TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS ON JANUARY 4, 1904
_To the Senate and House of Representatives:_
I lay before the Congress for its information a statement of my action
up to this time in executing the act entitled “An act to provide for
the construction of a canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans,” approved June 28, 1902.
By the said act the President was authorized to secure for the United
States the property of the Panama Canal Company and the perpetual
control of a strip six miles wide across the Isthmus of Panama. It was
further provided that “should the President be unable to obtain for
the United States a satisfactory title to the property of the New
Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary territory of the
Republic of Colombia ... within a reasonable time and upon reasonable
terms, then the President” should endeavor to provide for a canal
by the Nicaragua route. The language quoted defines with exactness
and precision what was to be done, and what as a matter of fact has
been done. The President was authorized to go to the Nicaragua route
only if within a reasonable time he could not obtain “control of the
necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia.” This control has now
been obtained; the provision of the act has been complied with; it is
no longer possible under existing legislation to go to the Nicaragua
route as an alternative.
This act marked the climax of the effort on the part of the United
States to secure, so far as legislation was concerned, an interoceanic
canal across the Isthmus. The effort to secure a treaty for this
purpose with one of the Central American republics did not stand on
the same footing with the effort to secure a treaty under any ordinary
conditions. The proper position for the United States to assume in
reference to this canal, and therefore to the governments of the
Isthmus, had been clearly set forth by Secretary Cass in 1858. In
my Annual Message I have already quoted what Secretary Cass said;
but I repeat the quotation here, because the principle it states is
fundamental:
While the rights of sovereignty of the States occupying this region
(Central America) should always be respected, we shall expect that
these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the occasion and the
wants and circumstances that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties
as well as its rights, and none of these local governments, even if
administered with more regard to the just demands of other nations
than they have been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern
isolation, to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways
of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these
avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to
shut them, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such
unjust relations as would prevent their general use.
The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was sound then and it
is sound now. The United States has taken the position that no other
government is to build the canal. In 1889, when France proposed to
come to the aid of the French Panama Company by guaranteeing their
bonds, the Senate of the United States in executive session, with only
some three votes dissenting, passed a resolution as follows:
That the Government of the United States will look with serious
concern and disapproval upon any connection of any European
government with the construction or control of any ship canal across
the Isthmus of Darien or across Central America, and must regard
any such connection or control as injurious to the just rights and
interests of the United States and as a menace to their welfare.
Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly provided that the
United States should control, police, and protect the canal which was
to be built, keeping it open for the vessels of all nations on equal
terms. The United States thus assumed the position of guarantor of the
canal and of its peaceful use by all the world. The guarantee included
as a matter of course the building of the canal. The enterprise was
recognized as responding to an international need; and it would be
the veriest travesty on right and justice to treat the governments in
possession of the Isthmus as having the right, in the language of Mr.
Cass, “to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the
world, and justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of
trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them.”
When this Government submitted to Colombia the Hay-Herran treaty three
things were, therefore, already settled.
One was that the canal should be built. The time for delay, the time
for permitting the attempt to be made by private enterprise, the time
for permitting any government of anti-social spirit and of imperfect
development to bar the work, was past. The United States had assumed
in connection with the canal certain responsibilities not only to its
own people, but to the civilized world, which imperatively demanded
that there should no longer be delay in beginning the work.
Second. While it was settled that the canal should be built without
unnecessary or improper delay, it was no less clearly shown to be our
purpose to deal not merely in a spirit of justice but in a spirit of
generosity with the people through whose land we might build it. The
Hay-Herran treaty, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of an
overgenerosity toward the Colombian Government. In our anxiety to be
fair we had gone to the very verge in yielding to a weak nation’s
demands what that nation was helplessly unable to enforce from us
against our will. The only criticisms made upon the Administration for
the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty were for having granted too much
to Colombia, not for failure to grant enough. Neither in the Congress
nor in the public press, at the time that this treaty was formulated,
was there complaint that it did not in the fullest and amplest manner
guarantee to Colombia everything that she could by any color of title
demand.
Nor is the fact to be lost sight of that the rejected treaty, while
generously responding to the pecuniary demands of Colombia, in
other respects merely provided for the construction of the canal in
conformity with the express requirements of the act of the Congress
of June 28, 1902. By that act, as heretofore quoted, the President
was authorized to acquire from Colombia, for the purposes of the
canal, “perpetual control” of a certain strip of land; and it was
expressly required that the “control” thus to be obtained should
include “jurisdiction” to make police and sanitary regulations and
to establish such judicial tribunals as might be agreed on for
their enforcement. These were conditions precedent prescribed by
the Congress; and for their fulfilment suitable stipulations were
embodied in the treaty. It has been stated in public prints that
Colombia objected to these stipulations, on the ground that they
involved a relinquishment of her “sovereignty”; but in the light
of what has taken place, this alleged objection must be considered
as an afterthought. In reality, the treaty, instead of requiring a
cession of Colombia’s sovereignty over the canal strip, expressly
acknowledged, confirmed, and preserved her sovereignty over it. The
treaty in this respect simply proceeded on the lines on which all the
negotiations leading up to the present situation have been conducted.
In those negotiations the exercise by the United States, subject
to the paramount rights of the local sovereign, of a substantial
control over the canal and the immediately adjacent territory, has
been treated as a fundamental part of any arrangement that might
be made. It has formed an essential feature of all our plans, and
its necessity is fully recognized in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.
The Congress, in providing that such control should be secured,
adopted no new principle, but only incorporated in its legislation
a condition the importance and propriety of which were universally
recognized. During all the years of negotiation and discussion that
preceded the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never
intimated that the requirement by the United States of control over
the canal strip would render unattainable the construction of a
canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama; nor were we advised, during
the months when legislation of 1902 was pending before the Congress,
that the terms which it embodied would render negotiations with
Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation could construct
and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less degree of
control than was stipulated for in the Hay-Herran treaty. A refusal
to grant such degree of control was necessarily a refusal to make any
practicable treaty at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised
the question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of the
worlds traffic across the Isthmus.
That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the people of the
locality through which it was to pass, and that the people of this
locality no less eagerly longed for its construction under American
control, are shown by the unanimity of action in the new Panama
Republic. Furthermore, Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in
spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her power to accept
it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty
if only the status quo could be restored. One of the men standing
highest in the official circles of Colombia, on November 6, addressed
the American minister at Bogota, saying that if the Government of the
United States would land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and
the transit, the Colombian Government would “declare martial law;
and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order
is disturbed, [would] approve by decree the ratification of the canal
treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers,
[would] call extra session of the Congress—with new and friendly
members—next May to approve the treaty.” Having these facts in view,
there is no shadow of question that the Government of the United
States proposed a treaty which was not merely just, but generous to
Colombia, which our people regarded as erring, if at all, on the side
of overgenerosity; which was hailed with delight by the people of
the immediate locality through which the canal was to pass, who were
most concerned as to the new order of things, and which the Colombian
authorities now recognize as being so good that they are willing to
promise its unconditional ratification if only we will desert those
who have shown themselves our friends and restore to those who have
shown themselves unfriendly the power to undo what they did. I pass
by the question as to what assurance we have that they would now
keep their pledge and not again refuse to ratify the treaty if they
had the power; for, of course, I will not for one moment discuss the
possibility of the United States committing an act of such baseness as
to abandon the new Republic of Panama.
Third. Finally the Congress definitely settled where the canal was to
be built. It was provided that a treaty should be made for building
the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; and if, after reasonable
time, it proved impossible to secure such treaty, that then we should
go to Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for it needs no argument
to show that the intent of the Congress was to ensure a canal across
Panama, and that whether the republic granting the title was called
New Granada, Colombia, or Panama mattered not one whit. As events
turned out, the question of “reasonable time” did not enter into the
matter at all. Although, as the months went by, it became increasingly
improbable that the Colombian Congress would ratify the treaty or
take steps which would be equivalent thereto, yet all chance for such
action on their part did not vanish until the Congress closed at the
end of October; and within three days thereafter the revolution in
Panama had broken out. Panama became an independent state, and the
control of the territory necessary for building the canal then became
obtainable. The condition under which alone we could have gone to
Nicaragua thereby became impossible of fulfilment. If the pending
treaty with Panama should not be ratified by the Senate this would
not alter the fact that we could not go to Nicaragua. The Congress
has decided the route, and there is no alternative under existing
legislation.
When in August it began to appear probable that the Colombian
Legislature would not ratify the treaty, it became incumbent upon me
to consider well what the situation was and to be ready to advise the
Congress as to what were the various alternatives of action open to
us. There were several possibilities. One was that Colombia would at
the last moment see the unwisdom of her position. That there might
be nothing omitted, Secretary Hay, through the minister at Bogota,
repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow from
her rejection of the treaty. Although it was a constantly diminishing
chance, yet the possibility of ratification did not wholly pass away
until the close of the session of the Colombian Congress.
A second alternative was that by the close of the session on the last
day of October, without the ratification of the treaty by Colombia
and without any steps taken by Panama, the American Congress on
assembling early in November would be confronted with a situation in
which there had been a failure to come to terms as to building the
canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not been a lapse of a
reasonable time—using the word reasonable in any proper sense—such as
would justify the Administration going to the Nicaragua route. This
situation seemed on the whole the most likely, and as a matter of fact
I had made the original draft of my Message to the Congress with a
view to its existence.
It was the opinion of eminent international jurists that in view of
the fact that the great design of our guarantee under the treaty of
1846 was to dedicate the Isthmus to the purposes of interoceanic
transit, and above all to secure the construction of an interoceanic
canal, Colombia could not under existing conditions refuse to enter
into a proper arrangement with the United States to that end, without
violating the spirit and substantially repudiating the obligations of
a treaty the full benefits of which she had enjoyed for over fifty
years. My intention was to consult the Congress as to whether under
such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the canal
was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms that we had
offered and no others; and that if such terms were not agreed to we
would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct, or take what other
steps were needful in order to begin the enterprise.
A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus, who had
formerly constituted an independent state, and who until recently
were united to Colombia only by a loose tie of federal relationship,
might take the protection of their own vital interests into their own
hands, reassert their former rights, declare their independence upon
just grounds, and establish a government competent and willing to do
its share in this great work for civilization. This third possibility
is what actually occurred. Every one knew that it was a possibility,
but it was not until toward the end of October that it appeared to
be an imminent probability. Although the Administration, of course,
had special means of knowledge, no such means were necessary in order
to appreciate the possibility, and toward the end the likelihood, of
such a revolutionary outbreak and of its success. It was a matter
of common notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be
indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs; a very few
will suffice. From Costa Rica on August 31 a special was sent to the
Washington “Post,” running as follows:
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA,
_August 31_
Travelers from Panama report the Isthmus alive with fires of a new
revolution. It is inspired, it is believed, by men who, in Panama
and Colon, have systematically engendered the pro-American feeling
to secure the building of the Isthmian Canal by the United States.
The Indians have risen, and the late followers of Gen. Benjamin
Herrera are mustering in the mountain villages, preparatory to
joining in an organized revolt, caused by the rejection of the canal
treaty.
Hundreds of stacks of arms, confiscated by the Colombian Government
at the close of the late revolution, have reappeared from some
mysterious source, and thousands of rifles that look suspiciously
like the Mausers the United States captured in Cuba are issuing to
the gathering forces from central points of distribution. With the
arms goes ammunition, fresh from factories, showing the movement is
not spasmodic, but is carefully planned.
* * * * *
The government forces in Panama and Colon, numbering less than
1,500 men, are reported to be a little more than friendly to the
revolutionary spirit. They have been ill paid since the revolution
closed, and their only hope of prompt payment is another war.
General Huertes, commander of the forces, who is ostensibly loyal
to the Bogota Government, is said to be secretly friendly to the
proposed revolution. At least, all his personal friends are open
in denunciation of the Bogota Government and the failure of the
Colombian Congress to ratify the canal treaty.
The consensus of opinion gathered from late arrivals from the
Isthmus is that the revolution is coming, and that it will succeed.
A special despatch to the Washington “Post,” under date of New York,
September 1, runs as follows:
B. G. Duque, editor and proprietor of the “Panama Star and Herald,”
a resident of the Isthmus during the past twenty-seven years, who
arrived to-day in New York, declared that if the canal treaty fell
through a revolution would be likely to follow.
“There is a very strong feeling in Panama,” said Mr. Duque, “that
Colombia, in negotiating the sale of a canal concession in Panama,
is looking for profits that might just as well go to Panama herself.
“The Colombian Government, only the other day, suppressed a
newspaper that dared to speak of independence for Panama. A while
ago there was a secret plan afoot to cut loose from Colombia and
seek the protection of the United States.”
In the New York “Herald” of September 10 the following statement
appeared:
Representatives of strong interests on the Isthmus of Panama, who
make their headquarters in this city, are considering a plan of
action to be undertaken in co-operation with men of similar views in
Panama and Colon to bring about a revolution and form an independent
government in Panama opposed to that in Bogota.
There is much indignation on the Isthmus on account of the failure
of the canal treaty, which is ascribed to the authorities at Bogota.
This opinion is believed to be shared by a majority of the Isthmians
of all shades of political belief, and they think it is to their
best interest for a new republic to be formed on the Isthmus,
which may negotiate directly with the United States a new treaty
which will permit the digging of the Panama Canal under favorable
conditions.
In the New York “Times,” under date of September 13, there appeared
from Bogota the following statement:
A proposal made by Señor Perez y Sotos to ask the Executive to
appoint an anti-secessionist governor in Panama has been approved
by the Senate. Speakers in the Senate said that Señor Obaldía, who
was recently appointed Governor of Panama, and who is favorable to
a canal treaty, was a menace to the national integrity. Senator
Marroquín protested against the action of the Senate.
President Marroquín succeeded later in calming the Congressmen.
It appears that he was able to give them satisfactory reasons for
Governor Obaldía’s appointment. He appears to realize the imminent
peril of the Isthmus of Panama declaring its independence.
Señor Deroux, representative for a Panama constituency, recently
delivered a sensational speech in the House. Among other things he
said:
“In Panama the bishops, governors, magistrates, military
chiefs, and their subordinates have been and are foreign to
the department. It seems that the government, with surprising
tenacity, wishes to exclude the Isthmus from all participation in
public affairs. As regards international dangers in the Isthmus,
all I can say is that if these dangers exist they are due to the
conduct of the national government, which is in the direction of
reaction.
“If the Colombian Government will not take action with a view to
preventing disaster, the responsibility will rest with it alone.”
In the New York “Herald” of October 26 it was reported that a
revolutionary expedition of about 70 men had actually landed on the
Isthmus. In the Washington “Post” of October 29 it was reported from
Panama that in view of the impending trouble on the Isthmus the Bogota
Government had gathered troops in sufficient numbers to at once put
down an attempt at secession. In the New York “Herald” of October 30
it was announced from Panama that Bogota was hurrying troops to the
Isthmus to put down the projected revolt. In the New York “Herald” of
November 2 it was announced that in Bogota the Congress had indorsed
the energetic measures taken to meet the situation on the Isthmus and
that 6,000 men were about to be sent thither.
Quotations like the above could be multiplied indefinitely. Suffice it
to say that it was notorious that revolutionary trouble of a serious
nature was impending upon the Isthmus. But it was not necessary to
rely exclusively upon such general means of information. On October
15 Commander Hubbard, of the navy, notified the Navy Department
that, though things were quiet on the Isthmus, a revolution had
broken out in the State of Cauca. On October 16, at the request of
Lieutenant-General Young, I saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and Lieut.
Grayson Mallet-Prevost Murphy, who had just returned from a four
months’ tour through the northern portions of Venezuela and Colombia.
They stopped in Panama on their return in the latter part of
September. At the time they were sent down there had been no thought
of their going to Panama, and their visit to the Isthmus was but
an unpremeditated incident of their return journey; nor had they
been spoken to by any one at Washington regarding the possibility
of a revolt. Until they landed at Colon they had no knowledge that
a revolution was impending, save what they had gained from the
newspapers. What they saw in Panama so impressed them that they
reported thereon to Lieutenant-General Young, according to his
memorandum—