There are, of course, numerous charitable
institutions—far more than in any other country—where seamen, as well
as all other classes of the community, are to some extent provided
for. But it is to be regretted that, when the Merchant Seaman’s Fund
was abolished, some great institution, under the authority of the
State, to be supported mainly by the seamen, as well as by voluntary
contributions and otherwise, was not then attempted for their special
use, so as to afford them some certainty that they would receive either
outdoor or indoor relief (the former is preferable) when no longer able
to provide for themselves.[19]
[Sidenote: Institution in Norway.]
One of the best of these institutions was formed in Norway, in
conformity with the royal rescript of the 23rd December, 1834. It is
maintained, by voluntary contributions from seamen and others, by
penalties arising from offences of seamen, and, in some measure, by
Government aid. The claimants on this society are those seamen who,
while employed, contribute regularly to its funds. Its affairs are
managed by directors consisting chiefly of shipmasters. Seamen who, on
foreign voyages, leave their vessels without permission of the master,
lose any rights they may have acquired; while such of them as are
entitled to claim, or their relicts, must prove to the satisfaction of
the directors that they stand in need of aid. Shipwrecked seamen also
receive aid from this society.
Institutions like these, combined with the course of examination
required from all men holding responsible positions on board ship, tend
materially to improve the condition of foreign seamen, and to give
them advantages too long withheld from the British. These advantages,
combined with the unwise protection afforded by the Navigation Laws
to the shipowners and seamen of Great Britain, gave foreign nations,
for a time, a decided superiority over them. Indeed, it was found that
during the first half of the present century neither the ships nor
their crews kept pace with those of other maritime nations, till at
length it became _necessary_ to adopt measures, not merely for the
improvement of the condition of our ships, but likewise for raising our
seafaring population, by means of a sound education, to such a position
as would enable them to compete successfully under all circumstances
with the ships and seamen of other states.
[Sidenote: Foreign Office circular of July 1, 1843.]
[Sidenote: Its value, though unfair and one-sided.]
With that important object in view, the English Foreign Office issued a
circular on the 1st July, 1843, to all our consuls abroad, requesting
information respecting the conduct and character of British shipmasters
and seamen frequenting foreign ports; the replies to which produced
a large mass of valuable information, presented to Parliament in
1848.[20] But this information would have been still more valuable
had it been obtained in a less one-sided and invidious manner. “I am
particularly desirous,” remarks the writer of the circular, Mr. James
Murray, “of gaining information in regard to instances which have come
under your observation of the _incompetency of British shipmasters
to manage their vessels and their crews_, whether arising from
deficiency of knowledge of practical navigation and seamanship, or of
moral character, particularly want of sobriety.... My object is to show
the necessity for more authoritative steps on the part of Her Majesty’s
Government to remedy what appears to be an evil, detrimental to, and
seriously affecting the character of, our commercial marine, and
therefore advantageous to foreign rivals, whose merchant vessels are
said to be exceedingly well manned and navigated.”
[Sidenote: Replies to circular.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Booker.]
With this assumption, that British ships and seamen did exhibit the
inferiority suggested by the writer of the circular, it was but natural
that the answers to it should, as a rule, be in conformity with the
prejudged and premature opinions expressed in it. Voluminous documents
poured in from the different consulates, and, certainly, some of them
contained charges of the gravest character against the owners and crews
of our merchant fleet. The first is a letter (11th July, 1843) from
Vice-Consul Booker, at Cronstadt, who seems to have ransacked his
archives, containing, as these did, the results of an experience of
fifty-nine years—to discover materials whereon he could ground a charge
against the British sailors; but, while admitting that drunkenness was
their principal failing, and that it was “a rare circumstance that
a master is unfit to clear his ship either inwards or outwards,” he
added: “It does not happen above two or three times in the year, in
which case I get hold of the mate, and no stoppage ensues; and, in
the intermediate time, when the ship is loading, the master, if the
worse for liquor, avoids the office.” Of the seamen he remarked: “The
crews behave like too many common Englishmen; take their glass freely
when they can get it, and sell or pawn their clothes when they have no
money; get into scrapes on a Sunday night, and are brought before me on
a Monday, lectured, and discharged.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Baker.]
Consul Baker, of Riga, was more pointed in his charges. He remarked:
“I am sorry to state that, in my opinion, the British commercial
marine is at present in a worse condition than that of any other
nation. Foreign shipmasters are generally a more respectable and sober
class of men than the British. I have always been convinced that,
while British shipowners gain by the more economical manner in which
their vessels are navigated, they are great losers from the serious
delays occasioned, while on the voyage, and discharging and taking
in cargoes, growing out of the incapacity of their shipmasters, and
their intemperate habits. I have had occasion to remark, while consul
in the United States, that American vessels, in particular, will
make three voyages to two of a British vessel, in this way having an
immense advantage over their competitor; and also from the superior
education, and consequent business habits, obtaining better freights
and employment for their vessels on foreign exchanges.” He further
remarked, that, in several instances, he had been compelled, on the
representations of the consignees, to take from shipmasters the command
of their vessels in a foreign port, and to appoint others for the
return voyage; their constant state of intoxication rendering them
wholly “unfit to carry on their duties.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Yeames.]
Consul-General Yeames, writing from Odessa on the 1st December, 1843,
stated, that though in his experience he had known many unexceptionable
and respectable persons in command of British vessels, they, as a rule,
fell very far below the character of commanders of foreign vessels,
more especially those of Austria. He attributed this inferiority in a
great measure to the want of education and an absence of discipline.
“Some of these shipmasters,” he added, “are shamefully illiterate, and
are not qualified to do justice to the interest of owners in common
transactions that occur in this port. There is, too, an impression
here (and certainly among all the foreign merchants) that British
shipmasters are indifferent to the condition of their cargoes, and
careless of their preservation, which is prejudicial at least to our
interests in the carrying trade.”
[Sidenote: The Consul of Dantzig.]
Somewhat similar accounts were received from Gottenburg, and numerous
other ports. “Taken as a whole,” remarked the consul at Dantzig, “there
is not—and I say it with regret—a more troublesome and thoughtless
set of men, to use the mildest term, to be met with than British
merchant-seamen. Only very lately, a master left his vessel, which
was loaded with a valuable cargo and ready for sea, and was, after
several days’ search, found in a house of ill-fame; his mate was very
little better than himself; and his people, following this example, a
set of drunkards.” He added, that occurrences nearly as bad as these
were by no means rare, and that a Prussian vessel was sure to obtain a
preference when freights were remunerative.
[Sidenote: The Consuls of Genoa, Ancona, and Naples.]
From the Mediterranean ports the accounts received were hardly more
favourable to the character of British seamen. The consul at Genoa
stated that it was quite common for captains of vessels at that port
to take up their abode at a tavern; leaving the entire charge of
the vessel in the hands of an ignorant mate, whose whole learning
was not a whit superior to that of a man before the mast, and whose
quarrels with the men or those among themselves were forced upon the
consul for adjustment. At Ancona, the greater part of the masters who
frequented the port were considered by the consul there to be unequal
to the responsible trust imposed in them, not so much from the want of
nautical skill as of sobriety. Out of the shipwrecks which had occurred
during his residence at that port, he considered one to have arisen
from incompetency, one from the inebriety of the master, and one from
causes beyond control. At Naples, the consul spoke of the masters of
British vessels being, on the average, ignorant and uneducated—“little
superior in mental or literary acquirements to the seamen they are
placed over;” and though, on the whole, good seamen, “few of them
understand navigation beyond the mere power of keeping the ship’s
reckoning. Nothing,” he added, “could be more truly disgraceful or
discreditable than the manner of keeping the log-books of the vessels
that resort to this port.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Sherrard.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Consul MacTavish.]
From Trieste, Constantinople, and Alexandria, reports nearly the
same were sent in. Nor were those from our consuls resident in the
United States of a more favourable character. “It was but last week,”
remarked Mr. Sherrard, writing from Portland, 27th July, 1843, “that
I had occasion to take upon myself the risk of sending back to New
Brunswick a vessel, whose master, after disposing of her cargo and
receiving the proceeds, squandered the whole in liquor, leaving his
crew without their wages and the vessel without sea stores.” He
mentioned, also, the instance of another, a British barque, from
England for St. John’s, Newfoundland, which was boarded by a revenue
cutter, the whole crew, including master and mate, being in a helpless
state of intoxication, and the vessel drifting about embayed in a
dangerous place near Mount Desert. From Baltimore the consul, Mr.
MacTavish, wrote that, with few exceptions, “almost all the masters of
English merchantmen which have arrived here from British ports in my
time appear to me incompetent, arising chiefly from inebriety; but,
with regard to colonial vessels, I am happy to say that my experience
has been the reverse of the foregoing; the temperance principle is
becoming very general on board of them, and a manifest improvement is
in progress from that cause;” he added, in reply to questions about
the conduct of masters of Hanseatic ships frequenting Baltimore, that,
in his thirteen years’ experience, he had heard of but one master of
a vessel being a drunkard, and he was at once removed. “They are,” he
said, “invariably competent navigators and good scholars, many of them
belonging to respectable families in Bremen; and most abstemious, the
principal beverage used in the cabin being light-bodied claret and vin
de grave.” Of the British shipmasters frequenting Baltimore he wrote in
very disparaging terms, asserting them to be, in point of intelligence,
address, and conduct, greatly inferior to the shipmasters of either
Bremen or America.
[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Hesketh.]
Mr. Hesketh, writing from Rio de Janeiro, states that, during an
active service of more than thirty years as consul at that port, he
had experienced unwearied trouble and much anxiety, in consequence of
the intemperate habits of the masters and crews of British merchant
vessels, and that cases were not uncommon in which it had been found
absolutely necessary to take from on board all intoxicating liquors.
With regard to their competency in other respects, he said: “I have
come to the conclusion that British shipmasters are frequently
entrusted with commands on voyages requiring more knowledge of the
scientific department of navigation than they possess;” he added,
however, that the masters of large or first-class merchant vessels were
generally fully competent for their duties.
[Sidenote: Reports from the Consuls in South America.]
Similar reports came from the consuls of Bahia, Pernambuco, and
Paraguay; the consul at the last-named port remarking, “shippers now
give such a decided preference to the merchant vessels of Sweden,
Denmark, Sardinia, Hamburg, and Austria, that they are rapidly
engrossing the carrying trade of Brazil; and this alarming fact is
attributed by the most intelligent British merchants and shipmasters,
with whom I have conversed on the subject, to the greater care taken by
foreign masters, and enforced by them on their crews, in the reception
and stowage of their cargoes, which they consequently deliver in
much better order than do British vessels, the masters of which are
in general said to be exceedingly careless and inattentive in this
respect,” an opinion confirmed by Mr. Ellis in his despatch to the
Foreign Office from Rio, 10th December, 1842.
Although, for the reasons I have named, these voluminous reports are
not so impartial as they otherwise might have been, had Mr. Murray,
in his circular-note, merely expressed his desire to ascertain the
facts without expressing any opinion of his own, there is too much
reason for believing that the character of British ships and the
conduct of British crews were then greatly inferior to those of other
nations; hence Mr. Murray’s subsequent memorandum of the 22nd November,
1847, contains unquestionably many valuable suggestions for their
improvement, while his conclusions could hardly be questioned when he
stated:—
[Sidenote: General conclusions of Mr. Murray, Nov. 22, 1847,]
“1st. That the character of British shipping has declined, and that the
character of foreign shipping has improved.
“2nd. That there was not sufficient control over British shipmasters
and seamen, either at home or abroad, while foreign vessels were
subject to considerable control.
“3rd. That there was no system of regular education for the merchant
service of Great Britain, but that, in foreign countries, this matter
was much attended to.
“4th. That the sort of education which a British subject receives, when
training for the higher grades of the merchant sea service, does not
suffice to qualify him to represent with advantage to the merchant by
whom he may be employed that merchant’s interest; and that he may often
neglect those interests and the merchant not be aware of the fact.”
“What was wanted,” Mr. Murray continued, “was not merely a study
of navigation and seamanship, but a thorough knowledge of ship’s
husbandry, and a thorough knowledge of stowage of cargo, of exchanges,
and other commercial information which would qualify a master to act,
if necessary, as the representative of his employer in the character
of merchant; the commander of a ship being in law considered the
representative of the owners of the property on board. It was further
urged that a merchant had no means of accurately ascertaining the
character and capability of shipmasters or of seamen, and really
depended for the safety of his property upon his insurances.”
[Sidenote: and suggestions for remedies]
For these reasons, with a view to maintain the supremacy of Great
Britain in commercial navigation and enterprise, Mr. Murray proposed to
establish “_a Board or Department of Commercial Marine_,” at the
same time pointing out that the want of such a department was greatly
felt in the preparation of any new law, and still more so in the
subsequent process of acting upon it. Nine departments, he explained,
were concerned in the Merchant Sea Service Laws; and there was no
central board to point out to each department how each could best act
for the success of the whole; each department being left to look merely
to those interests committed to its charge, and to its own convenience.
The Board of Trade was indicated as the department to which the
community would naturally look with regard to everything relating to
commerce, whether at sea or on shore.
[Sidenote: Board of Trade Commission, May 17, 1847.]
[Sidenote: Its results.]
Previously to the issue of Mr. Murray’s ‘Memorandum,’ that Board had,
on the 17th May, 1847,[21] announced the intention of Government to
issue a commission without delay to examine into certain matters
relating to the commercial marine. This inquiry confirmed in all
material respects the information previously received by Mr. Murray.
Indeed, three only out of seventy-five reports from consuls stated that
the condition of British shipping had improved rather than declined;
and, in these cases, it was shown that, from the nature of the trade in
which the vessels were engaged—the fruit trade of Greece, and from the
perishable character of their cargoes—the greatest care had to be taken
in selecting the best ships.
There can be no doubt that, as early as 1843, when Mr. Murray issued
his circular letter to the consuls, and more especially in 1847, when
Lord Palmerston ordered further inquiry to be made by means of this
commission, Government saw the time was approaching when great changes
would be demanded, not merely with regard to the Navigation Act, but
likewise in the laws affecting our ships and seamen; and that it would,
ere long, be essential for our own interests to follow the example set
us by foreigners in the education of our seamen, as well as in the
application of public tests to prove the competency of the masters and
officers of British merchant vessels.
[Sidenote: Shipowners condemned for the character of their ships and
officers.]
Strong objections were, however, raised by the shipowners against
any Government interference, on the ground that it would be partial,
and consequently so far unjust, these objections being naturally
strengthened by the manner in which Mr. Murray had set about the
enquiry of 1843. It was, nevertheless, but too evident that, however
much British shipowners might deprecate the assistance or interference
of Government, a large proportion of their ships were commanded
and navigated in a manner reflecting discredit on our national
intelligence, and injurious to the interests of Great Britain; that the
persons placed in command of them were too frequently unfit for their
duties; and that, while many of them were so habitually addicted to
drunkenness as to be altogether incompetent for their position, not a
few of them were almost without education.[22]
Nor in too many instances were the ships much better than their
masters; and hence foreign vessels were frequently chartered in
preference to British, not because, as ships, they were superior
in quality, but on account of the greater care foreign shipmasters
bestowed on the stowage and transport of their cargoes, and from the
fact that being generally educated, sober, intelligent, and capable of
commanding respect and maintaining discipline, the seamen themselves
were consequently more orderly.
[Sidenote: Views of Government.]
For these and numerous other reasons, Government naturally asked
whether it was justifiable that the lives of thousands of persons
should be constantly jeopardised, because shipowners had the power of
placing incompetent persons in charge of their vessels; and whether
it was proper for the State to allow its seafaring population to be
left in ignorance and disorder, and exposed to the evil example of
illiterate and intemperate masters. Many thoughtful men out of doors
also began to enquire if it was right that these men, by sheltering
themselves under the Navigation Laws, should be thus allowed to
encourage the growth and employment of foreign in preference to British
shipping, to the injury of the national interests.
[Sidenote: Necessity of a competent Marine Department.]
Even had it not become apparent that the time had arrived for great
changes in the commercial policy of England, the condition of our
seamen and the state altogether of our merchant service required the
exclusive attention of some such public department as Mr. Murray had
recommended. But such matters, however important, being subsidiary to
the question of the Navigation Laws and their effect upon maritime
commerce, were left in abeyance till these had been fully considered.
FOOTNOTES:
[16] See papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great Britain,
1846, p. 235.
[17] The “Winding-up Act, 1851,” enacted that compulsory contributions
should cease from that date; that those who had paid up till then,
should have the option of continuing these payments, but those
seamen who had not contributed before 1851 should not be admitted.
Thus the fund was practically “abolished,” and is now only in
operation for the purpose, as the Act names, of “winding-up.” This
well-intended Institution had become hopelessly insolvent through the
grossest mismanagement. Its administration was vested in different
irresponsible bodies at the different ports, and while the Legislature
_compelled_ contributions, it took no security for the just
appropriation of these funds, and no security for solvency! The
Winding-up Act of 1851 transferred its affairs to the Board of Trade
for the purpose of paying all existing pensions, and to allow the then
existing contributors to continue their annual payment should they wish
to do so. It has cost the country upwards of 1,000,000_l._, and
will probably cost 500,000_l._ more before all claims have been
satisfied. The pensions granted by the Board of Trade until now (1875)
have been 7528_l._ to masters and seamen, and 14,972_l._ to
widows and children.
[18]
[Sidenote: The “Belvidere,” or “Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s
Institution.”]
The “Belvidere,” known as the “Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution,”
was established, soon after the abolition of the “Merchant Seaman’s
Fund,” mainly through the exertions of the late Mr. William Phillipps,
Mr. George Marshall, and other philanthropic shipowners. The laudable
object of this excellent institution is to provide for the “relief
of aged and worn out merchant seamen of the United Kingdom.” It was
started by a grant of 5000_l._ from the Shipwrecked Mariners’
Society, and is now maintained entirely by legacies, donations, and
annual subscriptions from charitable persons. These amounted, in
1874, to somewhere about 7600_l._, though, out of this sum, the
annual subscriptions were only 1600_l._ Its inmates were then 105
decayed seamen, whose ages ranged from 63 to 85. There were, besides,
in that year 110 persons receiving from its funds 12_l._ per
annum in out-door pensions. The inmates are provided with comfortable
cabins, clothed, a good mess, and have every comfort, with pleasant
grounds for exercise, overlooking the River Thames. All their
physical and spiritual wants are well supplied; and, so far as its
limited funds permit, it has proved of great service, being well and
economically managed. When its claims on the public—I might say on
the country—become better known, its means of doing good will thus, I
hope, be largely extended. Indeed, the Board of Trade having now in
hand upwards of 200,000_l._, arising from the unclaimed wages
and effects of deceased merchant seamen, from the surplus fees of the
mercantile marine, and other similar sources, the question suggests
itself if a portion of these surplus funds could not be appropriated to
the benevolent purposes of the Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution?
[19] In 1859, when a member of the Royal Commission on manning the
Royal Navy, I proposed to my colleagues the establishment of a merchant
seamen’s fund, under Government supervision, as a means of raising
a large portion of the reserves of seamen we were then considering.
Though my views on this and other points were not adopted, they were
published by order of the House of Commons, and accompanied the report;
and as the question is still one of much public importance and still
requires solution, I furnish extracts from these “remarks”:—
[Sidenote: Mr. Williams, observations by, on the advantage of general
Seaman’s Fund.]
“‘Experience has shown,’ says Mr. H. R. Williams, of the Board of
Trade, in his sensible paper on the subject, ‘that any attempt to
establish a merchant seamen’s fund upon the principle of voluntary
payments would not be supported by a large body of seamen. The working
of the Seamen’s Fund Winding-up Act has proved that seamen generally,
whatever advantages may be offered to them, will not voluntarily
contribute to a fund. However great may be the objections, therefore,
to compulsory payments, there is no probability that a fund can be
established with any chance of success upon any other principle.’
“I admit that there is something repugnant to the feelings of the
sailor, and, in fact, to all Englishmen, in the word ‘compulsory,’ when
applied to the management of his own affairs; but, in general practice,
that which would be termed compulsion, if sanctioned and regulated
by the Legislature, is already a voluntary act cheerfully undertaken
by large masses of the people. There is scarcely a handicraft trade
in the kingdom the members of which have not formed themselves
into a society, the object of which is, by means of periodical
subscriptions, to secure a pension or payment in sickness or old age.
Both individually and nationally, every such institution is in the
highest degree commendable. If, therefore, these benefit societies
deserve encouragement and support, when formed for artisans and others
whose occupations are on shore, they merit encouragement and support
still more when their object is to relieve those whose occupation is
at sea. Seamen have no means of forming such associations, as they are
scattered over the whole world, having no organization, no central
power, and no machinery to put such a system into operation. Whatever
incentives they may have to combine together for such a purpose, they
have not the means of carrying into effect their wishes. This appears
to be generally conceded; and we have arrived at the conclusion that it
is the duty of Government to step forward to aid those who, from their
peculiar calling, are incapable of acting themselves.
“Commander Brown, the Registrar, Mr. Baker and Mr. Williams, of the
Board of Trade, together with Captain Pierce, of the Liverpool Sailors’
Home, all concur in the opinion that the time has arrived when a
new seamen’s fund should be established on sound principles under
Government supervision, and upon such a basis as shall offer to the
seaman a strong and powerful inducement to preserve that test which
secures to him substantial maintenance in old age, or when prematurely
worn out. The whole of the machinery necessary to effect this object
is now established at the shipping offices, and in the existing
departments of the Board of Trade, and already in operation upon
12,000 masters and seamen who have contributed to the fund under the
Winding-up Act of 1851.
“... I am of opinion that such an institution would be highly popular,
even with the shipping interest. I say this, with the knowledge that a
seaman may calculate his wages at only 2_l._ 9_s._ instead
of 2_l._ 10_s._ per month; and with the possibility, that
the difference of 1_s._ per month may fall upon the shipowner,
to which class I belong. But if the incidence of this extra shilling
should, in point of fact, fall absolutely upon the shipowners, they
would be gainers thereby, as it is of the highest importance to them
that the seaman should have some substantial tie to bind him to this
country. At present no such tie exists. The British-born seamen become
citizens of the world, and find themselves quite as much at home in
the United States as in their native country. The higher rate of wages
paid in the American ships presents a temptation to them to enter
that service in preference to that of England. Now if some special
inducement were offered to them to remain at home, it would operate to
diminish the number of British seamen in the service of foreign states.
The sailor would thus have also ‘his stake in the public hedge.’ At
present, the exceptional use of savings banks furnishes almost the only
link, for the beneficial use of money-order offices, however great
their advantages, is rather a ready facility given than a permanent
benefit enjoyed.
“With those views, I should propose to make a seamen’s fund the basis
of raising the remaining 18,000 men for a reserve. I think that the
fund should be a general one, to which both seamen in the Royal Navy
and in the mercantile marine should be called upon to subscribe. I
think it would be desirable to break through the line of demarcation
which has so long existed between the two services, and this would
be one step towards effecting that object. I would give seamen of
all classes a common interest in this one great fund, which might be
designated as National.
“I am aware that objections will be raised to any compulsory fund.
I would much prefer to have it a voluntary one; but knowing the
character of the seamen as I do, I am thoroughly convinced that any
fund established even under the auspices and with the guarantee of the
Government, on the voluntary principle, would be a failure.
“... So far as the nation was concerned, the salutary effects of such a
fund would operate in three different ways: it would prevent the seamen
from being objects of charity or claimants upon the poor rates during
their old age; it would be a permanent tie to bind them to their native
country, founded upon a common bond of self-interest; while it would
form the groundwork of a system whereby the reserve of 18,000, still
wanting, might be raised.”
[20] Papers relating to Commercial Marine of Great Britain.
[21] See Sir John Shaw Lefevre’s letter, page 144, part ii., Parl.
Papers relating to Mercantile Marine.
[22] In my own time, I remember a shipowner saying to me that he never
would have a “scholar” in command of any of his vessels, _because_
education taught him how to make up false accounts and the art of
cheating; while another whom I knew, only retained one “educated”
master in his service, because he was flattered by being invariably
addressed by him as “Mr. Joseph Perkins, Esquire.”
CHAPTER III.
High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws—Change necessary,
owing to the Independence of America—Other nations at first
Protectionist—Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with
America—Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues—Shipowners
and loyalists in America successfully resist his scheme—Congress
the first to retaliate—Restrictions injurious, alike, to England
and her Colonies—Commercial treaties with America between 1794
and 1817—Acts of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in
America—Order in Council, July 1826—Conciliatory steps of the
Americans in 1830—Foreigners look with suspicion on any change
in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity treaties of 1824-6—Value of
treaties in early times, but inadequate for the regulation of
commercial intercourse, and liable to unfair diplomacy—Reciprocity
treaties only, partially, of value, and do not check the anomalies
of Protection—Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the Shipowners, who
seek protection against Colonial shipping—Reciprocity must lead
to free navigation—New class of Statesmen, well supported by the
People—Exertions of Lord John Russell, who leads the way against
Protection—Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League—John
Bright—Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6—Sir Robert Peel carries
the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and resigns.
In proceeding to consider the great alterations in the ancient
commercial system of England which have ultimately led to the entire
abrogation of the Navigation Laws, it is advisable to trace their
remarkable history under several distinct heads, premising, however,
that, previously to 1844, their complete repeal had probably not
suggested itself to any of the statesmen who, at various periods, had
held the chief power in England.
[Sidenote: High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws.]
For nearly two centuries an opinion had prevailed in England, as
well as in all foreign countries carrying on maritime commerce, that
the English Navigation Laws, created originally to check, if not to
annihilate, the maritime power of Holland, had been the means of
raising Great Britain to her unquestioned superiority on the ocean. But
this opinion is best answered by the fact that, long after the creation
of these laws, the Dutch still remained more powerful at sea than any
other nation;[23] while, on the other hand, the shipping of England,
under a different policy, has become much more prosperous than it ever
was at any period during which the laws of Cromwell were enforced.
[Sidenote: Change necessary,]
Other nations, however, could not fail to see that English shipowners
upheld these laws with much tenacity; hence when, on the cessation of
the wars of Napoleon, they had more time to devote their attention to
individual pursuits, they asked themselves two questions: (1st) if
protective laws had been beneficial to English ships, why should they
not follow the example of that country and enact for themselves similar
laws? and (2nd) if England persisted in excluding their ships from
her ports, why should they not treat her vessels in the same manner?
In other words, they were already prepared to act on the principle
of retaliation, and adopt the course pursued by the United States of
America in 1817, when Congress passed a law, the counterpart, if not
the copy, of that in the English Statute-book, which was adopted with
the declared intention of retaliating on Great Britain.
[Sidenote: owing to the Independence of America.]
In the case of the American States, so long as they were dependencies
of the British Crown, their ships could trade with all British
dependencies on the same footing as our own; but, when they became
independent, their ships, like those of any other foreign Power,
were excluded from every port where our laws prohibited the entry of
such vessels. Previously they could freely trade with the British
possessions in America and with the West Indies, with which they had
hitherto carried on a profitable intercourse, supplying them with
lumber for their houses, staves for their casks, corn, fish, and other
provisions, together with horses and cattle for their plantations,
besides affording our people there a sure market for their surplus
produce of coffee, sugar, and rum.
[Sidenote: Other nations at first Protectionist.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with America.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues.]
Up to this period the practice of foreign nations had not very
materially complicated our navigation system. If Great Britain, on her
part, persisted in refusing to receive, for instance, the produce of
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in any but British ships, Spain and
Portugal, on their side, declined to send their goods to England in
any ships but their own. So that our law in such cases, rigorous as it
was, did nothing but determine how a trade, in which we had never had a
share, must be carried on, should we be permitted to enter it. But the
case of the United States was attended with much greater difficulty.
Here was an extensive and flourishing maritime commerce, averaging
nearly 3,500,000_l._ yearly, which had hitherto been open to
English and American vessels, indifferently, but which was now, by the
operation of our Navigation Laws, confined entirely to the former.[24]
It was then that the strength and elasticity of our exclusive system
were first severely tested. Mr. Pitt foresaw this serious difficulty so
early as 1783 when Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the necessity of
immediately introducing a temporary measure to regulate the commercial
intercourse with the now independent States of North America. The
Bill then actually introduced by Mr. Pitt proposed to allow American
vessels to import into our colonies any articles whatever of the
growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, and to export any
articles from our colonies to the United States. But, unfortunately,
while this wise measure was under the consideration of the House of
Commons, the ministry to which Mr. Pitt belonged resigned, and their
successors, to save themselves the trouble of passing a Bill of this
prudent and necessary character, passed a temporary Act, afterwards
renewed from time to time, vesting in the Crown alone the power of
regulating the trade with America.
[Sidenote: The shipowners and loyalists in America successfully resist
Mr. Pitt’s scheme.]
As might have been anticipated, considerable discussion immediately
arose with regard to the manner in which this power of the Crown
should be exercised. The West Indians, on the one hand, represented the
ruinous position in which they would be placed if they were forbidden
to trade with the United States: while, on the other, the loyalists
of the remaining North American Colonies pleaded that they were quite
able to supply the people of the West Indies with all they required,
and prayed that the monopoly the war had given them should not be
abrogated. These views were maintained by the shipowners of Great
Britain, on the plea that, if American vessels were allowed to export
West Indian produce, they would convey it to foreign countries as well
as to the United States, thus securing a materially improved position
as carriers by sea; and, after this case had been fully argued before
the Board of Trade, the shipowners and the loyalists unfortunately won
the day.
[Sidenote: Congress the first to retaliate.]
Exasperated by such conduct, three of the American States made a
requisition to Congress to prohibit all commercial intercourse with
the British colonies;[25] and, before Congress met in 1789, no less
than nine of these States had demanded retaliatory measures on British
commerce and navigation. The result was that two Acts of Congress were
immediately passed: one imposing a tonnage duty of six cents on all
American built and American owned vessels, of thirty cents on vessels
built in the United States but owned by foreigners, and of forty
cents on foreign vessels; while the other imposed a tariff of duties
in the ordinary form, and provided for the remission of 10 per cent.
of such duties in case the goods were imported in American ships.
The Americans thus paid us off in our own coin, and continued this
retaliatory system till 1817, when they passed the Navigation Act to
which I have just referred, in all respects analogous to our own. Nor,
indeed, can there be any question but that they were fully justified
in these retaliatory measures. If one nation insists on excluding the
vessels of other nations from their trade, they must naturally expect
that the legislators of the countries, whose vessels are thus excluded,
will take similar steps, even to the injury of their own people; in
fact, this is just what England did when she prohibited her people from
obtaining from other countries, at the lowest cost, the produce or
manufactures essential for their existence.
[Sidenote: These restrictions injurious, alike, to England and her
Colonies.]
But besides this, these restrictive measures on the part of Great
Britain, had in more than one instance, proved, in many other respects,
most injurious to her own people, while inflicting the greatest
hardships and most lamentable sufferings on her own West Indian
colonies. Thus, between 1780 and 1787 no less than 15,000 slaves
perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the requisite
supplies of food from the North American colonies at a period, when the
home-grown portion of their sustenance had been destroyed by several
hurricanes. Yet, notwithstanding this terrible calamity, the British
Parliament persevered in the system it adopted, and ultimately passed
an Act (28 Geo. III., cap. 6) whereby no goods could be imported into
the West Indies from the United States, even in British ships, except
about thirty enumerated articles, the produce of these States. Indeed,
the Act went so far as to prohibit the importation of even these
articles from any of the _foreign_ West Indian Islands, except in
cases of public emergency, when the governors of individual colonies
were allowed to relax this prohibition. Similar laws were also passed
to prohibit the importation of goods into our North American colonies
from the United States, except for similar reasons.
[Sidenote: Commercial treaties with America between 1794 and 1817.]
The injurious consequences of such policy, especially in the
provocation it gave to the Americans, led to the conclusion, in 1794,
of the treaty to which I have already incidentally referred[26]
(though, strange to say, even this was disapproved of by many persons
in England), whereby American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons
burden, were allowed admission into the British West Indies with such
articles of United States produce as were not generally prohibited,
and, at the same time, permitted to export therefrom to the United
States any produce of the West Indies legally exportable thereto in
British vessels. Curiously enough, the following proviso was appended
to this clause:—“That this liberty only extends to a direct intercourse
between the British West Indies and the ports of the United States, and
the United States engage to prohibit the carriage of molasses, sugar,
coffee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from his Majesty’s
dominions or from the United States to any other part of the world.”
The treaty also provided for placing the trade between Great Britain
and the United States on a permanent footing, it having till then been
regulated by Orders in Council. This treaty, which gave even greater
dissatisfaction in the United States than in England, was not ratified
by Congress till 1796; nor was the Act for giving effect to it in Great
Britain passed till the following year.
This Act, however, made no provision for the admission of American
vessels generally into our colonies. It simply provided that American
ships were at liberty to import into Great Britain such produce of
their own States as was admissible in British vessels; it moreover
imposed a tonnage duty on the ships, and a discriminating duty on the
goods imported by them, in order to countervail any duties levied on
goods imported into the United States by British ships. The provisions
of the treaty as to opening the trade of the West Indies appear to
have fallen to the ground. An additional article to the treaty of
1794 stipulated that the article containing those provisions shall be
suspended; while a later treaty (1806) contained a recital that the two
high contracting parties had been unable to arrange the terms on which
the commerce between the United States and the West Indies was to be
carried on. In fact, they came to no definite arrangements till the
United States passed their retaliatory Acts in 1817 and 1820, and, even
then, it took more than ten years to settle the differences between
them on almost any one question. Indeed, the only alterations of any
importance made between 1806 and the passing of the American Navigation
Act, in 1817, were the opening of the trade between the United States
and our North American colonies, in 1807, and the conclusion of a
treaty in 1815 abolishing the differential duties levied by the two
countries on the ships of each other in respect of direct voyages
between them.[27]
In 1808, and more fully in 1810, similar privileges were granted to
the Portuguese dominions in South America; and, in 1822, these were
extended to all countries in America, being, or having been, under the
dominion of Spain. When the Customs Laws were first consolidated in
1825, the exceptions became the rule, and importations from Asia and
Africa were placed on a similar footing to those from America. Thus our
original rule as to importations from Asia and Africa, as well as from
America, was broken down.
[Sidenote: Acts of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in America.]
Though the Act of 1822 allowed a considerable number of articles to
be imported into the free ports of the West Indies from any foreign
country in America in ships of such country, it contained a clause
reserving to the King the power of prohibiting such intercourse with
any foreign country not treating British shipping with equal favour.
The President of the United States, having been previously empowered
by Congress to open the ports of that country to British vessels on
the same terms as were required from United States vessels when coming
from any British port in the West Indies, passed on the 21st March,
1823, an Act to regulate “the commercial intercourse between the United
States and certain British ports.” By this Act the ports of the United
States became open to British vessels coming from the free ports of
the British North American and West Indian possessions, while power
was given to the President to remove the differential duties levied on
goods so imported, on receiving information that similar privileges
had been conceded in such British colonial ports to the vessels of the
United States. The Act, however, required all goods so imported to be
the produce of the colony whence they came and to have been imported
thence direct. It further enacted that such British ships might take
back produce of the United States, provided they gave bonds to land it
directly at the port for which they cleared out. As the provisions of
this Act were, however, to depend on the continuance of those enacted
by the British Legislature in 1822 (3rd Geo. IV., cap. 44), and, as
the vessels of the United States were not placed on precisely the
same footing in the ports of the West Indies as British ships, this
power of the President was never exercised, and a British Order in
Council in opposition to it was subsequently issued on the 21st July,
1823. Here again arose another war of tariffs, for this Order levied
countervailing duties on vessels of the United States and their cargoes
in the ports of the British North American and West Indian possessions
from the ports in the United States to the extent of 4_s._
3_d._ per ton, as well as a discriminating duty of 10 per cent. on
imported articles.
[Sidenote: Order in Council, July, 1826.]
In 1825, when the consolidation of the Customs Laws was under
consideration, as well as the extension of treaties with other
countries, negotiations were again renewed with the United States, but
they were not successful, and another Order in Council was issued on
the 27th July, 1826, reciting that the conditions laid down by the
Possessions Act, 6 Geo. IV., cap. 114, had not been fulfilled, that
is to say, that the United States had not reciprocated the privileges
Great Britain had granted to American ships, and that, therefore, the
privileges possessed by American vessels of importing the produce of
their country into British possessions abroad, and of exporting the
produce of those possessions to any foreign country whatever, would
cease on certain dates fixed in the following year. As might have
been anticipated, the President issued, on the 17th March, 1827, a
proclamation prohibiting the trade and intercourse with the British
possessions authorised by the Act of Congress of 1st March, 1823.
[Sidenote: Conciliatory steps of the Americans, 1830.]
Happily, however, these retaliatory measures did not remain long in
force; and, after various negotiations, it was enacted by the American
Congress on the 29th May, 1830, that, whenever the President should
have evidence that Great Britain would open the ports of her colonial
possessions in the West Indies, South America, and the Bermudas, for
a limited or indefinite time to United States ships, at the same rate
of impost and tonnage and with the same cargoes as British vessels,
and that they would be allowed to export from such British possessions
to any country whatever any article which could be exported in
British vessels, leaving any other intercourse with Great Britain in
other respects as it then was, he might grant similar privileges to
British vessels coming from the said possessions to the United States.
This conciliatory measure was followed on October 5th, 1830, by a
proclamation from the President, extending the provisions of the Act
to the British colonies therein specified, and which had been opened
to American vessels. Finally, a British Order in Council of the 5th
November of that year, repealing the various Orders passed between
1823 and 1827, was issued, authorising vessels of the United States to
import into British possessions abroad any produce of the United States
from those States, and to export goods from the British possessions
abroad to any foreign countries whatever.
[Sidenote: Foreigners look with suspicion on any change in the
Navigation Laws.]
Subsequently to the failure of Mr. Pitt’s measure respecting the trade
of the United States, no great effort was made for many years to modify
grievances with other nations, which every one felt were caused by
the Navigation Laws. Protection had become so thoroughly engrafted
on the whole policy of the nation, that the question of the repeal
of these laws could only be approached by degrees, the country being
so impressed with their necessity, that any attempt during the first
quarter of this century to sweep them away would have proved a signal
failure. Indeed, at the close of the French war, when modifications
were offered, conditionally, to other countries, it is not surprising
that such foreign nations as believed the prosperity of England to
be due to her protective system were not satisfied of the honesty
of her intentions: most of them, in fact, looked with suspicion on
proposals which, in the dawn of sound commercial knowledge, were not
unnaturally thought by them inimical to the interests of England.
Foreign nations were slow to recognise that the comparative freedom of
her constitution, her vast mineral resources, the skill and energy of
her people, the security of property, and the equality of taxation,
could secure for England either her commercial or her manufacturing
superiority; and, still less, could they comprehend how much such
causes as these had to do with her maritime supremacy. They were
equally unable to discover to how great an extent the prosperity of
these interests and of shipping were mutually dependent on each other,
ships being really the adjuncts only of commerce, as without it there
would be no reason for their existence.
[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaties of 1824-6.]
But after much discussion reciprocity treaties were concluded by Mr.
Canning and Mr. Huskisson with several Continental Powers, the object
of these statesmen being to hold out the right hand of fellowship to
other nations, and to surrender in exchange for some concession on
their part the more stringent conditions of our Navigation Laws. The
earliest of these treaties was with Prussia, on the 2nd April, 1824:
on the 16th June, we made another with Denmark; on the 29th September,
1825, with the Hanseatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg; on
the 16th January, 1826, with France, and on the 26th December, of the
same year, with Mexico. Various other treaties followed; opening, on
certain terms of reciprocity, the ports of Great Britain to the ships
of the nations with whom they were made; but reserving to her own
ships, as a rule and with jealous care, her colonial ports.
[Sidenote: Value of treaties in early times,]
During the Middle Ages, when foreigners were too frequently subjected
to unjust treatment, treaties were, no doubt, necessary for their
protection. For instance, at one time, all foreigners residing in
England were held liable for the debts and even for the crimes of
each other. Shipwrecks, though attended with less of the barbarity
of earlier times, were regarded in most countries as fortunate
opportunities for plunder; while tolls and local charges of the most
arbitrary description were levied on aliens by states, princes,
corporations, and the lords of manors. There were also many other
matters scarcely less oppressive and unjust which could only be
redressed by negotiations.
[Sidenote: but inadequate for the regulation of commercial intercourse,
and liable to unfair diplomacy.]