In Command of the Department of the Missouri--Troops Sent to General
Grant--Satisfaction of the President--Conditions on which Governor
Gamble would Continue in Office--Anti-Slavery Views--Lincoln on
Emancipation in Missouri--Trouble Following the Lawrence Massacre
--A Visit to Kansas, and the Party Quarrel There--Mutiny in the
State Militia--Repressive Measures--A Revolutionary Plot.
On May 24, 1863, I relieved General Curtis in command of the
Department of the Missouri. In his instructions of May 22, General
Halleck said:
"You owe your appointment entirely to the choice of the President
himself. I have not, directly or indirectly, interfered in the
matter. But I fully concur in the choice, and will give you all
possible support and assistance in the performance of the arduous
duties imposed upon you."
IN COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI
A few days later I received the following significant letter from
the President:
"Executive Mansion, Washington, May 27, 1863.
"General J. M. Schofield:
"My dear Sir: Having relieved General Curtis and assigned you to
the command of the Department of the Missouri, I think it may be
of some advantage for me to state to you why I did it.
"I did not relieve General Curtis because of any full conviction
that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because
of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri,
constituting, when united, a vast majority of the whole people,
have entered into a pestilent factional quarrel among themselves--
General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the head of one faction,
and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to
reconcile the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until
I felt it my duty to break it up somehow; and as I could not remove
Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis.
"Now that you are in the position, I wish you to undo nothing merely
because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise
your own judgment and _do right_ for the public interest.
"Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader
and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass
and persecute the people. It is a difficult rôle, and so much
greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions,
or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right.
Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other.
"Yours truly,
"A. Lincoln."
In acknowledging the President's letter on June 1, I concluded by
saying:
"I have strong hopes that the Missouri State Convention, at its
approaching session, will adopt such measures for the speedy
emancipation of slaves as will secure the acquiescence of the large
majority of Union men, though perhaps not quite satisfactory to
either extreme. If this hope be realized, one of my most embarrassing
difficulties will be removed, or at least greatly diminished."
The military problem in that department, as understood by me and
by my superiors in Washington, was at that time a comparatively
simple one, though my predecessor in command of the department
entertained different views. With my views of the military situation,
whether confined to my own department or extended to embrace the
entire country, there was but one course to pursue, namely, to send
all available forces to assist in the capture of Vicksburg and the
opening of the Mississippi to the gulf. After that I could easily
operate from points on the Mississippi as a base, capture Little
Rock and the line of the Arkansas, and then make that river the
base of future operations.
Hence, in response to a request from General Halleck, I at once
sent to General Grant and other commanders at the front all the
troops I could possibly spare, saying at the same time that this
would leave me very weak, but that I was "willing to risk it in
view of the vast importance of Grant's success."
Thus I began my military operations by stripping the department of
troops to the lowest possible defensive limit. But this was what
I had so earnestly urged before, when in a subordinate position;
and I was glad to do it when the responsibility rested upon me.
My loss of troops to Grant was returned with interest as soon as
practicable after Vicksburg had fallen, and I was then able to
advance a large force, under General Steele, for the capture of
Little Rock, resulting in holding the entire line of the Arkansas
River from that time forward.
At the time I had met General Grant but once, and then only for a
moment, and I have always assumed that the timely aid sent him at
Vicksburg was the foundation for the kind and generous friendship
and confidence which he ever afterward manifested toward me, and
which, with the like manifestations of approval from President
Lincoln, are to me the most cherished recollections of my official
career.
TROOPS SENT TO GENERAL GRANT
The appreciation of my action in Washington was expressed by General
Halleck in a letter dated July 7, 1863, in which he said: "The
promptness with which you sent troops to General Grant gave great
satisfaction here"; and by the President himself, in a letter to
the "Hon. Charles D. Drake and others, committee," dated October
5, 1863, in which he wrote: "Few things have been so grateful to
my anxious feelings as when, in June last, the local force in
Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general
force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg and
menaced from without by General Johnston."
It would have been impossible for me to send away more than a small
part of those troops if I had not been able to replace them by
Missouri militia. This General Curtis had probably been unable to
do because of the unfortunate antagonism between him and the State
government; and perhaps this much ought to be said in explanation
of his apparently selfish policy of retaining so many idle troops
in Missouri. For my part, I could see neither necessity nor excuse
for quarreling with the governor of Missouri, and thus depriving
myself and the nation of his legitimate aid. Governor Gamble was
perhaps "behind the times" in his views on the slavery question,
although decidedly in favor of gradual emancipation; and he was
utterly intolerant of those radical schemes for accomplishing ends
by lawless means, then so loudly advocated. I thought at the time
a more radical policy might possibly tend to harmonize the Union
factions and allay the excitement, and frequently told Governor
Gamble that it would be necessary to adopt a policy on the negro
question more in harmony with the views of the administration and
of the Northern people. To this the governor assented, and seemed
desirous of going as far in that direction as he could carry the
Union people of Missouri with him. From his seat in the State
Convention at Jefferson City he made a speech advocating emancipation
in a much shorter period than the convention could finally be
prevailed upon to adopt, while I was using my personal influence
with members to the same end.
But it soon became evident that nothing would satisfy the radical
leaders short of the overthrow of the existing State government;
that a reconciliation of the quarrel between the "pestilent factions"
( 1) in Missouri, so much desired by Mr. Lincoln, was exactly what
the radicals did not want and would not have. Satisfied of this
and disgusted with the abuse heaped upon him by men who owed him
warm and honest support, Governor Gamble tendered his resignation
to the convention, then in session. His resignation was not
accepted, and by a "majority of the convention and multitudes of
private citizens" he was requested to withdraw it. In this request
I united, for I could see no possibility of improvement under any
governor that the convention--a very conservative body--might elect,
while the result might be confusion worse confounded.
CONDITIONS OF GOVERNOR GAMBLE'S CONTINUING
The governor submitted to me the following letter including conditions
upon which he would consent to continue in office:
"Major-General Schofield.
"General: For the purpose of restoring order and law and maintaining
the authority of the Federal and State governments in the State of
Missouri, it is necessary that we have an understanding as to the
most important measures to be adopted.
"I have tendered my resignation as governor, and have been requested
to withdraw it on the ground that it is necessary to the peace and
quiet of the State that I remain in office. In this request you
have united with a majority of the convention and multitudes of
private citizens. I am willing to accede to the request, and, if
an ordinance of emancipation is passed, to remain in office, if on
the part of the government I can be sure of its co-operation in my
efforts to preserve the peace and remove all causes of dissension
and dissatisfaction from among the people.
"I think it necessary that the following measures be adopted by
you as the commanding general of the department:
"_First_. That it be distinctly made known that the provisional
government of the State is the government recognized by the government
of the United States, and that any attempt, in any way, to interfere
by violence, or by tumultuous assemblages, or in any other unlawful
manner, will be suppressed by the power of the government of the
United States.
"_Second_. That the functions of civil government of the State
will be supported and upheld, and that the process of the State in
civil and criminal matters may be executed in all posts and
encampments of the troops of the United States, and that resistance
thereto by military persons shall be punished.
"_Third_. That no recruiting of negroes within this State shall
be recognized, unless the persons recruiting them shall be able to
produce the written permission of the governor of the State; and
that any person attempting to recruit without such permission, if
he be in the military service shall be immediately prohibited from
all such conduct, and if in civil life shall be proceeded against
by the State authorities, without any interference by the military.
"_Fourth_. That no countenance or encouragement shall be given to
provost-marshals, or others in military authority, in any proceedings
against the property of citizens, slaves included, upon the ground
of its being liable to confiscation; but the confiscation shall be
executed by the civil officers of the United States, as is directed
by the authorities at Washington.
"When we arrive at a perfect understanding between ourselves, I am
willing to put myself in the same boat with you, and we will sink
or swim together. If you should be censured or removed from this
command because of what is done to carry these propositions into
effect, I will abandon office immediately . . . "
To this I replied verbally that I could not enter into any agreement
as to the policy to be pursued by me as commander of the department;
that I must hold myself free to pursue such course as circumstances
should from time to time indicate, or such as might be ordered by
the President; my policy would be indicated from time to time by
my general orders; in some respects it would doubtless conflict
with that submitted by his Excellency. Nevertheless the governor
finally consented to withdraw his resignation.
The convention at length passed an ordinance providing for the
gradual extinction of slavery in the State, and adjourned. The
feeling of bitterness between the opposing factions rather increased
than diminished during its session.
ANTI-SLAVERY VIEWS
The following letter to my friend Mr. Williams, which was published
in the New York and St. Louis papers with my consent, made sufficiently
clear the views I then entertained upon the slavery question, and
left no reasonable ground for any emancipationist to quarrel with
me on that subject, however much he may have been dissatisfied with
the action of the convention,--just as my letter of June 1 to the
President left him no room for doubt--if, indeed, he had entertained
any before--upon the question then deemed so important:
"Headquarters, Dep't of the Missouri,
"St. Louis, June 1, 1863.
"J. E. Williams, Esq.
"Pres't Metropolitan Bank, New York.
"My dear Sir: Professor Bartlett has informed me of the interest
you have manifested in my promotion and connection with this
department, and, above all, that you have done me the kindness to
assert my soundness on the important question of the day.
"You are right in saying that I was an anti-slavery man, though
not an abolitionist, before the war. These terms have greatly
enlarged their relative meaning since the rebellion broke out. I
regard universal emancipation as one of the necessary consequences
of the rebellion, or rather as one of the means absolutely necessary
to a complete restoration of the Union--and this because slavery
was the great cause of the rebellion, and the only obstacle in the
way of a perfect union. The perception of these important truths
is spreading with almost astounding rapidity in this State. I have
great hope that the State Convention, which meets on the 15th
instant, will adopt some measure for the speedy emancipation of
slaves. If so, our difficulties will be substantially at an end.
"When the popular mind seizes a great principle and resolves to
carry it into execution, it becomes impatient of the restraints
imposed by existing laws, and in its haste to break down the barriers
which stand in the way of its darling object, becomes regardless
of all law, and anarchy is the result. This is our difficulty
here. The people will have freedom for the slave. No law of the
United States nor of Missouri, nor yet any order of the President,
meets the case.
"The loyal slave-owner demands that his rights _under the law_ be
protected. Let us have an ordinance of the State Convention which
will satisfy the demands of the popular mind, and no loyal man will
murmur.
"You can imagine with what deep interest I look forward to the
legal settlement of this question, so deeply involving the success
of the great cause for the time being intrusted to my care.
"In Arkansas and other States to which the President's proclamation
applies, so far as I have observed, no such difficulty exists.
The loyal people accept the decree without complaint, perfectly
willing to give up all they have for the Union. So much the greater
honor is due them for this cheerful sacrifice because they do not
and cannot be expected to appreciate and understand the principle
of freedom as it is impressed upon the loyal heart of the North.
"Please accept my thanks for your kindness, and believe me,
"Yours very truly,"
(Signed) "J. M. Schofield."
On June 20, I telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln:
"The action of the Missouri State Convention upon the question of
emancipation will depend very much upon whether they can be assured
that their action will be sustained by the General Government and
the people protected in their slave property during the short time
that slavery is permitted to exist. Am I authorized in any manner,
directly or indirectly, to pledge such support and protection?
"The question is of such vital importance to the peace of Missouri
that I deem it my duty to lay it before your Excellency."
LINCOLN ON EMANCIPATION IN MISSOURI
The following reply from the President fairly illustrates the wisdom
and justice of his views, and shows how perfectly I was in accord
with him in my desire to do what was wisest and best for the peace
of Missouri:
"Executive Mansion, Washington, June 22, 1863.
"Genl. John M. Schofield.
"My dear Sir: Your despatch, asking in substance whether, in case
Missouri shall adopt gradual emancipation, the General Government
will protect slave-owners in that species of property during the
short time it shall be permitted by the State to exist within it,
has been received.
"Desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri,
and believing as I do that _gradual_ can be made better than
_immediate_, for both black and white, except when military necessity
changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would
be given. I cannot know exactly what shape an act of emancipation
may take. If the period from the initiation to the final end should
be comparatively short, and the act should prevent persons being
sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole world
would be easier. I do not wish to pledge the General Government
to the affirmative support of even temporary slavery, beyond what
can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however,
this is not desired; but that it is desired for the military force
of the United States, while in Missouri, not to be used in subverting
the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during the progress
of emancipation. This I would desire also. I have very earnestly
urged the slave States to adopt emancipation; and it ought to be,
and is, an object with me not to overthrow or thwart what any of
them may in good faith do to that end. You are therefore authorized
to act in the spirit of this letter, in conjunction with what may
appear to be the military necessities of your department.
"Although this letter will become public at some time, it is not
intended to be made so now.
"Yours truly,
"A. Lincoln."
My impression is that the nature of this quarrel in Missouri was
not fully understood at the time in Washington, as General Halleck
wrote me that neither of the factions was regarded as really friendly
to the President. But my belief is that they were then, as they
subsequently proved to be, divided on the Presidential question as
well as in State politics; that the conservative were sincere in
their friendship and support of Mr. Lincoln, and desired his
renomination, while the radicals were intriguing for Mr. Chase or
some other more radical man.
This struggle between extreme radicalism and conservatism among
the Union men of Missouri was long and bitter, but I have nothing
to do with its history beyond the period of my command in that
department. It resulted, as is now well known, in the triumph of
radicalism in the Republican party, and the consequent final loss
of power by that party in the State. Such extremes could not fail
to produce a popular revulsion, and it required no great foresight
to predict the final result.
TROUBLE FOLLOWING THE LAWRENCE MASSACRE
The factions in Missouri gave the military commander trouble enough
in 1863; but to that was added the similar and hardly less troublesome
party quarrel in Kansas. I cannot give a more accurate account of
the complicated situation there than by quoting from my correspondence
and journal of that period. On August 28 I wrote to President
Lincoln as follows:
"In reply to your telegram of the 27th, transmitting copy of one
received from two influential citizens of Kansas, I beg leave to
state some of the facts connected with the horrible massacre at
Lawrence, and also relative to the assault made upon me by a certain
class of influential politicians.
"Since the capture of Vicksburg, a considerable portion of the
rebel army in the Mississippi valley has disbanded, and large
numbers of men have come back to Missouri, many of them doubtless
in hope of being permitted to remain at their former homes in peace,
while some have come under instructions to carry on a guerilla
warfare, and others, men of the worst character, become marauders
on their own account, caring nothing for the Union, nor for the
rebellion, except as the latter affords them a cloak for their
brigandage.
"Under instructions from the rebel authorities, as I am informed
and believe, considerable bands, called "Border Guards," were
organized in the counties of Missouri bordering upon Kansas, for
the ostensible purpose of protecting those counties from inroads
from Kansas, and preventing the slaves of rebels from escaping from
Missouri into Kansas. These bands were unquestionably encouraged,
fed, and harbored by a very considerable portion of the people of
those border counties. Many of those people were in fact the
families of these "bushwhackers," who are brigands of the worst
type.
"Upon the representation of General Ewing and others familiar with
the facts, I became satisfied there could be no cure for this evil
short of the removal from those counties of all slaves entitled to
their freedom, and of the families of all men known to belong to
these bands, and others who were known to sympathize with them.
Accordingly I directed General Ewing to adopt and carry out the
policy he had indicated, warning him, however, of the retaliation
which might be attempted, and that he must be fully prepared to
prevent it before commencing such severe measures.
"Almost immediately after it became known that such policy had been
adopted, Quantrill secretly assembled from several of the border
counties of Missouri about 300 of his men. They met at a preconcerted
place of rendezvous near the Kansas line, at about sunset, and
immediately marched for Lawrence, which place they reached at
daylight the next morning. They sacked and burned the town and
murdered the citizens in the most barbarous manner.
"It is easy to see that any unguarded town in a country where such
a number of outlaws can be assembled is liable to a similar fate,
if the villains are willing to risk the retribution which must
follow. In this case 100 of them have already been slain, and the
remainder are hotly pursued in all directions. If there was any
fault on the part of General Ewing, it appears to have been in not
guarding Lawrence. But of this it was not my purpose to speak.
General Ewing and the governor of Kansas have asked for a court of
inquiry, and I have sent to the War Department a request that one
may be appointed, and I do not wish to anticipate the result of a
full investigation. . . .
"I am officially informed that a large meeting has been held at
Leavenworth, in which a resolution was adopted to the effect that
the people would assemble at a certain place on the border, on
September 8, for the purpose of entering Missouri to search for
their stolen property. Efforts have been made by the mayor of
Leavenworth to get possession of the ferry at that place, for the
purpose of crossing armed parties of citizens into north Missouri.
"I have strong reasons for believing that the authors of the telegram
to you are among those who introduced and obtained the adoption of
the Leavenworth resolution, and who are endeavoring to organize a
force for the purpose of general retaliation upon Missouri. Those
who so deplore my 'imbecility' and 'incapacity' are the very men
who are endeavoring to bring about a collision between the people
of Kansas and the troops under General Ewing's command.
"I have not the 'capacity' to see the wisdom or justice of permitting
an irresponsible mob to enter Missouri for the purpose of retaliation,
even for so grievous a wrong as that which Lawrence has suffered.
"I have increased the force upon the border as far as possible,
and no effort has been, or will be, spared to punish the invaders
of Kansas, and to prevent such acts in the future. The force there
has been all the time far larger than in any other portion of my
department, except on the advanced line in Arkansas and the Indian
Territory. . . .
"P. S. Since writing the above I have received the 'Daily Times'
newspaper, published at Leavenworth, containing an account of the
meeting referred to, and Senator Lane's speech, which I have the
honor to inclose herewith for your information."
In a letter of that same date (August 28), Governor Carney informed
me, among other things, that "after the fearful disaster at Lawrence
and on the return of our troops who had pursued Quantrill and his
murderous band, General Ewing and General James H. Lane met at
Morristown and spent the night together. The latter returned to
Lawrence and called a mass meeting, at which he defended General
Ewing and made an intensely bitter speech against you. Yesterday
he arrived in this city, and soon after caused to be issued a
placard stating he would address the citizens on war matters.
There are two parties here--one for and the other against Ewing.
That against him is headed by Mr. Wilder, member of Congress, and
by Mr. Anthony, mayor of this city. This division put General Lane
in this dilemma here, that he could not defend Ewing as he had done
in Lawrence, and hence he devoted his whole attention to you. The
more violent of the men opposing you are for independent raids into
Missouri. How far General Lane encouraged this class you must
judge from the facts I have stated and from the inclosed speech.
To give tone and distinction to the meeting, General Lane offered
a resolution calling upon the President to relieve you, affirming
that there could be no safety in Kansas, no help for Kansas, unless
this was done. . . . You will judge from the facts stated, from
the course pursued by General Lane at Lawrence, and from his speech
here, how far General Ewing is your friend or fit to command this
district."
On August 31, I started for the scene of the agitation. The
following extracts from my journal reveal the situation:
"_Sept_. 2.--Reached Leavenworth at five o'clock A. M. Stopped at
the Planters' Hotel; was called upon by Governor Carney and several
of his political friends. Discussed at much length the condition
of affairs in the District of the Border. Carney is an aspirant
for the United States Senate. Intends to run against Lane. Desires
to kill off Ewing, considering him a formidable rival, or at least
a supporter of Lane. Ewing has determined not to be a candidate
at the next election, and will not commit himself in support of
either Carney or Lane. Desires to keep on good terms with Lane
because he thinks Lane will probably be re-elected. Carney
understands Ewing as supporting Lane, or at least of having withdrawn
in Lane's favor. In fact, Ewing refuses an alliance with Carney.
Carney therefore desires to kill Ewing. Lane finds it to his
interest to sustain Ewing so long as Schofield commands the
department. Ewing is a better man for Lane than any other Schofield
would be likely to give him. Lane's desire is to remove Schofield
and get in his place a general who would place Kansas under command
of one of Lane's tools, or a man who could be made one by Lane;
therefore Lane defends Ewing and concentrates his attack upon
Schofield. . . .
"Asked and obtained a long private interview with Lane. Went over
the whole ground of his hostility to Genl. S. during the past year.
Showed him the injustice he had done Genl. S., and how foolish and
unprofitable to himself his hostility had been. He stated with
apparent candor that he had bent the whole energies of his soul to
the destruction of Genl. S.; had never labored harder to accomplish
any object in his life. Said he had been evidently mistaken in
the character and principles of Genl. S., and that no man was more
ready than he to atone for a fault. We then approached the subject
of the invasion of Missouri by the people of Kansas. Genl. Lane
still adheres to his design of collecting the people at Paola and
leading them on an expedition "for the purpose of searching for
their stolen property." He professes his ability to control the
people; that he would be answerable, and offered to pledge himself
to Genl. S. and the government that they should do nothing beyond
that which he declares as the object of the expedition. . . .
"Lane was informed that Genl. S. would go to Kansas City the next
day, and Lane replied that he intended to go also. It was agreed
that both should go the next morning and converse with Genl. Ewing
on the subject. The same evening Genl. Lane made a public speech
in Leavenworth, in which he urged the people to meet at Paola, and
assured them that the department and district commanders would not
interfere with the proposed expedition; on the contrary, that both
would countenance and co-operate with it. He also proclaimed the
object to be to lay waste the border counties of Missouri and
exterminate the disloyal people. This statement, following an
interview on that subject, was calculated to mislead a large number
of well-disposed people who would not for a moment think of acting
in opposition to military rules, and to greatly increase the number
of people who would assemble at Paola, and seriously complicate
the difficulty.
"In the evening had another interview with Gov. Carney and some of
his friends. My main object was to secure the full co-operation
of the State government in preventing the invasion of Missouri.
For this purpose I had to consult to a considerable degree the
political views and aims of the governor and his friends. Their
object was, of course, to make out of Lane's project as much capital
as possible against him. It was held by many of them that Lane
had no serious design of entering Missouri; that he expected, of
course, that the military authorities would forbid it; and that he
would yield as a military necessity, and thus gain with his people
additional ground for condemnation of the department commander,
while he had the credit of having done all he possibly could to
enable them to 'recover their stolen property.' . . . Viewing
matters in this light, the governor and his advisers were strongly
inclined to the opinion that the surest way of making capital for
themselves out of Lane's move was to let him go on with it, without
any interference on their part, confident that it would turn out
a grand humbug. . . . After reaching Kansas City and talking with
Genl. Ewing, I replied to the governor, accepting the services of
as many of his troops as he and Genl. Ewing should deem necessary
for the protection of all the towns in Kansas near the border,
stating that with Kansas so protected, Genl. Ewing would not only
carry out his order for the expulsion of disloyal persons, but also
in a short time drive out the guerillas from his district and
restore peace. In addition to this, I wrote the governor a private
letter urging him to issue his proclamation discouraging the Paola
meeting and warning his people against any attempt to go into
Missouri, and informing him I would issue an order forbidding armed
men not in the regular military service from crossing the line.
"_Sept_. 4--I received the governor's reply that he would issue
his proclamation as requested, and also asking permission to publish
a letter which I had written him on August 29, in reply to one from
him regarding these matters. This permission was granted.
"My order was also published declaring that the militia of Kansas
and Missouri would be used only for the defense of their respective
States; that they should not pass from one State into the other
without express orders from the district commander; that armed
bodies of men _not_ belonging to the United States troops, or to
the militia placed under the orders of the department commander by
the governors of their respective States, should not, under any
pretext whatever, pass from one State into the other.
VISIT TO KANSAS, AND THE PARTY QUARREL THERE
"In the evening of the 3d I sent a despatch to the general-in-chief
[Halleck], informing him that the Paola movement was under the
control and guidance of Lane, and that I should not permit them to
enter Missouri; that Lane said he would appeal to the President;
that I did not apprehend a hostile collision; but that a despatch
from the President or the Secretary of War (to Lane) would aid me
much in preventing difficulty.
"If such despatch should be sent, I request to be informed of its
purport. No reply received from the general-in-chief up to this
time (1 P. M., Sept 5). . . .
"_Sept_. 6--Lane failed to meet me at Kansas City, according to
agreement. My correspondence with Governor Carney relative to the
Lawrence massacre and the Paola movement appeared in the Leavenworth
papers of yesterday; also my order forbidding armed citizens from
crossing into Missouri.
"The governor's proclamation did not appear according to promise;
probably he may have decided to defer it until after the Paola
meeting, as a means of making capital against Lane.
"A private letter from one of Governor Carney's advisers was received
yesterday (5th), dated the 3d, but evidently written in the evening
of the 4th or morning of the 5th, which indicated that Carney does
not intend to publish a proclamation, for the reason that Lane
desires to force him to do it. . . .
"Went to Westport yesterday. Met several of the leading loyal
citizens; all agree that Genl. Ewing's order No. 11 is wise and
just--in fact a necessity. I have yet to find the first loyal man
in the border counties who condemns it. They are also warm in
their support of Genl. Ewing, and deprecate his removal. I am
satisfied he is acting wisely and efficiently. . . .
"The radicals in Missouri condemn him (Ewing) as one of my friends;
the conservatives, because he is a Kansas man, and more especially
because of his order No. 11, and similar reasons and radical
measures. For a time this will weaken me very much, and possibly
may cause my overthrow. This risk I must take, because I am
satisfied I am doing the best for the public good, and acting
according to my instructions from the President. I seem in a fair
way to reach one of the positions referred to in the President's
letter of instructions, viz: That in which both factions will
abuse me. According to the President's standard, this is the only
evidence that I will ever have that I am right. It is hardly
possible that I will ever reach a point where both will commend
me. . . .
"_Sept_. 8--Went to Independence yesterday, in company with Genl.
Ewing; . . . made a few remarks to quite a large assemblage of
people, which were well received; was followed by Genl. Ewing in
an appropriate speech, which produced a good effect.
"Have determined to modify General Ewing's order, or rather he will
modify it at my suggestion, so that no property shall be destroyed.
I deem the destruction of property unnecessary and useless. The
chief evil has resulted from the aid given to guerillas in the way
of information conveyed by disloyal people, and by preparing their
food for them. This evil is now removed. Forage and grain cannot
be destroyed or carried away to such an extent as materially to
cripple them. I will as far as possible preserve the property of
all loyal people, with the view of permitting them to return as
soon as the guerillas shall be driven out. Property of known rebels
will be appropriated as far as possible to the use of the army and
loyal people who are made destitute. None will be destroyed.
"Had a long interview this morning with Mayor Anthony of Leavenworth
and a number of influential citizens of that place. Anthony was
arrested and sent to this place yesterday by a detective in the
employ of Genl. Ewing. The arrest was without authority, and Genl.
Ewing promptly discharged the mayor. The object of the citizens
was to obtain a revocation of martial law in Leavenworth, and come
to a correct understanding as to the relation between the military
and civil authorities in that town, so as to prevent difficulty in
future. The whole matter was satisfactorily arranged. . . .
"So far as can be learned, no people have gone from Leavenworth to
the Paola meeting, and it is probable the whole affair will amount
to nothing. Believing that the trouble here is substantially over,
I propose to start for St. Louis to-morrow morning."
MUTINY IN THE STATE MILITIA
A regiment of enrolled militia ordered to New Madrid to relieve
the 25th Missouri, in order that the latter might go to reinforce
General Steele in Arkansas, mutinied after they had gone on board
the steamer, brought the boat ashore, and went to their homes.
The provost guard of St. Louis was sent to arrest them. News having
come of the capture of Little Rock, the two enrolled militia
regiments in St. Louis were dismissed, except the mutineers, who
were kept at hard labor for some time, and the leaders tried for
mutiny.
This mutiny was caused by the efforts of the radical papers and
politicians, who had for some time openly opposed the organization
of the provisional regiments, and encouraged the men to mutiny.
I published an order enforcing martial law against all who should
incite mutiny among the troops, and through General Halleck obtained
the President's approval of this order, but did not find it necessary
to make that approval public until it was made known by the President
himself.
In writing to General Halleck on September 20, I said:
"I inclose herewith a copy of an order which I have found it
necessary to publish and enforce. The revolutionary faction which
has so long been striving to gain the ascendancy in Missouri,
particularly in St. Louis, to overthrow the present State government
and change the policy of the national administration, has at length
succeeded so far as to produce open mutiny of one of the militia
regiments and serious difficulties in others.
"I inclose a number of slips from papers published in Missouri, to
show the extent to which this factious opposition to the government
has been carried. The effect already produced is but natural, and
the ultimate effect will be disastrous in the extreme, unless a
strong remedy be applied speedily.
"Out of consideration for popular opinion and the well-known wishes
of the President relative to freedom of speech and of the press,
I have forborne until, in my belief, further forbearance would lead
to disastrous results. I am thoroughly convinced of the necessity
for prompt and decided measures to put down this revolutionary
scheme, and my sense of duty will not permit me to delay it longer.
It is barely possible that I may not have to enforce the order
against the public press. They may yield without the application
of force; but I do not expect it. The tone of some of their articles
since the publication of the order indicates a determination to
wage the war which they have begun to the bitter end. This
determination is based upon the belief that the President will not
sustain me in any such measures as those contemplated in the order.
A distinct approval by the President of my proposed action, and a
knowledge of the fact here, would end the whole matter at once.
I desire, if possible, to have such approval before taking action
in any individual case. Indeed, I believe such approval would
prevent the necessity for the use of force. It is difficult, I am
aware, for any one at a distance to believe that such measures can
be necessary against men and papers who claim to be 'radically
loyal.' The fact is, they are 'loyal' only to their 'radical'
theories, and are so 'radical' that they cannot possibly be 'loyal'
to the government. . . ."
A REVOLUTIONARY PLOT
These men were styled "revolutionists" not without sufficient cause.
It was currently reported that they had in 1861 conceived the
elevation of Frémont to a dictatorship. In 1862, and again in
1863, they invented a scheme for the violent overthrow of the
provisional State government and the existing national administration
in Missouri. The first act of the program was to seize and imprison
Governor Gamble and me. In 1862 some of them committed the
indiscretion of confiding their plans to General Frank P. Blair,
Jr., who at once warned me of it, but refused to give me the names
of his informers or of the leaders. He said he could not do so
without breach of confidence, but that he had informed them that
he should give me warning and expose the individuals if any further
steps were taken. Here the matter ended.
In 1863 I received warning through the guard stationed at my
residence in the suburbs of the city, with which the revolutionists
had the folly to tamper in their efforts to spread disaffection
among my troops. This discovery, and the premature mutiny of the
regiment ordered to New Madrid, nipped the plot in the bud. I
refer to the circumstances now only to show that I was not unjust
in my denunciation of the "revolutionary faction" in Missouri.
In General Halleck's letter of September 26, inclosing the President's
written approval of my general order, he said:
". . . Neither faction in Missouri is really friendly to the
President and administration; but each is striving to destroy the
other, regardless of all other considerations. In their mutual
hatred they seem to have lost all sense of the perils of the country
and all sentiment of national patriotism. Every possible effort
should be made to allay this bitter party strife in that State."
In reply, September 30, I expressed the following opinion:
". . . I feel compelled to say that I believe you are not altogether
right in your information about the factions in Missouri. If the
so-called 'claybank' faction are not altogether friendly to the
President and administration, I have not been able to discover it.
The men who now sustain me are the same who rallied round Lyon and
sustained the government in the dark days of 1861, while the leaders
of the present 'charcoal' faction stood back until the danger was
past. I believe I have carried out my instructions as literally
as possible, yet I have received a reasonable support from one
faction and the most violent opposition from the other. I am
willing to pledge my official position that those who support me
now will support me in the execution of any policy the President
may order. They are the real friends of the government. It is
impossible for me to be blind to this fact, notwithstanding the
existence, to some extent, of the factional feeling to which you
allude."
The improvement produced by the order was so decided that publication
of the President's approval was thought unnecessary. It only became
public through his letter of October 1, 1863, of which he gave a
copy to the radical delegation.
In September the governor of Missouri placed all the militia of
the State, including those not in active service, under my command.
I published orders intended to control their action and prevent
interference with political meetings; also to secure freedom of
voting at the coming election in November. Several militia officers
guilty of such interference were dismissed, which produced a
wholesome effect.
[( 1) The division of the Union party into radicals and conservatives,
or "charcoals" and "claybanks," originated during the administration
of General Frémont.]