The Death of General Hancock--Assigned to the Division of the
Atlantic--Measures for Improving the Sea-Coast Defense--General
Fitz-John Porter's Restoration to the Army--President of the Board
Appointed to Review the Action of the Court Martial--General Grant's
Opinion--Senator Logan's Explanation of His Hostile Attitude Toward
General Porter.
In the spring of 1886 we were again called to meet around the grave
of one of the bravest and best of our companions. The almost
incomparably gallant Hancock, the idol of his soldiers and of a
very large part of the people, so perfectly stainless in life and
character that even political contest could not fan the breath of
slander, had suddenly passed away. We buried him with all honor
at his home in Pennsylvania. Again it fell to my lot--the lot so
common to the soldier--to step into the place in the ranks where
my comrade had suddenly fallen.
ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC
The Division of the Missouri was then larger in territory and much
larger in number of troops than that of the Atlantic, and had been
far more important. But Indian wars were, as we hoped, approaching
an end, while we also hoped that the country might soon be aroused
to the necessities of the national defense. The Division of the
Atlantic, including also the greater part of the Gulf States and
those of the northeastern frontier, would then resume its rightful
place as by far the most important of the grand military divisions
of the country. Hence I accepted without hesitation the command
of that division. My natural tastes and favorite studies had led
me largely in the direction of these modern sciences which have in
a few years imparted such enormous strides to the development of
the mechanical means of attack and defense, changing in a corresponding
degree the great problems of war. The valor of great masses of
men, and even the genius of great commanders in the field, have
been compelled to yield the first place in importance to the
scientific skill and wisdom in finance which are able and willing
to prepare in advance the most powerful engines of war. Nations,
especially those so happily situated as the United States, may now
surely defend their own territory against invasion or damage, and
the national honor and the rights of their citizens throughout the
world, by the wise scientific use of surplus revenue, derived from
high import duties if the people so please, instead of by the former
uncivilized method of sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands
of brave men. Far more, such sacrifice of the brave can no longer
avail. As well might it be attempted to return to hand- or ox-
power, freight-wagons and country roads, in place of the present
steam-locomotives, trains of cars, and steel tracks, for the enormous
transportation of the present day, as to rely upon the bravery of
troops for the defense of a city.
Science has wrought no greater revolution in any of the arts of
peace than it has in the art of war. Indeed, the vast national
interests involved all over the world have employed the greatest
efforts of genius in developing the most powerful means of attack
and defense.
Such were the thoughts with which I entered upon my duties in the
Division of the Atlantic, and such guided my action there and in
the subsequent command of the army. That not very much was
accomplished is too painfully true. Yet a beginning was at once
made, and progress, though slow, continued until the hope now seems
justified that our country may be ready before it is too late to
"command the peace" in a voice which all must heed.
I was ably and zealously assisted in all this work by Major Joseph
P. Sanger, one of my aides until his well-merited promotion to
inspector-general. Then Captain Tasker H. Bliss took Major Sanger's
place, and helped me to carry forward the work with his well-known
ability, devotion, and industry. The army owes much to those
faithful officers, without whose help little could have been done
by me. I quote here from a memorandum, prepared at my request by
Major Sanger, showing in detail the measures taken to perfect, so
far as possible in advance, the instruction of the artillery of
the army in the service of the modern high-power armament, so that
every new gun and mortar should have, the moment it was finished
and placed in position, thoroughly qualified officers and men to
use it:
"Major-General J. M. Schofield assumed command of the Division of
the Atlantic and Department of the East April 13, 1886; and during
the remaining months of that year, as opportunity afforded, gave
much attention to the condition of the sea-coast forts and their
garrison from the Canadian line to the Gulf of Mexico.
"There were at this time sixty-six posts in the division, of which
twenty-seven were garrisoned and thirty-five ungarrisoned; of the
total number, fifty-one were sea-coast forts and the balance
barracks, properly speaking. Of the garrisoned forts, fifteen had
no armaments, and the armaments of all the others were the old
muzzle-loading types of low power. The efficiency of the artillery
personnel was far from satisfactory, from lack of proper instruction,
due in turn to lack of facilities. Artillery target practice,
except at Forts Monroe, Hamilton, and Wadsworth, had practically
ceased in the division; and of the forty-five companies of artillery,
comprising seventy-five per cent. of the entire artillery troops
of the army, only two batteries continually at Fort Monroe had had
annual artillery target practice during the preceding ten years,
and some of the batteries had not fired a shot.
MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE SEA-COAST DEFENSE
"To remedy these defects, and at the same time provide a system of
fire control applicable to the defense of all our harbors, orders
were issued in 1887 for mapping the harbors, establishing base
lines, and arranging the extremities for the use of angle-measuring
instruments, and graduating traverse circles in azimuth. Systematic
artillery instruction and target practice were ordered, and a system
of reports suited to the preservation and utilization of all data
resulting from the firing.
"Thus, for the first time in the history of the country, an effort
was made to establish and develop a system of artillery fire control
adapted to our fortifications and armament. In 1888 General
Schofield succeeded General Sheridan in command of the army, and
in December issued 'General Orders, No. 108' from the headquarters
of the army. This order extended to all the artillery troops of
the army the system of artillery instruction and target practice
which had been established in the Division of the Atlantic. As it
had not been found practicable to equip all the artillery posts
with the necessary appliances for carrying out the provisions of
the order, the eleven principal posts on the Eastern, Western, and
Southern coasts were designated as artillery posts of instruction,
and provided with all the guns, implements, and instruments necessary
for the instruction and target practice of such of the neighboring
garrisons as were unprovided with proper facilities.
"To insure the proper execution of the order, there was appropriated
March 2, 1889, twenty thousand dollars to be expended under the
direct supervision of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications,
which had been created by the Fortification Appropriation Act of
September 22, 1888, and of which General Schofield was the president.
The Army Regulations of 1889 were published on February 9, and
paragraph 382 authorized the commanding general of each geographical
division within which were the headquarters of one or more artillery
regiments to designate, with the approval of the general commanding
the army, a division inspector of artillery target practice, whose
duty it was to make inspections with a view to insuring uniform,
thorough, and systematic artillery instruction.
"On June 11, 1889, 'General Orders, No. 49' was issued from the
headquarters of the army, in anticipation of the more complete
equipment of the artillery posts with the apparatus necessary for
the proper conduct of artillery instruction and target practice.
The course of instruction covered the use of plane tables, telescopic
and other sights, electrical firing-machines, chronographs,
velocimeters, anemometers, and other meteorological instruments,
stop-watches, signaling, telegraphy, vessel tracking, judging
distance, and, in short, everything essential to the scientific
use of the guns. By 'General Orders, No. 62, Headquarters of the
Army,' July 2, 1889, Lieutenant T. H. Bliss, Fort Artillery, Aide-
de-Camp to General Schofield commanding, was announced as inspector
of small arms and artillery practice. As an inducement to greater
application on the part of the student officers of the Artillery
School and of the Infantry and Cavalry School, the distinction of
'honor graduate' was conferred on all officers who had graduated,
or should graduate, either first or second from the Artillery
School, or first, second, or third from the Infantry and Cavalry
School: the same to appear with their names in the Army Register
as long as such graduates should continue on the active or retired
list of the army. . . ."
FITZ-JOHN PORTER'S RESTORATION TO THE ARMY
In August, 1886, after the passage of a bill by Congress, General
Fitz-John Porter was restored to the army, as colonel, by President
Cleveland. When I was in the War Department in 1868, General Porter
had come to me with a request that I would present his case to the
President, and recommend that he be given a rehearing. I declined
to do so, on the ground that, in my opinion, an impartial investigation
and disposition of his case, whatever were its merits, could not
be made until the passions and prejudices begotten by the war had
subsided much further than they had done at that time. In the
course of conversation I told him that while I never permitted
myself to form an opinion of any case without much more knowledge
of it than I had of his, I presumed, from the finding of the court-
martial, that he had at least been guilty of acting upon what he
supposed to be his own better judgment under the circumstances he
found to exist, instead of in strict obedience to General Pope's
orders. He said that was not the case; that he had not even
literally disobeyed orders; that in so far as he had acted upon
his own judgment, he had loyally done all that could be done to
carry out General Pope's wishes; and that all he wanted was an
opportunity to prove such to be the facts. I replied that if he
could prove what he stated beyond question, he would of course have
a case worthy of consideration--not otherwise. Nothing was said
in respect to the facts or the evidence in contravention of the
judgment of the court-martial which tried him. Hence, beyond that
above stated, I had no knowledge of his case when the board of
review, of which I was president, met in 1878 to hear the new
evidence; and I believe neither of the other members of the board
--Generals A. H. Terry and George W. Getty--was any better informed.
The duty of the board was very different from that of a court-
martial appointed to try an original case. The accused had already
been tried and convicted. He was not to have a new trial. He
could not have any benefit whatever of any doubt that might exist
after all the evidence, old and new, had been fully considered.
He must prove his innocence positively, by absolutely convincing
evidence, or else the original judgment of the court-martial must
stand. This view of the issue was fully accepted by General Porter
and his counsel. This caused a new and peculiar duty to devolve
upon the board--at least it was so to me; that is, to find, if
possible, some view of all the evidence, or of all the facts
established by the evidence, that could be regarded as consistent
with the theory or supposition that Porter was guilty.
When the evidence was all in, the members of the board separated
for several weeks to let each examine all the evidence and reach
his own conclusion, to be presented in form at the next meeting of
the board. I believe I devoted more earnest work to the examination
and analysis than I had ever done to any one thing before in my
life. I tried in succession every possible explanation of the
established facts, in the effort to find some one consistent with
the theory that Porter had been guilty of disobedience, as charged,
or of any other military offense. But I could not find one, except
the very patent one that he had sent despatches to Burnside which
were by no means respectful to Pope; and the board expressed an
opinion in condemnation of that, which Porter's counsel very frankly
admitted to be just.
In the course of that long and earnest effort to find Porter guilty,
--for that is what the effort was in effect,--the whole story of
his conduct and of the operations of the two opposing armies and
the actions of other prominent officers became so clear, and his
honorable and soldierly conduct so absolutely demonstrated, that
it was exceedingly difficult, in view of all the wrong he had
suffered, to write a cold judicial statement of the facts. The
first draft was toned down in many particulars in the effort to
bring it within the strictest rules of judicial decisions. I have
sometimes thought since that if the report of the board could have
been much colder, it might have been better at first for Porter,
though less just. But I do not think he or any of his companions
and friends will ever feel like finding fault because the board
could not entirely suppress the feelings produced by their discovery
of the magnitude of the wrong that had been done to a gallant fellow-
soldier.
GENERAL GRANT'S OPINION
The first time I met General Grant after the decision of the board
was published was very soon after he had published in 1882 the
result of his own investigation of the case. He at once introduced
the subject, and talked about it for a long time in the most earnest
manner that I ever heard him speak on any subject. He would not
permit me to utter a single sentence until he had gone all over
the case and showed me that he understood all its essential features
as thoroughly as I did, and that his judgment was precisely the
same as that which the board had reached. He intimated very
decidedly that no impartial and intelligent military man could, in
his opinion, possibly reach any other conclusion. The general
evidently desired to make it perfectly clear that he had not adopted
the opinion of a board of which I was a member, nor that of any
one else; but that he had thoroughly mastered the case for himself,
and formed his own judgment in regard to it. I take pleasure in
recording the fact that he unquestionably had done it, and I never
knew a man who could form more positive opinions, or one who could
express them more convincingly, than General Grant.
The board was not called upon the express any opinion respecting
the action of the court-martial upon the evidence before it, and
it would have been manifestly improper to do so. Speaking for
myself, and not for any other member of the board, I do not now
hesitate to say that the finding and sentence of the general court-
martial which tried General Fitz-John Porter were not justified by
the evidence before that court. In my judgment, formed from long
observation and much experience, the passions of warfare often
render the administration of justice impossible. A suggestion once
made to me by a man in very high military authority, that a finding
and sentence of court-martial rendered in time of war should be
regarded as _res adjudicata_, produced in my mind the painful
impression that a very great man did not find the word "justice"
anywhere in his vocabulary; and I watched for many years the
conversation and writings and public speeches of that man without
finding that he ever made use of that word, or ever gave as a reason
for doing or not doing anything that it would be just or unjust.
In his mind, whatever might have happened to any person was simply
a matter of good or bad fortune which did not concern him. He
refused even to consider the question whether injustice had or had
not been done, or whether the operation of a law was not relatively
unjust to some as compared to others. When to such natural character
and habits of thought are added the stern necessities of war as
viewed by a commander and many other officers, what possible chance
of justice can be left to an _unfortunate_ man?
It is true that even if the life of an innocent man may have been
sacrificed under the stern necessities of discipline, that is no
more than thousands of his fellow-soldiers have suffered because
of the crimes and follies of politicians who brought on the war.
But that is no reason why his memory as well as those of his comrades
should not be finally honored, if it can be proved that, after all,
he also was innocent and brave.
In my opinion, no government can be regarded as just to its army
unless it provides, under appropriate conditions, for the rehearing
of cases that may be tried by court-martial in time of war. Perhaps
it may most wisely be left for the President and Congress to
institute appropriate action in each individual case. That is a
matter for mature consideration. My only desire is to suggest the
necessity for some such action, whenever reasonable grounds for it
may be presented. I have no respect for the suggestions sometimes
urged that labor and expense are sufficient grounds for failure to
secure justice to every citizen or soldier of the republic, whether
at home or abroad.
SENATOR LOGAN'S EXPLANATION
Soon after General Logan's last election to the Senate, I had a
very interesting and unreserved conversation with him, at his house
in Chicago, in respect to his action in the Porter case. He spoke
of it with evident candor, acknowledged that his view of the case
was probably wrong, and as if to excuse his mistake, volunteered
an explanation as to how he came to take that view of it. He told
me that when he found that the case might probably come before
Congress, he wanted to prepare himself in advance as far as possible
to deal with it justly, and to defend the right effectively. Hence
he went to General Grant to obtain the best possible view of the
military questions involved. General Grant gave him the theory of
the military situation and of the operations of the opposing armies,
as well as that of Porter's own conduct, which had been presented
to, and evidently accepted by, the court-martial, as presenting
the true merits of the case. General Logan accepted that theory
as unquestionably correct, and bent all his energies to the
construction of unanswerable arguments in support of Porter's
condemnation.
At that time neither General Grant nor General Logan knew anything
of the new evidence which was afterward submitted to the board of
review. Logan's powerful arguments in the Senate were based upon
the preconceived idea of the case, supported by such part of the
new evidence, as well as of the old, as could be made to support
that view. In reply to my statement that he had unquestionably
been led astray, he said that that was quite probable, but that
Grant was responsible, and that it was then too late to change.
I do not think that anybody will now hesitate to say that General
Grant's view of his duty in respect to this last point was the more
to be commended. But the fact I wish to record is that of Logan's
sincerity in the great efforts he had made to convict Porter on
the floor of the Senate, and his explanation of the way in which
he had been led into the greatest possible error. It suggests the
reflection that even a senator of the United States might better
form his own opinions rather than adopt those even of the highest
authority, when the only question involved is one of justice, and
not one of public policy, in which latter case differences of
opinion must of necessity be reconciled for the purpose of securing
unity of action.
As an illustration of the necessity for an absolutely impartial
review of cases which have involved the passions of war, reference
must be made to the action of one member of the Porter court-martial
who made it generally understood that his individual opinion
supported the finding of that court. He went so far as to make
inquiries whether precedents could be found in American or English
history to sustain a member of a court-martial in publicly defending
the finding of that court, notwithstanding the oath of secrecy
imposed by law upon every member. And this same member of the
court was furnished by a very able lawyer with an argument in
support of the findings of the court, based upon a review of the
evidence submitted to the subsequent board, as if that member of
the court might make public use of that argument as his own.