reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing
neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been
watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly
display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he
rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them
kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared,
their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings
at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his
simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be
suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them
either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to
the desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands.
For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to
them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
15. ¶Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who
were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however,
they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not
put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to
restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city
without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)
16. ¶The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,--a kind of beast that
they had never before seen,--had fallen into dismay, still, by
reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no
beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show
inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to
understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)
17. ¶The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the
allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie
ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)
18. ¶The Epirots dishonored the ties of friendship, through vexation
that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting
nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the
Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him,
on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike,
withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them
than his promises. (Mai, ib.)
19. ¶Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he
was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he
told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a
difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory
of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive
agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been
so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever
been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
20. ¶The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to
wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army
of Lævinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman
troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not,
however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn,
but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)
21. ¶Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were
approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as
far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the
hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city,
entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting
that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a
defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
22. ¶When Fabricius made this statement merely: "The Romans sent us to
bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size
for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us," he was quite
dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to
treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the
friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the
return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management,
whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are
lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
23 [lacuna]. "to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the
outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence,
if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence
for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since
Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be
enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program." By this
speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this
course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely
to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors:
"Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would
not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to
become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives
without ransom and make a treaty of peace." Privately, also, he did them
favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any
rate obtain friendship for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed
as follows: "Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer,
and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and
came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly,
then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I
see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two
words "and reputable" are a conjecture of Bossevain's. Some ten letters
in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in
getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a
campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general." Fabricius
replied: "I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring
peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose if it is to our
advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to
uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an
adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I
have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things,
because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all. I
would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a
reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me
worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you
bid me accept them? Let me assure you, then, of the fact that I have
many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I
feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you
believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would
not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest
of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been
reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no
limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he
longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and
with the idea that he could not live without it.
"Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford
you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable
than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace
nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it,
the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In
using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were
inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they
contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to
many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure
could rehearse. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely
necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence
rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree
of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of
gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crushing hand of Fate
[Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the
MSS. give.] rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a
man's body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as
well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the
slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be
content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire
for increased advantages." (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)
25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest
zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the
overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus,
chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)
26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led
even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place
respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his
gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)
27. ¶Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit,
suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] 28. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling
him that he would not succeed in accomplishing this even if he wished it
[i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he
were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls
answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a
proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to
conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] 29. He did not know how he would
repulse the one of them [Footnote: "They" are C. Fabricius Luscinus and
Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them
both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than
that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one
of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of
the question. (Mai, p.177.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general
toward them with great circumspection, and awarded greater credit for
his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him,
than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an
injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who
held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This
was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of
their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State
through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them
and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over
to some one else's [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 479)] 31. ¶As the allies were unwilling to
contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the
treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth,
despoiled them and sent the spoils on ships to Tarentum. And the men
almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were
cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)
32. ¶All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet
had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court
and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: "We should have
said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us,"
he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)
[Frag. XLI]
[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] ¶Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus,
king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that
the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The
Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away
should have come to respect them, despatched ambassadors to him in turn.
From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had
offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus,
p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)
[Frag. XLII]
[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)]¶Though the Romans were faring in this
manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no
haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the
Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus
Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their ambassadors.
The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him
home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)
[Frag. XLIII]
1. ¶The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were--on the
side of the Romans that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentini, on
the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of
friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as
those are inclined to do who in reality are desirous of advancing their
own interests but pause before a reputation for such action. The truth
is different. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been
powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly, kept viewing
each other with jealousy; and they were incited to war partly by the
desire of continually getting more, according to the instinct of the
majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful, and
partly also by fear. Each alike thought that the one sure salvation for
her own possessions lay in obtaining what the other held. If there had
been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two
nations that were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each
other, so to speak, only a very short distance (considering the speed of
voyages) to rule any outside tribes and yet keep their hands off each
other. But a mere accident of the kind that befell broke the truce they
had been keeping and dashed them together in war. (Mai, p.178. Zonaras,
8, 8.)
2. ¶The conflict, according to report, concerned Messana and Sicily, but
in reality both parties perceived that from this region danger
threatened their native land, and they thought that the island, lying,
as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a
safe base for operations against the other party. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras,
8, 8.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (_a.u._ 490)] 3. ¶Gaius Claudius came to the meeting,
and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the
object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no
need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he
should set their affairs in order. Next he bade the Carthaginians also
either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit
to arbitration. Now when not one of the Mamertines (by reason of fear)
opened his lips, and the Carthaginians since they were occupying the
city by force of arms paid little heed to him, he stated that the
silence on both sides afforded sufficient evidence: on the part of the
invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, for they would have
justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest, and on the
part of the Mamertines that they desired freedom; they might have been
quite free to speak, had they espoused the cause of the Carthaginians,
especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he
promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin
and on account of the request for assistance they had made. (Mai, p.179.
Zonaras, 8,8.)
4. ¶Gaius Claudius lost some of the triremes and with difficulty reached
safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, were prevented
from renewing attempts by sea through the fact that they had been
worsted when first making a trial of it, although this is the ordinary
course that people pursue who fail in the first undertaking and think
that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an
omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the watery element
with an even greater zeal, and chiefly because they were ambitious and
did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the
disaster. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras 8, 8, sq.) 5. ¶Hanno, who was in no wise
disposed to make light of the war in case it were bound to occur, was
particularly anxious to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce
upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was
taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the ships and
the captives, while he urged him to accept peace and exhorted him
besides not to meddle with the sea. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)
6. ¶When he would accept nothing, he launched at him an arrogant and
reprehensible threat. For he declared that he would never allow the
Romans even to wash their hands in the sea: yet he lost not only the sea
but also Messana not much later. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)
7. ¶Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbor, called an
assembly of their number and made the statement: "I have no need of arms
but will leave it with you to decide everything." By this means he
persuaded them to send for Hanno. As the latter refused to come down, he
chid him soundly, inveighing against him and declaring that if he had
even the slightest justification, he would certainly hold a conference
with him and not persist in occupying the city by force. (Mai, p.180.
Zonaras, 8, 9.)
8. ¶The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers beforehand to be of good
cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He
instructed them that in the first place victories fall to the lot of the
better equipped, and that secondly their valor far surpassed the skill
of their opponents. They would acquire, he said, the knowledge of
seafaring in a short time, whereas the Carthaginians would never have
bravery equal to theirs. Knowledge was something that could be obtained
in a brief space by men who gave their minds to it and could be mastered
by practice; but bravery, in case it were absent from a man's nature,
could never be furnished by instruction. (Mai, p. 181.)
9. ¶ The Libyans, rejoicing in the idea that they had conquered not
through the nature of their position, but by their own valor, sallied
out. But Claudius made them so fearful that they would not even peep out
of the camp. (Mai, p. 181. Zonaras, 8, 9.)
10. For it happens in the majority of instances that those who as a
result of calculation fear something are successful by reason of their
precaution against it, whereas those whose boldness rests on lack of
forethought, are ruined on account of their unguarded condition.
[Footnote: The Carthaginians are, in a general way, the subject of this
section.] (Mai, p. 539.)
11. The quality of moderation both obtains victories and preserves them
after they are won, whereas that of wantonness can prevail against
nothing, and if it be at any time fortunate in some matter, very easily
destroys it. And again, if it perchance preserves some conquest, it
grows worse by the very fact of extraordinary good fortune and so far
from being benefited by its success is actually ruined by it
irretrievably.
Moreover, whenever there is boldness not in accord with reason, you may
expect to find unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it
resolution strengthened by forethought, and a hope made confident by its
own trustworthiness do not allow one to be either dejected or
presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, however, often elates men in the
midst of good fortune and humbles them to dust in disasters, possessing,
as it were, no support, but always copying the feature of the chance
event. (Mai, p. 539 and p. 181.)
12. ¶ The Romans and Carthaginians when they entered upon war were
equally matched in the number of ships and readiness to serve.
[Sidenote: B.C. 260 (_a.u._ 494)] It was a naval battle soon after in
which, with equal equipment, they first became engaged. They hoped that
it would decide the whole war: Sicily lay before their eyes as the
prize: they were contending in a matter of servitude or empire, resolved
not to be beaten, lest they taste the former, but to conquer and obtain
the latter. One side surpassed in the experience possessed by the crews
of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea, and the
other in the strength of its marines and its daring; for the rashness
and audacity of their fighting was commensurate with their inexperience
in naval affairs. In matters of experience practically all men make
exact calculations and are imbued with wholesome fear, even if their
judgment approves a particular course, but the untried renders them
unreasonably bold, and draws them into conflict through lack of due
consideration. (Mai, p.181.)
13. ¶The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the
sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a trait of
practically all people who send out armies on any mission to lay claims
to advantage gained but to put the responsibility of defeat upon their
leaders, and the Carthaginians were very ready to chastise those who
failed in an enterprise.
He, however, was afraid and immediately after the defeat enquired of
them whether if the business were still untouched they would bid him
risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he
had doubtless expected, because they prided themselves on having such a
superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: "I, then,
have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes
as you. The decision was within my power but not the fortune of the
battle." (Mai, p.182. Zonaras, 8, 11.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 258 (_a.u._ 496)] 14. Dio in Book 11: "When the storm
continued and a mist arose besides, he brought about Hannibal's defeat
through the agency of some deserters." (Bekker, Anecd. p.171, 26.
Zonaras, 8, 12.)
15. But regarding the non-surrender of their native land and the
acquirement of foreign territory as matters of equal importance, they
[Footnote: I.e., The Carthaginians.] contended with courage and force.
For whereas most men defend their own possessions to the very limit of
their power but are unwilling to lay claim to the goods of others if it
involves danger, these antagonists set a like value upon what they held
fast and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both
points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at
a distance, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have
the contest in the Carthaginians' own land. If they failed, they would
lose nothing; and if they conquered they would obtain something besides
hopes. Therefore, making their preparation follow their resolve, they
took the field against Carthage. (Mai, p. 183. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 12.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] 16. Their leaders were Regulus and
Lucius, preferred before others for their excellence. Regulus was,
indeed, in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that
account, to take up the command; and it was voted that his wife and
children should be furnished their support from the public treasury.
(Valesius, p. 593. Zonaras, 8, 12.)
17. ¶ Hanno had been sent to the Romans by Hamilcar, as was pretended,
in behalf of peace, but in reality for the sake of delay. And he, when
some clamored for his arrest, because the Carthaginians by fraud
[lacuna] Cornelius [lacuna] [Mai, p. 183.] Four pages of the MS. are
lacking. (Zonaras, 8, 12.)
18. Dio the Roman, who wrote a history about the Empire and the Republic
of Rome and describes the far-famed Carthaginian war, says that when
Regulus,
[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] consul for Rome, was warring against
Carthage, a serpent suddenly crept out of the palisade of the Roman army
and lay there. By his command the Romans slew the reptile and having
flayed it sent its skin, a great prodigy, to the Roman senate. And when
measured by the same senate (as the same Dio says) it was found to have
a length of one hundred and twenty feet. In addition to its length its
thickness was also notable. (Ioannes Damascenus, On Serpents, vol. I, p.
472, A.B. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 13.)