were the oaths observed by them nor gratitude for favors manifested in
any other way, and that few instead of many were surrendered, thus
making void the oaths, became terribly angry and loudly called upon the
gods in respect to some of these matters: moreover, they brought the
pledges to their attention, demanded the captives, and ordered them to
pass naked under the same yoke where through pity they had been
released, in order that by experience they might learn to abide by terms
which had been once agreed upon. The men that had been surrendered they
dismissed, either because they did not think it right to destroy
guiltless persons or because they wished to fasten the perjury upon the
populace and not through the punishment of a few men to absolve the
rest. This they did, hoping as a result to secure decent treatment.
(Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 15. ¶The Romans so far from being grateful
to the Samnites for the preservation of the surrendered soldiers,
actually behaved as if they had in this suffered some outrage. They
showed anger in their conduct of the war, and, being victorious, treated
the Samnites in the same way. For the justice of the battle-field does
not fit the ordinary definition of the word, and it is not inevitable
that the party which has been wronged should conquer: instead, war, in
its absolute sway, adjusts everything to the advantage of the victor,
often causing something that is the reverse of justice to go under that
name. (Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.)
16.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Romans after vanquishing the
Samnites sent the captives in their turn under the yoke, regarding as
satisfactory to their honor a repayment of similar disgrace. So did
Fortune for both parties in the briefest time reverse her position and
by treating the Samnites to the same humiliation at the hands of their
outraged foes show clearly that here, too, she was all-supreme. (Mai, p.
164. Zonaras, 7, 26.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 319 (_a.u._ 435)] 17. ¶ Papirius made a campaign against
the Samnites and having reduced them to a state of siege entrenched
himself before them. At this time some one reproached him with excessive
use of wine, whereupon he replied: "That I am not intoxicated is clear
to every one from the fact that I am up at the peep of dawn and lie down
to rest latest of all. But on account of having public affairs on my
mind day and night alike, and not being able to obtain sleep easily, I
take a little wine to lull me to rest." (Mai, ib.)
18. ¶ The same man one day while making the rounds of the garrison
became angry on not finding the general from Præneste at his post. He
summoned him and bade him hand the axe to the lictor. Alarm and
consternation at this was evident on the part of the general, and his
fear sufficed. Papirius harmed him no further but merely gave orders to
the lictor to cut off some roots growing beside the tents, so that they
should not injure passers-by. (Mai, ib.)
19. ¶ In numerous cases instances of good fortune are not at all
constant, but lead many aside into paths of carelessness and ruin
them.[Footnote: Cp. Livy, IX, 18, 8.] (Mai, p. 165.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 310 (_a.u._ 444)] 20. ¶ The men of the city put forward
Papirius as dictator, and fearing that Rullus might be unwilling to name
him on account of his own experiences while master of the horse, they
sent for him and begged him to put the common weal before a private
grudge. And he gave the envoys, indeed, no response, but when night had
come (according to ancient custom it was quite necessary that the
dictator be appointed at night), he named Papirius and secured by this
act the greatest renown.(Valesius, p. 585.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._)] 21. ¶ Appius the Blind and Volumnius
became at variance each with the other: and it was owing to this that
Volumnius once, when Appius charged him in the assembly with showing no
gratitude for the progress he had made in wisdom through Appius's
instruction, answered that he had indeed grown wiser and was likewise
ready to admit it, but that Appius had not advanced at all in matters
pertaining to war. (Mai, p. 165.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._ 458)] 22. ¶ As regards the prophecy the
multitude was not capable for the time being of either believing or
disbelieving him.[Footnote: I.e., Manius, an Etruscan.] It neither
wished to hope for everything, inasmuch as it did not desire to see
everything fulfilled, nor did it dare to refuse belief in all points
inasmuch as it wished to be victorious, but was placed in an extremely
painful position, as it were between confusion and fear. As each single
event occurred they applied the interpretation to it according to the
actual result, and the man himself undertook to assume some reputation
for skill with regard to the foreknowledge of the unseen. (Mai, p. 165.
Cp. Zonaras, 8, 1.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 293 (_a.u._ 461)] 23. ¶ The Samnites, enraged at what
occurred and deeming it highly disgraceful to be defeated, resorted to
extreme daring and folly with the intention of either conquering or
being utterly destroyed. They assembled all their men that were of
military age, threatening with death all that should remain at home, and
they bound themselves with frightful oaths to the effect that no man
should flee from the contest but should slaughter any person that might
undertake to do so. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 1.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 292 (_a.u._ 462)] 24. ¶ The Romans on hearing that their
consul Fabius had been worsted in the war became terribly angry and
summoned him to stand trial. A vehement denunciation of the man was
made before the people,--and, indeed, he was depressed by the injury to
his father's reputation even more than by the complaints,--and no
opportunity was afforded the object of the attack for reply. Nor did the
elder man make a set defence of his son, but by enumerating his own
services and those of his ancestors, and by promising furthermore that
his son would do nothing unworthy of them, he abated the people's wrath,
especially since he urged his son's youth. Moreover, he joined him at
once in the campaign, overthrew the Samnites in battle, though they were
elated by their victory, and captured their camp and great booty. The
Romans therefore extolled him and ordered that his son also should
command for the future with consular powers, and still employ his father
as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything for him,
sparing his old age not a whit, and the allied forces readily assisted
the father in remembrance of his old-time deeds. He made it clear,
however, that he was not executing the business on his own
responsibility, but he associated with his son as if actually in the
capacity of counselor and under-officer, while he moderated his
temperament and assigned to him the glory of the exploits. (Valesius, p.
585. Zonaras, 8, 1.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 291 (_a.u._ 463)] 25. ¶ The soldiers with Junius who took
the field along with Postumius fell sick on the way, and thought that
their trouble was due to the felling of the grove. He was recalled for
these reasons, but showed contempt for them even at this juncture,
declaring that the senate was not his master but that he was master of
the senate [lacuna] Envio [lacuna] and the [lacuna] men much [lacuna]
ambition [lacuna] [Words of Postumius Megillus: Cp. Dionys. Hal. Ant.
Rom. 16, [Footnote: The famous Apollonius of Tyana.]. (Mai, p. 167.)
[Frag. XXXIV]
¶ Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in
incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on
that account did not please Rufinus, but was always at variance with
him. Yet the latter chose Fabricius, thinking that he was a most proper
person to meet the requirements of the war, and making his personal
enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the
commonwealth.
[Frag. XXXIV]
As a result he gained some reputation for having shown himself above
jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by
reason of emulation. Since he was a thorough patriot and did not
practice virtue for a show he thought it a matter of indifference
whether the State were benefited by him or through some other man, even
if that man should be an opponent. (Valesius, p.586.)
[Frag. XXXV]
¶Cornelius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to
his foe, [lacuna][Footnote: See Niebuhr, Rh. Mus., 1828, p.600, or
_Kleine Schriften_, 2, p.241.] the general excellence of Rufius and
added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being bought
and sold by the enemy. [This anecdote concerns Fabricius Luscinus,
mentioned by Cicero, de orat. 2, 66, 268; Quintilian 12, 1, 43; Gellius
4, 48.]
[Frag. XXXVI]
[Sidenote: B.C. 290 (_a.u._ 464)] ¶Curius, in defence of his conduct in
the popular assembly, said that he had acquired so much land [lacuna]
and had hunted for so many men [lacuna] country [lacuna] [The person
referred to is Manius Curius Dentatus. Cp. Auct. de Viris. Illustr., c.
33.
¶After Niebuhr, Rh. Mus. 1828, p.579.]
[Frag. XXXVII]
¶When the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the law was often
proposed without avail, since the lenders were by no means willing to
accept it and the tribunes granted the nobles the choice of either
putting this law to the vote or following that of Stolo, by which they
were to reckon the previous interest toward the principal and receive
the remainder in triennial payments. [Footnote: The opening portion of
this fragment is based largely on conjectures of Niebuhr (Rhein. Mus.,
1828, p.579ff.)] And for the time being the weaker party, dreading lest
it might lose all, paid court to them, and the wealthier class,
encouraged to think it would not be compelled to adopt either course,
maintained a hostile attitude. But when the revolted [Footnote: A
doubtful reading.] party proceeded to press matters somewhat, both sides
changed their positions. The debtors were no longer satisfied with
either plan, and the nobles thought themselves lucky if they should not
be deprived of their principal. Hence the dispute was not decided
immediately, but subsequently they prolonged their rivalry in a spirit
of contentiousness, and did not act at all in their usual character.
Finally the people made peace in spite of the fact that the nobles were
unwilling to remit much more than they had originally expected; however,
the more they beheld their creditors yielding, the more were they
emboldened, as if they were successful by a kind of right; and
consequently they regarded the various concessions almost as matters of
course and strove for yet more, using as a stepping-stone to that end
the fact that they had already obtained something. (Mai, p.167. Zonaras,
8,2.)
[Frag. XXXVIII]
¶When the opposite side [Footnote: The Tuscans, Senones, and Gauls
appear to be meant.] saw also another general approaching, they ceased
to heed the common interests of their force but each cast about to
secure his individual safety, as a common practice of those who form a
union uncemented by kindred blood, or who make a campaign without common
grievances, or who have not one commander. While good fortune attends
them their views are harmonious, but in disaster each one sees before
him only matters of individual concern. They betook themselves to flight
as soon as it had grown dark, without having communicated to one another
their intention. In a body they thought it would be impossible for them
to force their way out or for their defection to pass unnoticed, but if
they should leave each on his own account and, as they believed, alone,
they would more easily escape. And so, to his own party,--each one of
them [lacuna] they will think that accomplishing their flight with the
greatest security [lacuna] (Mai, p.167.)
[Frag. XXXIX]
[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 1. The Romans had learned that the
Tarentini and some others were making ready to war against them, and had
despatched Fabricius as an envoy to the allied cities to prevent them
from committing any revolutionary act: but they had him arrested, and by
sending men to the Etruscans and Umbrians and Gauls they caused a number
of them also to secede, some immediately and some a little later.
(Ursinus, p.375. Zonaras, 8, 2-Vol. II, p.174, 4 sq.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 2. ¶The Tarentini, although they had
themselves initiated the war, nevertheless were sheltered from fear. For
the Romans, who understood what they were doing, pretended not to know
it on account of temporary embarrassments. Hereupon the Tarentini,
thinking that they either could mock [Footnote: Verb adopted from
Boissevain's conjecture [Greek: _diasilloun_] (cp. the same word in Book
Fifty-nine, chapter 25). at Rome or were entirely unobserved because
they were receiving no complaints behaved still more insolently and
involved the Romans even contrary to their own wishes in a war. This
proved the saying that even good fortune, when a disproportionately
large portion of it falls to the lot of any individuals, becomes the
cause of disaster to them; it entices them on to a state of frenzy
(since moderation refuses to cohabit with vanity) and ruins their
greatest interests. So these Tarentini, too, after rising to an
unexampled height of prosperity in turn met with a misfortune that was
an equivalent return for their wantonness. (Mai, p.168 and 536.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 282 (_a.u._ 472)] 3. Dio in Book 9: "Lucius Valerius,
[Footnote: Appian (Samnite Wars, VII, 1) gives the second name as
Cornelius.] who was admiral of the Romans and had been despatched on
some errand by them." (Bekker, Anecd. p.158, 25. Zonaras, 8, 2.)
4. ¶Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini
were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the
theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an
enemy. Immediately in a passion and partly under the influence of their
intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his
part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and
sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of
this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field
against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not
to seem to have passed over the affair in silence and by that means
render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them
decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable,
at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of
their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use
in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of
stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would
cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers
accordingly jeered at them,--they were still celebrating the festival,
which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior,
rendered them still more wanton,--and finally a man planted himself in
the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down
and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who
praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they
sang many scurrilous anapæsts upon the Romans, accompanied by applause
and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may!
For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this
garment clean with your blood." (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8,
2.)
5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing
towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to
themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the
ambassadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)
6. ¶Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in
hostilities with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put
garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a
flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they
gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and
hand-clapping, as is often done under such circumstances. But he, after
reducing them to silence, spoke: "Now it is yours both to be drunken and
to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be
slaves." (Mai, p.169.)
[Frag. XL]
[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (_a.u._ 473)] ¶King Pyrrhus was not only king of the
district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world
his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The Ætolians, who at
that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of
Cassander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and
the chief men in Illyricum did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and
force of education and experience in affairs he far surpassed all, so as
to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those
of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589.
Zonaras, 8, 2.)
2. ¶Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his
powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans:
and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who
had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the
same time to anticipate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he
received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair
pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been
considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from
taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him.
(Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)
3. ¶King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by
his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch,
Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,--the only one in
fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a
sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the
folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule
the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own
possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man's fondness
for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of
Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy,
after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces.
(Valesius, p.586.)
4. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the
expedition. And a response having come to him: "You, if you cross into
Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish (for
desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the
coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (_a.u._ 474)] 5. ¶The Rhegians had asked of the
Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: _Decius Vibellius_.] was the
leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of
the excess of supplies and general easy habits,--for they enjoyed a far
less strenuous existence than they had known at home,--through the
persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and
occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform
whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied
with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to
persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the
Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to
garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the
natives and occupied the town.
The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they
were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius,
purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view
to the betrayal of the city. He next assembled the soldiers and read
these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk
(the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly.
The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had
been assigned to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus's fleet had
anchored somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the
traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and
shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before some harm
happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would
find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing
places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great
numbers,--save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were
slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)
6. ¶Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians,
ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar
nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He
was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some
common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of
lawful association or the bonds of kinship. (Mai, p.170.)
7. ¶The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such
time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied
with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did
seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)
8. ¶The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of
him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large
force by no means despicable as an adversary,--the sort of information,
of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons
unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras,
8,3.)
9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same
institutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same
things as base or noble, should ever become friends with one
another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from
the speech made by Lævinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).]
(Mai, p. 537.)
10. ¶Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is
inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is
distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a
similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the
same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only
forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these
conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comradeship, but
find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)
11. ¶Generalship, if it is assisted by respectable forces of men,
contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of
victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other
profession that is of weight without persons to coöperate and to aid in
its administration. (Mai, p.171.)
12. ¶When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle
took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by
his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their
fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the
other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since
they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of
the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable
results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai,
p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)
13. ¶When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted
the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again
in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of
him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them
superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered
the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." (Mai, p.171.
Zonaras, 8, 3.)