statements as to sensation, except that knowledge is in proportion to the
excess of one of the two elements. Intelligence varies as the heat or
the cold is in excess, and it is better and purer by reason of heat; but
nevertheless it has need of a certain symmetry. (Vv. 146-149) ‘For,’ he
says, ‘as at any time is the blending of very complex members in a man,
so is the mind in men constituted; for that which thinks is the same in
all men and in every man, viz., the essence of the members of the body;
and the element that is in excess is thought.’ He says that perceiving
and thinking are the same thing, and that remembering and forgetting come
from these[62] as the result of mixture, but he does not say definitely
whether, if they enter into the mixture in equal quantities, thought
will arise or not, nor what the disposition should be. But it is evident
that he believes sensation to take place by the presence of some quality
in contrast with its opposite, where he says that a corpse does not
perceive light and heat and sound by reason of the absence of fire, but
that it perceives cold and silence and the similar contrasted qualities,
and in general that being as a whole has a certain knowledge. So in his
statements he seems to do away with what is difficult by leaving it out.
Theophr. Fr. 7; Simpl. _Phys._ 25 r 115; _Dox._ 483. In the first book
of his physics Theophrastos gives as the opinion of Parmenides: That
which is outside of being is not-being, not-being is nothing, accordingly
being is one.
Hipp. _Phil._ 11; _Dox._ 564. Parmenides supposes that the all is one and
eternal, and without beginning and spheroidal in form; but even he does
not escape the opinion of the many, for he speaks of fire and earth as
first principles of the all, of earth as matter, and of fire as agent and
cause, and he says that the earth will come to an end, but in what way
he does not say. He says that the all is eternal, and not generated, and
spherical, and homogeneous, not having place in itself, and unmoved, and
limited.[63]
Plut. _Strom._ 5; _Dox._ 580. Parmenides the Eleatic, the companion
of Xenophanes, both laid claim to his opinions, and at the same time
took the opposite standpoint. For he declared the all to be eternal and
immovable according to the real state of the case; for it is alone,
existing alone, immovable and without beginning (v. 60); but there is a
generation of the things that seem to be according to false opinion, and
he excepts sense perceptions from the truth. He says that if anything
exists besides being, this is not-being, but not-being does not exist at
all. So there is left the being that has no beginning; and he says that
the earth was formed by the precipitation of dense air.
Epiph. _adv. Haer._ iii. 10; _Dox._ 590. Parmenides, the son of Pyres,
himself also of the Eleatic school, said that the first principle of all
things is the infinite.
Cic. _de Nat. Deor._ i. 11; _Dox._ 534. For Parmenides devised a sort
of contrivance like a crown (he applied to it the word στεφάνη), an orb
of light with continuous heat, which arched the sky, and this he called
god, but in it no one could suspect a divine form or a divine sentiment,
and he made many monstrosities of this sort; moreover, he raised to the
rank of gods War, Discord, Desire, and many other things which disease or
sleep or forgetfulness or old age destroys; and similarly with reference
to the stars he expresses opinions which have been criticised elsewhere
and are omitted here.
Aet. i. 3; _Dox._ 284. Parmenides, the Eleatic, son of Pyrrhes, was a
companion of Xenophanes, and in his first book the doctrines agree with
those of his master; for here that verse occurs: (v. 60), Universal,
existing alone, immovable and without beginning. He said that the cause
of all things is not earth alone, as his master said, but also fire. 7;
303. The world is immovable and limited, and spheroidal in form. 24; 320.
Parmenides and Melissos did away with generation and destruction, because
they thought that the all is unmoved. 25; 321. All things are controlled
by necessity; this is fated, it is justice and forethought, and the
producer of the world.
Aet. ii. 1; _Dox._ 327. The world is one. 4; 332. It is without beginning
and eternal and indestructible. 7; 335. Parmenides taught that there were
crowns encircling one another in close succession,[64] one of rarefied
matter, another of dense, and between these other mixed crowns of light
and darkness; and that which surrounded all was solid like a wall, and
under this was a crown of fire; and the centre of all the crowns was
solid, and around it was a circle of fire; and of the mixed crowns the
one nearest the centre was the source of motion and generation for all,
and this ‘the goddess who directs the helm and holds the keys,’[65] he
calls ‘justice and necessity.’ The air is that which is separated from
the earth, being evaporated by the forcible pressure of the earth; the
sun and the circle of the milky way are the exhalation of fire, and the
moon is the mixture of both, namely of air and fire. The aether stands
highest of all and surrounding all, and beneath this is ranged the fiery
element which we call the heavens, and beneath this are the things of
earth. 11; 339. The revolving vault highest above the earth is the
heavens. 340. The heavens are of a fiery nature. 13; 342. The stars are
masses of fire. 15; 345. He ranks the morning star, which he considers
the same as the evening star, first in the aether; and after this the
sun, and beneath this the stars in the fiery vault which he calls the
heavens. 17; 346. Stars are fed from the exhalations of the earth. 20;
349. The sun is of a fiery nature. The sun and the moon are separated
from the milky way, the one from the thinner mixture, which is hot, the
other from the denser, which is cold. 25; 356. The moon is of a fiery
nature. 26; 357. The moon is of the same size as the sun, and derives
its light from it. 30; 361. (The moon appears dark) because darkness is
mingled with its fiery nature, whence he calls it the star that shines
with a false light.
Aet. iii. 1; 365. The mixture of dense and thin gives its milk-like
appearance to the milky way. 11; 377. Parmenides first defined the
inhabited parts of the earth by the two tropical zones. 15; 380. Because
the earth is equally distant on all sides from other bodies, and so rests
in an equilibrium, not having any reason for swaying one way rather than
another; on this account it only shakes and does not move from its place.
Aet. iv. 3; 388. The soul is of a fiery nature. 5; 391. The reason is
in the whole breast. 392. Life and intelligence are the same thing,
nor could there be any living being entirely without reason. 9; 397.
Sensations arise part by part according to the symmetry of the pores,
each particular object of sense being adapted to each sense (organ). 398.
Desire is produced by lack of nourishment.
Aet. v. 7; 419. Parmenides holds the opposite opinion; males are produced
in the northern part, for this shares the greater density; and females in
the southern part by reason of its rarefied state. 420. Some descend from
the right side to the right parts of the womb, others from the left to
the left parts of the womb; but if they cross in the descent females are
born. 11; 422. When the child comes from the right side of the womb, it
resembles the father; when it comes from the left side, the mother. 30;
443. Old age attends the failure of heat.
VII.
_THE ELEATIC SCHOOL: ZENO._
Zeno of Elea, son of Teleutagoras, was born early in the fifth century
B.C. He was the pupil of Parmenides, and his relations with him were so
intimate that Plato calls him Parmenides’s son (_Soph._ 241 D). Strabo
(vi. 1, 1) applies to him as well as to his master the name Pythagorean,
and gives him the credit of advancing the cause of law and order in
Elea. Several writers say that he taught in Athens for a while. There
are numerous accounts of his capture as party to a conspiracy; these
accounts differ widely from each other, and the only point of agreement
between them has reference to his determination in shielding his fellow
conspirators. We find reference to one book which he wrote in prose
(Plato, _Parm._ 127 C), each section of which showed the absurdity of
some element in the popular belief.
Literature: Lohse, Halis 1794; Gerling, _de Zenonis
Paralogismis_, Marburg 1825; Wellmann, _Zenos Beweise_, G.-Pr.
Frkf. a. O. 1870; Raab, _d. Zenonische Beweise_, Schweinf.
1880; Schneider, _Philol._ xxxv. 1876; Tannery, _Rev. Philos._
Oct. 1885; Dunan, _Les arguments de Zénon_, Paris 1884;
Brochard, _Les arguments de Zénon_, Paris 1888; Frontera,
_Étude sur les arguments de Zénon_, Paris 1891.
(_a_) FRAGMENTS OF ZENO, FROM SIMPLICIUS ON THE PHYSICS.
1. Simpl. _Phys._ 30 r 139, 11. εἰ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ὄντι προσγένοιτο, οὐδὲν ἂν
μεῖζον ποιήσειεν· μεγέθους γὰρ μηδενὸς ὄντος, προσγενομένου δὲ οὐδὲν οἷόν
τε εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδοῦναι. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ προσγινόμενον οὐδὲν εἴη.
εἰ δὲ ἀπογινομένου τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲν ἔλαττόν ἐστι, μηδὲ αὖ προσγινομένου
αὐξήσεται, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ προσγενόμενον οὐδὲν ἦν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπογενόμενον.
2. Simpl. _Phys._ 30 r 140, 29. εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα
ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐστί,
πεπερασμένα ἂν εἴη. εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα
μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξύ. καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα
τὰ ὄντα ἐστί.
3. Simpl. _Phys._ 30 v 141, 1. εἰ μὴ ἔχοι μέγεθος τὸ ὂν οὐδ’ ἂν εἴη, εἰ
δὲ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον μέγεθός τι ἔχειν καὶ πάχος καὶ ἀπέχειν αὐτοῦ τὸ
ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου. καὶ περὶ τοῦ προύχοντος ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ
ἐκεῖνο ἕξει μέγεθος καὶ προέξει αὐτοῦ τι. ὅμοιον δὴ τοῦτο ἅπαξ τε εἰπεῖν
καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον ἔσχατον ἔσται οὔτε ἕτερον πρὸς
ἕτερον οὐκ ἔσται. οὕτως εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ
μεγάλα, μικρὰ μὲν ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι.
4. Simpl. _Phys._ 130 ν 562, 4. εἰ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, ἔν τινι ἔσται· πᾶν γὰρ
ὂν ἔν τινι· τὸ δὲ ἔν τινι καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ καὶ
τοῦτο ἐπ’ ἄπειρον· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.
_Sources and Critical Notes._
Fr. 1. _D_ εἰ γὰρ, _EF_ οὐ γὰρ, a οὐ γὰρ εἰ: _E_ ἄλλων. προσγενομένου δὲ]
Zeller, _Vorsokr. Phil._ 591, n. 2, strikes out δὲ: _F_ οἴονται εἰς: _E_
gives οὐ διὰ for οὐδὲ: _DEF_ ἀπογινόμενον.
Fr. 2. a adds καὶ πάλιν after ἂν εἴη.
Fr. 3. _DF_ ἔχοι, a_E_ ἔχει.
Fr. 4. _E_ omits καὶ after ἄρα.
(_a_) SIMPLICIUS’S ACCOUNT OF ZENO’S ARGUMENTS, INCLUDING THE TRANSLATION
OF THE FRAGMENTS.
30 r 138, 30. For Eudemos says in his Physics, ‘Then does not this exist,
and is there any _one_? This was the problem. He reports Zeno as saying
that if any one explains to him the _one_, what it is, he can tell
him what things are. But he is puzzled, it seems, because each of the
senses declares that there are many things, both absolutely, and as the
result of division, but no one establishes the mathematical point. He
thinks that what is not increased by receiving additions, or decreased
as parts are taken away, is not one of the things that are.’ It was
natural that Zeno, who, as if for the sake of exercise, argued both
sides of a case (so that he is called double-tongued), should utter such
statements raising difficulties about the one; but in his book which has
many arguments in regard to each point, he shows that a man who affirms
multiplicity naturally falls into contradictions. Among these arguments
is one by which he shows that if there are many things, these are both
small and great—great enough to be infinite in size, and small enough
to be nothing in size. By this he shows that what has neither greatness
nor thickness nor bulk could not even be. (Fr. 1)[66] ‘For if, he says,
anything were added to another being, it could not make it any greater;
for since greatness does not exist, it is impossible to increase the
greatness of a thing by adding to it. So that which is added would be
nothing. If when something is taken away that which is left is no less,
and if it becomes no greater by receiving additions, evidently that which
has been added or taken away is nothing.’ These things Zeno says, not
denying the one, but holding that each thing has the greatness of many
and infinite things, since there is always something before that which is
apprehended, by reason of its infinite divisibility; and this he proves
by first showing that nothing has any greatness because each thing of the
many is identical with itself and is one.
_Ibid._ 30 v 140, 27. And why is it necessary to say that there is a
multiplicity of things when it is set forth in Zeno’s own book? For again
in showing that, if there is a multiplicity of things, the same things
are both finite and infinite, Zeno writes as follows, to use his own
words: (Fr. 2) ‘If there is a multiplicity of things, it is necessary
that these should be just as many as exist, and not more nor fewer. If
there are just as many as there are, then the number would be finite. If
there is a multiplicity at all, the number is infinite, for there are
always others between any two, and yet others between each pair of these.
So the number of things is infinite.’ So by the process of division he
shows that their number is infinite. And as to magnitude, he begins with
this same argument. For first showing that (Fr. 3) ‘if being did not have
magnitude, it would not exist at all,’ he goes on, ‘if anything exists,
it is necessary that each thing should have some magnitude and thickness,
and that one part of it should be separated from another. The same
argument applies to the thing that precedes this. That also will have
magnitude and will have something before it. The same may be said of each
thing once for all, for there will be no such thing as last, nor will one
thing differ from another. So if there is a multiplicity of things, it is
necessary that these should be great and small—small enough not to have
any magnitude, and great enough to be infinite.’[67]
_Ibid._ 130 v 562, 3. Zeno’s argument seems to deny that place exists,
putting the question as follows: (Fr. 4) ‘If there is such a thing as
place, it will be in something, for all being is in something, and that
which is in something is in some place. Then this place will be in a
place, and so on indefinitely. Accordingly there is no such thing as
place.’
_Ibid._ 131 r 563, 17. Eudemos’ account of Zeno’s opinion runs as
follows:—‘Zeno’s problem seems to come to the same thing. For it is
natural that all being should be somewhere, and if there is a place for
things, where would this place be? In some other place, and that in
another, and so on indefinitely.’
_Ibid._ 236 v. Zeno’s argument that when anything is in a space equal to
itself, it is either in motion or at rest, and that nothing is moved in
the present moment, and that the moving body is always in a space equal
to itself at each present moment, may, I think, be put in a syllogism as
follows: The arrow which is moving forward is at every present moment in
a space equal to itself, accordingly it is <in a space equal to itself>
in all time; but that which is in a space equal to itself in the present
moment is not in motion. Accordingly it is in a state of rest, since it
is not moved in the present moment, and that which is not moving is at
rest, since everything is either in motion or at rest. So the arrow which
is moving forward is at rest while it is moving forward, in every moment
of its motion.
237 r. The Achilles argument is so named because Achilles is named in it
as the example, and the argument shows that if he pursued a tortoise it
would be impossible for him to overtake it.
255 r. Aristotle accordingly solves the problem of Zeno the Eleatic,
which he propounded to Protagoras the Sophist.[68] Tell me, Protagoras,
said he, does one grain of millet make a noise when it falls, or does the
ten-thousandth part of a grain? On receiving the answer that it does
not, he went on: Does a measure of millet grains make a noise when it
falls, or not? He answered, it does make a noise. Well, said Zeno, does
not the statement about the measure of millet apply to the one grain and
the ten-thousandth part of a grain? He assented, and Zeno continued,
Are not the statements as to the noise the same in regard to each? For
as are the things that make a noise, so are the noises. Since this is
the case, if the measure of millet makes a noise, the one grain and the
ten-thousandth part of a grain make a noise.
(_b_) ZENO’S ARGUMENTS AS DESCRIBED BY ARISTOTLE.
_Phys._ iv. 1; 209 a 23. Zeno’s problem demands some consideration; if
all being is in some place, evidently there must be a place of this
place, and so on indefinitely. 3; 210 b 22. It is not difficult to solve
Zeno’s problem, that if place is anything, it will be in some place;
there is no reason why the first place should not be in something else,
not however as in that place, but just as health exists in warm beings as
a state while warmth exists in matter as a property of it. So it is not
necessary to assume an indefinite series of places.
vi. 2; 233 a 21. (Time and space are continuous ... the divisions of time
and space are the same.) Accordingly Zeno’s argument is erroneous, that
it is not possible to traverse infinite spaces, or to come in contact
with infinite spaces successively in a finite time. Both space and time
can be called infinite in two ways, either absolutely as a continuous
whole, or by division into the smallest parts. With infinites in point
of quantity, it is not possible for anything to come in contact in a
finite time, but it is possible in the case of the infinites reached by
division, for time itself is infinite from this standpoint. So the result
is that it traverses the infinite in an infinite, not a finite time, and
that infinites, not finites, come in contact with infinites.
vi. 9; 239 b 5. And Zeno’s reasoning is fallacious. For if, he says,
everything is at rest [or in motion] when it is in a space equal to
itself, and the moving body is always in the present moment <in a space
equal to itself,> then the moving arrow is still. This is false; for
time is not composed of present moments that are indivisible, nor indeed
is any other quantity. Zeno presents four arguments concerning motion
which involve puzzles to be solved, and the first of these shows that
motion does not exist because the moving body must go half the distance
before it goes the whole distance; of this we have spoken before (_Phys._
viii. 8; 263 a 5). And the second is called the Achilles argument; it
is this:—The slow runner will never be overtaken by the swiftest, for
it is necessary that the pursuer should first reach the point from
which the pursued started, so that necessarily the slower is always
somewhat in advance. This argument is the same as the preceding, the
only difference being that the distance is not divided each time into
halves.... His opinion is false that the one in advance is not overtaken;
he is not indeed overtaken while he is in advance; but nevertheless he is
overtaken, if you will grant that he passes through the limited space.
These are the first two arguments, and the third is the one that has been
alluded to, that the arrow in its flight is stationary. This depends on
the assumption that time is composed of present moments; there will be
no syllogism if this is not granted. And the fourth argument is with
reference to equal bodies moving in opposite directions past equal bodies
in the stadium with equal speed, some from the end of the stadium, others
from the middle; in which case he thinks half the time equal to twice
the time. The fallacy lies in the fact that while he postulates that
bodies of equal size move forward with equal speed for an equal time, he
compares the one with something in motion, the other with something at
rest.
(_c_) PASSAGES RELATING TO ZENO IN THE DOXOGRAPHISTS.
Plut. _Strom._ 6; _Dox._ 581. Zeno the Eleatic brought out nothing
peculiar to himself, but he started farther difficulties about these
things.
Epiph. _adv. Haer._ iii. 11; _Dox._ 590. Zeno the Eleatic, a dialectician
equal to the other Zeno, says that the earth does not move, and that no
space is void of content. He speaks as follows:—That which is moved is
moved in the place in which it is, or in the place in which it is not; it
is neither moved in the place in which it is, nor in the place in which
it is not; accordingly it is not moved at all.
Galen, _Hist. Phil._ 3; _Dox._ 601. Zeno the Eleatic is said to have
introduced the dialectic philosophy. 7; _Dox._ 604. He was a skeptic.
Aet. i. 7; _Dox._ 303. Melissos and Zeno say that the one is universal,
and that it exists alone, eternal, and unlimited. And this one is
necessity [_Heeren inserts here the name_ Empedokles], and the material
of it is the four elements, and the forms are strife and love. He says
that the elements are gods, and the mixture of them is the world. The
uniform will be resolved into them;[69] he thinks that souls are divine,
and that pure men who share these things in a pure way are divine. 23;
320. Zeno et al. denied generation and destruction, because they thought
that the all is unmoved.
VIII.
_THE ELEATIC SCHOOL: MELISSOS._
Melissos of Samos, son of Ithagenes, was a contemporary of Zeno, though
he may have been slightly younger. Parmenides is said to have been his
teacher, and it is possible that he may have made the acquaintance
of Herakleitos. According to Diogenes, he was a respected statesman,
and there seems to be good evidence (Plutarch, _Perikles_ 26, after
Aristotle) that he commanded the Samian fleet at its victory over the
Athenians, 440 B.C. He wrote a book which later writers refer to under
various titles.
Literature: The fragments are treated by Brandis, _Commen.
Eleat._ iii. and by Mullach _de Melisso X. G._ p. 80; Pabst,
_de Meliss. Fragmentis_, Bonn 1889, disputes the authenticity
of Fr. 1-5. Spalding, _Vindic. philos. Megar._ Berlin 1793,
first showed that the first two chapters of the book called _de
Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia_, refer to Melissos. Cf. also Fr.
Kern, _Zur Würdigung des Melissos_, Festschrift d. stettin.
Stadtgym. 1880.
(_a_) FRAGMENTS OF MELISSOS MAINLY FROM SIMPLICIUS ON THE PHYSICS.
Simpl. _Phys._ 23 v 109, 20 (Fr. 7). ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐγένετο, ἔστι δέ,
ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν, ἄλλ’ ἄπειρόν
ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἂν εἶχεν· ἤρξατο γὰρ ἄν ποτε γινόμενον·
καὶ τελευτήν· ἐτελεύτησε γὰρ ἄν ποτε γινόμενον· εἰ δὲ μήτε ἤρξατο μήτε
ἐτελεύτησεν ἀεί τε ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ τελευτήν· οὐ
γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστὸν ὅ τι μὴ πᾶν ἐστι. l. 31. (Fr. 8.) ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἔστιν
ἀεί, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἀεὶ χρὴ εἶναι. l. 33. (Fr. 15.) εἰ γὰρ
διῄρηται τὸ ἐόν, κινεῖται. κινούμενον δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα.
_Phys._ 24 r 110, 1. (Fr. 16.) εἰ μὲν ὂν εἴη, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἓν εἶναι· ἓν δὲ ὂν
δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. (19 r 87, 6) εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάθος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια καὶ
οὐκέτι ἓν εἴη. l. 3. (Fr. 9.) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τέλος ἔχον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀίδιον
οὔτε ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. l. 5. (Fr. 10.) εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη, περανεῖ πρὸς ἄλλο.
_Phys._ 247 r 111, 19. (Fr. 11.) οὕτως οὖν ἀίδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον·
καὶ ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πᾶν. καὶ οὔτ’ ἂν ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζον γίνοιτο οὔτε
μετακοσμέοιτο οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται. εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν
ἔτι ἓν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ μιῇ
μυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γίνοιτο τὸ πᾶν, ὀλεῖται ἂν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ. l.
24. (Fr. 12.) ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μετακοσμηθῆναι ἀνυστόν· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος ὁ πρόσθεν
ἐὼν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται οὔτε ὁ μὴ ἐὼν γίνεται. ὅτε δὲ μήτε προσγίνεται μηδὲν
μήτε ἀπόλλυται μήτε ἑτεροιοῦται, πῶς ἂν μετακοσμηθὲν τῶν ἐόντων τι ᾖ; εἰ
μὲν γάρ τι ἐγίνετο ἑτεροῖον, ἤδη ἂν καὶ μετακοσμηθείη· οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ οὐ γὰρ
ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον οὐδὲ ἔχει
ἴσην δύναμιν τῷ ὑγιεῖ· οὔτ’ ἂν ὅμοιον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· ἀπογινομένου γάρ
τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὅμοιον εἴη. οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς
ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐὸν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν
γένοιτο. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι ωὑτὸς λόγος τῷ ἀλγέοντι. l. 6. (Fr. 14.)
οὐδὲ κενεόν ἐστιν οὐδέν· τὸ γὰρ κενεὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη τό γε
μηδέν. οὐδὲ κινεῖται· ὑποχωρῆσαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῇ, ἀλλὰ πλέων ἐστίν.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ κενεὸν ἦν, ὑπεχωρεῖ ἂν εἰς τὸ κενόν· κενοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐόντος οὐκ
ἔχει ὅκῃ ὑποχωρήσει. πυκνὸν δὲ καὶ ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ ἀραιὸν οὐκ
ἀνυστὸν πλέων εἶναι ὁμοίως τῷ πυκνῷ, ἀλλ’ ἤδη τὸ ἀραιόν γε κενεώτερον
γίνεται τοῦ πυκνοῦ. κρίσιν δὲ ταύτην χρὴ ποιήσασθαι τοῦ πλέω καὶ τοῦ
μὴ πλέω· εἰ μὲν οὖν χωρεῖ τι ἢ εἰσδέχεται, οὐ πλέων· εἰ δὲ μήτε χωρεῖ
μήτε εἰσδέχεται, πλέων. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν πλέων εἶναι, εἰ κενὸν μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ
τοίνυν πλέων ἐστίν, οὐ κινεῖται.
_Phys._ 34 v 162, 24. (Fr. 6.) ἀεὶ ἦν ὅ τι ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ
ἐγένετο, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι πρὶν γενέσθαι εἶναι μηδέν. †εἰ τύχοι νῦν μηδὲν
ἦν, οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός.