OCEAN WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE--PRIVATEERING--BRITISH
LICENSES--NAVAL ACTIONS: "WASP" AND "FROLIC"; "UNITED STATES"
AND "MACEDONIAN"
In anticipation of war the British Admiralty took the military measure
of consolidating their transatlantic stations, with the exception of
Newfoundland. The Jamaica, Leeward Islands, and Halifax squadrons,
while retaining their present local organizations, were subordinated
to a single chief; for which position was designated Admiral Sir John
Borlase Warren, an officer of good fighting record, but from his
previous career esteemed less a seaman than a gallant man. This was
apparently his first extensive command, although he was now
approaching sixty; but it was foreseen that the British minister might
have left Washington in consequence of a rupture of relations, and
that there might thus devolve upon the naval commander-in-chief
certain diplomatic overtures, which the Government had determined to
make before definitely accepting war as an irreversible issue. Warren,
a man of courtly manners, had some slight diplomatic antecedents,
having represented Great Britain at St. Petersburg on one occasion.
There were also other negotiations anticipated, dependent upon
political conditions within the Union; where bitter oppositions of
opinion, sectional in character, were known to exist concerning the
course of the Administration in resorting to hostilities. Warren was
instructed on these several points.
It was not until July 25, 1812, that a despatch vessel from Halifax
brought word to England of the attack upon the "Belvidera" by Rodgers'
squadron on June 24. By the same mail Admiral Sawyer wrote that he had
sent a flag of truce to New York to ask an explanation, and besides
had directed all his cruisers to assemble at Halifax.[491] The
Government recognized the gravity of the news, but expressed the
opinion that there was no evidence that war had been decided upon, and
that the action of the American commodore had been in conformity with
previous orders not to permit foreign cruisers within the waters of
the United States. Some color was lent to this view by the
circumstance that the "Belvidera" was reported to have been off Sandy
Hook, though not in sight of land.[492] In short, the British Cabinet
officially assumed that facts were as they wished them to continue;
the course best adapted to insure the maintenance of peace, if
perchance not yet broken.
On July 29, however, definite information was received that the United
States Government had declared that war existed between the two
countries. On the 31st the Cabinet took its first measures in
consequence.[493] One order was issued forbidding British merchant
vessels to sail without convoy for any part of North America or the
West Indies; while another laid an embargo on all American merchant
ships in British ports, and directed the capture of any met at sea,
unless sailing under British licenses, as many then did to Continental
ports. No other hostile steps, such as general reprisals or commercial
blockade, were at this time authorized; it was decided to await the
effect in the United States of the repeal of the obnoxious Orders in
Council. This having taken place only on June 23, intelligence of its
reception and results could not well reach England before the middle
of September. When Parliament was prorogued on July 30, the speech
from the throne expressed a willingness still "to hope that the
accustomed relations of peace and amity between the two countries may
yet be restored."
It is a coincidence, accidental, yet noteworthy for its significance,
that the date of the first hostile action against the United States,
July 31, was also that of the official promulgation of treaties of
peace between Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden.[494] Accompanied as
these were with clauses embodying what was virtually a defensive
alliance of the three Powers against Napoleon, they marked that turn
of the tide in European affairs which overthrew one of the most
important factors in the political and military anticipations of the
United States Administration. "Can it be doubted," wrote Madison on
September 6, "that if, under the pressure added by our war to that
previously felt by Great Britain, her Government declines an
accommodation, it will be owing to calculations drawn from our
internal divisions?"[495] Of the approaching change, however, no sign
yet appeared. The reverses of the French were still in the far future.
Not until September 14 did they enter Moscow, and news of this event
was received in the United States only at the end of November. A
contemporary weekly, under date of December 5, remarked: "Peace before
this time has been dictated by Bonaparte, as ought to have been
calculated upon by the dealers (_sic_) at St. Petersburg, before they,
influenced by the British, prevailed upon Alexander to embark in the
War.... All Europe, the British Islands excepted, will soon be at the
feet of Bonaparte."[496] This expectation, generally shared during the
summer of 1812, is an element in the American situation not to be
overlooked. As late as December 4, Henry Clay, addressing the House of
Representatives, of which he then was Speaker, said: "The British
trade shut out from the Baltic--excluded from the Continent of
Europe--possibly expelled the Black Sea--perishing in South America;
its illicit avenue to the United States, through Canada, closed--was
this the period for throwing open our own market by abandoning our
restrictive system? Perhaps at this moment the fate of the north of
Europe is decided, and the French Emperor may be dictating the law
from Moscow."[497] The following night Napoleon finally abandoned his
routed army and started on his return to Paris.
War having been foreseen, the British Government took its first step
without hesitation. On August 6 the Foreign Office issued Warren's
secret instructions, which were substantially the repetition of those
already addressed on July 8 to its representative in Washington. It
being probable that before they could be received he would have
departed in consequence of the rupture, Warren was to submit the
proposition contained in them, that the United States Government, in
view of the revocation of the Orders in Council, so long demanded by
it, should recall the hostile measures taken. In case of acceptance,
he was authorized to stop at once all hostilities within his command,
and to give assurance of similar action by his Government in every
part of the world. If this advance proved fruitless, as it did, no
orders instituting a state of war were needed, for it already existed;
but for that contingency Warren received further instructions as to
the course he was to pursue, in case "a desire should manifest itself
in any considerable portion of the American Union, more especially in
those States bordering upon his Majesty's North American dominions, to
return to their relations of peace and amity with this country." The
admiral was to encourage such dispositions, and should they take shape
in formal act, making overtures to him for a cessation of hostilities
for that part of the country, he was directed to grant it, and to
enter into negotiations for commercial intercourse between the section
thus acting and the British dominions. In short, if the General
Government proved irreconcilable, Great Britain was to profit by any
sentiment of disunion found to exist.[498]
Warren sailed from Portsmouth August 14, arriving in Halifax September
26. On the 30th, he despatched to the United States Government the
proposal for the cessation of hostilities. Monroe, the Secretary of
State, replied on October 27. The President, he said, was at all times
anxious to restore peace, and at the very moment of declaring war had
instructed the _charge_ in London to make propositions to that effect
to the British Ministry. An indispensable condition, however, was the
abandonment of the practice of impressment from American vessels. The
President recognized the embarrassment under which Great Britain lay,
because of her felt necessity to control the services of her native
seamen, and was willing to undertake that hereafter they should be
wholly excluded from the naval and merchant ships of the United
States. This should be done under regulations to be negotiated between
the two countries, in order to obviate the injury alleged by Great
Britain; but, meanwhile, impressing from under the American flag must
be discontinued during any armistice arranged. "It cannot be presumed,
while the parties are engaged in a negotiation to adjust amicably this
important difference, that the United States would admit the right,
or acquiesce in the practice of the opposite party, or that Great
Britain would be unwilling to restrain her cruisers from a practice
which would have the strongest tendency to defeat the negotiation."
The Orders in Council having been revoked, impressment remained the
only outstanding question upon which the United States was absolute in
its demand. That conceded, upon the terms indicated, all other
differences might be referred to negotiation. Upon this point Warren
had no powers, for his Government was determined not to yield. The
maritime war therefore went on unabated; but it may be mentioned here
that the President's undertaking to exclude British-born seamen from
American ships took effect in an Act of Congress, approved by him
March 3, 1813. He had thenceforth in hand a pledge which he considered
a full guarantee against whatever Great Britain feared to lose by
ceasing to take seamen from under the American flag. It was not so
regarded in England, and no formal agreement on this interesting
subject was ever reached.
The conditions existing upon his arrival, and the occurrences of the
past three months, as then first fully known to Warren, deeply
impressed him with the largeness of his task in protecting the
commerce of Great Britain. He found himself at once in the midst of
its most evident perils, which in the beginning were concentrated
about Halifax, owing to special circumstances. Although long seemingly
imminent, hostilities when they actually came had found the mercantile
community of the United States, for the most part, unbelieving and
unprepared. The cry of "Wolf!" had been raised so often that they did
not credit its coming, even when at the doors. This was especially the
case in New England, where the popular feeling against war increased
the indisposition to think it near. On May 14, Captain Bainbridge,
commanding the Boston navy yard, wrote: "I am sorry to say that the
people here do not believe we are going to war, and are too much
disposed to treat our national councils with contempt, and to consider
their preparations as electioneering."[499] The presidential election
was due in the following November. A Baltimore newspaper of the day,
criticising the universal rush to evade the embargo of April 4,
instituted in order to keep both seamen and property at home in
avoidance of capture, added that in justice it must be said that most
people believed that the embargo, as on former occasions, did not mean
war.[500]
Under the general sense of unpreparedness, it seemed to many
inconceivable that the Administration would venture to expose the
coasts to British reprisals. John Randolph, repeating in the House of
Representatives in secret session a conversation between the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Secretary of State, said: "He was asked
whether any essential changes would be made in the sixty days (of the
proposed embargo) in the defence of our maritime frontier and
seaports. He replied, pretty considerable preparations would be made.
He said New York was in a pretty respectable state, but not such as to
resist a formidable fleet; but that it was not to be expected that
that kind of war would be carried on." The obvious reply was, "We must
expect what commonly happens in wars." "As to the prepared state of
the country, the President, in case of a declaration, would not feel
bound to take more than his share of the responsibility. The
unprepared state of the country was the only reason why ulterior
measures should be deferred."[501] Randolph's recollections of this
interview were challenged by members of the Committee in other
points, but not in these. The Administration had then been in office
three years, and the causes of war had been accumulating for at least
seven; but so notorious was the unreadiness that a great part of the
community even now saw only bluster.
For these reasons the first rush to privateering, although feverishly
energetic, was of a somewhat extemporized character. In consequence of
the attempt to elude the embargo, by a precipitate and extensive
export movement, a very large part of the merchant ships and seamen
were now abroad. Hence, in the haste to seize upon enemy's shipping,
anything that could be sent to sea at quick notice was utilized.
Vessels thus equipped were rarely best fitted for a distant voyage, in
which dependence must rest upon their own resources, and upon crews
both numerous and capable. They were therefore necessarily directed
upon commercial highways near at hand, which, though not intrinsically
richest, nor followed by the cargoes that would pay best in the United
States, could nevertheless adequately reward enterprise. In the near
vicinity of Halifax the routes from the British West Indies to New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the St. Lawrence, met and crossed the
equally important lines of travel from the British Islands to the same
points. This circumstance contributed to the importance of that place
as a naval and commercial centre, and also focussed about it by far
the larger part of the effort and excitement of the first privateering
outburst from the United States. As Rodgers' bold sortie, and
disappearance into the unknown with a strong squadron had forced
concentration upon the principal British vessels, the cruisers
remaining for dispersion in search of privateers were numerically
inadequate to suppress the many and scattered Americans. Before
Warren's arrival the prizes reported in the United States were one
hundred and ninety, and they probably exceeded two hundred. An
analysis of the somewhat imperfect data which accompany these returns
indicates that about three fourths were seized in the Bay of Fundy and
in the off-lying waters from thence round to Newfoundland. Of the
remainder, half, probably, were taken in the West Indies; and the rest
out in the deep sea, beyond the Gulf Stream, upon the first part of
the track followed by the sugar and coffee traders from the West
Indies to England.[502] There had not yet been time to hear of prizes
taken in Europe, to which comparatively few privateers as yet went.
One of the most intelligent and enterprising of the early privateers
was Commodore Joshua Barney, a veteran of the American Navy of the
Revolution. He commissioned a Baltimore schooner, the "Rossie," at the
outbreak of the war; partly, apparently, in order to show a good
example of patriotic energy, but doubtless also through the promptings
of a love of adventure, not extinguished by advancing years. The
double motive kept him an active, useful, and distinguished public
servant throughout the war. His cruise on this occasion, as far as can
be gathered from the reports,[503] conformed in direction to the
quarters in which the enemy's merchant ships might most surely be
expected. Sailing from the Chesapeake July 15, he seems to have stood
at once outside the Gulf Stream for the eastern edge of the Banks of
Newfoundland. In the ensuing two weeks he was twice chased by an
enemy's frigate, and not till July 31 did he take his first prize.
From that day, to and including August 9, he captured ten other
vessels--eleven in all. Unfortunately, the precise locality of each
seizure is not given, but it is inferable from the general tenor of
the accounts that they were made between the eastern edge of the
Great Banks and the immediate neighborhood of Halifax; in the
locality, in fact, to which Hull during those same ten days was
directing the "Constitution," partly in pursuit of prizes, equally in
search of the enemy's ships of war, which were naturally to be sought
at those centres of movement where their national traders accumulated.
On August 30 the "Rossie," having run down the Nova Scotia coast and
passed by George's Bank and Nantucket, went into Newport, Rhode
Island. It is noticeable that before and after those ten days of
success, although she saw no English vessels, except ships of war
cruising on the outer approaches of their commerce, she was
continually meeting and speaking American vessels returning home.
These facts illustrate the considerations governing privateering, and
refute the plausible opinion often advanced, that it was a mere matter
of gambling adventure. Thus Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the
Treasury, in a communication to Congress, said: "The occupation of
privateers is precisely of the same species as the lottery, with
respect to hazard and to the chance of rich prizes."[504] Gallatin
approached the subject from the standpoint of the financier and with
the abstract ideas of the political economist. His temporary
successor, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Jones, had been a merchant
in active business life, and he viewed privateering as a practical
business undertaking. "The analogy between privateering and lotteries
does not appear to me to be so strict as the Secretary seems to
consider it. The adventure of a privateer is of the nature of a
commercial project or speculation, conducted by commercial men upon
principles of mercantile calculation and profit. The vessel and her
equipment is a matter of great expense, which is expected to be
remunerated by the probable chances of profit, after calculating the
outfit, insurance, etc., as in a regular mercantile voyage."[505] Mr.
Jones would doubtless have admitted what Gallatin alleged, that the
business was liable to be overdone, as is the case with all promising
occupations; and that many would engage in it without adequate
understanding or forethought.
The elements of risk which enter into privateering are doubtless very
great, and to some extent baffle calculation. In this it only shares
the lot common to all warlike enterprise, in which, as the ablest
masters of the art repeatedly affirm, something must be allowed for
chance. But it does not follow that a reasonable measure of success
may not fairly be expected, where sagacious appreciation of well-known
facts controls the direction of effort, and preparation is
proportioned to the difficulties to be encountered. Heedlessness of
conditions, or recklessness of dangers, defeat effort everywhere, as
well as in privateering; nor is even the chapter of unforeseen
accident confined to military affairs. In 1812 the courses followed by
the enemy's trade were well understood, as were also the
characteristics of their ships of war, in sailing, distribution, and
management.[506] Regard being had to these conditions, the pecuniary
venture, which privateering essentially is, was sure of fair
returns--barring accidents--if the vessels were thoroughly well found,
with superior speed and nautical qualities, and if directed upon the
centres of ocean travel, such as the approaches to the English
Channel, or, as before noted, to where great highways cross, inducing
an accumulation of vessels from several quarters. So pursued,
privateering can be made pecuniarily successful, as was shown by the
increasing number and value of prizes as the war went on. It has also
a distinct effect as a minor offensive operation, harassing and
weakening the enemy; but its merits are more contestable when regarded
as by itself alone decisive of great issues. Despite the efficiency
and numbers of American privateers, it was not British commerce, but
American, that was destroyed by the war.
From Newport the "Rossie" took a turn through another lucrative field
of privateering enterprise, the Caribbean Sea. Passing by Bermuda,
which brought her in the track of vessels from the West Indies to
Halifax, she entered the Caribbean at its northeastern corner, by the
Anegada Passage, near St. Thomas, thence ran along the south shore of
Porto Rico, coming out by the Mona Passage, between Porto Rico and
Santo Domingo, and so home by the Gulf Stream. In this second voyage
she made but two prizes; and it is noted in her log book that she here
met the privateer schooner "Rapid" from Charleston, fifty-two days
out, without taking anything. The cause of these small results does
not certainly appear; but it may be presumed that with the height of
the hurricane season at hand, most of the West India traders had
already sailed for Europe. Despite all drawbacks, when the "Rossie"
returned to Baltimore toward the end of October, she had captured or
destroyed property roughly reckoned at a million and a half, which is
probably an exaggerated estimate. Two hundred and seventeen prisoners
had been taken.
While the "Rossie" was on her way to the West Indies, there sailed
from Salem a large privateer called the "America," the equipment and
operations of which illustrated precisely the business conception
which attached to these enterprises in the minds of competent business
men. This ship-rigged vessel of four hundred and seventy-three tons,
built of course for a merchantman, was about eight years old when the
war broke out, and had just returned from a voyage. Seeing that
ordinary commerce was likely to be a very precarious undertaking, her
owners spent the months of July and August in preparing her
deliberately for her new occupation. Her upper deck was removed, and
sides filled in solid. She was given larger yards and loftier spars
than before; the greatly increased number of men carried by a
privateer, for fighting and for manning prizes, enabling canvas to be
handled with greater rapidity and certainty. She received a battery of
very respectable force for those days, so that she could repel the
smaller classes of ships of war, which formed a large proportion of
the enemy's cruisers. Thus fitted to fight or run, and having very
superior speed, she was often chased, but never caught. During the two
and a half years of war she made four cruises of four months each;
taking in all forty-one prizes, twenty-seven of which reached port and
realized $1,100,000, after deducting expenses and government charges.
As half of this went to the ship's company, the owners netted $550,000
for sixteen months' active use of the ship. Her invariable cruising
ground was from the English Channel south, to the latitude of the
Canary Islands.[507]
The United States having declared war, the Americans enjoyed the
advantage of the first blow at the enemy's trade. The reduced numbers
of vessels on the British transatlantic stations, and the perplexity
induced by Rodgers' movement, combined to restrict the injury to
American shipping. A number of prizes were made, doubtless; but as
nearly as can be ascertained not over seventy American merchant ships
were taken in the first three months of the war. Of these,
thirty-eight are reported as brought under the jurisdiction of the
Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, and twenty-four as captured on the
Jamaica station. News of the war not being received by the British
squadrons in Europe until early in August, only one capture there
appears before October 1, except from the Mediterranean. There Captain
Usher on September 6 wrote from Gibraltar that all the Americans on
their way down the Sea--that is, out of the Straits--had been
taken.[508] In like manner, though with somewhat better fortune,
thirty or forty American ships from the Baltic were driven to take
refuge in the neutral Swedish port of Gottenburg, and remained
war-bound.[509] That the British cruisers were not inactive in
protecting the threatened shores and waters of Nova Scotia and the St.
Lawrence is proved by the seizure of twenty-four American privateers,
between July 1 and August 25;[510] a result to which the inadequate
equipment of these vessels probably contributed. But American
shipping, upon the whole, at first escaped pretty well in the matter
of actual capture.
It was not in this way, but by the almost total suppression of
commerce, both coasting and foreign, both neutral and American, that
the maritime pressure of war was brought home to the United States.
This also did not happen until a comparatively late period. No
commercial blockade was instituted by the enemy before February, 1813.
Up to that time neutrals, not carrying contraband, had free admission
to all American ports; and the British for their own purposes
encouraged a licensed trade, wholly illegitimate as far as United
States ships were concerned, but in which American citizens and
American vessels were largely engaged, though frequently under flags
of other nations. A significant indication of the nature of this
traffic is found in the export returns of the year ending September
30, 1813. The total value of home produce exported was $25,008,152,
chiefly flour, grain, and other provisions. Of this, $20,536,328 went
to Spain and Portugal with their colonies; $15,500,000 to the
Peninsula itself.[511] It was not till October, 1813, when the British
armies entered France, that this demand fell. At the same time Halifax
and Canada were being supplied with flour from New England; and the
common saying that the British forces in Canada could not keep the
field but for supplies sent from the United States was strictly true,
and has been attested by British commissaries. An American in Halifax
in November, 1812, wrote home that within a fortnight twenty thousand
barrels of flour had arrived in vessels under Spanish and Swedish
flags, chiefly from Boston. This sort of unfaithfulness to a national
cause is incidental to most wars, but rarely amounts to as grievous a
military evil as in 1812 and 1813, when both the Peninsula and Canada
were substantially at our mercy in this respect. With the fall of
Napoleon, and the opening of Continental resources, such control
departed from American hands. In the succeeding twelvemonth there was
sent to the Peninsula less than $5,000,000 worth.
Warren's impressions of the serious nature of the opening conflict
caused a correspondence between him and the Admiralty somewhat
controversial in tone. Ten days after his arrival he represented the
reduced state of the squadron: "The war assumes a new, as well as more
active and inveterate aspect than heretofore." Alarming reports were
being received as to the number of ships of twenty-two to thirty-two
guns fitting out in American ports, and he mentions as significant
that the commission of a privateer officer, taken in a recaptured
vessel, bore the number 318. At Halifax he was in an atmosphere of
rumors and excitement, fed by frequent communication with eastern
ports, as well as by continual experience of captures about the
neighboring shores; the enemies' crews even landing at times. When he
went to Bermuda two months later, so many privateers were met on the
line of traffic between the West Indies and the St. Lawrence as to
convince him of the number and destructiveness of these vessels, and
"of the impossibility of our trade navigating these seas unless a very
extensive squadron is employed to scour the vicinity." He was crippled
for attempting this by the size of the American frigates, which
forbade his dispersing his cruisers. The capture of the "Guerriere"
had now been followed by that of the "Macedonian;" and in view of the
results, and of Rodgers being again out, he felt compelled to
constitute squadrons of two frigates and a sloop. Under these
conditions, and with so many convoys to furnish, "it is impracticable
to cut off the enemy's resources, or to repress the disorder and
pillage which actually exist to a very alarming degree, both on the
coast of British America and in the West Indies, as will be seen by
the copies of letters enclosed," from colonial and naval officials. He
goes on to speak, in terms not carefully weighed, of swarms of
privateers and letters-of-marque, their numbers now amounting to six
hundred; the crews of which had landed in many points of his Majesty's
dominions, and even taken vessels from their anchors in British
ports.[512]
The Admiralty, while evidently seeing exaggeration in this language,
bear witness in their reply to the harassment caused by the American
squadrons and private armed ships. They remind the admiral that there
are two principal ways of protecting the trade: one by furnishing it
with convoys, the other by preventing egress from the enemy's ports,
through adequate force placed before them. To disperse vessels over
the open sea, along the tracks of commerce, though necessary, is but
a subsidiary measure. His true course is to concentrate a strong
division before each chief American port, and they intimate
dissatisfaction that this apparently had not yet been done. As a
matter of fact, up to the spring of 1813, American ships of war had
little difficulty in getting to sea. Rodgers had sailed again with his
own squadron and Decatur's on October 8, the two separating on the
11th, though this was unknown to the British; and Bainbridge followed
with the "Constitution" and "Hornet" on the 26th. Once away, power to
arrest their depredations was almost wholly lost, through ignorance of
their intentions. With regard to commerce, they were on the offensive,
the British on the defensive, with the perplexity attaching to the
latter role.
Under the circumstances, the Admiralty betrays some impatience with
Warren's clamor for small vessels to be scattered in defence of the
trade and coasts. They remind him that he has under his flag eleven
sail of the line, thirty-four frigates, thirty-eight sloops, besides
other vessels, making a total of ninety-seven; and yet first Rodgers,
and then Bainbridge, had got away. True, Boston cannot be effectively
blockaded from November to March, but these two squadrons had sailed
in October. Even "in the month of December, though it was not possible
perhaps to have maintained a permanent watch on that port, yet having,
as you state in your letter of November 5, precise information that
Commodore Bainbridge was to sail at a given time, their Lordships
regret that it was not deemed practicable to proceed off that port at
a reasonable and safe distance from the land, and to have taken the
chance at least of intercepting the enemy." "The necessity for sending
heavy convoys arises from the facility and safety with which the
American navy has hitherto found it possible to put to sea. The
uncertainty in which you have left their Lordships, in regard to the
movements of the enemy and the disposition of your own force, has
obliged them to employ six or seven sail of the line and as many
frigates and sloops, independent of your command, in guarding against
the possible attempts of the enemy. Captain Prowse, with two sail of
the line, two frigates, and a sloop, has been sent to St. Helena.
Rear-Admiral Beauclerk, with two of the line, two frigates, and two
sloops, is stationed in the neighborhood of Madeira and the Azores,
lest Commodore Bainbridge should have come into that quarter to take
the place of Commodore Rodgers, who was retiring from it about the
time you state Commodore Bainbridge was expected to sail. Commodore
Owen, who had preceded Admiral Beauclerk in this station, with a ship
of the line and three other vessels, is not yet returned from the
cruise on which the appearance of the enemy near the Azores had
obliged their Lordships to send this force; while the 'Colossus' and
the 'Elephant' [ships of the line], with the 'Rhin' and the 'Armide,'
are but just returned from similar services. Thus it is obvious that,
large as the force under your orders was, and is, it is not all that
has been opposed to the Americans, and that these services became
necessary only because the chief weight of the enemy's force has been
employed at a distance from your station."[513]
The final words here quoted characterize exactly the conditions of the
first eight or ten months of the war, until the spring of 1813. They
also define the purpose of the British Government to close the coast
of the United States in such manner as to minimize the evils of widely
dispersed commerce-destroying, by confining the American vessels as
far as possible within their harbors. The American squadrons and
heavy frigates, which menaced not commerce only but scattered ships of
war as well, were to be rigorously shut up by an overwhelming division
before each port in which they harbored; and the Admiralty intimated
its wish that a ship of the line should always form one of such
division. This course of policy, initiated when the winter of 1812-13
was over, was thenceforth maintained with ever increasing rigor;
especially after the general peace in Europe, in May, 1814, had
released the entire British navy. It had two principal results. The
American frigates were, in the main, successfully excluded from the
ocean. Their three successful battles were all fought before January
1, 1813. Commodore John Rodgers, indeed, by observing his own precept
of clinging to the eastern ports of Newport and Boston, did succeed
after this in making two cruises with the "President;" but entering
New York with her on the last of these, in February, 1814, she was
obliged, in endeavoring to get to sea when transferred to Decatur, to
do so under circumstances so difficult as to cause her to ground, and
by consequent loss of speed to be overtaken and captured by the
blockading squadron. Captain Stewart reported the "Constitution"
nearly ready for sea, at Boston, September 26, 1813. Three months
after, he wrote the weather had not yet enabled him to escape. On
December 30, however, she sailed; but returning on April 4, the
blockaders drove her into Salem, whence she could not reach Boston
until April 17, 1814, and there remained until the 17th of the
following December. Her last successful battle, under his command, was
on February 20, 1815, more than two years after she captured the
"Java." When the war ended the only United States vessels on the ocean
were the "Constitution," three sloops--the "Wasp," "Hornet," and
"Peacock "--and the brig "Tom Bowline." The smaller vessels of the
navy, and the privateers, owing to their much lighter draft, got out
more readily; but neither singly nor collectively did they constitute
a serious menace to convoys, nor to the scattered cruisers of the
enemy. These, therefore, were perfectly free to pursue their
operations without fear of surprise.
On the other hand, because of this concentration along the shores of
the United States, the vessels that did escape went prepared more and
more for long absences and distant operations. On the sea "the weight
of the enemy's force," to use again the words of the Admiralty, "was
employed at a distance from the North American station." Whereas, at
the first, most captures by Americans were made near the United
States, after the spring of 1813 there is an increasing indication of
their being most successfully sought abroad; and during the last nine
months of the war, when peace prevailed throughout the world except
between the United States and Great Britain, when the Chesapeake was
British waters, when Washington was being burned and Baltimore
threatened, when the American invasion of Canada had given place to
the British invasion of New York, when New Orleans and Mobile were
both being attacked,--it was the coasts of Europe, and the narrow seas
over which England had claimed immemorial sovereignty, that witnessed
the most audacious and successful ventures of American cruisers. The
prizes taken in these quarters were to those on the hither side of the
Atlantic as two to one. To this contributed also the commercial
blockade, after its extension over the entire seaboard of the United
States, in April, 1814. The practically absolute exclusion of American
commerce from the ocean is testified by the exports of 1814, which
amounted to not quite $7,000,000;[514] whereas in 1807, the last full
year of unrestricted trade, they had been $108,000,000.[515] Deprived
of all their usual employments, shipping and seamen were driven to
privateering to earn any returns at all.
From these special circumstances, the period from June, 1812, when the
war began, to the end of April, 1813, when the departure of winter
conditions permitted the renewal of local activity on sea and land,
had a character of its own, favoring the United States on the ocean,
which did not recur. Some specific account of particular transactions
during these months will serve to illustrate the general conditions
mentioned.
When Warren reached Halifax, there were still in Boston the
"Constitution" and the ships that had returned with Rodgers on August
31. From these the Navy Department now constituted three squadrons.
The "Hornet," Captain James Lawrence, detached from Rodgers' command,
was attached to the "Constitution," in which Captain William
Bainbridge had succeeded Hull. Bainbridge's squadron was to be
composed of these two vessels and the smaller 32-gun frigate "Essex,"
Captain David Porter, then lying in the Delaware. Rodgers retained his
own ship, the "President," with the frigate "Congress;" while to
Decatur was continued the "United States" and the brig "Argus." These
detachments were to act separately under their several commodores; but
as Decatur's preparations were only a few days behind those of
Rodgers, the latter decided to wait for him, and on October 8 the two
sailed in company, for mutual support until outside the lines of
enemies, in case of meeting with a force superior to either singly.
In announcing his departure, Rodgers wrote the Department that he
expected the British would be distributed in divisions, off the ports
of the coast, and that if reliable information reached him of any such
exposed detachment, it would be his duty to seek it. "I feel a
confidence that, with prudent policy, we shall, barring unforeseen
accidents, not only annoy their commerce, but embarrass and perplex
the commanders of their public ships, equally to the advantage of our
commerce and the disadvantage of theirs." Warren and the Admiralty
alike have borne witness to the accuracy of this judgment. Rodgers was
less happy in another forecast, in which he reflected that of his
countrymen generally. As regards the reported size of British
re-enforcements to America, "I do not feel confidence in them, as I
cannot convince myself that their resources, situated as England is at
present, are equal to the maintenance of such a force on this side of
the Atlantic; and at any rate, if such an one do appear, it will be
only with a view to bullying us into such a peace as may suit their
interests."[516] The Commodore's words reflected often an animosity,
personal as well as national, aroused by the liberal abuse bestowed on
him by British writers.
[Illustration: THE CRUISES OF THE THREE AMERICAN SQUADRONS IN
THE AUTUMN OF 1812]
On October 11 Decatur's division parted company, the "President" and
"Congress" continuing together and steering to the eastward. On the
15th the two ships captured a British packet, the "Swallow," from
Jamaica to Falmouth, having $150,000 to $200,000 specie on board; and
on the 31st, in longitude 32 deg. west, latitude 33 deg. north, two hundred
and forty miles south of the Azores, a Pacific whaler on her homeward
voyage was taken. These two incidents indicate the general direction
of the course held, which was continued to longitude 22 deg. west,
latitude 17 deg. north, the neighborhood of the Cape Verde group. This
confirms the information of the British Admiralty that Rodgers was
cruising between the Azores and Madeira; and it will be seen that
Bainbridge, as they feared, followed in Rodgers' wake, though with a
different ulterior destination. The ground indeed was well chosen to
intercept homeward trade from the East Indies and South America.
Returning, the two frigates ran west in latitude 17 deg., with the trade
wind, as far as longitude 50 deg., whence they steered north, passing one
hundred and twenty miles east of Bermuda. In his report to the Navy
Department Rodgers said that he had sailed almost eleven thousand
miles, making the circuit of nearly the whole western Atlantic. In
this extensive sweep he had seen only five enemy's merchant vessels,
two of which were captured. The last four weeks, practically the
entire month of December, had been spent upon the line between Halifax
and Bermuda, without meeting a single enemy's ship. From this he
concluded that "their trade is at present infinitely more limited than
people imagine."[517] In fact, however, the experience indicated that
the British officials were rigorously enforcing the Convoy Law,
according to the "positive directions," and warnings of penalties,
issued by the Government. A convoy is doubtless a much larger object
than a single ship; but vessels thus concentrated in place and in time
are more apt to pass wholly unseen than the same number sailing
independently, and so scattered over wide expanses of sea.
Shortly before his return Rodgers arrested and sent in an American
vessel, from Baltimore to Lisbon, with flour, sailing under a
protection from the British admiral at Halifax. This was a frequent
incident with United States cruisers, national or private, at this
time; Decatur, for example, the day after leaving Rodgers, reported
meeting an American ship having on board a number of licenses from the
British Government to American citizens, granting them protection in
transporting grain to Spain and Portugal. The license was issued by a
British consular officer, and ran thus:[518]
"To the commanders of His Majesty's ships of war, or of private
armed ships belonging to subjects of His Majesty.
"Whereas, from the consideration of the great importance of
continuing a regular supply of flour and other dried provisions,
to the allied armies in Spain and Portugal, it has been deemed
expedient by His Majesty's Government that, notwithstanding the
hostilities now existing between Great Britain and the United
States, every degree of encouragement and protection should be
given to American vessels laden with flour and other dry
provisions, and _bona fide_ bound to Spain or Portugal, and
whereas, in furtherance of the views of His Majesty's
Government, Herbert Sawyer, Esq., Vice Admiral and
commander-in-chief on the Halifax station, has addressed to me a
letter under the date of the 5th of August, 1812 (a copy whereof
is hereunto annexed) wherein I am instructed to furnish a copy
of his letter certified under my consular seal to every American
vessel so laden and bound, destined to serve as a perfect
safeguard and protection of such vessel in the prosecution of
her voyage: Now, therefore, in obedience to these instructions,
I have granted to the American ship ----, ----, Master," etc.
To this was appended the following letter of instructions from Admiral
Sawyer:
"Whereas Mr. Andrew Allen, His Majesty's Consul at Boston, has
recommended to me Mr. Robert Elwell, a merchant of that place,
and well inclined toward the British Interest, who is desirous
of sending provisions to Spain and Portugal for the use of the
allied armies in the Peninsula, and whereas I think it fit and
necessary that encouragement and protection should be afforded
him in so doing,
"These are therefore to require and direct all captains and
commanders of His Majesty's ships and vessels of war which may
fall in with any American or other vessel bearing a neutral
flag, laden with flour, bread, corn, and pease, or any other
species of dry provisions, bound from America to Spain or
Portugal, and having this protection on board, to suffer her to
proceed without unnecessary obstruction or detention in her
voyage, provided she shall appear to be steering a due course
for those countries, and it being understood this is only to be
in force for one voyage and within six months from the date
hereof.
"Given under my hand and seal on board His Majesty's Ship
'Centurion,' at Halifax this fourth day of August, one thousand
eight hundred and twelve.
"(Sig.) H. SAWYER, Vice Admiral."
This practice soon became perfectly known to the American Government,
copies being found not only on board vessels stopped for carrying
them, but in seaports. Nevertheless, it went on, apparently tolerated,
or at least winked at; although, to say the least, the seamen thus
employed in sustaining the enemies' armies were needed by the
state.[519] When the commercial blockade of the Chesapeake was
enforced in February, 1813, and Admiral Warren announced that licenses
would no longer enable vessels to pass, flour in Baltimore fell two
dollars a barrel. The blockade being then limited to the Chesapeake
and Delaware, the immediate effect was to transfer this lucrative
traffic further north, favoring that portion of the country which was
considered, in the common parlance of the British official of that
day, "well inclined towards British interests."
On October 13, two days after Rodgers and Decatur parted at sea, the
United States sloop of war "Wasp," Captain Jacob Jones, left the
Capes of the Delaware on a cruise, steering to the eastward. On the
16th, in a heavy gale of wind, she lost her jib-boom. At half-past
eleven in the night of the 17th, being then in latitude 37 deg. north,
longitude 65 deg. west, between four and five hundred miles east of the
Chesapeake, in the track of vessels bound to Europe from the Gulf of
Mexico, half a dozen large sail were seen passing. These were part of
a convoy which had left the Bay of Honduras September 12, on their way
to England, under guard of the British brig of war "Frolic," Captain
Whinyates. Jones, unable in the dark to distinguish their force, took
a position some miles to windward, whence he could still see and
follow their motions. In the morning each saw the other, and
Whinyates, properly concerned for his charges chiefly, directed them
to proceed under all sail on their easterly course, while he allowed
the "Frolic" to drop astern, at the same time hoisting Spanish colors
to deceive the stranger; a ruse prompted by his having a few days
before passed a Spanish fleet convoyed by a brig resembling his own.
It still blowing strong from the westward, with a heavy sea, Captain
Jones, being to windward, and so having the choice of attacking, first
put his ship under close-reefed topsails, and then stood down for the
"Frolic," which hauled to the wind on the port tack--that is, with the
wind on the left side--to await the enemy. The British brig was under
the disadvantage of having lost her main-yard in the same gale that
cost the American her jib-boom; she was therefore unable to set any
square sail on the rearmost of her two masts. The sail called the boom
mainsail in part remedied this, so far as enabling the brig to keep
side to wind; but, being a low sail, it did not steady her as well as
a square topsail would have done in the heavy sea running, a condition
which makes accurate aim more difficult.
The action did not begin until the "Wasp" was within sixty yards of
the "Frolic." Then the latter opened fire, which the American quickly
returned; the two running side by side and gradually closing. The
British crew fired much the more rapidly, a circumstance which their
captain described as "superior fire;" in this reproducing the illusion
under which Captain Dacres labored during the first part of his fight
with the "Constitution." "The superior fire of our guns gave every
reason to expect a speedy termination in our favor," wrote Whinyates
in his official report. Dacres before his Court Martial asked of two
witnesses, "Did you understand it was not my intention to board whilst
the masts stood, in consequence of our superior fire and their great
number of men?" That superior here meant quicker is established by the
reply of one of these witnesses: "Our fire was a great deal quicker
than the enemy's." Superiority of fire, however, consists not only in
rapidity, but in hitting; and while with very big ships it may be
possible to realize Nelson's maxim, that by getting close missing
becomes impossible, it is not the same with smaller vessels in
turbulent motion. It was thought on board the "Wasp" that the enemy
fired thrice to her twice, but the direction of their shot was seen in
its effects; the American losing within ten minutes her maintopmast
with its yard, the mizzen-topgallant-mast, and spanker gaff. Within
twenty minutes most of the running rigging was also shot away, so as
to leave the ship largely unmanageable; but she had only five killed
and five wounded. In other words, the enemy's shot flew high; and,
while it did the damage mentioned, it inflicted no vital injury. The
"Wasp," on the contrary, as evidently fired low; for the loss of the
boom mainsail was the only serious harm received by the "Frolic's"
motive power during the engagement, and when her masts fell,
immediately after it, they went close to the deck. Her loss in men,
fifteen killed and forty-three wounded, tells the same story of aiming
low.
The "Frolic" having gone into action without a main-yard, the loss of
the boom mainsail left her unmanageable and decided the action. The
"Wasp," though still under control, was but little better off; for she
was unable to handle her head yards, the maintopmast having fallen
across the head braces. There is little reason therefore to credit a
contemporary statement of her wearing twice before boarding. Neither
captain mentions further manoeuvring, and Jones' words, "We gradually
lessened the space till we laid her on board," probably express the
exact sequence. As they thus closed, the "Wasp's" greater remaining
sail and a movement of her helm would effect what followed: the
British vessel's bowsprit coming between the main and the mizzen
rigging of her opponent, who thus grappled her in a position favorable
for raking. A broadside or two, preparatory for boarding, followed,
and ended the battle; for when the Americans leaped on board there was
no resistance. In view of the vigorous previous contest, this shows a
ship's company decisively beaten.[520]
Under the conditions of wind and weather, this engagement may fairly
be described as an artillery duel between two vessels of substantially
equal force. James' contention of inferior numbers in the "Frolic" is
true in the letter; but the greater rapidity of her firing shows it
irrelevant to the issue. The want of the mainyard, which means the
lack of the maintopsail, was a more substantial disadvantage. So long
as the boom mainsail held, however, it was fairly offset by the fall
of the "Wasp's" maintopmast and its consequences. Both vessels carried
sixteen 32-pounder carronades, which gave a broadside of two hundred
and fifty-six pounds. The "Wasp" had, besides, two 12-pounder long
guns. The British naval historian James states that the "Frolic" had
in addition to her main battery only two long sixes; but Captain Jones
gives her six 12-pounders, claiming that she was therefore superior to
the "Wasp" by four 12-pounders. As we are not excusing a defeat, it
may be sufficient to say that the fight was as nearly equal as it is
given to such affairs to be. The action lasted forty-three minutes;
the "Frolic" hauling down her colors shortly after noon. Almost
immediately afterward the British seventy-four "Poietiers" came in
sight, and in the disabled condition of the two combatants overhauled
them easily. Two hours later she took possession of both "Wasp" and
"Frolic," and carried them into Bermuda. The "Wasp" was added to the
British navy under the name of "Loup Cervier" (Lynx).
When Rodgers and Decatur separated, on October 11, the former steered
rather easterly, while the latter diverged to the southward as well as
east, accompanied by the "Argus." These two did not remain long
together. It is perhaps worth noticing by the way, that Rodgers
adhered to his idea of co-operation between ships, keeping his two in
company throughout; whereas Decatur, when in control, illustrated in
practice his preference for separate action. The brig proceeded to
Cape St. Roque, the easternmost point of Brazil, and thence along the
north coast of South America, as far as Surinam. From there she passed
to the eastward of the West India Islands and so toward home;
remaining out as long as her stores justified, cruising in the waters
between Halifax, Bermuda, and the Continent. These courses, as those
of the other divisions, are given as part of the maritime action,
conducive to understanding the general character of effort put forth
by national and other cruisers. Of these four ships that sailed
together, the "Argus" alone encountered any considerable force of the
enemy; falling in with a squadron of six British vessels, two of them
of the line, soon after parting with the "United States." She escaped
by her better sailing. Her entire absence from the country was
ninety-six days.
Decatur with the "United States" kept away to the southeast until
October 25. At daybreak of that day the frigate was in latitude 29 deg.
north, longitude 29 deg. 30' west, steering southwest on the port tack,
with the wind at south-southeast. Soon after daylight there was
sighted a large sail bearing about south-southwest; or, as seamen say,
two points on the weather bow. She was already heading as nearly as
the wind permitted in the direction of the stranger; but the latter,
which proved to be the British frigate "Macedonian," Captain John S.
Carden, having the wind free, changed her course for the "United
States," taking care withal to preserve the windward position,
cherished by the seamen of that day. In this respect conditions
differed from those of the "Constitution" and "Guerriere," for there
the American was to windward. Contrary also to the case of the "Wasp"
and "Frolic," the interest of the approaching contest turns largely on
the manoeuvres of the antagonists; for, the "United States" being
fully fifty per cent stronger than the "Macedonian" in artillery
power, it was only by utilizing the advantage of her windward
position, by judicious choice of the method of attack, that the
British ship could hope for success. She had in her favor also a
decided superiority of speed; and, being just from England after a
period of refit, was in excellent sailing trim.
When first visible to each other from the mastheads, the vessels were
some twelve miles apart. They continued to approach until 8.30, when
the "United States," being then about three miles distant,
wore--turned round--standing on the other tack. Her colors,
previously concealed by her sails, were by this manoeuvre shown to the
British frigate, which was thus also placed in the position of
steering for the quarter of her opponent; the latter heading nearer
the wind, and inclining gradually to cross the "Macedonian's" bows
(1). When this occurred, a conversation was going on between Captain
Carden, his first lieutenant, and the master;[521] the latter being
the officer who usually worked the ship in battle, under directions
from the captain. These officers had been in company with the "United
States" the year before in Chesapeake Bay; and, whether they now
recognized her or not, they knew the weight of battery carried by the
heavy American frigates. The question under discussion by them, before
the "United States" wore, was whether it was best to steer direct upon
the approaching enemy, or to keep farther away for a time, in order to
maintain the windward position. By the first lieutenant's testimony
before the Court, this was in his opinion the decisive moment, victory
or defeat hinging upon the resolution taken. He favored attempting to
cross the enemy's bows, which was possible if the "United States"
should continue to stand as she at the moment was--on the port tack;
but in any event to close with the least delay possible. The master
appears to have preferred to close by going under the enemy's stern,
and hauling up to leeward; but Captain Carden, impressed both with the
advantage of the weather gage and the danger of approaching exposed to
a raking fire, thought better to haul nearer the wind, on the tack he
was already on, the starboard, but without bracing the yards, which
were not sharp. His aim was to pass the "United States" at a distance,
wear--turn round from the wind, toward her--when clear of her
broadside, and so come up from astern without being raked. The
interested reader may compare this method with that pursued by Hull,
who steered down by zigzag courses. The Court Martial censured
Carden's decision, which was clearly wrong, for the power of heavy
guns over lighter, of the American 24's over the British 18's, was
greatest at a distance; therefore, to close rapidly, taking the
chances of being raked--if not avoidable by yawing--was the smaller
risk. Moreover, wearing behind the "United States," and then pursuing,
gave her the opportunity which she used, to fire and keep away again,
prolonging still farther the period of slow approach which Carden
first chose.
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND MACEDONIAN]
The "United States" wearing, while this conversation was in progress,
precipitated Carden's action. He interpreted the manoeuvre as
indicating a wish to get to windward, which the "Macedonian's" then
course, far off the wind, would favor. He therefore hurriedly gave the
order to haul up (2), cutting adrift the topmast studdingsail; a
circumstance which to seamen will explain exactly the relative
situations. That he had rightly interpreted Decatur's purpose seems
probable, for in fifteen or twenty minutes the "United States" again
wore (_a_), resuming her original course, by the wind on the port
tack, the "Macedonian" continuing on the starboard; the two now
running on lines nearly parallel, in opposite directions (_b b_). As
they passed, at the distance of almost a mile, the American frigate
discharged her main-deck battery, her spar-deck carronades not ranging
so far. The British ship did not reply, but shortly afterward wore
(_c_), and, heading now in the same general direction as the "United
States," steered to come up on her port side. She thus reached a
position not directly behind her antagonist, but well to the left,
apparently about half a mile away. So situated, if steering the same
course, each ship could train its batteries on the opponent; but the
increased advantage at a distance was with the heavier guns, and when
the "Macedonian," to get near, headed more toward the "United States,"
most of hers ceased to bear, while those of her enemy continued their
fire. A detailed description of the "United States's" manoeuvres by
her own officers has not been transmitted; but in the searching
investigation made by Carden's Court Martial we have them probably
well preserved. The master of the British ship stated that when the
"Macedonian" wore in chase, the "United States" first kept off before
the wind, and then almost immediately came back to it as before (_c_),
bringing it abeam, and immediately began firing. By thus increasing
her lateral distance from the line of the enemy's approach, she was
able more certainly to train her guns on him. After about fifteen
minutes of this, the "Macedonian" suffering severely, her foresail was
set to close (_e_), upon which the "United States," hauling out the
spanker and letting fly the jib-sheet, came up to the wind and backed
her mizzen-topsail, in order not to move too fast from the
advantageous position she had, yet to keep way enough to command the
ship (_e_).
Under these unhappy conditions the "Macedonian" reached within half
musket-shot, which was scarcely the ideal close action of the day; but
by that time she had lost her mizzen-topmast, mainyard, and
maintopsail, most of her standing rigging was shot away, the lower
masts badly wounded, and almost all her carronade battery, the
principal reliance for close action, was disabled. She had also many
killed and wounded; while the only visible damage on board the "United
States" was the loss of the mizzen-topgallant-mast, a circumstance of
absolutely no moment at the time. In short, although she continued to
fight manfully for a half-hour more, the "Macedonian," when she got
alongside the "United States," was already beaten beyond hope. At the
end of the half-hour her fore and main topmasts fell, upon which the
"United States" filled her mizzen-topsail and shot ahead, crossing the
bows of the "Macedonian,"[522] and thus ending the fight. Surprise was
felt on board the British vessel that a raking broadside was not at
this moment poured in, and it was even believed by some that the
American was now abandoning the contest. She was so, in the sense that
the contest was over; a ship with all her spars standing, "in perfect
condition," to use the expression of the enemy's first lieutenant,
would be little less than brutal to use her power upon one reduced to
lower masts, unless submission was refused. Upon her return an hour
later, the "Macedonian's" mizzenmast had gone overboard, and her
colors were hauled down as the "United States" drew near.
[Illustration: CAPTAIN STEPHEN DECATUR
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Independence Hall,
Philadelphia.]
This action was fought by the "United States" with singular wariness,
not to say caution. Her change to the starboard tack, when still some
three miles distant, seems to indicate a desire to get the weather
gage, as the "Macedonian" was then steering free. It was so
interpreted on board the British vessel; but as Carden also at once
hauled up, it became apparent that he would not yield the advantage of
the wind which he had, and which it was in his choice to keep, for the
"United States" was a lumbering sailer. Decatur, unable to obtain the
position for attacking, at once wore again, and thenceforth played the
game of the defensive with a skill which his enemy's mistake seconded.
By the movements of his ship the "Macedonian's" closing was
protracted, and she was kept at the distance and bearing most
favorable to the American guns. But when her foresail was set, the
"United States," by luffing rapidly to the wind--flowing the jib-sheet
and hauling out the spanker to hasten this movement--and at the same
time backing the mizzen-topsail to steady her motions and position,
was constituted a moving platform of guns, disposed in the very best
manner to annihilate an opponent obliged to approach at a pretty broad
angle.
This account, summarized from the sworn testimony before the British
court, is not irreconcilable with Decatur's remark, that the enemy
being to windward engaged at his own distance, to the greatness of
which was to be ascribed the unusual length of the action. Imbued with
the traditions of their navy, the actions of the "United States"
puzzled the British extremely. Her first wearing was interpreted as
running away, and her shooting ahead when the "Macedonian's" topmasts
fell, crossing her bows without pouring a murderous broadside into a
beaten ship, coupled with the previous impression of wariness, led
them to think that the American was using the bad luck by which alone
they could have been beaten, in order to get away. Three cheers were
given, as though victorious in repelling an attack. They had expected,
so the testimony ran, to have her in an hour.[523] Judged by this
evidence, the handling of the "United States" was thoroughly skilful.
Though he probably knew himself superior in force, Decatur's object
necessarily should be to take his opponent at the least possible
injury to his own ship. She was "on a cruise"; hence haste was no
object, while serious damage might cripple her further operations. The
result was, by his official statement, that "the damage sustained was
not such as to render return to port necessary; and I should have
continued her cruise, had I not deemed it important that we should see
our prize in."[524]
In general principle, the great French Admiral Tourville correctly
said that the best victories are those which cost least in blood,
timber, and iron; but, in the particular instance before us, Decatur's
conduct may rest its absolute professional justification on the
testimony of the master of the British ship and two of her three
lieutenants. To the question whether closing more rapidly by the
"Macedonian" would have changed the result, the first lieutenant
replied he thought there was a chance of success. The others differed
from him in this, but agreed that their position would have been more
favorable, and the enemy have suffered more.[525] Carden himself had
no hesitation as to the need of getting near, but only as to the
method. To avoid this was therefore not only fitting, but the bounden
duty of the American captain. His business was not merely to make a
brilliant display of courage and efficiency, but to do the utmost
injury to the opponent at the least harm to his ship and men. It was
the more notable to find this trait in Decatur; for not, only had he
shown headlong valor before, but when offered the new American
"Guerriere" a year later, he declined, saying that she was overmatched
by a seventy-four, while no frigate could lie alongside of her. "There
was no reputation to be made in this."[526]
The "United States" and her prize, after repairing damages sufficiently
for a winter arrival upon the American coast, started thither; the
"United States" reaching New London December 4, the "Macedonian," from
weather conditions, putting into Newport. Both soon afterward went to
New York by Long Island Sound. It is somewhat remarkable that no one of
Warren's rapidly increasing fleet should have been sighted by either.
There was as yet no commercial blockade, and this, coupled with the
numbers of American vessels protected by licenses, and the fewness of
the American ships of war, may have indisposed the admiral and his
officers to watch very closely an inhospitable shore, at a season
unpropitious to active operations. Besides, as appears from letters
already quoted, the commander-in-chief's personal predilection was more
for the defensive than the offensive; to protect British trade by
cruisers patrolling its routes, rather than by preventing egress from
the hostile ports.
FOOTNOTES:
[491] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 73.
[492] Ibid.
[493] Ibid., pp. 138, 139.
[494] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 139.
[495] Writings of Madison (ed. 1865), vol. ii. p. 545.
[496] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 220.
[497] Annals of Congress, 1812-13, p. 301.
[498] Castlereagh to the Admiralty, Aug. 6 and 12, 1812. British
Record Office MSS. Warren's Letter to the United States Government and
Monroe's reply are in American State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 595, 596.
[499] Captains' Letters. Navy Department MSS.
[500] Niles' Register, vol. ii. p. 101.
[501] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 1593.
[502] These data are summarized from Niles' Register, which throughout
the war collected, and periodically published, lists of prizes.
[503] A synopsis of the "Rossie's" log is given in Niles' Register,
vol. iii p. 158.
[504] Gallatin, Dec. 8, 1812. American State Papers, Finance, vol. ii.
p. 594.
[505] Jones, July 21, 1813. American State Papers, Finance, vol. ii.
p. 645.
[506] In the memoir of Commodore Barney (p. 252), published by his
daughter, it is said that, successful though the "Rossie's" cruise was
in its issue, he was dissatisfied with the course laid down for him by
his owners, who did not understand the usual tracks of British
commerce.
[507] Account of the Private Armed Ship "America," by B.B.
Crowninshield. Essex Institute Historical Collections, vol. xxxvii.
[508] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 431.
[509] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 320.
[510] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 257.
[511] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. i. p. 992.
[512] Warren to Croker, Dec. 28 and 29, 1812. Records Office MSS.
[513] Croker to Warren, Jan. 9, Feb. 10, and March 20, 1813. Records
Office MSS.
[514] American State Papers. Commerce and Navigation, vol. i. p. 1021.
[515] American State Papers. Commerce and Navigation, vol. i. p. 718.
[516] Captains' Letters. Navy Department, Oct. 3, 1812.
[517] Captains' Letters, Navy Department, Dee. 31, 1812, and Jan. 2,
1813.
[518] From the file of Captains' Letters, Jan. 1, 1813. Found in the
American licensed brig "Julia," captured by United States frigate
"Chesapeake," Captain Samuel Evans. The vessel was condemned in the
United States Courts.
[519] Besides the obvious impropriety, the practice was expressly
forbidden by law. It was reprobated in strong terms by Justice Joseph
Story, of Massachusetts, of the Supreme Court of the United States,
affirming the condemnation of the "Julia." His judgment is given in
full in Niles' Register, vol. iv. pp. 393-397.
[520] Captain Jones' Report of this action can be found in Niles'
Register, vol. iii. p. 217; that of Captain Whinyates in Naval
Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 76.
[521] Macedonian Court Martial. British Records Office MSS.
[522] James states that this was in order to fill fresh cartridges,
which is likely enough; but it is most improbable that the movement
was deferred till the last cartridge ready was exhausted--that the
battery could not have been fired when crossing the bows.
[523] "Macedonian" Court Martial.
[524] Decatur's Report. Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 253.
[525] "Macedonian" Court Martial.
[526] Captains' Letters, April 9, 1814. Navy Department MSS.
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