By the act of June 28, 1902, the Congress authorized the President to

enter into treaty with Colombia for the building of the canal across

the Isthmus of Panama; it being provided that in the event of failure

to secure such treaty after the lapse of a reasonable time, recourse

should be had to building a canal through Nicaragua. It has not been

necessary to consider this alternative, as I am enabled to lay before

the Senate a treaty providing for the building of the canal across the

Isthmus of Panama. This was the route which commended itself to the

deliberate judgment of the Congress, and we can now acquire by treaty

the right to construct the canal over this route. The question now,

therefore, is not by which route the Isthmian Canal shall be built,

for that question has been definitely and irrevocably decided. The

question is simply whether or not we shall have an Isthmian Canal.

When the Congress directed that we should take the Panama route

under treaty with Colombia, the essence of the condition, of course,

referred not to the government which controlled that route, but to the

route itself; to the territory across which the route lay, not to the

name which for the moment the territory bore on the map. The purpose

of the law was to authorize the President to make a treaty with the

power in actual control of the Isthmus of Panama. This purpose has

been fulfilled.

In the year 1846 this Government entered into a treaty with New

Granada, the predecessor upon the Isthmus of the Republic of Colombia

and of the present Republic of Panama, by which treaty it was provided

that the Government and citizens of the United States should always

have free and open right of way or transit across the Isthmus of

Panama by any modes of communication that might be constructed, while

in return our Government guaranteed the perfect neutrality of the

above-mentioned Isthmus with the view that the free transit from the

one to the other sea might not be interrupted or embarrassed. The

treaty vested in the United States a substantial property right carved

out of the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada then

had and possessed over the said territory. The name of New Granada has

passed away and its territory has been divided. Its successor, the

Government of Colombia, has ceased to own any property in the Isthmus.

A new republic, that of Panama, which was at one time a sovereign

state, and at another time a mere department of the successive

confederations known as New Granada and Colombia, has now succeeded to

the rights which first one and then the other formerly exercised over

the Isthmus. But as long as the Isthmus endures, the mere geographical

fact of its existence, and the peculiar interest therein which is

required by our position, perpetuate the solemn contract which binds

the holders of the territory to respect our right to freedom of

transit across it, and binds us in return to safeguard for the Isthmus

and the world the exercise of that inestimable privilege. The true

interpretation of the obligations upon which the United States entered

in this treaty of 1846 has been given repeatedly in the utterances of

Presidents and Secretaries of State. Secretary Cass in 1858 officially

stated the position of this Government as follows:

“The progress of events has rendered the interoceanic route across the

narrow portion of Central America vastly important to the commercial

world, and especially to the United States, whose possessions extend

along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and demand the speediest and

easiest modes of communication. While the rights of sovereignty of

the states occupying this region should always be respected, we

shall expect that these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting

the occasion and the wants and circumstances that have arisen.

Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these

local governments, even if administered with more regard to the just

demands of other nations than they have been, would be permitted, in

a spirit of Eastern isolation, to close the gates of intercourse on

the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the pretension

that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they

choose to shut them, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them

with such unjust relations as would prevent their general use.”

Seven years later, in 1865, Mr. Seward in different communications

took the following position:

“The United States have taken and will take no interest in any

question of internal revolution in the State of Panama, or any

State of the United States of Colombia, but will maintain a perfect

neutrality in connection with such domestic altercations. The United

States will, nevertheless, hold themselves ready to protect the

transit trade across the Isthmus against invasion of either domestic

or foreign disturbers of the peace of the State of Panama.... Neither

the text nor the spirit of the stipulation in that article by which

the United States engages to preserve the neutrality of the Isthmus of

Panama, imposes an obligation on this Government to comply with the

requisition [of the President of the United States of Colombia for a

force to protect the Isthmus of Panama from a body of insurgents of

that country]. The purpose of the stipulation was to guarantee the

Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only.”

Attorney-General Speed, under date of November 7, 1865, advised

Secretary Seward as follows:

“From this treaty it can not be supposed that New Granada invited the

United States to become a party to the intestine troubles of that

government, nor did the United States become bound to take sides in

the domestic broils of New Granada. The United States did guarantee

New Granada in the sovereignty and property over the territory. This

was as against other and foreign governments.”

For four hundred years, ever since shortly after the discovery of this

hemisphere, the canal across the Isthmus has been planned. For two

score years it has been worked at. When made it is to last for the

ages. It is to alter the geography of a continent and the trade routes

of the world. We have shown by every treaty we have negotiated or

attempted to negotiate with the peoples in control of the Isthmus and

with foreign nations in reference thereto our consistent good faith

in observing our obligations; on the one hand to the peoples of the

Isthmus, and on the other hand to the civilized world whose commercial

rights we are safeguarding and guaranteeing by our action. We have

done our duty to others in letter and in spirit, and we have shown the

utmost forbearance in exacting our own rights.

Last spring, under the act above referred to, a treaty concluded

between the representatives of the Republic of Colombia and of our

Government was ratified by the Senate. This treaty was entered into at

the urgent solicitation of the people of Colombia and after a body of

experts appointed by our Government especially to go into the matter

of the routes across the Isthmus had pronounced unanimously in favor

of the Panama route. In drawing up this treaty every concession was

made to the people and to the Government of Colombia. We were more

than just in dealing with them. Our generosity was such as to make it

a serious question whether we had not gone too far in their interest

at the expense of our own; for in our scrupulous desire to pay all

possible heed, not merely to the real but even to the fancied rights

of our weaker neighbor, who already owed so much to our protection

and forbearance, we yielded in all possible ways to her desires in

drawing up the treaty. Nevertheless the Government of Colombia not

merely repudiated the treaty, but repudiated it in such manner as to

make it evident by the time the Colombian Congress adjourned that not

the scantiest hope remained of ever getting a satisfactory treaty

from them. The Government of Colombia made the treaty, and yet when

the Colombian Congress was called to ratify it the vote against

ratification was unanimous. It does not appear that the government

made any real effort to secure ratification.

Immediately after the adjournment of the Congress a revolution broke

out in Panama. The people of Panama had long been discontented with

the Republic of Colombia, and they had been kept quiet only by

the prospect of the conclusion of the treaty, which was to them a

matter of vital concern. When it became evident that the treaty was

hopelessly lost, the people of Panama rose literally as one man. Not

a shot was fired by a single man on the Isthmus in the interest of

the Colombian Government. Not a life was lost in the accomplishment

of the revolution. The Colombian troops stationed on the Isthmus, who

had long been unpaid, made common cause with the people of Panama,

and with astonishing unanimity the new republic was started. The duty

of the United States in the premises was clear. In strict accordance

with the principles laid down by Secretaries Cass and Seward in the

official documents above quoted, the United States gave notice that

it would permit the landing of no expeditionary force, the arrival

of which would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the

railroad and of the proposed canal, and an interruption of transit

as an inevitable consequence. The de facto Government of Panama was

recognized in the following telegram to Mr. Ehrman:

“The people of Panama have, by apparently unanimous movement,

dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia

and resumed their independence. When you are satisfied that a

de facto government, republican in form and without substantial

opposition from its own people, has been established in the State

of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the responsible

government of the territory and look to it for all due action to

protect the persons and property of citizens of the United States

and to keep open the isthmian transit, in accordance with the

obligations of existing treaties governing the relations of the

United States to that territory.”

The Government of Colombia was notified of our action by the following

telegram to Mr. Beaupré:

“The people of Panama having, by an apparently unanimous movement,

dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia

and resumed their independence, and having adopted a government of

their own, republican in form, with which the Government of the

United States of America has entered into relations, the President

of the United States, in accordance with the ties of friendship

which have so long and so happily existed between the respective

nations, most earnestly commends to the Governments of Colombia and

of Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all questions at

issue between them. He holds that he is bound not merely by treaty

obligations, but by the interests of civilization, to see that the

peaceful traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall

not longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and

wasteful wars.”

When these events happened, fifty-seven years had elapsed since the

United States had entered into its treaty with New Granada. During

that time the Governments of New Granada and of its successor,

Colombia, have been in a constant state of flux. The following is

a partial list of the disturbances on the Isthmus of Panama during

the period in question, as reported to us by our consuls. It is not

possible to give a complete list, and some of the reports that speak

of “revolutions” must mean unsuccessful revolutions.

May 22, 1850.—Outbreak; two Americans killed. War vessel demanded to

quell outbreak.

October, 1850.—Revolutionary plot to bring about independence of the

Isthmus.

July 22, 1851.—Revolution in four Southern provinces.

November 14, 1851.—Outbreak at Chagres. Man-of-war requested for

Chagres.

June 27, 1853.—Insurrection at Bogota, and consequent disturbance on

Isthmus. War vessel demanded.

May 23, 1854.—Political disturbances; war vessel requested.

June 28, 1854.—Attempted revolution.

October 24, 1854.—Independence of Isthmus demanded by provincial

legislature.

April, 1856.—Riot, and massacre of Americans.

May 4, 1856.—Riot.

May 18, 1856.—Riot.

June 3, 1856.—Riot.

October 2, 1856.—Conflict between two native parties. United States

forces landed.

December 18, 1858.—Attempted secession of Panama.

April, 1859.—Riots.

September, 1860.—Outbreak.

October 4, 1860.—Landing of United States forces in consequence.

May 23, 1861.—Intervention of the United States forces required, by

intendente.

October 2, 1861.—Insurrection and civil war.

April 4, 1862.—Measures to prevent rebels crossing Isthmus.

June 13, 1862.—Mosquera’s troops refused admittance to Panama.

March, 1865.—Revolution, and United States troops landed.

August, 1865.—Riots; unsuccessful attempt to invade Panama.

March, 1866.—Unsuccessful revolution.

April, 1867.—Attempt to overthrow Government.

August, 1867.—Attempt at revolution.

July 5, 1868.—Revolution; provisional government inaugurated.

August 29, 1868.—Revolution; provisional government overthrown.

April, 1871.—Revolution; followed apparently by counter revolution.

April, 1873.—Revolution and civil war which lasted to October, 1875.

August, 1876.—Civil war which lasted until April, 1877.

July, 1878.—Rebellion.

December, 1878.—Revolt.

April, 1879.—Revolution.

June, 1879.—Revolution.

March, 1883.—Riot.

May, 1883.—Riot.

June, 1884.—Revolutionary attempt.

December, 1884.—Revolutionary attempt.

January, 1885.—Revolutionary disturbances.

March, 1885.—Revolution.

April, 1887.—Disturbance on Panama Railroad.

November, 1887.—Disturbance on line of canal.

January, 1889.—Riot.

January, 1895.—Revolution which lasted until April.

March, 1895.—Incendiary attempt.

October, 1899.—Revolution.

February, 1900, to July, 1900.—Revolution.

January, 1901.—Revolution.

July, 1901.—Revolutionary disturbances.

September, 1901.—City of Colon taken by rebels.

March, 1902.—Revolutionary disturbances.

July, 1902.—Revolution.

The above is only a partial list of the revolutions, rebellions,

insurrections, riots, and other outbreaks that have occurred during

the period in question; yet they number 53 for the 57 years. It will

be noted that one of them lasted for nearly three years before it

was quelled; another for nearly a year. In short, the experience of

over half a century has shown Colombia to be utterly incapable of

keeping order on the Isthmus. Only the active interference of the

United States has enabled her to preserve so much as a semblance of

sovereignty. Had it not been for the exercise by the United States

of the police power in her interest, her connection with the Isthmus

would have been sundered long ago. In 1856, in 1860, in 1873, in

1885, in 1901, and again in 1902, sailors and marines from United

States warships were forced to land in order to patrol the Isthmus,

to protect life and property, and to see that the transit across

the Isthmus was kept open. In 1861, in 1862, in 1885, and in 1900,

the Colombian Government asked that the United States Government

would land troops to protect its interests and maintain order on the

Isthmus. Perhaps the most extraordinary request is that which has just

been received and which runs as follows:

“Knowing that revolution has already commenced in Panama [an eminent

Colombian] says that if the Government of the United States will

land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty, and the transit, if

requested by Colombian chargé d’affaires, this government will declare

martial law; and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when

public order is disturbed, will approve by decree the ratification

of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United

States prefers, will call extra session of the Congress—with new

and friendly members—next May to approve the treaty. [An eminent

Colombian] has the perfect confidence of vice-president, he says, and

if it became necessary will go to the Isthmus or send representative

there to adjust matters along above lines to the satisfaction of the

people there.”

This despatch is noteworthy from two standpoints. Its offer of

immediately guaranteeing the treaty to us is in sharp contrast with

the positive and contemptuous refusal of the Congress which has just

closed its sessions to consider favorably such a treaty; it shows

that the government which made the treaty really had absolute control

over the situation, but did not choose to exercise this control. The

despatch further calls on us to restore order and secure Colombian

supremacy in the Isthmus from which the Colombian Government has just

by its action decided to bar us by preventing the construction of the

canal.

The control, in the interest of the commerce and traffic of the whole

civilized world, of the means of undisturbed transit across the

Isthmus of Panama has become of transcendent importance to the United

States. We have repeatedly exercised this control by intervening in

the course of domestic dissension, and by protecting the territory

from foreign invasion. In 1853 Mr. Everett assured the Peruvian

minister that we should not hesitate to maintain the neutrality of

the Isthmus in the case of war between Peru and Colombia. In 1864

Colombia, which has always been vigilant to avail itself of its

privileges conferred by the treaty, expressed its expectation that

in the event of war between Peru and Spain the United States would

carry into effect the guarantee of neutrality. There have been few

administrations of the State Department in which this treaty has

not, either by the one side or the other, been used as a basis of

more or less important demands. It was said by Mr. Fish in 1871 that

the Department of State had reason to believe that an attack upon

Colombian sovereignty on the Isthmus had, on several occasions, been

averted by warning from this Government. In 1886, when Colombia was

under the menace of hostilities from Italy in the Cerruti case, Mr.

Bayard expressed the serious concern that the United States could

not but feel, that a European power should resort to force against

a sister republic of this hemisphere, as to the sovereign and

uninterrupted use of a part of whose territory we are guarantors under

the solemn faith of a treaty.

The above recital of facts establishes beyond question: First, that

the United States has for over half a century patiently and in good

faith carried out its obligations under the treaty of 1846; second,

that when for the first time it became possible for Colombia to do

anything in requital of the services thus repeatedly rendered to it

for fifty-seven years by the United States, the Colombian Government

peremptorily and offensively refused thus to do its part, even though

to do so would have been to its advantage and immeasurably to the

advantage of the State of Panama, at that time under its jurisdiction;

third, that throughout this period revolutions, riots, and factional

disturbances of every kind have occurred one after the other in almost

uninterrupted succession, some of them lasting for months and even for

years, while the central government was unable to put them down or to

make peace with the rebels; fourth, that these disturbances instead of

showing any sign of abating have tended to grow more numerous and more

serious in the immediate past; fifth, that the control of Colombia

over the Isthmus of Panama could not be maintained without the armed

intervention and assistance of the United States. In other words, the

Government of Colombia, though wholly unable to maintain order on the

Isthmus, has nevertheless declined to ratify a treaty the conclusion

of which opened the only chance to secure its own stability and to

guarantee permanent peace on, and the construction of a canal across,

the Isthmus.

Under such circumstances, the Government of the United States would

have been guilty of folly and weakness, amounting in their sum to a

crime against the Nation, had it acted otherwise than it did when

the revolution of November 3 last took place in Panama. This great

enterprise of building the interoceanic canal can not be held up to

gratify the whims, or out of respect to the governmental impotence,

or to the even more sinister and evil political peculiarities, of

people who, though they dwell afar off, yet, against the wish of the

actual dwellers on the Isthmus, assert an unreal supremacy over the

territory. The possession of a territory fraught with such peculiar

capacities as the Isthmus in question carries with it obligations to

mankind. The course of events has shown that this canal can not be

built by private enterprise, or by any other nation than our own;

therefore it must be built by the United States.

Every effort has been made by the Government of the United States to

persuade Colombia to follow a course which was essentially not only to

our interests and to the interests of the world, but to the interests

of Colombia itself. These efforts have failed; and Colombia, by her

persistence in repulsing the advances that have been made, has forced

us, for the sake of our own honor, and of the interest and well-being,

not merely of our own people, but of the people of the Isthmus of

Panama and the people of the civilized countries of the world, to

take decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs which

had become intolerable. The new Republic of Panama immediately

offered to negotiate a treaty with us. This treaty I herewith submit.

By it our interests are better safeguarded than in the treaty with

Colombia which was ratified by the Senate at its last session. It is

better in its terms than the treaties offered to us by the Republics

of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. At last the right to begin this great

undertaking is made available. Panama has done her part. All that

remains is for the American Congress to do its part and forthwith this

Republic will enter upon the execution of a project colossal in its

size and of wellnigh incalculable possibilities for the good of this

country and the nations of mankind.

By the provisions of the treaty the United States guarantees and will

maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. There is granted

to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of

a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles into the sea

at either terminal, with all lands lying outside of the zone necessary

for the construction of the canal or for its auxiliary works, and with

the islands in the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon are

not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States assumes their

sanitation and, in case of need, the maintenance of order therein;

the United States enjoys within the granted limits all the rights,

power, and authority which it would possess were it the sovereign of

the territory to the exclusion of the exercise of sovereign rights

by the republic. All railway and canal property rights belonging to

Panama and needed for the canal pass to the United States, including

any property of the respective companies in the cities of Panama and

Colon; the works, property, and personnel of the canal and railways

are exempted from taxation as well in the cities of Panama and Colon

as in the canal zone and its dependencies. Free immigration of the

personnel and importation of supplies for the construction and

operation of the canal are granted. Provision is made for the use of

military force and the building of fortifications by the United States

for the protection of the transit. In other details, particularly as

to the acquisition of the interests of the New Panama Canal Company

and the Panama Railway by the United States and the condemnation of

private property for the uses of the canal, the stipulations of the

Hay-Herran treaty are closely followed, while the compensation to be

given for these enlarged grants remains the same, being ten millions

of dollars payable on exchange of ratifications; and, beginning nine

years from that date, an annual payment of $250,000 during the life of

the convention.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

WHITE HOUSE,

_December 7, 1903_.

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