corr. Stein. Karsten omits v. 52. V. 55: Bergk εὔσκοπον. V.
56: _CRV_ κρίνε, _G_ κριναν: _L_ πολύπειρον. Vulg. λόγῳ, corr.
Burnet. Stein rejects v. 53, and transfers 54-57a to the
proœmium following 32.
57 b-112 (except 90-93). Simpl. _Phys._ 31: 145-146. 57 b-59. _Ibid._
31 r 142, 34. 57 b-70. _Ibid._ 17 r 78, 12. 59-60. Clem. Al. _Strom._
v. 716; Euseb. _Praep._ xiii. 680 c. 59-61. Simpl. _Phys._ 7 r 30, 1.
60. Plut. _adv. Col._ 1114 D; Euseb. _Praep._ i. 23; Theod. _Ther. Ser._
iv. 7; Phil. _Phys._ B 5 r: 65; Simpl. _de Caelo_ 557, 17; _Phys._ 26 r
120, 23. 60a. Simpl. _Phys._ 19 r 87, 21; Plut. _Strom._ 5; _Dox._ 580.
61. Ammon. on Herm. D 7 (= Cramer A. P. 1388); Philop. _Phys._ 5 r: 65;
Prokl. _Parm._ iv. 62. 62-66. Simpl. _Phys._ 34 v 162, 18. 62-65. Simpl.
_de Caelo_, 137, 1.
V. 57: Stein μόνης: _V_ δέ τι, _CH_ δὲ τοι, _FG_ δέ γε. V. 60:
Plut. _Strom._ 5 reads μοῦνον for οὖλον: a (17: 78) ἀτέλευτον,
MSS. (26: 120) and _Dox._ 284 and 580 ἀγένητον. V. 62: _F_
διζήσεται. V. 66: D (31: 145) μηδαμῶς: _E_ (31: 145) αὐξάμενον:
_Da_ (17: 78) a (31: 145) φῦναι, _E_ φῦν. Cf. Stein, p. 786.
V. 68: MSS. ἔκ γε μὴ ὄντος, _DE_ om. γε, Karst. ἐκ τοῦ ἐόντος,
Stein ἔκ γε πέλοντος. Corr. Diels, paraphrasing Simpl. 78, 27.
V. 70: _EF_ Bergk, Diels πέδησιν. V. 71b: _v._ Stein, _Symbol._
787. V. 73: a_DE_ ἀνόνητον; text follows F. V. 75: MSS. ἔπειτα
πέλοι το, corr. Karsten, Stein ἀπόλοιτο πέλον: MSS. ἄν, corr.
Stein. V. 76: _EF_ ἐγένετ’, _D_ ἔγετ’, corr. Bergk.
77. _De Caelo_, 559, 115. 78. Simpl. _Phys._ 19 r 86, 24, 31 r 143, 3;
81. Simpl. _Phys._ 86, 22; 87, 23. Plot. _Ennead._ vi. 4, 4, 648 A;
Prokl. _Parm._ ii. 62 and 120; Philop. B 5: 65. 82-89 (except 85). Simpl.
_Phys._ 9 r 39, 26. 82-84. _Ibid._ 17 v 79, 32. 85-89. _Ibid._ 7 r 30, 6;
9 r 40, 3. 85. Prokl. _Parm._ iv. 32. Simpl. _Phys._ 31 r 143, 15.
V. 78: _F_ διαιρέτεον. V. 79: For μᾶλλον Stein reads κεν ἐόν.
V. 80: _F_ δὲ πλέον. V. 82: _D_ ἀκινήτων. V. 84: MSS. τῆδε,
corr. Scal. _DEF_ ἐπλάχθησαν, corr. a. V. 85: Diels ταὐτόν,
ταὐτῷ, ἑαυτό. Simpl. 30, 6 omits the last τε. V. 86: _C_ οὐχ
οὕτως, a οὕτως, text from _DF_. V. 88: Stein πέλον. V. 89:
Simpl. μὴ ἐὸν δὲ ἂν παντὸς. Karsten reads ἐπιδευές in three
syllables and puts κε for ἄν. Preller omits μή. Stein considers
these views untenable, and finds a break, probably longer than
one line, after ἐπιδευές.
90-93. Clem. Al. _Strom._ v. 2, 653. 90. Theod. _Ther. Ser._ i. 13.
V. 90: Stein suggests ἀπεόν τε νόῳ παρεόν τε βεβαίῳ. V. 91:
Stein πέλον: Vulg. ἀποτμήξει, corr. Brandis. MSS. τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ,
corr. Preller, comparing vv. 105 and 108.
94-112. Simpl. _Phys._ 31 v 146, 7. 94-98. _Ibid._ 19 r 87, 13 and 86,
31. 94-96. _Ibid._ 31 r 143, 22. 98. Plat. _Theaet._ 180 E, and from this
Simpl. _Phys._ 7 r 29, 18. 103-105. Plat. _Soph._ 244 E; from Plato,
Simpl. _Phys._ 12 r 52, 23; 19 v 89, 22; Stob. _Ecl._ i. 15, p. 352.
103-104. Arist. _de X. Z. G._ ch. 2 and 4; Prokl. _Tim._ 160 D; Simpl.
_Phys._ 27 r 126, 22 and 127, 31; 29 v 137, 16. 104-105. Prokl. _Parm._
iv. p. 62.
V. 95: _DE_ (87, 15) πεφωτισμένον. V. 96: (19: 86, 13) οὐδὲν
γάρ ἐστιν. (31: 146) οὐδ’ εἰ χρόνος ἐστίν, corr. Stein. V. 98:
Text from Simpl. 19: 87. Simpl. 31: 146 πάντ’ ὠνόμασται. Plato
οἷον ἀκίνητον † τελέθει τῷ πάντι † ὄνομ’ εἶναι. V. 100: MSS.
οὐχί, corr. Karst. V. 105: _E_ and Plato χρεόν. V. 102: Karsten
αὐτὰρ ἐπί, Stein αὐτὰρ ἐόν, V. 106: _DEF_ παύοι, text from a:
_F_ κινεῖσθαι, Stein ἱκέσθαι. V. 107: MSS. οὔτε ὄν, corr. a.
_DEF_ καὶ ἕν, a κενὸν, corr. Karsten. V. 109: _DEF_ οἱ γάρ, a ἦ
γάρ, Diels εἰ γάρ or ἧ γάρ: MSS. κυρεῖ, corr. Stein.
110-121. Simpl. _Phys._ 9 r 38, 30. 110-119. _Ibid._ 7 v 30, 4. 113-119.
_Ibid._ 38 r 180, 1. 110-113. Simpl. _de Coelo_ 138, Peyr. 55 sq.
V. 113: (9 r 38) _DEF_ γνώμας. 110-111. _Phys._ 9 r 41, 8 (7 v
30 and 38 r 180 all MSS. give γνώμαις and Stein prefers this,
p. 794). V. 117: (9 r 39) _DE_, (39 r 180) _DEF_ ἤπιον ἀραιὸν
ἐλαφρόν (ἔστιν a), 7 r 30, and (9 r 39) a_F_ ἤπιον ὂν μέγ’
ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρόν, RP λεπτὸν ἀραιὸν ἐλαφρὸν, text follows Stein V.
118: (9 r 39) a_EF_ (39 r 180) a_F_, (7 v 31) MSS. κατ’ αὐτό·
(9 r 39) _DE_ κατὰ ταὐτον, text follows Stein, who uses first
letter of the next line. V. 119: _F_ κατ’ αὐτό τἀντια, a_DE_
τἀναντια, text from Stein by change of Τ to Υ. V. 120: MSS.
τὸν, corr. Karsten. V. 121: Stein reads γνώμῃ.
122-125. Simpl. _Phys._ 39 r 180, 9.
V. 125: D ἶσον, Stein suggests ἀμφότερον.
126-128. _Ibid._ 9 r 39, 14. 127-131. _Ibid._ 7 v 31, 13.
V. 126: _E_ᵃ_D_¹ πάηντο, _D_²_E_ πύηντο, a ποίηντο, corr.
Bergk: _DE_ᵃ ἀκρήτοις, a ἀκρίτοιο, corr. Stein. V. 127: _E_ᵃ
οἴεται. V. 129: MSS. πάντα, Mullach πάντῃ, Stein πᾶσιν: a_F_
ἄρχη, text follows _DE_. V. 130: Stein suggests μιγῆν, τό τ’.
132. Plato, _Symp._ 178 B; Arist. _Met._ i. 4, 984 b 26; Plut. _Amat._
756 F; Sext. Emp. _Math._ ix. 9; Stob. _Ecl._ i. 10, p. 274; Simpl.
_Phys._ 9 r 39, 18.
133-139. Clem. Al. _Strom._ v. 14, 732. Stein assigns to Empedokles.
140-143. Simpl. _de Coelo_ f. 138: Peyr. 55 sqq., Brandis 510 a.
V. 140: Stein introduces λέγειν before πως from what precedes.
144. Plut. _Colot._ p. 1116 A.
145. Plut. _Quaest. Rom._ 282 A; _de fac. lun._ 929 A.
146-149. Arist. _Met._ iii. 5, 1009 b 17; Theophr. _de sens._ 3; _Dox._
499.
V. 146: Text follows Arist. SBᵇCᵇ, Theophr. PF; Vulg. ἕκαστος:
MSS. κρᾶσιν, corr. Stephan. V. 147: Arist. παρίσταται; text
follows Theophr.
150. Galen, Hipp. _Epid._ vi. 48; Comm. ii. (ix. p. 430 Char).
151-153. Simpl. _de Coelo_ f. 138; Peyr. 55 sq., Gaisf. _Poet. Min._ 287.
V. 151: MSS. ἔφυ, corr. Stein. MSS. (καὶ) νῦν ἔασι, Peyr. νῦν
τε ἔασι, Stein νῦν καὶ ἔασι. V. 153: Text follows Oxford MS.:
Turin MS. transposes last two words.
150-155. (Karsten) Coelius Aurel. _de Morb. Chron._ iv. 9, p. 545 Wet. R.
P. 102 c. V. (151) Vulg. _venis informans_, corr. Diels, Dox. 193, n. 1.
TRANSLATION.
(Proœmium) The horses which bear me conducted me as far as desire may
go, when they had brought me speeding along to the far-famed road of
a divinity who herself bears onward through all {5} things the man of
understanding. Along this road I was borne, along this the horses, wise
indeed, bore me hastening the chariot on, and maidens guided my course.
The axle in its box, enkindled by the heat, uttered the sound of a pipe
(for it was driven on by the rolling wheels on either side), when the
maiden daughters of Helios hastened to conduct me {10} to the light,
leaving the realms of night, pushing aside with the hand the veils from
their heads. There is the gate between the ways of day and night; lintel
above it, and stone threshold beneath, hold it in place, and high in air
it is fitted with great doors; retributive Justice holds the keys that
open and {15} shut them.[57] However, the maidens addressed her with
mild words, and found means to persuade her to thrust back speedily for
them the fastened bolt from the doors; and the gate swinging free made
the opening wide, turning in their sockets the bronze {20} hinges, well
fastened with bolts and nails; then through this the maidens kept horses
and chariot straight on the high-road. The goddess received me with
kindness, and, taking my right hand in {25} hers, she addressed me with
these words:—Youth joined with drivers immortal, who hast come with the
horses that bear thee, to our dwelling, hail! since no evil fate has bid
thee come on this road (for it lies far outside the beaten track of men),
but right and justice. ’Tis necessary for thee to {30} learn all things,
both the abiding essence of persuasive truth, and men’s opinions in which
rests no true belief. But nevertheless these things also thou shalt
learn, since it is necessary to judge accurately the things that rest on
opinion, passing all things carefully in review.
CONCERNING TRUTH.
Come now I will tell thee—and do thou hear my word and heed it—what
are the only ways of {35} enquiry that lead to knowledge. The one way,
assuming that being is and that it is impossible for it not to be, is
the trustworthy path, for truth attends it. The other, that not-being is
and that it necessarily is, I call a wholly incredible course, {40} since
thou canst not recognise not-being (for this is impossible), nor couldst
thou speak of it, for thought and being are the same thing.
It makes no difference to me at what point I begin, for I shall always
come back again to this.
It is necessary both to say and to think that being is; for it is
possible that being is, and it is impossible {45} that not-being is;
this is what I bid thee ponder. I restrain thee from this first course
of investigation; and from that course also along which mortals knowing
nothing wander aimlessly, since helplessness directs the roaming thought
in their bosoms, and they are borne on deaf and likewise {50} blind,
amazed, headstrong races, they who consider being and not-being as
the same and not the same; and that all things follow a back-turning
course.[58]
That things which are not are, shall never prevail, she said, but do thou
restrain thy mind from this course of investigation.
And let not long-practised habit compel thee {55} along this path, thine
eye careless, thine ear and thy tongue overpowered by noise; but do thou
weigh the much contested refutation of their words, which I have uttered.
There is left but this single path to tell thee of: namely, that being
is. And on this path there are many proofs that being is without
beginning and {60} indestructible; it is universal, existing alone,
immovable and without end; nor ever was it nor will it be, since it now
_is_, all together, one, and continuous. For what generating of it wilt
thou seek out? From what did it grow, and how? I will not permit thee
to say or to think that it came from not-being; for it is impossible
to think or to say that not-being {65} is. What thing would then have
stirred it into activity that it should arise from not-being later rather
than earlier? So it is necessary that being either is absolutely or is
not. Nor will the force of the argument permit that anything spring from
{70} being except being itself. Therefore justice does not slacken her
fetters to permit generation or destruction, but holds being firm.
(The decision as to these things comes in at this point.)
Either being exists or it does not exist. It has been decided in
accordance with necessity to leave the unthinkable, unspeakable path, as
this is not the true path, but that the other path exists and is true.
{75} How then should being suffer destruction? How come into existence?
If it came into existence, it is not being, nor will it be if it ever is
to come into existence.... So its generation is extinguished, and its
destruction is proved incredible.
Nor is it subject to division, for it is all alike; nor is anything more
in it, so as to prevent its cohesion, nor anything less, but all is full
of being; {80} therefore the all is continuous, for being is contiguous
to being.
Farther it is unmoved, in the hold of great chains, without beginning or
end, since generation and destruction have completely disappeared and
{85} true belief has rejected them. It lies the same, abiding in the
same state and by itself; accordingly it abides fixed in the same spot.
For powerful necessity holds it in confining bonds, which restrain it on
all sides. Therefore divine right does not permit being to have any end;
but it is lacking in nothing, for if it lacked anything it would lack
everything.[59]
{90} Nevertheless, behold steadfastly all absent things as present to thy
mind; for thou canst not separate being in one place from contact with
being in another place; it is not scattered here and there through the
universe, nor is it compounded of parts.
Therefore thinking and that by reason of which {95} thought exists are
one and the same thing, for thou wilt not find thinking without the
_being_ from which it receives its name. Nor is there nor will there be
anything apart from being; for fate has linked it together, so that it is
a whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things will be but a name, all
these things which mortals determined in the belief that they were true,
viz. that things arise and perish, {100} that they are and are not, that
they change their position and vary in colour.
But since there is a final limit, it is perfected on every side, like
the mass of a rounded sphere, equally distant from the centre at every
point. For {105} it is necessary that it should neither be greater at all
nor less anywhere, since there is no not-being which can prevent it from
arriving at equality, nor is being such that there may ever be more than
what is in one part and less in another, since the whole is inviolate.
For if it is equal on all sides, it abides in equality within its limits.
CONCERNING OPINIONS.
{110} At this point I cease trustworthy discourse and the thought about
truth; from here on, learn the opinions of mortals, hearing of the
illusive order of my verses.
Men have determined in their minds to name two principles [_lit._ forms];
but one of these they ought {115} not to name, and in so doing they
have erred. They distinguish them as antithetic in character, and give
them each character and attributes distinct from those of the other.
On the one hand there is the aethereal flame of fire, fine, rarefied,
everywhere identical with itself and not identical with its opposite; and
on the other hand, opposed to the first, is {120} the second principle,
flameless darkness, dense and heavy in character. Of these two principles
I declare to thee every arrangement as it appears to men, so that no
knowledge among mortals may surpass thine.
But since all things are called light and darkness, and the peculiar
properties of these are predicated of one thing and another, everything
is at the same time full of light and of obscure darkness, of both {125}
equally, since neither has anything in common with the other.
And the smaller circles are filled with unmixed fire, and those next them
with darkness into which their portion of light penetrates; in the midst
of these is the divinity who directs the course of all. For she controls
dreaded birth and coition in every {130} part of the universe, sending
female to join with male, and again male to female.
First of all the gods she devised love.
Thou shalt know the nature of the heavens and {135} all signs that are
in the sky, the destructive deeds of the pure bright torch of the sun
and whence they arose, and thou shalt learn the wandering deeds of the
round-eyed moon and its nature. Thou shalt know also the sky surrounding
all, whence it arose, and how necessity took it and chained it so as to
serve as {140} a limit to the courses of the stars. How earth and sun and
moon and common sky and the milky way of the heavens and highest Olympos
and the burning (might of the) stars began to be.
It (the moon) wanders about the earth, shining {145} at night with
borrowed light. She is always gazing earnestly toward the rays of the sun.
For as at any time is the blending of very complex members in a man, so
is the mind in men constituted; for that which thinks is the same in all
men and in every man, _viz._ the essence of the members of the body; and
the element that is in {150} excess is thought.
On the right hand boys, on the left hand girls.
So, according to men’s opinions, did things arise, and so they are now,
and from this state when they shall have reached maturity shall they
perish. For each of these men has determined a name as a distinguishing
mark.
{K. 150} When male and female mingle seed of Venus in the form [the body]
of one, the excellence from the two different bloods, if it preserves
harmony, fashions a well-formed body; but if when the seed is mingled the
excellencies fight against each other and do not unite into one, they
will distress the sex that is coming into existence, as the twofold seed
is mingled in the body of the unfortunate woman.
With this there are fineness and heat and light and softness and
brightness; and with the dense are classed cold and darkness and hardness
and weight, for these are separated the ones on one side, the others on
the other.
(_b_) PASSAGES RELATING TO PARMENIDES IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.
Plato, _Theaet._ 180 D. I almost forgot, Theodoros, that there were
others who asserted opinions the very opposite of these: ‘the all
is alone, unmoved; to this all names apply,’ and the other emphatic
statements in opposition to those referred to, which the school of
Melissos and Parmenides make, to the effect that all things are one, and
that the all stands itself in itself, not having space in which it is
moved.
_Ibid._ 183 E. Feeling ashamed before Melissos and the rest who assert
that the all is one being, for fear we should examine the matter somewhat
crudely, I am even more ashamed in view of the fact that Parmenides is
one of them. Parmenides seems to me, in the words of Homer, a man to be
reverenced and at the same time feared. For when I was a mere youth and
he a very old man, I conversed with him, and he seemed to me to have an
exceedingly wonderful depth of mind. I fear lest we may not understand
what he said, and that we may fail still more to understand his thoughts
in saying it; and, what is most important, I fear lest the question
before us should fail to receive due consideration....[60]
_Soph._ 238 C (concluding a discussion of Parmenides). You understand
then that it is really impossible to speak of not-being or to say
anything about it or to conceive it by itself, but it is inconceivable,
not to be spoken of or mentioned, and irrational.
_Parm._ 150 E. Accordingly the unity itself in relation to itself is as
follows: Having in itself neither greatness nor littleness, it could not
be exceeded by itself nor could it exceed itself, but being equal it
would be equal to itself.
_Ibid._ 168 C. This statement: It does not exist, means absolutely that
it does not exist anywhere in any way, nor does not-being have any share
at all in being. Accordingly not-being could not exist, nor in any other
way could it have a share in being.
(_Symp._ 178 B, 195 C: Reference to the stories which Hesiod and
Parmenides told about the gods. Line 132 is quoted.)
Arist. _Phys._ i. 2; 184 b 16. The first principle must be one, unmoved,
as Parmenides and Melissos say, ...
_Ibid._ i. 3; 186 a 4. To those proceeding after this impossible manner
things seem to be one, and it is not difficult to refute them from their
own statements. For both of them reason in a fallacious manner, both
Parmenides and Melissos; for they make false assumptions, and at the
same time their course of reasoning is not logical.... And the same sort
of arguments are used by Parmenides, although he has some others of his
own, and the refutation consists in showing both that he makes mistakes
of fact and that he does not draw his conclusions correctly. He makes a
mistake in assuming that being is to be spoken of absolutely, speaking of
it thus many times; and he draws the false conclusion that, in case only
whites are considered, white meaning one thing, none the less there are
many whites and not one; since neither in the succession of things nor in
the argument will whiteness be one. For what is predicated of white will
not be the same as what is predicated of the object which is white, and
nothing except white will be separated from the object; since there is no
other ground of separation except the fact that the white is different
from the object in which the white exists. But Parmenides had not yet
arrived at the knowledge of this.
_Ibid._ i. 5; 188 a 20. Parmenides also makes heat and cold first
principles; and he calls them fire and earth.
_Ibid._ iii. 6; 207 a 15. Wherefore we must regard Parmenides as a more
acute thinker than Melissos, for the latter says that the infinite is the
all, but the former asserts that the all is limited, equally distant from
the centre [on every side].[61]
_Gen. Corr._ i. 3; 318 b 6. Parmenides says that the two exist, both
being and not being—_i.e._ earth and water.
_Metaph._ i. 3; 984 b 1. None of those who have affirmed that the all is
one have, it happens, seen the nature of such a cause clearly, except,
perhaps, Parmenides, and he in so far as he sometimes asserts that there
is not one cause alone, but two causes.
_Metaph._ i. 5; 986 b 18. For Parmenides seemed to lay hold of a unity
according to reason, and Melissos according to matter; wherefore the
former says it is limited, the latter that it is unlimited. Xenophanes
first taught the unity of things (Parmenides is said to have been his
pupil), but he did not make anything clear, nor did he seem to get at
the nature of either finiteness or infinity, but, looking up into the
broad heavens, he said, the unity is god. These, as we said, are to be
dismissed from the present investigation, two of them entirely as being
somewhat more crude, Xenophanes and Melissos; but Parmenides seems to
speak in some places with greater care. For believing that not-being does
not exist in addition to being, of necessity he thinks that being is
one and that there is nothing else, ... and being compelled to account
for phenomena, and assuming that things are one from the standpoint of
reason, plural from the standpoint of sense, he again asserts that there
are two causes and two first principles, heat and cold, or, as he calls
them, fire and earth; of these he regards heat as being, its opposite as
not-being.
_Metaph._ ii. 4; 1001 a 32. There is nothing different from being, so
that it is necessary to agree with the reasoning of Parmenides that all
things are one, and that this is being.
(_c_) PASSAGES RELATING TO PARMENIDES IN THE DOXOGRAPHISTS.
Theophrastos, Fr. 6; Alexander _Metaph._ p. 24, 5 Bon.; _Dox._ 482. And
succeeding him Parmenides, son of Pyres, the Eleatic—Theophrastos adds
the name of Xenophanes—followed both ways. For in declaring that the
all is eternal, and in attempting to explain the genesis of things, he
expresses different opinions according to the two standpoints:—from the
standpoint of truth he supposes the all to be one and not generated and
spheroidal in form, while from the standpoint of popular opinion, in
order to explain generation of phenomena, he uses two first principles,
fire and earth, the one as matter, the other as cause and agent.
Theophrastos, Fr. 6 a; Laer. Diog. ix. 21, 22; _Dox._ 482. Parmenides,
son of Pyres, the Eleatic, was a pupil of Xenophanes, yet he did not
accept his doctrines.... He was the first to declare that the earth is
spheroidal and situated in the middle of the universe. He said that there
are two elements, fire and earth; the one has the office of demiurge, the
other that of matter. Men first arose from mud; heat and cold are the
elements of which all things are composed. He holds that intelligence and
life are the same, as Theophrastos records in his book on physics, where
he put down the opinions of almost everybody. He said that philosophy
has a twofold office, to understand both the truth and also what men
believe. Accordingly he says: (Vv. 28-30), ‘’Tis necessary for thee to
learn all things, both the abiding essence of persuasive truth, and men’s
opinions in which rests no true belief.’
Theoph. Fr. 17; Diog. Laer. viii. 48; _Dox._ 492. Theophrastos says that
Parmenides was the first to call the heavens a universe and the earth
spheroidal.