PROPOSITIONS

I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases

passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily

active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is

necessarily passive.

>>>>>Proof--In every human mind there are some

adequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary

and confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which are

adequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch

as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Cor.),

and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise

(by the same Cor.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he

contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone,

but as he, at the same time, contains the minds of other

things. Again, from any given idea some effect must

necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.); of this effect God is the

adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is

infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by

the given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof God

is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which

is adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the

mind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Cor.).

Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas

(III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active;

this was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarily

follows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by

virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man

only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the

mind of that one man, the minds of other things also,

of such an effect (II. xi. Cor.) the mind of the given man

is not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus

(III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate

ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this was

our second point. Therefore our mind, &c. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the mind is more

or less liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses

inadequate ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active

in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas.

II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind

determine body to motion or rest or any state different

from these, if such there be.

>>>>>Proof--All modes of thinking have for their cause

God, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by

virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II.

vi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought

is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that

is (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our first point.

Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from

another body, which has also been determined to a state

of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely

everything which takes place in a body must spring from

God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some

mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought

(II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which

is a mode of thought. This was our second point.

Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note--This is made more clear by what was said

in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one

and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of

thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus

it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical,

whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the

other; consequently the order of states of activity and

passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the

order of states of activity and passivity in the mind.

The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which

we proved II. xii.

Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there

be no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe,

until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be

induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly

are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the

mind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs

a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will

or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto

laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no

one has as yet been taught by experience what the body

can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as

she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained

such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that

he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention

to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower

animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and

that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which

they would not venture to do when awake: these instances

are enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws

of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind

moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion

it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it.

Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has

its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the

body, they are using words without meaning, or are

confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant

of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.

But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the

means whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at

any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind

is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover,

we have experience, that the mind alone can determine

whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar

states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's

decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors,

whether experience does not also teach, that if the body

be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for

thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind

simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no

power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body

is awake. Again, I think everyone's experience will

confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times

equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according

as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by

the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more

or less fitted for contemplating the said object.

But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from

the laws of nature considered as extended substance,

we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings,

pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced

only by human art; nor would the human body, unless

it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of

building a single temple. However, I have just pointed

out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's

power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration

of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many

things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature,

which they would never have believed possible except

under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed

by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their

performers when awake. I would further call attention

to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses

in complexity all that has been put together by human art,

not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that

from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered,

infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I

submit that the world would be much happier, if men were

as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.

Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything

more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more

easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many

believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which

we moderately desire, because our desire for such can

easily be controlled by the thought of something else

frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free

in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our

desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of

anything else. However, unless such persons had proved

by experience that we do many things which we afterwards

repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary

emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would

be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all

things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it

desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires

to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters

from the free decision of his mind words which, when he

is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a

delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others

of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free

decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to

restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no

less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be

free, simply because they are conscious of their actions,

and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are

determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the

mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore

vary according to the varying state of the body. Everyone

shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are

assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;

those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed

this way or that. All these considerations clearly show that

a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state,

are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which

we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained

through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when

it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced

from the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more

plainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention

to another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision

of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done

so. For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering

that we have done so. Again, it is not within the free power

of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Therefore

the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the

power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers.

But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak

from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we

do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we

dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act

from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep

silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly,

we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do

something, which we should not dare to do when awake.

Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two

sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?

If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily

admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be

free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory,

and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by

virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.).

Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by

the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.

Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence

or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do

but dream with their eyes open.

III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate

ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely

on inadequate ideas.

>>>>>Proof--The first element, which constitutes the essence

of the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent

body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many

other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate

(II. xxix. Cor., II. xxxviii. Cor.). Whatsoever therefore follows

from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause,

through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow

either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But in

so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily

passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from

adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so

far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

*****Note--Thus we see, that passive states are not

attributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something

involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of

nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived

through itself without other parts: I could thus show, that

passive states are attributed to individual things in the same

way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot

otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat

of the human mind.

IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to

itself.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the

definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but

does not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence

of the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as

we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account

external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything

which could destroy it. Q.E.D.

V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same

object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.

>>>>>Proof--If they could agree together or co-exist in the same

object, there would then be in the said object something which

could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd,

therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.

VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in

its own being.

>>>>>Proof--Individual things are modes whereby the

attributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner

(I. xxv.Cor.); that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express

in a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby

God is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anything

whereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its

existence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all that

could take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as

it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist

in its own being. Q.E.D.

VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to

persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence

of the thing in question.

>>>>>Proof--From the given essence of any thing certain

consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any

power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as

determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,

or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things,

it acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or

endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,

is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in

question. Q.E.D.

VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist

in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

>>>>>Proof--If it involved a limited time, which should determine

the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that

power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist

beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but

this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a

thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since

(III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already exists

always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external

cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and

also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its

being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.

>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate

and inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far

as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter,

it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite

time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious

of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind

is therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.

*****Note--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is

called "will," when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it

is called "appetite"; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence,

from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which

tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined

to perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except

that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they

are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined:

"Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof." It is thus plain from

what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long

for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the

other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it,

wish for it, long for it, or desire it.

X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be

postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be

postulated therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such

a thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix.

Cor.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated

as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element,

that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human

body as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour

of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body:

thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary

to our mind, &c. Q.E.D.

XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power

of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps

or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.

*****Note--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,

and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes

to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition

explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By "pleasure"

therefore in the following propositions I shall signify "a passive state

wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection." By "pain" I shall

signify "a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection."

Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind

together I shall call "stimulation" (titillatio) or "merriment" (hilaritas),

the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call "suffering" or

"melancholy." But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and

suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more

affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts

are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the

note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no

other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other

emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should

like here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order

that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another.

In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes

the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as

the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out

in the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind

depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual

existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and

Note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and

remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the

actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present

existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed,

as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the

body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this

existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor

again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.)

the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body,

is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same

reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body,

because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result

follows from another idea, which excludes the present

existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and

which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence

of our mind.

XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those

things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.

>>>>>Proof--So long as the human body is affected in a mode,

which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind

will regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently

(II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as

present, that is (II. xvii. Note), conceives it, the human body is

affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external

body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase

or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in

modes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post. i.);

consequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for that

period increased or helped. Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far

as it can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D.

XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the

body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to

remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named

things.

>>>>>Proof--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind

alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or

constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue to

conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes

the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown),

the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained,

until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the

existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.),

as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter.

Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from

conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of

itself and of the body.

*****Note--From what has been said we may clearly understand

the nature of Love and Hate. "Love" is nothing else but "pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause." We further see,

that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep

present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours

to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of

these matters at more length hereafter.

XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the

same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these

two, be also affected by the other.

>>>>>Proof--If the human body has once been affected by two

bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of

them, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But

the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body

than the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. ii.); therefore, if

the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once

affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is

afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the

other.

XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain,

or desire.

>>>>>Proof--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously

affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor

diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase

or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoing

proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards

affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis)

neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at

the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or

diminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affected

with pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will,

not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or

pain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing

may be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--Simply from the fact that we have regarded

a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be

not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.

>>>>>Proof--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that

the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the

emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as

the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished,

&c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind may

desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Cor.), in other

words (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same.

Q.E.D.

*****Note--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we

love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known

to us; merely, as a phrase is, from "sympathy" or "antipathy." We

should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us

pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other

objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the

next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to

introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify

thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may

be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest

qualities.

XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object

has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont

to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of

resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we

shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.

>>>>>Proof--The point of resemblance was in the object (by

hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus

(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will

straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and

consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point

of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure

or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point

in which the two objects resemble one another be not the

efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named

object with love or hate. Q.E.D.

XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us

painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which

is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure,

we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall

love it.

>>>>>Proof--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause

of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with this

emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that

it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont

to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall

with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus

we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.

*****Note--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two

contrary emotions, is called "vacillation"; it stands to the emotions

in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note);

vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as

greater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I have

deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through

themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally.

I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced

from what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the

disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient

cause of both emotions. The human body is composed

(II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature,

and may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be

affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body;

and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in

many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and

the same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, that

one and the same object may be the cause of many and

conflicting emotions.

XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully

by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing

present.

>>>>>Proof--So long as a man is affected by the image of

anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be

non-existent (II. xvii. and Cor.), he will not conceive it as past

or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image

of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the image of

a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred

to time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Cor.), the

disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image

be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.

*****Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either

have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according

as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has

recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,

or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its

existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which

excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the

body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if

the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens

that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as

they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about

its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise from

similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally

disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured

of the issue.

*****Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what

is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and

Disappointment. "Hope" is nothing else but "an inconstant pleasure,

arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do

not yet know the issue." "Fear," on the other hand, is "an inconstant

pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we

are in doubt." If the element of doubt be removed from these

emotions, hope becomes "Confidence" and fear becomes "Despair."

In other words, "Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of

something concerning which we have hoped or feared." Again,

"Joy" is "Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof

we have doubted the issue." "Disappointment" is "the Pain opposed

to Joy."

XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed

will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.

>>>>>Proof--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to

conceive those things which increase or help the body's power

of activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things

which it loves. But conception is helped by those things which

postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered

by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);

therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence

of an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive

the object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind

pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existence

of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour; in

other words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, who

conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain,

&c. Q.E.D.

XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will

also feel pleasure.

>>>>>Proof--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those

things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's

power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii.

note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the

existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which

excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid

mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mind

pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of his hate

is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.

XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected

pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or

painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less

in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.

>>>>>Proof--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.)

which postulate the existence of the object of love, help the

mind's endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure

postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much

the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater;

for it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore

the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental

endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably,

and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have

been greater in the object of love. This was our first point.

Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that

extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount

of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives,

that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be

affected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater

or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.

XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some

object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that

thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of

our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.

>>>>>Proof--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object

of our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we

conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure

or pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come

to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore

(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object of

our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love

or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.

*****Note--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of 'Pity,' which

we may define as 'pain arising from another's hurt.' What term

we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.

We will call the 'love towards him who confers a benefit on

another,' 'Approval;' and the 'hatred towards him who injures

another,' we will call 'Indignation.' We must further remark,

that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as

shown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto

regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles

ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval

on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,

contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully

affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said

object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these

emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater

or less in the object of hatred.

>>>>>Proof--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,

it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the

pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that

some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure,

to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives

in the object of his hatred. This was our first point. Again,

pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected

thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or

less. If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably

affected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour

to persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be

painfully affected. Q.E.D.

*****Note--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and

without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.

xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to

himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like

manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary

circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.

XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object

of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we

conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel

love towards him.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.

xxii., which see.

*****Note--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable

to 'envy,' which, accordingly, is nothing else but 'hatred, in so far

as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt,

and to grieve at another's advantage.'

XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and

concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive

to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.

Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which

we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.

>>>>>Proof--That, which we conceive to affect an object

of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably

or painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as

far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us

pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Cor.), it endeavours

to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it

endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect

us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning

ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we

conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.

Q.E.D.

XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate,

everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,

contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything

which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the

foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

*****Note--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a

man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object,

and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling

is called 'pride,' in reference to the man who thinks too highly

of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams

with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things

that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon

accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is

unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence,

and determines his own power of action. 'Pride,' therefore,

is 'pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.'

Again, the 'pleasure which arises from a man thinking too

highly of another' is called 'over-esteem.' Whereas the

'pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man' is

called 'disdain.'

XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like

ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,

to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with

a like emotion (affectus).

>>>>>Proof--The images of things are modifications of the

human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as

present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the

ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time,

the nature of the external bodies as present. If, therefore,

the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our

body, then the idea which we form of the external body will

involve a modification of our own body similar to the

modification of the external body. Consequently, if we

conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any

emotion, this conception will express a modification of our

body similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of

conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any

emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.

If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall,

to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar,

emotion. Q.E.D.

*****Note I--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred

to pain, is called "compassion" (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is

referred to desire, it is called "emulation," which is nothing

else but "the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact

that we conceive that others have the like desire."

<<<<<Corollary I--If we conceive that anyone, whom we

have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects

something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love

towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he

painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred

towards him.

>>>>>Proof--This is proved from the last proposition in the

same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

<<<<<Corollary II--We cannot hate a thing which we pity,

because its misery affects us painfully.

>>>>>Proof--If we could hate it for this reason, we should

rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

<<<<<Corollary III--We seek to free from misery, as far as

we can, a thing which we pity.

>>>>>Proof--That, which painfully affects the object of

our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing

proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall

everything which removes its existence, or which destroys

it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire

to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction;

thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which

we pity. Q.E.D.

*****Note II--This will or appetite for doing good, which

arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a

benefit, is called "benevolence," and is nothing else but "desire

arising from compassion." Concerning love or hate towards

him who has done good or harm to something, which we

conceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we

conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to

remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly

repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.

>>>>>Proof--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive

that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in

other words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far

as possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour

of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and

simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's

power of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Cor. and II. xi.

Cor.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its

existence, in other words (which by III. ix., note, come to the

same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.

Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to

be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate,

is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, therefore

(by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the

same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not

regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore

whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.

XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we

conceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we

shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink

from.

[*N.B. By "men" in this and the following propositions, I

mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.]

>>>>>Proof--From the fact of imagining, that men love or

hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).

That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure

or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall endeavour to

do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure,

etc. Q.E.D.

*****Note--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone,

solely in order to please men, we call "ambition," especially

when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we

do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other

cases it is generally called "kindliness." Furthermore I give the

name of "praise" to the "pleasure, with which we conceive the

action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us";

but of "blame" to the "pain wherewith we feel aversion to his

action."

XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives

as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by

pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in

other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the

other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as

affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that he affects others

with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be

affected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II.

xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications

whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who

conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected

with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in

other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so

"mutatis mutandis" in the case of pain. Q.E.D.

*****Note--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by

the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied

by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in

question will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms

love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we

will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion:

pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will

style "Honour," and the emotion contrary thereto we will style

"Shame": I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain

arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed:

otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external

cause is called "self-complacency," and its contrary pain is

called "repentance." Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Cor.)

that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects

others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III.

xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself

that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may

easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may

imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be

an annoyance to all.

XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates

anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall

thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast

love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks

from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations

of soul.

>>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone

loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.):

but we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a

new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered;

hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again,

from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from

anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).

If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then

simultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, we

shall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--From the foregoing, and also from III.

xxviii. it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible,

to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what

he himself hates: as the poet* says: "As lover let us share every

hope and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love

what the other leaves."**

[* Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5]

[** Spinoza transposes the verses: "Speremus pariter, pariter

metuamus amantes; Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."]

*****Note--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes

and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition

(see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by nature

desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according

to his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally

present in all, everyone stands in everyone else's way, and in

wishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.

XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something,

which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring

it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.

>>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another

person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Cor.) we shall

ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein. But

we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by

another's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to

prevent his possession thereof (III. xxviii.). Q.E.D.

*****Note--We thus see that man's nature is generally so

constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies

those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to

his own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see

that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows

that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and

ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall

find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially

if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that

children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium,

laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying;

moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see

others doing, and to possess themselves of whatever they

conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of things

are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or

modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by

external causes to act in this or that manner.

XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour,

as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.

>>>>>Proof--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we

can, to conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the

thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it

pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In other

words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about,

that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by

the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note), that it should love

us in return. Q.E.D.

XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a

loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our

complacency.

>>>>>Proof--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to

bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in other

words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure

accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in

proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected

because of us, our endeavour will be assisted. --that is (III. xi.

and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take

pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similar

to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. xxx);

therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a

loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.

XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins

itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself

has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the

loved object and with envy towards his rival.

>>>>>Proof--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved

object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of

his self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note),

of his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour,

as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely

bound to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if

he thinks that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).

But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by

the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image

of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore

(III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain,

accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in

conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be

(III. xiii.) affected with hatred towards the loved object

and also towards his rival (III. xv. Cor.), which latter he

will envy as enjoying the beloved object. Q.E.D.

*****Note--This hatred towards an object of love joined

with envy is called "Jealousy," which accordingly is nothing

else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined

love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who

is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will

be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous

man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of

the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had

previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him,

he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he

conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself

hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image

of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This

condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a

woman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves

prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because

his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled

to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame

and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved

with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives

him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken

delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as

when he first took delight therein.

>>>>>Proof--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction

with the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of

pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in

conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words,

he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same

circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the

aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.

>>>>>Proof--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to

be missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.

As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or

circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives

it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.

*****This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of

the object of love, is called "Regret."

XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or

love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

>>>>>Proof--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power

of activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes or

constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his

own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour:

thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed

to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion

as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater

part of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain,

the greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is,

the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to

remove it. Again, since pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aids

a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner,

that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to

preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude

of the pleasure.

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain

and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite,

or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in

proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.

XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so

that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,

regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and

his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.

>>>>>Proof--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved,

more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never

loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man

endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);

he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and

by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is

greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the

endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his

affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained

by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Cor. and III. xxiii.);

wherefore the love (III. xi. note) will for this cause also be

affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has

been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred,

there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object;

wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain,

or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved

it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love

was greater. Q.E.D.

XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an

injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue

to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the

same law, seek to benefit him.

>>>>>Proof--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him

as a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour

to remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in

other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby

--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying

out the injury, which he planned against the object of his hatred

--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.),

and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater

than his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail

over it, as we asserted. The second part of this proof proceeds

in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates another, etc.

Q.E.D.

*****Note--By "good" I here mean every kind of pleasure,

and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our

longings, whatsoever they may be. By "evil," I mean every kind

of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have

shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we

deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because

we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink

from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,

judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,

what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a

miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of

money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as

glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man

nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing

more painful than another's success. So every man, according

to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or

useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that

which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is

called "timidity," which may accordingly be defined as "the fear

whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as

future by encountering a lesser evil" (III. xxviii.). But if the evil

which he fears be shame, timidity becomes "bashfulness."

Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the

fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,

fear becomes "consternation," especially if both the evils feared

be very great.

XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and

believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate

that other in return.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives another as affected with

hatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III.

xxvii.), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of an

external cause. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives no

cause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore,

from conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will be

affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy;

in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D.

*****Note--He who thinks that he has given just cause for

hatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but

this case (III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred

may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to

injure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who

conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy

as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with

pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause;

in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his

enemy, as I said above.

<<<<<Corollary I--He who conceives, that one whom he loves

hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in

so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is

determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,

he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to

conflicting hatred and love.

<<<<<Corollary II--If a man conceives that one, whom he has

hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from

motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in

kind.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that another hates him, will

(by the last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.)

will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;

he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).

Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury

done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay

it in kind. Q.E.D.

*****Note--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is

called "Anger;" the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to

ourselves is called "Revenge."

XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and

believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love

that other in return. (Cf. XIII. xv. Cor., and III. xvi.)

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as

the preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.

*****Note--If he believes that he has given just cause for the

love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what

most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary

took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by

another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal

love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves

us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called

"gratitude" or "thankfulness." It thus appears that men are much

more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

<<<<<Corollary--He who imagines that he is loved by one

whom he hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.

This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the

preceding proposition.

*****Note--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will

endeavour to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called

cruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given no

ordinary cause for hatred.

XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives

of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is

received without gratitude.

>>>>>Proof--When a man loves something similar to himself,

he endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should

be loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has

conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which

he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hope

of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour,

as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard

it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives

something else, which excludes the existence of the said cause

of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.

XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on

the other hand be destroyed by love.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred

hates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the

former hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on

the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him,

he will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,

and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion.

In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), and

not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be

greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises.

Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred,

and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the

thing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the

hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes

into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not

preceded it.

>>>>>Proof--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop.

xxxviii. of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he

was wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of

loving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added

the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove

the pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the

idea of the former object of hatred as cause.

*****Note--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate

anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying

this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should

be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long

to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always

endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as

he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should

desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more

thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of

love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the

man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more

and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become

more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure

in being restored to health: in such a case he would always

endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd.

XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates

anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that

person.

>>>>>Proof--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards

him who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that

anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as

affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequently

he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the

hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who

hates anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D.

XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by

anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the

pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said

stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or

nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual

stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.

>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xvi.

XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is

destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by

a certain pain in us.

>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as

we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,

we ourselves feel pain.

*****Note--This proposition can also be proved from the

Corollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even

if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and

the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far

as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined

to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the

thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance

of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing,

but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so

far as the said determination is checked: for this reason the

joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated,

every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as we

have said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused,

inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the

man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to

do, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joined

to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its

existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and

the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place.

This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and

delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped.

For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future,

and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked

afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with

the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom:

this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.

XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed,

if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the

latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: and

will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have

been the sole cause of either emotion.

>>>>>Proof--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition

of love and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love

towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply

in so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the

other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly

removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part

vanishes. Q.E.D.

XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive

to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than

if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

>>>>>Proof--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def.

vii.) be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore,

we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore

(III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost

love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the

thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by

necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive

it not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion,

and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.

*****Note--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves

to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than

towards anything else: to this consideration we must add the

imitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.

L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or

fear.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as

III. xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.

*****Note--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope

or fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such

omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions

of hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of

pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them

with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as

means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as

obstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further,

from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe

readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which

we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above

or below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions,

whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not

think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing

from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these

emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear

without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further,

in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love

or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear

what we have said concerning love and hatred.

LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object,

and the same man may be differently affected at different times

by the same object.

>>>>>Proof--The human body is affected by external bodies

in a variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be

differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.

after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by one

and the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human

body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;

consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected

at different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.

*****Note--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man

loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may

not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he

once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.

Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,

what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows

that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions*, hence

when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely

by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others

timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a

man "intrepid," if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to

fear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure

his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not

restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me,

I shall call him "daring." Again, a man will appear "timid" to me,

if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I

further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the

fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say

that he is "cowardly;" and in like manner will everyone pass

judgment.

[*This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine

intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.]

Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment,

inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions,

and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or

pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often

purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded

to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at

one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain,

accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily

understand what are "Repentance" and "Self-complacency."

"Repentance" is "pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as

cause;" "Self-complacency" is "pleasure, accompanied by the

idea of one's self as cause," and these emotions are most intense

because men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).

LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with

others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that

is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long,

as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar

to itself.

>>>>>Proof--As soon as we conceive an object which we have

seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those

others (II. xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the

contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another

object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive

to have no property that is not common to many. For we

thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which

we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects.

But when we suppose that we conceive an object something

special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say

that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing

which it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is

determined to the contemplation of that object only. Therefore

an object, &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note--This mental modification, or imagination of a

particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called

"Wonder;" but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called

"Consternation," because wonder at an evil keeps a man so

engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no

power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the

evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence,

industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man,

is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is

called "Veneration;" otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c.,

be what we wonder at, the emotion is called "Horror." Again,

if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love,

that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater

(III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called

"Devotion." We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope,

confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder;

and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than

those which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence

it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied

in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with

an accurate knowledge of their nature.

To wonder is opposed "Contempt," which generally arises

from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at,

loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight,

appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love,

fear, &c., we are, in consequence (III. xv. Cor. and III. xxvii.),

determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the

presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we

are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of

wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the

thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which

are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other

hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly

to regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder

at a thing which we love, so does "Derision" spring from contempt

of a thing which we hate or fear, and "Scorn" from contempt of

folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can

conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association

with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are

not distinguished one from another by any recognized name.

LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,

it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the

distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of

activity.

>>>>>Proof--A man does not know himself except through the

modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.).

When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby

assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feel

pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the

distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own

power of activity. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in

proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.

For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more

he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied

by the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)

himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea

of himself. Q.E.D.

LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert

its power of activity.

>>>>>Proof--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual

essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously

only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it

neither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive

only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity. Q.E.D.

LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain

thereat.

>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind only affirms that which

the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to

conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last

Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own

weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting

to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is

checked in its endeavour -- in other words (III. xi. note), it feels

pain. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man

conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the

same way as the corollary to III. liii.

*****Note--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own

weakness, is called "humility;" the pleasure, which springs from

the contemplation of ourselves, is called "self-love" or "self-

complacency." And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as

often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power

of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own

exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind,

and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one

another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III.

xxiv. note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings

of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever

a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure

(III. liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection,

and he conceives them more distinctly -- that is (II. xl. note),

in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and

regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take

most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates

some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he

affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals

in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the

contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall

short when compared with those of others. This pain (III.

xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong

construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as

he can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and

envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents

are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur

of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent

to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues,

and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts,

I append the following corollary.

<<<<<Corollary--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is

not his equal.

>>>>>Proof--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or

(III. xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby

a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is

checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,

which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man

will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same

thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's

nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked,

nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one

unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. But

he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature

as himself. Q.E.D.

*****Note--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,

we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,

&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be

peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore,

no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall,

or lions for being courageous.

LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,

and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations

of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear,

&c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.

>>>>>Proof--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions

compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or

passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive

(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so

far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, we

are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive,

or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion,

which involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of an

external body. Wherefore the nature of every passive state must

necessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object whereby

we are affected be expressed. Namely, the pleasure, which

arises from, say, the object A, involves the nature of that object

A, and the pleasure, which arises from the object B, involves

the nature of the object B; different, inasmuch as the causes

whence they arise are by nature different. So again the emotion

of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature different from

the pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the case

of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c.

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love,

hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are

affected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far

as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any

given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, according

as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind

of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according

as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire

be of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must

necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely

as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there

are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure,

pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there

are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects

whereby we are affected. Q.E.D.

*****Note--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last

proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are "luxury,"

"drunkenness," "lust," "avarice," and "ambition," being merely

species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions

in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are

concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,

&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,

venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so

far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects

wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For

"temperance," "sobriety," and "chastity," which we are wont

to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions

or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which

moderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot here

explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are

as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it

be necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to

determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power

over them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It is

sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the

emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality

and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking

the emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference between

various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance

between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife,

there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences,

or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.

LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion

of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one

individual differs from the essence of the other.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which

see after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will

prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as

their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's

nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individual

differs from desire in another individual, only in so far as the

nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence

of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or

passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist

in his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III.

xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in its being, in

so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we

mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure and

pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by

external causes they are increased or diminished, helped or

hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore

the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure

and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or

essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other;

consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c.

Q.E.D.

*****Note--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals

which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind

we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions,

to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse

and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but

the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human.

So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must

needs very according to the several natures. Thus, although each

individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to

him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content

and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said

individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from

the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs

from the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing

proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy

which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a

philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I

have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as

he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those

attributable to him in so far as he is active.

LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or

passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and

desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

>>>>>Proof--When the mind conceives itself and its power

of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily

contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea

(II. xliii). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas

(II. xl. note ii.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active

(III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and

distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours

to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour

we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore,

desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand,

or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.

LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active,

there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.

>>>>>Proof--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure,

or pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain

we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or

checked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind

feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is

diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions

can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but

only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)

are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.

*****Note--All actions following from emotion, which are

attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set

down to "strength of character" ("fortitudo"), which I divide

into "courage" ("animositas") and "highmindedness"

("generositas"). By "courage" I mean "the desire whereby

every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance

solely with the dictates of reason." By "highmindedness" I

mean "the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely

under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite

them to himself in friendship." Those actions, therefore,

which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set

down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I

set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety,

and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage;

courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary

causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which

arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit,

desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said,

that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and

that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to

and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said,

that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not all

that might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way as

above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance,

scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from what has

been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with

another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise

therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,

for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most

important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be

more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning

love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a

thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,

acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another

way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind

begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example,

when we conceive something which generally delights us with

its flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we

are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is

otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus

otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present

be stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to

eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body

will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently

the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will

become odious. This revulsion of feeling is called "satiety"

or weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward

modifications of the body observable in emotions, such,

for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c.,

for these are attributable to the body only, without any

reference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions

require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore

repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should

here and there be added.