CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF

NIKIAS.

The eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened

with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta,

chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards

the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other

events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of

Athens, against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially

successful, the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with

a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace, following close

upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations

everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again

seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The

year thus closed amidst humiliations the more painful to Athens, as

contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom

she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his

supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever

she desired it.[682] Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she

had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the

past year; and this speculation, though not in itself unreasonable,

had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had

occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace.

Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their

captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they

considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone

towards that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make

peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis,

setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating

reinforcements, they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in

no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief

men;[683] who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking

upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from

Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds

disposed to labor for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon

the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the

present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas as a basis for

negotiation and recovery of the prisoners; without opening the chance

of ulterior enterprises, which though they might perhaps end in

results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which

was now secure.[684] The history of the Athenians during the past

year might, indeed, serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from

playing an adventurous game.

[682] Thucyd. iv, 21.

[683] Thucyd. iv, 108. Ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν

τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε.... Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ

φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, etc.

[684] Thucyd. iv, 117. Τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο

κομίσασθαι, ὡς ἔτι Βρασίδας εὐτύχει· καὶ ἔμελλον, ἐπὶ μεῖζον

χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος, τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι,

τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατήσειν.

This is a perplexing passage, and the sense put upon it by the

best commentators appears to me unsatisfactory.

Dr. Arnold observes: “The sense required must be something

of this sort. If Brasidas were still more successful, the

consequence would be that they would lose their men taken at

Sphakteria, and after all would run the risk of not being

finally victorious.” To the same purpose, substantially Haack,

Poppo, Göller, etc. But surely this is a meaning which cannot

have been present to the mind of Thucydidês. For how could

the fact, of Brasidas being _more successful_, cause the

Lacedæmonians to lose the chance of regaining their prisoners?

The larger the acquisitions of Brasidas, the greater chance

did the Lacedæmonians stand of getting back their prisoners,

because they would have more to give up in exchange for them.

And the meaning proposed by the commentators, inadmissible under

all circumstances, is still more excluded by the very words

immediately preceding in Thucydidês: “The Lacedæmonians were

above all things anxious to get back their prisoners, while

Brasidas was yet in full success;” (for ὡς with ἔτι must mean

substantially the same as ἕως.) It is impossible immediately

after this, that he can go on to say: “Yet if Brasidas became

_still more successful_, they would _lose_ the chance of

getting the prisoners back.” Bauer and Poppo, who notice this

contradiction, profess to solve it by saying, “that if Brasidas

pushed his successes farther, the Athenians would be seized with

such violence of hatred and indignation, that they would put the

prisoners to death.” Poppo supports this by appealing to iv, 41,

which passage, however, will be found to carry no proof in the

case: and the hypothesis is in itself inadmissible, put up to

sustain an inadmissible meaning.

Next, as to the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος (ἐπὶ μεῖζον

χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος); Göller translates

these: “Postquam Brasidas in majus profecisset, et _sua arma cum

potestate Atheniensium æquasset_.” To the same purpose also Haack

and Poppo. But if this were the meaning, it would seem to imply,

that Brasidas had, as yet, done nothing and gained nothing;

that his gains were all to be made during the future. Whereas

the fact is distinctly the reverse, as Thucydidês himself has

told us in the line preceding: Brasidas had already made immense

acquisitions,—so great and serious, that the principal anxiety of

the Lacedæmonians was to make use of what he had already gained

as a means of getting back their prisoners, before the tide of

fortune could turn against him.

Again, the last part of the sentence is considered by Dr. Arnold

and other commentators as corrupt; nor is it agreed to what

previous subject τοῖς δὲ is intended to refer.

So inadmissible, in my judgment, is the meaning assigned by the

commentators to the general passage, that, if no other meaning

could be found in the words, I should regard the whole sentence

as corrupt in some way or other. But I think another meaning may

be found.

I admit that the words ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ _might_

signify, “if he should arrive at greater success;” upon the

analogy of i, 17, and i, 118, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως—ἐπὶ

μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. But they do not necessarily, nor even

naturally, bear this signification. Χωρεῖν ἐπὶ (with accus.

case) means to _march upon_, to _aim at_, to _go at_ or _go

for_ (adopting an English colloquial equivalent), ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ

τὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐλευθερίαν (Thucyd. viii, 64). The phrase might be

used, whether the person of whom it was affirmed succeeded in his

object or not. I conceive that in this place the words mean: “if

Brasidas should go at something greater;” if he should aim at,

“or march upon, greater objects;” without affirming the point,

one way or the other, whether he would attain or miss what he

aimed at.

Next, the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος do not refer, in my

judgment, to the future gains of Brasidas, or to their magnitude

and comparative avail in negotiation. The words rather mean: “if

he should set out in open contest and hostility that which he

had already acquired,” (thus exposing it to the chance of being

lost), “if he should put himself and his already-acquired gains

in battle-front against the enemy.” The meaning would be then

substantially the same as καταστήσαντος ἑαυτὸν ἀντίπαλον. The two

words here discussed are essentially obscure and elliptical, and

every interpretation must proceed by bringing into light those

ideas which they imperfectly indicate. Now, the interpretation

which I suggest keeps quite as closely to the meaning of the two

words as that of Haack and Göller; while it brings out a general

sense, making the whole sentence, of which these two words form a

part, distinct and instructive. The substantive, which would be

understood along with ἀντίπαλα, would be τὰ πράγματα; or perhaps

τὰ εὐτυχήματα, borrowed from the verb εὐτύχει, which immediately

precedes.

In the latter part of the sentence, I think that τοῖς δὲ refers

to the same subject as ἀντίπαλα: in fact, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι

is only a fuller expression of the same general idea as ἀντίπαλα.

The whole sentence would then be construed thus: “For they were

most anxious to recover their captives while Brasidas was yet in

good fortune; while they were likely, if he should go at more,

and put himself as he now stood into hostile contention, to

remain deprived of their captives; and even in regard to their

successes, to take the chance of danger or victory in equal

conflict.”

The sense here brought out is distinct and rational; and I think

it lies fairly in the words. Thucydidês does not intend to

represent the Lacedæmonians as feeling, that if Brasidas should

_really gain_ more than he had gained already, such further

acquisition would be a disadvantage to them, and prevent them

from recovering their captives. He represents them as preferring

_the certainty_ of those acquisitions which Brasidas had already

made, to _the chance and hazard_ of his aiming at greater; which

could not be done without endangering that which was now secure,

and not only secure, but sufficient, if properly managed, to

procure the restoration of the captives.

Poppo refers τοῖς δὲ to the Athenians: Göller refers it to

the remaining Spartan military force, apart from the captives

who were detained at Athens. The latter reference seems to me

inadmissible, for τοῖς δὲ must signify some persons or things

which have been before specified or indicated; and that which

Göller supposes it to mean has not been before indicated. To

refer it to the Athenians, with Poppo and Haack, in his second

edition, we should have to look a great way back for the subject,

and there is, moreover, a difficulty in construing ἀμυνόμενοι

with the dative case. Otherwise, this reference would be

admissible; though I think it better to refer τοῖς δὲ to the same

subject as ἀντίπαλα. In the phrase κινδυνεύειν, or κινδυνεύσειν,

for there seems no sufficient reason why this old reading should

be altered, ~καὶ~ κρατήσειν, the particle ~καὶ~ has a disjunctive

sense, of which there are analogous examples; see Kühner,

Griechische Grammmatik, sect. 726, signifying, substantially, the

same as ἢ: and examples even in Thucydidês, in such phrases as

τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια (i, 22, 143), τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα

τούτων, v, 74; see Poppo’s note on i, 22.

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had

been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace

and the recovery of the prisoners; their pacific dispositions

being especially instigated by king Pleistoanax, whose peculiar

circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a

close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the

commencement of the war, and a little before the thirty years’

truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on

occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years, he lived

in banishment, close to the temple of Zeus Lykæus, in Arcadia; in

such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians, that his dwelling-house was

half within the consecrated ground.[685] But he never lost the hope

of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess

at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklês kept in their pay. To

every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated

the same imperative injunction: “They must bring back the seed of

(Hêraklês) the demi-god son of Zeus, from foreign land to their own:

if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver

ploughshare.” The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and

backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax

at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta.

In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile

was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded

honors, received with the same sacrifices and choric shows as those

which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the

first settlement of Sparta.

[685] Thucyd. v, 17. ἥμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Διὸς

οἰκοῦντα φόβῳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

“The reason was, that he might be in sanctuary at an instant’s

notice, and yet might be able to perform some of the common

offices of life without profanation, which could not have been

the case had the whole dwelling been within the sacred precinct.”

(Dr. Arnold’s note.)

As in the case of Kleomenês and Demaratus, however, it was not

long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at

least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of

Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive

public calamity which befell the state, the miscarriages of

Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphilochia, and above all,

the unprecedented humiliation in Sphakteria, were imputed to the

displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of

Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most

eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace,

so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door

for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by

regaining the prisoners.[686]

[686] Thucyd. v, 17, 18.

After the battle of Delium,[687] the pacific dispositions of Nikias,

Lachês, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favor

at Athens;[688] while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick

upon each other, each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently

increasing his means of achieving more, tended to convert the

discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations

appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter:

and the continual hope that these might be brought to a close,

combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to

energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of

Athens, under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her

courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look

upon a truce as her only means[689] of preservation against the

victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we

are not directly informed: he would probably still continue opposed

to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on

terms more favorable than could be obtained. On this point, his

political counsels would be wrong; but on another point, they would

be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias:

for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by

Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment

this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether

she entertained or rejected the views of peace: and the policy of

Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by

encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta,

was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will

hereafter show.

[687] Thucyd. v, 15. σφαλέντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ ~παραχρῆμα~

οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξομένους, ποιοῦνται

τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, etc.

[688] Thucyd. iv, 118; v, 43.

[689] Thucyd. iv, 117. νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν

Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστῆσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσαιντο καθ᾽

ἡσυχίαν, etc.

Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to

negotiate at first for a definitive peace: but the conditions of such

a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties,

and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas.

At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his

progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year, desiring

the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the

terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the

conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for

one year,[690] together with the first two articles ready prepared,

came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without

proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as

allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations

against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so

much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace,

as to insure some peace which would liberate her captives: and she

calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of

peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon

themselves the rigorous obligations of war.[691]

[690] This appears from the form of the truce in Thucyd. iv,

118; it is prepared at Sparta, in consequence of a previous

proposition from Athens; in sect. 6. οἱ δὲ ἰόντες, τέλος ἔχοντες

ἰόντων, ᾗπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε.

[691] Thucyd. iv, 117. καὶ γενομένης ἀνακωχῆς κακῶν καὶ

ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους) αὐτοὺς

πειρασαμένους ξυναλλαγῆναι, etc.

In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the

month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month

Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn,

between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus,

and Megara, on the other.[692] The Spartans, instead of merely

despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired,

went a step farther: in concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they

drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in

such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the

Athenians. The general principle of the truce was _uti possidetis_,

and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

[692] Thucyd. iv, 119. The fourteenth of Elaphebolion, and the

twelfth of Gerastius, designate the same day. The truce went

ready-prepared from Sparta to Athens, together with envoys

Spartan, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and Epidaurian.

The truce was accepted by the Athenian assembly, and sworn

to at once by all the envoys as well as by three Athenian

stratêgi (σπείσασθαι δὲ ~αὐτίκα μάλα~ τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ

τὰς παρούσας, iv, 118, 119); that day being fixed on as the

commencement.

The lunar months in different cities were never in precise

agreement.

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the

right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to

the customs of his particular city. The main purpose of this

stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow

Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during

the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians[693] and

Phocians: the Delphian authorities also were in the interest of

Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation

to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phocians were no parties

to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the

article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not

pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and

Phocians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable

representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this

moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have

fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.[694]

[693] See Aristophan. Aves, 188.

[694] Thucyd. v, 1-32. They might perhaps believe that the

occupation of Delium had given offence to Apollo.

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each

according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property

of the Delphian god.[695] This article also is prepared at Athens,

for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favor of Apollo and the

Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

[695] Thucyd. iv, 118 Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι

ὅπως ~τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας~ ἐξευρήσομεν, etc. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist.

Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxiii, p. 273) thinks that this article has

reference to past appropriation of the Delphian treasure by

the Peloponnesian alliance, for warlike purposes. Had such a

reference been intended, we should probably have found the past

participle, τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας: whereas the present participle, as

it now stands, is perfectly general, designating acts future and

contingent.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythêra, Nisæa, and Minôa, and

Methana in the neighborhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present.

No communication to take place between Kythêra and any portion of

the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers

occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between

Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minôa, within the road which

leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon,

without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In

like manner, the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen,

and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special

convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.[696]

[696] Thucyd. iv, 118: see Poppo’s note.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for

trading purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty

to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of

tonnage equal to five hundred talents. [All war-ships were generally

impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for

fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were

sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to insure that the

Lacedæmonians shall not, under color of merchantmen, get up a warlike

navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land

between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy with suitable

attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of

differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free

or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens

had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies, Sparta the desertion of

Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to

their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta, seemingly

in concert with Athenian envoys, and sent by the Spartans to Athens

for approval, with the following addition: “If there be any provision

which occurs to you, more honorable or just than these, come to

Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their allies will

resist any just suggestions. But let those who come, bring with them

full powers to conclude, in the same manner as you desire of us. The

truce shall be for one year.”

By the resolution which Lachês proposed in the Athenian public

assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that

negotiations should be open for a definitive treaty, and directed

the stratêgi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and

principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment

when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce

to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to

cancel it altogether. Two days[697] after the important fourteenth

of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace,

Skiônê revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

[697] Thucyd. iv, 122.

Skiônê was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies

which, in the want of an acknowledged mother city, traced its origin

to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula

of Pallênê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land

into which Chalkidikê branches out); conterminous with the Eretrian

colony Mendê. The Skiônæans, not without considerable dissent among

themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with

Brasidas. He immediately crossed the gulf into Pallênê, himself in a

little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that

she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel,—while any

Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme,

paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The

revolt of Skiônê was, from the position of the town, a more striking

defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus

connecting Pallênê with the mainland was occupied by the town of

Potidæa, a town assigned at the period of its capture seven years

before to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other

residents besides. Moreover, the isthmus was so narrow, that the

wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea: Pallênê

was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land-force from

the continent, like the towns previously acquired by Brasidas. The

Skiônæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict

against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire

not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself their revolt appeared a step of astonishing

boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public

assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had

employed at Akanthus and Torônê, disavowing all party preferences as

well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and

exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy.

He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their

courage. “They, though exposed to all hazards of islanders, had

stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom,[698] without

waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards

what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any

measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens

should be averted, and he should assign to them the very first post

of honor among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon.” This generous,

straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation, appealing to the

strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete

city autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct

had hitherto been conformable to it, had proved highly efficacious in

all the previous towns. But in Skiônê it roused the population to the

highest pitch of enthusiasm:[699] it worked even upon the feelings

of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily

in the movement: it produced a unanimous and exalted confidence

which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances

in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same

time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal

attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The

Skiônæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the

liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst

of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the

Grecian bosom was capable. “They crowded round him individually, and

encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete,”[700]

says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I

observed before, that the achievements, the self-relying march,

the straightforward politics and probity of this illustrious man,

who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good

qualities of Athens predominant, inspired a personal emotion towards

him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The

sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete

was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was,

perhaps of all others, the most wide-spread and Pan-Hellenic. It was

connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation,

common to the whole nation, while politics tended rather to disunite

the separate cities: it was farther a sentiment at once familiar

and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout

Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason;

but Thucydidês cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and

unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skiônê, just after the

desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

[698] Thucyd. iv, 120. ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται, etc.

[699] Thucyd. iv, 121. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπῄρθησάν τε τοῖς

λόγοις, καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε

τὰ πρασσόμενα, etc.

[700] Thucyd. iv, 121. Καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς

ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ τε ἐταινίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο

ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.

Compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28: compare also Krause (Olympia),

sect. 17, p. 162 (Wien, 1838). It was customary to place a fillet

of cloth or linen on the head of the victors at Olympia, before

putting on the olive wreath.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution

of the Skiônæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position

would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly

brought across to Pallênê a considerable portion of his army, not

merely with a view to the defence of Skiônê, but also with the

intention of surprising both Mendê and Potidæa, in both which places

there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who

came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year,

and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta, one of the three

Spartans who had sworn to the treaty: Aristonymus, from Athens.

The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication;

much to the satisfaction of the newly acquired allies of Sparta in

Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith, but to the great chagrin

of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. But he could

not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred

from the peninsula of Pallênê to Torônê.

The case of Skiônê, however, immediately raised an obstruction,

doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners who had come in

an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place,

and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallênê. But on

inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skiônæans had not

revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement

of the truce: accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the

other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skiônê in it,

sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly

against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skiônê,

which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and

even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners,

by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day

named in the truce. Violent was the burst of indignation when the

news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens: nor was it softened,

when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to

them by Brasidas and Athenæus, despatched an embassy hither to claim

protection for Skiônê, or at any rate to procure the adjustment of

the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of

the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to

relax from their rights in favor of the first revolting islanders.

They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest

of Skiônê; and farther, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death

all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should

have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition

to throw up the truce generally; and the state of feeling on both

sides tended to this result, that, while the war continued in Thrace,

it was suspended everywhere else.[701]

[701] Thucyd. iv, 122, 123.

Fresh intelligence soon arrived, carrying exasperation at Athens

yet farther, of the revolt of Mendê, the adjoining town to

Skiônê. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly

introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the

truce-commissioners; but they saw that he retained his hold on

Skiônê, in spite of the provisions of the truce, and they ascertained

that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though

he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the

surprise of the town. Being, moreover, only a small party, with the

sentiment of the population against them, they were afraid, if they

now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the

partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against

Skiônê. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous

course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens,

constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them:[702] the government

seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means

to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt.

Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook

to protect them, professing to think that he had a right to do so,

because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed.

But the truce upon this point was clear, which he himself virtually

admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in

which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made

preparation for the defence both of Mendê and Skiônê against the

attack, which was now rendered more certain than before, conveying

the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic

Olynthus, and sending thither as garrison five hundred Peloponnesian

hoplites with three hundred Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of

which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his

own troops separately.[703] Brasidas then withdrew himself with the

greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition

into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkêstæ. On what ground,

after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became

his active enemy, we are left to conjecture: probably his relations

with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were

such that this step was forced upon him against his will, or he may

really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate

to the defence of Mendê and Skiônê; an idea which the unaccountable

backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well

foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved

them, considering the situation of Pallênê and the superiority of

Athens at sea; but his absence made their ruin certain.[704]

[702] Thucyd. iv, 123. Διὸ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τήν

τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἑτοίμην, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ~πρασσόντων

σφίσιν ὀλίγων τε ὄντων~, καὶ ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων,

ἀλλὰ ~καταβιασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλούς~, iv, 130. ὁ δῆμος

εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπί τε Πελοποννησίους

~καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντας~, etc.

The Athenians, after the conquest of the place, desire the

Mendæans πολιτεύειν ὥσπερ εἰωθέσαν.

Mendê is another case in which the bulk of the citizens were

averse to revolt from Athens, in spite of neighboring example.

[703] Thucyd. iv, 130.

[704] Thucyd. iv, 123, 124.

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian

armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa: fifty

triremes, ten of them Chian; one thousand hoplites and six hundred

bowmen from Athens; one thousand mercenary Thracians, with some

peltasts from Methônê and other towns in the neighborhood. From

Potidæa, they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which

they landed for the purpose of attacking Mendê. Polydamidas, the

Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of

seven hundred hoplites, including three hundred Skiônæans, upon

an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon

which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with

sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, one hundred and twenty Methonean

peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side

path and thus turn the position; while Nikostratus with the main

army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of

the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and

the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly

escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the

position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians,

sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skiônê,

ravaged the neighboring lands; and Nikias on the ensuing day carried

his devastations still farther, even to the border of the Skiônæan

territory.

But dissensions had already commenced within the walls, and the

Skiônæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took

advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendê had been

brought about against the will of the citizens by the intrigues and

for the benefit of an oligarchical faction: moreover, it does not

appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited

Skiônê and the other revolted towns: had he come, his personal

influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and

create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished,

after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating

words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops whom he had

sent to Mendê, were mere instruments to sustain the newly erected

oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens

generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus

with half of the Athenian force was planted before that gate of Mendê

which opened towards Potidæa: in the neighborhood of that gate,

within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of

the Peloponnesians and of the citizens; and Polydamidas, intending

to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of them in battle order,

when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence

a sentiment common to most of them, told him, “that he would not

sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest.”

Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of

the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush

upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset,

sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into

the acropolis; the rather, as they saw some of the Mendæans open

the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a

preconcerted betrayal. No such concert, however, existed, though the

besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened,

soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it

impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from

plundering the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the

lives of the citizens.[705]

[705] Thucyd. iv, 130; Diodor. xii, 72.

Mendê being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of

the citizens to resume their former government, leaving it to them

to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use

was made of this permission, we are not told; but probably most

of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with

Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the

acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard

it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege of Skiônê, where they

found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a

strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround

the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked

it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mendê;

for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take

refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced

the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison

who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendê, got into Skiônê at

night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading

wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias

from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time

completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of

circumvallation.[706]

[706] Thucyd. iv, 131.

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from

the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendê or to relieve

Skiônê, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torônê.

Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê, returned soon afterwards

with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every

way, and nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from

utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of

three thousand Grecian hoplites, Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and

Chalkidian, with one thousand Macedonian and Chalkidian horse, and

a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they

had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkêstæ,

they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that

prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days,

awaiting—before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the

territory of Arrhibæus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries,

with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain.[707] At length Perdikkas

became impatient to advance without them; while Brasidas, on the

contrary, apprehensive for the fate of Mendê during his absence,

was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming

aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments

at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected

intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas.

The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus,

and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number

of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, and such was their

reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian

army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night

and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them,

and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had

been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found

Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him, while the Macedonians

were already far advanced in their journey homeward.

[707] Thucyd. iv, 124.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia, general as

well as soldiers, was never more strikingly exhibited than on this

critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as

well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline:

the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full

authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square, or

oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the

retreating march: youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer

ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the

assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen

men, formed the rear-guard.[708]

[708] Thucyd. iv, 125.

The short harangue which, according to a custom universal with

Grecian generals, he addressed to his troops immediately before

the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some

were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all

by the honorable title of “Peloponnesians.” Reassuring them against

the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior

numbers of the advancing enemy, he invokes their native, homebred

courage.[709] “_Ye_ do not require the presence of allies to inspire

you with bravery, nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for

ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger

number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule

subjects more numerous than themselves, having acquired their power

by no other means than by superiority in battle.” Next, Brasidas

tried to dissipate the _prestige_ of the Illyrian name; his army

had already vanquished the Lynkêstæ, and these other barbarians

were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they

were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of

arms, and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were

incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand.

“They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with

shame for deserting their post: flight and attack are with them

in equally honorable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the

really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he

chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretence

for running away.” “Repel ye their onset whenever it comes; and so

soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye

will soon arrive in a place of safety; and ye will be convinced that

such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep

aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes;

while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold

in running after him where there is no danger.”[710]

[709] Thucyd. iv, 126. Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ

πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οἰκείαν

ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵ γε (μηδὲ) ἀπὸ

πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν,

ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· ~οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν

δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν~.

[710] Thucyd. iv, 126. Οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν

λιπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι· ἥ τε φυγὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος

ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει·

αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί (se

sauver) τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε.

Σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε, ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ

ὂν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατάσπερχον. Ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον,

καὶ ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ

ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίξεσθε, καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι

ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ~ἄποθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ

ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν~, οἳ δ᾽ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ

πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐπιδείκνυνται.

The word μέλλησις which occurs twice in this chapter in regard to

the Illyrians, is very expressive and at the same time difficult

to translate into any other language,—“what they seem on the

point of doing, but never realize.” See also i, 69.

The speech of the Roman consul Manlius, in describing the Gauls,

deserves to be compared: “Procera corpora, promissæ et rutilatæ

comæ, vasta scuta, prælongi gladii: ad hoc cantus ineuntium

prælium, et ululatus et tripudia, et quatientium scuta in patrium

quendam morem horrendus armorum crepitus: _omnia de industriâ

composita ad terrorem_” (Livy, xxxviii, 17.)

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly

numbers, even with equal undivided courage, is now a truth so

familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves

back into the fifth century before the Christian era, when this

truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the

practice of all their neighbors—Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics,

Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of

it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military

habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed, having been

pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian

town of Stratus, in the second year of the war.[711] Both Epirots and

Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either

Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now

about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more

forcibly. Nor is it merely the contrast between two modes of fighting

which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers: he

gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which

that contrast is founded,—a theory of large range and going to the

basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The

sentiment in each individual man’s bosom, of a certain place which he

has to fill and duties which he has to perform, combined with fear of

the displeasure of his neighbors as well as of his own self-reproach

if he shrinks back, but at the same time essentially bound up

and reciprocating with the feeling that his neighbors are under

corresponding obligations towards him,—this sentiment, which Brasidas

invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks,

was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace

as citizens of the same community. Simple as this principle may seem,

it would have found no response in the army of Xerxes, or of the

Thracian Sitalkês, or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes

to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip

which the Great King commands to be administered to him: the Illyrian

or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of

his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty,

but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied

or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself

bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble,[712]—who

obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but

a common and imperative sentiment of obligation,—whose honor or shame

is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor

overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the

minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be

farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the

Ten Thousand: at present, I merely indicate them as forming a part

of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as

military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who

surrounded them.

[711] Thucyd. ii, 81. See above, chap. xlviii, of this History.

[712] See the memorable remarks of Hippokratês and Aristotle

on the difference in respect of courage between Europeans

and Asiatics, as well as between Hellens and non-Hellens

(Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 24, ed. Littré, sect.

116, _seq._, ed. Petersen; Aristotel. Politic. vii, 6, 1-5), and

the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 103,

104).

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves

notice. He tells his soldiers: “Courage is your homebred property;

for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs

the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves

and conquest by their ancestors.” First, it is remarkable that

a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas

thus addresses, consisted of Helots, the conquered race, not the

conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride

supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered

by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race

which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of

the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as

an honorable and ennobling recollection, by an officer of Dorian

race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable

character: and we shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a

similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at

Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as

a theory invented by demagogues and sophists, upon one or other of

whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in

Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As

soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the

confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing

that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they

approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the

purpose, turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while

Brasidas himself, with his rear-guard of three hundred, was present

everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkêstæ and Illyrians

attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed

its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely

handled, and with such unwonted vigor,—for they probably had had no

previous experience of Grecian troops,—that after a few trials they

desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain.

They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians

under Perdikkas, who had fled before, partly to occupy the narrow

pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into

Lynkêstis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter

approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it;

several of them were already on the summits, and more were ascending

to reinforce them; while a portion of them were moving down upon his

rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen three hundred,

to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best

speed, before it became more numerously occupied, not staying to

preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement

disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the

Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their

flanks.[713] The retreating army, thus master of one of the side

hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to

drive away the Lynkêstian and Illyrian occupants. Having got through

this narrow outlet, Brasidas found himself on the higher ground, nor

did his enemies dare to attack him farther: so that he was enabled

to reach, even in that day’s march, the first town or village in the

kingdom of Perdikkas, called Arnissa. So incensed were his soldiers

with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, who had fled on the first

news of danger without giving them any notice, that they seized and

appropriated all the articles of baggage, not inconsiderable in

number, which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a

nocturnal flight; and they even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of

the baggage carts.[714]

[713] Thucyd. iv, 128. It is not possible clearly to understand

this passage without some knowledge of the ground to which it

refers. I presume that the regular road through the defile, along

which the main army of Brasidas passed, was long and winding,

making the ascent to the top very gradual, but at the same time

exposed on both sides from the heights above. The detachment of

three hundred scaled the steep heights on one side, and drove

away the enemy, thus making it impossible for him to remain

any longer even in the main road. But I do not suppose, with

Dr. Arnold, that the main army of Brasidas followed the three

hundred, and “broke out of the valley by scaling one of its

sides:” they pursued the main road, as soon as it was cleared for

them.

[714] Thucyd. iv, 127, 128.

Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas,

following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that

general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkêstis.

From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesians,

and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the

wall of blockade round Skiônê. Such was the general faithlessness

of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the

alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions;

and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable

importance.[715]

[715] Thucyd. iv, 128-132. Some lines of the comic poet Hermippus

are preserved (in the Φορμοφόροι, Meineke, Fragm. p. 407)

respecting Sitalkês and Perdikkas. Among the presents brought

home by Dionysus in his voyage, there is numbered “the itch from

Sitalkês, intended for the Lacedæmonians, and many shiploads

of lies from Perdikkas.” Καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὶν πάνυ

πολλαῖς.

The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion

of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious

combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding,

and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed.

The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for

discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely

frustrated; nor does the decree of the Athenian people, which stands

included in their vote sanctioning the truce, for sending and

receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, ever seem to have been

executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable

reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own

request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament

now under Nikias in Pallênê. But Ischagoras, the commander of the

reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther

progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops.

For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been

enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests

to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and

was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an

essential service to the Athenians.[716] Ischagoras, however, with

a few companions, but without his army, made his way to Brasidas,

having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and

report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions

a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as

harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas: this was

among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of

the ancient Spartan custom, that none except elderly men, above the

military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed, Brasidas himself

was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of

these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any

but Spartans to such posts, for there were no Spartans in the army

of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of

Amphipolis; another, Pasitelidas, of Torônê.[717] It is probable that

these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the

activity of Brasidas: and the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas,

together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops

intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one

exploit performed by him at this time, and that too more than six

months after the retreat from Macedonia, about January or February

422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the

town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring

up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant

his scaling ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying

and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a

short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to

pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another

throughout the night), when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took

advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach

the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the

assailants were compelled to retreat.[718]

[716] Thucyd. iv, 132.

[717] Thucyd. iv, 132. Καὶ ~τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν~ παρανόμως ἄνδρας

ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι καὶ μὴ

~τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν~ ἐπιτρέπειν.

Most of the commentators translate ἡβώντων, “_young men_,” which

is not the usual meaning of the word: it signifies, “_men of

military age_,” which includes both young and middle-aged. If we

compare iv, 132 with iii, 36, v, 32, and v, 116, we shall see

that ἡβῶντες really has this larger meaning: compare also μέχρι

ἥβης (ii, 46), which means, “until the age of military service

commenced.”

It is not therefore necessary to suppose that the men taken out

by Ischagoras were very young, for example that they were below

the age of thirty, as Manso, O. Müller, and Göller would have us

believe. It is enough that they were within the limits of the

military age, both ways.

Considering the extraordinary reverence paid to old age at

Sparta, it is by no means wonderful that old men should have been

thought exclusively fitted for such commands, in the ancient

customs and constitution.

The extensive operations, however, in which Sparta became

involved through the Peloponnesian war, would render it

impossible to maintain such a maxim in practice: but at this

moment, the step was still recognized as a departure from a

received maxim, and is characterized as such by Thucydidês under

the term παρανόμως.

I explain τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν to refer to the case of men _not

Spartans_ being named to these posts: see in reference to this

point, the stress which Brasidas lays on the fact that Klearidas

was a Spartan, Thucyd. v, 9.

[718] Thucyd. iv, 135.

In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near

Peloponnesus, during the course of this summer, Thucydidês mentions

to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there

been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Hêrê,

between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times

more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the

latter, Mykenæ itself having been subjected and almost depopulated

by the Argeians), enjoyed an ancient Pan-Hellenic reputation; the

catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of

each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real

and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate

nominees. Chrysis, an old woman, who had been priestess there for

fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning

lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and

though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient,

and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of

the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it

necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athênê

Alea, at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place.[719]

The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus, of Argos,

continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of

the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude: Pausanias, the

traveller, who describes this temple as a visitor, near six hundred

years afterwards, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had

been burned.

[719] Thucyd. ii, 5; iv, 133; Pausan. ii, 17, 7; iii, 5, 6.

Hellanikus (a contemporary of Thucydidês, but somewhat older,

coming in point of age between him and Herodotus) had framed a

chronological series of these priestesses of Hêrê, with a history

of past events belonging to the supposed times of each. And such

was the Pan-Hellenic importance of the temple at this time,

that Thucydidês, when he describes accurately the beginning of

the Peloponnesian war, tells us, as one of his indications of

time, that Chrysis had then been forty-eight years priestess at

the Heræum. To employ the series of Olympic prize-runners and

Olympiads as a continuous distribution of time, was a practice

which had not yet got footing.

The catalogue of these priestesses of Hêrê, beginning with

mythical and descending to historical names, is illustrated by

the inscription belonging to the temple of Halikarnassus in

Boeckh, Corpus Inscr. No. 2655: see Boeckh’s Commentary, and

Preller, Hellanici Fragmenta, pp. 34, 46.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities

of Mantineia and Tegea, each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly

free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion,

the victory was disputed: each party erected a trophy, each sent

spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak

farther of these Arcadian dissensions.

The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta

and Athens in the preceding month of March; but they seem to have

followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities _de

facto_: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of

Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and

sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual

incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one

which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendency of the

Thebans over the inferior Bœotian cities.[720] The Thebans destroyed

the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified,

on the charge of _atticizing_ tendencies. How far this suspicion was

well founded we have no means of judging: but the Thespians, far from

being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having

lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium,

where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very

helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against

Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce

the rigorous sentence above mentioned.[721]

[720] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 6.

[721] Thucyd. iv, 133.

But the month of March, or the Attic Elaphebolion, 422 B.C., the time

prescribed for expiration of the one year’s truce, had now arrived.

It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more

than partially observed: Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from

the beginning, and both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced

in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace

elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking

the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we

plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among

both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. Nor was

there anything except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted

subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive

the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to

maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties, always

excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover, the Athenians were to a certain

degree soothed by their success at Mendê and Skiônê, and by their

acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of

423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties

was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or

to conclude any new agreement, though neither were disposed to depart

from that which had been already concluded.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical

difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had

expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually

did renew them. To the Athenians, there was this additional motive

for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great

Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the

beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy

spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the

conclusion of the one year’s truce, their pious feelings seem now to

have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and

festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really

ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were

over.[722]

[722] This seems to me the most reasonable sense to put upon the

much-debated passage of Thucyd. v, 1. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους

αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι τῶν Πυθίων· καὶ ἐν τῇ

~ἐκεχειρίᾳ~ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου; again, v, 2.

Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ

τὴν ~ἐκεχειρίαν~, etc.

Thucydidês says here, that “the truce was dissolved:” the

bond imposed upon both parties was untied, and both resumed

their natural liberty. But he does not say that “_hostilities

recommenced_” before the Pythia, as Göller and other critics

affirm that he says. The interval between the 14th of the month

Elaphebolion and the Pythian festival was one in which there

was no binding truce any longer in force, and yet no actual

hostilities: it was an ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος, to use the words of

Thucydidês, when he describes the relations between Corinth and

Athens in the ensuing year (v, 32).

The word ἐκεχειρία here means, in my judgment, the truce

proclaimed at the season of the Pythian festival,—quite distinct

from the truce for one year which had expired a little while

before. The change of the word in the course of one line from

σπονδαὶ to ἐκεχειρία marks this distinction.

I agree with Dr. Arnold, dissenting both from M. Boeckh and

from Mr. Clinton, in his conception of the events of this year.

Kleon sailed on his expedition to Thrace after the Pythian holy

truce, in the beginning of August: between that date and the end

of September, happened the capture of Torônê and the battle of

Amphipolis. But the way in which Dr. Arnold defends his opinion

is not at all satisfactory. In the Dissertation appended to his

second volume of Thucydidês (p. 458), he says: “The words in

Thucydidês αἱ ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, mean,

as I understand them, ‘that the truce for a year had _lasted

on_ till the Pythian games, and then ended:’ that is, instead

of expiring on the 14th of Elaphebolion, it had been _tacitly

continued_ nearly four months longer, till after midsummer: and

it was not till the middle of Hekatombæon that Cleon was sent out

to recover Amphipolis.”

Such a construction of the word διελέλυντο appears to me

inadmissible, nor is Dr. Arnold’s defence of it, p. 454, of much

value: σπονδὰς διαλύειν is an expression well known to Thucydidês

(iv, 23; v, 36), “to dissolve the truce.” I go along with Boeckh

and Mr. Clinton in construing the words, except that I strike

out what they introduce from their own imagination. They say:

“The truce was ended, and _the war again renewed_, up to the

time of the Pythian games.” Thucydidês only says “that the truce

was dissolved;” he does not say “_that the war was renewed_.” It

is not at all necessary to Dr. Arnold’s conception of the facts

that the words should be translated as he proposes. His remarks

also (p. 460) upon the relation of the Athenians to the Pythian

games, appear to me just: but he does not advert to the fact,

which would have strengthened materially what he there says, that

the Athenians had been excluded from Delphi and from the Pythian

festival between the commencement of the war and the one year’s

truce. I conceive that the Pythian games were celebrated about

July or August. In an earlier part of this History (ch. xxviii,

vol. iv, p. 67), I said that they were celebrated in _autumn_;

it ought rather to be “towards the end of summer.”

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at

Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their

instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed

them with great additional strength of argument; the question being

now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding

obligation.

“At this time (observes Thucydidês)[723] the great enemies of peace

were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former,

because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war;

the latter, because he thought that if peace were concluded, he

should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily

credited in his criminations of others.” As to Brasidas, the remark

of the historian is indisputable: it would be wonderful, indeed,

if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the

war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian

towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from

Lacedæmon,—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were

not in his view the paramount object. In truth, his position in

Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady

peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

[723] Thucyd. v, 16. Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν

μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν, διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ

τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ, γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος

νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, etc.

But the coloring which Thucydidês gives to Kleon’s support of the

war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the

question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war,—whether his

personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by

it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations,

which tended infallibly to place ascendency in the hands of others,

and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on

dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of

his political ascendency; while matter of crimination against others,

assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood, could hardly be

wanting either in war or peace; and if the war brought forward

unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw

up successful generals who would certainly outshine him, and would

probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of

Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one

of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens, of character

analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon, expressed his surprise

on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new

war: “Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though

I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you;

if there be peace, you will have command over me.”[724] This is

surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the

comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than

that which Thucydidês pronounces in reference to the interests of

Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of

Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific,

and the aristocrat Hermokratês far more warlike:[725] the former is

afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence

energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We

may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike: he commenced

his political career as an opponent of Periklês, when the latter was

strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the

Peloponnesian war.[726]

[724] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[725] See the speeches of Athenagoras and Hermokratês, Thucyd.

vi, 33-36.

[726] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33-35.

But farther, if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate

party-interest in promoting the war, it will still remain to be

considered, whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of

energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and

prudent policy for Athens. Taking Periklês as the best judge of

that policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating

emphatically two important points: 1. To stand vigorously upon the

defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, “keeping

their subject-allies well in hand,” submitting patiently even to see

Attica ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire

or to make new conquests during the war.[727] Consistently with this

well-defined plan of action, Periklês, had he lived, would have taken

care to interfere vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from

making his conquests: had such interference been either impossible

or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too

great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of

the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which

the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible

to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely

than his rival Nikias to the policy of Periklês. It was to Nikias,

more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not

interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be

imputed: it was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost

any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who

encouraged his countrymen, at a moment of great public depression

of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the

chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The

peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year,

with the promise and for the express purpose of checking the farther

conquests of Brasidas; also with the farther promise of maturing that

truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the

restoration of Amphipolis.

[727] Thucyd. i, 142, 143, 144; ii, 13. καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν

ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν ἐξαρτύεσθαι, ~τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς

ἔχειν~—λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς

προσόδου, etc.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace

and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out

might perhaps appear plausible in March 422 B.C., at the moment when

the truce for one year was concluded. But the subsequent events had

frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the

best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly

be realized while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For

the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce

on the basis of _uti possidetis_, and desiring to extend it to Thrace

as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it

upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions,

so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in

that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch

of her armament to Skiônê and Mendê had she maintained herself in

possession even of Pallênê. Now what was the lesson to be derived

from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their

future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of

all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace,

especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace,

continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing

to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens;

and his connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her

professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and

doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent

experience: “If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of

Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of

finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their

prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will

never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who

are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that

after all, you will give them back their prisoners on the faith of an

equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened

during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of

Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not

even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and

to desist from farther conquest: much less will he obey them when

they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all,

if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition

and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you

desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic

employment of force, as has happened with Skiônê and Mendê: and you

ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while

the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting

until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby

losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon.”

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent

history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound

themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or

could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the

death of Brasidas: much less could they have done so during his life,

when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and

hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them.

Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so

that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing

him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the

expiration of the one year’s truce, may be thus shown to be not only

more conformable to the genius of Periklês, but also founded on a

juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy

of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without

refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his

own narrative, nay, without even indicating their existence, merely

tells us that “Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloke

dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination?” We

cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such

words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydidês, that

it is harsh and unfair towards Kleon, and careless in regard to truth

and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit

of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history: it is

an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to

his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the

citizen who justly accused him: it is conceived in the same tone as

his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphakteria.

Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydidês, we may

confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging

his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis.

Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably

distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias,

who grasped at peace with hasty credulity through sickness of the

efforts of war, as from the restless movement and novelties, not

merely unprofitable but ruinous, which we shall presently find

springing up under the auspices of Alkibiadês. Periklês had said to

his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries

of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than

that which prevailed in B.C. 422: “You hold your empire and your

proud position, by the condition of being willing to encounter cost,

fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire,

but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired. To lose what

we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at

acquisition.”[728] The very same language was probably held by Kleon

when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest

of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very

different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held

by Periklês, and different also from that which it would now have

produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it

when it came from Kleon; partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly

from a conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition

against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all

concerned in it, general as well as soldiers; partly also from a

persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time, though afterwards

proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be

got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians.