is no small thing to escape the appearance of creating war, and seem to
be compelled to defend the existing population. (Mai, p.189.)
9. After speeches of this character on both sides they determined to
prepare for fighting: they would not vote that way however, but
determined to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; then, if
the Carthaginians refrained from approving his exploits, they would
arbitrate the matter, or if all responsibility were laid on his
shoulders, they would demand his extradition; if he were given up, well;
otherwise they would declare war. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)
10. ¶When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and
instead behaved contemptuously toward them, Marcus [Footnote: According
to Livy (XXI, 18, 1) his name was _Quintus_. Willems suggests emending
to Maximus here.] Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga and holding
them with palms upward said: "Here I bring to you, Carthaginians, both
war and peace: do you choose unequivocally whichever of them you wish."
Upon their replying to this challenge even then that they chose neither
but would readily accept either that the Romans left with them, he
declared war upon them. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)
[Frag. LV]
¶The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But the latter
declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians or
received any favor from the Romans that they should war against the one
or defend the other, and were quite angry with them, charging that the
Romans had often treated their kinsmen outrageously. (Mai, p.190.)
[Frag. LVI]
1. ¶From such an expectation, Dio says, already acquired from that
source, the Romans and Carthaginians had reached a state in which they
had formed the most different judgments regarding the administration of
the war. For hopefulness, in that it leads all men to cheerfulness,
renders them also more active and confident, possessed of a faith that
they will be victorious; lack of hope casts them into dejection and
despair, and deprives of strength even the naturally stout-hearted.
(Mai, p.191.)
2. Just as matters at a great distance and quite unknown are accustomed
to disturb many men, so now they struck no little fear to the hearts of
the Spaniards. [Footnote: This refers to the Spaniards' refusing, at the
start, to undertake a campaign. Cp. Livy, XXI, 23.] For the majority of
the multitude that makes a campaign not for any reason of its own but
ranking as an allied force is a strong force just so long as it has the
hopes of obtaining some benefit without danger. But when the men reach
the vicinity of the conflict, they are frightened out of their hopes of
gain and lose their faith in promises. And the most of them have gotten
it into their heads that they are by all means going to be successful in
any case; consequently, even if they should meet with some reverse, they
esteem it lightly in comparison with the hopes which have been
offsetting it. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] 3. When the preparations failed to be
sufficient in any respect for the size of Hannibal's army, and some one
on this account suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on the flesh
of their opponents, he did not take the idea amiss, but said he feared
that some day through lack of bodies of that kind they might turn to
eating one another. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)
4. ¶Hannibal before beginning operations called together the soldiers
and brought in the captives whom he had taken by the way: he enquired of
the latter whether they wished to undergo imprisonment in fetters and to
endure a grievous slavery or to fight in single combat one with another
on condition that the victors should be released. When they chose the
second alternative, he set them to fighting. And at the end of the
conflict he said: "Now is it not shameful, fellow-soldiers, that these
men who have been captured by us are so disposed toward bravery as to be
eager to die in place of becoming slaves, whereas we shrink from
incurring a little toil and danger for the purpose of not being
subservient to others,--yes, and ruling them besides?" (Mai, p.192.
Zonaras, 8, 23.)
5. All the sufferings that we have endured when occasionally defeated by
the enemy we will inflict upon them, if we are victorious. Be well
assured that by conquering we shall obtain all the benefits that I
mention, but if conquered we shall not even have a safe means of escape.
The victor straightway finds everything friendly, even if possibly it
hates him, and to the vanquished no one even of his own household pays
any longer heed. (Mai, pp. 543 and 192.)
6. ¶To have once failed in an enterprise against some foes puts them
forever out of countenance, and is a preventative of any future courage.
(Mai, p. 192.)
7. For the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less eccentric and
cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face
of hopes, so (only more readily) when frightened do they fall into a
panic. The fact that they were no more faithful to the Carthaginians
will teach the rest of mankind a lesson never to dare to invade Italy.
(Mai, p. 192. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 24.)
8. ¶Many portents, [Footnote: Cp. Livy XXI, 62, and XXII, I, 8-20.] some
of which had actually occurred and others which were the product of idle
talk, became the subject of conversation. For when persons get seriously
frightened and those [lacuna] are in reality proven to have occurred to
them, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any of the former
phenomena is believed, heedlessly at once the rest [lacuna]
Accordingly, the sacrifices were offered and all the other ceremonies
were accomplished which men are in the habit of performing for the cure
of their temporary terror and for escape from expected ruin. Yet the
race of men is wont to trust such agencies, hoping in the line of
improvement, and so now, even if because of the greatness of the danger
awaited they thought that the harshest fate would fall upon them, still
they kept hoping that they would not be defeated. (Mai, p. 192.)
9. ¶ The Romans proclaimed Fabius dictator, satisfied if they could
themselves survive, and neither despatched any aid to the allies nor
[lacuna] but learning that Hannibal had turned aside from Campania, they
made sure of the former's safety through fear that they might change
sides either willingly or under compulsion. (Mai, p. 193. Zonaras, 8,
25.)
10. ¶ Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in
dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled
in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great
circumspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no
disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one
to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of
their enormous multitude would encounter danger again even if once
defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he
calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this
would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to
the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men
with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most
dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by
the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk
and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a
hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse assent, and he
further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the
hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
11. ¶ The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to
Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he
was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes
he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did
not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army
sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds
from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor
because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many
soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a
triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always
exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)
13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in
enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set
upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to
conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p.
543.)
14 ¶ Hannibal either as a favor to Fabius, on the ground that he was an
advantage to them or perhaps to create a prejudice against him, did not
ravage any of his possessions. Accordingly, when an exchange of captives
was made between the Romans and Carthaginians with the proviso that any
number in excess on either side should be ransomed, and as the Romans
were unwilling to ransom their men with money from the public treasury,
Fabius sold the farms and paid their ransom. Therefore they did not
depose him but they gave equal power to his master of the horse, so that
both held their commands on a like footing. Fabius harbored no wrath
against either the citizens or Rufus: he excused them for an act
prompted by human nature and was for contenting himself if in any way
they might survive. He desired the preservation and victory of the
commonwealth rather than an individual reputation, and continued to
believe that excellence depends not on decrees but on each man's spirit,
and that a man is better or worse not as a result of any ordinance but
as a result of his own wisdom or ignorance.
Rufus, however, who had not shown the right spirit in the first place
was now more than ever puffed up and could not contain himself because
he had obtained through his insubordination the further prize of equal
authority with the dictator. And so he kept asking for the right to hold
sole sway a day at a time, or for several days alternately. But Fabius,
in the fear that he might work some harm if he should get possession of
the undivided power, would not consent to either plan of his, but
divided the army in such a way that they each, like the consuls, had a
separate force. And immediately Rufus encamped apart, in order that he
might give a practical illustration of the fact that he held sway in his
own right and not subject to the dictator. (Valesius, p. 597. Zonaras,
8, 26.)
15. ¶ It is customary for men who are ruled to concur in opinion easily.
Especially often do they join forces when the object is to slander men
of good reputation, for the reason that it is their nature to help in
augmenting any power just come to light but to bring low what has
already obtained preëminence. And though one can not immediately measure
one's self with men who surpass one through ampler resources, growth in
an unexpected quarter brings hope of a like good fortune to others that
dwell in obscurity. [Footnote: This may come from a speech of M.
Terentius Varro in favor of equalizing the powers of dictator and of
master-of-horse.](Mai, p. 194.) 16. ¶ Rufus, who obtained equal
authority with the dictator, after a defeat by the Carthaginians altered
his attitude (for disasters chasten somehow those who are not completely
fools) and voluntarily gave up his leadership. And for this all praised
him loudly. He was not held worthy of censure because he had failed to
recognize at first what was fitting, but was commended for not
hesitating to change his mind. They deemed it an act of good fortune for
a man to choose right at the start a proper course of conduct, but they
thoroughly approved the course of one, who, having learned from
practical experience the better way, was not ashamed to face squarely
about. From this episode, too, it was clearly shown how much one man
differs from another and true excellence from the reputation therefor.
What had been taken from Fabius by jealousy and prejudice of the
citizens, he received back with good-will and even at the request of his
colleague. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.) 17. ¶ The same man when about
to retire from office sent for the consuls, surrendered his army to
them, and advised them in addition very fully regarding all the details
of what must be done. The safety of the city stood higher in his
estimation than a reputation for being the only successful commander,
and expecting that if they followed their own bent they would probably
meet with failure, but if they heeded his counsel they would meet with a
favorable outcome, he preferred to look to the second contingency for
praise. And the consuls were not unduly bold but acted on the suggestion
of Fabius, deeming it better not to accomplish any important result than
to be ruined; hence they remained where they were throughout the entire
period of their command. (Mai, p. 195. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
18. For the Iapygians and Apulians dwell around the Ionic Gulf. Of the
Apulians the tribes according to Dio are the Peuketii Pediculi, Daunii,
Tarentini. There is also Cannæ, the "plain of Diomed," near Daunian
Apulia. Messapia was called also Iapygia, later Salentia, and then
Calabria. Argyrippa, a Diomedian city, was renamed Arpi by the
Apulians. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603 and 852. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (_a.u._ 538)] 19. Later he was arrayed against the
Romans at Cannæ, when the Roman generals were Paulus and Terentius. Now
Cannæ is a level district of Argyrippa, where Diomed founded the city
Argyrippa, that is to say "Argos the Horse-City" in the tongue of the
Greeks. And this plain comes to belong later to the Daunii (of the
Iapygians), then to the Salantii, and now to those that all call by the
name Calauri. It is also the boundary between the Calauri and
Longibardi, where the great war burst upon them. (Tzetzes, Hist., 1,
757-767. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
20. ¶ With regard to divination and astronomy Dio says: "I, however, can
not form any opinion either about these events or about others that are
foretold by divination. For what does foreshowing avail, if a thing
shall certainly come to pass, and if there could be no averting of it
either by human devices or by divine providence? Accordingly, let each
man look at these matters in what way he pleases." (Mai, p. 195. Cp.
Zonaras, 9, 1.)
21. ¶ The commanders were Paulus and Terentius, men not of similar
temperament, but differing alike in family and in character. The former
was a patrician, possessed of the graces of education, and esteemed
safety before haste, being restrained partly, it might be said, as a
result of the censure he had received for his former conduct in office.
Hence he was not inclined to audacity, but was considering how he might
keep from getting into trouble again rather than how he might achieve
success by some desperate venture. Terentius, however, had been brought
up among the rabble, was practiced in vulgar bravado, and so displayed
lack of prudence in nearly all respects; for instance, he promised
himself general direction of the war, kept constantly annoying the
patricians, and thought that he alone should have the leadership in view
of the quiet behavior of his colleague. Now they both reached the camp
at a most opportune time: Hannibal had no longer any provender; Spain
was in turmoil; the affection of the allies was being alienated from
him: and if they had waited for even the briefest possible period, they
would have conquered without trouble. As matters went, however, the
heedlessness of Terentius and the submissiveness of Paulus, who always
desired the proper course but assented to his colleague in most
points--so sure is gentleness to be overcome by audacity,--compassed
their defeat. (Mai, p. 196. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
22. ¶ In the mêlée of the war not even the boldest possessed a hope so
buoyant as to rise above the fear that arose from its uncertainty. The
surer they felt of conquering the more did they tremble for fear they
might in some way come to grief. Those who are ignorant of a matter by
reason of their very lack of perception are not awaiting anything
terrible, but the boldness derived from calculation [lacuna] (Six pages
are lacking.) (Mai, p. 196.)
23. At the time when burst this frightful war, a terrific earthquake
occurred, so that mountains were cleft asunder and showers of great
stones poured down from heaven. But they, fighting vigorously, perceived
none of these things. At last so great a multitude of Roman warriors
fell that Hannibal, the general, in sending to Sicily the finger-rings
of the generals and the other men of repute filled many bushel and peck
measures--so great a multitude that the noble, foremost Roman women ran
lamenting to the temples in Rome and with the hairs of their heads
cleansed the statues there;--and later had intercourse with both slaves
and barbarians (because the Roman land had been utterly impoverished of
men), to the end that their race might not be every whit extirpated.
Rome at that time, after the utter loss of all her citizens, stood
inglorious through many day-coursing cycles. Her old men sitting at her
outer gates bewailed the disaster most grievous to be borne and asked
ever and anon the passers-by whether any one perchance were left alive.
(Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 767-785. (Cp. Fragm. LVI, 19, which precedes this.)
Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
24. ¶ Scipio, on learning that some of the Romans were prepared to
abandon Rome, and indeed all Italy, because they felt it was destined to
fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, yet found a way to restrain
them. Sword in hand he sprang suddenly into the room where they were
conferring, and after himself swearing to take all proper measures both
of word and act he made them also devote themselves by oath to utter
destruction, should they fail to keep their pledges to him. Later these
men reached a harmonious decision and wrote to the consul that they were
safe enough. He, however, did not at once write or despatch a messenger
to Rome; on reaching Canusium he set in order affairs at that place,
sent to the regions in proximity garrisons sufficient for immediate
needs, and repulsed a cavalry attack upon the city. Altogether, he
displayed neither dejection nor terror, but with an unbending spirit,
as if no serious evil had befallen them, he both planned and executed
all measures of immediate benefit. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
25. Hannibal took possession of the Nucerini under an agreement that
each man should leave the city carrying one change of clothing. As soon,
however, as he was master of the situation he shut the senators into
bath-houses and suffocated them, and in the case of the others, although
he had granted them permission to go away where they pleased, he cut
down many of them even on the road. Still, this course was of no profit
to him, for the rest became afraid that they might suffer a similar
fate, and so would not come to terms with him and resisted as long as
they could hold out. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
26. ¶ Marcellus showed great bravery, moderation, and justice. His
demands on his subjects were not all rigorous or harsh, nor was he
careful to see that they also should do what was needful. Those of them
who committed any errors he pardoned humanely and, furthermore, was not
angry if they failed to be like him. (Valesius, p. 601.)
27. ¶ When many citizens of Nola were dreading the men captured at Cannæ
and later released by Hannibal, because they thought that such persons
favored the invader's cause, and when they were even desirous of putting
them to death, he opposed it. Furthermore, he concealed from this time
on the suspicion that he felt toward them, and treated them in such a
way that they chose his side by preference, and became extremely useful
both to their native land and to the Romans. (Valesius, p. 601. Cp.
Zonaras, 9, 2.)
28. ¶ The same Marcellus when he perceived that one of the Lucanian
cavalrymen was in love with a woman permitted him to keep her in the
camp, because he was a most excellent fighter: this in spite of the
fact that he had forbidden any women to enter the ramparts. (Valesius,
p. 601.)
29. ¶ He pursued the same course with the people of Acerræ as he had
with those of Nucreia, except that he cast the senators into wells and
not into bath-houses. (Valesius, p. 601. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
30. ¶ Fabius got back some of the men captured in former battles by
exchanging man for man, while others he made a compact to ransom with
money. When, however, the senate failed to confirm the expenditure,
because it did not approve of their ransoming, he offered for sale, as I
have said, [Footnote: Cp. section 14 (first paragraph) of this fragment.]
his own farms and from the proceeds of them furnished the ransom for the
men. (Valesius, p. 601.)
31. Archimedes, the well-known inventor, was by birth a Syracusan. Now
this old geometrician, who had passed through seventy-five seasons, had
built many powerful engines, and by the triple pulley, with the aid of
the left hand alone, could launch a merchant ship of fifty thousand
medimni burden. And when Marcellus once, the Roman general, assaulted
Syracuse by land and sea, this man first by his engines drew up some
merchantmen, and lifting them up against the wall of Syracuse dropped
them again and sent them every one to the bottom, crews and all. Again,
as Marcellus removed his ships a little distance, the old man gave all
the Syracusans the power to lift stones of a wagon's size, and letting
them go one by one to sink the ships. When Marcellus withdrew a bow
shot thence, the old man manufactured a kind of hexagonal mirror, and at
an interval proportionate to the size of the mirror he set similar small
mirrors with four edges, moving by links and by a kind of hinge, and
made the glass the center of the rays of the sun,--its noontide ray,
whether in summer or in the dead of winter. So after that when the beams
were reflected into this, a terrible kindling of flame arose upon the
ships, and he reduced them to ashes a bowshot off. Thus by his
contrivances did the old man vanquish Marcellus.
He used to say, moreover, in Dorian, the Syracusan dialect: "Give me
where to stand, and with a lever I will move the whole earth."
This man, when (according to Diodorus) this Syracuse surrendered herself
entire to Marcellus, or (according to Dio) was pillaged by the Romans
during an all-night festival to Artemis that the citizens were
celebrating, was killed by a certain Roman in the following fashion.--He
was bent over, drawing some geometrical figure, and some Roman, coming
upon him, made him his prisoner and began to drag him away: but he, with
all his attention fixed just then upon his figure, not knowing who it
was that pulled him said to the man: "Stand aside, fellow, from my
figure." But as the other kept on dragging, he turned, and recognizing
him as a Roman cried out: "Let some one give me one of my machines." The
Roman in terror immediately killed him, an unsound weak old man, but
marvelous through his works. Marcellus straightaway mourned on learning
this, buried him brilliantly in his ancestral tomb, assisted by the
noblest citizens and all the Romans, and the man's murderer, I trow, he
slew with an axe. Dio and Diodorus have written the story. (Tzetzes,
Hist. 2, 103-149. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 4.)
32. Proculus sings of having forged fire-producing mirrors and of having
hung them from the wall opposite the enemy's ships. Then when the rays
of the sun fell upon these, fire was struck out of them that consumed
the naval force of the opponents and the ships themselves,--a device
which Dio relates Archimedes hit upon long ago, at the time when the
Romans were besieging Syracuse. (Zonaras, 14, 3.)
33. Though such a disaster at that time had overwhelmed Rome, Hannibal
neglected to reduce the town, and occupied in triumphs, drinking bouts
and luxurious living appeared sluggish in the enterprise, until at
length a Roman army was collected for the Romans.