This historical document promised at one time to be a problem like the
Sibilline Leaves or Czar Peter's will. But Secretary H. C. Whitney
declares that it existed as he had it laid before him by the strategist.
"Running his long forefinger down the map of Virginia, he said: 'We
must drive them away from here (Manassas Gap, where indeed were fights
over the keystone), and clear them out of this part of the State, so
that they cannot threaten them here (Washington) and get into
Maryland.' (Unfortunately, the rebels did threaten Washington right on
and entered Maryland and Pennsylvania, as late as July, 1863, and by a
cavalry raid, a year later.)
"'We must keep up a good and thorough blockade of their ports. We must
march an army into East Tennessee and liberate the Union sentiment
there. (This was not finally done till the end of 1864.)
"'Finally, we must rely on the (Southern) people growing tired, and
saying to their leaders: "We have had enough of this thing, and will
bear it no longer."'"
In 1862, a year after, Lincoln says to McClellan: "We have distinct and
different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac: yours to be
down the Chesapeake, etc.; mine, to move directly to the point on the
railroads southwest of Manassas. (He hugs his original idea.)... In
case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan
than mine?" You see the prudence in him esteemed ignorant and
consequently blindly rash. All this amounted to nothing when the
President trusted fully to Grant as his lieutenant.
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