Transfer of the Twenty-Third Corps to North Carolina--Sherman's
Plan of Marching to the Rear of Lee--The Surrender of J. E. Johnston's
Army--Authorship of the Approved Terms of Surrender--Political
Reconstruction--Sherman's Genius--Contrast Between Grant and Sherman
--Halleck's Characteristics--His Attempt to Supplant Grant--Personal
Feeling in Battle--The Scars of War.
Upon the termination of the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee, General
Grant ordered me, with the Twenty-third Corps, to the coast of
North Carolina, via Louisville, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington,
and the sea. Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of
War, Charles A. Dana, and the personal management of Colonel Lewis
B. Parsons of the quartermaster's department, that movement was
made without any necessity for the exercise of direction or control
on my part, in respect to routes or otherwise. I enjoyed very much
being a simple passenger on that comfortable journey, one of the
most remarkable in military history, and exceedingly creditable to
the officers of the War Department who directed and conducted it.
I did not know at the time anything about the details of the
arrangements made for transportation, nor who made them; but I have
always thought it an excellent illustration of the good results to
be obtained by a judicious distribution and division of duty,
authority, and responsibility in military operations on a large
scale. This being done under one common, competent head, to whom
all subordinates are alike responsible, the military system becomes
as nearly perfect as possible.
While the transports were detained by an ice blockade in the Potomac,
I joined General Grant at Fort Monroe, and went with him on the
war-steamer _Rhode Island_ to Cape Fear River, where we met General
Terry and Admiral Porter, discussed the military situation, and
decided on the general plan of operations for the capture of the
defenses of Cape Fear River and the city of Wilmington, and subsequent
operations. On our return to Fort Monroe, I proceeded to Washington,
and sailed with the advance of the Twenty-third Corps, arriving at
the mouth of Cape Fear River on February 9, 1865, where we joined
General Terry, who with two divisions had already captured Fort
Fisher. I was then assigned to command the new department of North
Carolina. We turned the defenses of Cape Fear River by marching
round the swamps, and occupied Wilmington with little loss; then
we captured Kinston, after a pretty sharp fight of three days, and
occupied Goldsboro' on March 21, within one day of the time indicated
by Sherman, from Laurel Hill, N. C., March 8, for our junction at
Goldsboro'. General Sherman, who had been delayed by his battle
at Bentonville, did not reach Goldsboro' until the 23d, but the
sound of his guns on the 20th and 21st informed me that he was
near, and I put a bridge across the Neuse River, so as to go to
his assistance if necessary. After the junction at Goldsboro', I
commanded the "center," one of the three grand divisions of Sherman's
army.
For the elucidation of some things in this campaign which have
seemed obscure, and some acts of General Sherman which have been
severely criticized, it is necessary to know the ruling ideas which
actuated him. As Sherman says, in his own estimate of the relative
importance of his march through Georgia and that through the
Carolinas, the former was only a change of base preparatory to the
latter, the great final campaign of the war, which had for its end
the defeat and capture of Lee's army. Sherman and his army expected
to share the glory of capturing Richmond and Lee's army, which had
baffled the Eastern troops for four years. This feeling in the
army was very general and very manifest at the time.
SHERMAN'S PLAN OF MARCHING TO THE REAR OF LEE
After the concentration at Goldsboro', Sherman's plan was to march
straight for Lee's rear at Petersburg, and he expected Johnston to
keep ahead of him and to unite with Lee for the final struggle at
or near Richmond. Grant's idea was quite different: He wanted
Sherman to keep between Lee and Johnston and prevent their union,
as well as to cut off Lee's retreat if he should escape before
Grant was ready to move, the latter alleging that he had ample
force to take care of Lee as soon as the necessary preparations
were made and the roads would permit him to move. It was this
important difference of plan that occasioned Sherman's visit to
City Point, where he hoped to gain Grant's acquiescence in his own
plans. The result was the movement ordered by Sherman on his return
to Goldsboro', which was substantially the same as that which Grant
had before proposed. Grant's immediate army proved to be, as he
predicted it would, amply sufficient for the capture of the whole
of Lee's army. Hence it is difficult to see in what respect
Sherman's campaign of the Carolinas was essential to this great
result, or proved to be more important than his march through
Georgia. Each was a great raid, inflicting immense damage upon
the enemy's country and resources, demoralizing to the people at
home and the army in Virginia, cutting off supplies necessary to
the support of the latter, possibly expediting somewhat the final
crisis at Richmond, and certainly making the subjugation more
complete of those of the Southern people who were thus made to
"feel the weight of war." Considered as to military results,
Sherman's march cannot be regarded as more than I have stated--a
grand raid. The defeat and practical destruction of Hood's army
in Tennessee was what paved the way to the speedy termination of
the war, which the capture of Lee by Grant fully accomplished; and
the result ought to have been essentially the same as to time if
Sherman's march had never been made. The capitulation of Johnston
was but the natural sequence of Lee's surrender; for Johnston's
army was not surrounded, and could not have been compelled to
surrender. Indeed Sherman could not have prevented that army from
marching back into the Gulf States and continuing the war for a
time. In military history Sherman's great march must rank only as
an auxiliary to the far more important operations of Grant and
Thomas. Sherman at the time saw clearly enough this view of the
case; hence his undeviating bent toward the final object of his
march, disregarding all minor ends--to take part in the capture of
Lee's army.
During General Sherman's interviews with the President and General
Grant at City Point, his mind must have been absorbed with this
one idea which was the sole reason of his visit. Terms of surrender
and the policy to be pursued toward the conquered South must have
been referred to very casually, and nothing approximating instructions
on the subject can have been received or asked for by General
Sherman. Else how is it possible that the very pointed and emphatic
instructions of the President to General Grant, dated March 3,
1865,( 1) were not made known to him or the spirit of them conveyed
to him in conversation?
THE SURRENDER OF J. E. JOHNSTON'S ARMY
The question of the abstract wisdom of the terms of the Sherman-
Johnston "memorandum" has little to do with that of Sherman in
agreeing to it. Any person at all acquainted with the politics of
the dominant part at that time would have known that it was at
least unwise to introduce political questions at all. Besides, he
had the example of his superior, the general-in-chief, who had just
accepted the surrender of the principal Confederate army from the
Confederate generalissimo without any political conditions; and
the knowledge of President Lincoln's assassination, which must have
made the country unwilling to consent to more liberal terms than
had before been granted. Yet, however unwise Sherman's action may
have been, the uproar it created, and the attacks upon his honor
and integrity for which it was made the excuse, were utterly
inexcusable. They were probably unexampled as an exhibition of
the effect of great and unusual excitement upon the minds of men
unaccustomed to such moral and mental strain.
The most charitable view of this matter seems also to be the most
just--namely, that the high officers of government were completely
unnerved and lost their heads under the terrible strain produced
by President Lincoln's assassination, increased somewhat, perhaps,
by a natural apprehension of what might come next. The contrast
between this state of excitement in Washington and the marked calm
that prevailed throughout the army was very instructive, and it
was difficult for any soldier to understand at that time the state
of mind in Washington. No part of the people could have felt more
deeply or with greater indignation the loss the country had suffered,
and the infamous crime by which it had been accomplished. Yet not
a ripple of excitement could be seen anywhere in the army. The
profound calm which pervades the atmosphere surrounding a great,
disciplined, self-confident army is one of the most sublime
exhibitions of human nature.
That Sherman felt "outraged beyond measure" was natural and indeed
inevitable. He had committed an error of judgment arising from
political inexperience and a failure to appreciate the difference
between Mr. Lincoln's humane purposes toward individual Confederates
and his political policy. But the error was of the least possible
practical consequence, and there was not the slightest excuse for
making it public at the time, in violation of all rules of official
courtesy. All that it was necessary or right to do was to tell
Sherman to correct his error.
While the effect of these ferocious bulletins received some time
later was such as General Sherman fully describes, the first effect
of the simple disapproval of the convention, both upon Sherman and
Johnston, not referred to by either in their published narratives,
may be interesting to readers of history. General Sherman was
manifestly much disappointed and mortified at the rejection of his
terms, although he had been prepared somewhat by expressions of
opinions from others in the interval, and both he and Johnston at
their last meeting seemed sad and dejected.
To understand this, it must be remembered that Johnston's army was
not surrounded, and its surrender could not have been compelled.
Unless the terms of capitulation could be made such as the troops
themselves would be willing to accept, they would, it was apprehended,
break up into guerrilla bands of greater or less strength and carry
on the war in that way indefinitely. So strongly was I impressed
at the time with General Johnston's apprehension, that I was often
thereafter haunted in my dreams with the difficulties I was actually
encountering in the prosecution of military operations against
those remnants of the Confederate armies, in marshy and mountainous
countries, through summer heats and winter storms. It was several
years after the war that I became fully satisfied, at night, that
it was really over.
AUTHORSHIP OF THE APPROVED TERMS OF SURRENDER
At the time of Sherman's first interview with Johnston I hinted
that I would like to accompany him; but he desired me to remain in
immediate command, as I was next in rank, and we could not tell
what might happen. He took some others with him, but I believe
had no one present in the room to assist him in his discussion with
Johnston and Breckinridge. At his last interview I accompanied
him, by his special request. On meeting at Bennett's House, after
the usual salutations General Sherman and Johnston retired to the
conference room, and were there a long time with closed doors. At
length I was summoned to their presence, and informed in substance
that they were unable to arrange the terms of capitulation to their
satisfaction. They seemed discouraged at the failure of the
arrangement to which they had attached so much importance, apprehensive
that the terms of Grant and Lee, pure and simple, could not be
executed, and that if modified at all, they would meet with a second
disapproval. I listened to their statements of the difficulties
they had encountered, and then stated how I thought they could all
be arranged. General Johnston replied, in substance, "I think
General Schofield can fix it"; and General Sherman intimated to me
to write, pen and paper being on the table where I was sitting,
while the two great antagonists were nervously pacing the floor.
I at once wrote the "military convention" of April 26, handed it
to General Sherman, and he, after reading it, to General Johnston.
Having explained that I, as department commander, after General
Sherman was gone, could do all that might be necessary to remove
the difficulties which seemed to them so serious, the terms as
written by me were agreed to, as General Sherman says, "without
hesitation," and General Johnston, "without difficulty," and after
being copied _without alteration_ were signed by the two commanders.
Johnston's words, on handing the paper back to Sherman, were: "I
believe that is the best we can do." It was in pursuance of this
understanding that I made with General Johnston the "supplemental
terms," and gave his disbanded men the two hundred and fifty thousand
rations, with wagons to haul them, to prevent the troops from
robbing their own people, for which, in his "Narrative," he very
properly credits General Sherman.
But I also gave to the troops from each State arms enough to arm
a guard to preserve order and protect citizens en route, the arms
so used to be turned over to United States officers after the troops
got home. This was one of the things most bitterly condemned in
Sherman's first agreement. Yet not a word was said when I did it!
It would be difficult for a soldier to imagine anything more
monstrous than the suggestion that he could not trust the officers
and men whom he had been fighting four years to go home and turn
in their arms after they had voluntarily surrendered and given
their parole of honor to do so. Yet there seem to be even in high
places some men who have no conception of the sense of honor which
exists among brave men.
When that second "convention" was handed to General Grant the same
evening, he said that the only change he would have made would have
been to write General Sherman's name before General Johnston's.
So would I if I had thought about it; but I presume an unconscious
feeling of courtesy toward a fallen foe dictated the order in which
their names were written.
AUTHORSHIP OF THE APPROVED TERMS OF SURRENDER
It seems to me a little singular that neither General Sherman nor
General Johnston thought the circumstances above referred to worthy
of being preserved in memory, and I am not quite willing that
General Breckinridge shall carry off all the honor of assisting
the great commanders to make "memoranda" and "military conventions"
at "Bennett's House." But Sherman and Johnston were writing their
own defense, and it was natural that they should omit matter not
pertaining thereto. Besides, I was General Sherman's subordinate,
and owed him all the help I could give in every way. He may have
regarded my services, and perhaps justly, as little more than
clerical, after it was all over, even if he thought of the matter
at all.( 2)
The Confederate troops were promptly furnished with all needed
supplies of food and transportation and sent in comfort to their
homes, freed from the necessity of taxing the slender resources of
the impoverished people on their routes. The surplus animals and
wagons remaining with the army were given to the people of North
Carolina in large numbers, and they were encouraged at once to
resume their industrial pursuits. In the meantime, all who were
in want were furnished with food.
It may not be possible to judge how wise or unwise Sherman's first
"memorandum" might have proved if it had been ratified. It is
always difficult to tell how things that have not been tried would
have worked if they had been. We now know only this much--that
the imagination of man could hardly picture worse results than
those wrought out by the plan that was finally adopted--namely, to
destroy everything that existed in the way of government, and then
build from the bottom on the foundation of ignorance and rascality.
The de facto State governments existing at the time of the surrender
would have been of infinite service in restoring order and material
prosperity, if they had been recognized by the military authority
of the United States and kept under military control similar to
that exercised by the district commissioners under the "reconstruction
acts." And such recognition would in no manner have interfered
with any action Congress might have thought it wise to take looking
to the organization of permanent governments and the admission of
senators and representatives in Congress. After two years of
"reconstruction" under President Johnson's "policy," the Southern
State governments were no better than those he had destroyed. Then
Congress took the matter in hand, and after years of labor brought
forth State governments far worse than either of those that had
been torn down.
Party ambition on the one hand, and timidity on the other, were
the parents of these great follies. The presidential succession
was the mainspring of the first movement and of the opposition
thereto, while that and party majority in Congress were the motives
of the later "reconstruction." Both ingloriously failed, as they
deserved to do. How much stronger the Republican party would have
been if it had relied upon the loyal States which had sustained it
through the war, instead of timidly distrusting them and trying to
bolster itself up by the aid of the negro and "carpet-bag" governments
in the South!
Political reconstruction ought not to have been thought of at the
close of the war. What was then needed was local civil government
under such military control as might be necessary, restoration of
order, industry, and material prosperity, leading to a gradual
reorganization of the society which had been completely broken up
by the war. After this had been done, and Congress had decided
upon the conditions of full restoration, it would have been time
enough to inaugurate political reconstruction. This was clear
enough at the time to those who had studied the subject and knew
by personal observation the real condition and feeling of the
Southern people. But the leading politicians of either party do
not appear to have had the wisdom and moral courage to advocate
such a policy. Both were impatient to see their party represented
on the floors of Congress by members from the South.
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION
It was something of the kind above suggested which was aimed at by
Generals Sherman and Johnston, and which was deemed wise by the
leading generals both North and South. There were several conditions
in the memorandum that were clearly inadmissible, though easy of
correction without changing the essential features of the document.
This was to be expected from a hasty effort to solve a great
political problem by a man without political education or experience.
Sherman's failure was not unlike that of great politicians who
undertake to command armies. Their general ideas may be very good,
but they have no knowledge of details, and hence make mistakes
resulting in failure.
As now seen, projected upon the dark background of the political
history of the Southern States during the twelve years from 1865
to 1877, and compared with the plans of political doctrinaires in
1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston
memorandum and Sherman's letters of that period seem self-luminous
with political wisdom. Sherman needed only the aid of competent
military advisers in whom he had confidence to have made him one
of the greatest generals of any age, and he would have needed only
the aid of competent political advisers to have made him a great
statesman. But he looked almost with contempt upon a "staff," and
would doubtless have thought little better of a "cabinet."
The efforts of political leaders to establish an absolutely impossible
popular government in the South seem to show the necessity of
general political education, no less than the military blunders of
the war show the necessity of general military education. If our
schools would drop from their course of studies some of the
comparatively unimportant "ologies," and substitute the qualifications
for good citizenship, the change would be greatly for the better.
General Sherman was one of those rare actors in historic events
who require no eulogy. All his important acts were so unqualifiedly
his own, and so emphatically speak for themselves, that it is only
necessary to judge of the quality and merits of those acts. There
is no question of division of honors between him and any other
respecting any of his important operations. It is not meant by
this that he was disdainful of the advice or opinions of others.
On the contrary, although naturally impulsive and self-reliant,
his acquired habit was to study carefully and consult freely with
his subordinate commanders respecting all important movements.
Yet discussion resulted almost if not quite invariably in the
adoption of his own original plans. As to details, he was wont to
leave them very much to his subordinates, and, I think, did not
estimate very accurately the possibilities or probabilities of the
accomplishment of the details necessary to the success of his
general plans. It is certainly not too much to say that his
expectations in this regard were very frequently unrealized. But
of this it must be observed that the character of the theater of
war made the handling of a large army extremely difficult, precision
of movement impossible, and any accurate estimate of the time in
which projected operations could be accomplished by no means easy.
Criticism of General Sherman, or of his subordinates, based upon
military experience in other countries or upon the success of his
able antagonist General Johnston, to whom Sherman's difficulties
were corresponding advantages, is likely to be extremely unjust.
In short, Sherman's campaigns stand alone, without a parallel in
military history; alike unique in their conception, execution, and
final results; in most respects among the highest examples of the
art of war. Plans so general and original in conception and
successful in execution point unmistakably to a very high order of
military genius.
SHERMAN'S GENIUS
In the order of nature, comparison with those that follow as well
as those that precede is needed to establish the merits of any
individual. A commander may be a great captain compared with his
military predecessors, and yet some of his operations be regarded
as very faulty by more modern commanders.
Some future historian, with the example before him of a later
chieftain who, on a similar field and under similar but improved
conditions, may have won more brilliant successes, may be able to
determine Sherman's rank among the commanders of past, present,
and future ages.
Sufficient is not yet known in this country of the credit due any
one individual for the success achieved in the recent campaigns in
Europe to furnish the means of just comparison between the European
and American commanders of this generation. And even between Grant
and Sherman there are so few points of resemblance in military
character or methods, that they must be judged by contrasts rather
than by comparison. Hence it may always be difficult to determine
their exact relative merits as military leaders. Upon this point
I forbear, for the present, to express any opinion.
In some other respects, Grant and Sherman were hardly less in
contrast than in their military characteristics. At the close of
the Atlanta campaign, in his letter of September 12, 1864, Grant
paid to Sherman the following generous and glowing tribute: "In
conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you
have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general
in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged
in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It gives me as much
pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any
living man, myself included."
To this Sherman replied, September 20: "In the meantime, know that
I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever."
There has been much learned discussion of the relative merits of
McClellan's, Grant's, and other plans for the "capture of Richmond,"
as if that was the object of the campaign. In fact, though the
capture of Richmond at any time during the war would have produced
some moral effect injurious to the rebellion and beneficial to the
Union in public opinion, it would have been a real injury to the
Union cause in a military sense, because it would have given us
one more important place to garrison, and have increased the length
of our line of supplies, always liable to be broken by the enemy's
cavalry.
The worst form of operations in such a war is "territorial" strategy,
or that which aims at the capture and occupation of territory as
a primary object. The best is that which aims at the destruction
or capture of the opposing armies as the first and only important
object. Grant at Donelson, Vicksburg, and in Virginia best
illustrated this kind of strategy.
HALLECK'S CHARACTERISTICS
Halleck was probably the chief of the "territorial" strategists of
our Civil War period. In the winter of 1861-1862 the counties of
north Missouri bordering on the Missouri River were infested with
guerrillas. Halleck sent Pope, with a force of all arms amounting
to a considerable army, to "clear them out." Pope marched in
triumph from one end of that tier of counties to the other, and
Halleck then informed me with evident satisfaction that north
Missouri was cleared of rebels, and that the war was ended in that
part of the State! In fact, the guerrillas, "flushed" like a flock
of quail by Pope's advance-guard, had taken to the bush until the
rear-guard had passed out of sight, and then were found "feeding"
again on their old ground.
I felt greatly complimented when Halleck, on his return from Corinth
to St. Louis, en route to Washington to take command of the army,
gave me a full explanation of his "siege of Corinth," including
his application of the standard European tactics of a former
generation, with its rule of 10,000 men to the mile in line and
regular approaches.
I was many years younger than Halleck, Thomas, Sherman, Grant, and
the other chief commanders, and hence had much more to learn than
they. Perhaps I was also, on account of comparative youth, more
teachable. At any rate, the two lessons from Halleck above referred
to, and later experience, cause me to do "a world of thinking"; so
that I was amazed beyond expression when, in the winter of 1863-
64, just before Grant was made lieutenant-general, Halleck told me
that _his_ plan for the next campaign was to send west of the
Mississippi River force enough to finish the war in all that region
of country, and then return and clear up the States east of that
river! I said nothing, but could not help thinking that it was,
sure enough, time to have another general-in-chief of the army.
But accepting his strategic theory of operations in the American
Civil War,--territorial conquest,--his plans of campaign were
unquestionably sound.
Halleck was, I believe, a man of great ability and of high military
education, though with little practical experience in war; yet his
peculiar views, and still more singular action, have seemed to me
very remarkable. He remained in Washington, practically inert,
while one of the great armies of which he was general-in-chief was
suffering sore reverses, almost in sight of the Capitol, and the
country's cause greatly imperiled for want of a competent commander
for that army. How could a soldier resist the impulse to "do or
die" at the head of that army? But General Halleck must have known
better than any one else at that time the limits of his own capacity.
He probably knew that even his great ability and education did not
suffice to qualify him for the command of an army in the field.
If so, his action afforded a patriotic example which some others
would have done well to imitate.
As I have before stated, General Halleck was always kind and just
to me, so far as I ever knew, and I was much indebted to him for
support when it was needed. Now I find in the records the following
letter:
"Richmond, Va., May 10, 1865, 10:30 A. M.
"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War:
"I beg leave to withdraw for the present my recommendation of
Schofield as military governor of North Carolina. It is represented
to me that he and General Blair were the principal advisers of
Sherman in his armistice with the rebel General Johnston. If so,
he is not a proper person to command in North Carolina. I therefore
suspend my recommendation for further developments.
"H. W. Halleck, Major-General."
The fact was that I had not been present when Sherman's memorandum
was agreed upon, had not been consulted about in any way, and knew
nothing of its character until after it had been sent to Washington.
All of this Halleck could have learned at once if he had inquired,
which he did not. So far as I know, he left on record, without
any subsequent explanation or correction, a report which was without
the slightest foundation in fact, and which he understood to be
very damaging to my reputation. Hence it seems necessary for me
to record the fact that there was no foundation for that report.
Beyond this I will only say that I think General Halleck, in this
slight matter, as in his far more serious conduct toward General
Sherman, was inexcusably thoughtless respecting the damage he might
do to the reputation of a brother soldier. The least a true man
can do is to make suitable public reparation if he has for any
reason done publicly a personal injustice.
HALLECK'S ATTEMPT TO SUPPLANT GRANT
I knew personally at the time the exact truth respecting the action
of General Halleck toward General Grant before the battle of Shiloh,
especially in ordering Grant to remain in the rear while General
C. F. Smith was sent with the advance of the army to Pittsburg
Landing, as described by General Grant in his "Memoirs." Halleck
hoped Smith might fight a battle and win a victory in Grant's
absence, which would naturally be followed by an order putting
Smith in command in place of Grant. But Halleck had not anticipated
Grant's soldierly action in applying to be relieved, and was not
prepared to face that emergency. As soon as Grant's application
reached St. Louis, Halleck abandoned that line of action, but he
did not abandon his purpose to supersede Grant in some way until
some time later. Whatever excuse there may have been at that time
for Halleck's opinion of Grant, nothing can be said in favor of
the method he adopted to accomplish his purpose to supersede him.
The action of Grant in this case well foreshadowed that which
occurred when he was tendered the commission of lieutenant-general
and the command of all the armies. Grant would not hold any
commission or command without full authority to perform the duties
belonging to it. In his "Memoirs" he modestly refrains from relating
the most important part of that action, as he told it to me on the
war-steamer _Rhode Island_ the next January. Before accepting the
commission from President Lincoln, as Grant describes, he said in
substance that if it meant that he was to exercise actual command
of all the armies, without any interference from the War Department,
he was willing to accept it, otherwise he could not. To illustrate
what he meant, Grant said to me that when he was coming East to
accept that commission he determined that he would not be
"McClellanized."
The personal observation, experience, and emotions of an individual
soldier may perhaps be interesting to the reader. I have never
been a lover of war or of strife, and have never been disposed to
seek a fight or quarrel. But when once engaged in or challenged
to battle all the combativeness in human nature is at once aroused.
It is then difficult, if not morally impossible, to decline the
challenge. At all events, that question is not even thought of at
times. One of the most difficult lessons a commander has to learn
is when to offer or accept battle, and when to refrain or decline
--that is, to be complete master of his own natural combativeness.
That courage which is the highest quality of a private or a
subordinate officer may become extremely dangerous in a commander,
unless dominated by that higher moral courage which is undisturbed
by excitement or passion. Grant probably possessed this higher
quality in a greater degree than any other commander of our time.
Sherman and Thomas also possessed it in a very high degree. In
Sherman it was the more remarkable because he was naturally impulsive,
and often manifested this trait, especially in minor matters. He
acquired the power of absolute self-command in battle. With Thomas
this quality appeared to be perfectly natural, as it did with Grant.
Since I had to fight, I sometimes regretted that I could not have
a chance with a musket in the ranks (behind a good parapet and
"head-log," of course!), for I was a remarkably good shot in my
youth. But I never had a chance to fire a shot in battle except
once, and that was with my artillery at Fredericktown, Missouri,
where not an officer or man in the battery had any idea how to
point a field-piece and give it proper elevation according to the
distance. I quickly found the proper elevation by the means well
known to artillerists, and then directed the battery to go on firing
at that elevation, while I was called upon by the commanding officer
to devote myself to some men with muskets. I have seen this passion
so strong that a major-general commanding an army corps would
dismount and act the part of a gunner to a field-piece, apparently
oblivious to the battle raging all along the line of his corps.
PERSONAL FEELING IN BATTLE
Personal feeling in battle is sometimes remarkable, even to the
person himself. In my own experience, the degree of danger was
not often entirely unthought of; and in the comparatively few cases
where it was, the actual danger was much the greatest ever experienced
by me. That such should be the experience of a general in chief
command, under the responsibilities of a great battle, is natural
enough; but that the same should occur when there is little or no
responsibility seems worthy of remark in reference to its apparent
cause. In my first battle,--that of Wilson's Creek,--where I was
a staff officer under a soldier of great experience, ability, and
unsurpassed courage,--General Lyon,--I felt for a long time no
sense of responsibility whatever. I had only to convey his orders
to the troops. Yet the absorption of my mind in the discharge of
this simple duty, and in watching the progress of the battle, was
so complete that I absolutely had no thought whatever of self.
Even after Lyon had been twice wounded, both of our horses killed,
the troops on our left given way in disorder, leaving us standing
in the line, only a few feet to the left of Totten's battery, under
a murderous fire, it did not occur to me that I also might possibly
be hit. I had not even thought for a moment that the commanding
general ought not to be in such an exposed position, or that his
wounds ought to have surgical treatment! My absolute confidence
in my chief left no room in my mind for even such thoughts as those.
It was not until wounds had produced discouragement in the bravest
soul I ever knew that I was aroused to some sense of my own
responsibility as his senior staff officer, and spontaneously said:
"No, general, let us try it again." I was so much absorbed in the
battle itself at that time, and even after Lyon's death, that it
did not occur to me that wounds and death, even of the commanding
general himself, were of any consequence except as they might
influence the progress and final result of the battle. This is
the feeling that must dominate the action of every successful
commander. It is remarkable only because of its early development
in one not then under any such responsibility.
It may not be a proper subject for criticism at this time, and
certainly is not for any that might seem harsh or unkind, yet it
is an instructive lesson which ought never to be forgotten, that
feeling and passion sometimes more than reason, sound military
principles, or wise statesmanship, dictated military as well as
political policy during and long after the Civil War.
No doubt all are now ready to admit this in respect to the political
measures which wrought so much evil in the South during the so-
called reconstruction period. But those who are not familiar with
the facts will, I think, be amazed when they see the evidences of
this influence in military operations, and perhaps at no time more
strikingly than during the last period of the Civil War. It would
seem that the official correspondence of that period ought to be
a sufficient warning to deter any future generation from bringing
the country into a condition where even some of the most distinguished
citizens, statesmen, and soldiers seem to be governed more by
passion than by reason in the conduct of public affairs. The
inevitable horrors of war are bad enough in any case, but they are
vastly increased when the passions begotten of civil strife become
dominant. While all parts of the United States have reason for
pride in the manhood and valor of American soldiers, and in the
patriotic devotion of citizens to the cause which they believed to
be right, and profound gratitude for the restoration of the Union
of the States, the people of this entire country should bow their
heads in humiliation when they think of the general low state of
civilization which made such a war possible, and much of its conduct
the dictate of passion and hate rather than of reason or regard
for the public good. Even if it is true, as some soldier-statesmen
have said, but which I do not believe, that occasional wars are
necessary to the vitality of a nation,--necessary to keep up the
fires of patriotism and military ardor upon which the national life
depends,--let them be foreign and not civil wars. It is a great
mistake, though apparently a common one, to suppose that a country
benefits ultimately, in some mysterious way, by civil war, in spite
of all its losses during the war. That able scientist General M.
C. Meigs demonstrated years ago that this country had, in accordance
with a general law, suffered permanent national injury, irreparable
in all future time, by its Civil War, and showed very closely the
amount of that injury.
It is, no doubt, true that the body politic, like the natural body,
may in extreme cases be so diseased either by inheritance or from
violation of natural laws, as to require the surgeon's knife to
remove the diseased part. But in such a case there is little cause
for pride except in the skill of the surgeon, and little cause for
rejoicing except in the fact that the operation was successful,
that neither the disease nor the surgeon's knife killed the patient.
While the great Von Moltke and others were unquestionably right in
their views of the necessity for thorough preparation for war at
all times, I believe that indispensable preparation can be made in
a way vastly more satisfactory than by actual war. And this can
be done with only a trifling expenditure of treasure, and at no
cost whatever in blood or sorrow, nor in suspension of peaceful
pursuits, nor in burdensome debts, nor in enormous disbursements
for pensions. Let the schools of all kinds and all grades teach
patriotism, respect for law, obedience to authority, discipline,
courage, physical development, and the rudiments of practical
military manoeuvers; let the national and State military schools
be fostered and perfected, and the volunteer citizen soldiery given
material aid proportionate to their patriotic military zeal. Let
the fortifications of the sea-coasts and the fleets of battle-ships
and cruisers on the ocean be commensurate with the vast national
interests and honor intrusted to their protection and defense; let
the standing army be sufficient to discharge the duties which
require long and scientific education and training, and to serve
as models and instructors for the millions of young citizens: then
will the United States, by being always ready for war, insure to
themselves all the blessings of peace, and this at a cost utterly
insignificant in comparison with the cost of one great war. It is
a source of profound gratification to an old soldier who has long
worked toward this great end to know that his country has already,
in his short lifetime, come so near this perfect ideal of a peace-
loving yet military republic. Only a few more years of progress
in the direction already taken, and the usual prolongation of
natural life will yet enable me to witness the realization of this
one great object of my earthly ambition.
[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLVI, part ii, p. 802.]
[( 2) For the military convention of April 26, 1865, signed by
Sherman and Johnston, and the supplemental terms, signed by Johnston
and Schofield, see War Records, Vol. XLVII, part iii, pp. 313, 482.]