Sherman's "March to the Sea"--The Military Theory On Which It Was
Based--Did It Involve War or Statesmanship?--The Correspondence
Between Grant and Sherman, and Sherman and Thomas--The Effect of
Jefferson Davis's Speech on Sherman--Rawlins's Reported Opposition
to the March, and Grant's Final Judgment On It.
During the Atlanta campaign the principal commanders of the army
assumed, as a matter of course, that Atlanta would be ours in due
time, and hence there was much discussion of the question, What
next? It was evident the army could not go much farther and rely
upon its present line of supply, although General Thomas said,
immediately after the capture of Atlanta, that he had "a plan for
the capture of Macon" which he would like to execute. What the
plan was he did not divulge, General Sherman turning the conversation
in another direction. At that time it was presumed Hood would
oppose whatever move was attempted, and hence a new base, to be
provided in advance, if practicable, by the capture of some place
on the gulf or on the Atlantic, was evidently essential to further
operations in Georgia. This new base being provided, Sherman could
move out from Atlanta with twenty or thirty days' supplies in
wagons, and swing round Hood so as to place his rear toward the
new base and open communication therewith. Evidently the march to
the sea, as it was actually made, was impossible, and was not
thought of until Hood moved from Sherman's front and cleared the
way.
In the popular judgment formed immediately after important events,
success or failure is the only criterion of wisdom; but the historian
must go deeper, and consider the merits of a general plan in view
of the greater or less probability of failure of any one of its
parts. What would have been the just judgment of mankind upon
Sherman's march to the sea if Thomas had failed, as Sherman with
a much larger force had done, to destroy or seriously cripple Hood's
army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of
Kentucky--an event much less improbable than many that have actually
occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller
force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as
he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for
it was not defensible by any force Thomas then had there. Thomas's
cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers,
would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched
to the Ohio. What offset to this would have been the capture of
Savannah as a "Christmas gift" to the nation?
The situation at that time was certainly a perplexing one to Sherman.
He could not permit Hood to put him, with his superior force, on
the defensive, nor even to appear to do so for a moment; and it
was not easy for him to consent that his enemy should entirely
nullify all his elaborately considered plans for future operations
in Georgia. What operations Sherman decided on in that unprecedented
case is well known.
SHERMAN'S "MARCH TO THE SEA"
When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah on November 12, he
had not, as events proved, sufficient reason for assuming "Thomas's
strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field," or even to
hold Nashville against him, much less to hold "the line of the
Tennessee River firmly," which was the condition upon which Grant
at first consented that Sherman might make "the trip to the sea-
coast."( 1)
Thomas's concurrence in Sherman's opinion, as shown in his despatch
of November 12, simply shows that they were both in the same error;
for A. J. Smith's troops did not begin to arrive at Nashville until
the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a
very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman's plan.
The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay
of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate
battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman's six corps, without
the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so
largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to
say that the hazards of that retreat from Pulaski and of the defense
at Franklin were far greater than any portion of Sherman's army
had ever before encountered, and far greater than any army ever
ought to meet except in case of necessity--hazards which, at that
stage of the war, with our vastly superior armies in the field, it
would have been inexcusable voluntarily to incur. If it is asked
why such hazard was taken, the answer has heretofore been given.
By it alone could the time be gained which was necessary for Thomas's
reinforcements to reach Nashville. The time gained was barely
sufficient; one day less might have been fatal.
The question that at once arises is, Why have taken even a chance
of error in a matter of so vital moment--an error that might have
led to disastrous consequences? Hood was already on the Tennessee
River, preparing to cross and begin his march to Nashville. Thomas
had ready to meet him only about two thirds Hood's strength in
infantry, and less than half in effective cavalry. A few days'
delay on Sherman's part in commencing his march would have disclosed
to him the impossibility of Smith's arrival in time, and have
enabled him to send another corps from his superabundant force to
assist Thomas. Such delay of only a few days could not have been
of serious consequence in respect to Sherman's plans. The near
approach of winter was the only reason why an early start was
important; and that was not considered any very serious obstacle
to the operations of Hood or Thomas in a more unfavorable country
for winter operations.
The railroad was in running order to Atlanta, and the enemy's
cavalry were then known to be far from it. Sherman could have kept
his army supplied, and ready to start any day he pleased. Why not
have waited to see whether Thomas could get together troops enough
to cope with Hood, and then, when sufficient preparation had been
assured to fight the enemy, and only then, start off on a march
where there was no considerable enemy to fight?
In the estimate of time, Sherman had no right to disregard even
Thomas's well-known "slowness of thought and action," but was bound
to take that into account.
I have never yet been able to see the wisdom of taking any hazard
of defeat in Tennessee when we had ample force at command to secure
victory there, with enough remaining to march wherever its commander
pleased through the South, except where Hood's or Lee's army might
be. By this I mean to say that three, or even two, of Sherman's
corps could have gone to Savannah, or anywhere else, just as well
as four, and thus have left Thomas force enough to make the defeat
of Hood sure beyond contingency; or that Sherman should have delayed
his march to the sea until Thomas had concentrated troops enough
to defeat Hood.
THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED
The question which now presents itself for critical consideration
is, Upon what military theory was Sherman's "march to the sea"
based?
Sherman himself explains it as a change of base, and he estimates
its value in comparison with that of his subsequent operations in
the ratio of one to ten. But why those subsequent operations, or
a change of base with a view to any such ulterior purpose? Grant
had not at that time even suggested the need of Sherman's aid
against Lee, and events proved that no such need existed. When
Sherman started for Savannah from Atlanta, the Confederate force
in the Gulf States was quite equal to Lee's army in Virginia, while
Grant's army was larger than Sherman's. Could Sherman have
contemplated at that time such a thing as going to Grant's assistance,
where he was not needed, and leaving Hood's army behind him?
A change of base to Savannah or Mobile had been contemplated as a
probable necessity of future operations in Georgia or in the Gulf
States, upon the capture of Atlanta; but that of course upon the
supposition that there would still be a formidable army of the
Confederacy in those States against which operations were to be
conducted. When that Confederate army, under Hood, marched toward
the west, with the evident intention to carry the war into Tennessee
and Kentucky, why a change of base by Sherman in the opposite
direction, to Savannah?
Sherman appears to have supposed at first that Hood would follow
him when he started on his march through Georgia, as Hood had
supposed that Sherman would follow him into Tennessee. Was there
any more reason for the one supposition than the other? Ought not
Sherman as well as Hood to have known his antagonist better than
such a supposition would imply? Was it not extremely unreasonable
to suppose that Hood, after he had marched hundreds of miles west
from Atlanta and reached the base of his projected operations in
Tennessee, would turn back and follow Sherman at such a distance
in his rear? It is perfectly evident that such a stern-chase by
Hood was contemplated only as a bare possibility, not by any means
as a probable result of Sherman's march. It could have had no
influence in forming Sherman's final determination to make that
march. In fact, the march does not appear to have been finally
decided on--certainly it was not commenced--until Hood had gone so
far in the opposite direction as to make his pursuit of Sherman
out of the question, and had fully disclosed his plan to invade
Tennessee. It was surely, therefore, an extraordinary spectacle
to see the main Union army marching where there was no considerable
hostile force to meet it, leaving a comparatively small detachment
to cope with the formidable enemy!
Of course Sherman could not fall back into Tennessee, and thus let
Hood put him on the defensive, even for a short time. He could
afford only to send back a detachment large enough to enable Thomas,
with the other forces he could assemble, to hold Nashville and
prevent Hood from crossing the Cumberland. This is virtually but
little more than what Sherman did in that regard.
THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED
There then remained to Sherman practically only one line of action
at all consistent with the dictates of established principles in
the conduct of a military campaign: That was to strike with his
superior remaining force for Hood's rear, south of the Tennessee
River. Such a movement could have been commenced immediately upon
Hood's march in that direction. Supplies would have been drawn,
first from Chattanooga, and afterward from Stevenson, and then from
Decatur, Sherman's line of supply being thus very much shortened.
A small detachment at Atlanta could have destroyed the works of
military value in that place, and the railroad thence back to
Chattanooga, being completely covered in this work by Sherman's
army, without delaying its march a single day. Sherman could thus
have easily struck Hood south of the Tennessee before the latter
could have made his preparations for crossing that river. Indeed,
with Sherman marching in that direction, even so bold a man as Hood
could hardly have been so reckless as to have crossed the Tennessee;
and if he had, his destruction must have been sure. Hence the
least result would have been simply to transfer the theater of
operations from Georgia to Alabama, or perhaps to Mississippi, and
greatly to shorten Sherman's line of supply. And what possible
difference could it make in which part of the revolted States the
theater of war might be, so long as the Confederate army, to destroy
which was the only important object of a campaign, was there? To
avoid a transfer of the battlefield from Georgia to Alabama or
Mississippi, was it wise to run the risk of transferring it to
Kentucky or Ohio? Perhaps no movement which could have been
contemplated by the Confederate authorities would have been more
greatly to Sherman's advantage over Hood than the one they adopted.
I cannot better show my own exact impression at the time respecting
the operations of Sherman and Hood in 1864, than by an illustration
that will be at once appreciated on every farm in America. When
two fighting-cocks meet for the first time, battle is joined without
delay, and is prosecuted with all possible vigor and skill. If
the result is decisive the victor's triumph is loudly proclaimed,
while the defeated combatant, with lowered crest, seeks safety in
flight. If, on the contrary, the result is a drawn battle, the
two antagonists, as if by common consent, slowly separate, carrying
their heads high, and sharply watching each other. When distance
has assured the close of that contest, they severally go to feeding,
as if nothing unusual had happened, or else march off to seek some
less formidable foe. Neither utters a note of defiance until he
is well beyond the other's reach.
The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, especially the letters
from Grant of September 12, and from Sherman of September 20, both
carried by Grant's staff officer, Colonel Horace Porter, show a
complete understanding of the situation at that time, and perfect
accord in respect to the operations appropriate to that situation.( 2)
Savannah was to be captured, if practicable, by military and naval
forces from the east, and Sherman was so to manoeuver in respect
to Hood's army as to swing round the latter and thus place himself
in position to open communication with Savannah as his new base.
This was the simple, logical plan dictated by the situation, which
had for a long time been considered and worked out after weighing
all the advantages and disadvantages of other possible plans.
But very soon after Sherman despatched his letter of September 20
by Colonel Porter, Hood commenced his movement to Sherman's rear,
and then far to the west, which was designed to and did radically
change the military situation in view of which the carefully matured
plan described in Sherman's letter of September 20 had been formed.
Sherman, as clearly appears from his despatches later than September
20, considered long and apparently with great doubt what change
ought to be made in his own plans in consequence of the altered
situation due to the unexpected movements of his enterprising
adversary. That some very important change in Sherman's plans was
imperative was a matter of course. A general cannot well make his
own plans entirely upon his own theory as to what his enemy will
or ought to do, but must be governed in some measure by what the
other actually does. General Sherman evidently perceived quite
clearly what established rules of action required to be done, and
General Grant even more clearly, as was shown in his despatches of
October 11, 1864, and others.
THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED
It seems hardly possible to speak seriously of many of the reasons
given by Sherman for finally deciding to leave his old adversary
to the care of Thomas's inferior force. He said, for instance, in
his despatch to Grant of November 2: "If I could hope to overhaul
Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force. . . . No single
army can catch him."( 3) Sherman had been "catching" Hood with a
single army all summer, and without the slightest difficulty. What
reason had he to conclude that it would be impossible to do so
later? As my experience proved, it was as easy to "catch" him in
November, though with a smaller force, as it had been in July and
August with a much larger force, and Thomas had the same experience
in December. As Sherman knew from his own experience, as well as
I, whether the pursuing force was larger or smaller, Hood was about
the easiest man in the world to "catch," even by a "single" army.
But Sherman had under his command at that time, in Georgia and
Tennessee, as he said with great emphasis and confidence, two
armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming the largest estimate
then made of the strength of Hood's army. It appears that Sherman
gave Hood credit at that time for only thirty thousand infantry,
besides cavalry.( 4) If that was his estimate, then he had at
least three or four armies (including the reinforcements he counted
on for Thomas in Tennessee), each equal in strength to Hood's. Is
it possible Sherman thought he could not catch Hood with three or
four armies? But another despatch from Sherman, dated November 2,
seems to show that his estimate of Hood's army was more than 50,000,
instead of 30,000; for in that despatch he said in substance that
unless he drew Slocum's corps back from Atlanta, and abandoned that
place, his army would be inferior to Hood's.( 5) Now Slocum's
corps numbered 10,000 men, and Sherman marched to the sea with
60,000 after stripping down to the best possible fighting condition.
Hence Sherman, after sending back the Fourth and Twenty-third corps
to Thomas, and leaving out Slocum's corps, had 50,000 men, and
therefore according to this reckoning Hood had _more_ than 50,000.
Forty thousand would have been a reasonable estimate for Sherman
to have made of Hood's strength, with his more accurate knowledge
than any of his subordinate commanders could have. But, somehow,
the estimate of Hood's force at that time accepted by Thomas and
his subordinates in Tennessee was 45,000, besides cavalry, which
as understood to be 10,000, or even 12,000 including Forrest's
separate command. But even this was less than half of Sherman's
two armies.
Sherman made no attempt to "catch" Hood during his raid in Sherman's
rear in September, 1864, nor to interfere with his movement to the
west. In his "Memoirs,"( 6) Sherman says: "At first I thought of
interposing my whole army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent
Hood's escape south. . . . He would be likely to retreat eastward
by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do." Even thus early
in the game Sherman saw the opportunity Hood was probably going to
give him to make his projected change of base to Savannah, and
hence he took care not to prevent Hood from completing his "co-
operative" movement.
Sherman determined to destroy Atlanta and his railroad back to
Chattanooga, abandon entirely his former base of operations and
line of supply, and assume a new base of future operations on the
Atlantic or the gulf. In other words, Sherman decided that he
could not attempt to hold any part of the territory he had conquered
in the Atlanta campaign; that conquest was valuable only in the
opportunity it gave him to destroy everything of military importance
in that territory--that is, Atlanta and the railroads. The question
then arises, What possible difference could it make in which
direction he moved after having decided not to hold any part of
that territory, but to destroy it? Why would a move toward the
west any more than a move toward the east have the appearance of
losing all that had been gained, after he had destroyed it? The
simple fact is, the Confederate commander had abandoned Georgia to
its fate in the vain hope of putting Sherman on the defensive, not
realizing, apparently, that Sherman had ample force for defensive
purposes, besides an army superior to Hood's for aggressive
operations. The Southern army was thus placed where Sherman could
operate against it by a much shorter line, and hence with a much
larger force, if that was what he wished to do. He could at the
same time, if he thought it necessary or desirable, inflict upon
Georgia the destruction which the Confederate commander wanted to
prevent, but had in fact invited by abandoning that State, and that
without materially impairing the strength of his (Sherman's) main
army operating against the main force of the enemy. As suggested
by Grant, a cavalry raid through Georgia would have accomplished
that destruction as well as a march of 60,000 men. Hence, in the
light of all that appears in the records up to the time when Sherman
actually started on his march, no valid military reason had been
given why Sherman should not have sent a cavalry raid into Georgia,
as Grant suggested, to destroy everything there, and thus negative
Mr. Davis's promise of protection, while he (Sherman) pursued
relentlessly the strictly military plan Grant had prescribed for
him to break up Hood's army or capture it, which Sherman had yet
failed to accomplish.
Manifestly some other motive besides the motives stated in Sherman's
telegraphic despatches must have decided him to carry out his plan
to make the march to the sea.
The boastful assurance and threat of the Confederate commander-in-
chief,( 7) referred to by Sherman, gave at least some reason for
Sherman's defiant response by himself marching through Georgia
instead of sending a subordinate; and the partial execution of that
threat by Forrest's cavalry, referred to in Sherman's despatch of
November 1 to Grant, gave a strong reason for Sherman's eager
determination to march at once, without waiting for anything but
his own preparations. In his article, "The Grand Strategy of the
Last Year of the War,"( 8) Sherman reveals one of the reasons for
his haste in starting on his march. "How free and glorious I felt,"
he says, "when the magic telegraph was cut, which prevented the
possibility of orders of any kind from the rear coming to delay or
hinder us!" A letter written by Sherman to Grant, November 6, on
the eve of his start for the sea, also gave reasons, other than
military, for his famous march. In Sherman's "Memoirs" no quotation
is made from this letter,( 9) and it is referred to very briefly
without giving any suggestion of its important contents.
General Sherman thus stated his reasons for writing that letter:
"I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but
I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided
to you as a key to future developments."
DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP?
Then Sherman explained, with the art of which he was master, clearly,
logically, and convincingly, the reasons for the operations of his
army from the fall of Atlanta down to the time of his writing, by
which he had completely defeated his adversary's designs, closing
with the following language:
"Now, as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the
first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard
moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson
and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly
against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut
off his retreat. . . . These are the reasons which have determined
my former movements."
General Sherman then continues by explaining the reasons which
induced him not to carry out the movement above suggested.
Now come the reasons for the future movements upon which Sherman
had then fully decided, after having obtained General Grant's
consent, and which he was about to begin. After stating what he
had done "in the last ten days" to prepare for his march, he said:
"Then the question presents itself what shall be done? On the
supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee,
and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against
Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material
resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat
and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army
right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world,
foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot
resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship; nevertheless
it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people
abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can
march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that
the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question
of its willingness to use that power."
It was, perhaps, not _war_, but rather _statesmanship_ upon which
Sherman was about to enter--not to defeat and destroy or capture
the Confederate armies, but to demonstrate in the most positive
manner that the "North can prevail in this contest," provided only
it is willing to use its power. And by what means was this
demonstration to be made? By marching a large army through the
South where there was and could be no Confederate army able to
oppose it, destroying everything of military value, including food,
and continuing this operation until the government and people of
the Southern States, and people abroad, should find the demonstration
convincing. Again I quote:
"Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the
conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even
without a battle, the result, operating upon the minds of sensible
men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense,
trouble, and risk."
The election of Mr. Lincoln meant, of course, continued ascendancy
of the "war party" at the North, and that, coupled with the conclusion
above reached, made, as Sherman so forcibly stated it, "a complete,
logical whole."
General Sherman then went on to give in his masterly way the
advantages and disadvantages of the several objectives open to him
as the goal of his march, reserving to himself finally the choice
between three,--Savannah, Mobile, and Pensacola,--trusting to
Richmond papers to keep Grant well advised of his movements and of
his final choice of the objective; and then, near the close of this
letter, in discussing the military aspects of his proposed march,
upon which he was about entering, he reverted to the old theory of
the line of the Tennessee--"on the supposition always that Thomas
can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to
assume the offensive as against Beauregard."
DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP?
It is impossible not to admire the thoroughness with which Sherman
had considered all possible or even imaginary difficulties in his
way, nor to suppress a smile at the supreme confidence with which
he set out, with sixty thousand of the best soldiers in the world,
upon a march through a fine healthy country laden with abundance
of supplies for men and animals, at a time when only two armies in
the South were strong enough to offer him any serious opposition,
both of them farther from his line of march than he was from his
goal when he started, one besieged by Grant in Petersburg, and the
other already commencing an aggressive campaign against Thomas in
Tennessee! It is equally impossible to speak seriously of the
apprehension of some geographers and logisticians that Hood would
interfere in some way with Sherman's march through Georgia. Hood
could not have got within two hundred miles of Sherman before the
latter had destroyed as much of Georgia as he wished, and then
captured Savannah. Of course Sherman was not disturbed by any
apprehension that Hood might possibly oppose the march to Savannah.
He could have meant by what he said in his despatches on the subject
only that Hood would be compelled by "public clamor" to return to
Georgia to defend that State against Sherman's _further_ operations.
Hence his strong insistence that Thomas pursue Hood with energy,
and thus keep him out of his (Sherman's) way.
It had never occurred to me, if the fact ever existed, that the
rebellion could not be suppressed by crushing or capturing the
Confederate armies, or that our vastly superior military strength
must necessarily be employed in crushing the Southern people,
however much they might deserve crushing, or else that we must give
up the contest. Yet while I never saw the necessity for what
Sherman called "statesmanship" rather than "war," I would never
have hesitated for a moment to say, what I now repeat, if it really
was necessary, in order to put down the rebellion and restore the
Union, to destroy all the property in the South, in the name of a
just and beneficent God, destroy it all! Hence my objection to
Sherman's plans was based upon my conviction that such plans were
not at that time, and never had been, necessary. Yet such plans
are legitimate and often necessary, and no man is wise enough to
tell in advance whether they may prove to be necessary or not.
The surest way to reach results is the way Sherman adopted. In
either a civil or foreign war, such methods may be very bad policy;
but very few men are cool-headed enough in civil war, even if wise
enough, to see what good policy dictates, and this is even more
true of men at a distance than of those at the front. Men who have
been fighting most of the time for three or four years generally
become pretty cool, while those in the rear seem to become hotter
and hotter as the end approaches, and even for some time after it
is reached. They must in some way work off the surplus passion
which the soldier has already exhausted in battle. Whatever may
be true as to Sherman's methods before Lee surrendered, the
destruction inflicted on the South after that time was solely the
work of passion, and not of reason. Of this last Sherman was
innocent.
Sherman's destruction of military supplies and railroads did
undoubtedly render impossible any great prolongation of the war,
if that would otherwise have been possible; but it did not materially
hasten the actual collapse of the rebellion, which was due to
Grant's capture of Lee's army. Besides, if Grant had not captured
Lee, Sherman would. Lee could not possibly have escaped them both.
Hence Sherman's destruction of property in Georgia, South Carolina,
and North Carolina did not hasten the end of the rebellion. If
General Sherman was, at the time he planned his march to the sea,
informed of the nearly bankrupt condition of the United States
treasury, that fact went far toward justifying his action in leaving
as small a force as possible with Thomas, and even in starting on
his march before Thomas was fully ready to meet Hood. For to make
his demonstration early enough and as convincing as possible to
the people of the South and all the world, it was important to move
at once, and to show that his march was not a mere rapid _raid_,
but a deliberate march of a formidable army capable of crushing
anything that might get in its way, and that without waiting for
anything that might occur in its rear. Such a march of such an
army might well have been sufficient to convince everybody that
the United States had the military power to crush the rebellion,
and even destroy everything in the South, before the world should
find out that the resources of the government had been exhausted,
and that the United States had not the financial strength necessary
to make any further military use of the million of men they then
had on the muster- and pay-rolls. To have given the still more
convincing proof of the power of the Union, by destroying one of
the Confederate armies, would have taken a longer time.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN
The following despatches fully show Sherman's first plan, assented
to by Grant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should
be able to "hold the line of the Tennessee firmly," and the
corresponding information and instructions to Thomas:
"Sherman to Grant
"Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864, 12 M.
". . . Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome,
bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I
not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter,
and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend
the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements
ordered reach Nashville."
"Grant to Sherman
"City Point, Va., October 11, 1864, 11 A. M.
"Your despatch received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to
attempt the invasion of middle Tennessee? . . . If he does this,
he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee
River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet
Hood's army. . . . Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking
by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we
could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of
getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to
your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from
here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will
be independent of mine, at least until the fall of Richmond takes
place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to
protect, could not prevent Hood going north. With Wilson turned
loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more
on the defensive than heretofore."
"Sherman to Grant.
"October 11, 1864, 10 A. M.
"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw
one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I
hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments
along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparatively
small army. We cannot remain now on the defensive. With 25,000
men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my road.
I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the
country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city,
send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective
army, move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may
turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced
to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on
the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would
have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 per
cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the
Chattahoochee. Answer quick, as I know we will not have the
telegraph long."(10)
"Grant to Sherman.
"October 11, 1864, 11:30 P. M.
"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip
to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee
firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton
or Chattanooga, as you think best."
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SHERMAN AND THOMAS
"Sherman to Thomas.
"October 20, 1864.
". . . I want all things bent to the following general plan of
action for the next three months. Out of the forces now here and
at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000
to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and,
it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open
the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this
I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make
its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous
terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a
fox and wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long
lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked
up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines
of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to
its maturity. As to detail, I propose to take General Howard and
his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz.,
Generals Davis and Slocum. . . . I will send General Stanley, with
the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson
to report to you. . . . I want you to retain command in Tennessee,
and before starting I will give you delegated authority over
Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity
of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and
Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which
you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will
follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to
push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus,
Miss., and Selma, not absolutely to reach those points, but to
divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however,
Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the
Tennessee. . . . I do not fear that the Southern army will again
make a lodgment on the Mississippi. . . . The only hope of a Southern
success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now
a good entering wedge, and should drive it home. . . ."
"Sherman to Grant.
"Gaylesville, Ala., October 22, 1864.
"I feel perfectly master of the situation here. I still hold
Atlanta and the road, with all bridges and vital points well guarded,
and I have in hand an army before which Hood has retreated
precipitately down the valley of the Coosa. It is hard to divine
his future plans; but by abandoning Georgia, and taking position
with his rear to Selma, he threatens the road from Chattanooga to
Atlanta, and may move to Tennessee by Decatur. He cannot cross
the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are
patrolled by our gunboats. I am now perfecting arrangements to
put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee
whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the
city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, and break up all its
railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation
everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and
Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah
or Charleston. I think this far better than defending a long line
of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all
my division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting
material."
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN
But a few days later Sherman had made a radical change in his
previous plan. He telegraphed Grant, from Rome, Georgia, November
1, as follows:
"As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now
in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my
communications and defeat this army. His infantry, about 30,000,
with Wheeler's and Roddey's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now
in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and, the water being
low, is able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from
Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee; and General
Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five transports.
General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski Stanley's corps, about
15,000 strong, and Schofield's corps, 10,000, en route by rail,
and has at least 20,000 to 25,000 men, with new regiments and
conscripts arriving all the time; also Rosecrans promises the two
divisions of Smith and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they
can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. If I were to let go
Atlanta and north Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he did
here, retreat to the southwest, leaving his militia, now assembling
at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our conquests, and the work of last
summer would be lost. I have retained about 50,000 good troops,
and have sent back full 25,000; and having instructed General Thomas
to hold defensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all strongly
fortified and provisioned for a long siege, I will destroy all the
railroads of Georgia and do as much substantial damage as is
possible, reaching the sea-coast near one of the points hitherto
indicated, trusting that General Thomas, with his present troops
and the influx of new troops promised, will be able in a very few
days to assume the offensive. Hood's cavalry may do a good deal
of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry,
retaining only about 4500. This is the best I can do, and shall,
therefore, when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move as soon
as possible."
To that despatch General Grant replied, November 2:
"Your despatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I despatched
you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked
so far north, be looked upon more as the objective. With the force,
however, you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care
of Hood and destroy him. I do not really see that you can withdraw
from where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we have
gained in territory. I say, then, go as you propose."
Thus Grant gave his assent to Sherman's proposition that Nashville,
Chattanooga, and Decatur be held defensively, even during a long
siege if necessary, instead of the line of the Tennessee, as at
first insisted on by General Grant. Yet Grant's assent was given
in view of Sherman's trust that Thomas would be able _in a very
few days_ to assume the offensive.
Sherman's despatch to Thomas of the same date (November 1) instructed
him as to the policy then determined on, in lieu of that which had
contemplated holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, as follows:
"Despatch of last night received. The fact that Forrest is down
about Johnsonville, while Hood, with his infantry, is still about
Florence and Tuscumbia, gives you time for concentration. The
supplies about Chattanooga are immense, and I will soon be independent
of them; therefore I would not risk supplies coming in transitu
from Nashville to Chattanooga. In like manner, we have large
supplies in Nashville, and if they be well guarded, and Hood can't
get our supplies, he can't stay in Tennessee long. General Schofield
will go to you as rapidly as cars can take him. I have no doubt,
after the emergency is past, and the enemy has done us considerable
damage, reinforcements will pour to you more than can be provided
for or taken care of. In the meantime do your best. I will leave
here to-morrow for Kingston, and keep things moving toward the
south; therefore hold fast all new troops coming to you, excepting
such as are now at Chattanooga, to whom I will give orders."
Yet in his letter to Grant, five days later, Sherman reverts to
the original plan: "On the supposition, always, that Thomas can
hold the line of the Tennessee."
November 7, Sherman telegraphed Grant: ". . . On that day [November
10] or the following, if affairs should remain as now in Tennessee,
I propose to begin the movement which I have hitherto fully described
. . ." To which despatch General Grant replied: ". . . I see no
present reason for changing your plan. . . ."
General Grant does not refer to the later despatches in his general
report, July 22, 1865, quoted in his "Memoirs," but uses the
following language:
"With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt
that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in
the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and
beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that
Sherman should start for the sea-coast."
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN
General Sherman also omits to make any reference in his "Memoirs"
to the despatches respecting a possible long siege of Nashville,
Chattanooga, and Decatur; but he says in a despatch of November 2
to Grant, quoted in his "Memoirs":
"If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By
my movements I have thrown Beauregard [Hood] well to the west, and
Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until
the reinforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample
supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's
interruption to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate
army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and
Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I am clearly
of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement
through Georgia."
The following language is found in a despatch dated November 11,
midnight, from Sherman to Thomas, which is especially important as
giving the last expression of his views of the situation, and of
what Thomas would be able to do after Sherman started for the sea:
"I can hardly believe that Beauregard would attempt to work against
Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all
information seems to point that way. If he does, you will whip
him out of his boots; but I rather think you will find commotion
in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in
two or more days will burn Atlanta; and he must discover that I am
not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart
of Georgia. . . . These [some Confederate movements about Rome and
Atlanta] also seem to indicate that Beauregard expects me to retreat.
. . . To-morrow I begin the movement laid down in my Special Field
Orders, No. 115, and shall keep things moving thereafter. . . . By
using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your
fortifications, you will have Generals Schofield and Stanley and
General A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments
and all of Wilson's cavalry. You could safely invite Beauregard
across the Tennessee River and prevent his ever returning. I still
believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and
follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur and move
directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. . . .
You may act . . . on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on
the 16th instant with about 60,000 well provisioned, but expecting
to live chiefly on the country."
The reason for this sudden and radical change of program is made
perfectly clear by Sherman's despatch of November 1 and others:
"The enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan
to destroy my communications and defeat this army." Sherman's
defiant spirit, thus aroused, brooked no delay. He would not wait
for anything but his own necessary preparations. Nashville,
Chattanooga, and Decatur could stand a long siege, and these alone
he regarded as of strategic importance. The enemy would doubtless
do "considerable damage," but afterward "reinforcements will pour
to you" (Thomas). He convinced himself that Thomas had troops
enough; but, "to make things sure," he might "call on the governors
of Indiana and Kentucky for some militia"! In the meantime, he
(Sherman) would "destroy all the railroads in Georgia and do as
much substantial damage as is possible." Thus recklessly challenged
by the Confederate chief, Sherman must not only accept that challenge,
but do it at once. Perhaps if Jefferson Davis had known William
T. Sherman as well as some of us did, he would not have uttered
that challenge.
RAWLINS'S REPORTED OPPOSITION TO THE MARCH
From Grant's "Memoirs"(11) it appears that General Grant not only
confirms Sherman's claim in respect to his independent authorship
of the plan, but says he (General Grant) was in favor of that plan
from the time it was first submitted to him, and credits his chief
of staff, General Rawlins, with having been "very bitterly opposed
to it," and with having appealed to the authorities at Washington
to stop it.
This recollection of General Grant, after the lapse of so long a
time, and when he was suffering almost beyond endurance from a
fatal disease, may possibly, it seems to me, not express the views
he entertained in October, 1864, quite so fully or accurately as
his despatch of October 11, 1864, 11 A. M., to General Sherman,
heretofore quoted.
That despatch was a literal prediction of what Hood actually did.
It was dictated by a clear military foresight, whether of Grant or
Rawlins. How far world-wide approval of Sherman's plans after
their brilliant success may have obscured the past can only be
conjectured. As distinctly stated by Grant himself soon afterward,
he clearly saw that somebody ought to be criticized; but, in view
of the results, he decided to let it pass.
However all this may be, even my respect for the opinions of the
greatest of Union soldiers cannot alter the conclusion I have
reached after many years of study and mature consideration. I can
only say that the opinion ascribed to General Rawlins, as opposed
to General Grant's, was in my judgment the better of the two; and
that General Rawlins, though he had not the advantage of an early
military education, was a man of great natural ability, and had
learned much from more than three years' experience in war, after
which the differences in military judgment which had existed at
the beginning must have very largely, if not entirely, disappeared.
General Rawlins was my immediate successor in the War Department,
and would, I doubt not, have made a great reputation there if his
life had been prolonged.
I believe Grant's own sound military judgment dictated his first
answer to Sherman, dissenting from the proposition to begin the
march to the sea before Hood's army was disposed of, or that result
assured. His great confidence in the genius of his brilliant
subordinate, and in Sherman's judgment that he had given Thomas
ample means to take care of Hood, no matter what that bold and
reckless adversary might do, dictated Grant's final assent to
Sherman's project. Their correspondence shows this so clearly and
fully that there would seem to be no need of my making any special
reference to it. I do so only because of the statement in General
Grant's "Memoirs." Very possibly General Grant may have meant, in
his "Memoirs," only that he approved the general project, under
the condition that sufficient force would be left "to take care of
Hood and destroy him," not caring to say anything about the
fulfillment or nonfulfillment of that condition.
From about October 1 till the time Sherman started on his march--
six weeks--he seems to have been so intent on the execution of that
project, and upon doing it with as large an army as possible, that
no question of military principle or of fact could be permitted to
stand in his way. He assumed and maintained throughout that the
only question was whether he should continue the aggressive, or
allow the enemy's movements to put him on the defensive, refusing
to consider any other possible plan of aggressive operations, except
for a moment in response to advice from Grant, and then brushing
it aside as impracticable.--"If I could hope to overhaul Hood,"
etc. In like manner, he appears to have convinced himself that
his arrangements for direct operations against Hood by Thomas in
Tennessee were very materially more complete than they were in
fact, and he so represented the matter to General Grant. It seems
quite certain that Grant was laboring under a serious misapprehension
in respect to Thomas's condition to cope with Hood, and no doubt
Grant's subsequent impatience in respect to Thomas's action was
largely due to this fact. This point deserves close consideration.
GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT ON IT
Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on
the condition of "holding the line of the Tennessee firmly." On
October 22 Sherman telegraphed: "I am now perfecting arrangements
to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the
Tennessee."
Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that
Hood ought to be his "objective," now that he "has gone so far
north." At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above
quoted, Sherman telegraphed, "trusting that General Thomas . . .
will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive." To this
Grant replied November 2: "With the force, however, you have left
with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him."
In that despatch of November 1 Sherman had made a statement of the
troops Thomas would have, including A. J. Smith's from Missouri,
adding, "but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten
days." Now Smith's troops did not reach Tennessee in less than
_thirty_ days instead of ten days, and after the crisis of the
campaign was passed; and the effective force in Tennessee before
Smith's arrival was 13,000 men less than Sherman had stated it.
So that the whole brunt of the fight with Hood fell upon the two
corps which Sherman had sent back, without any help from the
reinforcements upon which Sherman counted so largely. It was, in
fact, _six weeks_ instead of a "very few days" before Thomas was
able "to assume the offensive." It was not attempted to "hold the
line of the Tennessee" either "firmly" or at all.
Having been absent from the army in the field during Hood's raid
in Sherman's rear, I knew little personally about those estimates
of the strength of the opposing forces. For the same reason, I
knew nothing of Sherman's plans or correspondence with Grant which
were considered or took place after the fall of Atlanta, though I
had been perfectly familiar with the plans discussed previous to
that time having in view a change of base to some point on the
Atlantic or on the gulf, with a view to further operations in
Georgia or the Gulf States, wherever there might be a hostile army
to operate against. Yet when I met Sherman at Gaylesburg I was
surprised to learn that he was going off to the sea with five sixths
of his army, leaving Thomas, with only one of his six corps, and
no other veteran troops then ready for field service, to take care
of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, incorporate
new regiments into the army and make them fit to meet the veteran
enemy, remount his cavalry, and concentrate his garrisons and
railroad guards in Tennessee! Of course I knew far less than
Sherman did about all that, for I had no responsibility and little
knowledge about Thomas's department. But I knew enough to feel
astonished when Sherman told me what he proposed to do. I plainly
told Sherman so, and urged him to send me back with my corps to
join Stanley and help Thomas.(12)
Here arise several interesting questions which would be worthy of
consideration, although a satisfactory solution of them might not
be possible. Under Sherman's assurance as to what he had done for
Thomas in Tennessee, Grant appears to have been fully satisfied
that Thomas would be able to take care of Hood and destroy him,
thus eliminating that Confederate army from the future problem in
the Atlantic States. But could Sherman, with his more exact
knowledge of what he actually had done, have felt the same confidence?
In view of that knowledge and of the results of his own previous
operations against Hood, could he have expected any such result?
Is it not more probable that Sherman simply expected to take
advantage of Hood's temporary absence from Georgia to make his own
change of base to Savannah? Did Sherman not, in fact, really expect
Hood to follow him, even though at so great a distance, and be
prepared to resist his future operations from Savannah? Sherman
repeatedly said, in his despatches before he started, that he
believed Hood would follow him, being compelled to do so by public
clamor. What was Sherman's plan when he started for Savannah?
Was it simply to effect a change of base, or was it for well-defined
ulterior purposes? When did Sherman mature his plan to march to
Virginia, and when did that plan first dawn upon Sherman's mind?
In this connection, what significance is to be attached to the
dates of events in Tennessee, especially the battles of Franklin
and Nashville?
GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT OF IT
By the first mails which reached Sherman after he arrived on the
coast, December 14 and 15, containing letters from Grant dated
December 3 and 6, full information was received of the battle of
Franklin, which had occurred November 30. Thomas's official report
of the battle of Nashville was received by Sherman on December 24,
but rumors of that victory had reached him earlier. Sherman's
first letter to Grant, relative to future operations, written in
reply to those from Grant of December 3 and 6, was dated December
16. In that letter was mentioned Sherman's plan in the following
words: "Indeed, with my present command I had expected, upon
reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina,
thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you." Sherman's second
letter to Grant, on the same subject, written in reply to Grant's
letter of the 18th, was dated December 24, the day on which he
received Thomas's report of the battle of Nashville. In this letter
Sherman said: "I am also gratified that you have modified your
former orders. . . . I feel no doubt whatever as to our future
plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear
as clear as daylight."
When Sherman first mentioned his future plan he knew that the
success of his past plan in Tennessee had been assured. Thomas
had succeeded in concentrating his forces at Nashville, and Hood
had suffered a severe defeat in attempting to prevent it. At the
time of Sherman's second letter, mentioning his very mature
consideration of his future plans and perfect confidence in respect
to them, he knew that Hood's army had been broken up, and had become
a small factor in the future problem. How long, and to what extent,
had Sherman anticipated these results in Tennessee, and matured
the plans of future operations, which were dependent upon those
results? I shall consider these several questions, which involve
so intimately the character of my old commander.
[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.]
[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part ii, pp. 364, 411.]
[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 594.]
[( 4) _ibid_., p. 576.]
[( 5) _Ibid_., p. 594.]
[( 6) Vol. II, p. 154.]
[( 7) Mr. Jefferson Davis's speech. See General Sherman's "Memoirs,"
Vol. II, p. 141.]
[( 8) See the Century War Book, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War," Vol. IV, p. 257.]
[( 9) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.]
[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.]
[(11) Vol. II, pp. 374-6.]
[(12) See my letter to General Sherman, December 28, 1864, p. 254.]