The Death of General Sheridan--His Successor in Command of the Army
--Deplorable Condition of the War Department at the Time--A Better
Understanding Between the Department and the Army Commander--General
Sheridan's Humiliating Experience--The Granting of Medals--The
Secretary's Call-Bell--The Relations of Secretary and General--
Views Submitted to President Cleveland--The Law Fixing Retirement
for Age--An Anecdote of General Grant.
Again, in 1888, only two years after Hancock's death, another of
our most gallant companions, the matchless Sheridan, was suddenly
stricken down, and soon passed away, before the expiration of half
the term allotted for his command of the army. As next in rank,
upon the request of the general's family and upon the order of the
Secretary of War it became my duty to arrange and conduct the
military ceremonies at the funeral.
We buried our companion in beautiful Arlington, the choicest spot
in America for the last resting-place of a soldier. It was a bright
summer's day, and the funeral ceremonies, both religious and
military, were the most impressive I have ever seen. As a special
tribute of respect to my brother soldier, a staff officer in uniform
was sent to meet and escort the archbishop who came to celebrate
the funeral mass.
The death of General Sheridan placed me in a position which I had
never anticipated--that of senior officer on the active list of
the army. The President had known little of me either officially
or personally, and I had some grave differences with the Secretary
of War upon subjects of great importance in my estimation, though
doubtless less in his. I had defended as well as I could, and with
some persistence, what I then believed and now know was the right,
but had been worsted, as a matter of course. It is due to the
Honorable Secretary to say that he disclaimed, many months later,
ever having knowingly given his sanction to the document announcing
one of the military doctrines which I had so persistently but
ineffectually combated. But I did not know that in August, 1888,
and he did not then know that he had been thus betrayed. Hence I
thought it quite improbable that a general holding opinions so
radically opposed to those of the Secretary of War would be called
to the command of the army. But I quietly waited in Washington
for the President's orders, neither seeking nor receiving any
opportunity for explanation of the supposed irreconcilable difference
with the Secretary of War. What occurred in that secret council-
chamber of the commander-in-chief, where the fate of so many anxious
soldiers has been sealed, I have never known or inquired; but in
no great length of time came the President's order assigning me to
the command of the army,--six or seven hours, as I afterward learned,
after it was received in the War Department and given to the press.
DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
It is not too much to say that the condition of the War Department
at that time was deplorable. It was the culmination of the
controversy respecting the relations between the administration
and the command which had lasted, with slight intermissions, for
forty years. It is not my purpose to go into the history of that
long controversy, but only to state briefly its final result, part
of which was perhaps due to General Sheridan's extreme illness for
some time before his death, and his retention in nominal command
and in the nominal administration of military justice long after
it had become impossible for him to discharge such duties intelligently.
But that result had been practically reached a long time before
General Sheridan became seriously ill. He had long ceased, as
General Sherman and General Scott had before him, not only to
command, but to exercise any appreciable influence in respect to
either the command or the administration. The only difference was
that General Scott went to New York and General Sherman to St.
Louis, while General Sheridan stayed in Washington.
I have always understood, but do not know the fact, that in former
times the Secretary of War had exercised some intelligent control
over military affairs, so that there was at least unity in the
exercise of military authority. But in 1888 even that had ceased,
and it had been boldly announced some time before that each
departmental chief of staff, in his own sphere, was clothed with
all the authority of the Secretary of War. All that a major-general
as well as an officer of lower grade had to do was to execute such
orders as he might receive from the brigadiers at the head of the
several bureaus in Washington. It was not even necessary for those
mighty chiefs to say that their mandates had the sanction of any
higher authority. Their own fiat was all-sufficient for a mere
soldier of the line or for his commanding general, of whatever
grade of rank or of command. It is not strange that the Secretary
was finally unable to admit that he, great lawyer as he was, could
possibly have given his sanction to such an interpretation of the
law as that; but the decision was given by his order, and it governed
the army for a long time. Of course the adjutant-general became
by far the chiefest of those many chiefs; for it is his function
to issue to the army all the orders of both the Secretary of War
and the commanding general. Be it said to his credit that he did
not assume to issue orders in his own name, after the manner of
other chiefs. Like a sensible man, he was content with the actual
exercise of power, without caring to let the army know that he did
it. He had only to use the name of the Secretary or the general,
as he pleased; either would answer with the army. Of course I knew
something of this before I went to Washington, for the evidence of
it was sometimes too plain to be ignored. Yet it did seem to me
passing strange to sit in my office about noon, where I had been
all the day before, and learn from the New York papers what orders
I had issued on that previous day! Upon inquiry I was told that
that was only a matter of routine, and a rule of long standing.
But I mildly indicated that such a practice did not meet my approval,
and that I wished it changed, which was finally done, as explained
in a previous chapter. But even then I had no means of knowing
whether an order sent to me in the name of the Secretary of War
had ever been seen by him, or whether it was the work of the adjutant-
general, or the product of some joint operations of two or more of
the several chiefs, each of whom had the Secretary's authority to
do such things. At length the Secretary, though with evidently
serious misgivings respecting some deep ulterior purpose of mine,
consented that I might have an officer of the adjutant-general's
department, whom I knew, in my own office, to keep me informed of
what I was to do, and, if possible, what orders I might actually
receive from the Secretary himself, and what from the several other
heads of that hydra called the War Department.
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
After that change things went on much better; but it was at best
only an armed truce, with everybody on guard, until the end of that
administration, and then it came very near culminating in a pitched
battle at the very beginning of the next. By what seemed at the
time a very sharp trick, but which may possibly have been only the
natural working of the vicious system, I was made to appear to the
new Secretary of War as having failed promptly to give effect to
an order authorized by his predecessor, but on which no authentic
marks of _his_ authority appeared, only such as might indicate that
it came from another source. But if it was a trick, it signally
failed. A few candid words from one soldier to another, even if
that other had not been a solider all his life, were quite sufficient
to dissipate that little cloud which at first had threatened a
storm. Then sunlight began to appear; and when, in due time, by
the operation of some natural laws, and some others happily enacted
by Congress, certain necessary changes came about, the sky over
the War Department became almost cloudless, and I trust it may
never again be darkened as it had been nearly all the time for
forty years.
General Sheridan had entered upon his duties with all the soldierly
courage and confidence of his nature, declaring his purpose to
regain the ground lost by General Sherman when, to use Sheridan's
own expressive words, "Sherman threw up the sponge." He announced
his interpretation of the President's order assigning him to the
"command of the army" as necessarily including _all_ the army, not
excepting the chiefs of the staff departments; and he soon gave
evidence of his faith by ordering one of those chiefs on an inspecting
tour, or something of that kind, without the knowledge of the
Secretary of War. Thus the Secretary found the chief of one of
the bureaus of his department gone without his authority, he knew
not where. It was not difficult for the Secretary to point out to
the general, as he did in writing, in a firm, though kind and
confidential way, that such could not possibly be the true meaning
of the President's order. No attempt appears to have been made to
discuss the subject further, or to find any ground broad enough
for both Secretary and general to stand upon. Nothing further
appears to have been said or done on that subject during that
administration. But upon the inauguration of the next, the Secretary
of War sent out to all the commanding generals of the army copies
of that letter of his predecessor, in which the general-in-chief
had been so mildly and respectfully, yet so thoroughly, beaten.
The army was thus given to understand on that occasion that their
senior in command had not even been given a chance to "throw up
the sponge," as his predecessor had done, but had been "knocked
out" by the first blow.
GENERAL SHERIDAN'S HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE
As if that was not humiliation enough for a great soldier to bear,
whenever the Secretary went away one of the same chiefs of bureaus
that the general thought he had a right to command acted as Secretary
of War, to dominate over him! But the loyal, subordinate soldier
who had commanded great armies and achieved magnificent victories
in the field while those bureau chiefs were purveying powder and
balls, or pork and beans, submitted even to that without a murmur,
for a great lawyer had told him that such was the law, and how
could he know any better? It was only when the adjutant-general,
his own staff-officer, so made by the regulations which the general
knew, was thus appointed over him, that his soldierly spirit
rebelled. The humblest soldier of a republic could not endure
that. All this was based upon the theory that the general of the
army was not an officer of the War Department, and hence could not
be appointed acting Secretary of War. What other great department
of the government could recognize the standing army as belonging
to it, if not the Department of War? Surely the little army had
a hard time while it was thus turned out into the cold, not even
its chief recognized as belonging to any department of the government
of the country which they were all sworn to serve, but subject to
the orders of any bureau officer who happened to be the senior in
Washington in hot summer weather, when nearly all had gone to the
mountains or the sea?
That same great lawyer announced in my hearing, very soon after
his accession to power, in response to a suggestion that war service
was entitled to weight in appointments and promotions, that in his
judgment "that book was closed." Could any one of the million of
soldiers still living, and the many more millions of patriots who
are always alive in our country, be expected to support such a
policy as that? In my opinion, that one short speech cost the
national administration more than a million of votes. Soldiers
don't say much through the press, but they quietly talk things over
around their campfires. And I hope many generations will pass away
before they and their sons will cause thus to keep alive the fires
of patriotism kindled by the great struggle for American Union.
Thank God, that "law" did not last many years. There was great
rejoicing throughout the little army when it was again recognized
as belonging to the Department of War. But that cause of rejoicing
was soon beclouded. By another of those inscrutable dispensations
of Providence, another superior, under the title of Assistant
Secretary of War, was interposed between the commander-in-chief of
the army and the general appointed to assist him in the command.
It had been thought, and so stated in writing, that the major-
general commanding, and the ten heads of staff departments and
bureaus, with their many assistants, all educated men of long
experience in the several departments of military affairs, and some
of them tried in war, might give the Secretary all the assistance
he needed, if they were permitted to do it. But no; it appears to
have been thought that some other, who had had no education or
experience in the affairs of the War Department, could better assist
a Secretary who to similar acquired qualifications for his office
added far greater natural endowments and the just confidence of
his country. Thus the major-general was treated as much worse than
the lieutenant-general had been, as he was inferior to him in rank.
But I also submitted without a word, because it was this time
unquestionably the law as well as the will of my lawful superiors
in office. I waited as patiently as I could, as the lieutenant-
general had done, the time when by operation of law, human or
divine, welcome relief from a burdensome duty would come, upon the
official declaration that I had done, as best I could, all the duty
that God and my country required of me.
THE GRANTING OF MEDALS
One illustration will suffice to show the working of this new
invention by which the general-in-chief was still further removed
from the commander-in-chief, whose chief military adviser he was
supposed to be. An act of Congress authorized the President to
confer medals of honor upon soldiers of all grades who might be
most distinguished for bravery in action. It is the most highly
prized of all military rewards because given to the _soldier_,
without regard to rank, for that service which every true soldier
regards as of the greatest merit. The standard of merit deserving
that reward is essentially the same in all the armies of the
civilized world, and the medal is made of iron or bronze, instead
of anything more glittering or precious, to indicate the character
of the deed it commemorates. That standard of merit is the most
heroic devotion in the discharge of _soldierly duty_ in the face
of the enemy, that conduct which brings victory, honor, and glory
to the country for which a brave man has devoted his life in
obedience to the orders which have come down to him from the head
of the nation, which spirit of obedience and devotion creates armies
and saves nations from defeat, disaster, or domestic convulsion.
These highest tokens of a nation's honor had for many years been
given with the greatest care, after most rigid scrutiny of the
official records and all other evidence presented, laboriously
reviewed by the general-in-chief in person, recommended by him
under the universal rule of civilized nations, and approved by the
Secretary of War, whose approval is considered equivalent to the
order of the President, by which alone, under the law, a medal of
honor can be granted. But at length these carefully considered
recommendations were disapproved by the Assistant Secretary of War,
on the ground that the soldier had only done his duty! He had only
done, or heroically tried to do until stricken down by the enemy's
fire, what his commander had ordered! Some other standard of
soldierly honor was set up, not involving obedience to orders nor
discharge of duty, but instead of that some act of each soldier's
own volition, as if what a nation most highly honored was independent
action of each one of its million of soldiers, without any special
regard to the orders of the commander-in-chief or any of his
subordinate commanders! Thus the most dearly bought honor of a
citizen of this great republic, intrusted by Congress to the
commander-in-chief of the army, to be duly awarded to his subordinates,
passed into the hands of an Assistant Secretary of War, to be
awarded by him under his own newly invented theory of soldierly
merit! After a laborious but vain attempt to obtain recognition
of the time-honored standard of soldierly honor and merit, the
general-in-chief was forced to admit that the new standard set up
by the Assistant Secretary of War did not afford him any intelligible
guide by which he could be governed in making his recommendations,
and hence he requested to be relieved _by the Secretary of War_
from consideration of such cases in future, presuming that the
vital question would thus, as a matter of course, receive the
_personal_ consideration of the _Secretary_. The formal action of
the "Secretary of War," relieving the general from that important
duty involving the honor of those under his command, was very
promptly made known to him. But now there is very good reason for
the belief that the honorable and very worthy Secretary knew nothing
at all of the whole transaction!
It was my good fortune to have had, by close personal association,
exact knowledge of the difficulties which my predecessors had
encountered, as well as, perhaps, a more modest ambition, and hence
to avoid some of those difficulties. Yet in view of the past
experience of all commanders of the army, from that of George
Washington with the Continental Congress down to the present time,
I advise all my young brother soldiers to limit their ambition to
the command of the Division of the Atlantic or Department of the
East. But since some of them must in all probability be required
to discharge the duties of the higher position, I trust the varied
experiences of their predecessors may serve as some help to them
in the discharge of those duties, which are vastly more difficult
and far less agreeable than any other duties of an American soldier.
They are the duties which most closely concern the subordinate
relation of the military to the civil power in a republic. In that
relation I had the great good fortune to enjoy most cordial and
considerate personal treatment on the part of my distinguished
associates representing the civil power. Hence my advice to my
young military friends may be fairly regarded as based upon the
most favorable view of what any of them may reasonably expect. It
is the one position of all in the army which most severely tries
the spirit of subordination which is so indispensable in a soldier
of a republic. I have not thought it surprising that none of my
great predecessors were quite able to endure the trial.
THE SECRETARY'S CALL-BELL
It is there where the polished surfaces of military etiquette and
modern methods come in contact with the rough cast-iron of those
which often prevail in civil administration, and the former get
badly scratched. Military rules are invariable, with rare exceptions
understood and observed by all, while civil practice varies according
to the character and habits of the chief in authority, from those
of the illustrious Stanton, now well known in history,( 1) to the
opposite extreme of refined courtesy. Long observation and experience
have led to the belief that such rasping of feelings, too sensitive
perhaps, even more than substantial difference, has often been the
cause of discord. A single example may suffice to illustrate what
is meant. In the arrangements of the room especially designed for
the office of the Secretary of War in the splendid new State, War,
and Navy Departments building, was a great table-desk on which was
a complete system of electric buttons connected with wires leading
to bells in all the principal offices in the department, the buttons
bearing the titles of the officers at the head of the several
bureaus, etc., so that the Secretary could "ring up" any colonel,
brigadier-general, or major-general whom he wished to see, just as
a gentleman in private life does his coachman, butler, or valet.
To an army officer who had for many years, in lower grades, been
accustomed to the invariable formula, delivered by a well-dressed
soldier standing at "attention" and respectfully saluting, "The
commanding officer sends his compliments to Captain B---, and wishes
to see the captain at headquarters," the tinkling of that soft
little bell must have sounded harsh indeed after he had attained
the rank of brigadier-general. Twice only, I believe, my own old
soldier messenger who attended in the room where the telephone and
bells were located, came to my room, with an indescribable expression
on his face, and said, "The bell from the Secretary's office is
ringing!" I replied, "Indeed? Go up and inquire what it means."
Presently the Secretary's own messenger appeared, and delivered a
message in courteous terms--whether the same the Secretary had
given to him I did not know, but had reason to doubt, for I had
seen and heard the Secretary violently ring a certain bell several
times, and then say with great emphasis to his messenger, "Go and
tell ---- to come here," not even using the high military title by
which "----" was habitually addressed in the War Department. But
those uncivil methods of an imperfect civilization are gradually
passing away, and the more refined courtesies, taught, I believe,
in all our great schools as well as in the military and naval
service, are taking their place. It is now a long time since that
reform was practically complete in the War Department.
THE RELATIONS OF SECRETARY AND GENERAL
Thus it appeared, when I went into the office in 1888, that of my
predecessors in command of the army, Scott and Sherman had given
up the contest, Sheridan had been put quickly _hors de combat_,
while Grant alone had won the fight, and that after a long contest,
involving several issues, in which a Secretary of War was finally
removed from office with the consent of his own personal and
political friends, a President was impeached and escaped removal
from office by only one vote, and the country was brought to the
verge of another civil war. As I had helped Evarts, Seward, and
some others whose names I never knew, to "pour oil on the troubled
waters" in the time of Grant and Stanton, and to get everybody into
the humor to respond heartily to that great aspiration, "Let us
have peace," I thought perhaps I might do something in the same
direction in later years. Be that as it might, I had no desire to
try again what so many others had failed to accomplish, but thought
it better to make an experiment with a less ambitious plan of my
own, which I had worked out while trying to champion the ideas
entertained by all my predecessors. At the request of General
Grant and General Sherman, when the one was President and the other
general of the army, I studied the subject as thoroughly as I was
capable of doing, and formulated a regulation intended to define
the relations between the Secretary of War, the general of the
army, and the staff departments. I still think that plan of my
great superiors, only formulated by me, would have worked quite
satisfactorily if it could have had general and cordial support.
Yet I do not think it was based upon the soundest view of the
constitutional obligations of the President as commander-in-chief
of the army, nor at all consistent with the practice in this country
of giving the command of the army to the officer happening to be
senior in rank, without regard to the "special trust and confidence"
reposed in him by the President for the time being. It was based
too much upon the special conditions then existing, wherein the
general of the army, no less than the Secretary of War, enjoyed
the confidence of the President in the highest degree. The plan
proposed to give far too great authority to the general, if he did
not, for whatever reason, enjoy the full confidence of the President.
It also trusted too much to the ability and disinterested fidelity
of the several chiefs of the staff departments. In short, it was
based upon a supposed higher degree of administrative virtue than
always exists even in this country.
However all this may be, the proposed regulation did not meet with
cordial support, so far as I know, from any but General Grant,
General Sherman, and General M. C. Meigs, then quartermaster-general.
The other bureau chiefs earnestly opposed it. It was near the end
of General Grant's second term, and no effort was made, so far as
I know, to adopt any regulation on the subject in the next or any
succeeding administration. The personal controversy between General
Scott and the Secretary of War many years before had resulted in
the repeal, through revision, of the old and quite satisfactory
regulation on the subject, and no other worthy of the name has ever
been adopted in its place.
Soon after I was assigned to the command of the army I submitted,
in writing, to President Cleveland my own mature views on the
subject. They received some favorable consideration, but no formal
action, in view of the near approach of the end of his first term.
From that time till near the present the paper was in the personal
custody of the Secretary of War. What consideration, if any, it
ever received, I was never informed. But it was the guide of my
own action, at least, while I was in command of the army. It is
now on file in the War Department. It is to be hoped that some
future military and administrative geniuses, superior to any of
the last hundred years, may be able to solve that difficult problem.
I can only say that my own plan worked well enough so long as I
helped to work it. How it may be with anybody else, either under
my plan or some other, only the future can determine. I so far
succeeded that the most intelligent staff officers used to say,
"For the first time the general actually does command the army."
They saw only the results, without exactly perceiving the nature
of the motive-power.
The way to success in rendering efficient public service does not
lie through any assumption of the authority which the nation may
have given to another, even if not most wisely, but rather in
zealous, faithful, and subordinate efforts to assist that other in
doing what the country has imposed upon him.
THE LAW FIXING RETIREMENT FOR AGE
A soldier may honorably crave, as the dearest object of his life,
recognition of his _past services_ by promotion to a higher grade.
That is his one reward for all he may have done. But the desire
for higher command, greater power, and more unrestrained authority
exhibits ambition inconsistent with due military subordination and
good citizenship. It is a dangerous ambition in a republic. The
highest examples of patriotism ever shown in this country have been
in the voluntary surrender of power into the hands of the people
or of their chosen representatives, not in efforts to increase or
prolong that power. Following those highest examples, in the year
1882 all the senior officers of the army, including Sherman,
Sheridan, and Hancock, united in advocating the measure then pending
in Congress, to fix a limit of age when every officer should
relinquish command and return to the ranks of private citizenship.
In doing so, nearly all of those seniors, especially Hancock,
relinquished forever all hope of rising to the command of the army.
My case was not so strong as that of Hancock, because I was younger.
But Sheridan was only six months older than I, and his "expectation
of life" was far beyond the time when I should become sixty-four
years old. Hence I cheerfully relinquished in 1882 any reasonable
ambition I may ever have had to command the army. My ultimate
succession to that command in 1888 was, like all other important
events in my personal career, unsought and unexpected. Hence
whatever I did from 1888 to 1895 was only a little "extra duty,"
and I have had no reason to find fault on account of the "extra-
duty pay" which I received, though none of it was in money. I am
inclined to think it a pretty good rule for a soldier to wait until
he is "detailed," and not to try to put himself "on guard." I do
not know any case in American history where the opposite course
has not resulted in irretrievable injury to him who adopted it.
Temporary success in gaining high position, before education and
experience have given the necessary qualifications, necessarily
results finally in failure; while slower advancement, giving full
opportunities for education and experience in the duties of each
grade, insures full qualification for the next higher. American
history is full of such examples, as it is--alas! too truly--of
those cases where the highest qualifications and most becoming
modesty have not met with any appropriate advancement or other
recognition.
AN ANECDOTE OF GENERAL GRANT
In the official intercourse of a soldier with the great departments
of government, he often finds useful those maxims which have served
him as commander of an army in the field. The most important of
these is, not to enter a combat where he is sure to be beaten, as,
for instance, where his opponent is the judge who is to decide the
issue. As in war, so in administration, battle once joined,
questions of right become obscured. The most powerful guns and
battalions are sure to win. It is much wiser to seek an ally who
carries a heavier armament. Some subordinates of mine--clerks and
messengers, I believe--were once required to refund some money
which had been paid them on my interpretation of the law and
regulations. My careful explanation of the ground of my action
was promptly disapproved. I then requested that the money be
charged to me and the whole matter referred to Congress, in reply
to which request I was informed that the accounts had been settled.
In another case I requested that my appeal from adverse action be
submitted to President Grant, who had had occasion to know something
about me. I was requested by telegraph, in cipher, to withdraw
that appeal, as it was liable to cause trouble. Being a lover of
peace rather than war, I complied. In that perhaps I made a mistake.
If I had adhered to my appeal, it might have saved a public
impeachment. Again, I was called upon by one of the Treasury
bureaus to refund some money which had been paid me for mileage by
the Secretary of War, on the alleged ground that the Secretary
could not lawfully give me such an order. I referred the matter
to the Secretary, as one that did not concern me personally, but
which involved the dignity of the head of the War Department as
compared with that of a subordinate bureau of another department.
The Treasury official soon notified me that the account had been
allowed. To illustrate the application of the same principle under
opposite conditions, I must relate the story told of President
Grant. When informed by a Treasury officer that he could not find
any law to justify what the President had desired to be done, he
replied, "Then I will see if I can find a Treasury officer who can
find that law." Of course no change in the incumbent of that office
proved to be necessary. I have thought in several cases in later
years that Grant's military method might have been tried to
advantage.
"Be ye wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove" is the only rule
of action I have ever heard of that can steer a soldier clear of
trouble with the civil powers of this great republic. Yet he must
sometimes, when his honor or the rights of his subordinates are
involved, make the fight, though he knows he must be beaten. A
soldier must then stand by his guns as long as he can, and it has
happened that such a fight, apparently hopeless at the time, has
given victory to a future generation.
[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 422.]