territories, the Treaty of Pressburg, December 20, 1805, showed how
greatly the traditional balance of power was altered, giving place
to Napoleon’s scheme for dominating the whole of Europe. Austria
lost the territories of Venice, Istria except Trieste, Dalmatia; she
recognized Napoleon as King of Italy and was forced to surrender
valuable possessions to the German princes who were allies of the
French. There was also a titular diminution of power, because Francis
II now surrendered the title of Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire,
which gave him a theoretical sovereignty over the German states, and
accepted the territorial title of hereditary Emperor of Austria. To
these extreme measures of humiliation Napoleon obstinately adhered,
though his foreign minister, Talleyrand, wisely preached moderation to
him, urging with unique diplomatic vision that if Austria were to be
deprived of so much territory in the west, there should be compensation
made for her losses by handing over to her Turkish provinces in the
lower valley of the Danube. France, he pointed out, would profit by
this act of generosity, for Austria would give up looking to England
for support, and, as a power in the East, would be certain to excite
the jealousy of Russia, because Russia had always looked to inherit the
Ottoman domains. But Napoleon’s plans would tolerate no scheme by which
any European state would be helped to preserve more than a fictitious
independent existence.
After Austerlitz the Confederation of the Rhine was created, a league
of sixteen dependent German princes, of which the French Emperor was
the head. Bavaria and Wurtemburg were especially favored, receiving the
title of kingdoms, while their royal houses were drawn close into the
orbit of French influence by marriages with members of the Bonaparte
and Beauharnais families. Italy being now absorbed, Napoleon’s sisters
were rewarded with Italian principalities, while his brother Joseph
took the place of one of the Bourbons on the throne of Naples. Only
the Pope was left as an independent sovereign in the much reduced
temporal dominions of the Church. Holland, in accordance with the fully
developed imperial system, became a kingdom, in place of a republic,
with Louis, the Emperor’s brother, as its sovereign. Only one member
of the family proved recalcitrant to Napoleon’s plans, and, therefore,
was not rewarded in this division of the spoils of conquest. This was
Lucien, who had saved the day on the 19th Brumaire and had made it
possible for his brother to climb into absolute power. He refused to
divorce his wife and marry a princess, and, therefore, he shared none
of the favors that were being distributed. Napoleon’s mother, Letitia
Bonaparte, who took Lucien’s side in this quarrel, was never declared
a princess, and had to be satisfied with the honorary title of Madame
Mère. Napoleon had conferred upon himself officially the title of Great
(1806). His birthday was kept as a national and imperial holiday on
which was celebrated a quasi-religious feast of apotheosis, modeled
after the precedents of the Roman Empire.
Although Austerlitz called forth a new distribution of the map of
Europe, and elevated, as if by a miracle, the members of the house of
Bonaparte, it did not give peace to France. Russia had not shared in
the Treaty of Pressburg, and even the English government, which, after
the death of Pitt, was headed by the liberal pro-French statesman
Fox, could make no satisfactory peace terms with the Emperor of the
French. Prussia, whose neutrality was suspected, was treated with
little consideration and no frankness by Napoleon’s government. It is
true that he handed Hanover to it, but he made no secret of the fact
that he would withdraw his gift provided that, if he restored Hanover
to England, that power would consent to make peace. There was an
active war party in Prussia who were anxious to try conclusions with
the French army, because they relied on the traditions of the perfect
military machine established by Frederick the Great. They boasted of
their ability to destroy Napoleon’s army which had only conquered
Austrians and Russians. Alexander of Russia was also anxious to renew
the conflict, and England poured out its treasures to the extent of
6,000,000 pounds.
The result was the Fourth Coalition against France, made up of England,
Prussia, Russia, and Sweden. Hostilities began with an inflated
ultimatum from the King of Prussia, ordering Napoleon to evacuate
Germany and to give up the Confederation of the Rhine. The declaration
of war on the part of Prussia was most ill-timed, for the Austrians had
not yet recovered from the defeat of Austerlitz, and the Russians were
not prepared to act the part of effective allies at the beginning of
the campaign. To this carelessness in selecting the time for commencing
hostilities was added over-confidence in the military superiority of
the Prussian army. As a machine, it presented the outward semblance
of the creation of Frederick the Great; but there was an absence
of intelligent direction. The soldiers were badly treated under a
régime of poor diet and strict discipline, while the officers were a
privileged class, who remained in active service long after they had
passed the prime of life. This artificial system collapsed like a pack
of cards; as Heine said, “Napoleon breathed on Prussia and Prussia
ceased to exist.”
In preparing for this new campaign, Napoleon repeated the strategy of
the Austerlitz campaign. He disguised, by feigned hostile movements and
by ostentatiously remaining in Paris, his intention of striking one
of his rapid, certain strokes at the enemy’s weakest spot. Led into a
false self-confidence, the Prussians took the offensive with 150,000
men. By means of quick concentration, Napoleon’s army was brought up to
a strength of 175,000. With this force, instead of coming into contact
with the Prussians on the northwest, as had been expected, he turned
their army on the southeast and threatened their communications with
Berlin. The victory was won by two skilfully conducted pitched battles,
at Jena and also at Auerstadt (the 14th of October, 1806), where
Davout, with an army much inferior to that opposed to him, specially
distinguished himself. The Prussian armies were reduced to a mass of
fugitives; there were 20,000 killed and wounded and 18,000 prisoners,
but the victory cost the French 12,000 men, for the Prussians had
fought bravely, though their generalship was poor.
There was later a spectacular entrance into Berlin by the victorious
army, arranged after the manner of a Roman triumph, with the Prussian
regiment of the guards disarmed and following their conquerors.
Napoleon interpreted his victory as giving him a chance to show his
power of wreaking a personal vengeance on those who had so rashly
questioned his power. “I will render this court nobility so small,” he
said, “that they will be obliged to beg their bread.” He acted in the
spirit of these words, and outraged public sentiment by carrying off,
as part of the booty of Berlin, the sword of Frederick the Great. Over
the conquered country was extended a network of officials, intrusted
with the duty of collecting large money contributions. No community
was allowed to escape the imposition, and all were made to feel their
responsibility for the war. There was also a rearrangement of German
territories, under which Jerome, the Emperor’s youngest and least
competent brother, was provided with a throne under the title of King
of Westphalia.
After the defeat of Prussia, the Russians, who had been slowly
drawing together great masses of men, kept up an obstinate struggle
against Napoleon’s generals, and little progress was made by the
French. Marbot describes the campaign in all its hardships; the
weather, he says, was terribly cold, but the troops seem to have
suffered even more in their marches from the thaws which rendered
the bad roads impassable. While the French army was encamped for the
winter, Benningsen, the Russian general, tried, early in February,
to force his way between the two divisions of the French army under
Ney and Bernadotte. The plan failed because Bernadotte was not taken
by surprise; his defense was a brilliant one, and gave Napoleon an
opportunity for attempting a turning movement on Benningsen’s army.
This purpose could not be carried out because the despatch announcing
it to the French subordinate commanders fell into the hands of the
Russians, who got away in time. In the pursuit, the Russians turned on
the French, and the result was a “soldiers’ battle,” fought at Eylau,
February 8, 1807, in which for a time the Emperor’s position was most
critical, for his army was half encircled and suffered terribly from
the enemy’s artillery fire. The day was finally saved by a remarkable
cavalry charge, led by Murat, who passed through three Russian lines
and broke up their attack. But despite this terrible massacre of men
at Eylau,--10,000 French and 30,000 Russians,--no final result was
attained by it. Neither side could claim to be victorious; it was
something, however, to prove that Napoleon was not invincible, and,
as Eylau was not a Russian defeat, the Russians interpreted it as a
victory. The two powers, Prussia and Russia, agreed not to make a
permanent treaty with France until the banks of the Rhine were accepted
as her frontiers.
During the spring each side remained inactive, for both were in need
of reinforcements. Benningsen with 100,000 men took the offensive,
but after some preliminary hard fighting, placed himself, still on
the offensive, in an unfavorable position near Friedland. He had
brought his army into a narrow ravine with the river Alle behind him,
so that in case of a check he had only the bridges to depend upon for
withdrawing his men. These bridges were cut in a turning movement, made
by Ney, while Lannes, with 26,000 French against 82,000 Russians, kept
Benningsen from leaving his position, during a space of thirteen hours.
By the evening the Russian army had but 25,000 men under arms and was
hopelessly demoralized.
After this defeat the Fourth Coalition was at an end. The Peace of
Tilsit was drawn up as the result of a personal interview between
Alexander of Russia and Napoleon on a raft anchored in the river
Niemen. After several private meetings Napoleon succeeded in attracting
to himself the enthusiastic sympathy of his obstinate opponent. There
was outlined a common plan of action by which both sides were to
benefit, Russia was to gain territory in Finland, at the expense of
Sweden, and in the East, at the expense of Turkey. Even more important
was the winning over of Alexander to agree to Napoleon’s continental
blockade against England, by which all English goods were to be kept
out of continental ports.
But even by making this volteface in Russian policy, Alexander
could secure no favorable terms for his late ally, Prussia. That
power was denuded of territory to the east which it had originally
acquired in the partition of Poland; for of this was constructed one
of Napoleon’s new creations, the grand duchy of Warsaw, of which the
elector of Saxony, approved by Napoleon for his pro-French policy,
became sovereign with the title of King. On the west, all lands beyond
the Elbe were taken, to be added to the new kingdom of Westphalia.
Frederick of Prussia had besides to accede to the anti-British economic
measures of Napoleon, to pay a war indemnity of $20,000,000, and to be
humbly grateful for the return of four provinces in the northeast that
had been detached from Prussia after the battle of Jena.
VI AT THE ZENITH OF POWER
After Tilsit it was plain that Napoleon was no longer a French monarch;
his schemes of conquest were now not made in the interest of France,
for France, like the other powers of central Europe, was to be only
a province of a vast territorial empire, managed for the personal
profit of a single individual, who bestowed and took away power and
territory, according to his caprice. England still stood in his way
after his diplomatic success at Tilsit, but no armies were left to
oppose him. It seemed, therefore, a comparatively easy matter to master
England by cutting her off from the sources of her wealth. No power
or state was allowed to be neutral, for those who declared themselves
so were proscribed along with England (decree of Milan, 1807). A hard
fate awaited any refractory nation, for nationalism now lived only
on sufferance. To suspend the economic life of millions of people,
to transform habits of industry peculiar to sea-going populations
was to Napoleon’s mind no greater task than to annihilate armies
and partition kingdoms. From Tilsit dates the effort to attain the
impossible, and with it begins, in a succession of rapid changes, the
decline of the imperial system, the strain being greater than any
such artificial construction could bear. Externally the establishment
of peace consolidated Napoleon’s power and influence at home; the last
campaigns had been a severe drain, but the diplomatic success of Tilsit
compensated for the losses in the battlefield.
Napoleon’s familiar method of using a period of peace for extending his
power at every weak point of contact was now resumed. Portugal, as a
state closely connected with England, was to be detached from British
influence by force of arms. Nor was any consideration to be paid to
Spain, loyal though she had been to France, her ally. A loyalty which
had cost her dear already became more fatal still when Napoleon began
to plan for a cession of Spanish territory and the substitution of a
member of his own house for the Bourbons. In the north, Denmark was to
be required to renounce her position of neutrality and to hand over her
valuable fleet of twenty ships to coöperate with the French. It was in
anticipation of this step, that an English fleet, outdoing the lawless
code of their adversaries, bombarded, in July, 1807, Copenhagen, the
capital of a state with which it was at peace, and seized the Danish
ships in the harbor.
This was the act which drove Alexander into closer relations with
Napoleon, who adroitly used the opportunity for arranging a formal
alliance, by which common action against the English in the East, as
well as the West, might be secured. His plans in their full scope
are given in the following letter addressed to the Czar of Russia
in February, 1808: “An army of 80,000 men, Russian and French,
perhaps a few Austrians, which will advance on Asia by the road of
Constantinople, will not have to reach the Euphrates, to make England
tremble and bring her to our feet on the continent. I am ready on the
spot in Dalmatia, your Majesty is on the Danube. A month after we have
agreed to act, the army can be on the Bosphorus. The news of it will be
heard in India, and England will give in. I do not refuse to accept any
of the preliminary stipulations necessary to attain an end so great.
But the mutual interest of our two states should be well combined and
balanced. All can be signed and decided before the 15th of March. On
May 1, our troops can be in Asia, and at the same time your Majesty’s
troops in Stockholm. Then the English, threatened in India, chased
out of the Levant, will be broken under the weight of the events by
which the atmosphere will be charged. Your Majesty and myself would
prefer the enjoyment of peace and to pass our life in the midst of our
vast empires, busied in vitalizing them and making them happy by the
methods and benefits of our government. The enemies of the world will
not have it so. We must be greater in spite of ourselves. It is the
part of wisdom and policy to do what fate ordains and to go where the
irresistible march of events is leading us.... In these few lines I
am expressing to your Majesty my whole mind. The work of Tilsit will
regulate the destinies of the world. Perhaps so far as your Majesty and
I are concerned, a little pusillanimity would have us prefer a certain
actual good to a better and more perfect condition. But since, after
all, England does not wish it, let us recognize that the time for great
events and for great changes has come.”
This vision Alexander desired to transform into hard realities without
delay; the first step was to divide the dominions of Turkey. The
question arose as to what disposition should be made of Constantinople
and the Dardanelles. But while the Russians were arguing as to the
proposed increase of territory in the Orient, Napoleon, without
consulting his correspondent at St. Petersburg, was manipulating the
situation in the West by the virtual annexation of Spain to France. The
haggling with Russia was dropped, and Napoleon hastened to embark in
the adventure which was ultimately to lead to his downfall.
Disgust with Godoy, the court favorite, had brought about a
revolutionary movement in Spain, which aimed to substitute for
the reigning monarch, Charles IV, his son Ferdinand. These family
difficulties were laid before Napoleon, who traveled to Bayonne, post
haste from Paris, to act as arbitrator. With a duplicity worthy of a
profound student of Machiavelli, he caused to be placed in his hands an
abdication, signed by both the royal father and his son; the impartial
arbiter handed over the crown to a third party, his brother Joseph,
King of Naples. So, by a juggle that a sporting gamester might have
envied, a Bonaparte came to reside in the royal palace of Madrid, and
if kingships went by personal capacity, and not by descent, it must be
said that, mediocre as was Napoleon’s elder brother, he was far better
fitted for governing Spain than either the feeble Charles IV or his
scoundrelly son and heir, Ferdinand.
Alexander heard of these transactions from the pen of his assiduous
correspondent, but he cared for none of these things; his mind was
filled with the spoliation of Sweden and Finland as a preliminary step
to realize his dream of Oriental conquest. It was arranged that the two
emperors should meet at Erfurt to settle the terms of their proposed
dual domination of the world; only by a personal interview could the
question as to the possession of Constantinople be decided. In the
meantime there were elaborate plans for the sailing of fleets to Egypt,
and around the Cape of Good Hope, to overawe the English.
Events in Spain put an awkward stop to this program. The population
of the country had never been awakened by the French Revolution; they
hated foreign interference, and, when their Bourbon king was dethroned,
they rose _en masse_ in revolt, with the spirit of the Vendée. News
soon came to Paris of the defeat of a French army in which 18,000 men
surrendered. This defeat, the capitulation of Baylem, was soon followed
by a disaster to the army corps which was operating in Portugal against
a combined Portuguese and English force. The effect of the Spanish
resistance was enormous; in all parts of central Europe it revived the
hope of successful revolt against the domination of the French system.
It stirred Prussia and Austria to renewed efforts; there was great
activity of secret societies in Prussia, directed against the French
occupation, and Austria was busy in reorganizing its military forces
for a fresh struggle.
Napoleon realized the critical situation; antedating his letter to
Alexander, to give the impression that it was written before the bad
news from Spain had reached him, he announced his purpose to withdraw
the French troops from Prussia, and promised to give up the Danubian
principalities, without compensation, provided Russia would be willing
to see that the Germans were kept quiet, and would influence Austria to
abandon her warlike preparations. Alexander showed much complacency,
even going so far as to express his sympathy for the eclipse of the
French arms in Spain.
Nothing was spared at Erfurt, where the two emperors met, to impress
upon the world the security and the extent of Napoleon’s rule. It was
the fête of a cosmopolitan society, where men of distinction in all
spheres of life were brought together at the bidding of the Emperor of
the French. Goethe was present, also Talleyrand, who left on record
his impression of the atmosphere of adulation that prevailed. The two
central figures, Alexander and Napoleon, showed marked cordiality to
each other. Alexander spoke of his friend as not only the greatest
but the best of men. Yet there were visible rifts in the friendship;
Alexander refused to show hostility to Austria, an attitude which was
secretly encouraged by Talleyrand, who had begun to fear the result of
Napoleon’s grandiose schemes, and wished to make friends before fortune
turned. Napoleon proved obdurate, when Alexander urged upon him a more
generous treatment of Prussia.
In the formal treaty, the result of the meeting, there was incorporated
a proposition of peace with England on the basis of the _status
quo_--i.e., Finland and the Danubian principalities for Russia and the
deposition of the Bourbons in Spain. Alexander would go no further as
regards Austria than the prospect of armed coöperation, if Austria went
to war against France. Among the subjects proposed was the marriage of
Napoleon with a Russian princess. He had been considering for some time
a divorce from Josephine, a plan now resolved upon after the birth of
an illegitimate son had convinced him that there was the possibility of
a direct heir. Alexander, encouraged by Talleyrand’s advice, refused
to make a frank engagement to forward this scheme, saying that to
his mother alone belonged the disposition of his sisters’ marriage
arrangements.
After the meeting at Erfurt, Napoleon hastened to Spain, where,
fighting several successful battles, he restored his brother to his
capital at Madrid, and forced an English army under Moore to retreat
towards the sea coast. This was in January, 1809. Then Napoleon was
obliged to withdraw from Spain because of the threatening attitude of
Austria, now firmly resolved on opening hostilities with France. There
were also evidences brought him of a plot in Paris, the responsibility
for which rested on Talleyrand and Fouché, both long in service
under him. It was arranged between them that in case of a reverse or
a successful attempt on Napoleon’s life, they were to take charge
of the government, giving it a figurehead in the person of Murat,
Napoleon’s brother-in-law. Long before he was expected, Napoleon
appeared suddenly in Paris, having ridden from the north of Spain in
six days. For a while Talleyrand was in disgrace, but acts of personal
revenge were forgotten in the preparation for crushing Austria. It was
a most distasteful task, for he feared to break up his friendship with
Alexander, the necessary result of dismembering the Austrian Empire.
He therefore tried to secure the intervention of Russia, but Alexander
refused to act at all vigorously.
Hostilities broke out in April, 1809. There was no longer a question
of purely dynastic interests in this armed protest of Austria against
the Napoleonic system; the army of 310,000 men represented a general
patriotic movement of self-defense that had penetrated all classes of
society in the Hapsburg dominions. It stood ready to resist the power
that was crushing out racial and territorial distinctions; it spoke
for a nation in arms conscious of its national right to exist. At home
the French Emperor had to deal now with a population that was weary
of warfare and satiated with military glory. To meet, on Austrian
territory, this massive attack of the Fifth Coalition, which was made
up of England, Spain, and Austria, there was no longer the material at
hand that had secured for the conqueror the brilliant achievements at
Austerlitz and Marengo. His latest army consisted of new recruits and
old soldiers from France and of levies from dependent states.
Napoleon thoroughly appreciated the dangers of his position, as his
correspondence with his agent at the Russian court shows. He was most
urgent in inviting Alexander to play the part of an effective ally by
sending troops to Hungary and Galicia, a movement which would have
taken Austria between two fires. There were no longer vague promises
of reward held out, but specific engagements were offered as an
inducement for the Czar to act. “The three crowns of Austria could be
separated. When these last-mentioned states have been thus divided, we
can diminish the number of our troops, substitute for these general
enlistments of troops, which are tending to call even the women under
arms, a small number of regular troops and so change to the system of
small armies, as introduced by the late King of Prussia (Frederick
II). Our barracks can become poor-houses and the conscripts can stick
to their tillage. Even if it is wished after the conquest to guarantee
the integrity of the monarchy, I will agree to it provided there is a
complete disarmament.”