Halleck Relieves Frémont of the Command in Missouri--A Special
State Militia--Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia--A
Hostile Committee Sent to Washington--The Missouri Quarrel of
1862--In Command of the "Army of the Frontier"--Absent Through
Illness--Battle of Prairie Grove--Compelled to be Inactive--
Transferred to Tennessee--In Command of Thomas's Old Division of
the Fourteenth Corps--Reappointed Major-General--A Hibernian
"Striker."
On November 19, 1861, Major-General H. W. Halleck relieved Major-
General Frémont of the command of the Department of the Mississippi.
On November 21 I was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers,
and reported to General Halleck for duty.
In the spring of 1861 a convention of the State of Missouri had
assembled at St. Louis to consider the question of secession, and
had decided to adhere to the Union. Nevertheless, the governor,
Claiborne Fox Jackson, and the executive officers had joined the
rebellion and fled from the State. The convention reassembled on
July 20, and organized a provisional government. Hamilton R. Gamble
was chosen provisional governor, and intrusted with very large
powers. He was a sterling patriot, a man of ability and of the
highest character in his public and private relations, much too
conservative on the questions of States' rights and slavery to suit
the "radical" loyalists of that time, but possessing probably in
a higher degree than any other citizen of Missouri the confidence
of all classes of Union men in the State.
A SPECIAL STATE MILITIA
One of Governor Gamble's first important public acts was to seek
and obtain from President Lincoln authority to raise a special
force of State militia, to be employed only in defense of the State,
but to be paid, equipped, and supplied in all respects by the United
States. This force was to be organized in conformity with the
militia laws of the State, was to include an adjutant-general, a
quartermaster-general, and three aides-de-camp to the governor,
one major-general and his staff, and a brigadier-general and staff
for each brigade. The number of regiments, aggregate strength and
arms of service were not specified.
By the terms of this arrangement the force would remain subject to
the governor's command; but at the suggestion of Major-General
McClellan, then general-in-chief, to avoid possible conflict of
command it was stipulated by the President that the commanding
general of the department should be ex-officio major-general of
the militia. And it is due to the memory of Governor Gamble to
say that although partizan enemies often accused him of interfering
with the operations of the militia in the interest of his supposed
political views, there never was, while I was in command of the
militia, the slightest foundation for such accusation. He never
attempted to interfere in any manner with the legitimate exercise
of the authority of the commanding general, but was, on the contrary,
governed by the commander's views and opinions in the appointment
and dismissal of officers and in other matters in which his own
independent authority was unquestioned. This authority, given by
the President, was subsequently confirmed by act of Congress, by
which the force was limited to 10,000 men.
As stated above, I was appointed brigadier-general, to date from
November 21, 1861; and on November 27 was assigned by General Halleck
to the "command of all the militia of the State," and charged with
the duty of raising, organizing, etc., the special force which had
been authorized by the President.
The organization of the militia was not completed until about the
middle of April, 1862, when the aggregate force was 13,800 men,
consisting of fourteen regiments and two battalions of cavalry
(mounted riflemen), one regiment of infantry, and one battery of
artillery. But the troops were enrolled mainly in the districts
where their services were required. As rapidly as companies were
organized and equipped, they were put in the field with the United
States troops then occupying the State, and thus rapidly acquired,
by active service with older troops, the discipline and instruction
necessary to efficiency, so that by the time the organization was
completed this body of troops was an efficient and valuable force.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL OF THE MISSOURI MILITIA
My official report, made on December 7, 1862,( 1) to the department
commander and the general-in-chief, gives a detailed account of
the purely military operations of that period. But many matters
less purely military which entered largely into the history of that
time deserve more than a passing notice.
During the short administration of General Frémont in Missouri,
the Union party had split into two factions, "radical" and
"conservative," hardly less bitter in their hostility to each other
than to the party of secession. The more advanced leaders of the
radicals held that secession had abolished the constitution and
all laws restraining the powers of the government over the people
of the Confederate States, and even over disloyal citizens of States
adhering to the Union. They advocated immediate emancipation of
the slaves, and confiscation by military authority of all property
of "rebels and rebel sympathizers"--that is to say, of all persons
not of the radical party, for in their partizan heat they disdained
to make any distinction between "conservatives," "copperheads,"
and "rebels." So powerful and persistent was the radical influence
that even so able a lawyer as Edwin M. Stanton, then Secretary of
War, was constrained to send an order to the commander of the
District of Missouri, directing him to execute the act of Congress
of July 17, 1862, relative to the confiscation of property of
persons engaged in the rebellion, although the law provided for
its execution in the usual way by the judicial department of the
government, and gave no shadow of authority for military action.
It is only necessary here to remark that the order was not, as it
could not be lawfully, obeyed. Action under it was limited to the
securing of property subject to confiscation, and liable to be
removed or otherwise disposed of, and the collection of evidence
for the use of the judicial officers. The following is Secretary
Stanton's order sent by telegraph, September 5, 1862:
"It is represented that many disloyal persons residing at St. Louis
and elsewhere in your command are subject to the provisions of the
Confiscation Act, and that it would be expedient to enforce against
them the provisions of that act. You are instructed to enforce
that act within your command, and will please send directions for
that purpose to your provost-marshal."
In compliance with the Secretary's instructions, I issued an order,
on September 11, providing for the action above stated, and no
further.
These instructions from the Secretary of War were subsequently
repudiated by President Lincoln; but in the meantime they produced
serious evil under my successor, who fully enforced them by apparently
committing the national administration to the extreme radical
doctrine, and making the military commander in Missouri appear to
be acting not in harmony with the President's views. So far as I
know, this subject does not appear to have been submitted to the
President until some time in 1863, after Major-General Curtis, as
department commander, had for some months carried out the radical
theory of military confiscation, and I, as his successor, had put
a stop to it. Then an appeal was made to the President, and he,
in his celebrated letter of instructions of October 1, 1863, directed
the military to have nothing to do with the matter.
The State administration of Missouri, under its conservative
governor, was of course sternly opposed to this radical policy,
including the forced liberation of slaves, for which there was at
that time no warrant of law or executive authority. A simple sense
of duty compelled the military commander to act in these matters
more in harmony with the State government than with the radical
party, and in radical eyes he thus became identified with their
enemies, the conservatives.
This gave rise on August 4, 1862, to a meeting of prominent citizens
of St. Louis, who adopted resolutions, of the most important of
which the following was reported to be a true copy:
"_Resolved_, That a committee of gentlemen be requested to go to
Washington City to urge upon the President the appointment of a
commander of the military forces of this State who will, under
instructions, act with vigor in suppressing the guerillas of this
State, and with authority to enlist the militia of the State into
the service of the United States."
A HOSTILE COMMITTEE SENT TO WASHINGTON
The chair appointed, as the committee to go to Washington, Henry
T. Blow, John C. Vogle, I. H. Sturgeon, and Thomas O'Reilley, and
authorized Mr. Blow to add to this committee any other "true Union
man" who would go. Who, if any, besides Messrs. Blow, Vogle, and
O'Reilley actually composed the committee, I was never informed.
On August 10, Halleck, then general-in-chief, telegraphed me from
Washington: "There is a deputation here from Colonel Blair and
others asking for your removal on account of inefficiency."
Colonel Blair happened into my office a few minutes after the
receipt of the despatch on the 11th, and I handed it to him. He
at once said in substance, and with feeling: "That is not true.
No one is authorized to ask in my name for your removal"; and he
sent a despatch to that effect to General Halleck.
The next day (August 12) despatches were exchanged between General
Halleck and Colonel Blair, of which the latter furnished me a copy,
inclosed with the following note from himself:
"St. Louis, Mo., August 13th, '62.
"Brig.-Gen'l Schofield.
"Dear Schofield: I inclose you a copy of a despatch (marked 'A')
received yesterday from Major-General Halleck, and my answer thereto,
marked 'B'.
"Yours,
"Frank P. Blair, Jr."
Copy "A."
"To Hon. F. P. Blair,
"August 12, 1862.
"(By telegraph from War Dep't.)
"Washington, 12:50 P.M.
"The committee from St. Louis--Henry T. Blow, John C. Vogle, and
Thomas O'Reilley--told me, in presence of the President, that they
were authorized by you to ask for Gen. Schofield's removal for
inefficiency. The Postmaster-General has to-day sent me a letter
from Mr. ----, asking that you be put in Gen. Schofield's place.
There has been no action in this or on the papers presented by the
above-named committee.
"H. W. Halleck,
"General-in-chief."
Copy "B."
"St. Louis, Mo., August 12th, 1862.
"Major-General Halleck,
"General-in-chief, Washington City, D. C.:
"I despatched to you yesterday, and wrote the Postmaster-General
last week. Let the letter be submitted to you. Nobody is authorized
to ask in my name for Gen'l Schofield's removal. I think the State
military organization should be abandoned as soon as practicable,
and a military commander, in this State, authorized to act without
respect to Gov. Gamble. I do not want the place, but want the
commander in the State to be instructed to act without any regard
to the State authorities.
"Frank P. Blair, Jr."
The foregoing gives, so far as I know it, the essence of the Missouri
quarrel of 1862. I have never had the curiosity to attempt to
ascertain how far the meeting of August 4 was hostile to me
personally.
During the time, subsequent to General Halleck's departure for
Washington, July 23, 1862, that the Department of the Mississippi
was left without any immediate commander, there appears to have
been a contest in Washington between the military and the political
influence, relative to the disposition to be made of that important
command. The following from General Halleck to me, dated September
9, 1862, indicates the situation at that time:
"(Unofficial.)
"My dear Gen'l:
"There has been a strong political pressure of outsiders to get
certain parties put in command of new Dep'ts to be made out of the
old Dep't of the Miss. The presence of the enemy and the danger
of the capital have for the moment suspended these political
intrigues, or rather prevented the accomplishment of their objects.
If any one of our Western Gen'ls would do something creditable and
brilliant in the present crisis, it would open the way to a new
organization such as it should be.
"From the position of St. Louis as the source of supplies, Missouri
ought not to be separated from Arkansas and western Tennessee.
What will be done in the matter I do not know.
"Yours truly,
"H. W. Halleck."
None of "our Western generals" had then done anything very "creditable
and brilliant." Even Grant was the object of grave charges and
bitter attacks. Powerful influences were at work to supersede him
in command of the army in west Tennessee. Had there been any
available general at that time capable of commanding public
confidence, the military idea would doubtless have prevailed, but
in the absence of such a leader the politicians triumphed in part.
IN COMMAND OF THE "ARMY OF THE FRONTIER"
The old department, called Department of the Mississippi, was
divided, and Major-General Samuel R. Curtis was assigned to command
the new Department of the Missouri, composed of the territory west
of the Mississippi River. For some months the radicals had it all
their own way, and military confiscation was carried on without
hindrance.
When this change occurred I was in the field in immediate command
of the forces which I had assembled there for aggressive operations,
and which General Curtis named the "Army of the Frontier." My
official report of December 7, 1862, gave a full account of the
operations of that army up to November 20, when sickness compelled
me to relinquish the command.
As will be seen from that report and from my correspondence with
General Curtis at that time, it was then well known that the enemy
was concentrating in the Arkansas valley all the troops he could
raise, and making preparations to return across the Boston Mountains
and "dispute with us the possession of northwestern Arkansas and
southwestern Missouri"; and I had placed my troops where they could
live to a great extent on the country, and quickly concentrate to
meet the enemy when he should advance. But General Curtis ordered
me to move north and east with two divisions, leaving Blunt with
one division to occupy that country. It was on this return march
that I was overtaken by a severe attack of bilious fever.
As my official report of December 7, 1862, is published in Volume
XIII of the War Records, I make no reference here to the operations
covered by it. That able and impartial historian, the Comte de
Paris, published a very accurate history of the operations in
Missouri in the summer of 1862, in which he paid me the compliment,
which a soldier values so highly, of saying that I was free from
partizan passion.
It was during my absence through illness that Hindman made his
expected advance. Blunt's division was encamped at Cane Hill, and
Hindman crossed the mountains at Lee's Creek, aiming to reach
Blunt's rear, cut off his retreat, and overwhelm him.
BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE
Fortunately, Blunt had received information in advance of the
intended movement, and had called the two divisions from Missouri
to his support. These two divisions, under General Herron, were
encamped at Wilson's Creek, a distance of about 116 miles. On the
morning of December 3 they began their march to join General Blunt.
They had reached a point about six miles south of Fayetteville,
when, unexpectedly to both, Herron's and Hindman's heads of column
met at Prairie Grove about seven o'clock in the morning of December
7, and the engagement commenced immediately. Blunt, hearing the
sound of battle, moved rapidly toward Prairie Grove and attacked
the enemy's left. The battle lasted all day, with heavy losses on
both sides, and without any decided advantage to either side. At
dark the enemy still held his position, but in the morning was
found to be in full retreat across the mountains. A portion of
our troops occupied the battle-field of Prairie Grove when I resumed
command on December 29, and the remainder were making a raid to
the Arkansas River, where they destroyed some property, and found
that Hindman had retreated toward Little Rock. It was evident that
the campaign in that part of the country for that season was ended.
The question was "What next?" I took it for granted that the large
force under my command--nearly 16,000 men--was not to remain idle
while Grant or some other commander was trying to open the Mississippi
River; and I was confirmed in this assumption by General Curtis's
previous order to march eastward with two divisions, which order,
though premature when given, might now be renewed without danger.
At once, therefore, I set to work to organize a suitable force,
including the Indian regiments, to hold the country we had gained,
and three good divisions to prosecute such operations as might be
determined on, and at once commenced the march north and east toward
the theater of future active operations.
Although I had at first esteemed General Blunt much more highly
than he deserved, and had given him most liberal commendation in
my official report for all he had done, I became satisfied that he
was unfit in any respect for the command of a division of troops
against a disciplined enemy. As was my plain duty, I suggested
confidentially to General Curtis that the command of a division in
the field was not General Blunt's true place, and that he be assigned
to the District of Kansas, where I permitted him to go, at his own
request, to look after his personal interests. General Curtis
rebuked me for making such a suggestion, and betrayed my confidence
by giving my despatch to James H. Lane, senator from Kansas, and
others of Blunt's political friends, thus putting me before the
President and the United States Senate in the light of unjust
hostility to gallant officers who had just won a great victory over
the enemy at Prairie Grove. The result of this, and of radical
influence in general, was that my nomination as major-general of
volunteers, then pending in the Senate, was not confirmed, while
both Blunt and Herron were nominated and confirmed as major-
generals!
Such as Lane and Blunt were the men who so long seemed to control
the conduct of military affairs in the West, and whom I found much
more formidable enemies than the hostile army in my front. Herron
I esteemed a very different man from Blunt, and thought he would,
with experience, make a good division commander. But circumstances
occurred soon after which shook my confidence in his character as
well as in that of General Curtis. Herron and some of his staff-
officers were subpoenaed, through department headquarters, as
material witnesses for the defense in the case of an officer on
trial before a military commission. They failed to appear. Soon
after, when Herron was assigned to command the Army of the Frontier,
he "dissolved" the commission "for the present," adding: "The
court will be reassembled by order from these headquarters in the
field when witnesses not at present to be had can be brought
forward." Upon learning this, after I assumed command of the
department I ordered Herron to report for duty to General Grant
before Vicksburg. In the meantime Herron wrote to the War Department
protesting against serving under me as department commander, and
got a sharp rebuke from the President through the Secretary of War.
This brief explanation is all that seems necessary to show the
connection between the several events as they appear in the official
records.
COMPELLED TO BE INACTIVE
After the battle of Prairie Grove, being then in St. Louis, I asked
General Curtis to let me go down the Mississippi and join the
expedition against Vicksburg, saying that as Blunt and Herron had
won a battle in my absence, I did not wish to resume command over
them. But Curtis would not consent to this; he said he wanted me
to command the Army of the Frontier. He thus invited the confidence
which he afterward betrayed, and for which he rebuked me. I felt
outraged by this treatment, and thereafter did not feel or show
toward General Curtis the respect or subordination which ought to
characterize the relations of an officer toward his commander.
This feeling was intensified by his conduct in the Herron affair,
and by the determination gradually manifested not to permit me or
my command to do anything. He for a long time kept up a pretense
of wanting me to move east or west, or south, or somewhere, but
negatived all my efforts actually to move. The situation seemed
to me really unendurable: I was compelled to lie at Springfield
all the latter part of winter, with a well-appointed army corps
eager for active service, hundreds of miles from any hostile force,
and where we were compelled to haul our own supplies, in wagons,
over the worst of roads, 120 miles from the railroad terminus at
Rolla. I could not get permission even to move nearer the railroad,
much less toward the line of which the next advance must be made;
and this while the whole country was looking with intense anxiety
for the movement that was to open the Mississippi to the Gulf, and
the government was straining every nerve to make that movement
successful. Hence I wrote to General Halleck the letters of January
31, 1863, and February 3. These appear to have called forth some
correspondence between Generals Halleck and Curtis, of which General
Halleck's letter of February 18 was the only part that came into
my possession.( 2) This account was written several years before
the War Records were published.
In my letter of January 31, I said:
"Pardon me for suggesting that the forces under command of Davidson,
Warren, and myself might be made available in the opening of the
Mississippi, should that result not be accomplished quickly. . . ."
The immediate result of this correspondence was that some troops
were sent down the river, but none of my command, while two divisions
of the latter were ordered toward the east. This march was in
progress when Congress adjourned. The Senate not having confirmed
by appointment as major-general, the time of my temporary humiliation
arrived. But I had not relied wholly in vain upon General Halleck's
personal knowledge of my character. He had not been able fully to
sustain me against selfish intrigue in Kansas, Missouri, and
Washington; but he could and did promptly respond to my request,
and ordered me to Tennessee, where I could be associated with
soldiers who were capable of appreciating soldierly qualities.
One of the happiest days of my life was when I reported to Rosecrans
and Thomas at Murfreesboro', received their cordial welcome, and
was assigned to the command of Thomas's own old division of the
Fourteenth Corps. One of the most agreeable parts of my whole
military service was the thirty days in command of that division
at Triune, and some of my strongest and most valued army attachments
were formed there.
But that happy period of soldier life was brief. Early in May
President Lincoln reappointed me major-general, with original date,
November 29, 1862, and ordered me back to the old scene of unsoldierly
strife and turmoil in Missouri and Kansas.
A HIBERNIAN "STRIKER"
In 1861 and 1862 I had a Hibernian "striker" who had been a soldier
of the old mounted rifles, and had been discharged on account of
a wound received in an Indian fight, but was yet well able to
perform the duties of an officer's servant in the field. His care
of his master's property, and sometimes of the master himself, was
very remarkable. In the midst of the battle of Wilson's Creek the
horse I was riding was killed, and I called in vain for my spare
horse. From the best information obtained I concluded that both
the horse and my faithful orderly had been killed, and I sincerely
mourned my loss. But after the fight was over I found my man
quietly riding the spare horse along with the troops, as if nothing
unusual had happened. When I upbraided him for his conduct and
demanded to know where he had been all that time, he replied: "Ah,
Major, when I saw the one horse killed I thought I'd better take
the other to a place of safety!"
Where my efficient assistant obtained his supplies I never knew,
but he would fill without delay any requisition I might make, from
a shoe-string to a buffalo-robe. One day in 1862 I found in my
camp trunk several pairs of shoulder-straps belonging to the grades
of captain, major, and lieutenant-colonel. As I was then a brigadier-
general, I inquired of my man why he kept those badges of inferior
grades. He replied: "Ah, General, nobody can tell what may happen
to you." When, only a few months later, after having been promoted
to the rank of major-general I was again reduced to that of brigadier-
general, I remembered the forethought of my Irish orderly.
[( 1) See War Records, Vol. XIII, p. 7.]
[( 2) The whole correspondence may be found in the War Records,
Vol. XXII, part ii.]