τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς
πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc. c. 62, αἴσχιον δὲ, ἔχοντας
ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἢ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι. Contrast the tenor of the two
speeches of Periklês (Thucyd. i, 140-144; ii, 60-64) with the
description which Thucydidês gives of the simple “avoidance of
risk,” (τὸ ἀκίνδυνον), which characterized Nikias (v. 16).
If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself
as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible
ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is
understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute,
we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption,
arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was
the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at
Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit,
it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself
some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair
at Sphakteria, the eighth year of the war: a season of most active
warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out
of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he
obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period we
may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive
personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did
not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which
he had manifested in that affair, reluctance to engage in military
expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well
as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in
proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to
take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable,
that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the stratêgi to take
the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias, doubtless,
opposed the expedition as much as he could: when it was determined
by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily
decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force
it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under
his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less
glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service than to see
his rival entangled in it; and he would have before him the same
alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much
satisfaction in the affair of Sphakteria: either the expedition would
succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken, or it would fail,
and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two
was really the more probable at Amphipolis, as Nikias had erroneously
imagined it to be at Sphakteria.
It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these
circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the
public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens
unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover,
Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army, and
the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest
officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in
putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political
as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites
whom he took out with him went with much reluctance.[729] An
ignorant general, with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically
disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from
Brasidas: but had Nikias or the stratêgi done their duty, and carried
the entire force of the city under competent command to the same
object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and
loss; certainly very different as to dishonor.
[729] Thucyd. v, 7. καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον.
Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently towards the beginning of
August, with twelve hundred Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites,
and three hundred horsemen, troops of excellent quality and
condition: besides an auxiliary force of allies, number not exactly
known, and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all
equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers,
besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of
the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and
Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first
halted in his voyage near Skiônê, from which place he took away such
of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed
across the gulf from Pallênê to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place
called the Harbor of the Kolophonians, near Torônê.[730] Having
here learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable
Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torônê, he landed his forces
and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time
round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians
from Torônê, to assail the latter place from seaward. It happened
that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torônê,
had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials
in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion, or
suburb: this new wall appears to have been still incomplete and
in an imperfect state of defence. Pasitelidas, the Peloponnesian
commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could;
but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian
triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all.
Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to repel these
new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered
from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered
aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles’ distance
from the city when he learned the capture, and was obliged to retire
unsuccessfully. Pasitelidas the commander, with the Peloponnesian
garrison and the Torônæan male population, were despatched as
prisoners to Athens; while the Torônæan women and children, by a fate
but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.[731]
[730] The town of Torônê was situated near the extremity of the
Sithonian peninsula, on the side looking towards Pallênê. But the
territory belonging to the town comprehended all the extremity
of the peninsula on both sides, including the terminating point
Cape Ampelos,—Ἄμπελον τὴν Τορωναίην ἄκρην (Herodot. vii, 122).
Herodotus calls the Singitic gulf θάλασσαν τὴν ἄντιον Τορώνης
(vii, 122).
The ruins of Torônê, bearing the ancient name, and Kufo, a
land-locked harbor near it, are still to be seen (Leake, Travels
in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 119).
[731] Thucyd. v, 3.
After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory
of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of
Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent
envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of
Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to
Pollês the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come
with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians,
the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas:
and the local influence of the banished Thucydidês would no longer be
at the service of Athens, much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting
the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an
attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic gulf, which was repulsed; next
upon Galêpsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which
was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and
being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to
remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement
out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant
watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from
his station on the hill of Kerdylion, on the western bank of the
river-communication with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed
in such inaction on both sides; but the Athenian hoplites, becoming
impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those
feelings of dislike which they had brought out from Athens against
their general, “whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian)
they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent.”[732]
Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely
to refrain from manifesting it; and Kleon was presently made aware
of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against
his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be
anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground
all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of
doing nothing, being aware that it was impossible to attack the place
with any effect before his reinforcements arrived.
[732] Thucyd. v, 7. Ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα δὲ
~ἠναγκάσθη~ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο. Τῶν γὰρ
στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν
ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν, πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μεθ᾽ οἵας
ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο, καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες
αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ
τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγε.
To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary
to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can
understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was
placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around
which the river makes a bend, first in a southwesterly direction,
then, after a short course to the southward, back in a southeasterly
direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification
one long wall, which began near the point northeast of the town,
where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through
the lake Kerkinitis, ascended along the eastern side of the hill,
crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus, and then
descended so as to touch the river again at another point south
of the town; thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent
bow formed by the river. On three sides therefore, north, west,
and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon, and was thus
visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side
of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or
west and north).[733] At some little distance below the point where
the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge,[734]
a communication of great importance for the whole country, which
connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the
western or right bank of the river, bordering it, and forming an
outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount
Kerdylium: in fact, the course of the Strymon is here determined by
these two steep eminences, Kerdylium on the west, and the hill of
Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when
Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected
with the long city wall; but during the intervening eighteen months,
he had erected a palisade work—probably an earthen bank topped with
a palisade—connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge
was thus at the time of Kleon’s expedition comprehended within the
fortifications of the city; and Brasidas, while keeping watch on
Mount Kerdylium, could pass over whenever he chose into the city,
without any fear of impediment.[735]
[733] Thucyd. iv, 102. Ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἅγνων
ὠνόμασεν, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιῤῥέοντος τοῦ Στρύμονος, διὰ τὸ
περιέχειν αὐτὴν, τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν,
περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον ᾤκισεν.
Ὁ καλλιγέφυρος ποταμὸς Στρύμων, Euripid. Rhesus, 346.
I annex a plan which will convey some idea of the hill of
Amphipolis and the circumjacent territory: compare the plan in
Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxv, p.
191, and that from Mr. Hawkins, which is annexed to the third
volume of Dr. Arnold’s Thucydidês, combined with a Dissertation
which appears in the second volume of the same work, p. 450.
See also the remarks in Kutzen, De Atheniensium imperio circa
Strymonem, ch. ii, pp. 18-21; Weissenborn, Beiträge zur genaueren
Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte, pp. 152-156;
Cousinéry, Voyage dans la Macédoine, vol. i, ch. iv, p. 124,
_seq._
Colonel Leake supposes the ancient bridge to have been at the
same point of the river as the modern bridge; that is, north of
Amphipolis, and a little westward of the corner of the lake.
On this point I differ from him, and have placed it, with Dr.
Arnold, near the southeastern end of the reach of the Strymon,
which flows round Amphipolis. But there is another circumstance,
in which Col. Leake’s narrative corrects a material error in
Dr. Arnold’s Dissertation. Colonel Leake particularly notices
the high ridge which connects the hill of Amphipolis with Mount
Pangæus to the eastward (pp. 182, 183, 191-194), whereas Dr.
Arnold represents them as separated by a deep ravine (p. 451):
upon which latter supposition the whole account of Kleon’s march
and survey appears to me unintelligible.
The epithet which Thucydidês gives to Amphipolis, “conspicuous
both towards the sea and towards the land,” which occasions some
perplexity to the commentators, appears to me one of obvious
propriety. Amphipolis was indeed situated on a hill; so were many
other towns: but its peculiarity was, that on three sides it had
no wall to interrupt the eye of the spectator: one of those sides
was towards the sea.
Kutzen and Cousinéry make the long wall to be the segment of a
curve highly bent, touching the river at both ends. But I agree
with Weissenborn that this is inadmissible; and that the words
“long wall” imply something near a straight direction.
[734] Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως: see a note a few
pages ago upon these words. This does not necessarily imply that
the bridge was at any considerable distance from the extreme
point where the long wall touched the river to the south: but
this latter point was a good way off from the town properly so
called, which occupied the higher slope of the hill. We are not
to suppose that the _whole_ space between the long wall and the
river was covered by buildings.
[735] Thucyd. v. 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν (Brasidas) κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ
σταύρωμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος
ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν, etc.
The explanation which I have here given to the word σταύρωμα is
not given by any one else; but it appears to me the only one
calculated to impart clearness and consistency to the whole
narrative.
When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis first, the bridge was
completely unconnected with the Long Wall, and at a certain
distance from it. But when Thucydidês wrote his history, there
were a pair of _connecting walls_ between the bridge and the
fortifications of the city as they then stood—οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη
ὥσπερ νῦν (iv, 103): the whole fortifications of the city had
been altered during the intermediate period.
Now the question is, was the Long Wall of Amphipolis connected
or unconnected with the bridge, at the time of the conflict
between Brasidas and Kleon? Whoever reads the narrative of
Thucydidês attentively will see, I think, that they must have
been connected, though Thucydidês does not in express terms
specify the fact. For if the bridge had been detached from the
wall, as it was when Brasidas surprised the place first, the hill
of Kerdylium on the opposite side of the river would have been
an unsafe position for him to occupy. He might have been cut off
from Amphipolis by an enemy attacking the bridge. But we shall
find him remaining quietly on the hill of Kerdylium with the
perfect certainty of entering Amphipolis at any moment that he
chose. If it be urged that the bridge, though unconnected with
the Long Wall, might still be under a strong separate guard,
I reply, that on that supposition an enemy from Eion would
naturally attack the bridge first. To have to defend a bridge
completely detached from the city, simply by means of a large
constant guard, would materially aggravate the difficulties of
Brasidas. If it had been possible to attack the bridge separately
from the city, something must have been said about it in
describing the operations of Kleon, who is represented as finding
nothing to meddle with except the fortifications of the town.
Assuming, then, that there was such a line of connection between
the bridge and the Long Wall, added by Brasidas since the first
capture of the place, I know no meaning so natural to give to
the word σταύρωμα. No other distinct meaning is proposed by any
one. There was, of course, a gate, or more than one, in the Long
Wall, leading into the space inclosed by the palisade; through
this gate Brasidas would enter the town when he crossed from
Kerdylium. This gate is called by Thucydidês αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα
πύλαι. There must have been also a gate, or more than one, in
the palisade itself, leading into the space without: so that
passengers or cattle traversing the bridge from the westward and
going to Myrkinus (_e. g._) would not necessarily be obliged to
turn out of their way and enter the town of Amphipolis.
On the plan which I have here given, the line running nearly from
north to south represents the Long Wall of Agnon, touching the
river at both ends, and bounding as well as fortifying the town
of Amphipolis on its eastern side.
The shorter line, which cuts off the southern extremity of this
Long Wall, and joins the river immediately below the bridge,
represents the σταύρωμα, or palisade: probably it was an earthen
mound and ditch, with a strong palisade at the top.
By means of this palisade, the bridge was included in the
fortifications of Amphipolis, and Brasidas could pass over from
Mount Kerdylium into the city whenever he pleased.
In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the
ridge which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to
Mount Pangæus, in order to survey the city and its adjoining ground
on the northern and northeastern side which he had not yet seen;
that is, the side towards the lake, and towards Thrace,[736] which
was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he
was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city
long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the
bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march, the
rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible
on Mount Kerdylium: moreover, the gates of Amphipolis were all shut,
not a man was on the wall, nor were any symptoms of movement to be
detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack,
he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly
array.[737] Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army
on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall,
he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city
which lay towards Thrace, or towards Myrkinus, Drabêskus, etc., thus
viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward towards
the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and
even astonished him: it seemed altogether undefended, and he almost
fancied that, if he had brought battering-engines, he could have
taken it forthwith.[738] Impressed with the belief that there was no
enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while
his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim,
some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.
[736] Thucyd. v, 7; compare Colonel Leake, _l. c._ p. 182; αὐτὸς
ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρύμονος, καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ
Θρᾴκῃ, ὡς ἔχοι.
[737] Thucyd. v, 7. Κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ
χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ,
ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων
τὴν πόλιν.
The words οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, etc. do not refer to μείζω
παρασκευὴν, as the Scholiast, with whom Dr. Arnold agrees,
considers them, but to the general purpose and dispositions of
Kleon. “He marched up, not like one who is abundantly provided
with means of safety, in case of being put on his defence; but
like one who is going to surround the city and take it at once.”
Nor do these last words represent any real design conceived in
the mind of Kleon (for Amphipolis from its locality _could not
be really surrounded_), but are merely given as illustrating the
careless confidence of his march from Eion up to the ridge: in
the same manner as Herodotus describes the forward rush of the
Persians before the battle of Platæa, to overtake the Greeks whom
they supposed to be running away—Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ
ἐπήισαν, ὡς ~ἀναρπασόμενοι~ τοὺς Ἕλληνας (ix, 59): compare viii,
28.
[738] Thucyd. v, 7. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ κατῆλθεν ἔχων,
ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει· ἑλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον.
I apprehend that the verb κατῆλθεν refers to the coming of the
armament to Eion: analogous to what is said v, 2, ~κατέπλευσεν~
ἐς τὸν Τορωναίων λιμένα: compare i, 51; iii, 4, etc. The march
from Eion up to the ridge could not well be expressed by
the word κατῆλθεν: but the arrival of the expedition at the
Strymon, the place of its destination, might be so described.
Battering-engines would be brought from nowhere else but from
Athens.
Dr. Arnold interprets the word κατῆλθεν to mean that Kleon had
first marched up to a higher point, and then descended from this
point upon Amphipolis. But I contest the correctness of this
assumption, as a matter of topography: it does not appear to me
that Kleon ever reached any point higher than the summit of the
hill and wall of Amphipolis. Besides, even if he had reached a
higher point of the mountain, he could not well talk of “bringing
down battering-machines _from that point_.”
But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas
knew that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium
of absolute inaction, and he calculated that by affecting extreme
backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some
incautious movement of which advantage might be taken. His station
on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian
army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside
of the Long Wall of Amphipolis,[739] he immediately crossed the
river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his
intention to march out and offer them open battle; for his army,
though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and
equipment;[740] in which points the Athenian force now present was
so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves
a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field.
He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed
surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling
of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their
enemy.
[739] Thucyd. v, 6. Βρασίδας δὲ—ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ
Κερδυλίῳ· ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων, πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ
πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ ~κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε
οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ~, etc.
[740] Thucyd. v, 8.
Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athênê, Brasidas
called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements
prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his
Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained
to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with
comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not
prepared for it,[741] when their courage was not wound up to battle
pitch, and when, after carelessly mounting the hill to survey the
ground, they were thinking only of quietly returning to quarters. He
himself at the proper moment would rush out from one gate, and be
foremost in conflict with the enemy: Klearidas, with that bravery
which became him as a Spartan, would follow the example by sallying
out from another gate: and the enemy, taken thus unawares, would
probably make little resistance. For the Amphipolitans, this day and
their own behavior would determine whether they were to be allies of
Lacedæmon, or slaves of Athens, perhaps sold into captivity or even
put to death as a punishment for their recent revolt.
[741] Thucyd. v, 9. Τοὺς γὰρ ἐναντίους εἰκάζω καταφρονήσει
τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας ὡς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς
μάχην, ἀναβῆναί τε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον, καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θέαν
τετραμμένους ὀλιγωρεῖν.... Ἕως οὖν ἔτι ~ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι~,
καὶ τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ φαίνονται,
τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ~ἐν τῷ ἀνειμένῳ αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης, καὶ πρὶν
ξυνταχθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν~, ἐγὼ μὲν, etc.
The words τὸ ἀνειμένον τῆς γνώμης are full of significance in
regard to ancient military affairs. The Grecian hoplites, even
the best of them, required to be peculiarly _wound up_ for a
battle; hence the necessity of the harangue from the general
which always preceded. Compare Xenophon’s eulogy of the manœuvres
of Epameinondas before the battle of Mantineia, whereby he made
the enemy fancy that he was not going to fight, and took down the
preparation in the minds of their soldiers for battle: ἔλυσε μὲν
τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευὴν,
etc. (Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.)
These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy; for
Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the
hill of Kerdylium, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis,
to the Athenian scouts without: moreover, so conspicuous was the
interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of
Athênê, and Brasidas with its ministers around him, performing the
ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognized. The fact was made
known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey,
while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported
that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen
under them, as if preparing for a sally.[742] He himself went close
to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must
recollect that there was no defender on the walls, and no danger from
missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his
reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat,
which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within
could be fully organized; for he imagined that a considerable number
of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before
the attack was actually begun, not dreaming that the sally would be
instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been
proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left
flank towards Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill
with the right wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually
in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to
wheel to the left and follow them.
[742] Thucyd. v, 10. Τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ
ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιφανεῖ οὔσῃ
ἔξωθεν περὶ τὸ ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς θυομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος,
ἀγγέλλεται (προὐκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν) ὅτι ἥ τε
στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τῇ πόλει, etc.
Kleon did not himself _see_ Brasidas sacrificing, or see the
enemy’s army within the city; others on the lower ground were
better situated for seeing what was going on in Amphipolis,
than he was while on the high ridge. Others saw it, and gave
intimation to him.
The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a
direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with
their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy, when Brasidas,
looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small
detachment ready marshalled near him, burst out into contemptuous
exclamations on the disorder of their array.[743] “These men will
not stand us; I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their
heads. Men who reel about in that way, never stand an assailing
enemy. Open the gates for me instantly, and let us sally out with
confidence.”
[743] Thucyd. v, 10. Οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μένουσι (q. μενοῦσι?)·
δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν· οἷς γὰρ ἂν
τοῦτο γίγνηται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας.
This is a remarkable illustration of the regular movement of
heads and spears, which characterized a well-ordered body of
Grecian hoplites.
With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade,
and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown
open, and Brasidas with his one hundred and fifty chosen soldiers
issued out through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running
rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road
towards Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged
their central division on the right flank:[744] their left wing had
already got beyond him on the road towards Eion. Taken completely
unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at
the boldness of their enemy, the Athenians of the centre were seized
with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even
the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting
to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having
thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the
line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement
he was mortally wounded and carried off the field, unobserved by
his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian
gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him,
immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the
Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas
against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden
danger, had thus a moment’s warning, before they were themselves
assailed, to halt and take close rank on the hill. Klearidas here
found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon;
who, more astonished than any man in his army by a catastrophe so
unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was
overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus and slain. His soldiers
on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front
from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the
Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth
out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as
to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to
flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing
and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear.
Their sufferings and loss in the flight, from the hands of the
pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe: and when they at
last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but six
hundred Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found
missing.[745]
[744] Thucyd. v, 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν, κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας,
καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ
τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου
ἰόντι τὸ τροπαῖον ἕστηκε.
Brasidas and his men sallied forth by two different gates at
the same time. One was the first gate in the Long Wall, which
would be the first gate in order, to a person coming from the
southward. The other was the _gate upon the palisade_ (αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ
σταύρωμα πύλαι), that is, the gate in the Long Wall which opened
_from the town upon the palisade_. The persons who sallied out by
this gate would get out to attack the enemy by the gate in the
palisade itself.
The gate in the Long Wall which opened from the town upon the
palisade, would be that by which Brasidas himself with his army
entered Amphipolis from Mount Kerdylium. It probably stood open
at this moment when he directed the sally forth: that which
had to be opened at the moment, was the gate in the palisade,
together with the first gate in the Long Wall.
The last words cited in Thucydidês—ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον
τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τὸ τροπαῖον ἕστηκε—are not intelligible without
better knowledge of the topography than we possess. What
Thucydidês means by “the strongest point in the place,” we cannot
tell. We only understand that the trophy was erected in the road
by which a person went up to that point. We must recollect that
the expressions of Thucydidês here refer to the ground as it
stood sometime afterwards, not as it stood at the time of the
battle between Kleon and Brasidas.
[745] It is almost painful to read the account given by Diodorus
(xii, 73, 74) of the battle of Amphipolis, when one’s mind is
full of the distinct and admirable narrative of Thucydidês, only
defective by being too brief. It is difficult to believe that
Diodorus is describing the same event; so totally different are
all the circumstances, except that the Lacedæmonians at last
gain the victory. To say, with Wesseling in his note, “Hæc _non
usquequaque_ conveniunt Thucydideis,” is prodigiously below the
truth.
So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its
success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors.
But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being
carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete
victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the
sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among
the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished
honor of interment within their city, the universal habit being to
inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without
the walls. All the allies attended his funeral in arms and with
military honors: his tomb was encircled by a railing, and the space
immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the
city, which was remodelled accordingly. He was also proclaimed œkist,
or founder, of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship
with annual games and sacrifices to his honor.[746] The Athenian
Agnon, the real founder and originally recognized œkist of the city,
was stripped of all his commemorative honors and expunged from the
remembrance of the people: his tomb and the buildings connected
with it, together with every visible memento of his name, being
destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were towards
Athens,—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which
they had just sustained of their saviour and protector,—they felt
repugnance to the idea of rendering farther worship to an Athenian
œkist. Nor was it convenient to keep up such a religious link with
Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Lacedæmon
for assistance. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended
those numerous alterations in the city which this important change
required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot
where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining
armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their
dead, returned home without farther operations.
[746] Thucyd. v, 11. Aristotle, a native of Stageirus near
to Amphipolis, cites the sacrifices rendered to Brasidas as
an instance of institutions established by special and local
enactment (Ethic. Nikomach. v, 7).
In reference to the aversion now entertained by the Amphipolitans
to the continued worship of Agnon as their œkist, compare the
discourse addressed by the Platæans to the Lacedæmonians,
pleading for mercy. The Thebans, if they became possessors of
the Platæid, would not continue the sacrifices to the gods who
had granted victory at the great battle of Platæa, nor funereal
mementos to the slain (Thucyd. iii, 58).
There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and
contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest,—consummate
skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the
other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be
but one verdict of unqualified admiration: but the criticism passed
by Thucydidês on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without
reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up
to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident
spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus, in
the blind confidence that no one would resist him.[747] Now I have
already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the
anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from
being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and
judicious, realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from
fortune. Nor are the remarks, here made by Thucydidês on that affair,
more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it
is not true, as he here implies, that Kleon expected no resistance in
Sphakteria: he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force
sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as
that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This
charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself
wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should
arrive, and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to
abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by
the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance
and backwardness, the latter quality being the reverse of that with
which he is branded by Thucydidês.
[747] Thucyd. v, 7. Καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον
εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν· ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἤλπισέν οἱ
ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου,
καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, etc.
When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the
top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was
not in itself unreasonable, and might have been accomplished in
perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared
for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be completely
out-generalled and overreached by that simulated consciousness of
impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Brasidas took care to
present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been
the most frequently practised with success against inexperienced
generals, who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect
precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous
than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order
of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man
to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even real and
serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their
approach; much more when there _is_ positive evidence, artfully laid
out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault
substantially the same had been committed by Thucydidês himself and
his colleague Euklês a year and a half before, when they suffered
Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis: not even
taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the
fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous,
but ignorant and unpractised, in a military sense; incapable of
keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly
knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching
explosion.
This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid
for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the
danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within
were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving
instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away
before the enemy’s attack could be brought to bear.[748] An abler
officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the
hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper
array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind
up their courage to the fighting-point: for up to that moment they
had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian
hoplites, taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder
visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the
usual preliminaries of battle, was but too apt to prove deficient.
To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable
from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable
to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done, or for causing
his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as
Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in
not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight
during their retreat. Let us add, however, and the remark, if it
serves to explain Kleon’s idea of being able to get away before he
was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment to the judgment
as well as boldness of Brasidas, that no other Lacedæmonian general
of that day perhaps, not even Demosthenês, the most enterprising
general of Athens, would have ventured upon an attack with so very
small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his
sudden movement.
[748] Thucyd. v, 10. Οἰόμενος φθήσεσθαι ἀπελθὼν, etc.
But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the
worst of Kleon’s faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the
moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of
that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it.
A commander who has been out-generalled is under a double force of
obligation to exert and expose himself, to the uttermost, in order to
retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least
preserve his own personal honor, whatever censure he may deserve on
the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.[749]
[749] Contrast the brave death of the Lacedæmonian general
Anaxibius, when he found himself out-generalled and surprised by
the Athenian Iphikratês (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 38).
What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself, must be
applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian
hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of
the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems
to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when
we read in Thucydidês, that the men who thus disgraced themselves
were among the best, and the best-armed hoplites in Athens; that they
came out unwillingly under Kleon; that they began their scornful
murmurs against him before he had committed any fault, despising
him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt
anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in
waiting the arrival of expected reinforcements; when we read this,
we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with
former manœuvres respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern
other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of
the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens
the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon.
The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to their
wishes: they could not prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it
from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned
to it, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.
Had Periklês been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been
lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to
defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and
recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been, with
the full force and the best generals that Athens could furnish.
With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all
impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that
time it had no defence on three sides except the Strymon, and might
thus be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The
armament of Kleon,[750] even if his reinforcements had arrived, was
hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Periklês would have been able
to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being
paralyzed by the contentions of political party: he would have seen
as clearly as Kleon, that the place could only be recovered by force,
and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens
could devote her energies.
[750] Amphipolis was actually thus attacked by the Athenians
eight years afterwards, by ships on the Strymon, Thucyd. vii,
9. Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ᾽
Ἀμφίπολιν Θρᾳξὶ πολλοῖς, τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἷλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν
Στρύμονα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει,
ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἱμεραίου. (In the eighteenth year of the war.) But
the fortifications of the place seem to have been materially
altered during the interval. Instead of one long wall, with three
sides open to the river, it seems to have acquired a curved wall,
only open to the river on a comparatively narrow space near to
the lake; while this curved wall joined the bridge southerly by
means of a parallel pair of long walls with road between.
It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue,
partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous
defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas
converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained
no Spartan either like or second to that eminent man, either as a
soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him
in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace;
none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens
on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable.
The fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the
future, disappeared alike with him. The Athenian generals, Phormio
and Demosthenês, had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an
influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from
their country: but the career of Brasidas, exhibited an extent of
personal ascendency and admiration, obtained as well as deserved,
such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain
in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable
historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles.[751] All the
achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more
than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from
his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in
which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development
of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely
estranged from all experience of party or political discussion, we
are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power
of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his
felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite
political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired.
The combination “of every sort of practical excellence,” valor,
intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing, which his character
presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens,
and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favorable
presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize.[752]
At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was
unquestionably the first man in Greece; and though it is not given to
us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure
that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified;
perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had
sufficient occupation at home to keep her from the disastrous
enterprise in Sicily.
[751] Plato, Symp. c. 36, p. 221.
[752] Thuc. iv, 81. δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς, etc.
Thucydidês seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant
exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methônê to the last at
Amphipolis, not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in
different senses, the causes of his banishment. He never mentions
the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as
unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty
of empire thought itself entitled to practise in ancient times
against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reach their maximum
in the propositions against Mitylênê and Skiônê: both of them are
ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the
slaughter of the Melians, equally barbarous, and worse in respect to
grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects
of Athens, we find Thucydidês mentioning the deed without naming the
proposer.[753]
[753] Thucyd. v, 116.
Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated
will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that
of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydidês
has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticizing this personal
enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main
and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest
advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in
regard to his judgment as advocating the prosecution of war, three
different times must be distinguished: 1. After the first blockade
of the hoplites in Sphakteria; 2. After the capture of the island;
3. After the expiration of the one year truce. On the earliest of
those three occasions he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the
door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing
with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and
plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned
out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and
Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On
the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the
political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklêan,
much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the
coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state
after his death; how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the
enforcement of the conditions of peace; how Nikias and Alkibiadês
together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of
Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison,
we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydidês is reserved and
even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen, harsh
only towards those of his accuser.
As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician
in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy
evidence. There exists, indeed, a portrait of him, drawn in colors
broad and glaring, most impressive to the imagination, and hardly
effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the “Knights” of
Aristophanês. It is through this representation that Kleon has been
transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself
to have had a personal grudge against him, just as he has been
commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had
proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanês, so replete with
comic genius throughout, the “Knights” is the most consummate and
irresistible; the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and
purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in
reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest
possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it
obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit
combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule,
contempt, and odium. Dean Swift would have desired nothing worse,
even for Ditton and Winston. The old man, Demos of Pnyx, introduced
on the stage as personifying the Athenian people,—Kleon, brought
on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying,
impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master’s
ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches
himself,—the Knights, or chief members of what we may call the
Athenian aristocracy, forming the Chorus of the piece as Kleon’s
pronounced enemies,—the sausage-seller from the market-place, who,
instigated by Nikias find Demosthenês along with these Knights,
overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the
favor of Demos; all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of
expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libellous comedy.
The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was
represented at the Lenæan festival, January B.C. 424, about six
months after the capture of Sphakteria, with Kleon himself and most
of the real Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we
can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after
this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigor
and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence, at
least not permanently; for not only do we see him the most effective
opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for
believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his
tone towards this powerful enemy.
So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are
satisfied with Aristophanês as a witness against him: though no other
public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such
evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or
Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them:
no man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of
a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivalled comic merit of the
“Knights” of Aristophanês is only one reason the more for distrusting
the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too
of testing the candor and accuracy of Aristophanês by his delineation
of Sokratês, whom he introduced in the comedy of “Clouds” in the year
after that of the “Knights.” As a comedy, the “Clouds” stands second
only to the “Knights”: as a picture of Sokratês, it is little better
than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different
person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance; the
bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both; but the
entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one
would think of comparing it with Sokratês, whom we know well from
other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we
know generally of the portraits of Periklês by these authors, we are
not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except
on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that
some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their
pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact; as, for example, where
the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly robbed
Demosthenês of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphakteria.[754]
[754] Aristophan. Equit. 55, 391, 740, etc. In one passage of
the play, Kleon is reproached with pretending to be engaged at
Argos in measures for winning the alliance of that city, but in
reality, under cover of this proceeding, carrying on clandestine
negotiations with the Lacedæmonians (464). In two other passages,
he is denounced as being the person who obstructs the conclusion
of peace with the Lacedæmonians (790, 1390).
In the prose of Thucydidês, we find Kleon described as a dishonest
politician, a wrongful accuser of others, the most violent of all
the citizens:[755] throughout the verse of Aristophanês, these
same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but
others are also superadded; Kleon practises the basest artifices and
deceptions to gain favor with the people, steals the public money,
receives bribes, and extorts compositions from private persons by
wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretence of zeal for the
public treasury. In the comedy of the Acharnians, represented one
year earlier than the Knights, the poet alludes with great delight to
a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled “to disgorge”:
a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens, if we
may believe Theopompus, for the purpose of procuring a remission of
their tribute, and which the Knights, whose evasions of military
service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.[756]
[755] Thucyd. v, 17; iii, 45. καταφανέστερος μὲν εἶναι κακουργῶν,
καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων—βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν.
[756] Aristophan. Acharn. 8, with the Scholiast, who quotes from
Theopompus. Theopompus, Fragment, 99, 100, 101, ed. Didot.
But when we put together the different heads of indictment
accumulated by Aristophanês, it will be found that they are not
easily reconcilable one with the other; for an Athenian, whose temper
led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price
of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it
peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for
his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he
would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking
at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous
as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side
of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydidês; not Kleon, as
truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit
(which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about
the Mitylenæans, as given to us by the historian),[757] but Kleon
as a man of violent temper and fierce political antipathies, a
bitter speaker, and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against
adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free
debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was
thus that the elder Cato, “the universal biter, whom Persephonê was
afraid even to admit into Hades after his death,” was characterized
at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and
in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him,
as Thucydidês was to Kleon.[758] In Cato, such a temper was not
inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts
an anecdote respecting Kleon, that, on first beginning his political
career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy
with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him
from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.[759]
[757] The public speaking of Kleon was characterized by Aristotle
and Theopompus (see Schol. ad Lucian. Timon, c. 30), not as
wheedling, but as full of arrogance; in this latter point too
like that of the elder Cato at Rome (Plutarch, Cato, c. 14). The
derisory tone of Cato in his public speaking, too, is said to
have been impertinent and disgusting (Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend.
Præcept. p. 803, c. 7).
[758] An epigram which Plutarch (Cato, c. 1) gives us from a poet
contemporary of Cato the Censor, describes him:—
Πυῤῥὸν, ~πανδακέτην~, γλαυκόμματον, οὐδὲ θανόντα
Πόρκιον εἰς Ἀΐδην Περσεφόνη δέχεται.
Livy says, in an eloquent encomium on Cato (xxxix, 40):
“Simultates nimio plures et exercuerunt eum, et ipse exercuit
eas: nec facile dixeris utrum magis presserit eum nobilitas, an
ille agitaverit nobilitatem. Asperi procul dubio animi, et linguæ
acerbæ et immodice liberæ fuit: sed invicti a cupiditatibus
animi et rigidæ innocentiæ: contemptor gratiæ, divitiarum....
Hunc sicut omni vitâ, tum censuram petentem premebat nobilitas;
coierantque candidati omnes ad dejiciendum honore eum; non
solum ut ipsi potius adipiscerentur, nec quia indignabantur
novum hominem censorem videre; sed etiam quod tristem censuram,
periculosamque multorum famæ, et _ab læso a plerisque et lædendi
cupido_, expectabant.”
See also Plutarch (Cato, c. 15, 16: his comparison between
Aristeidês and Cato, c. 2) about the prodigious number of
accusations in which Cato was engaged, either as prosecutor or
as party prosecuted. His bitter feud with the _nobilitas_ is
analogous to that of Kleon against the Hippeis.
I need hardly say that the comparison of Cato with Kleon applies
only to domestic politics: in the military courage and energy for
which Cato was distinguished, Kleon is utterly wanting, nor are
we entitled to ascribe to him anything like the superiority of
knowledge and general intelligence which we find recorded of Cato.
The expression of Cicero respecting Kleon: “turbulentum quidem
civem, sed tamen eloquentem,” (Cicero, Brutus, 7) appears to be
a translation of the epithets of Thucydidês—βιαιότατος—τῷ δήμῳ
πιθανώτατος (iii, 45).
The remarks made too by Latin critics on the style and temper
of Cato’s speeches, might almost seem to be a translation of
the words of Thucydidês about Kleon. Fronto said about Cato:
“Concionatur Cato _infeste_, Gracchus turbulente, Tullius
copiose. Jam in judiciis _sævit_ idem Cato, triumphat Cicero,
tumultuatur Gracchus.” See Dübner’s edition of Meyer’s Oratorum
Romanorum Fragmenta, p. 117 (Paris, 1837).
[759] Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 806. Compare two other
passages in the same treatise, p. 805, where Plutarch speaks of
the ἀπόνοια καὶ δεινότης of Kleon; and p. 812, where he says,
with truth, that Kleon was not at all qualified to act as general
in a campaign.
Moreover, the reputation of Kleon as a frequent and unmeasured
accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy
Aristophanês: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just
representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the “Frogs”)
represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and
five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive
for misrepresentations against either. In the “Frogs,” the scene
is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of
Hêraklês and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of
bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripidês. Among the
incidents, Xanthias, in the attire which his master had worn, is
represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hostesses
of eating-houses; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing
to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a
drawn sword. Upon which the women, having no other redress left,
announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector
Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the
offender to justice before the dikastery.[760] This passage shows us,
if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible, that
Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping
poor persons who had been wronged to obtain justice before the
dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might apply to Antipho
or some other rhetor for paid advice and aid as to the conduct of his
complaint; but a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to
obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech,
of Kleon or Hyperbolus; who would thus extend their own popularity,
by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in
Rome.[761]
[760] Aristophan. Ran. 566-576.
[761] Here again we find Cato the elder represented as constantly
in the forum at Rome, lending aid of this kind, and espousing
the cause of others who had grounds of complaint (Plutarch,
Cato, c. 3), πρωῒ μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν βαδίζει καὶ παρίσταται
τοῖς δεομένοις—τοὺς μὲν θαυμαστὰς καὶ φίλους ἐκτᾶτο διὰ τῶν
ξυνηγοριῶν, etc.
But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also
a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or
alleged. That some one should undertake this duty was indispensable
for the protection of the city; otherwise, the responsibility to
which official persons were subjected after their term of office
would have been merely nominal: and we have proof enough that
the general public morality of these official persons, acting
individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same
time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor,
while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the
most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure
a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the
numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand
drachms. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a
formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and
the political club, of the accused party, extremely menacing to his
own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. There
was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline,
the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at
Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals,
but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing
it frequently or by inclination, and the orators constantly do so
guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain.
It is this reputation which Thucydidês fastens upon Kleon, and which,
like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited; from native
acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective and from
his position, both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights, or
aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in
what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious,
the real question upon which a candid judgment turns, we have no
means of deciding, either in his case or that of Cato. “To lash the
wicked (observes Aristophanês himself[762]) is not only no blame,
but is even a matter of honor to the good.” It has not been common
to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation, though he is
much more entitled to it than Aristophanês. For the attacks of a
poetical libeller admit neither of defence nor retaliation; whereas a
prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply
or even to retort, and was obliged to specify his charge, as well
as to furnish proof of it; so that there was a fair chance for the
innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.
[762] Aristophan. Equit. 1271:—
Λοιδορῆσαι τοὺς πονηροὺς, οὐδέν ἐστ᾽ ἐπίφθονον,
Ἀλλὰ τιμὴ τοῖσι χρηστοῖς, ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται.
The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanês is said to have arisen out
of an accusation which he brought against that poet[763] in the
Senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the
“Babylonians,” exhibited B.C. 426, at the festival of the urban
Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were
present at Athens, and especially many visitors and deputies from
the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute: and
as the “Babylonians,” (now lost), like so many other productions
of Aristophanês, was full of slashing ridicule, not only against
individual citizens but against the functionaries and institutions
of the city,[764] Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the
senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before
strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens was then
in the midst of an embarrassing war; that the fidelity of her
subject-allies was much doubted; that Lesbos, the greatest of her
allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a
revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such
circumstances, Kleon had good reason for thinking that a political
comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the
city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous
when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains[765]
that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and
calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor,
indeed, had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him
except to the extent of a small fine: they could only bring him to
trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done.
He himself, however, seems to have felt the justice of the warning:
for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before
the Peace of Nikias,—the Acharnians, the Knights, and the Wasps,—were
represented at the Lenæan festival,[766] in the month of January, a
season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless
much incensed with the play of the Knights, and seems to have annoyed
the poet either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising
freemen’s rights without being duly qualified, since none but
citizens were allowed to appear and act in the dramatic exhibitions,
or by some other means which are not clearly explained. Nor can we
make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding
less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an
apology without intending to be bound by it.[767] Certain it is, that
his remaining plays subsequent to the Knights, though containing some
few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate set
against him.
[763] It appears that the complaint was made ostensibly
against Kalistratus, in whose name the poet brought out the
“Babylonians,” (Schol. ad Arist. Vesp. 1284), and who was
of course the responsible party, though the real author was
doubtless perfectly well known. The Knights was the first play
brought out by the poet in his own name.
[764] See Acharn. 377, with the Scholia, and the anonymous
biography of Aristophanês.
Both Meineke (Aristoph. Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii, p. 966) and
Ranke (Commentat. de Aristoph. Vitâ, p. cccxxx) try to divine the
plot of the “Babylonians;” but there is no sufficient information
to assist them.
[765] Aristoph. Acharn. 355-475.
[766] See the Arguments prefixed to these three plays; and
Acharn. 475, Equit. 881.
It is not known whether the first comedy, entitled _The Clouds_
(represented in the earlier part of B.C. 423, a year after the
Knights, and a year before the Wasps), appeared at the Lenæan
festival of January, or at the urban Dionysia in March. It was
unsuccessful, and the poet partially altered it with the view
to a second representation. If it be true that this second
representation took place during the year immediately following
(B.C. 422: see Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 422), it
must have been at the urban Dionysia in March, just at the time
when the truce for one year was coming to a close; for the Wasps
was represented in that year at the Lenæan festival, and the same
poet would hardly be likely to bring out two plays. The inference
which Ranke draws from Nubes 310, that it was represented at the
Dionysia, is not, however, very conclusive (Ranke, Commentat. de
Aristoph. Vitâ, p. ccxxi, prefixed to his edition of the Plutus).
[767] See the obscure passage, Vespæ, 1285, _seqq._; Aristoph.
Vita Anonymi, p. xiii, ed. Bekker; Demosthen. cont. Meid. p. 532.
It appears that Aristophanês was of Æginetan parentage (Acharn.
629); so that the γραφὴ ξενίας (indictment for undue assumption
of the rights of an Athenian citizen) was founded upon a real
fact. Between the time of the conquest of Ægina by Athens, and
the expulsion of the native inhabitants in the first year of the
Peloponnesian war (an interval of about twenty years), probably
no inconsiderable number of Æginetans became intermingled or
intermarried with Athenian citizens. Especially men of poetical
talent in the subject-cities would find it their interest to
repair to Athens: Ion came from Chios, and Achæus from Eretria;
both tragic composers.
The comic author Eupolis seems also to have directed some taunts
against the foreign origin of Aristophanês, if Meineke is correct
in his interpretation of a passage (Historia Comicor. Græc. i, p.
111).
The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced
individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was
more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the
number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city
with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing
Athenian soldiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias
and Lachês, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon,
as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to
resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success.
King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their
side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all
the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of
Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and
winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities
on either side. At first, the pretensions advanced were found very
conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed
to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been
acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration
of Platæa; but the Thebans replied that Platæa was theirs neither by
force nor by treason, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender
of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat
remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less
the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in
the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing
their demand of Platæa, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had
acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Sollium,[768] which
they had taken from Corinth. To insure accommodating temper on the
part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica
in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the
territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies,
enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had
now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were
probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent
form.
[768] Thucyd. v, 17-30. The statement in cap. 30 seems to show
that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to
retain Sollium and Anaktorium. For if their retention of these
two places had been distinctly and in terms at variance with the
treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have chosen this fact as
the ostensible ground of their complaint: whereas they preferred
to have recourse to a πρόσχημα, or sham plea.
At the beginning of spring, about the end of March, 421 B.C.,
shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens, the important treaty
was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its
principal conditions:—
1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of
Greece, for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle,
or public sacred mission. Every man shall be undisturbed both in
going and coming. [The value of this article will be felt, when we
recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to
visit the Olympic or Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.]
2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their
temple and their territory. [This article was intended to exclude
the ancient claim of the Phocian confederacy to the management of the
temple; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the
thirty years’ truce: but they had now little interest in the matter,
since the Phocians were in the ranks of their enemies.]
3. There shall be peace for fifty years, between Athens and Sparta
with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief, either
overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.
4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory
of the other, not by any artifice or under any pretence.
Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by
equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be
hereafter agreed on.
5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the
Athenians.
They shall farther _relinquish_ to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus,
Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. But these cities shall
remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according
to the assessment of Aristeidês. Any of their citizens who may choose
to quit them shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his
property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies
of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable
persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if
she can.
The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sanê, and Singê, shall dwell
independently in their respective cities, just as much as the
Olynthians and Akanthians. [These were towns which adhered to Athens,
and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough
to be molested by Olynthus[769] and Akanthus, against which this
clause was intended to insure them.]
[769] Compare v, 39 with v, 18, which seems to me to refute the
explanation suggested by Dr. Arnold, and adopted by Poppo.
The use of the word ἀποδόντων in regard to the restoration of
Amphipolis to Athens, and of the word παρέδοσαν in regard to the
_relinquishment_ of the other cities, deserves notice. Those
who drew up the treaty, which is worded in a very confused way,
seem to have intended that the word παρέδοσαν should apply both
to Amphipolis and the other cities, but that the word ἀποδόντων
should apply exclusively to Amphipolis. The word παρέδοσαν is
of course applicable to the restoration of Amphipolis, for that
which is _restored_ is of course _delivered up_. But it is
remarkable that this word παρέδοσαν does not properly apply to
the other cities: for they were not _delivered up_ to Athens,
they were only _relinquished_, as the clauses immediately
following farther explain. Perhaps there is a little Athenian
pride in the use of the word, first to intimate indirectly that
the Lacedæmonians were to _deliver up_ various cities to Athens,
then to add words afterwards, which show that the cities were
only to be _relinquished_, not surrendered to Athens.
The provision, for guaranteeing liberty of retirement and
carrying away of property, was of course intended chiefly for the
Amphipolitans, who would naturally desire to emigrate, if the
town had been actually restored to Athens.
The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore Panaktum to the
Athenians.
6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythêra,
Methônê, Pteleum, Atalantê, with all the captives in their hands from
Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or
allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skiônê.
7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall also restore all the
captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.
8. Respecting Skiônê, Torônê, Sermylus, or any other town in the
possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures.
9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties,
according to the solemnities held most binding in each city
respectively, and in the following words: “I will adhere to this
convention and truce sincerely and without fraud.” The oaths shall
be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on
columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and
Athens.
10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention,
the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding
and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.
These oaths were accordingly exchanged: they were taken by seventeen
principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their
respective countries, on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at
Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately
after the urban Dionysia; Pleistolas being ephor eponymus at Sparta,
and Alkæus archon eponymus at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians
swearing, are included the two kings Agis and Pleistoanax, the ephor
Pleistolas, and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know, and
Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn, are
comprised Nikias, Lachês, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenês.[770]
[770] Thucyd. v, 19.
Such was the peace—commonly known by the name of the Peace of
Nikias—concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the
war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions were
put to the vote at Sparta, in the assembly of deputies from the
Lacedæmonian allies, the majority of whom accepted them: which,
according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of
the confederacy,[771] made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a
special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious
scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or
heroes, but, saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded
to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how
little the vote of the majority was worth, even when enforced by the
strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself, when the more powerful members
were among the dissentient minority. The Bœotians, Megarians, and
Corinthians, all refused to accept it; nor does it seem that any
deputies from the allies took the oath along with the Lacedæmonian
envoys; though the truce for a year, two years before,[772] had
been sworn to by Lacedæmonian, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and
Epidaurian envoys.
[771] Thucyd. v, 17-30. παραβήσεσθαί τε ἔφασαν (the Lacedæmonians
said) αὐτοὺς (the Corinthians) τοὺς ὅρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι
οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς, εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν
τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ.
[772] Compare Thucyd. iv, 119; v, 19. Though the words of the
peace stand ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις (v, 18), yet it seems that this
oath was not _actually_ taken by any of the allied cities; only
by the Lacedæmonians themselves, upon the vote of the majority of
the confederates (v, 17: compare v, 23).
The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover Sollium
and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the
Bœotians, because they were required to surrender Panaktum. In spite
of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these
powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted
against it in the general assembly of allies, but refused to accept
it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective
cities for instructions.[773]
[773] Thucyd. v, 22.
Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances,
of the Peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate,
the great Peloponnesian war, after a duration of ten years.
Its consequences and fruits, in many respects such as were not
anticipated by either of the concluding parties, will be seen in my
next volume.
End of Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, v. 6 (of 12), by George Grote