destined to receive a _denoument_ little or not at all foreseen, yet
very original and nothing less than illogical. The publicists and the
patriots of Berlin do not speak to-day of the mission of Austria in the
countries of the Danube and the Bosphorus, which they say is called by
Providence to strengthen in these countries German interests, to bring
there "German culture." Since the great day of Sedan, especially,
exhortations and summons are not wanting to this Power "to seek its
centre of gravity elsewhere than at Vienna," in short, to justify its
secular name of _Ostreich_, and to become an empire of the East, in the
true meaning of the word. A monarchy constantly menaced with the early
loss of its Germanic possessions on the Leitha may at length be brought
to try the experiment, when, above all, care is taken to present to it
this experiment as a necessity and as a virtue; a state which has never
been strongly centralized, and which has always oscillated between
dualism and a federal system more or less definite, will even have a
great chance to appear to Europe as the most proper outline of this
medley of races, of religions, of institutions, which stretches from the
Iron Gates to the Golden Horn. An _empire of the East_ of Germanic
traditions and influences on the Bosphorus, more to the South a kingdom
of Greece enlarged by Thessaly and Epirus, lastly, in the North a
Germany completed in its unity by the Cisleithan provinces,--that will
be something to fully content the world, not excepting England. We must
acknowledge, one solution of the formidable Ottoman question is like
another, and every hypothesis, every fantasy, has the right to appear,
when one touches this fantastic world of the Orient, and that world not
less mysterious and terrible which the great recluse of Varzin carries
in his head.
What, in any case, is not within the domain of hypothesis and fantasy,
what unfortunately is only a too evident and palpable reality, is, that
in place of this "combination purely and exclusively defensive," as
Prince Gortchakof one day so justly called the old _Bund_,--in place of
a league of peaceful states, all devoted friends of Russia, and forming
for it a continual succession of ramparts,--the empire of Alexander II.
now sees before it, firmly settled all along its frontier, a formidable
Power, the strongest Power of the Continent, ambitious, avaricious,
enterprising, and having henceforward the undoubted mission of defending
against it what they have agreed to call the _interests of the
Occident_. This Power can always excite the Polish question, if it
wishes to, according to its wants, and quite differently than the
cabinets of Paris and London would do it: has not the argument for such
a "_coup au coeur_" been very warmly sustained in 1871, by certain
Hungarian statesmen in the confidence of the Prussian minister? The
conduct of the government of Berlin at the time of the last insurrection
of Warsaw did not injure it in the future: the passionate speeches of M.
de Bismarck in 1849 against the revolt of the Magyars did not prevent
him from arming, many years later, the legions of General Klapka. We
cannot at least deny the Prussian plans in 1863 on the left bank of the
Vistula, "the natural frontier;" now, do not the friends of Berlin
occasionally insinuate that this would be the most efficacious means to
end the spirit of Polonism? They do not speak of the provinces of the
Baltic, as before Sadowa they repudiated all thoughts of ever wishing to
free the Main; but the Teutonic effervescence from Courland and Livonia
goes on increasing, and to what grievous sacrifices will the
Hohenzollern not resign himself when he thinks that he hears a voice
from above, the voice of "German brothers?"
Certainly it would have made the prince regent tremble in 1858, if any
one had spoken to him then of a war against a Hapsburg, and of a
companion in arms named Garibaldi; he ended, however, by accepting the
hard necessity, and he gave the signal for a fratricidal combat, with
grief in his soul and tears in his eyes. Is it not puerile, however, to
measure the destinies of nations by the life, more or less long, of this
or that sovereign? An emperor can reign in Germany who has neither
affection for, nor the remembrance of Alexander II.; he can raise up "a
Pharaoh who knows not Joseph," to speak with Holy Writ, and then there
is something stronger in the world than czar and emperor: the necessity
of history, the fatality of race. A formidable race that of these
conquerors of Sadowa and Sedan, whose invading and conquering minds have
from the beginning survived all transformations and accommodated
themselves to all disguises! Humble, and at the same time presumptuous,
temperate and prolific, expansive and tenacious, practicing with
persistence their old proverb, _ubi bene, ibi patria_, and nevertheless
always preserving a rough attachment for the _mother country_, the
Germans infiltrate every country, penetrate all regions, disdain no
corner of the habitable world. They have their friends and relations on
all the thrones and in all the offices of the world; they people the
industrial centres of Europe and the solitudes of the far West; they
decide the presidential elections in the United States; they furnish the
largest contingent of the high administrative _personnel_ in the empire
of the czars, and the remembrance is still recent of that statistic of
the Russian army, which, in 100 superior officers, counts eighty of
German origin.[145] So Germany appeared before the great strokes of
fortune of 1866 and of 1870, before the era of _iron and blood_, before
M. de Bismarck had awakened in it the secret of its strength, had said
to it the magic word, _tu regere imperio populos_! Is it necessary to
recall now the hatred which the Germans have always borne against the
Sclavic name, the extermination which they lately vowed on the Elbe
and the Oder; and does not the mind recoil in terror before a new
conflict of the two races, to-day more probable than ever? It is
allowable to treat all these apprehensions as boyish dreams, hollow
thoughts of _literati_ and professors; but the eminent men, the serious
men, the _augures_ and _aruspices_ of politics, have they in our day
treated otherwise many a formidable problem? Have they not used the same
language on the question of Schleswig-Holstein and the German
pretensions to Alsace, in regard to the unity of Italy and the plans of
the _National Verein_? That would be a curious chapter of
contemporaneous history to write, that of the _Diplomats and
Professors_, and which could well show that of these two respectable
bodies the most pedantic and the most ideological is not exactly the one
which a vain people thinks.
Is there not,--the same persons continue, more careful of the interests
of the present and the future than of the unseasonable reminiscences of
the past,--is there not ideological force, for instance, in the manner
of assimilating the two epochs of 1814 and 1870, and of saluting in
Field Marshal Moltke the continuator of the work of Koutouzof? At the
time of the memorable war of which the burning of Moscow had given the
heroic signal, it was all Europe that arose against an insolent master
and bore deliverance to states trodden and ground down by a universal
dominion. Was it the same in the last conflagration? and can one not
rather say that it was France, on the contrary, that fought at this
moment for the equilibrium of the world and the independence of
kingdoms, trying to repair by a tardy and badly conceived effort a
series of culpable errors, but from which it was not the only one to
suffer? Different in their motives, the two epochs scarcely resemble
each other more as to ways and means. It was "a war by means of
revolutions" that the Prussian minister had early announced to M.
Benedetti, and he has kept his word; he had regards, attenuations,
_comprehensions_ for the _commune_ difficult to justify; now he openly
protects the Republican _regime_ in France against any attempt at
restoration, thus sacrificing the monarchical principle and the highest
considerations of European order to a purely selfish and vindictive
calculation. That is not the spirit which animated the allies of 1814;
the magnanimous Alexander I. especially understood differently the
duties of sovereigns and the solidarity of conservative interests. And
what a severe judgment would the Emperor Nicholas have given on every
_ensemble_ of the policy of Berlin, on that regeneration of Germany
which has not ceased to be the revolution from above, from the federal
execution in Holstein up to the arrest of the syndics of the crown; from
the destruction of the _Bund_ up to the overturning of the dynasty of
the Guelphs; from the formation of the Hungarian legions and the close
relations with Mazzini to the _Kulturkampf_ against the Catholic Church!
That we may not be deceived in fact, we can still say it is the
revolution alone which finds its profit in the war made to-day in
Germany on Catholicism, and very great, very _naive_ is the illusion of
those who flatter themselves with seeing Protestant or Orthodox ideas,
the religious spirit in general, benefited by the losses of Papacy. It
suffices to cast a glance on the great battalions of the _Kulturkampf_
to recognize their God; they bear on their banners very clearly the sign
under whose name they expect to conquer. Are these sincere Protestants,
these _evangelical men_ for whom the Gospel is a truth, who first rush
to the assault or who only follow it with their wishes and their
prayers? Assuredly not; all those who from the Reformation have not kept
the name in vain, but the strong doctrine, openly repudiate this
dissension, while sighing in their souls. They have the just feeling
that in our epoch, so overturned, so profoundly disturbed by the genius
of negation, religious interests are conjointly responsible between them
just as well as conservative interests. Those eager for the combat, the
zealots "filled with the divine spirit," are precisely those who admit
neither divinity nor spirit, who have no other positive religion than
positivism; and it is not in them surely that Luther resuscitated would
wish to recognize his children. The great adversary of Rome in the
sixteenth century held on to the revelation, he held on to his Bible, to
his dogma of pardon: are not all these things very "old-fashioned," and
very laughable in the eyes of the disciples of Strauss and Darwin? The
apostle of Wittemberg believed in justification through faith; the
apostles of Berlin believe in justification through success.
It is a grave matter,--at length conclude these men, alarmed in their
patriotism and in their conservative sentiments,--an extremely perilous
matter for a great state to abandon, in its relations with the Powers,
certain established maxims, certain rules of conduct tried by long
experience, become in a manner the _arcana imperii_, and Napoleon III.
has just paid dearly for such a rupture with the ancient traditions in
the exterior policy of France. Russia had also, in regard to Europe,
sacred traditions, which have made the greatness and the strength of the
preceding reigns; under these reigns, they were jealous in defending the
liberty of the Baltic, they watched over the maintenance of the
equilibrium of strength between Austria and Prussia, they appreciated
the friendship and the devotion of the secondary States of Germany, and
they caused the monarchical principle to be everywhere respected as
opposed to revolution. Then Russia never had to repent at having turned
aside from the ways hollowed out by the triumphal car of Peter the
Great, of Catherine II., of Alexander I., and of Nicholas!
Thus spoke the independent minds on the banks of the Neva while the
official world there displayed all the northern magnificence in honor of
William the Conqueror: however, they only lent a reasoning and touching
language to a vague, but intense and profound sentiment which agitated
the very soul of Russia. With that habit of obedience and discipline
that one can often accuse of a servile instinct, but which with this
people is also sometimes a great and admirable patriotic instinct, the
children of Rourik were careful not to cross the government in the
brilliant reception which it gave the Prussian; they limited themselves
to remaining impassible witnesses of a spectacle which did not appeal to
their inmost feelings. The press showed itself abstemious of
descriptions, more sparing still in reflections during these days of
_fetes_ and festivals; the officials of Berlin only praised them with
having maintained a _decorous_ tone. Such was also the tone of Russian
society taken as a whole; the beautiful _perspectives_ of the imperial
residence appealed to the moral as well as to the physical man; flowers
from hot-houses on the first floor, ice under foot! The guests were not
the last to see the contrast: with the exquisite perfumes of exotic
plants, they breathed from time to time the sharp air of the country,
the rough North wind, and it was not M. de Bismarck himself who did not
seem to feel the circumambient atmosphere. One found in him more
vivacity and enjoyment than of dash and warmth; his words preserved a
measuredness which was not usual with him, and seemed to designedly
avoid all _eclat_ and all light. A curious matter, during this sojourn
of two weeks in the capital of Russia, the former grumbling diplomat did
not let any of his sallies and jokes escape, of which he is generally so
prodigal,--none of those amazing indiscretions which are at once the
amusement and the horror of the _salons_ and the chancellors' offices.
They only gleaned a single sensational expression fallen from those lips
which have so often pronounced the decree of destiny, the expression
"that he could not even admit the thought of being hostile to Russia."
The declaration seemed explicit and reassuring, and like a discreet
reply to an apprehension which did not dare to show itself openly. The
incredulous or fretful souls could not, however, desist from observing
that only ten years before such an assurance given to the empire of the
czars by a minister of Prussia, would have seemed very superfluous,
would have even provoked smiles.
Here ends the task which was imposed on us in undertaking this study.
The meeting of the two chancellors in the capital of Peter the Great, in
the spring of 1873, was like the epilogue of a common action which has
lasted ten years, and which has contributed so much to change the face
of the world. Since this epoch, Europe has known no tempest, although
occasionally menacing and threatening clouds have not ceased to traverse
its still obscured horizon. There were even glimmerings and indications
that the old and fatal agreement between the cabinets of Berlin and St.
Petersburg was no longer as absolute as in the past, that it admitted
certain intermissions, or at least certain differences of opinions and
appreciations. It is thus that the government of the czar refused to
follow the chancellor of Germany in his Spanish campaign, in his
feverish adhesion to the presidency of Marshal Serrano, and it did not
seem doubtful that the personal intervention of Alexander II., strongly
supported by England in the past year, turned from France an iniquitous
aggression and a terrible calamity. Since that epoch, also, the adhesion
of Austria to the official policy of the two Northern states has
come--we cannot emphasize it too much--either to complete or to
complicate an association in which it becomes difficult to discover any
common interests, and which, up to this day at least, has only found
harmony in silence. The future alone can unveil the importance and the
virtue of this extolled alliance of three empires, as badly known as it
is badly conceived, perhaps; but one will scarcely be deceived in
supposing that to-day, in this double and troubled household, it is M.
de Bismarck who can think himself the happiest of the three.
FOOTNOTES:
[139] _Provincial Correspondence_ of the 1st May, 1873.
[140] Telegram from the czar to King William I. of the 9th December,
1869. Quite recently, at the last banquet of St. George, the Emperor
Alexander II. said: "I am happy to be able to state that the close
alliance between our three empires and our three armies, founded by our
august predecessors for the defense of the same cause, exists intact at
the present moment." Official journal of the Russian empire of the 12th
December, 1875.
[141] Count Tarnowski, "A Visit to Moscow," _Revue de Cracovie_,
November, 1785.
[142] _Ausder Petersburger Gesellschaft._ The other descriptions are
taken from the _Journal de St. Petersburg_, and _L'Invalide Russe_ of
that time.
[143] _Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft_, vol. ii. p. 89.
[144] Confidential note of M. Magne, 20th July, 1866. _Papers and
Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 241.
[145] The _Golos_, several years ago, advanced these curious statistics,
the effect of which was profound at the time. The name of Kozlof had a
moment of celebrity in Russia: hearing it pronounced at the end of a
long list of purely Teutonic names, at the presentation of the officers
of a grand army corps, the czarovich cried out, "At last! thank God."
Fr. J. Celestin, _Russland seit Aufheburg der Leibeigenschaft_, Laibach,
1875, p. 334.
APPENDIX.
LETTER FROM M. BENEDETTI TO THE EDITOR OF THE "REVUE DES DEUX
MONDES." REPLY OF M. KLACZKO.
PARIS, _24th September_, 1875.
TO THE EDITOR,--You published in the last number of the
"Revue des deux Mondes," an article by M. Klaczko, which
forces me to ask you for an opportunity for a short
explanation. I surely would not wish to contest with any one
the right of estimating the events of which this author has
undertaken the anecdotal history, and of judging, as best one
can, of the part which I took in them; I call, on the
contrary, with all my heart, in my own interest as well as in
that of the government which I have had the honor to serve,
for the examination and the discussion; for it, as for me, I
can only be satisfied with the light which already flashes
from it, and with the errors which have been dissipated; but
the discussion is serious and useful only if it is loyal, and
it is loyal only when recounting fixed and undeniable facts.
Now, here is what I read in the article of M. Klaczko:
"Certainly the ambassador of France at the court of Berlin
had, in this year 1866 a very difficult and painful position,
we had almost said a pathetic one. He had worked with
_ardor_, with _passion_, to bring about this _connubio_ of
Italy and Prussia, which seemed to him to be an immense good
fortune for the imperial policy, a brilliant victory gained
over the old order of things to the profit of the 'new right'
and Napoleonic ideas. In the fear, very well founded besides,
of seeing this work miscarry and Prussia draw back, if one
spoke to it of eventual compensations and preventive
engagements, he had not _ceased to dissuade_ his government
from any attempt of this kind." Pp. 210, 211. Already, at p.
206, in a note, M. Klaczko had said: "M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who
had already obtained from Austria the cession, in any case,
of Venetia, insisted at this moment more strongly than ever,
that they should also take pledges in advance from Prussia,
'the most formidable, the most active of the parties.' M.
Benedetti _did not cease to oppose_ such a proceeding,
fearing that Prussia would renounce in this case all idea of
war against Austria."
Now, these allegations have no meaning, or they signify that
I was the real inspirer, if not the negotiator, without the
knowledge of my government, of the treaty of alliance
concluded in 1866 between Prussia and Italy; that I,
moreover, turned, by incessant efforts, M. Drouyn de Lhuys
from his intention of demanding of the Berlin government,
before the war against Austria, the pledges eventually
necessary for the security of France.
M. Klaczko neither corroborates these assertions by any known
fact, nor by the extract from an official document; he gives
no proof of them in any degree or in any way.
As to what concerns the Prusso-Italian treaty, he was
informed, however, since he continually quotes the
publication which I made in 1871, under the title, "My
Mission in Prussia," that I repudiated any participation in
this act; he knew that I had claimed to have shown it, and it
is not sufficient to contradict me; in such a case it is
necessary to prove the contrary, to establish that, far from
having remained ignorant, as I maintained, of the accord
between Prussia and Italy, I had been the principal
instigator of it.
It is of importance to me that the readers of the "Revue des
deux Mondes" be enlightened; they have seen the article of M.
Klaczko, it is just to place under their eyes some words only
from the dispatches which I published.... I wrote on the 14th
March, 1866: "The early arrival of an Italian officer,
General Govone, is announced, who comes to Berlin charged
with an important mission; this news ... has caused
considerable emotion. If it is confirmed, one will not fail
to believe that Prussia and Italy are negotiating a treaty of
alliance."
The third day after, I added: "General Govone arrived day
before yesterday at Berlin. According to Count Bismarck and
the Italian minister, he is charged with a military mission,
and his journey will have simply for its object the study of
the perfection arrived at in the instruments of war."
Two days later, I was in a position to inform my government
exactly, and I said: "I wrote you, announcing the arrival of
General Govone, that, according to M. de Bismarck and the
Italian minister, this envoy of the cabinet of Florence was
simply charged with studying the military condition of
Prussia. Forgetting, without doubt, what he had told me on
this point, M. de Bismarck informed me yesterday that General
Govone was authorized to conclude arrangements with the
Prussian government. The communications which he has made to
the president of the council substantiate this." In closing
this dispatch, I added: "The legation of Italy observes
toward me absolute reserve. I do not know whether to regret
it. The confidences of M. de Bismarck, which I cannot,
however, decline, already place me in a sufficiently delicate
position."
At last, on the 27th March, when the plenipotentiaries had
already held several conferences, I wrote to M. Drouyn de
Lhuys: "(M. de Bismarck) has spoken to me of his conferences
with General Govone and the Italian minister, ... and I am so
much the better in a position to inform you that M. de
Barral, Italian minister, _has_ AT LAST _decided on his part
not to hide from me entirely his proceedings and the
intentions of his government_."
One of two things, either M. Klaczko admits that my
correspondence was sincere, or he supposes that it was drawn
up with the design of dissimulating my conduct and the part
which I clandestinely took in the negotiation. In the first
case, no one will conceive how he can pretend that I labored
_with ardor and with passion to bring about this connubio of
Italy and Prussia_. In the second hypothesis matters are
changed, and I shall expect that M. Klaczko will be explained
as far as he goes by the expression of my opinion.
For the moment, I will invoke the only testimony that no one
can suspect, that of the Italian plenipotentiary. The
correspondence of General Govone was published after his
death and subsequently to "My Mission in Prussia," through
the efforts of General La Marmora, who has omitted nothing.
In this correspondence, where all is told in detail, my name
is quoted twice, the first time in a telegram of the 28th
March, twelve days after the arrival of the Italian
plenipotentiary at Berlin, and here is what he says as
regards me: "I think that I ought to announce to you that the
president (M. de Bismarck) keeps M. Benedetti exactly
advised."
In the letter in which my name appears for the second and
last time, dated the 6th April, on the very eve of the
signing of the treaty (the dates are valuable, and it is well
to retain them), General Govone mentions a visit which he
paid me, the first since his arrival at Berlin; and what did
I say to him concerning these negotiations? I quote
literally: "Yesterday, after my visit to M. de Bismarck, I
saw M. Benedetti; he thought that it was preferable for us to
sign no treaty, but only to have a project all discussed and
ready to sign when the mobilization of Prussia should be
achieved."
Do these two extracts, Mr. Editor, authorize the belief that
I was the confidant and the counselor of the Italian envoy?
Do they not confirm, on the contrary, from point to point the
sincerity of my correspondence? In what has M. Klaczko
sought, where has he seen that I labored for the accord
between Italy and Prussia? Should he not have told us before
making such a grave assertion? Does he think to reproach me
for having endeavored to keep myself informed as to what was
passing, and for having instructed my government exactly?