I. "Desire" is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived,
as determined to a particular activity by some given modification
of itself.
^^^^^Explanation--We have said above, in the note to
Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness
thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far
as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite
or not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order
to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
explaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care to define
it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all
those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by
the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed,
have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is
conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from
such a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the
mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore,
in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was
necessary to add, "in so far as it is determined by some given
modification," &c. For, by a modification of man's essence,
we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether
such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely
under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute
of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously
to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here
mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions,
which vary according to each man's disposition, and are,
therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according
as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not
where to turn.
II. "Pleasure" is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection.
III. "Pain" is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
perfection.
^^^^^Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not
perfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection
to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the
emotion of pleasure. This appears more clearly from the
consideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No one can
deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection,
and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be
pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree.
Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a
greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the
emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can
only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less
perfection--in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's
power of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III. xi. note).
I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy,
and grief, because these terms are generally used in reference
to the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.
IV. "Wonder" is the conception (imaginatio) of anything,
wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular
concept in question has no connection with other concepts
(cf. III. lii. and note).
^^^^^Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the
reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing,
straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely,
because the images of the two things are so associated and
arranged, that one follows the other. This state of association
is impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will
then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is
determined by other causes to think of something else.
Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself,
is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not
include wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I
should so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind
arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from
other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause,
which should determine the mind to pass from the
contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another.
I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions
(as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and
desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary
to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive
ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects
of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition
of contempt.
V. "Contempt" is the conception of anything which touches
the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine
those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it
(cf. III. lii. note).
The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
VI. "Love" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.
^^^^^Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly
the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who
say that love is "the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
object" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I
say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by
"wish" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind
(for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither
do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when
it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand;
for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but
by "wish" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on
account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the
pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
VII. "Hatred" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.
^^^^^Explanation--These observations are easily grasped
after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding
definition (cf. also III. xiii. note).
VIII. "Inclination" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
IX. "Aversion" is pain, accompanied by the idea of something
which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).