President of the New Board of Ordnance and Fortifications--Usefulness
of the Board--Troubles with the Sioux Indians in 1890-1891--Success
of the Plan to Employ Indians as Soldiers--Marriage to Miss
Kilbourne--The Difficulty with Chili in 1892.
Even as late as the year 1882, very high military authority in
this country advocated with great earnestness the proposition that
our old brick and stone forts, with their smooth-bore guns, could
make a successful defense against a modern iron-clad fleet! At
the same time, and even much later, high naval authority maintained
that the United States navy should be relied upon for the defense
of our many thousands of miles of sea-coast! In view of such
counsel, it does not seem strange that Congress, after all the old
ships had nearly all rotted away, began to give some attention to
a new navy, but thought little or nothing of land defenses. The
old brick and stone parapets and the cast-iron guns were still
there; none of them had become rotten, though the wooden carriages
had gone to decay, and the guns were lying on the ground! Yet,
after a long dream of security, the Great National Council announced
the decision that _something_ ought probably to be done for sea-
coast defense. Provision was made by law for a very high board,
with the Secretary of War presiding, to report to Congress what
was required--a thing which, if Congress had only known it, the
Engineer Bureau of the War Department could have reported just as
well in far less time. But a length a very able report was submitted,
which inspired the confidence of Congress.
BOARD OF ORDNANCE AND FORTIFICATION
In the meantime there had arisen a condition which can best be
expressed as "want of confidence" in the chief of the Ordnance
Department of the army on the part of committees of Congress. From
this it resulted that no appropriations were made for several years
for any new armament, and hence none for fortifications. Thus by
a trifle were the wheels of a great government blocked for a long
time! Yet that government still survives! Finally, in the year
1888 an act was passed creating a Board of Ordnance and Fortifications,
of which the commanding general of the army should be president,
and appropriating quite a large sum of money to be expended, under
the direct supervision of that board, to commence the work of
fortification and armament of the sea-coast. After a very careful
examination and full consideration and discussion, the board adopted
the plans prepared by the Bureaus of Engineering and Ordnance, and
the work was began and carried forward substantially the same as
if the expenditure of the appropriation had been intrusted to the
two bureaus concerned and the Secretary of War.
The board did perform, and still continues to perform, a very
important and essential duty, and one which cannot be satisfactorily
intrusted to any one man, namely, that of deciding the delicate
and difficult questions constantly arising in respect to the
practical utility and economy of new inventions having reference
to works of defense or of attack. But these questions had no
immediate bearing whatever upon the all-important problem of the
day--to place the sea-coasts of the United States in a satisfactory
state of defense according to the best scientific methods then
known to the world. And that problem had already been solved, in
all respects save one, namely, how to get out of Congress the
necessary money to do the work? Genius will never cease to invent
something better. If we are to wait for the best, the next war
will be over long before we shall begin to prepare for it. All
great military nations had been engaged for many years in elaborate
and costly experiments, to develop the best possible means of attack
and defense, and our Engineer and Ordnance departments had not
failed to profit thereby to the fullest extent. They were ready,
without any such costly experiments, to make our defenses as good
as any in the world. Yet that work of so vital importance must be
delayed until American genius could also be assured of a chance,
at government expense, of developing something better than anybody
else in the world had done! An end was finally, in 1888, put to
that dangerous delay by the device, so happily invented by somebody
in Congress, of a Board of Ordnance and Fortification.
USEFULNESS OF THE BOARD
The board has also served, and will doubtless continue to serve,
another very important purpose. It brings together, in close
consideration and discussion of all details of the system of national
defense, representative officers of the engineers, the ordnance,
and the artillery, together with a representative civilian who has
become, by service in Congress, far better able than any other
member to insure that perfect understanding between the board and
the committees of Congress which is essential to harmonious action.
Above all, it has given to the commanding general an opportunity
to become perfectly familiar with all the details of the coast
defenses, and to exert a legitimate influence in making preparations
for war, which must be of vital importance to him and to the country
when he has to bear the great responsibility of command. I used
to say that it would not be just to me to deprive me of such
opportunities for education, and I doubt not all my successors will
share that feeling. Thus, what may prove to be of the greatest
benefit to the military service has finally come out of that evil
of "want of confidence" in an ordnance chief.
When in command of the Division of the Atlantic in 1886-7, I made
a careful estimate of the aggregate strength of the war garrisons
required for the fortifications and armament recommended by the
Endicott board, and of the peace garrisons which would be absolutely
required for the care of the new works and for the instruction of
the militia artillery reserves. It was found that the addition of
two regiments to the present artillery strength of the army would
provide the requisite force. Hence a measure was formulated and
submitted to Congress to convert the present five regiments into
seven, with some proportionate reduction in the number of officers,
intended to promote efficiency and economy. That measure has
appeared to meet with the approval of nearly all concerned, but is
still pending in Congress. It is probably the most important
military measure now awaiting favorable action. The measure which
accompanies it for the reorganization of the infantry, though not
of so pressing necessity, is based upon sound military principles,
and is worthy of prompt and favorable action.
The first introduction of the policy of confining the warlike tribes
of Indians upon very restricted reservations necessarily caused
great discontent, especially among the younger men, who where thus
cut off from the sports of the chase and the still greater sport
of occasional forays into frontier settlements, which were the only
means known in Indian custom by which a young warrior could gain
a name and a position of honor in his tribe. Either through too
limited appropriations or bad management, the provisions furnished
for the support of the Indians, in lieu of those to which they had
been accustomed, proved inadequate. This caused the spirit of
discontent to increase and to become general among all ages. The
natural result was such a threat of war from the great Sioux nation
in the winter of 1890-91 as to necessitate the concentration of
quite a large army to meet the danger of a general outbreak. In
the course of military operations, accidents rather than design on
either side occasioned some serious collisions between the troops
and the Indians, especially at Wounded Knee, resulting in desperate
conflict and much loss of life. But by very careful management on
the part of the commanding general in the field, Major-General
Miles, a general conflict was averted, and the Sioux made their
submission. They had had no general intention to go to war, if
they could avoid it without starvation. After a large sum of money
had been expended by the War Department in this way, the deficiencies
in food were supplied at about the same cost as would, if made in
advance, have removed the cause of war. The Indians gained their
point of getting as much food as they needed, and the War Department
paid the extra bills, but out of the same public treasury which
has so often been bled in that way.
TROUBLES WITH THE SIOUX INDIANS IN 1890-91
It was quite beyond the power of the War Department to guard against
a recurrence of that greatest danger of Indian wars--starvation of
the Indians. But long experience and accurate knowledge of Indian
character had suggested a method by which the other cause of
discontent among the young Indian warriors might be, at least in
a great measure, removed. That was by providing a legitimate method
by which their irrepressible love of military life and exploits
might be largely gratified, and, at the same time, those ambitious
young men transferred from the ranks of more or less probable savage
enemies to the ranks of friends and practically civilized allies.
Fortunately, the strongest trait of the Indian character, namely,
fidelity to the war chief, lent itself to this project. Long
experience had shown the existence of this Indian trait. In only
one solitary instance had the Indian scouts so long employed by
the army ever proved unfaithful, though often employed in hostilities
against their own tribes. Hence, if the ardent young warriors
could be induced to enlist for three years in the army, they would,
at least for that time, be converted from enemies into allies, even
against such of their own tribes as might refuse to enlist. Of
course the army must suffer somewhat, in its effective strength
for all purposes, during this experiment; for it is evident that
a company or troop of Indians would not be quite as valuable for
general service as the same number of white men. Yet the transfer
of a few hundred of the best Sioux warriors from the Sioux side to
our side would much more than compensate for the loss of the same
number of white troops. The result of that experiment seemed to
be entirely satisfactory. At all events, there has been no great
Indian war, nor any threat of one, since that experiment was begun.
It has served to tide over the time during which the young men,
who had from earliest childhood listened to stories of the Custer
massacre and other great Indian achievements, were undergoing
transformation from the life and character of savage warriors to
those of civilized husbandmen, under the system of allotments in
severalty. When the short warlike part of the life of one generation
is past, the danger will no longer exist.
In June, 1891, at Keokuk, Iowa, I married Miss Georgia Kilbourne,
daughter of Mrs. George E. Kilbourne of that city. Then a host of
old soldiers of the Union army reassembled to greet their comrade.
In 1892 this country seemed to be on the verge of war with the
little republic of Chile. So confident were some officials of the
administration that war was inevitable, that I was asked to make
an estimate of the military force which would be necessary to occupy
and hold a vital point in Chilean territory until the demands of
the United States were complied with. It was assumed, of course,
that the navy could easily do all the rest. Pending the consideration
of this subject, so disagreeable to me, I had a dream which I
repeated at the time to a few intimate friends. I saw in the public
street a man holding a mangy-looking dog by the neck, and beating
him with a great club, while a crowd of people assembled to witness
the "sport." Some one asked the man why he was beating the poor
dog. He replied: "Oh, just to make him yelp." But the dog did
not "yelp." He bore his cruel punishment without a whine. Then
he was transformed into a splendid animal, one of the noblest of
his species, and the entire crowd of bystanders, with one accord,
rushing in and compelled the man to desist from beating him.