Return to Duty--General Harney's Attitude--Nathaniel Lyon in Command
--Defense of the St. Louis Arsenal--Service as Mustering Officer--
Major of the First Missouri--Surrender of Camp Jackson--Adjutant-
general on Lyon's Staff--A Missing Letter from Frémont to Lyon--
Lyon's Reply--Battle of Wilson's Creek--Death of Lyon--A Question
of Command During the Retreat--Origin of the Opposition of the
Blairs to Frémont--Affair at Fredericktown.
When it became probable that military force would be required by
the government to maintain its authority in the Southern States,
I informed the War Department of my readiness to return to duty
whenever my services might be required, and was instructed to await
orders in St. Louis. Upon President Lincoln's first call for
volunteers, I was detailed to muster in the troops required of the
State of Missouri. With the order of detail was furnished a copy
of the old instructions for mustering into service, etc., which
required me to call upon the governor of Missouri for the regiments
to be mustered, and to accept only fully organized regiments. It
was well and publicly known that the executive of Missouri was
disloyal to the United States, and that compliance with the
President's demand for volunteers was not to be expected from the
State government; yet my instructions authorized me to take no
action which could be effective under such circumstances, and the
then department commander, Brigadier-General William S. Harney,
would not consent that any such action be taken without orders from
Washington. I called upon Governor Jackson for his regiments, but
received no reply.
RETURN TO DUTY
In my visit to General Harney after the attack on Fort Sumter, I
urged the necessity of prompt measures to protect the St. Louis
Arsenal, with its large stores of arms and ammunition, then of
priceless value, and called his attention of a rumor of an intended
attack upon the arsenal by the secessionists then encamped near
the city under the guise of State militia. In reply, the general
denounced in his usual vigorous language the proposed attempt upon
the arsenal; and, as if to clinch his characterization of such a
"---- outrage," said: "Why, the State has not yet passed an
ordinance of secession; she has not gone out of the Union." That
did not indicate to me that General Harney's Union principles were
quite up to the standard required by the situation, and I shared
with many others a feeling of great relief when he was soon after
relieved, and Captain Nathaniel Lyons succeeded to the command of
the department. Yet I have no doubt General Harney was, from his
own point of view, thoroughly loyal to the Union, though much imbued
with the Southern doctrines which brought on secession and civil
war. His appropriate place after that movement began was that of
the honorable retirement in which he passed the remainder of his
days, respected by all for his sterling character and many heroic
services to his country.
Two days later, Captain Lyon, then commanding the St. Louis Arsenal,
having received from the War Department authority to enroll and
muster into the service the Missouri volunteers as they might
present themselves, I reported to him and acted under his orders.
Fortunately, a large number of the loyal citizens of St. Louis had,
in anticipation of a call to take up arms in support of the
government, organized themselves into companies, and received some
instruction in tactics at their places of secret nightly meeting
in the city. On the other hand, the organized militia of the State,
mostly disloyal, were in the city of St. Louis near the arsenal,
which contained many thousand muskets, and which was defended by
only a small body of regular troops. There was great danger that
the arsenal would follow the fate of the public arsenals in the
more Southern States. To avert this danger was the first great
object.
Upon receipt of the necessary authority by Captain Lyon, I was
called out of church on Sunday morning, April 21, and the loyal
secret organizations were instructed to enter the arsenal at night,
individually, each member being furnished with a pass for that
purpose. The mustering officer employed himself all night and the
following day in distributing arms and ammunition to the men as
they arrived, and in stationing them along the arsenal walls. Thus
the successful defense of the arsenal was secured, though its
garrison was neither mustered into service nor organized into
regiments, nor even enrolled. The organization of the volunteers
now began, the mustering officer superintending the election of
officers, enrolling the men, and perfecting the organization in
conformity to the militia laws of the State.
On June 4 I transmitted to the adjutant-general "the muster-rolls
of five regiments of infantry; of four rifle battalions of two
companies each, attached to the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments; of
one artillery battalion of three companies; and of a company of
pioneers"; also "the muster-roll of Brigadier-General Lyon's staff,
mustered by himself." Accompanying the muster-rolls was a return
showing the strength of each regiment and of the brigade.
Lyon had previously been elected brigadier-general of the brigade
the regiments of which I had mustered in, but I had no authority
to muster in a brigadier-general and staff.
MAJOR OF THE FIRST MISSOURI
The Missouri United States Reserve Corps, organized in St. Louis
about the same time, consisting of five regiments, was mustered
into service by General Lyon, under special authority from the War
Department. Upon the cordial invitation of the officers of the
1st Regiment, I accepted the place of major of that regiment,
mustered myself into service as such, and devoted all the time that
could be spared from my mustering duties to instructing the officers
in tactics and military administration--a labor which was abundantly
repaid by the splendid record soon made by that regiment.
On June 24 I made a full report to the adjutant-general of the
discharge of my duties as mustering officer, including three new
regiments of three years' volunteers whose muster would be completed
in a few days. With this report my connection with that service
was terminated. On the following day I was relieved from mustering
duty, and at General Lyon's request was ordered to report to him
at Boonville, remaining with him as adjutant-general and chief of
staff until his death at Wilson's Creek.
The foregoing account gives the organization (the strength was
about 14,000) of the volunteer force with which the war in Missouri
was begun. To this was added Lyon's company of the 2d Infantry,
a detachment of regular recruits, about 180 strong, commanded by
Lieutenant Lothrop, and Totten's battery of the 2d United States
Artillery. Lyon, who, as described, had been elected brigadier-
general of the militia, was on May 17 appointed by the President
to the same grade in the United States volunteer forces; and when,
on May 30, General Harney was relieved from the command of the
Department of the West, General Lyon became the commander of that
department.
General Lyon was a man of ability and scholarly attainments, an
earnest patriot, keenly alive to the nature and magnitude of the
struggle in which the country was about to engage, and eager to
take the initiative as soon as he had at his command sufficient
force to give promise of success. To his keen foresight the State
militia at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis, though a lawful State
organization engaged in its usual field exercises, was an incipient
rebel army which ought to be crushed in the bud. This feeling was
shared by the more earnest Union men of St. Louis, who had the
confidence of the President and were in daily consultation with
Lyon; while the more prudent or conservative, hoping to avoid actual
conflict in the State, or at least in the city, advised forbearance.
Subsequent events showed how illusive was the hope of averting
hostilities in any of the border States, and how fortunate it was
that active measures were adopted at once.
On May 10 General Lyon marched out with the force then organized,
surrounded Camp Jackson, and demanded its surrender. The militia
commander, Brigadier-General Daniel M. Frost, after protesting in
vain against the "wrong and insult" to his State, seeing resistance
hopeless, surrendered his command, about 1500 men, with their arms
and munitions of war. After the surrender, and while preparations
were making to conduct the prisoners to the arsenal, some shots
were fired upon our troops from a crowd that had assembled round
the camp-ground. The fire was returned by some of the troops, in
spite of all efforts of the officers to prevent it, and a number
of persons, mostly inoffensive, were killed and wounded. In this
affair I was designated by General Lyon to receive the surrender
of the commander of Camp Jackson and his troops, and to take charge
of the prisoners, conduct them to the arsenal, and the next day to
parole them. I extended to the commander and other officers the
courtesy of permitting them to retain their swords, and treated
the prisoners in such a manner as to soothe somewhat their intensely
excited feelings. One of the colonels, not anticipating such
courteous treatment, had broken his sword and thrown the pieces
upon the ground, rather than surrender it to the hated Yankees.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL ON LYON'S STAFF
The possession of St. Louis, and the supremacy of the national
authority therein, being now secured, General Lyon directed his
energies toward operations in the interior of the State. On June
13 he moved up the Missouri River with the 1st Missouri Volunteers,
Totten's battery of the 2d United States Artillery, one company of
the 2d United States Infantry, two companies of regular recruits,
and nine companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers, and attacked the
enemy under Sterling Price on the 17th, near Boonville, and gained
an easy victory. The loss on our side was two killed and nine
wounded; that of the enemy, ten killed and a number of prisoners.
I joined General Lyon at Boonville on June 26, and began duty as
his adjutant-general. Preparations were now made as rapidly as
possible to push operations into the southwestern part of Missouri.
A force consisting of about 1500 infantry and one battery of four
guns, under Colonel Franz Sigel, was sent from St. Louis, via Rolla,
to Springfield; while a force of regular troops under Major Samuel
D. Sturgis, 1st Cavalry, consisting of one company of the 2d
Dragoons, four companies of the 1st Cavalry, Du Bois's battery of
four guns, three companies of the 1st Infantry, two companies of
the 2d Infantry, some regular recruits, the 1st and 2d Kansas
Infantry, and one company of Kansas Cavalry Volunteers, was ordered
from Fort Leavenworth to join General Lyons's immediate command,
en route to Springfield. General Lyon's march was begun on July
3, and Major Sturgis joined him at Clinton, Mo., on the 4th. The
command reached Springfield on July 13, and there met Colonel
Sigel's brigade, which we learned had pushed as far to the front
as Newtonia, but, meeting a superior force of the enemy at Carthage
on July 5, had fallen back to Springfield. General Lyons's intention
was, upon effecting this junction with Sturgis and Sigel, to push
forward and attack the enemy, if possible, while we were yet superior
to him in strength. He had ordered supplies to be sent from St.
Louis via Rolla, but they remained at Rolla, the railroad terminus,
for want of wagon transportation. The troops had to live upon such
supplies as could be obtained from the country, and many of them
were without shoes. A continuous march of more than two or three
days was impossible. General Lyon's force was rapidly diminishing,
and would soon almost disappear by the discharge of the three
months' men, while that of the enemy was as rapidly increasing and
becoming more formidable by additions to its supplies of arms and
ammunition. General Lyon made frequent appeals for reinforcements
and for provisions, but received little encouragement, and soon
became convinced that he must rely upon the resources then at his
command. He was unwilling to abandon southwestern Missouri to the
enemy without a struggle, even though almost hopeless of success,
and determined to bring on a decisive battle, if possible, before
his short-term volunteers were discharged. Learning that the enemy
was slowly advancing from the southwest by two or three different
roads, Lyon moved out, August 1, on the Cassville road, had a
skirmish with the enemy's advance-guard at Dug Springs the next
day, and the day following (the 3d) again at Curran Post-office.
The enemy showed no great force, and offered but slight resistance
to our advance. It was evident that a general engagement could
not be brought on within the limits of time and distance to which
we were confined by the state of our supplies. It was therefore
determined to return to Springfield.
General Lyon was greatly depressed by the situation in which he
was placed, the failure of expected reinforcements and supplies
from St. Louis, and an evidently strong conviction that these
failures were due to a plan to sacrifice him to the ambition of
another, and by a morbid sensitiveness respecting the disaster to
the Union people of southwestern Missouri, (who had relied upon
him for protection) which must result from the retreat of his army.
Lyon's personal feeling was so strongly enlisted in the Union cause,
its friends were so emphatically his personal friends and its
enemies his personal enemies, that he could not take the cool,
soldierly view of the situation which should control the actions
of the commander of a national army. If Lyon could have foreseen
how many times the poor people of that section were destined to be
overrun by the contending forces before the contest could be finally
decided, his extreme solicitude at that moment would have disappeared.
Or if he could have risen to an appreciation of the fact that his
duty, as the commander in the field of one of the most important
of the national armies, was not to protect a few loyal people from
the inevitable hardships of war (loss of their cattle, grain, and
fences), but to make as sure as possible the defeat of the hostile
army, no matter whether to-day, to-morrow, or next month, the battle
of Wilson's Creek would not have been fought.
A MISSING LETTER FROM FRéMONT TO LYON
On August 9 General Lyon received a letter from General John C.
Frémont, then commanding the department, which had been forwarded
to him from Rolla by Colonel John B. Wyman. The letter from General
Frémont to Colonel Wyman inclosing that to General Lyon appears
among the published papers submitted by Frémont to the Committee
on the Conduct of the War in the early part of 1862, but the
inclosure to Lyon is wanting. The original letter, with the records
to which it belonged, must, it is presumed, have been deposited at
the headquarters of the department in St. Louis when the Army of
the West was disbanded, in the latter part of August, 1861. Neither
the original letter nor any copy of it can now (July, 1897) be
found. It can only be conjectured what motive caused General
Frémont to omit a copy of the letter from the papers submitted to
the committee, which were at the time strongly commented upon in
Congress, or what caused to be removed from the official files the
original, which had again come into his possession.
General Lyon's answer to this letter, given below, the original
draft which was prepared by me and is yet in my possession, shows
that Frémont's letter to Lyon was dated August 6, and was received
on the 9th. I am not able to recall even the substance of the
greater part of that letter, but the purport of that part of it
which was then of vital importance is still fresh in my memory.
That purport was instructions to the effect that _if Lyon was not
strong enough to maintain his position as far in advance as
Springfield, he should fall back toward Rolla until reinforcements
should meet him_.
It is difficult to see why General Frémont did not produce a copy
of those instructions in his statement to the committee. It would
have furnished him with the best defense he could possibly have
made against the charge of having sacrificed Lyon and his command.
But the opinion then seemed so strong and so nearly universal that
Lyon's fight at Wilson's Creek was a necessity, and that Frémont
ought to have reinforced him before that time at any cost, that
perhaps Frémont had not the courage to do what was really best for
his own defense, namely, to acknowledge and maintain that he had
ordered Lyon to fall back, and that the latter should have obeyed
that order.
LYON'S REPLY
At my suggestion, General Lyon instructed me to prepare an answer
to General Frémont's letter on the morning of August 9. He altered
the original draft, in his own hand, as is shown in the copy
following; a fair copy of the letter as amended was then made, and
he signed it.
"Springfield, Aug. 9, 1861.
"General: I have just received your note of the 6th inst. by special
messenger.
"I retired to this place, as I have before informed you, reaching
here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within ten miles of here.
He has taken a strong position, and is recruiting his supplies of
horses, mules, and provisions by forays into the surrounding country;
his large force of mounted men enabling him to do this without
annoyance from me.
"I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable
to determine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground or be
forced to retire. I can resist any attack from the front, but if
the enemy moves to surround me I must retire. I shall hold my
ground as long as possible, [and not] _though I may without knowing
how far_ endanger the safety of my entire force with its valuable
material, _being induced by the important considerations involved
to take this step. The enemy yesterday made a show of force about
five miles distant, and has doubtless a full purpose of making an
attack upon me_.
"Very respectfully your obedient servant,
"N. Lyon,
"Brigadier-General Vols., Commanding.
"Major-General J. C. Frémont,
"Comdg. Western Department, St. Louis, Mo."
The words in my handwriting which were erased ("and not" in brackets)
and those substituted by General Lyon, given in italics, clearly
express the difference of opinion which then existed between us
upon the momentous question which we had then been discussing for
several days, namely: What action did the situation require of
him as commander of the army?
I was then young and wholly inexperienced in war; but I have never
yet seen any reason to doubt the correctness of the views I then
urged with even more persistence than my subordinate position would
fully justify. And this, I doubt not, must be the judgment of
history. The fruitless sacrifice at Wilson's Creek was wholly
unnecessary, and, under the circumstances, wholly unjustifiable.
Our retreat to Rolla was open and perfectly safe, even if began as
late as the night of the 9th. A few days or a few weeks at the
most would have made us amply strong to defeat the enemy and drive
him out of Missouri, without serious loss to ourselves. Although
it is true that we barely failed winning a victory on August 10,
that was, and could have been, hoped for only as a mere possibility.
Lyon himself despaired of it before the battle was half over, and
threw away his own life in desperation. In addition to the depressing
effect of his wounds, he must probably have become convinced of
the mistake he had made in hazarding an unnecessary battle on so
unequal terms, and in opposition to both the advice of his subordinates
and the instructions of his superior. But this is only an inference.
After Lyon had with the aid of Sigel (as explained hereafter)
decided to attack, and arranged the plan, not a word passed between
him and me on the question whether an attack should be made, except
the question: "Is Sigel willing to undertake this?" and Lyon's
answer: "Yes; it is his plan."
We went forward together, slept under the same blanket while the
column was halted, from about midnight till the dawn of day, and
remained close together nearly all the time until his death. But
he seemed greatly depressed, and except to give orders, hardly
uttered a word save the few I have mentioned in this narrative.
He was still unwilling to abandon without a desperate struggle the
country he had occupied, thought the importance of maintaining his
position was not understood by his superior commander, and in his
despondency believed, as above stated, that he was the intended
victim of a deliberate sacrifice to another's ambition. He determined
to fight a battle at whatever risk, and said: "I will gladly give
my life for a victory."
BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK
The enemy had now concentrated his forces, and was encamped on
Wilson's Creek, about ten miles from Springfield. There had been
some skirmishing between our reconnoitering parties and those of
the enemy during the past few days, and a general advance had been
determined on for the night of August 8, but it was postponed on
account of the fatigued condition of the troops, who had been
employed that day in meeting a reconnaissance of the enemy. The
attack was finally made at daylight on the morning of the eventful
August 10.
The plan of battle was determined on the morning of the 9th, in a
consultation between General Lyon and Colonel Sigel, no other
officers being present. General Lyon said, "It is Sigel's plan,"
yet he seemed to have no hesitation in adopting it, notwithstanding
its departure from accepted principles, having great confidence in
Sigel's superior military ability and experience. Sigel's brigade,
about 1200 strong, was to attack the enemy's right, while Lyon,
with the main body, about 4000 strong, was to attack the enemy's
left. The two columns were to advance by widely separated roads,
and the points of attack were so distant that communication between
the two columns was not even thought of. The attack was made, as
intended, by both columns at nearly the same instant, and both
drove the enemy from his advanced position, Sigel even occupying
the enemy's camp. Here he was soon after assailed by a superior
force, and driven from the field with the loss of his artillery
and 292 men killed, wounded, and missing. He did not appear upon
the scene again that day, and the result of his attack was unknown
to any one in the other column until after the close of the battle.
The main body, under Lyon's immediate command, made no general
advance from the position first gained, but maintained that position
against several fierce assaults. The enemy manifestly did not make
good use of his superior numbers. He attacked us in front several
times, but with a force not greatly superior to our own, and was
invariably repulsed. Our men fought extremely well for raw troops,
maintaining their ground, without any cover whatever, against
repeated assaults for six hours, and losing in killed and wounded
fully _one third of their number_. General Lyon received two
wounds, one in the leg and one in the head, about the middle of
the engagement; he then became more despondent than before, apparently
from the effects of his wounds, for there appeared nothing in the
state of the battle to dishearten a man of such unbounded courage
as he undoubtedly possessed. A portion of our troops had given
away in some disorder. Lyon said: "Major, I am afraid the day is
lost." I looked at him in surprise, saw the blood trickling down
his face, and divining the reason for his despondency, replied:
"No, General; let us try it again." He seemed re-encouraged, and
we then separated, rallied, and led forward the only troops then
not in action--two regiments. Lyon was killed at the head of one
of these regiments while exposing himself with utter recklessness
to the enemy's fire.
DEATH OF LYON
When Lyon and I separated, he to lead the attack in which he fell,
I reformed the other regiment and led it into action, giving the
command "Charge!" as soon as we came within plain view of the enemy,
hoping to try conclusions with the bayonet, with which we were much
better supplied than they. That regiment advanced in splendid
style until it received the enemy's fire, then the command "Charge!"
was forgotten, and the regiment halted and commenced firing. Thus
I found myself "between two fires." But the brave boys in my rear
could see me, and I don't believe I was in any danger from their
muskets, yet I felt less "out of place" when I had passed around
the flank of a company and stood in rear of the line. I there
witnessed, for the only time in my experience, one of those remarkable
instances of a man too brave to think of running away, and yet too
much frightened to be able to fight. He was loading his musket
and firing in the air with great rapidity. When I took hold of
his arm and shook him, calling his attention to what he was doing,
he seemed as if aroused from a trance, entirely unconscious of what
had happened.
This circumstance recalls the familiar story of two comrades in
the ranks, the one apparently unmoved, the other pale and trembling.
The first said: "Why, you seem to be scared!" "Yes," replied the
other; "if you were half as scared as I am, you would run away!"
A few minutes later I went toward the right to rejoin my chief,
and found his lifeless body a few feet in rear of the line, in
charge of his faithful orderly, Lehman, who was mourning bitterly
and loudly the death of the great soldier whom he adored. At that
supremely critical moment--for the fight was then raging with great
fury--my only thought was the apprehension that the troops might
be injuriously affected if they learned of the death of the commander
who had so soon won their profound respect and confidence. I chided
poor Lehman for his outcry, and ordered that the body be taken
quietly to the rear, and that no one be told of the general's death.
Thus fell one of our bravest and truest soldiers and patriots, a
man who had no fear of death, but who could not endure defeat.
Upon Lyon's fall, Major Sturgis became the senior officer of military
education and experience present. Several of the senior volunteer
officers had been wounded and carried from the field. Who was the
actual senior in rank on the ground was not easy to ascertain in
the midst of a fierce engagement. It was no time to make experiments
with untried military genius.
I captured a "secesh" horse found running loose,--for my own horse
had been killed and I had been afoot quite a long time,--mounted
him, and as son as the state of the contest would permit, I rode
to Major Sturgis, informed him of Lyon's death, and told him he
must assume the command, which he accordingly did. It afterward
appeared that there was one lieutenant-colonel of volunteers
remaining on the field, but neither he nor any one else thought of
questioning the propriety of Major Sturgis's taking the command.
Soon after Lyon's death the enemy was repulsed, but then seemed to
gather up all his remaining strength for a last effort. His final
attack was heavier than any of the preceding, but it was more firmly
met by our troops and completely repulsed. There is probably no
room for doubt that the enemy was beaten if we had but known it;
but the battle-field was covered with timber and underbrush, so
that nothing could be seen beyond a few hundred yards. Our troops
were nearly out of ammunition, and exhausted by a night march and
by six hours' hard fighting without breakfast.
It did not seem possible to resist another such attack as the last,
and there was no apparent assurance that another would not be made.
Hence Major Sturgis decided to withdraw from the field while he
was free to do so. The movement was effected without opposition,
the wounded were brought off, and the command returned to Springfield
in the afternoon. This retreat was undoubtedly an error, and the
battle of Wilson's Creek must be classed as a defeat for the Union
army. The error was a failure to estimate the effect that must
have been produced upon the enemy as well as upon ourselves by so
much hard fighting. It was only necessary to hold our ground,
trusting to the pluck and endurance of our men, and the victory
would have been ours. Had Lyon, who was in the front of the line
of battle when wounded as well as when killed, appreciated this
fact and acted upon it, instead of throwing his life away, it is
safe to say he would have won a brilliant victory.
A QUESTION OF COMMAND DURING THE RETREAT
On the march from the battle-field the main body was joined by the
remnant of Sigel's brigade, which had made a complete circuit in
rear of the enemy's position. They were without brigade or regimental
commanders, and were escorted by a troop of regular cavalry. On
our arrival in Springfield it was found that Colonel Sigel and
Colonel Salomon, commanding the 5th Missouri Regiment, of Sigel's
brigade, had arrived in town some hours before. Major Sturgis then
relinquished the command to Colonel Sigel, and it was determined
to retreat toward Rolla next morning. Sigel's brigade was placed
in advance, and Sturgis's brigade of regulars was assigned the
important post of rear-guard. This order of march was continued
during three days, and the march was so conducted that while the
advance would reach camp at a reasonable hour and be able to get
supper and rest, the rear-guard, and even the main body, would be
kept in the road until late in the night, and then, unable to find
their wagons, be compelled to lie down without food. The clamor
for relief from this hardship became so general that Major Sturgis
determined to resume the command, justifying this action upon the
ground that Colonel Sigel, although mustered into the United States
service, had no commission from any competent authority. Colonel
Sigel protested against this assumption of Major Sturgis, but the
latter was so manifestly sustained by the great majority of the
officers of the army that Colonel Sigel quietly submitted.
One of Sigel's officers proposed that the question of title to the
command be put to a vote of the assembled officers. Sturgis objected
on the ground that the vote might possibly be in favor of Sigel.
"Then," said Sturgis, "some of you might refuse to obey my orders,
and I should be under the necessity of shooting you."
The march was continued under Sturgis's command, and the column
arrived at Rolla on August 19, nine days after the battle. Here
the little Army of the West, after its short but eventful career,
disappeared in the much larger army which Major-General Frémont
was then organizing.( 1)
My knowledge of the operations conducted by General Frémont in
Missouri is so slight that I must confine myself to some account
of those minor affairs with which I was personally concerned.
My duties as assistant adjutant-general ceased when Major Sturgis
resumed command on August 13. I then took command of my regiment,
the 1st Missouri, the colonel and lieutenant-colonel being absent,
the latter on account of wounds received at Wilson's Creek. Soon
after our arrival at Rolla the regiment was ordered to St. Louis,
to be converted into an artillery regiment. I was employed in the
reorganization and equipment of batteries until September 16, when
General Frémont ordered me to visit Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington,
West Point, and such other places in the East as I might find
necessary, to procure guns, harness, etc., to complete the equipment
of the regiment.
While in St. Louis after the battle of Wilson's Creek, I learned
much in confirmation of the opinion of the character and ability
of General Frémont which had very generally been held in the army.
ORIGIN OF THE OPPOSITION OF THE BLAIRS TO FRéMONT
Immediately after my arrival Colonel Frank P. Blair, Jr., said he
wanted me to go with him to see Frémont; so we went the next morning.
The headquarters palace was surrounded by a numerous guard, and
all ingress by the main entrance appeared to be completely barred.
But Blair had some magic word or sign by which we passed the
sentinels at the basement door. Ascending two flights of stairs,
we found the commanding general with a single secretary or clerk
occupying the suite of rooms extending from front to rear of the
building. The general received me cordially, but, to my great
surprise, no questions were asked, nor any mention made, of the
bloody field from which I had just come, where Lyon had been killed,
and his army, after a desperate battle, compelled to retreat. I
was led at once to a large table on which maps were spread out,
from which the general proceeded to explain at length the plans of
the great campaign for which he was then preparing. Colonel Blair
had, I believe, already been initiated, but I listened attentively
for a long time, certainly more than an hour, to the elucidation
of the project. In general outline the plan proposed a march of
the main Army of the West through southwestern Missouri and
northwestern Arkansas to the valley of the Arkansas River, and
thence down that river to the Mississippi, thus turning all the
Confederate defenses of the Mississippi River down to and below
Memphis. As soon as the explanation was ended Colonel Blair and
I took our leave, making our exit through the same basement door
by which we had entered. We walked down the street for some time
in silence. The Blair turned to me and said: "Well, what do you
think of him?" I replied, in words rather too strong to repeat in
print, to the effect that my opinion as to his wisdom was the same
as it had always had been. Blair said: "I have been suspecting
that for some time."
It was a severe blow to the whole Blair family--the breaking, by
the rude shock of war, of that idol they had so much helped to set
up and make the commander of a great army. From that day forward
there was no concealment of the opposition of the Blairs to Frémont.
I had another occasion at that time to learn something important
as to Frémont's character. He had ordered me to convert the 1st
Regiment of Missouri Volunteer Infantry into an artillery regiment.
I had organized eight batteries and used all the field-guns I could
get. There remained in the arsenal a battery of new rifled guns
which Frémont had purchased in Europe. I applied to him personally
for those guns, telling him I had a well-disciplined company of
officers and men ready to man them. He gave me the order without
hesitation, but when I went to the arsenal I found an order there
countermanding the order he had given me. I returned to headquarters,
and easily obtained a renewal of the order to issue the guns to
me. Determining to get ahead this time, I took the quickest
conveyance to the arsenal, but only to find that the telegraph had
got ahead of me--the order was again countermanded. The next day
I quietly inquired at headquarters about the secret of my repeated
disappointment, and learned that some foreign adventurer had obtained
permission to raise a company of artillery troops and wanted those
new rifled guns. It was true the company had not been raised, but
I thought that would probably make no difference, so I never
mentioned the matter to the general again. Instead I planned a
flank movement which proved far more successful than the direct
attack could possibly have been. I explained to General Frémont
the great need of field-guns and equipment for his army, and
suggested that if ordered East I might by personal efforts obtain
all he needed. He at once adopted my suggestion, bade me sit down
at a desk in his room and write the necessary order, and he signed
it without reading. I readily obtained twenty-four new rifled
Parrott guns, and soon had them in service in the Western Department,
in lieu of the six guns I had failed to get from the St. Louis
Arsenal.
When I had accomplished this duty and returned to St. Louis, where
I arrived in the early part of October, 1861, General Frémont had
taken the field in the central part of Missouri, with the main body
of his army, in which were eight batteries of my regiment. I was
instructed to remain in St. Louis and complete the organization
and equipment of the regiment upon the arrival of guns and equipments
procured in the East.
AFFAIR AT FREDERICKTOWN
It was while waiting for the expected guns that a demand for
artillery came from Colonel W. P. Carlin, commanding a brigade at
Pilot Knob and threatened with an attack by a Confederate force
under Jeff. Thompson. The latter had already made a raid in Carlin's
rear, and interfered seriously with the communication to St. Louis.
In the nervous condition of the military as well as the public mind
at that time, even St. Louis was regarded as in danger.
There was no organized battery in St. Louis, but there were officers
and men enough belonging to the different batteries of the 1st
Missouri, and recruits, to make a medium-sized company. They had
been instructed in the school of the piece, but no more. I hastily
put them upon the cars, with four old smooth-bore bronze guns,
horses that had never been hitched to a piece, and harness that
had not been fitted to the horses. Early next morning we arrived
at the Big River where the bridge had been burned, unloaded the
battery and horses by the use of platforms extemporized from railroad
ties, hitched up, and forded the river. On the other side we
converted platform-cars into stock-cars, loaded up, and arrived at
Pilot Knob the next morning (October 20). The enemy was understood
to be at Fredericktown, about twenty miles distant, and Colonel
Carlin determined to march that night and attack him at daylight
the next morning. Carlin's command consisted of the 8th Wisconsin
Volunteers, 21st Illinois Volunteers, parts of the 33d and 38th
Illinois Volunteers, 350 of the 1st Indiana Cavalry, one company
of Missouri Cavalry, and six pieces of artillery (including two
old iron guns which he had managed to make available in addition
to the four from St. Louis). His total force was about 3000 men.
The enemy's strength was supposed to be about the same, but it
turned out that he had only four old iron guns, so we had the
advantage of him in artillery at least.
AFFAIR AT FREDERICKTOWN
The head of our column reached the vicinity of Fredericktown some
time before daylight, and the troops lay upon their arms until
dawn. Upon entering the town in the morning, no enemy was found,
and citizens reported that he had marched south the day before.
The troops were ordered to rest in the village, and Colonel Carlin,
who was not well, went to bed in the hotel. Some hours later, I
think near noon, Colonel J. B. Plummer, with a brigade of infantry
and two pieces of artillery from Cape Girardeau, arrived at
Fredericktown. I am not aware whether this junction was expected
by the respective commanders, or what orders they had received from
department headquarters. Soon after Colonel Plummer arrived I was
summoned to the presence of the two commanders and requested to
decide a question of rank between them. It appeared that Colonel
Carlin had the older date as colonel of volunteers, while Colonel
Plummer was commanding, by special assignment of General Frémont,
a brigade in which at least one of the colonels was senior, not
only to him, but also to Colonel Carlin. It was clear enough that
according to the Articles of War this senior colonel of the Cape
Girardeau brigade should command the combined forces; but that
would be in plain disregard of General Frémont's order, the authority
for which nobody knew, but in comparison with which the Articles
of War or the Army Regulations were at that time regarded as
practically of trifling consequence. The question was settled, or
rather avoided (for there was no satisfactory settlement of it),
by the proposition that Colonel Plummer, who proposed to go in
pursuit of the enemy, should take with him, besides his own brigade,
such portion of Colonel Carlin's as he (Plummer) thought necessary,
Colonel Carlin, who was sick, remaining behind with the remainder.
Accordingly, early in the afternoon Plummer's column started in
pursuit. It had hardly got well out of the village when the head
of column received a volley from the enemy drawn up in line of
battle. How long the enemy had been in that position I have never
learned; but it is certain that his presence there was not even
suspected by our commander, who supposed him to be in full retreat.
This mistake, however, did not seem to cost us anything, except
perhaps the loss of a few men at the head of the column in the
first volley. Colonel Plummer quickly formed his troops; Carlin
jumped out of bed and galloped to the front, followed by those who
had remained in town. The volunteers, who had not yet been in
battle, threw off their knapsacks, blankets, and overcoats, and
went into action most gallantly. The engagement was sharp for a
few moments, and resulted in considerable loss on both sides; but
the enemy soon gave way and retreated in disorder. The pursuit
was continued several miles, and until near night, when a recall
was ordered, and our troops returned to the town to pick up their
trappings and get their supper.
The next morning Colonel Plummer continued his pursuit. I left my
extemporized battery, under Captain Manter, with Colonel Carlin,
and returned to St. Louis.( 2)
[( 1) My official report and others are published in the War Records,
Vol. III.]
[( 2) For the official reports, see the War Records, Vol. III.]