_Pr. Ev._ xiv. 17. (Fr. 17.) μέγιστον μὲν οὖν σημεῖον οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὅτι
ἓν μόνον ἐστίν. ἀτὰρ καὶ τάδε σημεῖα· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πολλὰ, τοιαῦτα χρῆν αὐτὰ
εἶναι, οἷόν περ ἐγώ φημι τὸ ἓν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ
καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῷον τὸ δὲ τεθνηκὸς καὶ μέλαν
καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὰ ὅσα φασὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἀληθῆ,—εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔστι
καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, εἶναι χρὴ ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον οἷόν περ
τὸ πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, καὶ μὴ μεταπίπτειν μηδὲ γίνεσθαι ἑτεροῖον, ἀλλ’
αἰεὶ εἶναι ἕκαστον οἷόν περ ἔστιν. νῦν δέ φαμεν ὀρθῶς ὁρᾷν καὶ ἀκούειν
καὶ συνιέναι, δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν
θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλθακὸν καὶ τὸ μαλθακὸν σκληρὸν, καὶ τὸ ζῷον
ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ ἐκ μὴ ζῶντος γίνεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι, καὶ
ὅ τι ἦν τε καὶ ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὅ τε σίδηρος σκληρὸς ἐὼν
τῷ δακτύλῳ κατατρίβεσθαι † ὁμοῦ ῥέων καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ λίθος καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι
ἰσχυρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι πᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει μήτε ὁρᾷν μήτε τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν·
ἐξ ὕδατός τε γῆ καὶ λίθος γίνεσθαι. οὐ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογεῖ·
φαμένοις γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀίδια καὶ εἴδη τε καὶ ἴσχυν ἔχοντα, πάντα
ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἑκάστοτε ὁρωμένου· δῆλον
τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἑωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ
ἂν μετέπιπτεν εἰ ἀληθῆ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἦν οἷόν περ ἐδόκει ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον· τοῦ
γὰρ ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ κρεῖσσον οὐδέν. ἢν δὲ μεταπέσῃ, τὸ μὲν ἐὸν ἀπώλετο,
τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γέγονεν. οὕτως οὖν εἰ πολλὰ εἴη, τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι οἷόν περ
τὸ ἕν.
_Sources and Critical Notes._
Fr. 1-5. The passage giving these fragments, as they have been called,
contains little that is not found in the remaining fragments, and in
spite of the fact that it is given as a direct quotation, it seems best
to regard it as a condensed statement of the opinions of Melissos. V.
Zeller, _Vorsokr. Phil._ 607, n. 1, and Pabst, _de Meliss. Fragmentis_,
Bonn 1889.
Fr. 7. _D_ omits καὶ ... γινόμενον. Simplicius writes γινόμενον, Diels
would restore γενόμενον regularly, and compares Spengel ad Eudem. fr. p.
18, 18. _DE_ ἔχει, a_F_ ἔχον.
Fr. 15. a_F_ ἅμα, _E_ ἀλλὰ.
Fr. 16. a_D_ ὂν εἴη, _EF_ οὖν εἴη, Brandis suggests ὂν ἔστι. _F_ δὲ μὴ
ὂν· Cf. 19 r 87, 6.
Fr. 11. a_F_ γίγνοιτο. _E_ οὐκέτι, omits ἂν. _E_ omits δὲ after τὸ. a_D_
(_F_) τριχὶ μιῆ, _E_ τριᵡ μὴ ἦ. Vulg. from Brandis εἰ τοίνυν τρισμυρίοισι
ἔτεσι. _F_ παρόντι for παντί.
Fr. 12. _D_ μετὰ τὸ κοσμηθῆναι: a ἀπολεῖται: _DF_ μετακοσμηθέντων ἐόντων:
a γάρ, _DFE_ γε: a ἀλγεινόν (twice): _D_ οὐκ for κοὐκ: _DF_ ὠυτὸς, a_E_ ὁ
αὐτὸς.
Fr. 14. Cf. Simpl. 40, 12. _E_ πλέον et passim, Text follows a_D_: _DF_
κενώτερον, _E_ κοινότερον: a omits οὖν.
Fr. 6. _E_ εἰ τύχοι νῦν, _D_ εἰ τύχη, a_F_ εἰ τοίνυν. Diels suggests ὅτε
τοίνυν; cf. 109, 20. _DE_ οὐδὲν, a_F_ μηδὲν.
Fr. 17. Vulg. χρή: Simpl. ζῷον, Aristokl. ζῶν (twice): Aristokl. εἶναι
ἐχρῆν, καὶ τὸ ἐὸν τοιοῦτον, οἷον πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν εἶναι, Simpl. omits
πάντα and ἀληθῆ: Aristokl. ἕτερον, ἀλλ’ εἶναι ὅμοιον, οἷόν περ ἐστὶ
ἕκαστον, Simpl. omits ἔστιν: Bergk ὁμουρέων, digito conterminus, aptatus,
MSS. τὸ μέσον, corr. Brandis, _Gesch. d. Phil._ i. 403: Vulg. εἴη.
SIMPLICIUS’S ACCOUNT OF MELISSOS, INCLUDING THE TRANSLATION OF THE
FRAGMENTS.
22; 103, 13. Now let us glance at Melissos’ argument, which we ran across
a few lines back. Melissos, making use of the axioms of the physicists,
in regard to generation and destruction, begins his book as follows:
(Fr. 1) If nothing is, how could this be spoken of as though something
is? And if anything is, either it has come into being, or else it always
has been. If it came into being, it sprung either from being or from
not-being; but it is impossible that any such thing should have sprung
from not-being (for nothing else that is could have sprung from it, much
less pure being); nor could it have sprung from being, for in that case
it <would simply be, and> would not have come into existence. So then
being is not generated; being always is, nor will it be destroyed. For
being could not be changed into not-being (this also is conceded by the
physicists), nor into being; for then it would abide as it is, and would
not be destroyed. Accordingly being was not generated, nor will it be
destroyed; so it always was and always will be. (Fr. 2) But while that
which comes into existence has a beginning, that which does not come into
existence does not have a beginning, and being which did not come into
existence would not have a beginning. Farther, that which is destroyed
has an end; but if anything is not subject to destruction, it does not
have an end; and that which has neither beginning nor end is of course
infinite; so being is infinite. (Fr. 3) And if it is infinite, it is
one; for if being were two, both parts could not be infinite, but each
would be limited by the other. But being is infinite; there could not be
several beings; accordingly being is one. (Fr. 4) Farther, if being is
one it does not move; for the one is always homogeneous [_lit._ like
itself]; and that which is homogeneous could not perish or become greater
or change its arrangement or suffer pain or annoyance. If it experienced
any of these things it would not be one; for that which is moved with any
sort of motion changes something from one thing into something different;
but there is nothing else except being, so this will not be moved. (Fr.
5) To follow another line of argument: there is no place void of being,
for the void is nothing; but that which is nothing could not exist; so
then being is not moved: it is impossible for it to go anywhere, if
there is no void. Nor is it possible for it to contract into itself,
for in that case different degrees of density would arise, and this is
impossible; for it is impossible that the rare should be as full as the
dense; but the rare is more empty than the dense, and there is no such
thing as emptiness. It is necessary to judge whether being is full or
not by its capacity to receive something else: if it will not receive
anything it is full; if it will receive something it is not full. Now if
the void does not exist, it must of necessity be full; and if this is
the case it does not move, not because it is impossible for it to move
through space already filled, as we say of bodies, but because all being
cannot be moved into being (for there is nothing besides itself), nor can
being be moved into not-being, for not-being does not exist.
23; 109, 7. Melissos also is blamed because in his frequent references
to the beginning he does not use the word to mean a beginning in time
which applies to that which comes into existence, but rather to mean a
logical beginning which does not apply to the things that are changing
collectively. He seems to have seen clearly before Aristotle that
all matter, even that which is eternal, being limited has a limited
capacity, and in itself is always at the end of time, and because of
the ever-moving beginning of that which passes, it is always at the
beginning, and remains eternal, so that that which has beginning and end
in quantity has also beginning and end in time, and the reverse; for that
which has beginning and end in time is not everything simultaneously.
So he bases his proof on beginning and end in time. Accordingly he
says that that which is not everything—_i.e._ which is not the whole
simultaneously—is not without beginning or end; what applies to things
that are indivisible and infinite in their being, applies so much the
more to pure being; and that all applies to being. Melissos puts it as
follows: (Fr. 7) Since then it did not come into being but _is_, it
always was and always will be, and has neither beginning nor end, but is
infinite. For if it had come into existence it would have had a beginning
(for that which once came into existence would have a beginning) and an
end (for that which once came into existence would come to an end); if it
neither had a beginning nor came to an end, it always was and always will
be; it has not beginning or end; but it is impossible that anything which
is not the whole should always exist.... l. 31. (Fr. 8) But as it always
exists, so it is necessary also that it be always infinite in magnitude.
l. 33. (Fr. 15) If being is separated it moves; and that which moves
could not exist simultaneously.
24; 110, 1 (Fr. 16) If being exists it must be one, and being one it
is necessary that it should not itself have body; (19; 87, 6) and if
it should have thickness, it would have parts and would no longer be a
unity. l. 3 (Fr. 9) Nothing which has beginning and end is either eternal
or infinite. l. 5 (Fr. 10) If it were not one, it would be bounded by
something else.[70]
24; 111, 18. Melissos bringing his previous topic to a conclusion goes
on to consider motion. (Fr. 11) So then the all is eternal and infinite
and homogeneous; and it could neither perish nor become greater nor
change its arrangement nor suffer pain or distress. If it experienced
any of these things it would no longer be one; for if it becomes
different, it is necessary that being should not be homogeneous, but
that which was before must perish, and that which was not must come into
existence. If then the all should become different by a single hair in
ten thousand years, it would perish in the whole of time. (Fr. 12) And
it is impossible for its order to change, for the order existing before
does not perish, nor does another which did not exist come into being;
and since nothing is added to it or subtracted from it or made different,
how could any of the things that are change their order? But if anything
became different, its order would already have been changed. (Fr. 13)
Nor does it suffer pain, for the all could not be pained; it would be
impossible for anything suffering pain always to be; nor does it have
power equal to the power of what is healthy. It would not be homogeneous
if it suffered pain; it would suffer pain whenever anything was added
or taken away, and it would no longer be homogeneous. Nor could what is
healthy suffer a pang of pain, for both the healthy and _being_ would
perish, and not-being would come into existence. The same reasoning that
applies to pain applies also to distress. (Fr. 14) Nor is there any void,
for the void is nothing, and that which is nothing could not be. Nor does
it move, for it has nowhere to go to, since it is full; for if there
were a void it could go into the void, but since there is no void it has
nowhere to go to. It could not be rare and dense, for it is not possible
for the rare to be as full as the dense, but the rare is already more
empty than the dense. This is the test of what is full and what is not
full: if it has room for anything, or admits anything into it, it is not
full; if it does not have room for anything, or admit anything into it,
it is full. If no void exists it must be full; if then it is full it does
not move. These are the doctrines of Melissos.
34; 162, 24. (Fr. 6) What was, always was and always will be; for if it
had come into existence, it necessarily would have been nothing before it
came into existence. If now there were nothing existing, nothing would
ever have come into existence from nothing.
Simpl. _de Coelo_ 137 r; Schol. Aristot. 509 b; cf. Aristokl. Euseb. _Pr.
Ev._ xiv. 17. (Fr. 17) This argument is the strongest proof that being
is one only. And the proofs are as follows: For if a multiplicity of
things existed it would be necessary that these things should be just
such as I say the one is. For if earth exists, and water and air and iron
and gold and fire and the living and the dead and black and white, and
everything else which men say is real,—if these things exist and we see
and hear them correctly, it is necessary that each thing should be such
as we first determined, namely, it should not change its character or
become different, but should always be each thing what it is. Now we say
that we see and hear and understand correctly; but it seems to us that
hot becomes cold and cold hot, that hard becomes soft and soft hard, that
the living being dies and life comes from what is not living; and that
all these things become different, and what they are is not like what
they were. It seems to us that iron, being hard to the touch, wastes away
†becoming liquefied,†[71] and so does gold, and rock, and whatever else
seems to be strong, so that we conclude that we do not see or know things
that are. And earth and rock arise from water. These things then do not
harmonise with each other. Though we said that many things are eternal,
and have forms and strength, it seems that they all become different
and change their character each time they are seen. Evidently we do not
see correctly, nor is the appearance of multiplicity correct; for they
would not change their character if they were real, but would remain each
thing as it seemed, for nothing is nobler than that which is real. But
if they change their character, being perishes and not-being comes into
existence. So then if a multiplicity of things exist, it is necessary
that they should be such as the one is.
(_b_) ARISTOTLE’S ACCOUNT OF MELISSOS.
_Phys._ i. 3; 186 a 6. Both Melissos and Parmenides argue fallaciously,
and they make false assumptions and their reasonings are not logical; but
the argument of Melissos is the more wearisome, for it sets no problem,
but granted one strange thing, others follow; and there is no difficulty
in this. The error in the reasoning of Melissos is plain, for he thinks
that if everything which has come into being has a beginning, he can
assume that that which has not come into being does not have a beginning.
This, then, is strange, that he should think that everything has a
beginning except time, and this does not, and that simple generation has
no beginning but change alone begins, as though change as a whole did not
come into being. Even if the all is a unity, why then should it not move?
Why should not the whole be moved even as a part of it which is a unity,
namely water, is moved in itself? Then why should there not be change? It
is not possible that being should be one in form, but only in its source.
_Soph. Elen._ 5; 163 b 13. The same is true of syllogisms, as for
instance in the case of Melissos’ argument that the all is infinite; in
this he assumes that the all is not generated (for nothing is generated
from not-being), and that that which is generated, is generated from
a beginning. If then the all was not generated, it does not have a
beginning, so it is infinite. It is not necessary to assent to this, for
even if everything which is generated has a beginning, it does not follow
that if anything has a beginning it was generated, as a man with a fever
is warm, but one who is warm may not have a fever.
_Soph. Elen._ 6; 164 b 35. Or again, as Melissos assumes in his argument
that generation and having a beginning are the same thing, or that that
which is generated from equals has the same size. The two statements,
that what is generated has a beginning, and that what has a beginning is
generated, he deems equivalent, so that the generated and the limited
are both the same in that they each have a beginning. Because what is
generated has a beginning, he postulates that what has a beginning is
generated, as though both that which is generated and that which is
finite were the same in having a beginning.
(_c_) PASSAGES RELATING TO MELISSOS IN THE DOXOGRAPHISTS.
Epiph. _adv. Haer._ iii. 12; _Dox._ 590. Melissos of Samos, son of
Ithagenes, said that the all is one in kind, but that nothing is fixed in
its nature, for all things are potentially destructible.
Aet. _Plac._ i. 3; _Dox._ 285. Melissos of Miletos, son of Ithagenes,
became his companion, but he did not preserve in its purity the doctrine
that was transmitted to him. For he said in regard to the infinite that
the world of those things that appear is limited. i. 7; 303. Melissos and
Zeno say that the one is universal, and that it exists alone, eternal,
and unlimited. And this unity is necessity [_Heeren inserts here the
name_ Empedokles], and the material of which it consists is the four
elements, and the forms are love and strife. He calls the elements gods,
and the mixture of them the world. And the uniform will be resolved. He
thinks that souls are divine, and that pure men who share these things in
a pure way are divine. i. 24; 320. Melissos (et al.) deny generation and
destruction, because they think that the all is unmoved.
Aet. ii. 1; 327. Melissos (et al.): The universe is one. 328. The all is
infinite, but the world is limited. 4; 332. Melissos (et al.): The world
is not generated, not to be destroyed, eternal.
Aet. iv. 9; 396. Melissos (et al.): Sensations are deceptive.
IX.
_PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS._
Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, a native of Samos, left his fatherland
to escape the tyranny of Polykrates (533/2 or 529/8 B.C.). He made his
home for many years in Kroton in southern Italy, where his political
views gained control in the city. At length he and his followers were
banished by an opposing party, and he died at Metapontum. Many stories
are told of his travels into Egypt and more widely, but there is no
evidence on which the stories can be accepted. He was a mystic thinker
and religious reformer quite as much as a philosopher, but there is no
reason for denying that the doctrines of the school originated with him.
Of his disciples, Archytas, in southern Italy, and Philolaos and Lysis,
at Thebes, are the best known. It is the doctrine of the school, not the
teaching of Pythagoras himself, which is known to us through the writings
of Aristotle.
Literature:—On Pythagoras: Krische, _De societatis a Pythagora
conditae scopo politico_, 1830; E. Rohde, _Rhein. Mus._ xxvi.
565 sqq.; xxvii. 23 sqq.; Diels, _Rhein. Mus._ xxxi. 25 sq.;
Zeller, _Sitz. d. kgl. preus. Akad._ 1889, 45, p. 985 sqq.;
Chaignet, _Pythagore_, 1873, and the excellent account in
Burnett.
Philolaos: Boeckh, _Philolaos Lehren, nebst den Bruchstücken
seines Werkes_, 1819; V. Rose, _Comment. de Arist. libr.
ord. et auct._ Berlin 1854; Schaarschmidt, _Die angebliche
Schriftstellerei des Phil._ Bonn 1864; Zeller, _Gesch. d.
griech. Phil._ 4 Auf. 261, 341, 386; _Hermes_ x. 178; Bywater,
_Journal of Philol._ i. 21 sqq.
Archytas: Hartenstein, _de Archyt. Tar. fragm._ Lips. 1833;
Gruppe, _Die Fragm. d. Archyt._ Berlin 1840; Petersen,
_Zeitschr. f. Altertumsk._ 1836; Chaignet, _Pythagore_, 1873,
pp. 191, 255.
PASSAGES IN PLATO REFERRING TO THE PYTHAGOREANS.
_Phaedo_ 62 B. The saying that is uttered in secret rites, to the effect
that we men are in a sort of prison, and that one ought not to loose
himself from it nor yet to run away, seems to me something great and not
easy to see through; but this at least I think is well said, that it is
the gods who care for us, and we men are one of the possessions of the
gods.
_Kratyl._ 400 B. For some say that it (the body) is the tomb of the
soul—I think it was the followers of Orpheus in particular who introduced
this word—which has this enclosure like a prison in order that it may be
kept safe.
_Gorg._ 493 A. I once heard one of the wise men say that now we are
dead and the body is our tomb, and that that part of the soul where
desires are, it so happens, is open to persuasion, and moves upward or
downward. And, indeed, a clever man—perhaps some inhabitant of Sicily
or Italy—speaking allegorically, and taking the word from ‘credible’
(πίθανος) and ‘persuadable’ (πιστικός), called this a jar (πίθος);
and he called those without intelligence uninitiated, and that part
of the soul of uninitiated persons where the desires are, he called
its intemperateness, and said it was not watertight, as a jar might be
pierced with holes—using the simile because of its insatiate desires.
_Gorg._ 507 E. And the wise men say that one community embraces heaven
and earth and gods and men and friendship and order and temperance and
righteousness, and for that reason they call this whole a universe, my
friend, for it is not without order nor yet is there excess. It seems to
me that you do not pay attention to these things, though you are wise in
regard to them. But it has escaped your notice that geometrical equality
prevails widely among both gods and men.
PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE REFERRING TO THE PYTHAGOREANS.
_Phys._ iii. 4; 203 a 1. For all who think they have worthily applied
themselves to such philosophy, have discoursed concerning the infinite,
and they all have asserted some first principle of things—some, like
the Pythagoreans and Plato, a first principle existing by itself, not
connected with anything else, but being itself the infinite in its
essence. Only the Pythagoreans found it among things perceived by sense
(for they say that number is not an abstraction), and they held that it
was the infinite outside the heavens.
iii. 4; 204 a 33. (The Pythagoreans) both hold that the infinite is
being, and divide it.
iv. 6; 213 b 22. And the Pythagoreans say that there is a void, and that
it enters into the heaven itself from the infinite air, as though it (the
heaven) were breathing; and this void defines the natures of things,
inasmuch as it is a certain separation and definition of things that lie
together; and this is true first in the case of numbers, for the void
defines the nature of these.
_De coel._ i. 1; 268 a 10. For as the Pythagoreans say, the all and all
things are defined by threes; for end and middle and beginning constitute
the number of the all, and also the number of the triad.
ii. 2; 284 b 6. And since there are some who say that there is a right
and left of the heavens, as, for instance, those that are called
Pythagoreans (for such is their doctrine), we must investigate whether it
is as they say.
ii. 2; 285 a 10. Wherefore one of the Pythagoreans might be surprised in
that they say that there are only these two first principles, the right
and the left, and they pass over four of them as not having the least
validity; for there is no less difference up and down, and front and back
than there is right and left in all creatures.
ii. 2; 285 b 23. And some are dwelling in the upper hemisphere and to the
right, while we dwell below and to the left, which is the opposite to
what the Pythagoreans say; for they put us above and to the right, while
the others are below and at the left.
ii. 9; 290 b 15. Some think it necessary that noise should arise when
so great bodies are in motion, since sound does arise from bodies among
us which are not so large and do not move so swiftly; and from the sun
and moon and from the stars in so great number, and of so great size,
moving so swiftly, there must necessarily arise a sound inconceivably
great. Assuming these things and that the swiftness has the principle of
harmony by reason of the intervals, they say that the sound of the stars
moving on in a circle becomes musical. And since it seems unreasonable
that we also do not hear this sound, they say that the reason for this
is that the noise exists in the very nature of things, so as not to
be distinguishable from the opposite silence; for the distinction of
sound and silence lies in their contrast with each other, so that as
blacksmiths think there is no difference between them because they are
accustomed to the sound, so the same thing happens to men.
ii. 9; 291 a 7. What occasions the difficulty and makes the Pythagoreans
say that there is a harmony of the bodies as they move, is a proof. For
whatever things move themselves make a sound and noise; but whatever
things are fastened in what moves or exist in it as the parts in a ship,
cannot make a noise, nor yet does the ship if it moves in a river.
ii. 13; 293 a 19. They say that the whole heaven is limited, the opposite
to what those of Italy, called the Pythagoreans, say; for these say that
fire is at the centre and that the earth is one of the stars, and that
moving in a circle about the centre it produces night and day. And they
assume yet another earth opposite this which they call the counter-earth
[ἀντίχθων], not seeking reasons and causes for phenomena, but stretching
phenomena to meet certain assumptions and opinions of theirs and
attempting to arrange them in a system.... And farther the Pythagoreans
say that the most authoritative part of the All stands guard, because it
is specially fitting that it should, and this part is the centre; and
this place that the fire occupies, they call the guard of Zeus, as it is
called simply the centre, that is, the centre of space and the centre of
matter and of nature.
iii. 1; 300 a 15. The same holds true for those who construct the heaven
out of numbers; for some construct nature out of numbers, as do certain
of the Pythagoreans.