that, owing largely to the dissatisfaction because of the failure
of Colombia to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, a revolutionary party
was in course of organization having for its object the separation
of the State of Panama from Colombia, the leader being Dr. Richard
Arango, a former governor of Panama; that when they were on the
Isthmus arms and ammunition were being smuggled into the city of Colon
in piano boxes, merchandise crates, etc., the small arms received
being principally the Gras French rifle, the Remington, and the
Mauser; that nearly every citizen in Panama had some sort of rifle
or gun in his possession, with ammunition therefor; that in the city
of Panama there had been organized a fire brigade which was really
intended for a revolutionary military organization; that there were
representatives of the revolutionary organization at all-important
points on the Isthmus; that in Panama, Colon, and the other principal
places of the Isthmus police forces had been organized which were in
reality revolutionary forces; that the people on the Isthmus seemed
to be unanimous in their sentiment against the Bogota Government, and
their disgust over the failure of that government to ratify the treaty
providing for the construction of the canal, and that a revolution
might be expected immediately upon the adjournment of the Colombian
Congress without ratification of the treaty.
Lieutenant-General Young regarded their report as of such
importance as to make it advisable that I should personally see
these officers. They told me what they had already reported to the
Lieutenant-General, adding that on the Isthmus the excitement
was seething, and that the Colombian troops were reported to be
disaffected. In response to a question of mine they informed me that
it was the general belief that the revolution might break out at any
moment, and if it did not happen before, would doubtless take place
immediately after the closing of the Colombian Congress (at the end of
October) if the canal treaty were not ratified. They were certain that
the revolution would occur, and before leaving the Isthmus had made
their own reckoning as to the time, which they had set down as being
probably from three to four weeks after their leaving. The reason they
set this as the probable inside limit of time was that they reckoned
that it would be at least three or four weeks—say not until October
20—before a sufficient quantity of arms and munitions would have been
landed.
In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Department to issue
instructions such as would ensure our having ships within easy reach
of the Isthmus in the event of need arising. Orders were given on
October 19 to the _Boston_ to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua;
to the _Dixie_ to prepare to sail from League Island; and to the
_Atlanta_ to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 30 the _Nashville_
was ordered to proceed to Colon. On November 2, when, the Colombian
Congress having adjourned, it was evident that the outbreak was
imminent, and when it was announced that both sides were making ready
forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and disorder, the Colombian
troops having been embarked on vessels, the following instructions
were sent to the commanders of the _Boston_, _Nashville_, and _Dixie_:
Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is
threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or
insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Government force
reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing
if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate a conflict.
These orders were delivered in pursuance of the policy on which our
Government had repeatedly acted. This policy was exhibited in the
following orders, given under somewhat similar circumstances last
year, and the year before, and the year before that. The first two
telegrams are from the Department of State to the consul at Panama:
JULY _25, 1900_
You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which may
involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit of persons or
property across the Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment of Panama
would have this effect, and the United States must insist upon the
neutrality of the Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty.
NOVEMBER _20, 1901_
Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit
across the Isthmus that such interference must cease and that the
United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the
railroad. Consult with captain of the _Iowa_, who will be instructed
to land marines, if necessary, for the protection of the railroad,
in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United
States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible.
The next three telegrams are from and to the Secretary of the Navy:
SEPTEMBER _12, 1902_
RANGER, _Panama_:
United States guarantees perfect neutrality of Isthmus and that a
free transit from sea to sea be not interrupted or embarrassed....
Any transportation of troops which might contravene these provisions
of treaty should not be sanctioned by you nor should use of road be
permitted which might convert the line of transit into theatre of
hostility.
MOODY.
COLON,
_September 20, 1902_
SECRETARY NAVY, _Washington_:
Everything is conceded. The United States guards and guarantees
traffic and the line of transit. To-day I permitted the exchange of
Colombian troops from Panama to Colon, about 1,000 men each way, the
troops without arms in train guarded by American naval force in the
same manner as other passengers; arms and ammunition in separate
train, guarded also by naval force in the same manner as other
freight.
MCLEAN.
PANAMA,
_October 3, 1902_
SECRETARY NAVY,
_Washington, D. C._:
Have sent this communication to the American consul at Panama:
“Inform Governor while trains running under United States protection
I must decline transportation any combatants, ammunition, arms,
which might cause interruption traffic or convert line of transit
into theatre hostilities.”
CASEY.
On November 3 Commander Hubbard responded to the above-quoted telegram
of November 2, 1903, saying that before the telegram had been received
400 Colombian troops from Cartagena had landed at Colon; that there
had been no revolution on the Isthmus, but that the situation was most
critical if the revolutionary leaders should act. On this same date
the Associated Press in Washington received a bulletin stating that
a revolutionary outbreak had occurred. When this was brought to the
attention of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, he prepared
the following cablegram to the consul-general at Panama and the consul
at Colon:
Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully
informed.
Before this telegram was sent, however, one was received from Consul
Malmros at Colon, running as follows:
Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 500
men. Their official promised support revolution. Fire department,
Panama, 441, are well organized and favor revolution. Government
vessel, _Cartagena_, with about 400 men, arrived early to-day with
new commander-in-chief, Tobar. Was not expected until November 10.
Tobar’s arrival is not probable to stop revolution.
This cablegram was received at 2.35 P.M., and at 3.40 P.M. Mr. Loomis
sent the telegram which he had already prepared to both Panama and
Colon. Apparently, however, the consul-general at Panama had not
received the information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin,
upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his dispatch; for
his answer was that there was no uprising, although the situation
was critical, this answer being received at 8.15 P.M. Immediately
afterward he sent another dispatch, which was received at 9.50 P.M.,
saying that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful, with
no bloodshed. The Colombian gunboat _Bogota_ next day began to shell
the city of Panama, with the result of killing one Chinaman. The
consul-general was directed to notify her to stop firing. Meanwhile,
on November 4, Commander Hubbard notified the Department that he had
landed a force to protect the lives and property of American citizens
against the threats of the Colombian soldiery.
Before any step whatever had been taken by the United States troops
to restore order, the commander of the newly landed Colombian troops
had indulged in wanton and violent threats against American citizens,
which created serious apprehension. As Commander Hubbard reported in
his letter of November 5, this officer and his troops practically
began war against the United States, and only the forbearance and
coolness of our officers and men prevented bloodshed. The letter of
Commander Hubbard is of such interest that it deserves quotation in
full, and runs as follows:
U. S. S. NASHVILLE, THIRD RATE,
_Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903_
SIR: Pending a complete report of the occurrences of the last
three days in Colon, Colombia, I most respectfully invite the
Department’s attention to those of the date of Wednesday, November
4, which amounted to practically the making of war against the
United States by the officer in command of the Colombian troops in
Colon. At 1 o’clock P.M. on that date I was summoned on shore by a
preconcerted signal, and on landing met the United States consul,
vice-consul, and Colonel Shaler, the general superintendent of the
Panama Railroad. The consul informed me that he had received notice
from the officer commanding the Colombian troops, Colonel Torres,
through the prefect of Colon, to the effect that if the Colombian
officers, Generals Tobal and Amaya, who had been seized in Panama on
the evening of the 3d of November by the Independents and held as
prisoners, were not released by 2 o’clock P.M., he, Torres, would
open fire on the town of Colon and kill every United States citizen
in the place, and my advice and action were requested. I advised
that all the United States citizens should take refuge in the shed
of the Panama Railroad Company, a stone building susceptible of
being put into good state for defence, and that I would immediately
land such body of men with extra arms for arming the citizens, as
the complement of the ship would permit. This was agreed to, and I
immediately returned on board, arriving at 1.15 P.M. The order for
landing was immediately given, and at 1.30 P.M. the boats left the
ship with a party of 42 men under the command of Lieut.-Commander
H. M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P. Jackson as second in command.
Time being pressing I gave verbal orders to Mr. Witzel to take the
building above referred to, to put it into the best state of defence
possible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled there—not
firing unless fired upon. The women and children took refuge on
the German steamer _Marcomania_ and Panama Railroad steamer _City
of Washington_, both ready to haul out from dock if necessary. The
_Nashville_ I got under way and patrolled with her along the water
front close in and ready to use either small-arm or shrapnel fire.
The Colombians surrounded the building of the railroad company
almost immediately after we had taken possession, and for about
one and a half hours their attitude was most threatening, it being
seemingly their purpose to provoke an attack. Happily our men were
cool and steady, and, while the tension was very great, no shot was
fired. At about 3.15 P.M. Colonel Torres came into the building for
an interview and expressed himself as most friendly to Americans,
claiming that the whole affair was a misapprehension and that he
would like to send the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see General
Tobal and have him direct the discontinuance of the show of force.
A special train was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At about
5.30 P.M. Colonel Torres made the proposition of withdrawing his
troops to Monkey Hill, if I would withdraw the _Nashville’s_ force
and leave the town in possession of the police until the return of
the alcalde on the morning of the 5th. After an interview with the
United States consul and Colonel Shaler as to the probability of
good faith in the matter, I decided to accept the proposition and
brought my men on board, the disparity in numbers between my force
and that of the Colombians, nearly ten to one, making me desirous of
avoiding a conflict so long as the object in view, the protection of
American citizens, was not imperiled.
I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, their
coolness and evident intention of standing their ground, had a most
salutary and decisive effect on the immediate situation, and was the
initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these troops and
their return to Cartagena the following day. Lieutenant-Commander
Witzel is entitled to much praise for his admirable work in command
on the spot.
I feel that I can not sufficiently strongly represent to the
Department the grossness of this outrage and the insult to our
dignity, even apart from the savagery of the threat.
Very respectfully,
JOHN HUBBARD,
_Commander, U. S. Navy,
Commanding_.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
_Navy Department, Washington, D. C._
In his letter of November 8 Commander Hubbard sets forth the facts
more in detail:
U. S. S. NASHVILLE, THIRD RATE,
_Porto Bello, U. S. Colombia, November 8, 1903_
SIR: 1. I have the honor to make the following report of the
occurrences which took place at Colon and Panama in the interval
between the arrival of the _Nashville_ at Colon on the evening of
November 2, 1903, and the evening of November 5, 1903, when by the
arrival of the U. S. S. _Dixie_ at Colon I was relieved as senior
officer by Commander F. H. Delano, U. S. Navy.
2. At the time of the arrival of the _Nashville_ at Colon at 5.30
P.M. on November 2 everything on the Isthmus was quiet. There was
talk of proclaiming the independence of Panama, but no definite
action had been taken and there had been no disturbance of peace and
order. At daylight on the morning of November 3 it was found that a
vessel which had come in during the night was the Colombian gunboat
_Cartagena_ carrying between 400 and 500 troops. I had her boarded
and learned that these troops were for the garrison at Panama.
Inasmuch as the Independent party had not acted and the Government
of Colombia was at the time in undisputed control of the Province of
Panama, I did not feel, in the absence of any instructions, that I
was justified in preventing the landing of these troops, and at 8.30
o’clock they were disembarked. The commanding officers, Generals
Amaya and Tobal, with four others, immediately went over to Panama
to make arrangements for receiving and quartering their troops,
leaving the command in charge of an officer whom I later learned
to be Colonel Torres. The Department’s message addressed to the
care of the United States consul I received at 10.30 A.M.; it was
delivered to one of the ship’s boats while I was at the consul’s and
not to the consul as addressed. The message was said to have been
received at the cable office at 9.30 A.M. Immediately on deciphering
the message I went on shore to see what arrangements the railroad
company had made for the transportation of these troops to Panama,
and learned that the company would not transport them except on
request of the Governor of Panama, and that the prefect at Colon
and the officer left in command of the troops had been so notified
by the general superintendent of the Panama Railroad Company. I
remained at the company’s office until it was sure that no action
on my part would be needed to prevent the transportation of the
troops that afternoon, when I returned on board and cabled the
Department the situation of affairs. At about 5.30 P.M. I again went
on shore, and received notice from the general superintendent of the
railroad that he had received the request for the transportation
of the troops and that they would leave on the 8 A.M. train on the
following day. I immediately went to see the general superintendent,
and learned that it had just been announced that a provisional
government had been established at Panama—that Generals Amaya and
Tobal, the Governor of Panama, and four officers, who had gone to
Panama in the morning, had been seized and were held as prisoners;
that they had an organized force of 1,500 troops and wished the
government troops in Colon to be sent over. This I declined to
permit, and verbally prohibited the general superintendent from
giving transportation to the troops of either party.
It being then late in the evening, I sent early in the morning of
November 4 written notification to the general superintendent of
the Panama Railroad, to the prefect of Colon, and to the officer
left in command of the Colombian troops, later ascertained to be
Colonel Torres, that I had prohibited the transportation of troops
in either direction, in order to preserve the free and uninterrupted
transit of the Isthmus. Copies of these letters are hereto appended;
also copy of my notification to the consul. Except to a few people,
nothing was known in Colon of the proceedings in Panama until the
arrival of the train at 10.45 on the morning of the 4th. Some
propositions were, I was later told, made to Colonel Torres by
the representatives of the new Government at Colon, with a view
to inducing him to re-embark in the _Cartagena_ and return to the
port of Cartagena, and it was in answer to this proposition that
Colonel Torres made the threat and took the action reported in my
letter No. 96, of November 5, 1903. The _Cartagena_ left the port
just after the threat was made, and I did not deem it expedient to
attempt to detain her, as such action would certainly, in the then
state of affairs, have precipitated a conflict on shore which I
was not prepared to meet. It is my understanding that she returned
to Cartagena. After the withdrawal of the Colombian troops on the
evening of November 4, and the return of the _Nashville’s_ force on
board, as reported in my letter No. 96, there was no disturbance
on shore, and the night passed quietly. On the morning of the 5th
I discovered that the commander of the Colombian troops had not
withdrawn so far from the town as he had agreed, but was occupying
buildings near the outskirts of the town. I immediately inquired
into the matter and learned that he had some trivial excuse for
not carrying out his agreement, and also that it was his intention
to occupy Colon again on the arrival of the alcalde due at 10.45
A.M., unless General Tobal sent word by the alcalde that he,
Colonel Torres, should withdraw. That General Tobal had declined
to give any instructions I was cognizant of, and the situation at
once became quite as serious as on the day previous. I immediately
landed an armed force, reoccupied the same building; also landed
two 1-pounders and mounted them on platform cars behind protection
of cotton bales, and then in company with the United States consul
had an interview with Colonel Torres, in the course of which I
informed him that I had relanded my men because he had not kept
his agreement; that I had no interest in the affairs of either
party; that my attitude was strictly neutral; that the troops of
neither side should be transported; that my sole purpose in landing
was to protect the lives and property of American citizens if
threatened, as they had been threatened, and to maintain the free
and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus, and that purpose I should
maintain by force if necessary. I also strongly advised that in the
interests of peace, and to prevent the possibility of a conflict
that could not but be regrettable, he should carry out his agreement
of the previous evening and withdraw to Monkey Hill.
Colonel Torres’s only reply was that it was unhealthy at Monkey
Hill, a reiteration of his love of Americans, and persistence in
his intention to occupy Colon, should General Tobal not give him
directions to the contrary.
On the return of the alcalde at about 11 A.M. the Colombian troops
marched into Colon, but did not assume the threatening demeanor
of the previous day. The American women and children again went
on board the _Marcomania_ and _City of Washington_, and through
the British vice-consul I offered protection to British subjects
as directed in the Department’s cablegram. A copy of the British
vice-consul’s acknowledgment is hereto appended. The _Nashville_ I
got under way as on the previous day and moved close in to protect
the water front. During the afternoon several propositions were made
to Colonel Torres by the representatives of the new government,
and he was finally persuaded by them to embark on the Royal Mail
steamer _Orinoco_ with all his troops and return to Cartagena. The
_Orinoco_ left her dock with the troops—474 all told—at 7.35 P.M.
The _Dixie_ arrived and anchored at 7.05 P.M., when I went on board
and acquainted the commanding officer with the situation. A portion
of the marine battalion was landed and the _Nashville’s_ force
withdrawn.
3. On the evening of November 4 Major William M. Black and Lieut.
Mark Brooke, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, came to Colon from
Culebra and volunteered their services, which were accepted, and
they rendered very efficient help on the following day.
4. I beg to assure the Department that I had no part whatever in
the negotiations that were carried on between Colonel Torres and
the representatives of the provisional government; that I landed
an armed force only when the lives of American citizens were
threatened, and withdrew this force as soon as there seemed to be
no grounds for further apprehension of injury to American lives or
property; that I relanded an armed force because of the failure of
Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement to withdraw and announced
intention of returning, and that my attitude throughout was strictly
neutral as between the two parties, my only purpose being to
protect the lives and property of American citizens and to preserve
the free and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus.
Very respectfully,
(Signed) JOHN HUBBARD,
_Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding_.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
_Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C._
This plain official account of the occurrences of November 4 shows
that, instead of there having been too much prevision by the American
Government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life
and property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the
American warships had been too long delayed; so long, in fact, that
there were but forty-two marines and sailors available to land and
protect the lives of American men and women. It was only the coolness
and gallantry with which this little band of men wearing the American
uniform faced ten times their number of armed foes, bent on carrying
out the atrocious threat of the Colombian commander, that prevented
a murderous catastrophe. At Panama, when the revolution broke out,
there was no American man-of-war and no American troops or sailors.
At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with entire impartiality toward
both sides, preventing any movement, whether by the Colombians or
the Panamans, which would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9
he prevented a body of the revolutionists from landing at Colon.
Throughout he behaved in the most creditable manner. In the New
York “Evening Post,” under date of Panama, December 8, there is an
article from a special correspondent, which sets forth in detail the
unbearable oppression of the Colombian Government in Panama. In this
article is an interesting interview with a native Panaman, which runs
in part as follows:
... We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of life
or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, with the United
States in control of it, peace and prosperity for us. President
Marroquin appointed an Isthmian to be governor of Panama; and we
looked upon that as of happy augury. Soon we heard that the canal
treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota; next we heard that our
Isthmian Governor, Obaldía, who had scarcely assumed power, was to be
superseded by a soldier from Bogota....
Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the way of
revenues, she did not bridge for us a single river, nor make a single
roadway, nor erect a single college where our children could be
educated, nor do anything at all to advance our industries.... Well,
when the new generals came we seized them, arrested them, and the
town of Panama was in joy. Not a protest was made, except the shots
fired from the Colombian gunboat _Bogota_, which killed one Chinese
lying in his bed. We were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at
Colon and fight it out; but the commander of the United States cruiser
_Nashville_ forbade Superintendent Shaler to allow the railroad to
transport troops for either party. That is our story.
* * * * *