OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AFTER HULL'S SURRENDER.
EUROPEAN EVENTS BEARING ON THE WAR
By August 25, nine days after the capitulation of Detroit, Brock was
again writing from Fort George, by Niagara. About the time of his
departure for Malden, Prevost had received from Foster, late British
minister to Washington, and now in Nova Scotia, letters foreshadowing
the repeal of the Orders in Council. In consequence he had sent his
adjutant-general, Colonel Baynes, to Dearborn to negotiate a
suspension of hostilities. Like all intelligent flags of truce, Baynes
kept his eyes wide open to indications in the enemy's lines. The
militia, he reported, were not uniformed; they were distinguished from
other people of the country only by a cockade. The regulars were
mostly recruits. The war was unpopular, the great majority impatient
to return to their homes; a condition Brock observed also in the
Canadians. They avowed a fixed determination not to pass the frontier.
Recruiting for the regular service went on very slowly, though pay and
bounty were liberal. Dearborn appeared over sixty, strong and healthy,
but did not seem to possess the energy of mind or activity of body
requisite to his post. In short, from the actual state of the American
forces assembled on Lake Champlain, Baynes did not think there was any
intention of invasion. From its total want of discipline and order,
the militia could not be considered formidable when opposed to
well-disciplined British regulars.[457] Of this prognostic the war was
to furnish sufficient saddening proof. The militia contained excellent
material for soldiers, but soldiers they were not.
Dearborn declined to enter into a formal armistice, as beyond his
powers; but he consented to a cessation of hostilities pending a
reference to Washington, agreeing to direct all commanders of posts
within his district to abstain from offensive operations till further
orders. This suspension of arms included the Niagara line, from action
upon which Hull had expected to receive support. In his defence Hull
claimed that this arrangement, in which his army was not included, had
freed a number of troops to proceed against him; but the comparison of
dates shows that every man present at Detroit in the British force had
gone forward before the agreement could be known. The letter engaging
to remain on the defensive only was signed by Dearborn at Greenbush,
near Albany, August 8. The same day Brock was three hundred and fifty
miles to the westward, embarking at Long Point for Malden; and among
his papers occurs the statement that the strong American force on the
Niagara frontier compelled him to take to Detroit only one half of the
militia that volunteered.[458] His military judgment and vigor,
unaided, had enabled him to abandon one line, and that the most
important, concentrate all available men at another point, effect
there a decisive success, and return betimes to his natural centre of
operations. He owed nothing to outside military diplomacy. On the
contrary, he deeply deplored the measure which now tied his hands at a
moment when the Americans, though restrained from fighting, were not
prevented from bringing up re-enforcements to the positions
confronting him.
Dearborn's action was not approved by the Administration, and the
armistice was ended September 4, by notification. Meantime, to
strengthen the British Niagara frontier, all the men and ordnance that
could now be spared from Amherstburg had been brought back by Brock to
Fort Erie, which was on the lake of that name, at the upper end of the
Niagara River. Although still far from secure, owing to the much
greater local material resources of the United States, and the
preoccupation of Great Britain with the Peninsular War, which
prevented her succoring Canada, Brock's general position was immensely
improved since the beginning of hostilities. His successes in the
West, besides rallying the Indians by thousands to his support, had
for the time so assured that frontier as to enable him to concentrate
his efforts on the East; while the existing British naval superiority
on both lakes, Erie and Ontario, covered his flanks, and facilitated
transportation--communications--from Kingston to Niagara, and thence
to Malden, Detroit, Mackinac, and the Great West. To illustrate the
sweep of this influence, it may be mentioned here--for there will be
no occasion to repeat--that an expedition from Mackinac at a later
period captured the isolated United States post at Prairie du Chien,
on the Mississippi, on the western border of what is now the state of
Wisconsin. Already, at the most critical period, the use of the water
had enabled Brock, by simultaneous movements, to send cannon from Fort
George by way of Fort Erie to Fort Malden; while at the same time
replacing those thus despatched by others brought from Toronto and
Kingston. In short, control of the lakes conferred upon him the
recognized advantage of a central position--the Niagara
peninsula--having rapid communication by interior lines with the
flanks, or extremities; to Malden and Detroit in one direction, to
Toronto and Kingston in the other.
It was just here, also, that the first mischance befell him; and it
cannot but be a subject of professional pride to a naval officer to
trace the prompt and sustained action of his professional ancestors,
who reversed conditions, not merely by a single brilliant blow, upon
which popular reminiscence fastens, but by efficient initiative and
sustained sagacious exertion through a long period of time. On
September 3, Captain Isaac Chauncey had been ordered from the New York
navy yard to command on Lakes Erie and Ontario. Upon the latter there
was already serving Lieutenant Melancthon T. Woolsey, in command of a
respectable vessel, the brig "Oneida," of eighteen 24-pounder
carronades. On Erie there was as yet no naval organization nor vessel.
Chauncey consequently, on September 7, ordered thither Lieutenant
Jesse D. Elliott to select a site for equipping vessels, and to
contract for two to be built of three hundred tons each. Elliott, who
arrived at Buffalo on the 14th, was still engaged in this preliminary
work, and was fitting some purchased schooners behind Squaw Island,
three miles below, when, on October 8, there arrived from Malden, and
anchored off Fort Erie, two British armed brigs, the "Detroit"--lately
the American "Adams," surrendered with Hull--and the "Caledonia,"
which co-operated so decisively in the fall of Mackinac. The same day
he learned the near approach of a body of ninety seamen, despatched by
Chauncey from New York on September 22.[459] He sent to hasten them,
and they arrived at noon. The afternoon was spent in preparations,
weapons having to be obtained from the army, which also supplied a
contingent of fifty soldiers.
The seamen needed refreshment, having come on foot five hundred
miles, but Elliott would not trifle with opportunity. At 1 A.M. of
October 9 he shoved off with a hundred men in two boats, and at 3 was
alongside the brigs. From Buffalo to Fort Erie is about two miles; but
this distance was materially increased by the strong downward current
toward the falls, and by the necessity of pulling far up stream in
order to approach the vessels from ahead, which lessened the chance of
premature discovery, and materially shortened the interval between
being seen and getting alongside. The enemy, taken by surprise, were
quickly overpowered, and in ten minutes both prizes were under sail
for the American shore. The "Caledonia" was beached at Black Rock,
where was Elliott's temporary navy yard, just above Squaw Island; but
the wind did not enable the "Detroit," in which he himself was, to
stem the downward drift of the river. After being swept some time, she
had to anchor under the fire of batteries at four hundred yards range,
to which reply was made till the powder on board was expended. Then,
the berth proving too hot, the cable was cut, sail again made, and the
brig run ashore on Squaw Island within range of both British and
American guns. Here Elliott abandoned her, she having already several
large shot through her hull, with rigging and sails cut to pieces, and
she was boarded in turn by a body of the enemy. Under the conditions,
however, neither side could remain to get her off, and she was finally
set on fire by the Americans.[460] Besides the vessel herself, her
cargo of ordnance was lost to the British. American seamen afterward
recovered from the wreck by night four 12-pounders, and a quantity of
shot, which were used with effect.
The conduct of this affair was of a character frequent in the naval
annals of that day. Elliott's quick discernment of the opportunity to
reverse the naval conditions which constituted so much of the British
advantage, and the promptness of his action, are qualities more
noticeable than the mere courage displayed. "A strong inducement," he
wrote, "was that with these two vessels, and those I have purchased, I
should be able to meet the remainder of the British force on the Upper
Lakes." The mishap of the "Detroit" partly disappointed this
expectation, and the British aggregate remained still superior; but
the units lost their perfect freedom of movement, the facility of
transportation was greatly diminished, and the American success held
in it the germ of future development to the superiority which Perry
achieved a year later. None realized the extent of the calamity more
keenly than Brock. "This event is particularly unfortunate," he wrote
to the Governor General, "and may reduce us to incalculable distress.
The enemy is making every exertion to gain a naval superiority on both
lakes; which, if they accomplish, I do not see how we can retain the
country. More vessels are fitting for war on the other side of Squaw
Island, which I should have attempted to destroy but for your
Excellency's repeated instructions to forbear. Now such a force is
collected for their protection as will render every operation against
them very hazardous."[461] To his subordinate, Procter, at Detroit, he
exposed the other side of the calamity.[462] "This will reduce us to
great distress. You will have the goodness to state the expedients you
possess to enable us to replace, as far as possible, the heavy loss we
have sustained in the 'Detroit'.... A quantity of provisions was ready
to be shipped; but as I am sending you the flank companies of the
Newfoundland Regiment by the 'Lady Prevost,' she cannot take the
provisions." Trivial details these may seem; but in war, as in other
matters, trivialities sometimes decide great issues, as the touching
of a button may blow up a reef. The battle of Lake Erie, as before
said, was precipitated by need of food.
Brock did not survive to witness the consequences which he
apprehended, and which, had he lived, he possibly might have done
something to avert. The increasing strength he had observed gathering
about Elliott's collection of purchased vessels corresponded to a
gradual accumulation of American land force along the Niagara line;
the divisions of which above and below the Falls were under two
commanders, between whom co-operation was doubtful. General Van
Rensselaer of the New York militia, who had the lower division,
determined upon an effort to seize the heights of Queenston, at the
head of navigation from Lake Ontario. The attempt was made on October
13, before daybreak. Brock, whose headquarters were at Fort George,
was quickly on the ground; so quickly, that he narrowly escaped
capture by the advance guard of Americans as they reached the summit.
Collecting a few men, he endeavored to regain the position before the
enemy could establish himself in force, and in the charge was
instantly killed at the head of his troops.
In historical value, the death of Brock was the one notable incident
of the day, which otherwise was unproductive of results beyond an
additional mortification to the United States. The Americans gradually
accumulated on the height to the number of some six hundred, and, had
they been properly re-enforced, could probably have held their ground,
affording an opening for further advance. It was found impossible to
induce the raw, unseasoned men on the other side to cross to their
support, and after many fruitless appeals the American general was
compelled to witness the shameful sight of a gallant division driven
down the cliffs to the river, and there obliged to surrender, because
their comrades refused to go betimes to their relief.
Van Rensselaer retired from service, and was succeeded by General
Smyth, who now held command of the whole line, thirty miles, from
Buffalo to Fort Niagara, opposite Fort George, where the river enters
Lake Ontario. A crossing in force, in the upper part of the river,
opposite Black Rock, was planned by him for November 28. In
preparation for it an attack was to be made shortly before daylight by
two advance parties, proceeding separately. One was to carry the
batteries and spike the guns near the point selected for landing; the
other, to destroy abridge five miles below, by which re-enforcements
might arrive to the enemy.
To the first of these was attached a party of seventy seamen, who
carried out their instructions, spiking and dismounting the guns. The
fighting was unusually severe, eight out of the twelve naval officers
concerned being wounded, two mortally, and half of the seamen either
killed or wounded. Although the bridge was not destroyed, favorable
conditions for the crossing of the main body had been established;
but, upon viewing the numbers at his disposal, Smyth called a council
of war, and after advising with it decided not to proceed. This was
certainly a case of useless bloodshed. General Porter of the New York
militia, who served with distinguished gallantry on the Niagara
frontier to the end of the war, was present in this business, and
criticised Smyth's conduct so severely as to cause a duel between
them. "If bravery be a virtue," wrote Porter, "if the gratitude of a
country be due to those who gallantly and desperately assert its
rights, the government will make ample and honorable provision for the
heirs of the brave tars who fell on this occasion, as well as for
those that survive."[463] Another abortive movement toward crossing
was made a few days later, and with it land operations on the Niagara
frontier ended for the year 1812. Smyth was soon afterward dropped
from the rolls of the army.
In the eastern part of Dearborn's military division, where he
commanded in person, toward Albany and Champlain, less was attempted
than at Detroit or Niagara. To accomplish less would be impossible;
but as nothing was seriously undertaken, nothing also disastrously
failed. The Commander-in-Chief gave sufficient disproof of military
capacity by gravely proposing to "operate with effect at the same
moment against Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal."[464] Such divergence
of effort and dissemination of means, scanty at the best, upon points
one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles apart, contravened all
sound principle; to remedy which no compensating vigor was
discoverable in his conduct. In all these quarters, as at Detroit, the
enemy were perceptibly stronger in the autumn than when the war began;
and the feebleness of American action had destroyed the principal
basis upon which expectation of success had rested--the disaffection
of the inhabitants of Canada and their readiness to side with the
invaders. That this disposition existed to a formidable extent was
well known. It constituted a large element in the anxieties of the
British generals, especially of Brock; for in his district there were
more American settlers than in Lower Canada.[465] On the Niagara
peninsula, especially, climatic conditions, favorable to farming, had
induced a large immigration. But local disloyalty is a poor reed for
an assailant to rest upon, and to sustain it in vigorous action
commonly requires the presence of a force which will render its
assistance needless. Whatever inclination to rebel there might have
been was effectually quelled by the energy of Brock, the weakness of
Hull, and the impotence of Dearborn and his subordinates.
In the general situation the one change favorable to the United
States was in a quarter the importance of which the Administration had
been slow to recognize, and probably scarcely appreciated even now.
The anticipated military laurels had vanished like a dream, and the
disinclination of the American people to military life in general, and
to this war in particular, had shown itself in enlistments for the
army, which, the President wrote, "fall short of the most moderate
calculation." The attempt to supplement "regulars" by "volunteers,"
who, unlike the militia, should be under the General Government
instead of that of the States--a favorite resource always with the
Legislature of the United States--was "extremely unproductive;" while
the militia in service were not under obligation to leave their state,
and might, if they chose, abandon their fellow-countrymen outside its
limits to slaughter and capture, as they did at Niagara, without
incurring military punishment. The governors of the New England
States, being opposed to the war, refused to go a step beyond
protecting their own territory from hostilities, which they declared
were forced upon them by the Administration rather than by the
British. For this attitude there was a semblance of excuse in the
utter military inefficiency to which the policy of Jefferson and
Madison had reduced the national government. It was powerless to give
the several states the protection to which it was pledged by the
Constitution. The citizens of New York had to fortify and defend their
own harbor. The reproaches of New England on this score were seconded
somewhat later by the outcries of Maryland; and if Virginia was silent
under suffering, it was not because she lacked cause for complaint. It
is to be remembered that in the matter of military and naval
unpreparedness the great culprits were Virginians. South of Virginia
the nature of the shore line minimized the local harrying, from which
the northern part of the community suffered. Nevertheless, there also
the coasting trade was nearly destroyed, and even the internal
navigation seriously harassed.
Only on the Great Lakes had the case of the United States improved,
when winter put an end to most operations on the northern frontier. As
in the Civil War a half century later, so in 1812, the power of the
water over the issues of the land not only was not comprehended by the
average official, but was incomprehensible to him. Armstrong in
January, and Hull in March, had insisted upon a condition that should
have been obvious; but not till September 3, when Hull's disaster had
driven home Hull's reasoning, did Captain Chauncey receive orders "to
assume command of the naval force on lakes Erie and Ontario, and to use
every exertion to obtain control of them this fall." All preparations
had still to be made, and were thrown, most wisely, on the man who was
to do the work. He was "to use all the means which he might judge
essential to accomplish the wishes of the government."[466] It is only
just to give these quotations, which indicate how entirely everything
to be done was left to the energy and discretion of the officer in
charge, who had to plan and build up, almost from the foundation, the
naval force on both lakes. Champlain, apparently by an oversight, was
not included in his charge. Near the end of the war he was directed to
convene a court-martial on some occurrences there, and then replied
that it had never been placed under his command.[467]
Chauncey, who was just turned forty, entered on his duties with a
will. Having been for four years in charge of the navy yard at New
York, he was intimately acquainted with the resources of the principal
depot from which he must draw his supplies. On September 26, after
three weeks of busy collecting and shipping, he started for his
station by the very occasional steamboat of those days, which required
from eighteen to twenty hours for the trip to Albany. On the eve of
departure, he wrote the Government that he had despatched "one hundred
and forty ship-carpenters, seven hundred seamen and marines, more than
one hundred pieces of cannon, the greater part of large caliber, with
muskets, shot, carriages, etc. The carriages have nearly all been
made, and the shot cast, in that time. Nay, I may say that nearly
every article that has been sent forward has been made."[468] The
words convey forcibly the lack of preparation which characterized the
general state of the country; and they suggest also the difference in
energy and efficiency between a man of forty, in continuous practice
of his profession, and generals of sixty, whose knowledge of their
business derived over a disuse of more than thirty years, and from
experience limited to positions necessarily very subordinate. From the
meagreness of steamer traffic, all this provision of men and material
had to go by sail vessel to Albany; and Chauncey wrote that his
personal delay in New York was no injury, but a benefit, for as it was
he should arrive well before the needed equipment.
On October 6 he reached Sackett's Harbor, "in company with his
Excellency the Governor of New York, through the worst roads I ever
saw, especially near this place, in consequence of which I have
ordered the stores intended for this place to Oswego, from which place
they will come by water." Elliott had reported from Buffalo that "the
roads are good, except for thirteen miles, which is intolerably bad;
so bad that ordnance cannot be brought in wagons; it must come when
snow is on the ground, and then in sleds." All expectation of
contesting Lake Erie was therefore abandoned for that year, and
effort concentrated on Ontario. There the misfortune of the American
position was that the only harbor on their side of the lake,
Sackett's, close to the entrance of the St. Lawrence, was remote from
the highways of United States internal traffic. The roads described by
Chauncey cut it off from communications by land, except in winter and
the height of summer; while the historic water route by the Mohawk
River, Lake Oneida, and the outlet of the latter through the Oswego
River, debouched upon Ontario at a point utterly insecure against
weather or hostilities. It was necessary, therefore, to accept
Sackett's Harbor as the only possible navy yard and station, under the
disadvantage that the maintenance of it--and through it, of the naval
command of Ontario--depended upon this water transport of forty miles
of open lake from the Oswego River. The danger, when superiority of
force lapsed, as at times it did, was lessened by the existence of
several creeks or small rivers, within which coasting craft could take
refuge and find protection from attack under the muskets of the
soldiery. Sackett's Harbor itself, though of small area, was a safe
port, and under proper precautions defensible; but in neither point of
view was it comparable with Kingston.
While in New York, Chauncey's preparations had not been limited to
what could be done there. By communication with Elliott and Woolsey,
he had informed himself well as to conditions, and had initiated the
purchase and equipment of lake craft, chiefly schooners of from forty
to eighty tons, which were fitted to carry one or two heavy guns; the
weight of battery being determined partly by their capacity to bear
it, and partly by the guns on hand. Elliott's report concerning Lake
Erie led to his being diverted, at his own suggestion, to the mouth of
the Genesee and to Oswego, to equip four schooners lying there; for
arming which cannon before destined to Buffalo were likewise turned
aside to those points. When Chauncey reached Sackett's, he found there
also five schooners belonging mainly to the St. Lawrence trade, which
had been bought under his directions by Woolsey. There was thus
already a very fair beginning of a naval force; the only remaining
apprehension being that, "from the badness of the roads and the
lowness of the water in the Mohawk, the guns and stores will not
arrive in time for us to do anything decisive against the enemy this
fall."[469] Should they arrive soon enough, he hoped to seek the
British in their own waters by November. Besides these extemporized
expedients, two ships of twenty-four guns were under construction at
Sackett's, and two brigs of twenty, with three gunboats, were ordered
on Lake Erie--all to be ready for service in the spring, their
batteries to be sent on when the snow made it feasible.
After some disappointing detention, the waters of the inlet and outlet
of Lake Oneida rose sufficiently to enable guns to reach Oswego,
whence they were safely conveyed to Sackett's. On November 2 the
report of a hostile cruiser in the neighborhood, and fears of her
interfering with parts of the armaments still in transit, led Chauncey
to go out with the "Oneida," the only vessel yet ready, to cut off the
return of the stranger to Kingston. On this occasion he saw three of
the enemy's squadron, which, though superior in force, took no notice
of him. This slackness to improve an evident opportunity may
reasonably be ascribed to the fact that as yet the British vessels on
the lakes were not in charge of officers of the Royal Navy, but of a
force purely provincial and irregular. Returning to Sackett's,
Chauncey again sailed, on the evening of November 6, with the "Oneida"
and six armed schooners. On the 8th he fell in with a single British
vessel, the "Royal George," of twenty-one guns, which retreated that
night into Kingston. The Americans followed some distance into the
harbor on the 9th, and engaged both the ship and the works; but the
breeze blowing straight in, and becoming heavy, made it imprudent
longer to expose the squadron to the loss of spars, under the fire of
shore guns, when retreat had to be effected against the wind. Beating
out, a British armed schooner was sighted coming in from the westward;
but after some exchange of shots, she also, though closely pressed,
escaped by her better local knowledge, and gained the protection of
the port. The squadron returned to Sackett's, taking with it two lake
vessels as prizes, and having destroyed a third--all three possible
resources for the enemy.[470]
Nothing decisive resulted from this outing, but it fairly opened the
campaign for the control of the lakes, and served to temper officers
and men for the kind of task before them. It gave also some experience
as to the strength of the works at Kingston, which exceeded Chauncey's
anticipations, and seems afterward to have exerted influence upon his
views of the situation; but at present he announced his intention, if
supported by a military force, to attack the enemy's vessels at their
anchorage. Although several shot had been seen to strike, Chauncey
himself entertained no doubt that all their damages could readily be
repaired, and that they would put out again, if only to join their
force to that already in Toronto. Still, on November 13, he reported
his certainty that he controlled the water, an assurance renewed on
the 17th; adding that he had taken on board military stores, with
which he would sail on the first fair wind for Niagara River, and that
he was prepared to effect transportation to any part of the lake,
regardless of the enemy, but not of the weather. The last reservation
was timely, for, sailing two days later, the vessels were driven back,
one schooner being dismasted. As navigation on Erie opened usually
much later than that upon Ontario, there was reasonable certainty that
stores could reach the upper lake before they were needed in the
spring, and the attempt was postponed till then. Meantime, however,
four of the schooners were kept cruising off Kingston, to prevent
intercourse between it and the other ports.[471]
On December 1 Chauncey wrote that it was no longer safe to navigate
the lake, and that he would soon lay up the vessels. He ascertained
subsequently that the recent action of the squadron had compelled
troops for Toronto to march by land, from Kingston, and had prevented
the transport of needed supplies to Fort George, thus justifying his
conviction of control established over the water communications. A few
days before he had had the satisfaction of announcing the launch, on
November 26, of the "Madison," a new ship of the corvette type, of 590
tons, one third larger than the ocean cruisers "Wasp" and "Hornet," of
the same class, and with proportionately heavy armament; she carrying
twenty-four 32-pounder carronades, and they sixteen to eighteen of the
like weight. "She was built," added Chauncey, "in the short time of
forty-five days; and nine weeks ago the timber that she is composed of
was growing in the forest."[472] It seems scarcely necessary to point
the moral, which he naturally did not draw for the edification of his
superiors in the Administration, that a like energy displayed on Lake
Erie, when war was contemplated, would have placed Hull's enterprise
on the same level of security that was obtained for his successor by
Perry's victory a year later, and at much less cost.
With the laying up of the fleet on the lakes operations on the
northern frontier closed, except in the far West, where General
Harrison succeeded to the command after Hull's capitulation. The loss
of Detroit had thrown the American front of operations back upon the
Maumee; nor would that, perhaps, have been tenable, had conditions in
Upper Canada permitted Brock to remain with the most of his force
through August and September. As it was, just apprehension for the
Niagara line compelled his return thither; and the same considerations
that decided the place of the Commander-in-Chief, dictated also that
of the mass of his troops. The command at Detroit and Malden was left
to Colonel Procter, whose position was defensively secured by naval
means; the ship "Queen Charlotte" and brig "Hunter" maintaining local
control of the water. He was, however, forbidden to attempt operations
distinctively offensive. "It must be explicitly understood," wrote
Brock to him, "that you are not to resort to offensive warfare for the
purposes of conquest. Your operations are to be confined to measures
of defence and security."[473] Among these, however, Brock included,
by direct mention, undertakings intended to destroy betimes
threatening gatherings of men or of stores; but such action was merely
to secure the British positions, on the principle, already noted, that
offence is the best defence. How far these restrictions represent
Brock's own wishes, or reflect simply the known views of Sir George
Prevost, the Governor General, is difficult to say. Brock's last
letter to Procter, written within a week of his death, directed that
the enemy should be kept in a state of constant ferment. It seems
probable, however, that Procter's force was not such as to warrant
movement with a view to permanent occupation beyond Detroit, the more
so as the roads were usually very bad; but any effort on the part of
the Americans to establish posts on the Maumee, or along the lake,
must be promptly checked, if possible, lest these should form bases
whence to march in force upon Detroit or Malden, when winter had
hardened the face of the ground.[474]
The purpose of the Americans being to recover Detroit, and then to
renew Hull's invasion, their immediate aim was to establish their line
as far to the front as it could for the moment be successfully
maintained. The Maumee was such a line, and the one naturally
indicated as the advanced base of supplies upon which any forward
movement by land must rest. The obstacle to its tenure, when summer
was past and autumn rains had begun, was a great swamp, known locally
as the Black Swamp, some forty miles wide, stretching from the
Sandusky River on the east to the Indiana line on the west, and
therefore impeding the direct approach from the south to the Maumee.
Through this Hull had forced his way in June, building a road as he
went; but by the time troops had assembled in the autumn progress here
proved wholly impossible.
On account of the difficulties of transportation, Harrison divided his
force into three columns, the supplies of each of which in a new
country could be more readily sustained than those of the whole body,
if united; in fact, the exigencies of supply in the case of large
armies, even in well-settled countries, enforce "dissemination in
order to live," as Napoleon expressed it. It is of the essence of such
dissemination that the several divisions shall be near enough to
support each other if there be danger of attack; but in the case of
Harrison, although his dispositions have been severely censured on
this score, south of the Maumee no such danger existed to a degree
which could not be safely disregarded. The centre column, therefore,
was to advance over the road opened by Hull; the right by the east of
the Sandusky River to its mouth on Lake Erie, east of the swamp,
whence it could move to the Maumee; while the left, and the one most
exposed, from its nearness to the Indian country, was to proceed by
the Auglaize River, a tributary of the Maumee navigable for boats of
light draught, to Fort Defiance, at the junction of the two streams.
Had this plan been carried out, the army would have held a line from
Fort Defiance to the Rapids of the Maumee, a distance of about forty
miles, on which fortified depots could be established prior to further
operations; and there would have been to it three chains of supply,
corresponding to the roads used by the divisions in their march. Fort
Defiance, with a work at the Rapids, afterward built and called Fort
Meigs, would sustain the line proper; while a subsidiary post,
subsequently known as Fort Stephenson, on the Lower Sandusky, was
essential to the defence of that road as it approached the lake, and
thence westward, where it skirted the lake shore, and was in measure
open to raids from the water. The western line of supplies, being
liable to attack from the neighboring Indians, was further
strengthened by works adequate to repel savages.
Fort Defiance on the left was occupied by October 22, and toward the
middle of December some fifteen hundred men had assembled on the
right, on the Sandusky, Upper and Lower; but the centre column could
not get through, and the attempt to push on supplies by that route
seems to have been persisted in beyond the limits of reasonable
perseverance. Under these conditions, Harrison established his
headquarters at Upper Sandusky about December 20, sending word to
General Winchester, commanding at Defiance, to descend the Maumee to
the Rapids, and there to prepare sleds for a dash against Malden
across the lake, when frozen. This was the substitution, under the
constraint of circumstances, of a sudden blow in place of regulated
advance; for it abandoned, momentarily at least, the plan of
establishing a permanent line. Winchester moved as directed, reaching
the Rapids January 10, 1813, and fixing himself in position with
thirteen hundred men on the north bank, opposite Hull's road. Early in
the month the swamp froze over, and quantities of supplies were
hurried forward. The total disposable force now under Harrison's
command is given as sixty-three hundred.
Preparations and concentration had progressed thus far, when an
impulsive outburst of sympathy evoked a singularly inconsiderate and
rash movement on the part of the division on the Maumee, the commander
of which seems to have been rather under the influence of his troops
than in control of them. Word was brought to the camp that the
American settlement of Frenchtown, beyond the River Raisin, thirty
miles away toward Detroit, and now within British control, was
threatened with burning by Indians. A council of war decided that
relief should be attempted, and six hundred and sixty men started on
the morning of January 17. They dispossessed the enemy and established
themselves in the town, though with severe losses. Learning their
success, Winchester himself went to the place on the 19th, followed
closely by a re-enforcement of two-hundred and fifty. More than half
his command was now thirty miles away from the position assigned it,
without other base of retreat or support than the remnant left at the
Rapids. In this situation a superior force of British and Indians
under Procter crossed the lake on the ice and attacked the party thus
rashly advanced to Frenchtown, which was compelled to surrender by 8
A.M. of January 22.
[Illustration: MAP OF LAKE FRONTIER TO ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGNS OF
1812-1814]
Winchester had notified Harrison of his proposed action, but not in
such time as to permit it to be countermanded. Receiving the news on
the morning of January 19, Harrison at once recognized the hazardous
nature of the step, and ordered forward troops from Upper and Lower
Sandusky; proceeding himself to the latter place, and thence to the
Rapids, which he reached early on the 20th, ahead of the
re-enforcements. There was nothing to do but await developments until
the men from Sandusky arrived. At noon of the 22d he received
intelligence of the surrender, and saw that, through the imprudence of
his subordinate, his project of crossing the ice to attack the enemy
had been crushed by Procter, who had practically annihilated one of
his principal divisions, beating it in detail.
The loss of so large a part of the force upon which he had counted,
and the spread of sickness among the remainder, arrested Harrison's
projects of offensive action. The Maumee even was abandoned for a few
days, the army falling back to Portage River, toward the Sandusky. It
soon, however, returned to the Rapids, and there Fort Meigs was built,
which in the sequel proved sufficient to hold the position against
Procter's attack. The army of the Northwest from that time remained
purely on the defensive until the following September, when Perry's
victory, assuring the control of the lake, enabled it to march secure
of its communications.
Whatever chance of success may attend such a dash as that against
Malden, planned by Harrison in December, or open to Hull in August,
the undertaking is essentially outside the ordinary rules of warfare,
and to be justified only by the special circumstances of the case,
together with the possibility of securing the results obtained.
Frenchtown, as a particular enterprise, illustrates in some measure
the case of Malden. It was victoriously possessed, but under
conditions which made its tenure more than doubtful, and the loss of
the expeditionary corps more than probable. Furthermore, if held, it
conferred no advantage. The position was less defensible than the
Maumee, more exposed because nearer the enemy, more difficult to
maintain because the communications were thirty miles longer, and,
finally, it controlled nothing. The name of occupation, applied to it,
was a mere misnomer, disguising a sham. Malden, on the contrary, if
effectually held, would confer a great benefit; for in the hands of an
enemy it menaced the communications of Detroit, and if coupled with
command of the water, as was the case, it controlled them, as Hull
found to his ruin. To gain it, therefore, justified a good deal of
risk; yet if seized, unless control of the water were also soon
established, it would, as compared with Detroit, entail upon the
Americans the additional disadvantage that Frenchtown incurred over
the Maumee,--an increase of exposure, because of longer and more
exposed lines of communication. Though Malden was valuable to the
British as a local base, with all the benefits of nearness, it was not
the only one they possessed on the lakes. The loss of it, therefore,
so long as they possessed decided superiority in armed shipping,
though a great inconvenience, would not be a positive disability. With
the small tonnage they had on the lake, however, it would have become
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to transport and maintain a
force sufficient seriously to interrupt the road from the Maumee, upon
which Detroit depended.
In short, in all ordinary warfare, and in most that is extraordinary
and seems outside the rules, one principle is sure to enforce itself
with startling emphasis, if momentarily lost to sight or forgotten,
and that is the need of secured communications. A military body, land
or sea, may abandon its communications for a brief period, strictly
limited, expecting soon to restore them at the same or some other
point, just as a caravan can start across the desert with food and
water which will last until another base is reached. There is no
surrender of certainty in such a case; but a body of troops thrown
into a position where it has no security of receiving supplies, incurs
a risk that needs justification, and can receive it only from special
circumstances. No position within striking distance of the lake shore
was permanently secure unless supported by naval power; because all
that is implied by the term "communications"--facility for
transporting troops, supplies, and ammunition, rapidity of movement
from point to point, central position and interior lines--all depended
upon the control of the water, from Mackinac to the rapids of the St.
Lawrence.
This truth, announced before the war by Hull and Armstrong, as well as
by Harrison somewhat later, and sufficiently obvious to any thoughtful
man, was recognized in act by Harrison and the Government after the
Frenchtown disaster. The general was not responsible for the blunder
of his subordinate, nor am I able to see that his general plans for a
land campaign, considered independent of the water, lacked either
insight, judgment, or energy. He unquestionably made very rash
calculations, and indulged in wildly sanguine assurances of success;
but this was probably inevitable in the atmosphere in which he had to
work. The obstacles to be overcome were so enormous, the people and
the Government, militarily, so ignorant and incapable, that it was
scarcely possible to move efficiently without adopting, or seeming to
adopt, the popular spirit and conviction. Facts had now asserted
themselves through the unpleasant medium of experience, and henceforth
it was tacitly accepted that nothing could be done except to stand on
the defensive, until the navy of Lake Erie, as yet unbuilt, could
exert its power. Until that day came, even the defensive positions
taken were rudely shaken by Procter, a far from efficient officer,
but possessed still of the power of the lakes, and following, though
over-feebly, the spirit of Brock's instructions, to attack the enemy's
posts and keep things in a ferment.
With the Frenchtown affair hostilities on the Canada frontier ceased
until the following April; but the winter months were not therefore
passed in inactivity. Chauncey, after laying up his ships at Sackett's
Harbor, and representing to the Government the danger to them and to
the navy yard, now that frost had extended over the waters the
solidity of the ground, enabling the enemy to cross at will, departed
to visit his hitherto neglected command on Lake Erie. He had already
seen cause to be dissatisfied with Elliott's choice of a navy yard,
known usually by the name Black Rock, a quarter of a mile above Squaw
Island. The hostile shores were here so close together that even
musketry could be exchanged; and Elliott, when reporting his decision,
said "the river is so narrow that the soldiers are shooting at each
other across." There was the further difficulty that, to reach the
open lake, the vessels would have to go three miles against a current
that ran four knots an hour, and much of the way within point-blank
range of the enemy. Nevertheless, after examining all situations on
Lake Erie, Elliott had reported that none other would answer the
purpose; "those that have shelters have not sufficient water, and
those with water cannot be defended from the enemy and the violence of
the weather."[475] Here he had collected materials and gathered six
tiny vessels; the largest a brig of ninety tons, the others schooners
of from forty to eighty. These he began to equip and alter about the
middle of October, upon the arrival of the carpenters sent by
Chauncey; but the British kept up such a fire of shot and shell that
the carpenters quitted their work and returned to New York, leaving
the vessels with their decks and sides torn up.[476]
They were still in this condition when Chauncey came, toward the end
of December; and although then hauled into a creek behind Squaw
Island, out of range, there were no workmen to complete them. He
passed on to Presqu'Isle, now Erie, on the Pennsylvania shore, and
found it in every way eligible as a port, except that there were but
four or five feet of water on the bar. Vessels of war within could
reach the lake only by being lightened of their guns and stores, a
condition impracticable in the presence of a hostile squadron; but the
local advantages were much superior to those at Black Rock, and while
it could be hoped that a lucky opportunity might insure the absence of
the enemy's vessels, the enemy's guns on the Niagara shore were
fixtures, unless the American army took possession of them. Between
these various considerations Chauncey decided to shift the naval base
from Black Rock to Erie; and he there assembled the materials for the
two brigs, of three hundred tons each, which formed the backbone of
Perry's squadron nine months later.[477] For supplies Erie depended
upon Philadelphia and Pittsburg, there being from the latter place
water communication by the Alleghany River, and its tributary the
French River, to within fifteen miles, whence the transportation was
by good road. Except timber, which grew upon the spot, the
materials--iron, cordage, provisions, and guns--came mainly by this
route from Pennsylvania; a number of guns, however, being sent from
Washington. By these arrangements the resources of New York, relieved
of Lake Erie, were concentrated upon Lakes Ontario and Champlain.
Chauncey further provided for the defence of Black Rock by its own
resources against sudden attack; the army, except a local force of
three hundred men, having gone into winter quarters ten miles back
from the Niagara. He then returned to Sackett's Harbor January 19,
where he found preparations for protection even less satisfactory than
upon Lake Erie,[478] although the stake was far greater; for it may
safely be said that the fall of either Kingston or Sackett's would
have decided the fate of Lake Ontario and of Upper Canada, at once and
definitively. It had now become evident that, in order to decide
superiority on the water, there was to be between these neighboring
and hostile stations the race of ship-building, which became and
continued the most marked feature of the war on this lake. Chauncey
felt the increasing necessity thus entailed for his presence on the
scene. He was proportionately relieved by receiving at this time an
application from Commander Oliver H. Perry to serve under him on the
lakes, and immediately, on January 21, applied for his orders, stating
that he could "be employed to great advantage, particularly on Lake
Erie, where I shall not be able to go so early as I expected, owing to
the increasing force of the enemy on this lake." This marks the
official beginning of Perry's entrance upon the duty in which he won a
distinction that his less fortunate superior failed to achieve. At
this time, however, Chauncey hoped to attain such superiority by the
opening of spring, and to receive such support from the army, as to
capture Kingston by a joint operation, the plan for which he submitted
to the Department. That accomplished, he would be able to transfer to
Lake Erie the force of men needed to destroy the enemy's fleet
there.[479] This expectation was not fulfilled, and Perry remained in
practically independent command upon the upper lakes.
The season of 1812 may be said, therefore, to have closed with the
American squadron upon Lake Ontario concentrated in Sackett's Harbor,
where also two new and relatively powerful ships were building. Upon
Lake Erie the force was divided between Black Rock, where Elliott's
flotilla lay, and Erie, where the two brigs were laid down, and four
other gunboats building. The concentration of these two bodies could be
effected only by first taking possession of the British side of the
Niagara River. This done, and the Black Rock vessels thus released,
there still remained the bar at Erie to pass. The British force on
Ontario was likewise divided, between Toronto and Kingston, the vessels
afloat being at the latter. Neither place, however, was under such
fetters as Black Rock, and the two divisions might very possibly be
assembled despite the hostile fleet. On the upper lake their navy was at
Amherstburg, where also was building a ship, inferior in force, despite
her rig, to either of the brigs ordered by Chauncey at Erie. The
difficulties of obtaining supplies, mechanics, and seamen, in that then
remote region, imposed great hindrances upon the general British
preparations. There nevertheless remained in their hands, at the opening
of the campaign, the great advantages over the Americans--first, of the
separation of the latter's divisions, enforced by the British holding
the bank of the Niagara; and secondly, of the almost insuperable
difficulty of crossing the Erie bar unarmed, if the enemy's fleet kept
in position near it. That the British failed to sustain these original
advantages condemns their management, and is far more a matter of
military criticism than the relative power of the two squadrons in the
battle of September 10. The principal business of each commander was to
be stronger than the enemy when they met. That the American accomplished
this, despite serious obstacles, first by concentrating his force, and
second by crossing the bar unimpeded, so that when he encountered his
opponent he was in decisively superior force, is as distinctly to his
credit as it would have been distinctly to his discredit had the odds
been reversed by any fault of his. Perry by diligent efficiency overcame
his difficulties, combined his divisions, gained the lake, and, by
commanding it, so cut off his enemy's supplies that he compelled him to
come out, and fight, and be destroyed. To compare the force of the two
may be a matter of curious interest; but for the purpose of making
comparisons of desert between them it is a mere waste of ink, important
only to those who conceive the chief end of war to be fighting, and not
victory.
* * * * *
The disaster at Frenchtown, with the consequent abandonment of all
project of forward movement by the Army of the Northwest, may be
regarded as the definite termination of the land campaign of 1812.
Before resuming the account of the ocean operations of the same
period, it is expedient here to give a summary of European conditions
at the same time, for these markedly affected the policy of the
British Government towards the United States, even after war had been
formally declared.
The British Orders in Council of 1807, modified in 1809 in scope,
though not in principle, had been for a long while the grievance
chiefly insisted upon by the United States. Against them mainly was
directed, by Jefferson and Madison, the system of commercial
restrictions which it was believed would compel their repeal.
Consequently, when the British Government had abolished the obnoxious
Orders, on June 23, 1812, with reservations probably admissible by
the United States, it was unwilling to believe that war could still
not be avoided; nor that, even if begun in ignorance of the repeal, it
could not be stopped without further concession. Till near the end of
the year 1812 its measures were governed by this expectation,
powerfully re-enforced by momentous considerations of European events,
the effect of which upon the United States requires that they be
stated.
In June, 1812, European politics were reaching a crisis, the issue of
which could not then be forecast. War had begun between Napoleon and
Russia; and on June 24 the Emperor, crossing the Niemen, invaded the
dominion of the Czar. Great Britain, already nine years at war with
France, had just succeeded in detaching Russia from her enemy, and
ranging her on her own side. The accession of Sweden to this alliance
conferred complete control of the Baltic, thus releasing a huge
British fleet hitherto maintained there, and opening an important
trade, debarred to Great Britain in great measure for four years past.
But on the other hand, Napoleon still, as during all this recent
period, controlled the Continent from the Pyrenees to the Vistula,
carrying its hosts forward against Russia, and closing its ports to
British commerce to the depressing injury of British finance. A young
Canadian, then in England, in close contact with London business life,
wrote to his home at this period: "There is a general stagnation of
commerce, all entrance to Europe being completely shut up. There was
never a time known to compare with the present, nearly all foreign
traders becoming bankrupt, or reduced to one tenth of their former
trade. Merchants, who once kept ten or fifteen clerks, have now but
two or three; thousands of half-starved discharged clerks are skulking
about the streets. Customhouse duties are reduced upwards of one half.
Of such dread power are Bonaparte's decrees, which have of late been
enforced in the strictest manner all over the Continent, that it has
almost ruined the commerce of England."[480]
A month before the United States declared war the perplexities of the
British Government were depicted by the same writer, in terms which
palpably and graphically reflect the contemporary talk of the
counting-house and the dinner-table: "If the Orders in Council are
repealed, the trade of the United States will flourish beyond all
former periods. They will then have the whole commerce of the
Continent in their hands, and the British, though blockading with
powerful armaments the hostile ports of Europe, will behold fleets of
American merchantmen enter in safety the harbors of the enemy, and
carry on a brisk and lucrative trade, whilst Englishmen, who command
the ocean and are sole masters of the deep, must quietly suffer two
thirds of their shipping to be dismantled and lie useless in little
rivers or before empty warehouses. Their seamen, to earn a little salt
junk and flinty biscuits, must spread themselves like vagabonds over
the face of the earth, and enter the service of any nation. If, on the
contrary, the Government continue to enforce the Orders, trade will
still remain in its present deplorable state; an American war will
follow, and poor Canada will bear the brunt." Cannot one see the fine
old fellows of the period shaking their heads over their wine, and
hear the words which the lively young provincial takes down almost
from their lips? They portray truly, however, the anxious dilemma in
which the Government was living, and explain concisely the conflicting
considerations which brought on the war with the United States. From
this embarrassing situation the current year brought a double relief.
The chance of American competition was removed by the declaration of
war, and exclusion from the Continent by Napoleon's reverses.
While matters were thus in northern and central Europe, in the far
southwest the Spanish peninsula had for the same four dreary years
been the scene of desolating strife, in which from the beginning Great
Britain had taken a most active part, supporting the insurgent people
with armies and money against the French legions. The weakening effect
of this conflict upon the Emperor, and the tremendous additional
strain upon his resources now occasioned by the break with Russia,
were well understood, and hopes rose high; but heavy in the other
scale were his unbroken record of success, and the fact that the War
in the Peninsula, the sustenance of which was now doubly imperative in
order to maintain the fatal dissemination of his forces between the
two extremities of Europe, depended upon intercourse with the United
States. The corn of America fed the British and their allies in the
Peninsula, and so abundantly, that flour was cheaper in Lisbon than in
Liverpool. In 1811, 802 American vessels entered the Tagus to 860
British; and from all the rest of the outside world there came only
75. The Peninsula itself, Spain and Portugal together, sent but
452.[481] The merchants of Baltimore, petitioning against the
Non-Intercourse Act, said that $100,000,000 were owing by British
merchants to Americans, which could only be repaid by importations
from England; and that this debt was chiefly for shipments to Spain
and Portugal.[482] The yearly export thither, mainly for the armies,
was 700,000 barrels of flour, besides grain in other forms.[483] The
maintenance of this supply would be endangered by war.
Upon the continuance of peace depended also the enjoyment of the
relatively tranquil conditions which Great Britain, after years of
vexation, had succeeded at last in establishing in the western basin
of the Atlantic, and especially in the Caribbean Sea. In 1808 the
revolt of the Spanish people turned the Spanish West Indies once more
to her side; and in 1809 and 1810 the conquest of the last of the
French islands gave her control of the whole region, depriving French
privateers of every base for local operations against British
commerce. In 1812, by returns to September 1, the Royal Navy had at
sea one hundred and twenty ships of the line and one hundred and
forty-five frigates, besides four hundred and twenty-one other
cruisers, sixteen of which were larger and the rest smaller than the
frigate class--a total of six hundred and eighty-six.[484] Of these
there were on the North American and West India stations only three of
the line, fifteen frigates, and sixty-one smaller--a total of
seventy-nine.[485] The huge remainder of over six hundred ships of war
were detained elsewhere by the exigencies of the contest, the naval
range of which stretched from the Levant to the shores of Denmark and
Norway, then one kingdom under Napoleon's control; and in the far
Eastern seas extended to the Straits of Sunda, and beyond. From
Antwerp to Venice, in various ports, when the Empire fell, Napoleon
had over a hundred ships of the line and half a hundred frigates. To
hold these in check was in itself a heavy task for the British sea
power, even though most of the colonial ports which might serve as
bases for their external action had been wrested from France. A
hostile America would open to the French navy a number of harbors
which it now needed; and at the will of the Emperor the United States
might receive a division of ships of a class she lacked entirely, but
could both officer and man. One of Napoleon's great wants was seamen,
and it was perfectly understood by intelligent naval officers, and by
appreciative statesmen like John Adams and Gouverneur Morris, that a
fleet of ships of the line, based upon American resources, would
constitute for Great Britain a more difficult problem than a vastly
larger number in Europe. The probability was contemplated by both the
British Commander-in-Chief and the Admiralty, and was doubtless a
chief reason for the comparatively large number of ships of the
line--eleven--assigned on the outbreak of hostilities to a station
where otherwise there was no similar force to encounter.[486] To bring
the French ships and this coast-line together was a combination
correct in conception, and not impracticable. It was spoken of at the
time--rumored as a design; and had not the attention and the means of
the Emperor been otherwise preoccupied, probably would have been
attempted, and not impossibly effected.
To avert such a conjuncture by the restoration of peace was
necessarily an object of British policy. More than that, however, was
at stake. The Orders in Council had served their turn. In conjunction
with Napoleon's Continental System, by the misery inflicted upon all
the countries under his control, they had brought about the
desperation of Russia and the resistance of the Czar, who at first had
engaged in the Emperor's policy. Russia and France were at war, and it
was imperative at once to redouble the pressure in the Peninsula, and
to recuperate the financial strength of Great Britain, by opening
every possible avenue of supply and of market to British trade, in
order to bring the whole national power, economical and military, to
bear effectively upon what promised to be a death struggle. The repeal
of the Orders, with the consequent admission of American merchant
ships to every hostile port, except such, few as might be effectively
blockaded in accordance with the accepted principles of International
Law, was the price offered for the preservation of peace, and for
readmission to the American market, closed to British manufacturers
and merchants by the Non-Importation Acts. This extension of British
commerce, now loudly demanded by the British people, was an object to
be accomplished by the same means that should prevent the American
people from constituting themselves virtually the allies of Napoleon
by going to war. Should this dreaded alternative, however, come to
pass, not only would British trade again miss the market, the loss of
which had already caused widespread suffering, but, in common with it,
British navigation, British shipping, the chief handmaid of commerce,
would be exposed in a remote quarter, most difficult to guard, to the
privateering activity of a people whose aptitude for such occupation
had been demonstrated in the fight for independence and the old French
wars. Half a century before, in the years 1756-58, there had been
fitted out in the single port of New York, for war against the French,
forty-eight privateers, carrying six hundred and ninety-five guns and
manned by over five thousand men.[487]
The conditions enumerated constituted the principal important military
possibilities of the sea frontier of the United States, regarded as an
element in the general international situation when the year 1812
opened. Its importance to France was simply that of an additional
weight thrown into the scale against Great Britain. France, being
excluded from the sea, could not be aided or injured by the United
States directly, but only indirectly, through their common enemy; and
the same was substantially true of the Continent at large. But to
Great Britain a hostile seaboard in America meant the possibility of
all that has been stated; and therefore, slowly and unwillingly, but
surely, the apprehension of war with its added burden forced the
Government to a concession which years of intermittent commercial
restrictions by the United States, and of Opposition denunciation at
home, had not been able to extort. The sudden death of Spencer
Perceval, the prime minister identified with the Orders in Council,
possibly facilitated the issue, but it had become inevitable by sheer
pressure of circumstances as they developed. It came to pass, by a
conjuncture most fortunate for Great Britain, and most unfavorable to
the United States, that the moment of war, vainly sought to be avoided
by both parties, coincided with the first rude jar to Napoleon's
empire and its speedy final collapse; leaving the Union, weakened by
internal dissension, exposed single-handed to the full force of the
British power. At the beginning, however, and till toward the end of
1812, it seemed possible that for an indefinite period the efforts of
the Americans would receive the support derived from the inevitable
preoccupation of their enemy with European affairs; nor did many doubt
Napoleon's success against Russia, or that it would be followed by
Great Britain's abandoning the European struggle as hopeless.
For such maritime and political contingencies the British Admiralty
had to prepare, when the near prospect of war with America threatened
to add to the extensive responsibilities entailed by the long strife
with Napoleon. Its measures reflected the double purpose of the
Government: to secure peace, if possible, yet not to surrender
policies considered imperative. On May 9, 1812, identical instructions
were issued to each of the admirals commanding the four transatlantic
stations,--Newfoundland, Halifax, Jamaica, and Barbados,--warning them
of the imminent probability of hostilities, in the event of which, by
aggressive action or formal declaration on the part of the United
States, they were authorized to resort at once to all customary
procedures of war; "to attack, take or sink, burn or destroy, all
ships or vessels belonging to the United States or to the citizens
thereof." At the same time, however, special stress was laid upon the
urgent wish of the Government to avoid occasions which might induce a
collision. "You are to direct the commanders of his Majesty's ships to
exercise, except in the events hereinbefore specified, all possible
forbearance toward the United States, and to contribute, as far as may
depend upon them, to that good understanding which it is his Royal
Highness's[488] most earnest wish to maintain."[489] The spirit of
these orders, together with caution not to be attacked unawares,
accounts for the absence of British ships of war from the neighborhood
of the American coast noted by Rodgers' cruising squadron in the
spring of 1812. Decatur, indeed, was informed by a British naval agent
that the admiral at Bermuda did not permit more than two vessels to
cruise at a time, and these were instructed not to approach the
American coast.[490] The temper of the controlling element in the
Administration, and the disposition of American naval officers since
the "Chesapeake" affair, were but too likely to afford causes of
misunderstanding in case of a meeting.
FOOTNOTES:
[457] Baynes to Prevost. Canadian Archives, C. 377, pp. 27-37.
[458] Life of Brock, p. 258. Brock first heard of the suspension
August 23, at Fort Erie, on his return toward Niagara. Life, p. 274.
See also a letter from Brock to the American General Van Rensselaer,
in the Defence of General Dearborn, by H.A.S. Dearborn, p. 8.
[459] Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 26, 1812. Captains'
Letters, Navy Department MSS.
[460] Elliott's report of this affair will be found in the Captains'
Letters, Navy Department MSS., forwarded by Chauncey Oct. 16, 1812.
[461] Life of Brock, p. 315.
[462] Ibid., p. 316.
[463] Porter's Address to the Public. Niles' Register, vol. iii. p.
284.
[464] See Eustis's Letter to Dearborn, Aug. 15, 1812. Hall's Memoirs
of the Northwestern Campaign, p. 87.
[465] Life of Brock, pp. 106, 130, 181.
[466] Chauncey to Secretary, Sept. 26, 1812. Captains' Letters, Navy
Department MSS.
[467] Chauncey to Secretary, Feb. 24, 1815. Ibid.
[468] The details of Chauncey's actions are appended to his letter of
Sept. 26, 1812.
[469] Chauncey to Secretary of the Nary, Oct. 8, 12, 21, 1812.
Captains' Letters.
[470] Chauncey to Secretary, October 27, November 4, 6, 13. Captains'
Letters. Those for November 6 and 13 can be found in Niles, vol. iii,
pp. 205, 206.
[471] Chauncey to Secretary, November 17. Captains' Letters.
[472] Chauncey to Secretary, Nov. 26, 1812. Ibid.
[473] Life of Brock, p. 293.
[474] In the Canadian Archives frequent mention is made of expeditions
by Procter's forces about the American lines, as of the British
shipping on the Lake front during the autumn of 1812.
[475] Elliott to Chauncey, Sept. 14, 1812. Captains' Letters, Navy
Department.
[476] Chauncey to the Secretary, Oct. 22, 1812. Captains' Letters,
Navy Department.
[477] Chauncey to the Secretary, Dec. 25, 1812; Jan. 1 and 8, and Feb.
16, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[478] See Chauncey's letters of Dec. 1, 1812, and Jan. 20, 1813.
Captains' Letters.
[479] Chauncey to the Secretary, Jan. 21, Feb. 22, 1813. Captains'
Letters.
[480] Ridout, "Ten Years in Upper Canada," pp. 52, 58, 115.
[481] Niles' Register, vol ii. p. 42.
[482] Ibid., p. 119.
[483] Ibid., p. 303.
[484] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 248.
[485] Quoted from Steele's List (British) by Niles' Register, vol. ii.
p. 356.
[486] Croker to Warren, Nov. 18, 1812, and March 20, 1813. British
Admiralty MSS. Out-Letters.
[487] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 111. Quoted from a publication of
1759.
[488] The Prince Regent. George III. was incapacitated at this time.
[489] Admiralty Out-Letters, British Records Office.
[490] Rodgers to the Secretary, April 29, 1812. Decatur, June 16,
1812. Captains' Letters.