hand, he let the Austrian government know that he hoped they would
be successful, promising at the same time that his alliance with the
French would be interpreted so formally, that the Austrians would
have nothing to fear from Russian armies. Yet in spite of these
diplomatic discouragements Napoleon lost none of his technical skill
in the campaign that followed. In five days (April 19-23, 1809) with
an army of 120,000 men, though the main Austrian army consisted of
175,000, he took 40,000 prisoners and 100 pieces of artillery. He
divided the enemy’s forces into separate divisions, both of which were
defeated, and so he opened up the road to Vienna. But the close of
the campaign was obstinately contested by the Austrian commander, the
Archduke Charles. In the neighborhood of the Austrian capital there
were desperate engagements at Aspern and Essling (May 21-22). For a
time Napoleon’s lieutenants, Masséna and Lannes, were hard pressed
near the island of Lobau in the Danube. The French advance was checked
thirteen times; Essling was taken and retaken, and, according to
general opinion, the primary result of this serious contest was only a
repetition of Eylau.
Reinforcements were summoned from all sides; Lobau was transformed
into a strong citadel with impregnable redoubts to insure the passage
of the river. In July, Napoleon had under him 150,000 men and 450
cannon. On the 5th and 6th of the month a decisive battle was fought
at Wagram, according to a carefully planned program. The Austrians
were first of all outnumbered; the whole French army was so dispersed
and concentrated over a distance of not more than four miles that it
could be directly under the Emperor’s eyes. On the other hand, the
Austrians were scattered, had no reserves at hand, and orders had to
be given in writing. Successful as was Napoleon’s strategy, which
contained his favorite expedient of breaking the enemy’s center by an
overwhelmingly strong concentrated attack on the weakest point, it was
plain to him that there was no longer in his army the cohesive action
that had made the earlier victories so complete. The battle cost from
20,000 to 25,000 men on each side. “These are no longer the soldiers
of Austerlitz,” he explained; and he showed his lack of confidence by
giving up bayonet charges and trusting to artillery fire to break up
his opponents’ lines.
The Austrian archduke withdrew from the field in good order, but
Napoleon had no desire to pursue and force another engagement in the
interior of the country. He trusted to the general influence abroad of
the success at Wagram, and was glad to sign a treaty of peace at Vienna
on the 14th of October, 1809, by which Austria was denuded of large
sections of territory, that were taken to reward the fidelity of the
Bavarians and Poles to their French allies. Under this reorganization
Austria occupied a territory smaller than that of pre-revolutionary
France. She was required to reduce her army to 150,000 men and to
pay an indemnity of $17,000,000. Russia’s share of the spoil was
measured by her apathetic position as an ally. There was an addition
of territory containing a population of 400,000, but this was a small
gain that by no means outweighed the favor shown to the Poles by the
annexation of western Galicia to the grand duchy of Warsaw. Annexed to
the French Empire were Fiume, Trieste, Croatia, Carniola, and a part of
Carinthia, so that Napoleon’s eastern dominions extended practically
without a break in their eastern border from the mouth of the Cattaro
to Dantzic. Austria seemed to have become as much a satellite of
Napoleon’s empire as Holland or Italy.
VII THE BEGINNING OF THE END
During the course of the contest with Austria, the war in the Iberian
peninsula went on in a prolonged series of obstinate campaigns
between Napoleon’s marshals and an allied force composed of English,
Portuguese, and Spanish contingents. Even after the victory of Wagram
the Spaniards held on in the face of several disasters; and helped
by the English fleet they managed to retain a foothold in Cadiz. The
temper of the population was judged to be so hostile that the French
army of occupation was raised to the enormous number of 270,000 and
the whole country was placed under martial law. The King, Napoleon’s
brother Joseph, was only the nominal executive; he aptly called himself
the porter of the Madrid hospitals. As the country was harassed with
guerrilla warfare, and as the Cortes refused to recognize Joseph as
their sovereign, Napoleon threatened to annex the whole kingdom to
France.
In Portugal, a French army under Masséna failed to win a decisive
victory. It was met by an Anglo-Portuguese force under Wellington, who
so strongly intrenched himself at Torres Vedras that Masséna finally
withdrew, followed by the English. In his retreat the French general
was unable to change his fortune, and the effort to occupy Portugal
failed. Masséna was then superseded in his command. Later on the French
cause was much injured by the mutual jealousies of the commanders of
the various army corps, who, if they had zealously coöperated, might,
with the superior forces at their command, have driven Wellington back
to the sea coast. By the year 1812, the French armies were stale,
and although there were 230,000 French soldiers in the peninsula,
Wellington was allowed to invade Spain with an army of only 60,000 men.
Napoleon was indignant at the mismanagement of his subordinates,
and sent Jourdon to take charge of the military operations. The new
commander not only found the various generals under him unwilling to
act together, but also had to deal with a situation in which the troops
were demoralized by habits of pillage. Their pay was in arrears, field
artillery was scarce, the large siege guns had fallen into the hands of
the English, there were no wagon trains and no supply service. Napoleon
himself could not from a distance undertake any intelligent supervision
of the Spanish situation, since he was obliged to depend on indirect
information, and when he interfered his commands were rarely carried
out with common sense or good will. His own hands were not free when
the Spanish affairs became most critical, for the alliance with Russia,
on which so much hope was placed, proved only temporary. On both sides
there were grievances; Napoleon was indignant at the apathetic attitude
of his ally during the Wagram campaign, and he felt irritated also
at the hesitation and delay of the Czar in arranging a marriage for
him with a Russian archduchess, after the divorce from Josephine. A
distinct Austrian trend was given to French policy when Napoleon found
the Austrian Emperor willing to sacrifice his daughter, for the purpose
of perpetuating the Napoleonic dynasty. Intimation was given in plain
terms that in the questions relating to the Balkan peninsula, Russia’s
scheme of aggression would be no more encouraged nor supported.
In Alexander’s domains the continental blockade against England was
unpopular and disastrous. With English vessels barred from Russian
ports there was no more an outlet for the raw materials of the country.
Many of the landlords were in a bankrupt condition; reprisals were made
by increasing the tariff on French goods. In a military sense the only
benefit accruing to Russia from the French alliance was the conquest of
Finland. No good came from French help either in the war with Persia
or in that with Turkey. On the other side, the constant extension
of French territory and influence placed a sinister but natural
interpretation on Napoleon’s promises to share with the Russians the
dominion of all European and Asiatic lands as far East as India.
The last step in annexation illustrated the character of Napoleon’s
present temper. Hamburg and Lübeck were incorporated with the French
Empire and along with them the duchy of Oldenburg, whose duke was
closely allied to the Russian royal house. The Czar protested formally,
but without moving the Emperor of the French either to recede or to
give adequate compensation for annexing these German territories.
But the severest blow to Russia came from the favors shown the Poles,
to reward their valorous coöperation in the Wagram campaign. The Czar,
who feared the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, attempted to
secure from Napoleon the promise that that kingdom should never be
reëstablished. Napoleon’s reply was that he would only pledge himself
not to give any assistance to any revolt tending to restore the kingdom
of Poland. The Czar’s anxiety was misplaced, for the provinces of his
empire that he feared might be taken, were in no sense Polish socially,
though they had formed a part of the ancient kingdom of Poland. There
was no likelihood of a popular movement in favor of the Poles, nor
would the population have endured a pro-Polish rearrangement of their
territory against the Russians, with whom they, as members of the
Orthodox Church, were closely in sympathy. There was also a pro-Russian
party among the Poles which Alexander encouraged, by proposing a scheme
to establish an enlarged autonomous Poland with a constitution under
Russian protection. In 1811, Russian troops were massed together, to
invade the grand duchy of Warsaw, and so to encourage the Russian
partisans to carry through Alexander’s scheme.
In the spring of 1811, Napoleon, who had at first made light of the
intimations of the hostile purposes of the Czar, that kept coming to
him from Polish sources, realized that there was a substance behind
these reports and began to collect forces from all parts of his empire
to protect the grand duchy. Napoleon told the Russian representatives
of his gigantic preparations, and at the same time declared that he
wished for peace; he asked also whether Alexander thought he was ready
to sacrifice 200,000 Frenchmen to re-establish Poland.
But the final rupture arose over Napoleon’s economic policy. Alexander
refused to give up the right of trading with neutrals. “I am ready,”
he said, “to withdraw to Siberia rather than accept for Russia the
situation now occupied by Austria and Prussia.” When the Russian
ultimatum was handed in, its conditions were the settlement of
Alexander’s grievances with Sweden, the evacuation of Prussia, and
the right of commerce with neutrals as preliminary to the question
of tariffs and indemnity for the seizure of Oldenburg. Napoleon’s
unwilling allies, Prussia and Austria, smarting as they were from past
defeats at his hands, were not to be depended upon. On the other hand,
Russia’s hands were made free by subsidies from England, by a treaty
of peace with Turkey, and by the valuable aid of Sweden, whose crown
prince was now Bernadotte, a kinsman of Napoleon and one of his ablest
marshals.
In May, 1812, the French Emperor appeared in Dresden, ready to
undertake the invasion of Russia; he was the personal ruler of 130
French departments, and under him, in the relation of vassals, were
seven kingdoms and thirty princes. In Poland, he was greeted with great
enthusiasm, but the actual contingents supplied to his army from Polish
sources did not amount to more than 70,000 men. Much of the Grand Army
with which Russia was now invaded, 678,000 in all (among the items
being 480,000 foot, 100,000 horse, and 80,000 artillerymen), were
composed, to the proportion of nearly half, of foreign contingents.
Besides the force taken with him to Russia, he had at his command,
under arms, 150,000 soldiers in France, 50,000 in Italy, 300,000 in
Spain. The plan of campaign was to penetrate into the interior of
the Russian Empire, leaving ample forces to guard communications and
protect the flanks, as the French advanced. On the Russian side the
forces were much less numerous, and there actually faced the 400,000
French who crossed the Niemen the last of June, only 147,000 Russians.
Napoleon’s plan depended for success on quick action. He hoped to
attack and overcome the two chief Russian armies, before they had
effected a junction. But the country was not like the plains of central
Europe; it was marshy and broken by forests. His commanders, especially
his brother Jerome, whose position at the head of an army corps was
an absurd concession to the clan spirit of the Bonaparte family,
showed dilatoriness in executing important strategical movements. The
troops also suffered in their discipline from the constant marauding
expeditions. Desertions were numerous, many lagged behind, and there
were epidemics in the invading army owing to the extreme heat. From
these various causes the divisions lost a large percentage of their
effective strength, so that by the middle of July the invaders were
faced by a reduction in the original number of their army of 150,000
men. Napoleon won no decisive victory, for after every engagement the
enemy contrived to get away, drawing the invading forces farther into
the interior of the country.
At Smolensk and Borodino there were battles that recalled the Eylau
campaign, the losses were heavy on both sides without producing any
change in the position of the opposing armies. On September 7, a
murderous battle took place at Borodino near Moscow; the victory for
the French might have been complete, if Napoleon had not at a critical
time refused to let his guard charge, saying that he did not want to
destroy it, 800 leagues away from France. The loss on both sides was
frightful; of the French 30,000 were “hors de combat,” while the
Russians counted their losses at 60,000. Among the killed on the French
side were three generals of division, nine brigadier generals, and ten
colonels. The Russians lost their heroic commander Bagration.
The road was now opened to Moscow, but there was no rejoicing among
the victors, for on the field of battle lay 30,000 dead and 60,000
wounded. On the 14th, Napoleon entered the city, the ancient capital
of Russia. Most of the inhabitants had fled, leaving only the lower
classes and the occupants of the prisons, whom the governor of the city
had released, when he heard of the victory of the French. While the
army was halted in expectation that Alexander would sue for peace, a
fire, started by Russian incendiaries, soon consumed most of the city,
the houses of which were constructed entirely of wood. Fifteen thousand
of the Russian wounded, who had been brought on in ambulances, were
burnt to death. After the fire had spent its course Napoleon took up
his abode in the Kremlin, which was only saved by the efforts of the
Imperial Guard. He still hoped that terms of peace might be arranged,
but Alexander continued inflexible.
Napoleon for a time contemplated spending the winter in Russia, since
he recognized the practical difficulties of the retreat and the loss
of prestige due to his withdrawal. Finally he decided to return by the
southern provinces. The start west began on the 19th of November, 1812,
with a force of 100,000 men; the way south was made impracticable by
the obstinate resistance of the Russian general Kutusoff, with his army
of only 50,000 men. Therefore the route over which they had come had
to be taken for the return. The rearguard was constantly harassed by
the enemy, and early in November there was a battle at Viazma, in which
the French lost from 15,000 to 18,000 men. Snow began to fall, food was
scarce, the troops were badly prepared to endure the wintry weather;
out of 100,000 men there were soon only 40,000 left able to bear arms,
and at Smolensk on the 12th of November only 34,000 were left.
No French army corps actually surrendered, but they suffered terrible
losses, some of them losing half their effective strength. The Russians
who followed the retreat were also reduced from 60,000 to 30,000.
At the Berezina, where three Russian armies were joined to dispute
the passage, the French with unheard-of bravery rescued themselves
from capture by forces three times as numerous, and inflicted on the
Russians a loss of 14,000 men. When the remnants of the army reached
Lithuania, Napoleon left them there in order to make a rapid return to
Paris and to counteract by his presence in his capital the bad effect
of the news of the defeat in Russia. New armies had to be raised, for
it was practically certain that a large part of Germany would soon be
in revolt. Though temporarily strengthened by the various contingents
left to protect the communications eastward, the final stage of the
retreat from Russia, which was conducted by Murat, bore witness to
the frightful straits and demoralization of the French. The sick and
wounded were abandoned; there were no provisions for carrying the
artillery or the pontoons; even the army treasure and the secret
archives had to be left behind. Before the end of the journey west Ney,
who commanded the rearguard, had with him no more than 500 or 600 men,
and when the Old Guard entered Königsberg, it was reduced to 1500 men,
of whom only 500 were fit to bear arms.
The extent of the Russian disaster may be measured by a few statistics;
533,000 soldiers crossed the actual frontier into Russia in the
summer of 1812; 18,000 of the main army returned in the December
following; about 130,000 men had been made prisoners in Russia,
55,000 had deserted at the opening of the campaign, and there were
55,000 survivors of the various corps that had been stationed as
reserves along the line outside of the Russian territory. Altogether
250,000 must be reckoned as having perished during the course of the
march to Moscow and the retreat from that city. The disaster meant
that Napoleon’s schemes of European domination were checked and his
military resources much diminished. It was no longer a question of new
conquests, but of turning to face the nations who had suffered so long
from French despotic rule.
VIII DEFEAT AND EXILE
From every quarter came the word that, with the Grand Army destroyed,
the French Cæsar must now yield; his system, it was said, had expired
on the plains of Russia. The hostile spirit of a subject population
was seen as the straggling French passed through Prussia; soldiers who
dropped out of the ranks were disarmed by the peasants, insulted and
badly handled. The Prussians and Austrians made separate arrangements
with the Russians, by which hostilities, so far as each were concerned,
were to be suspended. Most of Prussia was abandoned; there were only
40,000 French left to oppose a revolted Germany. Even Murat, Napoleon’s
brother-in-law, abandoned the failing cause and retired suddenly to
Naples, to make from there arrangements on his own account with the
Austrian Prime Minister Metternich.
The activity of Napoleon in such a desperate situation was marvelous.
As to money, he collected nearly $100,000,000 by using his own private
treasury and selling large amounts of communal estates. Every available
man was placed under arms, including the National Guard and even by
anticipation the conscripts of 1814--there were already 140,000 of
the conscripts of 1813 under training--the sailors in the seaports
were enrolled as soldiers; and many regiments were taken from Spain.
Altogether there was collected and sent in detachments to Germany an
army of 500,000 men, mostly made up of youths less than twenty years
of age. In order to give them discipline and stability, veterans were
incorporated in the new regiments.
Napoleon was not so alert as he had been; he was suffering from an
internal disease, and sometimes for weeks he was incapable of effort.
There were frequent attacks also of drowsiness, all indicative
of exhaustion of his powers. He was more intolerant than ever of
criticism, refused to take advice, was suspicious of his counselors,
and contemptuous of the ability of his commanders, an attitude somewhat
justified by the fact that many of his best marshals were now replaced
by men of second-rate ability, while others, who were fitted to
command, were unwilling from jealousy to work together. Marbot declared
that, “if the Emperor had wished to punish all those who were lacking
in zeal, he would have been obliged to dispense with the services of
nearly all his marshals.”
The service of supplies for the army was most defective. In the
beginning of the year 1813, by the carelessness of the administrative
work in this department, the Prussians got possession of over
$6,000,000 worth of supplies, intended for the French armies. The
consequence was that the soldiers depended on pillage; even the
officers lived on what they could get from the country. Worse than
all was the inability of the Emperor himself to gauge the changed
conditions produced by his defeat. He still behaved as if he were
invincible, and refused to make terms with Prussia or to conciliate
Austria by well-timed territorial concessions. To the end he would not
believe that his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, would take up
arms against him. If, at this time, he had accepted a smaller, compact
France, confined to its natural limits, he might have avoided the
disasters of 1813 and 1814, and yet ruled over a territory larger than
that ever held by Louis XIV.
In the new coalition Prussia was most anxious to restore her prestige;
the uprising against the French was a national movement common to all
classes of the population. Finally, even the timorous King was induced
to side with the Russians and to issue an appeal to his people. There
were 150,000 Prussians under arms, and in order to receive the help of
other German states, proclamations were issued under Russian auspices,
making generous promises of national independence and personal liberty.
So were transplanted to German soil the watchwords of the French
Revolution. Austria made many open professions of fidelity to the
alliance with France, but Metternich was actively intriguing with the
smaller German courts. He even tried to detach Jerome of Westphalia and
Murat of Naples from the French, and he did all in his power to urge
Frederick William, the Prussian king, to take up arms in behalf of the
independence of Europe.
In the military operations of 1813, while the French were opposed only
by the allied forces of Prussia and Russia, the advantage continued
on the side of the French Emperor; by the autumn, however, Austria
and many of the German vassal states had joined the coalition and the
defeat of Napoleon was the certain outcome. As a result of a series
of battles around Dresden, the cause of the allies was in a critical
position; both sides had lost heavily but Napoleon was much chagrined
that there had been no signal positive advantage from the constant
butchery of his men. He was weak in cavalry, and so could not follow
up his successes; the terrible loss of horses in Russia had not been
made up. But at any rate he was steadily getting back the territory
in Germany he had previously held. On the other side, the Russian and
Prussian generals were blaming one another for their failures, and so
making the continuance of the coalition problematical.
At this point Metternich intervened after an armistice had been signed
at Pressnitz early in July, 1813. He agreed to support the coalition,
unless the French consented to give up Holland, Switzerland, Spain,
the Confederation of the Rhine, Poland, and the larger part of Italy.
Napoleon was indignant when Metternich laid down these terms during a
personal interview at Dresden. “You want war,” he said; “well, you will
get it. I will meet you at Vienna. How many allies have you got, four,
five, six, twenty? The more you have the less disturbed I am. What do
you want me to do? Disgrace myself? Never. I can die, but I shall never
give up an inch of territory. Your sovereigns who are born on a throne
can let themselves be beaten twenty times, and always return to their
capital. I cannot do it, because I am an upstart soldier. You are not
a soldier, and you do not know what takes place in a soldier’s soul.
I grew up on battlefields, and a man such as I am cares little for the
lives of a million men.”