^^^^^Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have
shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it
happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived
by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the
emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.
XI. "Derision" is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which
we hate.
^^^^^Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we
hate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that
extent rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates
that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question
is not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
XII. "Hope" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea
of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent
doubt the issue.
XIII. "Fear" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent
doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
^^^^^Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that
there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled
with hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts
concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive
something, which excludes the existence of the said thing
in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III.
xix.); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears
for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words
doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates,
also conceives something which excludes the existence of
the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and
consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as
he desires (III. xx.).
XIV. "Confidence" is pleasure arising from the idea of
something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has
been removed.
XV. "Despair" is pain arising from the idea of something past
or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
^^^^^Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and
despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue
of an event has been removed: this comes to pass, because
man conceives something past or future as present and
regards it as such, or else because he conceives other things,
which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt. For,
although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue
of any particular event (II. xxxi. Cor.), it may nevertheless
happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have
shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the
same as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note). Thus it
may happen that we are affected by the same emotion
of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as
concerning the conception of a thing present; this I have
already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I refer
the reader.
XVI. "Joy" is pleasure accompanied by the idea of
something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.
XVII. "Disappointment" is pain accompanied by the idea
of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our
hope.
XVIII. "Pity" is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which
has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like
ourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
^^^^^Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia)
there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former
term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter
in reference to a disposition.
XIX. "Approval" is love towards one who has done good to
another.
XX. "Indignation" is hatred towards one who has done evil to
another.
^^^^^Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed
in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But
my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the
nature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may
convey my meaning without any violent departure from their
ordinary signification. One statement of my method will suffice.
As for the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii.
Cor. i., and III. xxii. note.
XXI. "Partiality" is thinking too highly of anyone because of
the love we bear him.
^^^^^Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
disparagement an effect of hatred: so that "partiality" may
also be defined as "love, in so far as it induces a man to
think too highly of a beloved object." Contrariwise,
"disparagement" may be defined as "hatred, in so far as
it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object."
Cf. III. xxvi. note.
XXIII. "Envy" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
evil fortune.
^^^^^Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy,
which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word,
may therefore be thus defined:
XXIV. "Sympathy" (misericordia) is love, in so far as it
induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune,
and pain at another's evil fortune.
^^^^^Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to II.
xxiv. and xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure
or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as
cause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other
emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something
within as a cause.
XXV. "Self-approval" is pleasure arising from a man's
contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
XXVI. "Humility" is pain arising from a man's contemplation
of his own weakness of body or mind.
^^^^^Explanation--Self-complacency is opposed to
humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from
a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far
as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of
any action which we believe we have performed by the free
decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we
may thus define:
XXVII. "Repentance" is pain accompanied by the idea of
some action, which we believe we have performed by the
free decision of our mind.
^^^^^Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have
set forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.
Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.
This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
called "wrong," are followed by pain, and all those, which are
called "right," are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather
from what has been said, that this depends in great measure
on education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of
actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of
them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class,
have brought it about, that the former should be associated
with pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by
experience. For custom and religion are not the same
among all men, but that which some consider sacred others
consider profane, and what some consider honourable others
consider disgraceful. According as each man has been
educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories
therein.
XXVIII. "Pride" is thinking too highly of one's self from
self-love.
^^^^^Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality,
for the latter term is used in reference to an external object,
but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.
However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the
effect or property of "self-love," which may therefore be
thus defined, "love of self or self-approval, in so far as it
leads a man to think too highly of himself." To this emotion
there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of
himself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too
meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is
incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man
imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of
necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he
really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do.
For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is
it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider
such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it
conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself;
for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his
own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all
men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less
than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly
of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something
in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As,
for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any
clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but
what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man
thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride
an emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from
self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
XXIX. "Self-abasement" is thinking too meanly of one's
self by reason of pain.
^^^^^Explanation--We are nevertheless generally
accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case
we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than
to its nature. We are wont to call "proud" the man who
boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of nothing but
his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to
be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and
pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the
other hand, we call "humble" the man who too often blushes,
who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues,
and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of
his attire. However, these emotions, humility and
self-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature,
considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can
(see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to be
most self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the
most ambitious and envious.
XXX. "Honour" (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the
idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be
praised by others.
XXXI. "Shame" is pain accompanied by the idea of
some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed
by others.
^^^^^Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx.
But we should here remark the difference which exists
between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following
the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or
dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a
base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness,
but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however,
the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already)
have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.
I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to
treat of those which I refer to desire.
XXXII. "Regret" is the desire or appetite to possess
something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing,
and at the same time constrained by the remembrance
of other things which exclude the existence of it.
^^^^^Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are
by that very fact, as I have already said more than once,
disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it
were something present; but this disposition or endeavour,
while we are awake, is generally checked by the images
of things which exclude the existence of that which we
remember. Thus when we remember something which
affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact
endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure
as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the
existence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is,
strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure,
which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf.
III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer
to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions
springing from desire.
XXXIII. "Emulation" is the desire of something, engendered
in us by our conception that others have the same desire.
^^^^^Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees
others running away, or he who fears, because he sees
others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man
has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and
moves his body as though his own were burnt; such an one
can be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulate
him; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are
different, but because it has become customary to speak
of emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem
to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause of
emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why this
emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from
III. xxxii. and note.
XXXIV. "Thankfulness" or "Gratitude" is the desire or
zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit
him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit
on us. Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl.
XXXV. "Benevolence" is the desire of benefiting one whom
we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.
XXXVI. "Anger" is the desire, whereby through hatred we
are induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
XXXVII. "Revenge" is the desire whereby we are induced,
through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar
feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Cor. ii. and note.)
XXXVIII. "Cruelty" or "savageness" is the desire, whereby
a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
^^^^^Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which
is not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man
restrains his anger and revenge.
XXXIX. "Timidity" is the desire to avoid a greater evil,
which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix.
note.
XL. "Daring" is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
XLI. "Cowardice" is attributed to one, whose desire is
checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare
to encounter.
^^^^^Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else
but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to
fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing
from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it
here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly
opposed to the emotion of daring.
XLII. "Consternation" is attributed to one, whose desire of
avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he
fears.
^^^^^Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species
of cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from
a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a
fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that
he is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in so
far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be
constrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so far
as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the
fear of another evil, which equally torments him: whence
it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avert
of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III.
lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
note.
XLIII. "Courtesy," or "deference" (Humanitas seu
modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should
please men, and refraining from that which should
displease them.