the end that by some satisfactory arrangement they might turn aside the
danger of the moment, and so escape. But since they refused to withdraw
from both Sicily and Sardinia, to release the Roman captives free of
cost and to ransom their own, to make good all the expenses incurred by
the Romans for the war and besides to pay more as tribute each year,
they accomplished nothing. And in addition to the above mentioned, there
were the following commands which displeased them: that they should make
neither war nor treaties without the consent of the Romans, that they
should employ not more than one warship but the Romans would come to
their aid with fifty triremes as often as notice should be sent them,
and that they would not be on an equal footing in conducting some other
kinds of business. Considering these points they decided that the truce
would mean their utter subjugation, and preferred rather to fight with
the Romans. (Ursinus, p. 376. Zonaras, 8, 13.)
20. Dio in Book 11: "The Carthaginians kept watch for their ships
homeward bound and captured several heavily laden with money." (Bekker,
Anecd. p. 131, 12. Zonaras, 8, 14.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 21. ¶ They say the Carthaginians sent
heralds to the Romans on account of the great number of the captives
(among other causes), and most of all to see if they would be inclined
to make peace on some moderate terms; if this could not be effected,
their purpose still held to get back the captives. They say that
Regulus, too, had been sent among the envoys because of his reputation
and valor. The people assumed that the Romans would do anything whatever
in the hope of getting him back, so that he might even be delivered up
alone in return for peace, or at any rate in exchange for the captives.
Accordingly, they bound him by mighty oaths and pledges to return
without fail in case neither of their objects should be accomplished,
and they despatched him as an envoy with others.
And he acted in all respects like a Carthaginian, not a Roman; for he
did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him nor did he enter
the city, although he was invited: instead, when the senate assembled
outside of the walls, as their custom was in treating with the envoys of
the enemy, he asked for permission to approach with the others--at
least, so the story goes, [lacuna] (Ursinus, p. 377. Zonaras, 8, 15.)
22. Dio in Book 11: "Regulus paid no heed to them until the
Carthaginians permitted him to do so." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 140, 20.
Zonaras, 8, 15.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 23. Dio in Book 11: "For it is neither
my duty nor that of any other upright man to give up aught that pertains
to the public welfare." (Ib. p. 165, 23.)
24. In Book 11: "Any one else, wishing to console himself for the
disaster which had happened in his own case, would have exalted the
prowess of the enemy." (Ib. p. 165, 30.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 249 (_a.u._ 505)] 25. The second part of the augury is
transmitted to us by Dio Cassius Cocceianus, who says that they keep
tame birds which eat barley, and put barley grains in front of them when
they seek an omen. If, then, in the course of eating the birds do not
strike the barley with their beaks and toss it aside, the sign is good;
but if they do so strike the grain, it is not good. (Io. Tzetzes,
Exegesis of Homer's Iliad, p. 108, 2.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 244 (_a.u._ 510)] 26. He [sc. Mamilcar] thought it was
requisite for a man who wished to accomplish anything by secret means
not to make the matter known to anyone at all. There was no one, he
believed, so self-possessed as to be willing, when he had heard, merely
to observe operations and be silent. Just the reverse was true: the more
strongly a man might be forbidden to mention anything, the greater would
be his desire to speak of it, and thus one man learning the secret from
another with the understanding that he was the only person to know it
would reveal the story. [Footnote: Section 26 may refer to Hamilcar
Barca's plans for seizing Mount Eryx.] (Mai, p. 540. Cp. Diodorus, 24,
7.)
27. In Book 11 of Dio: "He feasted the populace." [Footnote: Boissevain
thinks that No. 27 may concern the banqueting of the populace during
Metellus's triumph. Others have other opinions.] (Bekker, Anecd. p. 133,
24.)
28. In Book 11 of Dio: "You attack even such friends as have been guilty
of any error, whereas I pardon even my enemies." (Ib. p.171, 29.)
29. In Book 12 of Dio: "By the one process [Footnote: Perhaps from the
speech of Regulus to the senators.] he might have become to a certain
extent estranged from you." (Ib. p.124, 4.) 30. In Book 12 of Dio: "Some
are dead, and others who were deserving of some notice, have been
captured." [Footnote: This may be likewise from the speech of Regulus
and be said of the Carthaginian leaders.] (Ib. p. 133,25.)
[Frag. XLIV]
1. For the Ligurians occupy the whole shore from Etruria up to the Alps
and as far as Gaul, according to Dio's statement. (Isaac Tzetzes, on
Lycophron, 1312.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 236 (_a.u._ 518)] 2. The Romans at first sent Claudius
to the Corsicans and gave him up. This was after he had made terms with
them, but his countrymen, who claimed that the fault in breaking the
compact rested on him and not on themselves, had waged war upon them and
subdued them. When the Corsicans refused to receive him, the Romans
drove him out. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 18.)
[Frag. XLV]
[Sidenote: B.C. 235 (_a.u._ 519)] 1. ¶The Romans after exacting also
money from the Carthaginians, renewed the truce. And at first when an
embassy from the latter arrived, they returned no proper answer, because
they were aware of the state of their own equipment and because they
were themselves still busied at that time with the war against the
neighboring tribes. After this, however, Hanno, a man of youthful years
who employed striking frankness of speech, was sent. He touched
unreservedly on a number of other subjects and finally his appeal--"If
you don't want to be at peace, restore to us both Sardinia and Sicily;
for with these we purchased not a temporary respite but eternal
friendship"--caused them to become milder and ashamed [lacuna] (Ursinus,
p.378. Zonaras, 8, 18.)
2[lacuna] lest [Footnote: Preceding this fragment four pages of the MS.
are missing.] they might suffer the same injuries in return, so that
they were very glad to delay,--the one side choosing to preserve the
prosperity that was an inheritance of the past, and the other to cling
to the possessions which were still theirs. To judge by their threats
they were no longer maintaining peace, but in fact they still
deliberated about the matter, so that all could see that whichever of
the two found it to his advantage to create the first disturbance would
also be the one to begin war. Most men abide by their agreements just so
long as suits their own convenience. If they have in view a greater
resultant benefit to themselves, they deem it safe even to break some
compact. (Mai, p.184.)
[Frag. XLVI]
[Sidenote: B.C. 231 (_a.u._ 523)] ¶Once in the consulship of Marcus
Pomponius and Gaius Papirius they despatched envoys to investigate
affairs in Spain, although none of the Spanish States had ever yet
belonged to them. He, [Footnote: A reference to some previous proper
name, outside this fragment.] besides showing them other honors,
addressed them in suitable words, declaring that he was obliged to fight
against the Spaniards in order that the money which was still owing to
the Romans on the part of the Carthaginians might be paid; for it was
impossible to obtain it from any other source. The envoys were
consequently embarrassed to know how to censure him. (Mai, p.184)
[Frag. XLVII]
[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 1. ¶The island of Issa surrendered
itself voluntarily to the Romans. This was the first time the islanders
were about to make the acquaintance of the latter, but they judged them
more friendly and faithful than the powers which they then dreaded.
Calculation caused them to place more dependence on the unknown than on
the evident; for while the latter had aroused irritation through the
dealings already had with it, the former afforded good hope, because its
actions were as yet only matters of expectation. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8,
19.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 2. When the Issæans had attached
themselves to the Romans, the latter, being ready and anxious to do them
some favor in return forthwith, so as to get the reputation of aiding
such as espoused their cause and also for the purpose of restraining the
Ardiasans, who were annoying those that sailed from Brundusium,--for
these reasons they sent messengers to Agro, who were to ask clemency for
the Issæans and censure the king in that he was wronging them without
previous cause. Now these men found Agro no longer in existence: he had
died, leaving behind a child named Pineus. Teuta, Agro's wife and
stepmother of Pineus, held the power over the Ardiæans,[lacuna] Being
[lacuna] by boldness, she made no moderate response to their requests,
but woman-like she showed a vanity (due to innate recklessness as well
as to the power that she was holding) by casting some of the ambassadors
into prison and killing others for speaking frankly. Such was her action
at that time, and she actually took pride in it as if she had displayed
some strength by her facile cruelty. In a very short space, however, she
proved the weakness of the female sex, for as she had quickly flown into
a passion through short-sightedness of judgment, so through cowardice
she was quickly terrified. As soon as she learned that the Romans had
voted for war against her she was panic-stricken, and promised to
restore their men whom she held, while she tried to defend herself for
the death of the others, declaring that they had been slain by some
robbers. When the Romans were thus led to cease temporarily their
campaign and demand the surrender of the murderers, she showed contempt
again, because the danger was not yet at her doors, and declaring that
she would not give anybody up despatched an army against Issa. When she
learned that the consuls were at hand she grew terrified again, gave
over her high spirit, and became ready to heed them in every minutest
detail. She had not yet, however, been fully brought to her senses, for
when the consuls had crossed over to Corcyra she felt imbued with new
courage, revolted, and despatched an army against Epidamnus and
Apollonia. After the Romans had rescued the cities and at the news of
their capture of ships and treasures of hers she was on the point of
again yielding obedience. Meanwhile in the course of scaling certain
heights overlooking the sea they were worsted near the Atyrian hill and
she now waited, hoping, in view of the fact that it was really winter
already, for their withdrawal. But on perceiving that Albinus remained
where he was and Demetrius as a result of her caprice as well as from
fear of the Romans had transferred his allegiance, besides persuading
some others to desert, she became utterly terrified and gave up her
sovereignty. (Ursinus, p. 378. Zonaras, 8, 19.)
[Frag. XLVIII]
[Sidenote: B.C. 228 (_a.u._ 526)] In the time of Fabius Maximus
Berucosus ("full of warts") the Romans did this, after burying in the
middle Of the Forum a Greek and a Gallic couple, man and woman: they
were frightened by a certain oracle which said that Greek and Gaul
should occupy the city. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603, 1056. Cp.
Zonaras, 8, 19.)
[Frag. XLIX]
1. ¶ The Romans were being frightened by an oracle of the Sibyl which
urged the necessity of guarding against the Gauls when a thunderbolt
should fall upon the Capitol near the temple of Apollo. (Mai, p. 185.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 225 (_a.u._ 529)] 2. ¶ The Gauls became dejected on
seeing that the Romans had taken beforehand the most favorable
locations. All men if they obtain the object of their first aim proceed
more readily toward their subsequent goals, but if they miss it, lose
interest in everything else. They, however, after the Gallic fashion and
more than is usual with the rest of mankind, lay hold very eagerly of
what they desire and cling most tenaciously to any success, but if they
meet with the slightest obstacle have no hope left for the future. Folly
makes them inclined to expect whatsoever they wish, and their spirited
temperament ready to carry out whatsoever they undertake. They are given
to violent anger and dash headlong into enterprises, and for that reason
they have within themselves no quality of endurance (since it is
impossible for reckless audacity to prevail for any time), and if they
once suffer any setback they are unable (especially by reason of the
fear to which they then fall a prey) to recover themselves: they are
plunged into a state of panic corresponding to their previous fearless
daring. In a brief period they rush vehemently to the most opposite
extremes, since they can furnish no motive based on calculation for
either action. (Mai, p. 185.)
3. ¶ Æmilius on conquering the Insubres celebrated a triumph and in it
conveyed the foremost captives clad in armor up to the Capitol, making
jests upon them because he had heard that they had sworn not to remove
their breastplates before they had ascended the Capitol. (Mai, p. 186.
Zonaras, 8, 20.)
[Frag. L]
¶ If any of the details, even the smallest, that were customary in
festivals had been missed, they renewed the ceremonial proceedings at
any rate a second and a third time, and even more times still, so far as
was possible in one day, till everything seemed to them to have been
done faultlessly. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)
[Frag. LI]
[Sidenote: B.C. 219 (_a.u._ 535)] ¶ Demetrius, elated by his position as
guardian of Pineus and by the fact that he had married the latter's
mother Triteuta (Teuta was dead), was hateful to the natives and injured
the property of neighboring tribes. So they summoned him before them
(since it appeared that it was by misusing the friendship of the Romans
that he was able to wrong those peoples) as soon as they heard of it.
When he refused compliance and actually assailed their allies, they made
a campaign against Issa, where he was. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8,
20.)
[Frag. LII]
1. ¶The Romans were at their prime in equipment for war and enjoyed
absolute harmony among themselves. Whereas the majority of persons are
led by unmixed good fortune to audacity but by a tremendous fear to
proper behavior, they had quite a different experience at that time in
those matters. The more successes they had the more sober it made them;
against their enemies they displayed the kind of boldness that partakes
of bravery, while toward one another they employed that right dealing
which is closely connected with good order. [Footnote: The word for
"good order" is conjectured by van Herwerden.] They held their power
with a view to the practice of moderation and kept their orderliness for
the acquirement of a true bravery: they did not allow their good fortune
to develop into wantonness, nor their right dealing into cowardice. They
believed that in case of such laxity temperance might be ruined by
bravery and boldness by boldness; but that when people exercised care,
as they did, moderation was made more secure by bravery and good fortune
rendered surer by discipline. This was the reason for their vast
superiority over the enemies that encountered them and for their
excellent administration of both their own affairs and those of the
allies. (Mai, p. 186.)
2. ¶ All who dwelt on the near side of the Alps revolted to join the
Carthaginians, not because they preferred the Carthaginians to the
Romans as leaders, but because they hated the force that ruled them and
were for welcoming the untried. The Carthaginians had allies against the
Romans from every one of the tribes that then existed; but Hannibal was
worth nearly all of them. He could comprehend matters very quickly and
plan the details of every project that he laid to heart, notwithstanding
the fact that generally sureness is the product of slowness and only
rash decisions result from hastiness of disposition. He was most
[lacuna] when given the smallest margin of time, and most enduring with
a very great degree of reliability. He managed in a safe way the affair
of the moment and showed skill in considering the future beforehand: he
proved himself a most capable counselor in ordinary events and a very
accurate judge of the unusual. By these powers he handled the issue
immediately confronting him very readily and in the shortest time, while
by calculation he anticipated the future afar off and considered it as
though it were actually present. Consequently he, more than any man, met
each occasion with suitable words and acts, because he made no
distinction between what he possessed and what he hoped for. He was able
to conduct matters so for the reason that in addition to his natural
capacity he was well versed in much Phoenician learning, common to his
country, and likewise much Greek, and furthermore he understood
divination by inspection of entrails. (Mai, p. 187 and Valesius, p.
593.)
3. With such intellectual qualities he had brought his body to a state
of equal perfection, partly by nature, partly by practice, so that he
could carry out easily everything that he took in hand. It was nimble
and at the same time heavy to the utmost degree, and he could,
therefore, run, fight, and ride safely at full speed. He never burdened
himself with overmuch food, nor suffered annoyance by lack of it, but
took more or less with equal grace, feeling that either was
satisfactory. Hardship made him rugged, and on loss of sleep he grew
strong.
Having these advantages of mind and body he universally administered
affairs in a fashion now to be described. Since he saw that most men
were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself
dealt with them in this manner and expected the same treatment of them,
so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom
failed by being the object of a plot. He regarded as hostile every force
that could gain an advantage both among foreigners and among kinsmen
alike, and did not wait to learn their intentions from their acts, but
handled them quite unsparingly, assuming that they were anxious to
commit a wrong when they could: he thought it better to be the first to
act than the first to suffer, and resolved that the rest of the world
should be dependent on him, and not he upon other persons. In fine, he
paid attention to the nature of things, rather than to their reputed
good points, as often as the two did not happen to coincide. He also,
however, prized extravagantly whatever he needed. Slaves, most of them,
he esteemed in that way, and beheld them willing to encounter danger for
him even contrary to their own advantage. For these reasons he often
himself refrained from opportunities for gain and other most delightful
pleasures, but gave a share ungrudgingly to them. Hence he could get
them to be not unwilling partners in hard work. He subjected himself not
only to the same conditions of living as these men, but also to the same
dangers and was the first to accomplish every task that he demanded of
them. Likewise he was confident that they, too, without pretexts and
with zeal,--since he showed his care for them not in words only,--would
help him effect his projects.
Toward the rest he always behaved quite proudly; and the whole
multitude, in consequence, felt either good-will or fear toward him
because of their similar conditions of life, on the one hand, and
because of his haughtiness on the other. Accordingly, he was fully able
to bring low the towering head, to exalt humility, and to inspire all
whom he pleased, in the shortest period, one with hesitation, another
with boldness, with hope also and despair regarding most important
matters.
And that this information about him is not false, but is truthful
tradition, his works are proof. Much of Spain he won over in a short
time, and from there carried the war into Italy through the country of
the Gauls, most of whom were not only not in league with him, but
actually unknown to him. He was the first of non-Europeans, so far as we
know, to cross the Alps with an army, and after that he made a campaign
against Rome itself, sundering from it almost all its allies, some by
force and others by persuasion. This, however, he achieved by himself
without the aid of the Carthaginian government. He was not sent forth in
the beginning by the magistrates at home, nor did he later obtain any
considerable assistance from them. While they were on the eve of
enjoying the greatest glory and benefit through his efforts, they
wished rather not to appear to be leaving him in the lurch than to
coöperate effectively in any enterprise. (Valesius, p. 593.)
[Frag. LIII]
Dio Cocceianus calls the Narbonenses _Bebruces_, writing this: "To those
who of old were Bebruces, but now Narbonenses, belongs the Pyrenees
range. This range is the boundary between Spain and Gaul." (Isaac
Tzetzes on Lycophron, 516. Zonaras, 8, 21.)
[Frag. LIV]
1. ¶ Peace both creates wealth and preserves it, but war both expends it
and destroys it. [Footnote: The first eight sections of this fragment
seem to be taken from speeches of Romans in the senate-house. Nos. 1 and
2 are apparently the words of an unknown individual discouraging the
eagerness for war; Nos. 3 and 4 may be spoken by Lentulus, urging war;
and Nos. 5 to 8 may contain the opposing arguments of Fabius.](Mai, p.
188.)
2. ¶Every human being is so constituted as to desire to lord it over
such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune's scale against
voluntary slaves. (Mai, ib.)
3. But do you who know the facts and have experienced them, think that
propriety and humaneness are sufficient for your safety? And do you
regard listlessly all the wrongs they have committed against us by
stealth or deceit or violence? Are you not stimulated, are you not for
paying them back or for defending yourselves? Then again, you have never
reflected that such behavior is in place for you toward one another, but
toward the Carthaginians is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must
treat in a gentle and politic fashion; if one be preserved unexpectedly,
he is of our possessions: but harsh treatment is for the enemy. We shall
save ourselves not by our defeats as a result of sparing them, but by
our victories that will come from abasing them. (Mai, p.188.)
4. ¶War both preserves men's own possessions and wins the property of
others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war
but itself in addition. (Mai, pp.188 and 541.)
[Frag. LIV]
5. ¶It is base to proceed to action ere arguments about the matter have
been heard: for in such a case, if successful, you will be thought to
have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have employed good counsel, and
if worsted, to have taken your resolution without forethought, at a time
when there was no profit in it. And yet who does not know this,--that to
heap up reproaches and to accuse people that have once warred against us
is very easy--any man can do it--whereas, to say what is advantageous
for the State, not in anger over other men's deeds, but with a view to
the State's benefit, is really the duty of the advising class? Do not
irritate us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to begin war until you show us
that it shall be really for our advantage. Reflect particularly (though
there are other considerations) that speaking here about deeds of war is
not the same sort of thing as their actual performance. (Mai, p.189.)
6. Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who use them
wisely fare better than those who are completely fortunate and for that
very reason wanton. Somehow ill luck seems to hold no inconsiderable
portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses
or indulge in extreme wantonness. For naturally it is most advisable to
set one's face steadfastly toward all the best things, and to make not
possibility, but calculation, the measure of desire. And if a man be not
able to prefer what is more excellent, it will still pay him to behave,
even unwillingly, with moderation so as to regard in the light of
happiness even the failure to be fortunate in all cases. (Mai, p.542.)
7. It is imperative to be on one's guard against any similar experience
again,--that being the only benefit that can come from disasters.
Repeated good fortune occasionally ruins those who unthinkingly base
their hopes upon it, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas
failures compel every one as a result of his past trouble to provide for
the future carefully beforehand. (Mai, pp.189 and 542.)