Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea--His Expectations that
the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If Not "War"--The
Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to Sherman--The
Credit Given by Grant to Sherman--"Master of the Situation"--The
Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches--His Great Ability as a Strategist.
The actual result in Tennessee was more decisive than Sherman had
any good reason to expect. But he had good reason to expect, and
evidently did, that Thomas would be able, after he had concentrated
his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive
the latter out of Tennessee and pursue him with such force and
energy as fully to occupy his attention and prevent him from
interfering in any manner with Sherman's own operations. Hence
Sherman as well as Grant had reason to assume that Hood's army
would be eliminated from the military problem in the Atlantic
States. Again, the general military situation as known to General
Sherman, or probably to anybody else, in October and November,
1864, did not indicate that Grant, with the force he then had in
Virginia, would be able to capture or destroy Lee's army. He might
undoubtedly capture Petersburg and Richmond, but Lee would probably
be able to withdraw his army toward the south, nearer to his sources
of supply, and by skilful manoeuvers prolong the contest until the
National Government might abandon it. Grant's letters at that time
confirm this view of the military situation.
Some writers have attempted to explain and justify Sherman's action
in taking with him so large an army, while leaving Thomas one so
much smaller, on the ground that he might meet in his march to the
sea such opposition as possibly to require so large a force to
overcome it. But to any one familiar with the facts, and to no
one more than to Sherman, his army of 60,000 men was evidently all
out of proportion to any possible resistance it could meet in
Georgia. But when he should start northward from Savannah the case
would become vastly different. At any point in the Carolinas he
might possibly meet the whole of Lee's army. That is to say,
Sherman's ulterior plan could not be prudently undertaken at all
without an army as large as that with which he actually marched to
the sea, namely, 60,000 men. Indeed, as the records show, Sherman
considered a long time before he decided that he could spare the
Twenty-third Corps to go back and help Thomas. If any question
can possibly exist as to what was the essential part of Sherman's
plan in marching to Savannah, what other possible military reason
can be given for that march except to make the subsequent march to
Virginia with so large an army? Why change his base to Savannah?
What was he to operate against after he got there?
Nothing could have been clearer to any military mind in the fall
of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured
or destroyed, the surrender of the other must necessarily follow
very quickly, and the rebellion be ended. No man could have been
more earnest than Sherman in his laudable desire to make the capture
of his own adversary the beginning of the end. Sherman's well-
known character leaves this beyond question. It is not possible
that he could have preferred a manifestation of the power of the
nation by destroying Southern property rather than by destroying
a Southern army.
SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA
But there was one objection--absolutely overruling, apparently, in
Sherman's mind--to any further attempt by Sherman himself, with
the main body of his army then in Georgia, to prosecute the primary
military object of his campaign--the destruction or capture of
Hood's army. To have done so would have conceded a temporary
triumph to the chief of the Confederate armies, who had loudly
proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect
that State from any further invasion. Such a concession, however
temporary, was manifestly intolerable to Sherman's mind.( 1)
Besides, Sherman had formed and announced, with Grant's cordial
concurrence, a well-matured plan of future operations. As "master
of the situation," he could afford to go on and substantially
execute that plan, or at least the primary part of it,--the change
of base,--treating almost with contempt the enemy's bold design to
thwart him. Although this must, at least for the time being, compel
him personally to forego and leave to a subordinate the primary
operations of a military campaign,--those directly against the
opposing army,--the joint action of Sherman and Grant, each with
a powerful army, directly against Lee's army in Virginia, was the
surest and probably the shortest possible way to end the war.
Hence Sherman's broad view of the entire national military situation,
including the moral aspect of it, which was then of very great
importance, gave rise to that grand conception of far-reaching
strategy which must ever stamp its author as a master of that great
art.
Sherman having thus come to the conclusion that he personally must
abandon the attempt to "catch Hood," as he called it, his "busy
brain" did not fail to perceive every possible alternative plan of
operations. The abandonment of Georgia by Hood had completely
opened up two other alternatives, one of which was before not
possible, and the other only partly so. The one was a movement
upon Richmond or its communications to join with Grant in the
capture of Lee's army, and the other was to destroy the military
resources of the Southern Atlantic States. The first was too grand,
and perhaps might seem too visionary, to be talked about at first,
nor was any mention of it at that time necessary. Besides, events
might possibly render the march to Richmond unnecessary or
impracticable; or, possibly, Sherman might be compelled for some
reason to make his new base at Pensacola or Mobile, though he was
determined to make it at Savannah, if possible; and hence it was
necessary to have, in reserve as it were, a sufficient logical
reason for the preliminary operation, if that finally had to stand
alone.
Again, that part of the original plan which contemplated the capture
of Savannah in advance could not be carried out. Grant could not
spare the troops from the east for that purpose. If that had been
done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenished his
supplies by the river from Savannah, and marched thence northward
by the upland route instead of through the swamps of South Carolina.
But, as it was, Sherman was, as he thought, compelled to go to
Savannah first, capture that place himself, and make that the base
for his northward march. Hence there was no need to say anything
to anybody about what further was to be done until after Savannah
was in Sherman's possession, and the time had arrived for him to
consult Grant about the future. Yet in Sherman's remarkable letter
to Grant, dated November 6, 1864,( 2) written after it was too late
to have any influence upon Grant's approval of Sherman's march, he
disclosed to Grant the ulterior object he had in view. In discussing
the reasons for selecting the route to Savannah rather than either
of the others, he said: "Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's
depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston
or Savannah, from either of which points I could reinforce our
armies in Virginia."
SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA
Of course Grant, no less than Sherman, must have perceived instantly
the full significance of Sherman's change of base to Savannah the
moment that move was suggested. The question in what manner that
concerted action between Grant and Sherman against Lee should be
arranged could well be considered later, after that march had been
made and a new base established at Savannah. The correspondence
between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west,
including the letters of September 12 and 20, simply shows that
neither had at that time conceived the possibility of any movement
of Sherman toward Virginia. All their thoughts had reference to
continuing operations in the south, Sherman's most important object
being to get control of the Savannah River; or, as expressed, in
his last words: "If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the
Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of
absence to see the young folks." Their joint action against Lee
does not appear to have been suggested by either until Sherman's
letter of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after
Sherman started.
The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement "leaving
open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta," as embodied in his
despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity
thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original
plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement
had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as
practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic
States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the
ulterior purpose to "reinforce our armies in Virginia." He
telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November
6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to
reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savannah
on December 24: "I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans.
I have thought them over so long and well that they appear clear
as daylight."
It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant
was strictly confidential. "I have still some thoughts . . . that
should be confided to you [that is, to Grant and to nobody else]
as a key to future developments." Neither Grant nor Sherman appears
to have made any use of that "key" for the public benefit. But it
now unlocks the store-house of Sherman's mind, and shows to the
world more of the real character of the great strategist than any
other public document he ever wrote.
Then Grant was ready with his plan, first to seize and hold the
Southern railroads by which supplies could reach Lee, and second,
for Sherman and the most of his army to come to Virginia by sea,
to which Sherman responded with all the loyalty of his most loyal
nature, only mentioning incidentally his own plan. Thereupon, when
Grant gave him an invitation to speak freely, he replied as above
quoted, and explained in detail his plans for the northward march,
to "be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time
the spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can
whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident
that I can handle him in the open country."
But Sherman's "busy brain" had provided in advance even for the
worst possible contingency--that after all his long march, however
long it might prove to be, that march might have to "stand alone"
--he might not actually take part in the capture of either of the
Confederate armies. Hence, before starting on his march, in his
letter of November 6 to Grant he explained that his march would be
"statesmanship" anyway, even if it was not "war." Sherman was not
a man to be "left out," no matter what might happen.
SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA
But Sherman's good fortune was almost equal to his strategy and
his skill in marching an army. Although, as fate would have it,
he did not have a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas
had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf
states, whereby the fragments of that "broken and dispirited" army,
as Thomas well called it, were gathered together, under their old,
able commander, General Johnston, and appeared in Sherman's front
to oppose his northward march, and finally to capitulate to him at
"Bennett's House" in North Carolina. The remnant of that army
which Sherman had disdained to pursue into Alabama or Mississippi
had traveled a thousand miles to surrender to him! No story of
fiction could be more romantic than that fact of real war history.
It was not necessary for Sherman to produce his letter of November
6, 1864; but I have quoted from it here very largely to show that
there was no possible contingency which his far-reaching mind had
not foreseen and provided for.
Sherman's plan was so firmly fixed in his own mind, almost from
the very start, that he was determined to adhere to it in spite of
all possible opposition, even including the adverse opinions and
advice of General Grant. Hence, as was his habit in such cases,
he invented every imaginable reason, without regard to their logical
or illogical character, to convince others of the soundness of his
conclusion. But the logic of the real reasons which convinced his
own mind is, when the chaff is all winnowed away, as clear and
bright as the golden grain.
In view of the great strategical project which Sherman had mapped
out for himself and which required a formidable army, and of his
responsibility for what might be the result of operations against
Hood in Tennessee, it was a difficult and delicate question to
decide what force he should take with him, and what send back. My
own belief always has been, and is now, that in view of his exact
knowledge of Thomas's character and habits of thought and action,
Sherman ought to have sent back another corps of veteran troops,
or else have waited to see that Thomas was actually prepared to
cope with Hood, preferably the latter, before going so far away
that he could not render him any assistance. Yet, as has heretofore
been shown, if Thomas had carried out Sherman's instructions by
promptly concentrating his troops, there would have been no risk
of serious results in Tennessee.
In connection with Sherman's operations it is essential to bear in
mind the distinction between two radically different kinds of
strategy, one of which has for its object the conquest of territory
or the capture of places by defeating in battle or out-manoeuvering
the defending armies; while the other has for its object the
destruction or capture of those armies, resulting, of course, in
the conquest of all the enemy's territory. The first kind may be
all-sufficient, and hence best, in a foreign war having for its
object anything less than total conquest; but in the suppression
of a rebellion, as in a foreign conquest, the occupation of places
or territory ought to be entirely ignored except so far as this
contributes to the successful operation of armies against opposing
forces. This fundamental principle appears to have been duly
appreciated by the leading Union commanders near the close of the
Civil War, though not so fully in its earlier stages. Military
critics are apt to fall into error by not understanding the principle
itself, or by overlooking the change of policy above referred to.
SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA
It is necessary not to confound the "march to the sea" as actually
conceived and executed by Sherman as a preliminary to the march
northward for the capture of Lee's army, with the previous far-
reaching strategic plans of Grant, of which Sherman and other chief
commanders were informed in the spring of 1864.
Grant's plans had in view, as their great object, again to cut in
two the Confederate territory, as had been done by the opening of
the Mississippi River to the gulf. This next line of section might
be Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Savannah, or Chattanooga, Atlanta,
Montgomery, and Mobile. But with the disappearance of Hood's army
from that theater of operations, all reason for that plan of
"territorial" strategy had disappeared, and the occasion was then
presented, for the first time, for the wholly different strategical
plan of Sherman, of which Lee's army was the sole military objective.
Grant was perfectly just to himself as well as to Sherman in giving
the latter full credit for this last plan; and he modestly refrained
from any more than a brief mention of his own plans, which unforseen
events had made it unnecessary fully to execute. But history will
do justice to Grant's great strategical designs as well as to his
great achievements. I trust it may be my good fortune to contribute
something hereafter toward the payment of this debt of gratitude
which all Americans owe to the greatest soldier of the Union.
The fact that Savannah was one of the points in both Grant's plans
and Sherman's was merely an incident, and a very unimportant one.
Indeed, after Hood got out of his way, Sherman might as well, and
I think better, have marched direct to Augusta, and thence northward,
wholly ignoring Savannah as well as Charleston, except that he
would have arrived in Virginia rather early in the season. Savannah
was a good place to go in order to spend the winter, besides
destroying Georgia en route.
Of course it is much easier to see what might have been done than
to see in advance what can or ought to be done. But it can hardly
be believed that Sherman did not think of everything that was
possible, as well as many things that were not. At least, so simple
a proposition as the following could not have escaped his mind.
Sherman was, as he so confidently said, absolute "master of the
situation" before he started for Savannah. Hood and Forrest had
utterly failed so to damage his communications that they could not
be put in order again in a few days. He was able, if he chose, to
remain in perfect security at Atlanta all winter, with two or three
corps, while he sent back to Thomas ample force to dispose of Hood.
Then, if the result of the operations of a larger force in Tennessee
had been as decisive as they actually were with the smaller one
Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops
he had sent to Tennessee, and thus marched toward Virginia with
eighty-five or ninety or even one hundred thousand men, instead of
sixty thousand. All this could have surely been accomplished by
the middle of January, or before the time when Sherman actually
began his march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South
Carolina, crossing the Savannah River above Augusta, is an easier
march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not
cared about paying a visit to Columbia en route, he could have
taken the much shorter "Piedmont route" to Charlotte, North Carolina,
and thence northward by whichever route he pleased. Instead of
retaining the dominant attitude of "master," Sherman lost it the
moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior
force to cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and
the capture of Savannah did not by any means restore that mastery
to Sherman. It was not restored until Hood was actually defeated
in Tennessee.
THE FAME OF SHERMAN'S GRAND MARCHES
I have referred to the possibilities of a direct march from Atlanta
via Columbia or Charlotte, with a much larger army, at exactly the
same time, for the purpose of showing that even Sherman's grand
strategic plan to assist in the capture of Lee's army did not
necessitate or justify his action in marching to Savannah and
quitting his own theater of operations before his adversary there
had been disposed of. The plan above suggested would have negatived
even more positively the boast and promise of the Confederate chief
that Sherman should be driven out of Georgia. The fact that Sherman
personally, with an army about as large as, or larger than, Hood's,
could and did remain quietly at Atlanta while one of his subordinates
disposed of Hood and his army, would have been the most emphatic
possible defeat of the Confederate plan to force him back by
operations in his rear. Only one part of Sherman's earnest desires
would have been unrealized--namely, to destroy Georgia. But even
that could have been, at least in a great measure, compensated for
by the more complete destruction of South Carolina, the cradle of
secession and rebellion.
The more carefully Sherman's great operations are examined, the
more clearly it will appear that while his plans were magnificent,
their execution was not perfect. And this is the legitimate aim
of just military criticism, not to build up or pull down the
reputations of commanders, but to assist military students in their
efforts to perfect themselves in the art and science of war.
Sherman's great marches, especially through the enemy's country
and over such obstacles as those found from Savannah to Goldsboro',
showed him to be a master of the auxiliary art of logistics no less
than of the great science of strategy. Even to those who have had
no means of duly appreciating the higher merits of Sherman's general
plans, his marches have seemed the wonder of the world. Yet,
strangely enough, the march through Georgia, which was in fact the
simplest thing possible, has been regarded as the great exploit,
while the vastly more difficult and important march through the
Carolinas appears to have been taken as a matter of course, perhaps
because of the conviction, which had by that time become general,
that Sherman could do anything he might undertake.
In respect to Sherman's skill in grand tactics, I have only a few
words to say here. The part assigned him in Grant's general plan
of operations for all the armies, in 1864, in his "private and
confidential" letter of April 6, was as follows: "You I propose
to move against Johnston's army to break it up, and to get into
the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting
all the damage you can against their war resources." It is a
simple, plain matter of history that Sherman did not accomplish
the first and more important part of the task assigned him--"to
break it up"--in the four months of almost constant fighting with
Johnston's army. In the comments I have made upon the Atlanta
campaign, I believe I have shown clearly why Sherman did not
accomplish that result by the tactical operations to which he
limited himself. The manner in which that army, then under Hood
instead of Johnston, was finally broken up by Sherman's subordinates
in Tennessee, shows clearly enough what kind of modification of
Sherman's tactical methods was requisite to enable him to reach
the same result in Georgia.
SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST
Sherman's tactical operations during the entire Atlanta campaign
were marked by the highest degree of prudence and caution. Even
his one assault upon fortified lines at Kenesaw was no exception;
for the worst that could happen in that was what actually did
happen, namely, a fruitless loss of a considerable number of men,
yet a number quite insignificant in comparison with the total
strength of his army. Johnston displayed similar qualities in an
equal degree so long as he was in command; and his well-known
ability may have suggested to Sherman the wisdom of like prudence
in all his own operations. But Hood signalized his accession to
the command by the boldest kind of tactics, amounting even to
rashness in the commander of a force so inferior to that of his
adversary. Yet Sherman continued his own cautious methods to the
end. Even his last move, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta,
--the only one which had even the general appearance of boldness,
--was, in fact, marked by the greatest prudence throughout. The
Twentieth Corps occupied a strongly fortified bridge-head at the
Chattahoochee River, and the Twenty-third Corps another equally
strongly fortified "pivot" around which the grand wheel of the army
was made. That moving army was much larger than Hood's entire
force, and had all the advantage of the initiative, which completely
disconcerted the opposing commander, and caused him to commit a
blunder that ought to have proved fatal, namely, that of dividing
his inferior force and permitting his superior opponent to occupy
a position between the widely separated wings of his own army.
Yet Sherman refused to take any advantage of that blunder, and sat
still while Hood leisurely reunited his divided forces.
Even if such extreme caution in handling a superior force against
such an antagonist as Johnston could be regarded as wise, it surely
could not against such an antagonist as Hood, whose character of
extreme audacity in the aggressive should have assured his destruction
by a more skilful adversary in command of a superior force. But
Sherman's own knowledge of his own impulsive nature made him unduly
distrustful of his own judgment when under great responsibility in
emergencies, and this in spite of his unusual intellectual activity
and his great confidence in his deliberately matured judgment.
This is the opinion of Sherman's character formed by me after the
closest possible observation and study. For this reason Sherman's
capacity as a tactician was not by any means equal to his ability
as a strategist. He lacked the element of confident boldness or
audacity in action which is necessary to gain the greatest results
by taking advantage of his adversary's blunders, and by tempting
or forcing his adversary into positions of which he might take
advantage. Yet Sherman was very far from lacking skill as a
tactician. Both he and Johnston might well be likened to masters
of the sword so skilful and so equally matched that neither could
give any material advantage over the other. In my opinion, their
duel of ten weeks' duration was never surpassed in the history of
the world for the masterly skill and execution with which the one
pressed the other back step by step, and the other disputed every
foot of the ground, neither giving nor attempting to make an
opportunity to strike a decisive blow. If the object of that
campaign was to capture Atlanta on the one side, and to defend it
on the other, the handling of those two splendid armies was simply
magnificent. It would be a great pity that an end was put to that
duel by the removal of Johnston, and the military world thus deprived
of a complete lesson, except for the fact that, whether or not the
contest finally resulted in the fall of Atlanta, the rebellion in
that part of the South would have been practically as far from an
end as it was the first of May! Johnston would have been there in
front of Sherman, all the same, and at least one more campaign
would have been required before the march to the sea could have
been made.
SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST
Although Sherman did not himself accomplish the first part of
Grant's plan in respect to Johnston's army,--namely, "to break it
up",--the second part, "to get into the interior of the enemy's
country, . . . inflicting all the damage you can against their war
resources,"( 3) was carried out as thoroughly as Grant or anybody
else could have wished. It is also true that Sherman claimed the
credit for the breaking up of Hood's army in Tennessee, while he
was marching to Savannah, as a legitimate and foreseen part of his
general plan, like his successful march and capture of Savannah.
But he appeared not to see that in such a claim he was condemning
himself for not having done with a superior force what Thomas
actually did with a smaller one. That result was, in fact, due
largely to an accident which, in the ordinary course of military
operations, ought not to have happened, and by which Hood was
tempted to make at Franklin one of those furious assaults upon
troops in position and ready to receive him which are almost always
disastrous. It was just the kind of temptation to Hood's army that
was necessary "to break it up," and it did so very effectually.
The old "Army of Tennessee," which had been so formidable, ceased
to be a formidable army on November 30. Its fighting days were
nearly over. After that it never did any fighting at all worthy
of its old record. And there was hardly a single day while Hood
was in command in the Atlanta campaign when a similar result might
not have been reached by a similar method, and that without any
risk of disaster to the Union army, because the force assaulted by
Hood might always have had a more powerful army near to hand to
support it if necessary.
In his special field order of January 8, 1865, announcing to all
the troops of his military division the results of his great
campaign, General Sherman said: "Generals Thomas and Schofield,
commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts
and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes." If the
purpose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to
serve as a "decoy" to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport
would have been more enjoyable if it had taken place earlier in
the season, when Sherman was near by with his sixty thousand men
to help "bag the game."
It has occurred to me as at least possible that Sherman's recollection
of the suggestions I had repeatedly made to him during the Atlanta
campaign may have been in his mind when he ordered me back to report
to Thomas, and when he wrote his special field order. If so, I
must protest my innocence of any intention to play the role of
"decoy" at Franklin when one of the great gunners was twenty miles
away, and the other several hundred!
Yet, accepting even the most unfavorable view of Sherman's tactical
as well as of his strategical operations in connection with the
operations of all the other armies under Grant's general plans and
direction, there was nothing in them all that could possibly have
prevented their complete ultimate success in the capture of Lee's
army. If Grant had not captured that army, Sherman would. And
the surrender of Lee was necessarily followed by that of all the
other Confederate armies. Hence, whatever might have happened if
Sherman's great march had not been made, that march with so large
an army made the end of the rebellion in the spring of 1865 sure
beyond any possible doubt. In view of a public service so original
in its conception, so grand in its magnitude, and so brilliant in
its execution, any criticism respecting details cannot diminish
the fame of the general who planned and executed that grand campaign,
nor that of the general-in-chief, the success of whose far-reaching
plans had made the brilliant exploit of his subordinate possible.
Such criticisms are justifiable only in the interest of exact truth
and of exact military science, so that imperfections in the operations
of the greatest commanders may not be mistaken by the military
student as having been among the causes which led to success.
[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 141.]
[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.]
[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXII, part iii, p. 245.]