EARLY CRUISES AND ENGAGEMENTS: THE "CONSTITUTION" AND
"GUERRIERE." HULL'S OPERATIONS AND SURRENDER
War was declared on June 18. On the 21st there was lying in the lower
harbor of New York a division of five United States vessels under the
command of Commodore John Rodgers. It consisted of three frigates, the
"President" and "United States," rated of 44 guns, the "Congress" of
38, the ship-rigged sloop of war "Hornet" of 18, and the brig "Argus"
of 16. This division, as it stood, was composed of two squadrons; that
of Rodgers himself, and that of Commodore Stephen Decatur, the latter
having assigned to him immediately the "United States," the
"Congress," and the "Argus." There belonged also to Rodgers'
particular squadron the "Essex," a frigate rated at 32 guns. Captain
David Porter, one of the most distinguished names in American naval
annals, commanded her then, and until her capture by a much superior
force, nearly two years later; but at this moment she was undergoing
repairs, a circumstance which prevented her from accompanying the
other vessels, and materially affected her subsequent history.
It may be mentioned, as an indication of naval policy, that although
Rodgers and Decatur each had more than one vessel under his control,
neither was given the further privilege and distinction, frequent in
such cases, of having a captain to command the particular ship on
which he himself sailed. This, when done, introduces a very
substantial change in the position of the officer affected. He is
removed from being only first among several equals, and is advanced to
a superiority of grade, in which he stands alone, with consequent
enhancement of authority. Rodgers was captain of the "President" as
well as commodore of the small body of vessels assigned to him;
Decatur held the same relation to the frigate "United States," and to
her consorts. Though apparently trivial, the circumstance is not
insignificant; for it indicates clearly that, so far as the Navy
Department then had any mind, it had not yet made it up as to whether
it would send out its vessels as single cruisers, or combine them into
divisions, for the one operation open to the United States Navy,
namely, the destruction of the enemy's commerce. With divisions
permanently constituted as such, propriety and effective action would
have required the additional dignity for the officer in general
charge, and they themselves doubtless would have asked for it; but for
ships temporarily associated, and liable at any moment to be
scattered, not only was the simple seniority of naval rank sufficient,
but more would have been inexpedient. The commodores, now such only by
courtesy and temporary circumstance, would suffer no derogation if
deprived of ships other than their own; whereas the more extensive
function, similarly curtailed, would become a mere empty show, a
humiliation which no office, civil or military, can undergo without
harm.
This indecision of the Department reflected the varying opinions of
the higher officers of the service, which in turn but reproduced
different schools of thought throughout all navies. Historically, as a
military operation, for the injury of an enemy's commerce and the
protection of one's own, it may be considered fairly demonstrated that
vessels grouped do more effective work than the same number scattered.
This is, of course, but to repeat the general military teaching of
operations of all kinds. It is not the keeping of the several vessels
side by side that constitutes the virtue of this disposition; it is
the placing them under a single head, thereby insuring co-operation,
however widely dispersed by their common chief under the emergency of
successive moments. Like a fan that opens and shuts, vessels thus
organically bound together possess the power of wide sweep, which
insures exertion over a great field of ocean, and at the same time
that of mutual support, because dependent upon and controlled from a
common centre. Such is concentration, reasonably understood; not
huddled together like a drove of cattle, but distributed with a regard
to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a
single will.
There is, however, in the human mind an inveterate tendency to
dispersion of effort, due apparently to the wish to do at once as many
things as may be; a disposition also to take as many chances as
possible in an apparent lottery, with the more hope that some one of
them will come up successful. Not an aggregate big result, and one
only, whether hit or miss, but a division of resources and powers
which shall insure possible compensation in one direction for what is
not gained, or may even be lost, in another. The Navy Department, when
hostilities were imminent, addressed inquiries to several prominent
officers as to the best means of employing the very small total force
available. The question involved the direction of effort, as well as
the method; but as regards the former of these, the general routes
followed by British commerce, and the modes of protecting it, were so
far understood as to leave not much room for differences of opinion.
Rodgers may have been unconsciously swayed by the natural bias of an
officer whose seniority would insure him a division, if the
single-cruiser policy did not prevail. Of the replies given, however,
his certainly was the one most consonant with sound military
views.[416] Send a small squadron, of two or three frigates and a
sloop, to cruise on the coast of the British Islands, and send the
light cruisers to the West Indies; for, though he did not express it,
in the gentle breezes and smooth seas of the tropics small cruisers
have a much better chance to avoid capture by big ships than in the
heavy gales of the North Atlantic. This much may be termed the
distinctly offensive part of Rodgers' project. For the defensive,
employ the remainder of the frigates, singly or in squadron, to guard
our own seaboard; either directly, by remaining off the coast, or by
taking position in the track of the trade between Great Britain and
the St. Lawrence. Irrespective of direct captures there made, this
course would contribute to protect the access to home ports, by
drawing away the enemy's ships of war to cover their own threatened
commerce. Alike in the size of his foreign squadron, and in the touch
of uncertainty as to our own coasts, "singly or in squadron," Rodgers
reflected the embarrassment of a man whose means are utterly
inadequate to the work he wishes to do. One does not need to be a
soldier or a seaman to comprehend the difficulty of making ends meet
when there is not enough to go round.
Decatur and Bainbridge, whose written opinions are preserved, held
views greatly modified from those of Rodgers, or even distinctly
opposed to them. "The plan which appears to me best calculated for our
little navy to annoy the trade of Great Britain," wrote Decatur,[417]
"would be to send them out distant from our own coast, singly, or not
more than two frigates in company, without specific instructions;
relying upon the enterprise of their officers. Two frigates cruising
together would not be so easily traced by an enemy as a greater
number; their movements would be infinitely more rapid; they would be
sufficiently strong in most instances to attack a convoy, and the
probability is they would not meet with a superior cruising force. If,
however, they should meet a superior, and cannot avoid it, we would
not have to regret the whole of our marine crushed at one blow."
Bainbridge is yet more absolute. "I am anxious to see us all dispersed
about various seas. If we are kept together in squadron, or lying in
port, the whole are scarcely of more advantage than one ship. I wish
all our public vessels here [Boston] were dispersed in various ports,
for I apprehend it will draw speedily a numerous force of the enemy to
blockade or attack."[418] At the moment of writing this, Rodgers'
squadron was in Boston, having returned from a cruise, and the
"Constitution" also, immediately after her engagement with the
"Guerriere."
It will be observed that, in spirit even more than in letter, Rodgers'
leading conception is that of co-operation, combined action. First, he
would have a Department general plan, embracing in a comprehensive
scheme the entire navy and the ocean at large, in the British seas,
West Indies, and North Atlantic; each contributing, by its particular
action and impression, to forward the work of the others, and so of
the whole. Secondly, he intimates, not obscurely, though cautiously,
in each separate field the concerted action of several ships is better
than their disconnected efforts. Decatur and Bainbridge, on the
contrary, implicitly, and indeed explicitly, favor individual
movement. They would reject even combination by the Department--"no
specific instructions, rely upon the enterprise of the officers." Nor
will they have a local supervision or control in any particular; two
frigates at the most are to act together, singly even is preferable,
and they shall roam the seas at will.
There can be little doubt as to which scheme is sounder in general
principle. All military experience concurs in the general rule of
co-operative action; and this means concentration, under the liberal
definition before given--unity of purpose and subordination to a
central control. General rules, however, must be intelligently applied
to particular circumstances; and it will be found by considering the
special circumstances of British commerce, under the war conditions of
1812, that Rodgers' plan was particularly suited to injure it. It is
doubtless true that if merchant vessels were so dispersed over the
globe, that rarely more than one would be visible at a time, one ship
of war could take that one as well as a half-dozen could. But this was
not the condition. British merchant ships were not permitted so to
act. They were compelled to gather at certain centres, and thence,
when enough had assembled, were despatched in large convoys, guarded
by ships of war, in force proportioned to that disposable at the
moment by the local admiral, and to the anticipated danger.
Consequently, while isolated merchant ships were to be met, they were
but the crumbs that fell from the table, except in the near vicinity
of the British Islands themselves.
Such were the conditions while Great Britain had been at war with
France alone; but the declaration of the United States led at once to
increased stringency. All licenses to cross the Atlantic without
convoy were at once revoked, and every colonial and naval commander
lay under heavy responsibility to enforce the law of convoy. Insurance
was forfeited by breach of its requirements; and in case of parting
convoy, capture would at least hazard, if not invalidate, the policy.
Under all this compulsion, concentrated merchant fleets and heavy
guards became as far as possible the rule of action. With such
conditions it was at once more difficult for a single ship of war to
find, and when found to deal effectually with, a body of vessels which
on the one hand was large, and yet occupied but a small space
relatively to the great expanse of ocean over which the pursuer might
roam fruitlessly, missing continually the one moving spot he sought.
For such a purpose a well-handled squadron, scattering within
signal-distance from each other, or to meet at a rendezvous, was more
likely to find, and, having found, could by concerted action best
overcome the guard and destroy the fleet.
On June 22, 1812, the Navy Department issued orders for Rodgers,[419]
which are interesting as showing its ideas of operations. The two
squadrons then assembled under him were to go to sea, and there
separate. He himself, with the frigates "President," "Essex," and
"John Adams," sloop "Hornet," and the small brig "Nautilus," was to go
to the Capes of the Chesapeake, and thence cruise eastwardly, off and
on. Decatur's two frigates, with the "Argus," would cruise southwardly
from New York. It was expected that the two would meet from time to
time; and, should combined action be advisable, Rodgers had authority
to unite them under his broad pendant for that purpose. The object of
this movement was to protect the commerce of the country, which at
this time was expected to be returning in great numbers from the
Spanish peninsula; whither had been hurried every available ship, and
every barrel of flour in store, as soon as the news of the approaching
embargo of April 4 became public. "The great bulk of our returning
commerce," wrote the secretary, "will make for the ports between the
Chesapeake and our eastern extremities; and, in the protection to be
afforded, such ports claim particular attention."
The obvious comment on this disposition is that protection to the
incoming ships would be most completely afforded, not by the local
presence of either of these squadrons, but by the absence of the
enemy. This absence was best insured by beating him, if met; and in
the then size of the British Halifax fleet it was possible that a
detachment sent from it might be successfully engaged by the joint
division, though not by either squadron singly. The other adequate
alternative was to force the enemy to keep concentrated, and so to
cover as small a part as might be of the homeward path of the
scattered American trade. This also was best effected by uniting our
own ships. Without exaggerating the danger to the American squadrons,
needlessly exposed in detail by the Department's plan, the object in
view would have been attained as surely, and at less risk, by keeping
all the vessels together, even though they were retained between
Boston Bay and the Capes of the Chesapeake for the local defence of
commerce. In short, as was to be expected from the antecedents of the
Government, the scheme was purely and narrowly defensive; there was
not in it a trace of any comprehension of the principle that offence
is the surest defence. The opening words of its letter defined the
full measure of its understanding. "It has been judged expedient so to
employ our public armed vessels, as to afford to our returning
commerce all possible protection." It may be added, that to station on
the very spot where the merchant vessels were flocking in return,
divisions inferior to that which could be concentrated against them,
was very bad strategy; drawing the enemy by a double motive to the
place whence his absence was particularly desirable.
The better way was to influence British naval action by a distinct
offensive step; by a movement of the combined divisions sufficiently
obvious to inspire caution, but yet too vague to admit of precision of
direction or definite pursuit. In accordance with the general ideas
formulated in his letter, before quoted, Rodgers had already fixed
upon a plan, which, if successful, would inflict a startling blow to
British commerce and prestige, and at the same time would compel the
enemy to concentrate, thus diminishing his menace to American
shipping. It was known to him that a large convoy had sailed from
Jamaica for England about May 20. The invariable course of such bodies
was first to the north-northeast, parallel in a general sense to the
Gulf Stream and American coast, until they had cleared the northeast
trades and the belt of light and variable winds above them. Upon
approaching forty degrees north latitude, they met in full force the
rude west winds, as the Spanish navigators styled them, and before
them bore away to the English Channel. That a month after their
starting Rodgers should still have hoped to overtake them, gives a
lively impression of the lumbering slowness of trade movement under
convoy; but he counted also upon the far swifter joint speed of his
few and well-found ships. To the effective fulfilment of his double
object, defensive and offensive, however, he required more ships than
his own squadron, and he held his course dependent upon Decatur
joining him.[420]
[Illustration: THE CHASE OF THE _Belvidera_
From a drawing by Carlton T. Chapman.]
On June 21 Decatur did join, and later in the same day arrived a
Department order of June 18 with the Declaration of War. Within an
hour the division of five ships was under way for sea. In consequence
of this instant movement Rodgers did not receive the subsequent order
of the Department, June 22, the purport of which has been explained
and discussed. Standing off southeasterly from Sandy Hook, at 3 A.M.
of June 23 was spoken an American brig, which four days before had
seen the convoy steering east in latitude 36 deg., longitude 67 deg., or about
three hundred miles from where the squadron then was. Canvas was
crowded in pursuit, but three hours later was sighted in the northeast
a large sail heading toward the squadron. The course of all the
vessels was changed for her; but she, proving to be British,--the
"Belvidera," rated 32, and smaller than any one of the American
frigates,--speedily turned and took flight. Pursuit was continued all
that day and until half an hour before midnight, the "President"
leading as the fastest ship; but the British vessel, fighting for her
life, and with the friendly port of Halifax under her lee, could
resort to measures impossible to one whose plan of distant cruising
required complete equipment, and full stores of provisions and water.
Boats and spare spars and anchors were thrown overboard, and fourteen
tons of drinking water pumped out. Thus lightened, after being within
range of the "President's" guns for a couple of hours, the "Belvidera"
drew gradually away, and succeeded in escaping, having received and
inflicted considerable damage. In explanation of such a result between
two antagonists of very unequal size, it must be remembered that a
chasing ship of those days could not fire straight ahead; while in
turning her side to bring the guns to bear, as the "President" several
times did, she lost ground. The chased ship, on the other hand, from
the form of the stern, could use four guns without deviating from her
course.
After some little delay in repairing, the squadron resumed pursuit of
the convoy. On June 29, and again on July 9, vessels were spoken which
reported encountering it; the latter the evening before. Traces of its
course also were thought to be found in quantities of cocoanut shell
and orange peel, passed on one occasion; but, though the chase was
continued to within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, the
convoy itself was never seen. To this disappointing result atmospheric
conditions very largely contributed. From June 29, on the western edge
of the Great Banks, until July 13, when the pursuit was abandoned, the
weather was so thick that "at least six days out of seven" nothing was
visible over five miles away, and for long periods the vessels could
not even see one another at a distance of two hundred yards. The same
surrounding lasted to the neighborhood of Madeira, for which the
course was next shaped. After passing that island on June 21 return
was made toward the United States by way of the Azores, which were
sighted, and thence again to the Banks of Newfoundland and Cape Sable,
reaching Boston August 31, after an absence of seventy days.
Although Rodgers's plan had completely failed in what may properly be
called its purpose of offence, and he could report the capture of
"only seven merchant vessels, and those not valuable," he
congratulated himself with justice upon success on the defensive
side.[421] The full effect was produced, which he had anticipated from
the mere fact of a strong American division being at large, but seen
so near its own shores that nothing certain could be inferred as to
its movements or intentions. The "Belvidera," having lost sight of it
at midnight, could, upon her arrival in Halifax, give only the general
information that it was at sea; and Captain Byron, who commanded her,
thought with reason that the "President's" action warranted the
conclusion that the anticipated hostilities had been begun. He
therefore seized and brought in two or three American merchantmen; but
the British admiral, Sawyer, thinking there might possibly be some
mistake, like that of the meeting between the "President" and "Little
Belt" a year before, directed their release.
A very few days later, definite intelligence of the declaration of war
by the United States was received at Halifax. At that period, the
American seas from the equator to Labrador were for administrative
purposes divided by the British Admiralty into four commands: two in
the West Indies, centring respectively at Jamaica and Barbados; one
at Newfoundland; while the fourth, with its two chief naval bases of
Halifax and Bermuda, lay over against the United States, and embraced
the Atlantic coast-line in its field of operations. Admiral Sawyer now
promptly despatched a squadron, consisting of one small ship of the
line and three frigates, the "Shannon", 38, "Belvidera", 36, and
"AEolus", 32, which sailed July 5. Four days later, off Nantucket, it
was joined by the "Guerriere", 38, and July 14 arrived off Sandy Hook.
There Captain Broke, of the "Shannon", who by seniority of rank
commanded the whole force, "received the first intelligence of
Rodgers' squadron having put to sea."[422] As an American division of
some character had been known to be out since the "Belvidera" met it,
and as Rodgers on this particular day was within two days' sail of the
English Channel, the entire ignorance of the enemy as to his
whereabouts could not be more emphatically stated. The components of
the British force were such that no two of them could justifiably
venture to encounter his united command. Consequently, to remain
together was imposed as a military necessity, and it so continued for
some weeks. In fact, the first separation, that of the "Guerriere",
though apparently necessary and safe, was followed immediately by a
disaster.
Rodgers was therefore justified in his claim concerning his cruise.
"It is truly unpleasant to be obliged to make a communication thus
barren of benefit to our country. The only consolation I,
individually, feel on the occasion is derived from knowing that our
being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion
of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing an
incalculable amount of American property that would otherwise have
fallen a sacrifice." "My calculations were," he wrote on another
occasion, "even if I did not succeed in destroying the convoy, that
leaving the coast as we did would tend to distract the enemy, oblige
him to concentrate a considerable portion of his active navy, and at
the same time prevent his single cruisers from lying before any of our
principal ports, from their not knowing to which, or at what moment,
we might return."[423] This was not only a perfectly sound military
conception, gaining additional credit from the contrasted views of
Decatur and Bainbridge, but it was applied successfully at the most
critical moment of all wars, namely, when commerce is flocking home
for safety, and under conditions particularly hazardous to the United
States, owing to the unusually large number of vessels then out. "We
have been so completely occupied in looking out for Commodore Rodgers'
squadron," wrote an officer of the "Guerriere", "that we have taken
very few prizes."[424] President Madison in his annual message[425]
said: "Our trade, with little exception, has reached our ports, having
been much favored in it by the course pursued by a squadron of our
frigates under the command of Commodore Rodgers."
[Illustration: THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE
OCEAN ACTIONS OF THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE MOVEMENTS OF THE
SQUADRONS IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1812]
Nor was it only the offensive action of the enemy against the United
States' ports and commerce that was thus hampered. Unwonted defensive
measures were forced upon him. Uncertainty as to Rodgers' position and
intentions led Captain Broke, on July 29, to join a homeward-bound
Jamaica fleet, under convoy of the frigate "Thalia", some two or three
hundred miles to the southward and eastward of Halifax, and to
accompany it with his division five hundred miles on its voyage. The
place of this meeting shows that it was pre-arranged, and its distance
from the American coast, five hundred miles away from New York,
together with the length of the journey through which the additional
guard was thought necessary, emphasize the effect of Rodgers' unknown
situation upon the enemy's movements. The protection of their own
trade carried this British division a thousand miles away from the
coast it was to threaten. It is in such study of reciprocal action
between enemies that the lessons of war are learned, and its
principles established, in a manner to which the study of combats
between single ships, however brilliant, affords no equivalent. The
convoy that Broke thus accompanied has been curiously confused with
the one of which Rodgers believed himself in pursuit;[426] and the
British naval historian James chuckles obviously over the blunder of
the Yankee commodore, who returned to Boston "just six days after the
'Thalia', having brought home her charge in safety, had anchored in
the Downs." Rodgers may have been wholly misinformed as to there being
any Jamaica convoy on the way when he started; but as on July 29 he
had passed Madeira on his way home, it is obvious that the convoy
which Broke then joined south of Halifax could not be the one the
American squadron believed itself to be pursuing across the Atlantic a
month earlier.
Broke accompanied the merchant ships to the limits of the Halifax
station. Then, on August 6, receiving intelligence of Rodgers having
been seen on their homeward path, he directed the ship of the line,
"Africa", to go with them as far as 45 deg. W., and for them thence to
follow latitude 52 deg. N., instead of the usual more southerly
route.[427] After completing this duty the "Africa" was to return to
Halifax, whither the "Guerriere", which needed repairs, was ordered at
once. The remainder of the squadron returned off New York, where it
was again reported on September 10. The movement of the convoy, and
the "Guerriere's" need of refit, were linked events that brought
about the first single-ship action of the war; to account for which
fully the antecedent movements of her opponent must also be traced. At
the time Rodgers sailed, the United States frigate "Constitution", 44,
was lying at Annapolis, enlisting a crew. Fearing to be blockaded in
Chesapeake Bay, a position almost hopeless, her captain, Hull, hurried
to sea on July 12. July 17, the ship being then off Egg Harbor, New
Jersey, some ten or fifteen miles from shore, bound to New York,
Broke's vessels, which had then arrived from Halifax for the first
time in the war, were sighted from the masthead, to the northward and
inshore of the "Constitution". Captain Hull at first believed that
this might be the squadron of Rodgers, of whose actual movements he
had no knowledge, waiting for him to join in order to carry out
commands of the Department. Two hours later, another sail was
discovered to the northeast, off shore. The perils of an isolated
ship, in the presence of a superior force of possible enemies, imposed
caution, so Hull steered warily toward the single unknown. Attempting
to exchange signals, he soon found that he neither could understand
nor be understood. To persist on his course might surround him with
foes, and accordingly, about 11 P.M., the ship was headed to the
southeast and so continued during the night.
[Illustration: THE FORECASTLE OF THE _Constitution_ DURING THE
CHASE
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.]
The next morning left no doubt as to the character of the strangers,
among whom was the "Guerriere"; and there ensued a chase which,
lasting from daylight of July 18th to near noon of the 20th, has
become historical in the United States Navy, from the attendant
difficulties and the imminent peril of the favorite ship endangered.
Much of the pursuit being in calm, and on soundings, resort was had to
towing by boats, and to dragging the ship ahead by means of light
anchors dropped on the bottom. In a contest of this kind, the ability
of a squadron to concentrate numbers on one or two ships, which can
first approach and cripple the enemy, thus holding him till their
consorts come up, gives an evident advantage over the single opponent.
On the other hand, the towing boats of the pursuer, being toward the
stern guns of the pursued, are the first objects on either side to
come under fire, and are vulnerable to a much greater degree than the
ships themselves. Under such conditions, accurate appreciation of
advantages, and unremitting use of small opportunities, are apt to
prove decisive. It was by such diligent and skilful exertion that the
"Constitution" effected her escape from a position which for a time
seemed desperate; but it should not escape attention that thus early
in the war, before Great Britain had been able to re-enforce her
American fleet, one of our frigates was unable to enter our principal
seaport. "Finding the ship so far to the southward and eastward,"
reported Hull, "and the enemy's squadron stationed off New York, which
would make it impossible to get in there, I determined to make for
Boston, to receive your further orders."
On July 28 he writes from Boston that there were as yet no British
cruisers in the Bay, nor off the New England coast; that great numbers
of merchant vessels were daily arriving from Europe; and that he was
warning them off the southern ports, advising that they should enter
Boston. He reasoned that the enemy would now disperse, and probably
send two frigates off the port. In this he under-estimated the
deterrent effect of Rodgers' invisible command, but the apprehension
hastened his own departure, and on August 2 he sailed again with the
first fair wind. Running along the Maine coast to the Bay of Fundy, he
thence went off Halifax; and meeting nothing there, in a three or four
days' stay, moved to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to intercept the trade
of Canada and Nova Scotia. Here in the neighborhood of Cape Race some
important captures were made, and on August 15 an American brig
retaken, which gave information that Broke's squadron was not far
away. This was probably a fairly correct report, as its returning
course should have carried it near by a very few days before. Hull
therefore determined to go to the southward, passing close to Bermuda,
to cruise on the southern coast of the United States. In pursuance of
this decision the "Constitution" had run some three hundred miles,
when at 2 P.M. of August 19, being then nearly midway of the route
over which Broke three weeks before had accompanied the convoy, a sail
was sighted to the eastward, standing west. This proved to be the
"Guerriere," on her return to Halifax, whither she was moving very
leisurely, having traversed only two hundred miles in twelve days.
As the "Constitution," standing south-southwest for her destination,
was crossing the "Guerriere's" bows, her course was changed, in order
to learn the character of the stranger. By half-past three she was
recognized to be a large frigate, under easy sail on the starboard
tack; which, the wind being northwesterly, gives her heading from
west-southwest to southwest. The "Constitution" was to windward. At
3.45 the "Guerriere," without changing her course, backed her
maintopsail, the effect of which was to lessen her forward movement,
leaving just way enough to keep command with her helm (G 1). To be
thus nearly motionless assured the steadiest platform for aiming the
guns, during the period most critical for the "Constitution," when, to
get near, she must steer nearly head on, toward her opponent. The
disadvantage of this approach is that the enemy's shot, if they hit,
pass from end to end of the ship, a distance, in those days, nearly
fourfold that of from side to side; and besides, the line from bow to
stern was that on which the guns and the men who work them were
ranged. The risks of grave injury were therefore greatly increased by
exposure to this, which by soldiers is called enfilading, but at sea a
raking fire; and to avoid such mischance was one of the principal
concerns of a captain in a naval duel.
[Illustration: CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL
From the engraving by D. Edwin, after the painting by Gilbert
Stuart.]
Seeing his enemy thus challenge him to come on, Hull, who had been
carrying sail in order to close, now reduced his canvas to topsails,
and put two reefs into them, bringing by the wind for that object (C
1). All other usual preparations were made at the same time; the
"Constitution" during them lying side to wind, out of gunshot,
practically motionless, like her antagonist. When all was ready, the
ship kept away again, heading toward the starboard quarter of the
British vessel; that is, she was on her right-hand side, steering
toward her stern (C 2). As this, if continued, would permit her to
pass close under the stern, and rake, Captain Dacres waited until he
thought her within gunshot, when he fired the guns on the right-hand
side of the vessel--the starboard broadside--and immediately wore
ship; that is, turned the "Guerriere" round, making a half circle, and
bringing her other side toward the "Constitution," to fire the other,
or port, battery (G 2). It will be seen that, as both ships were
moving in the same general direction, away from the wind, the American
coming straight on, while the British retired by a succession of
semicircles, each time this manoeuvre was repeated the ships would be
nearer together. This was what both captains purposed, but neither
proposed to be raked in the operation. Hence, although the
"Constitution" did not wear, she "yawed" several times; that is,
turned her head from side to side, so that a shot striking would not
have full raking effect, but angling across the decks would do
proportionately less damage. Such methods were common to all actions
between single ships.
These proceedings had lasted about three quarters of an hour, when
Dacres, considering he now could safely afford to let his enemy close,
settled his ship on a course nearly before the wind, having it a
little on her left side (G 3). The American frigate was thus behind
her, receiving the shot of her stern guns, to which the bow fire of
those days could make little effective reply. To relieve this
disadvantage, by shortening its duration, a big additional sail--the
main topgallantsail--was set upon the "Constitution," which, gathering
fresh speed, drew up on the left-hand side of the "Guerriere," within
pistol-shot, at 6 P.M., when the battle proper fairly began (3). For
the moment manoeuvring ceased, and a square set-to at the guns
followed, the ships running side by side. In twenty minutes the
"Guerriere's" mizzen-mast[428] was shot away, falling overboard on the
starboard side; while at nearly the same moment, so Hull reported, her
main-yard went in the slings.[429] This double accident reduced her
speed; but in addition the mast with all its hamper, dragging in the
water on one side, both slowed the vessel and acted as a rudder to
turn her head to starboard,--from the "Constitution." The sail-power
of the latter being unimpaired would have quickly carried her so far
ahead that her guns would no longer bear, if she continued the same
course. Hull, therefore, as soon as he saw the spars of his antagonist
go overboard, put the helm to port, in order to "oblige him to do the
same, or suffer himself to be raked by our getting across his
bows."[430] The fall of the "Guerriere's" mast effected what was
desired by Hull, who continues: "On our helm being put to port the
ship came to, and gave us an opportunity of pouring in upon his
larboard bow several broadsides." The disabled state of the British
frigate, and the promptness of the American captain, thus enabled the
latter to take a raking position upon the port (larboard) bow of the
enemy; that is, ahead, but on the left side (4).
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION
AND GUERRIERE]
The "Constitution" ranged on very slowly across the "Guerriere's"
bows, from left to right; her sails shaking in the wind, because the
yards could not be braced, the braces having been shot away. From this
commanding position she gave two raking broadsides, to which her
opponent could reply only feebly from a few forward guns; then, the
vessels being close together, and the British forging slowly ahead,
threatening to cross the American's stern, the helm of the latter was
put up. As the "Constitution" turned away, the bowsprit of the
"Guerriere" lunged over her quarter-deck, and became entangled by her
port mizzen-rigging; the result being that the two fell into the same
line, the "Guerriere" astern and fastened to her antagonist as
described. (5) In her crippled condition for manoeuvring, it was
possible that the British captain might seek to retrieve the fortunes
of the day by boarding, for which the present situation seemed to
offer some opportunity; and from the reports of the respective
officers it is clear that the same thought occurred to both parties,
prompting in each the movement to repel boarders rather than to board.
A number of men clustered on either side at the point of contact, and
here, by musketry fire, occurred some of the severest losses. The
first lieutenant and sailing-master of the "Constitution" fell
wounded, and the senior officer of marines dead, shot through the
head. All these were specially concerned where boarding was at issue.
This period was brief; for at 6.30 the fore and main-masts of the
British frigate gave way together, carrying with them all the head
booms, and she lay a helpless hulk in the trough of a heavy sea,
rolling the muzzles of her guns under. A sturdy attempt to get her
under control with the spritsail[431] was made; but this resource, a
bare possibility to a dismasted ship in a fleet action, with friends
around, was only the assertion of a sound never-give-up tradition,
against hopeless odds, in a naval duel with a full-sparred antagonist.
The "Constitution" hauled off for half an hour to repair damages, and
upon returning received the "Guerriere's" surrender. It was then dark,
and the night was passed in transferring the prisoners. When day
broke, the prize was found so shattered that it would be impossible to
bring her into port. She was consequently set on fire at 3 P.M., and
soon after blew up.
[Illustration: THE BURNING OF THE _Guerriere_
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.]
In this fight the American frigate was much superior in force to her
antagonist. The customary, and upon the whole justest, mode of
estimating relative power, was by aggregate weight of shot discharged
in one broadside; and when, as in this case, the range is so close
that every gun comes into play, it is perhaps a useless refinement to
insist on qualifying considerations. The broadside of the
"Constitution" weighed 736 pounds, that of the "Guerriere" 570. The
difference therefore in favor of the American vessel was thirty per
cent, and the disparity in numbers of the crews was even greater. It
is not possible, therefore, to insist upon any singular credit, in the
mere fact that under such odds victory falls to the heavier vessel.
What can be said, after a careful comparison of the several reports,
is that the American ship was fought warily and boldly, that her
gunnery was excellent, that the instant advantage taken of the enemy's
mizzen-mast falling showed high seamanlike qualities, both in
promptness and accuracy of execution; in short, that, considering the
capacity of the American captain as evidenced by his action, and the
odds in his favor, nothing could be more misplaced than Captain
Dacres' vaunt before the Court: "I am so well aware that the success
of my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my earnest wish to be
once more opposed to the 'Constitution,' with the same officers and
crew under my command, in a frigate of similar force to the
'Guerriere.'"[432] In view of the difference of broadside weight, this
amounts to saying that the capacity and courage of the captain and
ship's company of the "Guerriere," being over thirty per cent greater
than those of the "Constitution," would more than compensate for the
latter's bare thirty per cent superiority of force. It may safely be
said that one will look in vain through the accounts of the
transaction for any ground for such assumption. A ready acquiescence
in this opinion was elicited, indeed, from two witnesses, the master
and a master's mate, based upon a supposed superiority of fire, which
the latter estimated to be in point of rapidity as four broadsides to
every three of the "Constitution."[433] But rapidity is not the only
element of superiority; and Dacres' satisfaction on this score,
repeatedly expressed, might have been tempered by one of the facts he
alleged in defence of his surrender--that "on the larboard side of the
'Guerriere' there were about thirty shot which had taken effect about
five sheets of copper down,"--far below the water-line.
Captain Hull with the "Constitution" reached Boston August 30, just
four weeks after his departure; and the following day Commodore
Rodgers with his squadron entered the harbor. It was a meeting between
disappointment and exultation; for so profound was the impression
prevailing in the United States, and not least in New England,
concerning the irreversible superiority of Great Britain on the sea,
that no word less strong than "exultation" can do justice to the
feeling aroused by Hull's victory. Sight was lost of the disparity of
force, and the pride of the country fixed, not upon those points which
the attentive seaman can recognize as giving warrant for confidence,
but upon the supposed demonstration of superiority in equal combat.
Consolation was needed; for since Rodgers' sailing much had occurred
to dishearten and little to encourage. The nation had cherished few
expectations from its tiny, navy; but concerning its arms on land the
advocates of war had entertained the unreasoning confidence of those
who expect to reap without taking the trouble to sow. In the first
year of President Jefferson's administration, 1801, the "peace
establishment" of the regular army, in pursuance of the policy of the
President and party in power, was reduced to three thousand men. In
1808, under the excitement of the outrage upon the "Chesapeake" and of
the Orders in Council, an "additional military force" was authorized,
raising the total to ten thousand. The latter measure seems for some
time to have been considered temporary in character; for in a return
to Congress in January, 1810, the numbers actually in service are
reported separately, as 2,765 and 4,189; total, 6,954, exclusive of
staff officers.
General Scott, who was one of the captains appointed under the Act of
1808, has recorded that the condition of both soldiers and officers
was in great part most inefficient.[434] Speaking of the later
commissions, he said, "Such were the results of Mr. Jefferson's low
estimate of, or rather contempt for, the military character, the
consequence of the old hostility between him and the principal
officers who achieved our independence."[435] In January, 1812, when
war had in effect been determined upon in the party councils, a bill
was passed raising the army to thirty-five thousand; but in the
economical and social condition of the period the service was under a
popular disfavor, to which the attitude of recent administrations
doubtless contributed greatly, and recruiting went on very slowly.
There was substantially no military tradition in the country. Thirty
years of peace had seen the disappearance of the officers whom the War
of Independence had left in their prime; and the Government fell into
that most facile of mistakes, the choice of old men, because when
youths they had worn an epaulette, without regarding the experience
they had had under it, or since it was laid aside.
Among the men thus selected were Henry Dearborn, for senior major
general, to command the northern division of the country, from Niagara
to Boston Bay and New York; and William Hull, a brigadier, for the
Northwestern frontier, centring round Detroit. The latter, who was
uncle to Captain Hull of the "Constitution," seems to have been chosen
because already civil Governor of Michigan Territory. President
Madison thus reversed the practice of Great Britain, which commonly
was to choose a military man for civil governor of exposed provinces.
Hull accepted with reluctance, and under pressure. He set out for his
new duties, expecting that he would receive in his distant and
perilous charge that measure of support which results from active
operations at some other point of the enemy's line, presumably at
Niagara. In this he was disappointed. Dearborn was now sixty-one, Hull
fifty-nine. Both had served with credit during the War of
Independence, but in subordinate positions; and Dearborn had been
Secretary of War throughout Jefferson's two terms.
Opposed to these was the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, Isaac
Brock, a major-general in the British army. A soldier from boyhood, he
had commanded a regiment in active campaign at twenty-eight. He was
now forty-two, and for the last ten years had served in North America;
first with his regiment, and later as a general officer in command of
the troops. In October, 1811, he was appointed to the civil government
of the province. He was thoroughly familiar with the political and
military conditions surrounding him, and his mind had long been
actively engaged in considering probable contingencies, in case war,
threatening since 1807, should become actual. In formulated purpose
and resolve, he was perfectly prepared for immediate action, as is
shown by his letters, foreshadowing his course, to his superior, Sir
George Prevost, Governor General of Canada. He predicted that the
pressure of the Indians upon the western frontier of the United States
would compel that country to keep there a considerable force, the
presence of which would naturally tend to more than mere defensive
measures. With the numerical inferiority of the British, the
co-operation of the Indians was essential. To preserve Upper Canada,
therefore, Michilimackinac and Detroit must be reduced. Otherwise the
savages could not be convinced that Great Britain would not sacrifice
them at a peace, as they believed her to have done in 1794, by Jay's
Treaty. In this he agreed with Hull, who faced the situation far more
efficiently than his superiors, and at the same moment was writing
officially, "The British cannot hold Upper Canada without the
assistance of the Indians, and that they cannot obtain if we have an
adequate force at Detroit."[436] Brock deemed it vital that
Amherstburg, nearly opposite Detroit, should be held in force; both to
resist the first hostile attack, and as a base whence to proceed to
offensive operations. He apprehended, and correctly, as the event
proved, that Niagara would be chosen by the Americans as the line for
their main body to penetrate with a view to conquest. This was his
defensive frontier; the western, the offensive wing of his campaign.
These leading ideas dictated his preparations, imperfect from paucity
of means, but sufficient to meet the limping, flaccid measures of the
United States authorities.
To this well-considered view the War Department of the United States
opposed no ordered plan of any kind, no mind prepared with even the
common precautions of every-day life. This unreadiness, plainly
manifested by its actions, was the more culpable because the
unfortunate Hull, in his letter of March 6, 1812, just quoted, a month
before his unwilling acceptance of his general's commission, had laid
clearly before it the leading features of the military and political
situation, recognized by him during his four years of office as
Governor of the Territory. In this cogent paper, amid numerous
illuminative details, he laid unmistakable emphasis on the decisive
influence of Detroit upon the whole Northwest, especially in
determining the attitude of the Indians. He dwelt also upon the
critical weakness of the communications on which the tenure of it
depended, and upon the necessity of naval superiority to secure them.
This expression of his opinion was in the hands of the Government over
three months before the declaration of war. As early as January,
however, Secretary Eustis had been warned by Armstrong, who
subsequently succeeded him in the War Department, that Detroit,
otherwise advantageous in position, "would be positively bad, unless
your naval means have an ascendency on Lake Erie."[437]
Unfortunately for himself and for the country, Hull, upon visiting the
capital in the spring, did not adhere firmly to his views as to the
necessity for a lake navy. After the capitulation, President Madison
wrote to his friend, John Nicholas, "The failure of our calculations
with respect to the expedition under Hull needs no comment. The worst
of it was that we were misled by a reliance, authorized by himself, on
its [the expedition] securing to us the command of the lakes."[438]
General Peter B. Porter, of the New York militia, a member also of
the House of Representatives, who served well on the Niagara frontier,
and was in no wise implicated by Hull's surrender, testified before
the Court Martial, "I was twice at the President's with General Hull,
when the subject of a navy was talked over. At first it was agreed to
have one; but afterwards it was agreed to abandon it, doubtless as
inexpedient."[439] The indications from Hull's earlier correspondence
are that for the time he was influenced by the war spirit, and
developed a hopefulness of achievement which affected his former and
better judgment.
On May 25, three weeks before the declaration of war, Hull took
command of the militia assembled at Dayton, Ohio. On June 10, he was
at Urbana, where a regiment of regular infantry joined. June 30, he
reached the Maumee River, and thence reported that his force was over
two thousand, rank and file.[440] He had not yet received official
intelligence of war having been actually declared, but all
indications, including his own mission itself, pointed to it as
imminent. Nevertheless, he here loaded a schooner with military
stores, and sent her down the river for Detroit, knowing that, twenty
miles before reaching there, she must pass near the British Fort
Malden, on the Detroit River covering Amherstburg; and this while the
British had local naval superiority. In taking this risk, the very
imprudence of which testifies the importance of water transportation
to Detroit, Hull directed his aids to forward his baggage by the same
conveyance; and with it, contrary to his intention, were despatched
also his official papers. The vessel, being promptly seized by the
boats of the British armed brig "Hunter," was taken into Malden,
whence Colonel St. George, commanding the district, sent the captured
correspondence to Brock. "Till I received these letters," remarked
the latter, "I had no idea General Hull was advancing with so large a
force."[441]
When Brock thus wrote, July 20, he was at Fort George, on the shore of
Ontario, near Niagara River, watching the frontier where he expected
the main attack. He had already struck his first blow. Immediately
upon being assured of the declaration of war, on June 28, he had
despatched a letter to St. Joseph's, directing all preparations to be
made for proceeding against Mackinac; the final determination as to
offensive or defensive action being very properly left to the officer
there in command. The latter, thus aware of his superior's wishes,
started July 16, with some six hundred men,--of whom four hundred were
Indians,--under convoy of the armed brig "Caledonia," belonging to the
Northwestern Fur Company. The next day he appeared before the American
post, where the existence of war was yet unknown. The garrison
numbered fifty-seven, including three officers; being about one third
the force reported necessary for the peace establishment by Mr.
Jefferson's Secretary of War, in 1801. The place was immediately
surrendered. Under all the conditions stated there is an entertaining
ingenuousness in the reference made to this disaster by President
Madison: "We have but just learned that the important post of
Michilimackinac has fallen into the hands of the enemy, but from what
cause remains to be known."[442]
Brock received this news at Toronto, July 29; but not till August 3 did
it reach Hull, by the arrival of the paroled prisoners. He was then on
the Canada side, at Sandwich, opposite Detroit; having crossed with
from fourteen to sixteen hundred men on July 12. This step was taken on
the strength of a discretionary order from the Secretary of War, that
if "the force under your command be equal to the enterprise, consistent
with the safety of your own post, you will take possession of Malden,
and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify." It must be
added, however, in justice to the Administration, that the same letter,
received July 9, three days before the crossing, contained the warning,
"It is also proper to inform you that an adequate force cannot soon be
relied on for the reduction of the enemy's posts below you."[443] This
bears on the question of Hull's expectation of support by diversion on
the Niagara frontier, and shows that he had fair notice on that score.
That over-confidence still possessed him seems apparent from a letter
to the secretary dated July 7, in which he said, "In your letter of
June 18, you direct me to adopt measures for the security of the
country, and to await further orders. I regret that I have not larger
latitude."[444] Now he received it, and his invasion of Canada was the
result. It is vain to deny his liberty of action, under such
instructions, but it is equally vain to deny the responsibility of a
superior who thus authorizes action, and not obscurely intimates a
wish, under general military conditions perfectly well known, such as
existed with reference to Hull's communications. Hull's attempt to
justify his movement on the ground of pressure from subordinates, moral
effect upon his troops, is admissible only if his decision were
consistently followed by the one course that gave a chance of success.
As a military enterprise the attempt was hopeless, unless by a rapid
advance upon Malden he could carry the works by instant storm. In that
event the enemy's army and navy, losing their local base of operations,
would have to seek one new and distant, one hundred and fifty miles to
the eastward, at Long Point; whence attempts against the American
positions could be only by water, with transportation inadequate to
carrying large bodies of men. The American general thus might feel
secure against attacks on his communications with Ohio, the critical
condition of which constituted the great danger of the situation,
whether at Detroit or Sandwich. Hull himself, ten days after crossing,
wrote, "It is in the power of this army to take Malden by storm, but it
would be attended, in my opinion, with too great a sacrifice under the
present circumstances."[445]
Instead of prompt action, two days were allowed to pass. Then, July
14, a council of war decided that immediate attack was inexpedient,
and delay advisable. This conclusion, if correct, condemned the
invasion, and should have been reached before it was attempted. The
military situation was this: Hull's line of supplies and
re-enforcements was reasonably secure from hostile interference
between southern Ohio and the Maumee; at which river proper
fortification would permit the establishment of an advanced depot.
Thence to Detroit was seventy-two miles, through much of which the
road passed near the lake shore. It was consequently liable to attack
from the water, so long as that was controlled by the enemy; while by
its greater distance from the centre of American population in the
West, it was also more exposed to Indian hostilities than the portion
behind the Maumee. Under these circumstances, Detroit itself was in
danger of an interruption of supplies and re-enforcements, amounting
possibly to isolation. It was open to the enemy to land in its rear,
secure of his own communications by water, and with a fair chance, in
case of failure, to retire by the way he came; for retreat could be
made safely in very small vessels or boats, so long as Malden was held
in force.
The reduction of Malden might therefore secure Detroit, by depriving
the enemy of a base suitable for using his lake power against its
communications. Unless this was accomplished, any advance beyond
Detroit with the force then at hand merely weakened that place, by
just the amount of men and means expended, and was increasingly
hazardous when it entailed crossing water. A sudden blow may snatch
safety under such conditions; but to attempt the slow and graduated
movements of a siege, with uncertain communications supporting it, is
to court disaster. The holding of Detroit being imperative, efforts
external to it should have been chiefly exerted on its rear, and upon
its front only to prevent the easy passage of the enemy. In short,
when Detroit was reached, barring the chance of a _coup de main_ upon
Malden, Hull's position needed to be made more solid, not more
extensive. As it was, the army remained at Sandwich, making abortive
movements toward the river Canard, which covered the approach to
Malden, and pushing small foraging parties up the valley of the
Thames. The greatest industry was used, Hull reported, in making
preparations to besiege, but it was not till August 7, nearly four
weeks after crossing, that the siege guns were ready; and then the
artillery officers reported that it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to take them to Malden by land, and by water still
more so, because the ship of war "Queen Charlotte," carrying eighteen
24-pounders, lay off the mouth of the Canard, commanding the stream.
The first impression produced by the advance into Canada had been
propitious to Hull. He himself in his defence admitted that the
enemy's force had diminished, great part of their militia had left
them, and many of their Indians.[446] This information of the American
camp corresponded with the facts. Lieut. Colonel St. George,
commanding Fort Malden, reported the demoralized condition of his
militia. Three days after Hull crossed he had left but four hundred
and seventy-one, in such a state as to be absolutely inefficient.[447]
Colonel Procter, who soon afterwards relieved him, could on July 18
muster only two hundred and seventy Indians by the utmost exertion,
and by the 26th these had rather decreased.[448] Professing to see no
immediate danger, he still asked for five hundred more regulars. At no
time before Hull recrossed did he have two hundred and fifty.[449]
Under Hull's delay these favorable conditions disappeared. British
re-enforcements, small but veteran, arrived; the local militia
recovered; and the Indians, with the facile changefulness of savages,
passed from an outwardly friendly bearing over to what began to seem
the winning side. Colonel Procter then initiated the policy of
threatening Hull's communications from the lake side. A body of
Indians sent across by him on August 4 defeated an American detachment
marching to protect a convoy from the Maumee. This incident, coming
upon accumulating adverse indications, and coinciding with the bad
news received from Mackinac, aroused Hull to the essential danger of
his situation. August 8 he recrossed to Detroit. August 9 another
vigorous effort was made by the enemy to destroy a detachment sent out
to establish communications with the rear. Although the British were
defeated, the Americans were unable to proceed, and returned to the
town without supplies. In the first of these affairs some more of
Hull's correspondence was captured, which revealed his apprehensions,
and the general moral condition of his command, to an opponent capable
of appreciating their military significance.
Brock had remained near Niagara, detained partly by the political
necessity of meeting the provincial legislature, partly to watch over
what he considered the more exposed portion of his military charge;
for a disaster to it, being nearer the source of British power, would
have upon the fortunes of the West an effect even more vital than a
reverse there would exert upon the East. Being soon satisfied that the
preparations of the United States threatened no immediate action, and
finding that Hull's troops were foraging to a considerable distance
east of Sandwich, along the Thames, he had decided to send against
them a small body of local troops with a number of Indians, while he
himself gathered some militia and went direct by water to Malden. To
his dismay, the Indians declined to assist, alleging their intention
to remain neutral; upon which the militia also refused, saying they
were afraid to leave their homes unguarded, till it was certain which
side the savages would take. On July 25 Brock wrote that his plans
were thus ruined; but July 29 it became known that Mackinac had
fallen, and on that day the militia about York [Toronto], where he
then was, volunteered for service in any part of the province. August
8 he embarked with three hundred of them, and a few regulars, at Long
Point, on the north shore of Lake Erie; whence he coasted to Malden,
arriving on the 13th.
Meanwhile batteries had been erected opposite Detroit, which opened on
the evening of August 15, the fort replying; but slight harm was done
on either side. Next day Brock crossed the greater part of his force,
landing three miles below Detroit. His little column of assault
consisted of 330 regulars, 400 militia, and 600 Indians, the latter in
the woods covering the left flank.[450] The effective Americans
present were by that morning's report 1,060;[451] while their field
artillery, additional to that mounted in the works, was much superior
to that of the enemy, was advantageously posted, and loaded with
grape. Moreover, they had the fort, on which to retire.
Brock's movements were audacious. Some said nothing could be more
desperate; "but I answer, that the state of Upper Canada admitted of
nothing but desperate remedies."[452] The British general had served
under Nelson at Copenhagen, and quoted him here. He knew also, through
the captured correspondence, that his opponent was a prey to a
desperation very different in temper from his own, and had lost the
confidence of his men. He had hoped, by the threatening position
assumed between the town and its home base, to force Hull to come out
and attack; but learning now that the garrison was weakened by a
detachment of three hundred and fifty, despatched two days before
under Colonel McArthur to open intercourse with the Maumee by a
circuitous road, avoiding the lake shore, he decided to assault at
once. When the British column had approached within a mile, Hull
withdrew within the works all his force, including the artillery, and
immediately afterward capitulated. The detachment under McArthur, with
another from the state of Ohio on its way to join the army, were
embraced in the terms; Brock estimating the whole number surrendered
at not less than twenty-five hundred. A more important capture, under
the conditions, was an American brig, the "Adams," not yet armed, but
capable of use as a ship of war, for which purpose she had already
been transferred from the War Department to the Navy.
In his defence before the Court Martial, which in March, 1814, tried
him for his conduct of the campaign, Hull addressed himself to three
particulars, which he considered to be the principal features in the
voluminous charges and specifications drawn against him. These were,
"the delay at Sandwich, the retreat from Canada, and the surrender at
Detroit."[453] Concerning these, as a matter of military criticism, it
may be said with much certainty that if conditions imposed the delay
at Sandwich, they condemned the advance to it, and would have
warranted an earlier retreat. The capitulation he justified on the
ground that resistance could not change the result, though it might
protract the issue. Because ultimate surrender could not be averted,
he characterized life lost in postponing it as blood shed uselessly.
The conclusion does not follow from the premise; nor could any
military code accept the maxim that a position is to be yielded as
soon as it appears that it cannot be held indefinitely. Delay, so long
as sustained, not only keeps open the chapter of accidents for the
particular post, but supports related operations throughout the
remainder of the field of war. Tenacious endurance, if it effected no
more, would at least have held Brock away from Niagara, whither he
hastened within a week after the capitulation, taking with him a force
which now could be well spared from the westward. No one military
charge can be considered as disconnected; therefore no commander has a
right to abandon defence while it is possible to maintain it, unless
he also knows that it cannot affect results elsewhere; and this
practically can never be certain. The burden of anxieties, of dangers
and difficulties, actual and possible, weighing upon Brock, were full
as great as those upon Hull, for on his shoulders rested both Niagara
and Malden. His own resolution and promptitude triumphed because of
the combined inefficiency of Hull and Dearborn. He scarcely could have
avoided disaster at one end or the other of the line, had either
opponent been thoroughly competent.
There was yet another reason which weighed forcibly with Hull, and
probably put all purely military considerations out of court. This
was the dread of Indian outrage and massacre. The general trend of the
testimony, and Hull's own defence, go to show a mind overpowered by
the agony of this imagination. After receiving word of the desertion
of two companies, he said, "I now became impatient to put the place
under the protection of the British; I knew that there were thousands
of savages around us." These thousands were not at hand. Not till
after September 1 did as many as a hundred arrive from the north--from
Mackinac.[454] In short, unless what Cass styled the philanthropic
reason can be accepted,--and in the opinion of the present writer it
cannot,--Hull wrote the condemnation of his action in his own defence.
"I shall now state what force the enemy brought, or might bring,
against me. I say, gentlemen, _might bring_, because it was that
consideration which induced the surrender, and not the force which was
actually landed on the American shore on the morning of the 16th. It
is possible I might have met and repelled that force; and if I had no
further to look than the event of a contest at that time, I should
have trusted to the issue of a battle.... The force brought against me
I am very confident was not less than one thousand whites, and as many
savage warriors."[455]
The reproach of this mortifying incident cannot be lifted from off
Hull's memory; but for this very reason, in weighing the
circumstances, it is far less than justice to forget his years,
verging on old age, his long dissociation from military life, his
personal courage frequently shown during the War of Independence, nor
the fact that, though a soldier on occasion, he probably never had the
opportunity to form correct soldierly standards. To the credit account
should also be carried the timely and really capable presentation of
the conditions of the field of operations already quoted, submitted by
him to the Government, which should not have needed such
demonstration. The mortification of the country fastened on his name;
but had the measures urged by him been taken, had his expedition
received due support by energetic operations elsewhere, events need
not have reached the crisis to which he proved unequal. The true
authors of the national disaster and its accompanying humiliation are
to be sought in the national administrations and legislatures of the
preceding ten or twelve years, upon whom rests the responsibility for
the miserably unprepared condition in which the country was plunged
into war. Madison, too tardily repentant, wrote, "The command of the
Lakes by a superior force on the water ought to have been a
fundamental part in the national policy from the moment the peace [of
1783] took place. What is now doing for the command proves what may be
done."[456]
FOOTNOTES:
[416] Captains' Letters, June 3, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
[417] Ibid., June 8, 1812.
[418] Captains' Letters, Sept. 2, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
[419] Navy Department MSS.
[420] Captains' Letters, J. Rodgers, Sept. 1, 1812. Navy Department
MSS.
[421] Letter of Sept. 1, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
[422] James, Naval History (edition 1824), vol. v. p. 283.
[423] Captains' Letters, Sept. 14, 1812. Navy Department MSS.
[424] Naval Chronicle (British), vol. xxviii. p. 426.
[425] Nov. 4, 1812.
[426] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 159; James, vol. v. p. 274.
[427] Sir J.B. Warren to Admiralty, Aug 24, 1812. Canadian Archives
MSS. M. 389. 1, p. 147.
[428] Of the three masts of a "ship," the mizzen-mast is the one
nearest the stern.
[429] The middle, where the yard is hung.
[430] Hull's report, Aug. 28, 1812. Captains' Letters, Navy Department
MSS.
[431] The spritsail was set on a yard which in ships of that day
crossed the bowsprit at its outer end, much as other yards crossed the
three upright lower masts. Under some circumstances ships would forge
slowly ahead under its impulse. It was a survival from days which knew
not jibs.
[432] Dacres' Defence before the Court Martial. Naval Chronicle, vol.
xxviii. p. 422.
[433] "Guerriere" Court Martial. MS. British Records Office.
[434] Memoirs of Gen. Winfield Scott, vol. i p. 31.
[435] Ibid., p. 35.
[436] Hull to the War Department, March 6, 1812. Report of Hull's
Trial, taken by Lieut. Col. Forbes, 42d U.S. Infantry. Hull's Defence,
p. 31.
[437] Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. i. p. 237.
[438] The Writings of Madison (ed. 1865), vol. ii. p. 563. See also
his letter to Dearborn, Oct. 7, 1812. Ibid., p. 547.
[439] Hull's Trial, p. 127. Porter was a witness for the defence.
[440] Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 4.
[441] Life of Brock, p. 192.
[442] Writings of James Madison (Lippincott, 1865), vol. ii. p. 543.
[443] Eustis to Hull, June 24, 1812. From MS. copy in the Records of
the War Department. This letter was acknowledged by Hull, July 9.
[444] Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 9.
[445] Hull to Eustis, July 22, 1812. Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 10.
[446] Hull's Trial, Defence, p. 45.
[447] Canadian Archives MSS. C. 676, p. 177.
[448] Ibid., p. 242.
[449] Hull's Trial. Evidence of Lieutenant Gooding, p. 101, and of
Sergeant Forbush, p. 147 (prisoners in Malden).
[450] Life of Brock, p. 250.
[451] Letter of Colonel Cass to U.S. Secretary of War, Sept. 10, 1812.
Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 27.
[452] Life of Brock, p. 267.
[453] Hull's Trial. Defence, p. 20.
[454] Hull's Trial. Testimony of Captain Eastman, p. 100, and of
Dalliby, Ordnance Officer, p. 84.
[455] Ibid. Hull's Defence, pp. 59-60.
[456] Madison to Dearborn, Oct. 7, 1812. Writings, vol. ii, p. 547.