PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
STENOGRAPHIC RECORD OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD ON 27 APRIL 1942
Berlin, 27 April 1942
Secret
_“THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD” IN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN_
_1ST CONFERENCE_
Present:
The three members:
Reich Minister Speer,
Field Marshal Milch,
State Secretary Koerner.
Furthermore:
State Secretary Dr. Schulze-Fielitz, Ministry of Munitions,
Ministerialrat von Normann, Four Year Plan.
Result:
I. The _Central Planning_ in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich
Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942—VP 6707 g) is a task for
leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters. It makes
unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of its directives.
The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous institutions difficult
to control, but always on individuals and fully responsible persons who
are free in the selection of their work methods and their collaboration
as far as there are no directives issued by the Central Planning.
II. _Discussion of the situation in iron._
A. The objective is to reach a production of 2,2 million tons per month.
In the first place it has to be established whether, after taking into
account the excessive requests which were certainly made and of the
difficulties confronting an increase of production (coal, transport) the
present figures are sufficient (2 million tons). For the distribution in
the third quarter these 2 million tons have to serve in any case as a
basis.
B. The principles of distribution and the new quotas will be discussed
in a subsequent conference with a wider circle of participants (see
special protocol).
C. The _iron-producing industry_ will be organized into a Reich
association. It is to be established and made to operate as soon as
possible. The creation of an interimistic liaison organization (Planning
Group Iron) has, therefore, been abandoned. The task of the Reich
Association ends with the production of iron and before the distribution
of the iron.
D. For the position of president of the Reich Association Iron,
Generaldirektor Voegler and Geheimrat Roechling[91] are suggested.
Roechling was chosen, the appointment of whom would be approved by the
Fuehrer, according to Reich Minister Speer. State Secretary Koerner will
submit the proposal to the Reich Marshal [Goering].
III. The reorganization of the Upper Silesian Territory with the object
of the highest and best utilization for war economy in mind is urgent.
The selection of locations and the determining of capacities in this
territory has to be expedited with regard to raw material, transport,
and labor.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
LETTER OF 20 OCTOBER 1942 TRANSMITTING THE STATUTES
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.
Central Planning Board.
_Z. P. 1_
Berlin, October 20, 1942
Enclosed I send you, for your information, the statutes of the Central
Planning Board with the request to support the office of the “Central
Planning Board” in every possible way in its work, and to direct, more
particularly, your section chiefs and reporters to forward all
information requested orally or by writing, in the shortest possible
time. By this collaboration of your section chiefs and reporters, the
building up of a larger apparatus in the framework of the “Central
Planning Board” is to be avoided.
BY ORDER:
[Typewritten] WALTHER SCHIEBER
Certified: SCHWINGE
Ministerialregistrator
[Stamp of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.]
Distribution to—
_a._ The highest Reich authorities.
_b._ The Reich Protector.
_c._ The Governor General.
_d._ The executive authorities in the occupied territories.
_STATUTES OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
1. The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the Reich
Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals only with the
decision of basic questions. Professional questions remain the task of
the competent departments, which in their fields remain responsible
within the framework of the decisions made by the Central Planning
Board.
2. In order to have the conferences properly prepared and to have the
execution of the decisions supervised, the Central Planning Board
appoints an office. This office consists of the deputies appointed by
each of three members of the Central Planning Board; one of these three
deputies shall be appointed chief of the office.
[Handwritten marginal note on left side of the document: “To be
forwarded”.]
3. In accordance with the attached Table of Organization [not
reproduced], the office appoints reporters. These reporters are at the
disposal of all members of the Central Planning Board. The office
appoints one reporter to keep the record.
4. Office and reporters have to see to it, above all, and to draw the
attention of the Central Planning Board, if necessary, to the required
measures, that—
_a._ All decisive tasks of war economy are achieved quickly,
without red tape, and ruthlessly, by mutual adapting of all
composing branches.
_b._ All such work as is obviously without importance for
winning the war, be discontinued.
5. _Tasks of the office_
_a._ The office prepares the meetings of the Central Planning
Board in such a manner that the members of the Central Planning
Board have the agenda and the material of discussion 24 hours in
advance. For this purpose the office conducts preliminary talks
with the competent departments, etc.
_b._ On the strength of the record made by the reporter, the
office sees to the execution of the decisions of the Central
Planning Board by the competent agencies, and sees to it that
the deadlines fixed are complied with.
_c._ The members of the office keep the members of the Central
Planning Board informed between the sessions.
6. The distribution of work, dealing with incoming mail, etc., is
arranged by the office itself. The members of the office sign: “By
order” of the Central Planning Board.
7. _Tasks of the reporters_
Reporters have to keep in constant touch with the departments, with
regard to the sectors of work they are in charge of. In the regular
sittings of the office they report on the progress made and on the
measures which are required for the carrying on of the war economy,
especially for the increase in production, for other improvements in the
supply with raw materials, and for necessary changes in distribution.
They do the preliminary work for the meetings of the board (see also 5
_a_) and in their working sector they are primarily responsible for the
execution, within the established time limits, of the decisions of the
Central Planning Board.
Berlin, 20 October 1942.
[Typewritten] MILCH
[Typewritten] SPEER
[Typewritten] KOERNER
[Stamp]
Berlin 6-11-1942
No. L 16-501
Copy to the State Secretary for his information.
[Typewritten] DR. SCHATTENMANN
Certified: Schulz, Reg. Sekr.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1510-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 58
EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1943, DEFINING THE
DUTIES OF THE PLANNING OFFICE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
Berlin, 16 September 1943
_DECREE OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1948 OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY GENERAL FOR ARMAMENT
TASKS WITHIN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN AND OF THE REICH MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT
AND WAR PRODUCTION CONCERNING THE TASK OF THE PLANNING OFFICE_
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has established a Planning
Office in my department by decree of 4 September 1943 for the purpose of
concentrated handling of all fundamental questions of war economical
planning.
In this connection I order:
I
1. The Planning Office prepares the decisions of the Central Planning
Board and supervises their execution.
2. In this connection it will especially prepare the distribution to
consumers of basic materials (for instance, iron, metals, coal, mineral
oil, nitrogen, and other important raw materials).
3. As a working basis for Central Planning Board, the Planning Office
has to draw up plans for production and distribution for the entire war
economy, the demand schedules being based on the demands of the entire
German sphere of power. In this connection imports and exports are to be
considered. The entire planning is to be synchronized in advance with
the participating departments and specialist offices, taking into
account production requisites. The Planning Office will constantly have
to summarize and to evaluate the necessary statistical material.
4. The Planning Office will have to submit to the Central Planning Board
for decision the proposed assignment of manpower to the individual big
sectors of employment (trade industry for war effort [gewerbliche
Kriegswirtschaft], traffic, foodstuffs, etc.). It also has to evaluate
statistically the carrying through of the assignments.
* * * * *
6. The Planning Office will have to advocate towards the Reich Ministry
of Economics the requirements of war industry in connection with the
establishment of import and export quotas.
It has to report constantly to the Central Planning Board about the
state of imports essential for war economy.
* * * * *
II
* * * * *
4. The Planning Office has to evaluate statistically the industrial and
war production existing within the power sphere of Greater Germany or of
the states allied with the Reich; it has to develop out of that
evaluation proposals for a common exchange of production in order to
increase the initial war production.
* * * * *
[Signed] SPEER
The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
Plenipotentiary General for
Armament Tasks within the Four Year Plan
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3721-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT NO. 41-A[92]
TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, REGARDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
TESTIMONY OF FRITZ SAUCKEL TAKEN AT NUERNBERG, GERMANY, 1030 HOURS TO
1210 HOURS ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, BY JOHN J. MONIGAN JR., MAJ., CAC,
OUSCC
MAJOR MONIGAN: Principally, what I am interested in are the functions
and responsibilities of the Central Planning Board in their relationship
to your office and their relationship to industry.
SAUCKEL: I believe that this Central Planning Board was founded about
three months after my taking over my office. The Board was founded in
accord with a law by the Fuehrer or just upon an agreement between the
Fuehrer and Speer and Goering, I don’t know which. The leader and
chairman of this Central Planning Board was Speer himself. It was
founded to transfer the work from the Four Year Plan to Speer, I think,
because Goering was already ill at that time, and there also were
difficulties about which I am not informed. Speer always took on the job
of making great changes in production and put it under his own
direction. Constant members of this Central Planning Board were the
State Secretary and Field Marshal Milch, and State Secretary Koerner.
These three were responsible for the decisions of the Central Planning
Board and for internal matters and they went through this office if they
were worked out by other people inside the office. I was only called to
this Central Planning Board when my task was discussed, and the demands
were put before me and my agencies by Speer, the Four Year Plan
[Office], as well as by Milch. The Fuehrer himself told me to fulfil
these demands without question. In other words, if Speer asked me for a
certain amount of workers, for instance, several thousand, I could not
refuse him. The particular minister had to give the number to the
Central Planning Board and that was the only place where the number of
workers could be discussed. In the Central Planning Board it was decided
how many workers I was able to supply to these various sections like
Milch and Speer, agriculture, and so on. If it came to an argument,
these discussions were brought before the Fuehrer and he then decided
himself.
Q. Would the Central Planning Board, in their outline of workers to be
provided for agriculture and for Speer and for Milch’s industries, etc.,
just give you the numbers of workers which they required, or would you
get the final destination of the workers too, say panzers [tanks] and
machine guns, and so on, from the Central Planning Board?
A. In general, I always got the numbers for the sections in large,
except for Speer who always demanded individual allocations of workers
to agriculture or mining; in other words, Speer always demanded a
certain number of workers for a certain kind of work.
Q. Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in general for the
broad field, but in Speer’s work you would get them allocated by
industry, and so on. Is that right?
A. The others only received whatever was left over, because Speer told
me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer
and that I mainly am his man, he mentioned it very often, without
reference to the countries involved. It was very unnatural, that process
of doing these things. These smaller plants, instead of ordering their
workers from the next higher echelons, gave their orders to the very
highest, to Speer, who in turn handed them down to the lower ones and to
me, and this was the reason for the Rotzettel (red slip) system which
had to be fulfilled by me without question. In practice it came to this
that if a factory actually didn’t need any workers but Speer demanded
them for that factory I had to supply these workers without being able
to discuss or to tell him that it would be a waste of manpower; I just
had to do it because Speer had complete domination.
Q. When it was determined in the Central Planning Board that say a
thousand workers would be required by Speer, how did these workers find
their way from all over Germany and Europe into the Krupp factory, for
instance?
A. The orders were given from higher echelons down to lower echelons;
for instance, the transports were either turned over from one office to
another or the lower echelons in Berlin, for instance, got orders to
transfer certain men from one factory which happened to be in Berlin to
another factory which was also in Berlin. This happened also through the
cooperation among the various offices who were headed by Hildebrand. The
orders were discussed in a so-called daily schedule of trains which was
decided upon in all these meetings.
Q. Well, as I understand it, you would get a requirement for say a
thousand workers for panzers, say; now, in Germany certain factories
would be making tread, some would be making turrets, and some would be
making other things. Now, of that thousand workers needed for tank
production some would be working on treads and some would be working on
other things. How did they get into the particular factories which were
making the specific products?
A. This was accomplished by giving orders recklessly through the various
offices. A factory, for instance, got an order to send 20 or 30 men to
another place, and they were just ordered to go there. This was the
reason for the Notdienstverordnung [Emergency Service Decree] where the
workers were forced by a decree to obey any order which was given to
them.
Q. After the workers were conscripted inside the Reich and outside, they
would be worked according to certain skills and technical specialties,
would they not?
A. As far as possible, they were used according to the profession they
had been trained in.
Q. And the local Gau labor offices, etc., would have a list of all the
workers according to their skills, would they not?
A. Yes, there were detailed files about this. This was the basic
principle: There were various offices which only were concerned about a
certain kind of trade or skill.
Q. So, when you got the request from the Central Planning Board for a
hundred thousand men for tank production, would you, through your
ministry, tell the various offices that you needed so many welders and
so many machine tool people, etc., and then tell them how many of each
specialty you wanted?
A. When I got these orders my assistants were always present and they in
turn took down the individual numbers required for this kind of work. I
also received rosters which pointed out in detail how many people were
needed for certain productions and how many were needed in a certain
place. There was also, besides the red-slip system, another one, which
was a system used after the red-slip system. We called this the
Dringlichkeitsstufen—that means the priority system for workers. These
Dringlichkeitsstufen, which were divided according to place and kind of
work, were given to me in the presence of my assistants and they in turn
worked out these plans. The influence of Speer was so great that
sometimes he specifically asked for certain specialists from a certain
factory to be turned over to another place. It also happened that we
were not even told about these things. If we were not able to supply him
with workers from inside Germany, we had to take them from the other
departments or from foreign countries. There was always a reserve of
something like 500,000 people who went to schools where they were
trained for the armament production.
Q. That was 500,000 German and foreign workers?
A. Yes.
Q. When a requirement was fixed for Speer or for Milch in the Central
Planning Board and they called you in and said we need 500,000, or some
number of workers, would they give at that time the breakdown of what
kind of workers they wanted, or would they give a blanket request for
500,000 without the listing of specialties?
A. Naturally, they gave a detailed breakdown. For instance, they only
asked for miners, but they also asked for specialists in that kind of
work.
Q. The requirements would be stated in detail for the kind of work, not
only whether it should be a mine worker, but, for instance, a locomotive
engineer in a mine, or something like that, would they not?
A. Naturally, since there are many kinds of professions; I, for
instance, put in charge of the mining President Dr. Gaertner who was
always oriented about the different jobs which were required in that
field of work.
Q. Then after you got the detailed specification of the qualifications
of the workers desired, would you also get a statement as to what places
they would work in, and so on?
A. This was just the remarkable thing about it, especially from Speer;
factories were always mentioned and they were also mentioned by
priority; for instance, the ones that always were working on the
so-called Fuehrer orders had priority over the others. Speer actually
controlled the small places, not step by step, but directly from the
highest echelon.
Q. So that you would be informed at the Central Planning Board, at least
for Speer’s factories, about the specialists and the place to which they
were supposed to be sent, is that right?
A. The Central Planning Board determined only the numbers for a certain
time, three months or so. These orders were then forwarded to the
individual offices, who were working for me, from all kinds of
industries; the Central Planning Board met only every two weeks or so.
Q. The Central Planning Board would decide that Speer would get so many
hundred thousand and Milch would get so many hundred thousand, and that
the agricultural program would get so many hundred thousand. Then, that
was agreed upon, if they all agreed upon it among themselves in the
Central Planning Board, and had no disputes regarding the number. But if
there were disputes, then the Fuehrer would decide?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, after they decided a hundred thousand for Speer, then the
section chiefs (in the rings for tank treads, and machine guns, etc.)
would meet with your section later and say we need so many hundred
thousand, we need 10,000 who are welders and 10,000 who are metal
workers, etc., is that right?
A. Yes. A daily conference was held among the different offices where it
was decided how many workers were needed for the individual industries.
It did not occur that when a factory asked for a certain amount of men,
it was like that: Speer said this factory has to be supplied with so and
so many workers. In peacetime it was different.
Q. And the requirements of Speer were met as a matter of priority among
all the other industries; first Speer and then the others?
A. Yes.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NI-1098
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 63
EXTRACTS FROM AFFIDAVIT OF FRITZ SAUCKEL, 22 SEPTEMBER 1946, REGARDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
A. 1. I, Fritz Sauckel, born in Hassfurt-Unterfranken on 27 October 1894
was honorary Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS and SA, Reich Governor
[Reichsstatthalter], Commissioner for Reich Defense and Gauleiter of
Thuringia. Since 1942 I was Plenipotentiary General for Manpower and
from 1933 on I was a member of the Reichstag. I state upon oath the
following facts which are known to me personally:
* * * * *
L. 1. The Central Planning Board intervened in the problem of foreign
workers to the extent of determining priorities and in representing and
demanding the requirements of the economics branches consolidated in the
Central Planning Board. It also transmitted these demands to the
Fuehrer. The competent gentlemen of the Central Planning Board at the
same time of course represented their ministries as heads. Thus I am not
in a position today to say whether Speer, for instance, spoke in one or
the other capacity in connection with any special matter. At any rate
the Central Planning Board determined the total labor requirements. In
practice I only obtained labor for them.
2. I attended sessions of the Central Planning Board only when questions
concerning the mobilization of labor were involved. Sometimes only my
representatives, Dr. Timm, Landrat Berk, Stothfang, or Dr. Hildebrand,
attended.
3. The competent gentlemen from Speer’s Ministry also attended. Speer
had a labor mobilization department where the requirements of industry
were collected and confirmed.
4. Milch produced the figures for aviation. The same was done by Speer
in his sphere of activity. Speer and Milch, however, also exerted
influence on the allocation of workers. How far this came within their
capacity as members of the Central Planning Board I cannot say; in any
case they did this in their ministerial capacity.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 22 JULY 1942
Berlin 24 July 1942
Dr. Goe/W
Reich Minister Speer
Minister’s Office
Secret
_REPORT ON THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF THE “CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD” ON 22 JULY 1942_
Present:
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner
Kommerzialrat Roechling Reich Association Iron
Dr. Rohland Reich Association Iron
Von Bohlen und Halbach Reich Association Iron
Dr. Langen Reich Association Iron
Bergassessor Sohl Reich Association Iron
Gauleiter Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Mobilization
State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry
General Director Pleiger Reich Association Coal
Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal
Major General Gablenz Reich Air Ministry
Colonel Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry
Ministerial Director Gramsch 4 Year Plan
Ministerial Advisor Normann 4 Year Plan
Dr. Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Stellwaag Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Major Wagner Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Brigadier General Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lieutenant Colonel Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Ministerial Advisor Dr. Wissmann Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Goerner Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
* * * * *
Securing of food. A net influx of 1 million foreign workers is counted
on. This number was not reached in the past months. Even with an influx
of more than 1 million in the coming months, the 1-million peak will
actually not be surpassed in view of current departures of workers. Food
for this 1 million is secured.[93]
To what extent an improvement of the food situation, through a sharper
hold on the production outside of Germany, could be accomplished.
* * * * *
Every day a train load of the forces recruited in the East will be
directed to the coal mines until the figure of 6,000 is achieved.
Prisoners of war are being obtained, at present, from camps in the
General Government. 51,000 prisoners of war in the Senne Camp. In the
district east of the General Government there are 74,000 prisoners of
war available. Up till now an elimination quota of 50 percent of
unemployable people has been reckoned with in the allocations to coal
mining. It is considered necessary that not too high demands should be
placed on the choice of prisoners of war. The Miner’s Union doctors
[Knappschaftsaerzte] are to be informed that a different standard is to
be established for the prisoners of war than for German miners.
For the consecutive order in which the prisoners of war are to be put to
work, it will be laid down, that before the metal workers are chosen,
the coal mining in the first place and requirements for the loading and
unloading commands in the second place are to be considered.
Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the procuring of the
Russian prisoners of war from the camps.
[Typewritten] DR. ING. GOERNER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON THE SEVENTEENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 28 OCTOBER 1942
Berlin, 30 October 1942
The Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
_REPORT ON THE 17TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 28 OCTOBER 1942, 0930 HOURS_
Increase of Coal Production
_Allocation of Labor_
Coal production in the Ruhr district has increased to 390,000 tons per
day. Any further increase depends on whether the requirements for labor
are being met. About 104,000 men are required. Furthermore 7,800
men—originally 16-17,000 requirements having been brought down by
rationalization—are needed for the supplying industry, 6,800 of these
for the machine industry. 5,000 more unskilled workers are furthermore
required to secure the transport of mine-timber which is essential for
reason of variety [Sortimentsgruenden].
The intake capacity of the mining industry for the month of November is
44,000 prisoners of war, of whom 25,000 are for the Ruhr district, and
12,600 eastern workers, 7,500 of whom are for the Ruhr district. Total
requirements so far amount to 191,000 laborers of whom 90,700 were
wanted by the Ruhr District. Up to 24 October a total of 123,000 was
allocated. These numbers are still to be checked up by the Reich
Association Coal (RVK) and Mr. Sauckel.
According to the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, the following
number of prisoners of war is at present at hand.
Within the Reich (on the way and in camp) 30,000
Remainder of prisoners of war (outstanding from a total of 60,000
150,000 and promised up to the beginning of December)
At camps in the General Government 15,000
Of these the following can be regarded as available up to 1 December:
Within the Reich 15,000
Of the remaining prisoners of war 10,000
From the General Government 7,500
———
Total about 32,000
Therefore, as compared to the required 44,000, there is a deficit of
about 12,000. Moreover, 10,000 civilian laborers from the East can be
put up by exchanges from the agricultural sector which is 2,000 less
than required so that the November deficit amounts to 14,000 and, in
comparison with the total requirements of the mining industry of
104,000, there is a deficit of 62,000. The deficit increases by the
smaller number of prisoners of war the size of which is still to be
ascertained by the Commissioner of Labor.
The mining industry is in a position to use any amount of eastern labor
instead of prisoners of war. Therefore, it is to get preference at the
combing-out of the agricultural sector. There is no objection to a
temporary accommodation of eastern labor at prisoner-of-war camps
(without barbed wire, etc.).
The requirements of the supply industry are to be met by the Red Label
method [Rotzettelverfahren]. Constructors are to be provided by
canvassing at the French prisoner-of-war camps for officers.
[Typewritten] DR. STEFFLER
* * * * *
Present:
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Staatsrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Brig. Gen. Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lt. Col. v. Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Herr Schlieker Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Oberberghauptmann Gabel Reich Economic Ministry
Colonel Dr. Krull Reich Economic Ministry
Oberbergrat Otto Reich Economic Ministry
State Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Traffic Ministry
Staatsrat Heinberg Reich Traffic Ministry
Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan
Min. Rat Steffler Four Year Plan
Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
Oberreg. Rat Hildebrand Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
Gen. Dir. Pleiger Reich Association Coal
Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal
Dr. Fischer Reich Association Coal
Dir. Winkaus Plenipotentiary for Mining Requirements
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF TWENTY-FIRST
CONFERENCE OF CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 30 OCTOBER 1942
_EXCERPT OF STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 21ST
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor supply and direction of labor held on 30 October 1942,
afternoon, at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munitions.
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: There is but one possibility, and that is, that the moment the
Wehrmacht takes prisoners in operational territory, they are to be
immediately turned over to us. We will move them away much faster than
the Wehrmacht.
MILCH: The correct thing to do would be to have all Stalags transferred
to you by order of the Fuehrer. The Wehrmacht takes prisoners and as
soon at it relinquishes them, the first delivery goes to your
organization. Then everything will be in order.
SAUCKEL: Yes, but we do not have sufficient personnel for guarding the
prisoners.
(MILCH: The Wehrmacht should have to provide you with that!)
SAUCKEL: As soon as prisoners of war are taken, they should be placed at
our disposal and we would then allocate them in a fair manner. However,
with the present method we get nothing or only a fraction of what the
Wehrmacht had promised us, although the prisoners had been taken by the
Wehrmacht.
TIMM: We can hardly hope to achieve that, since this might have
something to do with the convention concerning the treatment of
prisoners of war.
MILCH: The man who acts there for you can wear a uniform all right and
be a soldier. Only his superior will not be Herr Reinecke but Herr
Sauckel.
For psychological reasons emphasis should be placed on first of all
covering the requirements of the Wehrmacht branches, without other
considerations. The feeling, we don’t get it anyway, has gradually
permeated our whole air force industry—and I heard the same about the
army. I will admit that these gigantic allocations are completely
misjudged. For example, in the Luftwaffe where from an original
allocation of 480,000, a balance of 150,000 was left over [per Saldo
uebrig]. The plants always look only at the balance [Saldo]. However,
there are many plants also who have suffered an actual decrease in
manpower, especially in a young industry like ours, which is occupied
with the manufacture of very special products. This industry has many
young people, of whom many again have been drafted into the Wehrmacht.
This drafting is done in such an idiotic way that one actually has to
feel ashamed. All three experimenting engineers working on a development
which may have an important bearing on the outcome of the war are simply
drafted. They are not sent to the front or into training but sit around
in the back somewhere and are guarding some camp. No consideration
whatsoever is given to individual cases. Of course the plants then call
for replacements. The masses cannot fill these breaches, and qualified
replacements we cannot supply at all. Herr Dr. Werner, for example,
writes a letter to Herr Schieber of which he forwards a copy to me and
which states that production figures established in the delivery
schedules can no longer be met, owing to the fact that for weeks
partially even for months, no manpower has been allocated, and that even
current withdrawals cannot be replaced by the labor offices
[Arbeitsaemter]. The fact, that we can no longer meet the demands of the
rising production, that backlogs are increasing more and more, fills him
with rising apprehension. He then goes into details, but always reverts
to the same conclusion: everything might be accomplished, we could even
get the necessary material; in the final analysis we fail, however, in
one important aspect in connection with our whole armament program—the
allocation of manpower. If only we had, if only we had—thus it goes all
day and in every conference.
I am convinced that many people are beginning to put in fake requests
and exaggerate their requirements. There is only one way to straighten
out this affair. In my department, I do it this way: if for months a
spare part cannot be found, the entire front begins to hoard this
article; so, for instance, the tail skid of a Ju 52. Then we proceeded
to manufacture triple the amount of the expected requirements, yet no
tail skids were available. Ordnance stock piles were filled with it; but
they did not issue any. I then said: We will now manufacture nothing but
tail skids until we hear shouts not to send any more. Thus, an affair
like that gets finally straightened out. And here likewise we must say
for once: We will supply the required laborers to the industry, if
necessary by depriving other fields. Agriculture, at the moment can
spare laborers; it does not need them from 15 November to 15 March of
next year. It is just a waste to have to feed them. Only a small number
will be needed for the procurement of wood. Thus we are able to
generously help industry and later on again replenish agriculture. At
the same time we have the advantage of getting fairly well-fed people.
As Herr Timm recently explained, prisoners of war from the Ukraine would
not serve our purpose; they could not regain their physical strength on
what they get to eat in the industry. Even supplying them with better
food than we give to our own people would not be sufficient to get them
beyond a still weakened condition. In agriculture they get additional
food. Don’t muzzle the mouth of a beast when food lies all around it.
This is also of advantage to prisoners of war and workers from the East.
However, we have to finally do away with the general feeling: we have
nothing and we want yet anything; we have been forsaken by God and the
Fuehrer; constantly more and more is demanded of us; how can we still
believe in this great program? We can only carry it out if we have such
faith in it, as is spoken of in the Bible. In January we started with a
monthly production of 2,000 engines; today we have reached 4,000, and in
a year and a half I must reach 14,000. That of course is a gigantic
achievement for a month. Every engine has at least 1,200 h.p. If in
measurements of horsepower I compare the present with the former World
War, then the present achievement is 40 times as great. What an immense
amount of manpower was available at that time for an industry so totally
different from ours! Yet today we must come up to more than three times
that, which we have already done. That means, that in airplane engines
alone we have to achieve 135 to 140 times as much as we did in the World
War. Dr. Werner who is responsible for the engine industry proposed how
this can be done. He said: We must apply a mass production scale
everywhere, or else we will not accomplish it. He has very progressive
ideas in this field. With the airplane engine, it can be done for sure.
Crankshafts and connecting rods, etc., we can produce on a mass
production scale. Today we manufacture 40,000 connecting rods. However,
we still have no machines today that assemble these products
individually on the assembly line. The Americans have such machines. We
are lacking about 10 construction engineers and 5 mechanics; they just
simply cannot be procured. One must for once satisfy the needs of the
people again. I have always put them off until November and told them
that Sauckel would produce the necessary labor from agriculture.
* * * * *
SPEER: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the
sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories where
doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is
nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic steps and
putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no
alternative. Let it happen several times and the news will soon go
around.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: We talked of taking the waiters out of the restaurants in
Germany. But in this respect we have absolutely an abundance in France,
the General Government and the Protectorate. As long as we have not
skimmed that off, we could not take the responsibility towards the
German people for such a measure. Again a cable of the Foreign Minister
has burst into my recent negotiations in France stating that under no
circumstances should the Ministry Laval be put into peril. The Fuehrer
has said: If the French show no good will, then I shall retake the
800,000 French PW’s. If they show good will, then the French wives can
follow their husbands to Germany and work there. Of course, he said, I
have an interest that Laval remains in power. The Ministry Laval will
remain, it depends only on us. And Laval cannot go back after he has
reproduced in his speech and spoken before the French passages which he
has taken verbally out of my appeal. Only Pétain could bring him to
fall. I wish to draw your attention to the fact, however, that in France
there is a surplus of young men all of whom we could use in Germany. If
we expect our people to accept severest restrictions then we cannot
admit such luxuries in Paris as, e.g., small restaurants with bands of
25 musicians and two waiters per table. I am firmly convinced, if we are
brutal also against the others then we can extract quite a considerable
number of men out of the General Government—I sent an efficient man,
President Struwe, over there—and of the Protectorate. This need not
interfere with the armament industry over there. There is, therefore, no
fear that the demand could not be met.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 3 NOVEMBER 1942
Secret
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 23D CONFERENCE OF
CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning the fixing of iron quotas, on 3 November 1942, 1600_
_hours in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions,_
_Berlin, Pariser Platz 3_
* * * * *
PLEIGER: * * * For the physical strain on the miners, who practically
work two Sunday shifts each month, is such that they could not stand it
for another six months. In other words—this is the important point—the
quota of approximately 95,600 men is still lacking and must be assigned
to work now at last; it was promised to me at one time. The gentlemen of
the Ruhr tell me: We have our huts ready. Some of them are not
completely furnished, and I reproached the people for it. They answered,
however: But you promised us workers for about half a year. We have
always been ahead with our huts. How can you reproach us now, our huts
were not ready. The workers assigned to us will be taken care of. I
would be very thankful if Sauckel would be induced to assign to us the
quota of workers.
SPEER: He received the instruction in the last conference of the Central
Planning Board to assign workers first of all to the coal-mining
industry as well as to the iron-producing industry, for you the amount
of 44,000 plus 12,000, plus 7,500 for the feeder industry, plus 5,000
for pit props. The same holds true for Mr. Rohland.
PLEIGER: In our conferences it must always be taken as a basis that the
Reichsbahn, with regard to the allocation of cars, is at least in the
same position as they were last year.
(SPEER: That’s pretty bad.)
—No, it allocated over 80,000 cars in December.
* * * * *
SPEER: Can you give me by name any smelters or other people which could
be taken out?
(ROHLAND: Yes.)
This would still be another 50 or 100, I guess.
ROHLAND: I figure about 40 men per Martin furnace. If we take away 20 or
15—let’s say 20—as trained Martin furnace smelters, we would have 300
men. 300 smelters could help us a lot. But when will they come?
SPEER: Then we could deceive the French about the industry in such a
way, as if we would release among the prisoners of war the rollers and
smelters—they have—if they give us their names.
ROHLAND: We opened our own office in Paris. In other words, you mean the
French should report the smelters who are prisoners of war in Germany?
MILCH: I would simply say: You will get two people for one of this kind.
SPEER: The French firms know exactly who is a smelter among the
prisoners of war. There you should make it appear, as if they would be
released. They give us the names and then we take them out. Try it.
ROHLAND: That’s an idea.
MILCH: We in the Luftwaffe and airplane industry will also try to find
out: Who is a roller, smelter, or furnace mason.
ROHLAND: But by the time the people arrive, the quarter of the year will
be over.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-THIRD
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
16 FEBRUARY 1943
Secret!
Top Secret State Matter
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 33D CONFERENCE[94]
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning Labor Supply on 16 February 1943 at 1600 hrs. at the_
_Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions 3,_
_Pariser Platz, Berlin_
* * * * *
TIMM: I should like to say something about the labor supply
possibilities. Perhaps you will permit me to emphasize the negative side
a little. The greatest difficulties result from the fact that the supply
of labor outstanding could not be fully dispatched from the East, but
came in in ever diminishing numbers. One may say that they have almost
become completely exhausted. Eastern laborers during the last six weeks
arrived only in smaller numbers than in former times, so that they can
hardly be included to an appreciable amount on the credit side of the
supply account. In any case their numbers are small. The foremost reason
is that in former months most transports were dispatched from the
Ukraine while the main recruitment areas were those which in the
meantime have become operational areas, or even are no longer in our
hands. The forecasts we made applied to a large extent to the transport
of people from the Caucasus district, the Kuban, from areas like
Stalingrad. We prepared measures which should enable us to draw more
eastern workers again during the following months. I venture to think
that we should be able, on a conservative calculation, to transfer
during the month of March between 150,000 and 200,000 laborers from the
East to the West.
(SPEER: Including or excluding those needed for agriculture?)
Including those needed for agriculture. But in my opinion it will be
necessary to apply much pressure, since just those districts are
concerned which have been pacified to a certain extent, and for the same
reason will not be very much inclined to release labor. This is
calculated on the assumption that some labor has to be released also
from the eastern and northern parts of the East.
The second area, capable of releasing a considerable amount of labor is
the General Government and that for the January estimate which has been
drawn up with particular caution as I again wish to emphasize. We expect
that the figures will be surpassed rather than not reached. I think we
can expect a number of 40,000, of which, it is true, a part will have to
be given to agriculture, if we intend no more than to cover the losses
which we had to inflict last autumn.
Beyond this it ought to be possible in my opinion to employ within the
Reich, and especially for the mining industry, part of the Polish
Building Service. I venture to think one ought to enlarge this
organization in such a way that more age groups than so far are called
up for it, since this procedure is functioning. The younger age groups
which in fact are especially suited for mining could be dispatched to
the Reich. In this case the supervisors who are provided for the
greatest part by the Building Service, will be needed only in very small
numbers in the Reich.
The next area would be the Protectorate on which I cannot make a final
statement today. We have been promised for the month of March about
10,000 laborers. But I am of the opinion that some loosening-up is
possible. The Plenipotentiary will soon in a personal visit take in hand
the possibility of this loosening-up.
France is included in the account with 100,000 laborers for March.
Messages which I received permit us to hope that this number will be
increased in the middle of March. Belgium is included with 40,000,
Holland with 30,000, Slovakia with 20,000, who, it is true, are
exclusively suited for agriculture, since their share of individual
workers has been completely delivered. This item consists exclusively of
agricultural laborers, owing to a state treaty. For the remaining part
of the foreign areas I included another 10,000. This amounts altogether
to 400,000 laborers who should arrive in March. One might be entitled to
add for the last month altogether 10,000 prisoners of war. These are men
to be drawn from the East. It can be expected that this number might
under certain conditions be surpassed, since the High Command intends
especially for operational reasons, to take the prisoners of war back to
the Reich, particularly from the areas threatened by the enemy.
A former item concerns the fluctuation of labor which certainly amounts
to about 100,000 laborers. Then there are items which at the moment
cannot be estimated—the yield from the threatened areas and from the
“Stoppage-action”. Here I cannot venture to name final figures, but I
hope to be able to do so next month.
SAUCKEL: Of course, we regret very much that last autumn we were unable
to recruit as much as we would have liked in the areas which now are
again in enemy hands. This is partly due to the fact that we were not
assisted in the degree we had expected. Moreover we were not able to
effect the removal of the civil population which had been planned. These
events are an urgent reminder of the fact that it is necessary to employ
foreign laborers at once and in great numbers in Germany proper and in
the actual armaments industry. You may be certain that we wish to
achieve this. We have not the slightest interest in creating
difficulties for an armaments office, even for those working for German
interest abroad, by taking labor away from them to an unreasonable
extent. But on this occasion I should like to ask you to try and
understand our procedure. We Germans surely have sent to the front
between 50 and 75 percent of our skilled workers. A part of them has
been killed while the nations subjugated by us need no longer shed their
blood. Thus they can preserve their entire capacity with regard to
skilled workers, inasmuch as they have not been transferred to Germany
which is the case only for a much smaller percentage than all of us
supposed, and in fact they do use them partly for manufacturing things
which are not in the least important for the German war economy. If we
proceed energetically against this abuse, I ask you to give me credit
for so much reason that I do not intend to damage the foreign interests
of the German armaments industry. The quality of the foreign worker is
such that it cannot be compared with that of the German worker. But even
then I intend to create a similar proportion between skilled and workers
trained for their job, as it exists in Germany by force of tradition,
since it has come about that we had to send men to the front in much
larger numbers than we requested France or any other country to do.
Moreover we shall endeavor increasingly to bring about on a generous
scale the adaptation of the French, Polish, and Czech workers. I do not
see for the moment any necessity for limiting the use of foreign labor.
The only thing I ask for is that we understand each other, so that the
immense difficulties and friction between the respective authorities
disappear and the program drawn up by us will by no means be frustrated
by such things.
There are without a doubt still enough men in France, Holland, Belgium,
the Protectorate, and the General Government to meet our labor demands
for the next months. I confess that I expect more success from such a
procedure with respect to heavier work or for work where shifts of 10 or
more hours are customary, than from relying on the use of German women
and men exclusively. We shall have better success by proceeding this way
provided the foreign workers still obey, which remains a risk we always
run, than by using weaker German women and girls as labor in places of
very important armament work, where foreigners may be used for security
reasons. * * *
* * * The situation in France is this; after I and my assistants had
succeeded after difficult discussions in inducing Laval to introduce the
Service Act this act has now been enlarged, owing to our pressure so
that already yesterday three French age groups have been called up. We
are now, therefore, legally and with the assistance of the French
Government entitled to recruit laborers in France from three age groups,
whom we can use in French factories in the future, but of whom we may
choose some for our use in Germany and send them to Germany. I think in
France the ice is now broken. According to reports received they now
have begun to think about a possible break-through by the Bolshevists
and the dangers which thereby threaten Europe. The resistance which the
French Government has hitherto shown is diminishing. Within the next
days I shall go to France in order to set the whole thing into motion,
so that the losses in the East may be somewhat balanced by increasing
recruitment and calling-up in France.
If we receive comprehensive lists in time, we shall, I think, be able to
cover all demands by dispatching in March 800,000 laborers.
SPEER: Recruitment abroad as such is supported by us. We only fear very
much that the skilled workers extracted from the occupied countries do
not always reach the appropriate factories in Germany. It might
certainly be better if we acted in such a way that the parent firms of
Germany which work with the French and Czech factories would comb out
the foreign workers more than before for their own use.
SAUCKEL: We made an agreement with Field Marshal Milch. You will get the
factories which are urgently needed for your airplane motors, etc.;
these will be completely safeguarded. In the same way I promised Admiral
of the Fleet Doenitz[95] today that the U-boat repair firms proper are
absolutely safeguarded. We shall even be able to provide our own
armament factories on French soil with labor extracted from French
factories, in the main from the unoccupied territory where there still
are metal works which have their full complement of skilled workers
without even having been touched so far.
HILDEBRAND: May I point out at this point that we have to figure that we
shall be deprived of the Italian workers this year. This according to
present discussions, concerns 300,000 men altogether, or 15 to 20,000 a
month. If we deduct the first installment, the remaining ones to a great
part are just highly skilled metal workers.
SAUCKEL: This is a request of the Fuehrer, but he has not yet finally
decided.
HILDEBRAND: But we have been told to be prepared to lose these men.
SPEER: We ourselves quite support the combing-out abroad. On the other
hand we must be entitled—and this was agreed—to exclude or prefer
particular kinds of work, e.g., the armor factories. In France we are
more and more turning towards giving up finishing processes and
stressing the subcontracting. It is the foundries and similar works,
e.g., for the use of the aluminum industry, which we wish to use to
capacity. We could force the production of Opel, so that in this case
Peugeot who manufacture the forged parts for Opel, the parent firm,
might demand more labor for this while the rest of their workers would
be taken over by Opel.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
22 APRIL 1943
Dr. Jaenicke
Secret
Top Secret State Matter
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 36TH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning 1943-44 coal economy plan. Held on Thursday, 22 April 1943,
1550 hours at the Festival Hall at the Zoo, Jebenstr._
* * * * *
SPEER: Throughout the winter we have seen that in the last instance it
is coal which provides the basis for all plans we wish to execute in
other respects, and most of you are also aware of our intention to
increase the manufacture of iron. Here also it will again be coal which
in the last instance will tip the scales, whether or not we shall be
able to accomplish this increase of iron production. Seen from the
Central Planning Board, we are of the opinion that the demand for coal
as well as the demand for iron ought to be coordinated in a separate
plan, and that this plan ought to receive about the same degree of
urgency as the Krauch plan, and that with regard to labor, the
conditions required for the execution of that plan must be established.
Perhaps Mr. Timm will be able to state how he expects the question of
the miners to be developed; unfortunately the miners cannot be taken
from the German reservoir, in their place we shall have to use very
strong foreigners.
TIMM: At the moment, 69,000 men are needed for hauling that coal. We
want to cover this by finding within the Reich 23,000 men, viz., healthy
prisoners of war, etc., who are especially suitable for mining—and by
dispatching 50,000 Poles from the General Government. Out of these about
30,000 men have been supplied up to 24 April, so that about 39,000 men
are still outstanding for January to April. The demand for May has been
reported to us at 35,700. The difficulties existed especially with
regard to recruitment in the General Government, since in every district
surrounding Germany there is an extraordinary resistance to recruitment.
In all countries we have to change over more or less to registering the
men by age groups and to conscripting them in age groups. They do appear
for registration as such, but as soon as transport is available, they do
not come back so that the dispatch of the men has become more or less a
question for the police.
Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily
serious. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of
these actions. The resistance against the administration established by
us is very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to
increased dangers, and it was just in the last two or three weeks that
some of them were shot dead, e.g., the head of the labor office in
Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This
is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done
with the best will remain extremely difficult unless police
reinforcements are at hand.
* * * * *
SPEER: These [women] we can use in the Reich. There are a great number
of Russian PW’s and laborers who are employed at places where they need
not be employed. There can be an exchange. The only thing is to do this
with unskilled workers, and not to take the workers from the industry
where they were trained with difficulty.
KEHRL: Where we are late in completion of a task, or where we lose an
opportunity, we can make up for it. But any coal which we cannot haul at
once is definitely lost for use in this war. This is why we cannot do
enough to force the allotment to the pits.
SPEER: But not by forcible actions in smashing what we toilsomely built.
(KEHRL: We need not do that!)
You ought to add the conscripted labor.
TIMM: We must endeavor to get German men for working at the coal-face.
KEHRL: We subsist on foreigners who live in Germany.
TIMM: These men are concentrated within a very small area. Otherwise
there might be trouble in this sector.
SPEER: There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the
Russian PW’s have been distributed, and this statement is quite
interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 30
percent. I always complained about this.
TIMM: The highest percentage of PW’s are Frenchmen, and one ought not to
forget that it is difficult to employ them at the coal-face. The number
of Russians living within the Reich is small.
ROHLAND: In the mines one should exclusively use eastern people, not
western ones.
SPEER: The western men collapse!
* * * * *
SPEER: In any case we ought to force the coal production with all our
power. I now have here a statement on the distribution of the Soviet
prisoners. There are 368,000 altogether. Of these are: 101,000 in
agriculture; 94,000 in the mining industry—who are not available in any
case; 15,000 in the building materials industry; 26,000 in iron and
metal production where they cannot be extracted either; 29,000 in the
manufacture of iron, steel, and metal goods; 63,000 in the manufacture
of machines, boilers, and cars, and similar appliances, which means in
armaments industry; and 10,000 in the chemical industry. Agriculture has
received by far the most of them, and the men employed there could in
the course of time be exchanged for women. The 90,000 Russian PW’s
employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest
part skilled men. If you can extract 8-10,000 men from there, it would
already be the limit.
KEHRL: Would it not be possible to add Serbians, etc.?
SOGEMEIER: We ought not to mix too much.
ROHLAND: For God’s sake, no Serbians! We had very bad experiences with
mixing.
* * * * *
SPEER: Everything depends on the amount of the influx from abroad.
SCHIEBER: If anyway nothing arrives, the mines certainly will get
nothing.
TIMM: Gauleiter Sauckel is perfectly convinced that the transports will
be on their way within a short time. Now the front has been consolidated
at last.
SCHIEBER: We ought to be grateful that the weather has allowed the
farmer to keep things going in some way despite the little labor being
available to him. For the farmer, the coal supply is just as important
as for the whole of the armaments industry. When we discuss tomorrow the
nitrogen problem we shall see the same; our first need is coal.
KOERNER: On 1 April we had in agriculture a deficit of about 600,000
laborers. It had been planned to cover it by supplying labor from the
East, mainly women. These laborers will first have to be supplied until
other laborers are released from agriculture. We are just entering the
season where the heaviest work in the fields has to be done, for which
many laborers are necessary. Much labor is needed for the hoeing of the
fruits, and it is to be hoped that this year the harvest can be started
early which would be rendered much more difficult if an exchange of
labor would have to take place.
* * * * *
MILCH: We ought to except certain areas of the Protectorate to which the
orders are being directed, and extract nothing there until a surplus is
found out subsequently. For the time being it cannot be ascertained.
There are enough other areas of the Protectorate which are not affected
by the industry plan and some labor could be extracted from them at
once. We ought to name the places which are excepted from our action.
TIMM: In this the authorities on the other side ought to participate;
they are in the best position to tell the places from where nothing must
be extracted.
MILCH: If one proceeds as I proposed, and Timm agreed to it, no damage
can be done. This ought to be done in any case. For the rest I
completely agree; we must now supply the mines with labor. The greatest
part of labor which we can supply from the East will indeed be women.
But the eastern women are quite accustomed to agricultural work, and
especially to the type of work which has to be done these coming weeks,
the hoeing and transplanting of turnips, etc. The women are quite
suitable for this. One thing has to be considered: first you must supply
agriculture with the women, then you can extract the men, laborer for
laborer. It is not the right thing if first the men are taken away and
the farmers are left without labor for 4 to 6 weeks. If the women arrive
after such time they arrive too late.
SPEER: Beyond this we are prepared to release from all parts of the war
economy, in exchange for women, any Russian PW’s or other Russian who is
employed as auxiliary laborer.
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
REPORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 23 JUNE 1943
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
Z.P. 148
Berlin W 8, 24 June 1943
Leipziger Strasse 3
24 copies, 17th copy
Top Secret State Matter
_REPORT ON THE 42D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 23 JUNE 1943, 1600 HOURS_
_Coal situation_
The manpower situation in the coal mining industry, particularly in the
hard coal mining industry, is still unsatisfactory, and necessitates an
extension of the measures decided upon at the 36th Conference of the
Central Planning Board, held on 22 April 1943.
The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use
of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more
homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary
higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts
and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations.
1. The present drive, which is to be carried out throughout the German
economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the
mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and
at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of eastern
workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50,000 workmen are expected to be made
available up to the end of July 1943. This drive is to be accelerated.
Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the
Fuehrer—RVK [Reich Association Coal] and GBA [Plenipotentiary General
for Labor Allocation] submitting the necessary figures for the statement
to the Fuehrer—that 200,000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work
be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the chiefs of
the army groups [Heeresgruppenchefs]. The prisoners will be selected on
the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the
office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation will take
charge of them there and then. Provisions are to be made for an
extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for manpower,
which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943.
The manpower needed by the mining transport industry
[Bergbau-Zubringer-Industrie] and by the iron-producing industry may be
supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal
mining industry have previously been adjusted.
The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a
premium system. For this purpose, the present pay restrictions are to be
lifted and the manager [Betriebsfuehrer] be allowed to distribute
amongst the workers, according to his discretion, one Reichmark per head
per day as premium for particular services rendered.
Furthermore, care will be taken that workmen can exchange these
premiums, which will be paid out in camp money [Lagergeld] for goods. It
is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g., sunflower
seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily
use, etc.
The Reich Food Ministry in conjunction with the Reich Association Coal
and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs will clarify the question
whether, beyond that, something else can be changed as far as rations
are concerned.
2. Equally, in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more securely to
the various factories by means of the distribution of additional ration
cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the
General Government and the occupied territories in the East. The output
demanded of the General Government is to be fixed at the proposed
amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then be
rated accordingly.
[Typewritten signature] DR. GRAMSCH
Present:
Reich Minister Speer
Field Marshal Milch
Staatstrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Oberbuergermeister Liebel Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Major General Waeger Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Dr. Ing. Groener Reich Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
President Kehrl Reich Economic Ministry
Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan
Min. Dirig. Timm Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Allocation (GBA)
Staatsrat Pleiger Reich Association Coal (RVK)
Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association Coal (RVK)
Dr. Rosenkranz Reich Association Coal (RVK)
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE FIFTY-THIRD
CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD,
16 FEBRUARY 1944
Secret!
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 53D CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
_Concerning Supply of Labor held on 16 February 1944, 10 o’clock,_
_in the Reich Air Ministry_
Present: Milch (for Central Planning Board), Kehrl, Backe, etc.
MILCH: The armament industry employs foreign workers to a large extent,
according to the latest figures—40 percent. The new allocations of the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation consist mostly of
foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up.
Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many
young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is
easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In
mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95
percent and higher. Our best new engine is made 88 percent by Russian
prisoners of war and the other 12 percent by German men and women. 50-60
Ju 52’s which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month.
Only 6-8 German men are working on this machine, the rest are Ukrainian
women who have beaten all the records of trained workers.
* * * * *
The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s trustworthy
hands who will make them work, all right. This is very important for
educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who
would likewise feel inclined to shirk.
* * * * *
* * * It is, therefore, not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners
unless we compel them by piece work or have the possibility of taking
measures against foreigners who are not doing their bit. But if the
foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him, at once there is
a terrible uproar, the man is put into prison, etc. There are sufficient
officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up
for human rights instead of war production. I, too, am all for human
rights. But if a Frenchman says, “You fellows will all be hanged and the
chief of the factory will be beheaded first”, and if then the chief
says, “I am going to hit him”, then he is in a mess. He is not
protected, but the “poor fellow” who said that to him is protected. I
have told my engineers, “I am going to punish you if you don’t hit such
a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I
shall see to it that nothing happens to you.” This is not yet
sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all plant leaders. I should like to
see the man who stays my arm because I can take care of anybody who does
so. If the little plant leader does that he is put into a concentration
camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two
Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that
these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I
left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the
factory for the others to see. * * *
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-B
REPORT ON THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 16 FEBRUARY 1944
[Marginal notes] St. 10-44 VII Top Secret
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
Z.P. 7 g. Rs.
Pl. 030053
Berlin, 18 February 1944
W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3
Secret
31 copies, 3d copy
[Milch’s initial]
M
_REPORT ON THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 16 FEBRUARY 1944,
ON LABOR ALLOCATION 1944_
The purpose of this conference is to determine the labor needs and
resources for the 1st quarter and the whole year of 1944. The session is
opened by the discussion of the data submitted by the planning office
(see enclosures 1-9). On the basis of the planning office’s estimate of
the requirements (enclosure 9) these turn out, after discussion with the
individual allottees, to be the following:
First Second-Fourth
Quarter-44 Quarter-44 Total
in 1000’s
Agriculture 70 (1) 70 (2) 140
Forestry and Timber Industry 40 (3) . . (4) 40
Armament and War Production 544 (5) 3,000 (6) 3,544
Air Raid Damages 100 50 150 (7)
Communications 85 (8) 265 350
Distribution . . . . . .
Public Administration 62 (9) . . 62
Wehrmacht Administration 130 . . 130
——— ——— ———
1,031 3,385 4,416
(1) Not including the 200,000 of whom 100,000 each will flow back from
industry and forestry.
(2) Not including the demand for seasonal workers amounting usually to
62,000.
(3) 25,000 for forestry and 15,000, including 8,000 women for the timber
industry, as against a peacetime requirement of 150,000 male and 40,000
female seasonal workers, although now considerably increased production
(1943:70 million cubic meters; 1944:80 million cubic meters) and
particularly heavy combing-out through draft.
(4) Starting autumn 1944, the usual necessary transfer from agriculture.
(5) Found to be a priority requirement for February with the
Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation.
(6) Starting March, 200,000 monthly as compensation for fluctuations—2
million for period March to December 1944. Plus compensation for return
to agriculture 100,000 (cp. note 1) including 30,000 retrained workers
who perhaps will have to be covered by an over-all exchange system and
about 900,000 as replacement for draftees, as reserves for increased
programs, etc., making about 3 million men all told for the period from
March to December 1944.
(7) 150,000 is the minimum requirement in addition to the hitherto
assigned 70,000 OT, 100,000 GB construction and 118,000 workmen to the
local and district assignments and 42,000 workers centrally assigned.
The mobile formations are to be increased and sometimes to be reinforced
by local help, particularly by people unemployed through bombings.
(8) Including 75,000 for the Reichsbahn, 1,000 for inland navigation,
7,000 for motor traffic, 2,000 for minor railways.
(9) Including 27,000 for the Reichspost and 35,000 for the Red Cross.
In this estimate, real fluctuation (departure from work) as well as
fictitious fluctuation (change of work location) are taken into account.
Fictitious fluctuation is still to be variously estimated in the various
branches. For the armament section it is estimated at 50 percent of the
total fluctuation (cp. note 6). The total requirements of approximately
4.4 million would thus decrease by up to 1 million. The above estimate
of requirements ought, therefore, in no case to exceed the requirements
determined at the Fuehrer’s conference on 4 January 1944, comprising
only the real fluctuation and amounting to 4,05 million namely:
1. Maintenance of the status of activity in the whole of 2,5 million
the war economy including agriculture, taking into
account the replacement of deficiencies due to drafts
into the Wehrmacht, deaths, illness, expiration of
contract, etc. (real fluctuation)
2. For additional armament tasks and removal of bottleneck 1,30 million
situations in armament plants
3. Air raid defense constructions, etc. 0,25 million
—————
Total 4,05 million
Kehrl is charged with the task of ascertaining the magnitude of real and
fictitious fluctuation, and as a basis thereto, on behalf of the Central
Planning Board, together with the competent offices, to determine the
concepts, “real and fictitious fluctuation,” furthermore the concepts,
assignment, reserves [Aufstockung], etc., in a uniform terminology which
will be binding for all agencies concerned.
The following resources are the GBA’s [Sauckel’s] estimated coverage of
the requirements:
1. With the utmost efforts, other workers can be mobilized 500,000
from German domestic reserves (getting hold of labor
unemployed as result of enemy air raids, compulsory
registration, shutting down, combing out measures)
2. Recruitment of Italian labor numbering at the rate of 1,500,000
250,000 a month from January to April—1,000,000 and
500,000 from May to December
3. Recruitment of French labor at equal monthly rates, 1,000,000
from 1 February to 31 December 1944 (approx. 91,000 per
month)
4. Recruitment of labor from Belgium 250,000
5. Recruitment of labor from the Netherlands 250,000
6. Recruitment of labor from the eastern territories, 600,000
occupied former Soviet territories, Baltic states, and
General Government
7. Recruitment of workers from other European countries 100,000
—————
Approximately 4,2 million
In addition, the following possibilities are seen for the mobilization
of more reserves: Intensification of employment of women (in England, 61
percent of women between 14 and 65 are conscripted for the war economy,
in Germany only 46 percent) especially in agriculture (more stringent
application of the Goering ordinance), reduction in number of domestic
assistants, reduction of the idle classes (Sauckel-Kehrl-Himmler, in
this respect regional round-ups are to be carried out separately for
foreigners, men and women) improvement of the sanitary system (saving up
to 3 percent), working out of equitable contractual wages with incentive
wage premiums. The planning office undertakes in common with the GBA
[Sauckel] the examination of these possibilities for an intensified
mobilization. Kehrl is moreover commissioned to make a general
examination of the question of an improvement of industrial labor
assignment. Everyone concerned will transmit their data on faulty
assignment of workers to the planning office. If necessary, this
question will be handled at a special session of the Central Planning
Board.
For the 1st quarter of 1944 the following resources (including a
fictitious fluctuation of about 50,000 per month) are given by the
estimate of the GBA [Sauckel]:
Assignments in January 145,000
Assignments February-March 500,000
————
Approximately 650,000
The adjustment of requirements and coverage will be effected at another
session of the Central Planning Board.
[Signed] STEFFLER
Present:
Field Marshal Milch
State Secretary Koerner
President Kehrl
Ministerial Councillor Steffler
Maj. Gen. Waeger Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Teuscher Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
KVV Chief Bosch Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Ministerial Councillor Wissmann Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Lt. Col. Schaede Ministry for Armament and
Munitions
Provincial Counsellor Berk Plenipotentiary for Labor
Allocation
State Secretary Hayler Reich Economic Ministry
General of Engineers Sellschopp Reich Air Ministry
Staff Engineer Kaufmann Reich Air Ministry
Staff Secretary Ganzenmueller Reich Transport Ministry
Ministerial Director Hassenpflug Reich Transport Ministry
Ministerial Councillor Hennig Reich Transport Ministry
State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry
State Secretary Alpers Reich Office for Forestry
Prof. Abetz Reich Office for Forestry
State Secretary Gutterer Propaganda Ministry
Mayor Ellgering Propaganda Ministry
Gen. Weidemann OKW
Major Koch OKW
Distribution:
Reich Minister Speer 1st copy
Reich Minister Funk 2d copy
Field Marshal Milch 3d copy
State Secretary Koerner 4th copy
President Kehrl 5th copy & 6th
Engineer Goerner 7th copy
Ministerial Councillor Steffler 8th & 9th copies
Maj. Gen. Waeger 10th copy
KVV Chief Bosch 11th copy
Ministerial Councillor Wissmann 12th copy
Provincial Councillor Berk 13th copy
State Secretary Hayler 14th copy
General Engineer Sellschopp 15th copy
State Secretary Ganzenmueller 16th copy
State Secretary Backe 17th copy
State Secretary Alpers 18th copy
State Secretary Gutterer 19th copy
Gen. Weidemann 20th copy
Major Koch 21st copy
Planning Office 22d & 23d copies
Registry V.P. 24th & 31st copies
Pla. 160/ 11.2.
List of persons invited to the Conference of the Central
Planning Board on 16 February 1944:
Chairman: Field Marshal Milch
Participants:
Reich Minister of Economy Funk
State Secretary Koerner
State Secretary Dr. Backe
General Forester Dr. Alpers
State Secretary Dr. Ganzenmueller
State Secretary Dr. Gutterer
President Kehrl
Maj. Gen. Waeger
Ministerial Manager Dr. Timm (crossed out and replaced by Provincial
Councillor Berk)
Military Government vice-regent Dr. Bosch
Ministerial Councillor Dr. Steffler
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-A
EXTRACTS FROM THE STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE
FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING
BOARD, 1 MARCH 1944
_STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF THE 54TH CONFERENCE_[96]
_OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD_
Re: Labor Supply on Wednesday, 1 March 1944, 10 o’clock, at the
Ministry for Air Transport
SAUCKEL: Field Marshal [Milch], Gentlemen, it goes without saying that
we shall satisfy as far as possible the demands agreed upon by the
Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call
such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor
Allocation “possible” by stressing every nerve of his organization.
Already on 4 January I had to report to the Fuehrer with the greatest
regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee
delivery of the grand total of 4,050,000 men then calculated in the
Fuehrer’s Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Fuehrer
I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to
satisfy the demands, at least with regard to the number of laborers, but
this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I
can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving
would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program.
Of course, I shall readily agree if I am now told by the board: Now we
have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes
without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to
the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much
about figures!
We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for
ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we
collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to
make some general statements and ask for your indulgence.
In the autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns
supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not
give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I
have to state: the program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium,
and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these
countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these
countries themselves. For months—sometimes I visited these countries
twice within a month—I have been called a fool who against all reason
travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went
so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders
not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled
over whether or not Sauckel was a fool. If one’s work is smashed in such
a way, repair is very, very difficult. * * *
* * * * *
* * * Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According
to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again
including foreign workers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1
million which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that
time. Thus we dispatched to the Reich in those two months no more than
4,500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7,000
civilians arrived. This, although from 1 December until today, I have
had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all
these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was
terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to
be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are
still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European
scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the
French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done
by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German
food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last
stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any
comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians,
viz., as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need
not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by
their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor
reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed.
The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no
executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a
sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch
them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole
batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was
done in olden times for “shanghaiing”, went hunting for men and made
them drunk by using liquor as well as words in order to dispatch them to
Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor
supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming,
with the help of the Higher SS and Police Leader, a number of natives,
but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of
these men. * * *
* * * * *
* * * Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make
my work more difficult. According to reports received within the last
days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity,
and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very
much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to
emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories
which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of
mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrand with an
inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to
extract from French medium and small factories—80 percent of all French
factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours—1 million
laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for
dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite
possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up
the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased,
as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new
categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally
no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to
repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does
double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he
has here twice the value he has in France. I want to state clearly and
fearlessly—the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in
connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a
grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the
decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are
to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will
remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program
prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies
to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough
skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the
French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a
smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like
in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident.
If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be
prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected
factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and
feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the
Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for
use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to
French eyes as a German of whom they may say, Sauckel is here stopped
from acting for German armament! * * * On the other hand, I have grounds
for hoping that I shall be just able to wiggle through, first by using
my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying
upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from
the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted
from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened
for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and
certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required
a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France,
Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French
Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in
fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to
ask, is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant
with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the
answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no
executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France!
This I have been answered over and over again. How then, am I to
regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one
solution—the German authorities have to co-operate with each other, and
if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans
must make an example of one case, and, by reason of this law, if
necessary put prefect or burgomaster against the wall, if he does not
comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched
to Germany. During the latter quarter the belief in a German victory and
in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make has sunk
below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new
French ministers, especially Henriot [French (Vichy) Minister of
Propaganda] will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good
impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to
impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the
situation in France.
In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. * * *
Moreover, I am offended, and this grieves me most, by the statement that
I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German
authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who
have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this
slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. * * *
* * * Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with
economics and labor supply, inquired of me, why do you fetch these
people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our
existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply: It is my duty
to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer
a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by
my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to
transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German
traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer the German
armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit
for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in
question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. It is the
flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have
always been one of those who says: If only energetic measures are
applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s
name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen
our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions from Thuringia are
frequently mentioned in the armed forces report, I can only tell you
that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages
has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the
World War [I] by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as
Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best
kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the
front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace
them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland,
and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and
extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this
circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite
the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a
year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that
just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the
last quarter at least 1½ million workers whom I would have been able to
deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been
better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they
did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My
duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you,
Gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A
start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived,
and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order.
How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided
according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall
always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and
to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with
intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such
collaboration exists. * * *
* * * * *
MILCH: * * * I now proceed to the important question, where are we still
able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt
the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short
appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your
statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work
abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too
many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no
executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and
stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or
consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in
giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation,
probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your
work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at
the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist
between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the
armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In
case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain
degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have
never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this
would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by
not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have
grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are,
therefore, at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced
by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal
hatred against us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have
been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present
the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly
convinced and have said several times, if invasion starts, sabotage of
all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and
then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available
to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will
have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more
dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc. If one had shown
the nailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace
would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts.
This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I
am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will
be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to
kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that
their supply of arms in the West is rather ample since the English are
dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you,
Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon
as you arrive the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to
Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist,
they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this
is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of
the fact that your opposite number, the executive is not able to prevent
their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the
problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and
this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is
feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive,
as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found
out on the other side, I do not think, Party Comrade Sauckel, that you
will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The
men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and
power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army
alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this
kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are training
forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which
could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the
partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in
the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at
Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the army, and at
the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km.
and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their
assistance. In the rear there were great masses of men who had retreated
in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available
neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am
aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have
seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the
army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich
Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question
to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the
duties of the military commanders. There ought to be orders of such
lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that
things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these
duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every
passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the
future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump;
and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker
if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of
mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring
into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by
the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers
within the quarter ending 30 May. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months
which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the
protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send
them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to
larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in
Italy, i.e., the number of protected factories, will not be further
increased.
* * * * *
SAUCKEL: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing
with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to
Germany—in other words 2 million—cannot be fulfilled, the employment
of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers,
however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the
protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected
factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the
effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type
will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact
more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in
Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep
to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in
France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only
be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who
still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like
waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops, etc.
MILCH: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared
with the whole of Italian labor?
SCHIEBER: I think 14 percent, but I don’t have the figures here.
MILCH: Would not the following method be better: We could take under
German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell
them: Only he gets any food who either works in a protected factory or
goes to Germany.
SAUCKEL: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the
German worker is in Germany, and the Italian worker too, even if he does
not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us
than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food
authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German
worker introducing the “factory sandwich”. When I am in Paris, of
course, I go to Maxim’s. There one can experience miracles of
nourishment. The Fuehrer still thinks that in these countries only very
rich men who can go to Maxim’s are well provided with food. Thereupon I
sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch
restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel
the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our
nation has to experience. The average French citizen too can still buy
everything he wishes.
(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!)
Yes. Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. Therefore he
has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food.
This unfortunately is the case.
MILCH: Is there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control
the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene
at an earlier stage of distribution.
KOERNER: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food;
these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure,
but they have been fulfilled.
MILCH: But there is a simple remedy, let us cease supplying the troops
from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from
France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then
we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen.
KOERNER: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system.
The Frenchmen had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The
rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which
we cannot touch at all. Every year we increase our food demands to the
French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently
yielding to pressure, and in proportion to the harvest results, were
they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at
all. The Italian can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian
always has money and deals in the black market, he is in a much better
situation than our German worker who practically has nothing but what he
gets on his card.
MILCH: But don’t we even send food to Italy?
KOERNER: We are exchanging certain goods.
SAUCKEL: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French
and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the
money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany
than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to
Germany.
* * * * *
MILCH: Unfortunately, Reich Minister Speer is not present today. He
certainly must have had an opinion about the whole system. His agreement
with Bichelonne was to activate an additional labor supply in France
itself for our armament with the aid of existing French capacities. We
cannot compute the result here of what was achieved by that action.
Whether the result he dreamed of has been achieved cannot be decided
just yet; that is, have the S-plants given us an increase of armaments
which is greater than what we would have achieved if the people had
worked in Germany? I would propose that Minister Speer himself one day
clarify this problem again. Because if only a negative result had been
achieved, he would automatically change his point of view too.
The first question is: Is the percentage of trained people in the
S-plants so great that all the others are to be regarded as rubbish? And
the second question is: Is it possible at all, with the lack of
so-called executive power and differing opinions on this question, to
seize and transfer to Germany the remaining 80 percent who are not in
the S-plants? So, in view of the general political and organizational
conditions in France, would you be able to transfer some 10-15 percent
of the best of these 80 percent?
SAUCKEL: I’ll have to get them.
MILCH: Can you do it at all?
SAUCKEL: Today I cannot promise anything. Today I can only do my work.
MILCH: I mean, in reference to the other 80 percent, if your hands are
not tied by different circumstances, that first, there is nothing to
attract these people to Germany; that second, they reckon with Germany’s
defeat in a short time; that third, they are attached to their families
and to their country; and that fourth, they shun work because they can
still exist, and without it they look on the whole period as a period of
transition. On the other hand you have the fact that the army does not
assist you and that the German authorities are hostile to each other, a
fact which is very cleverly utilized by the French.
SAUCKEL: That has changed since my last visit. All German authorities,
the Military Commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Field Marshal
Sperrle, have supported me considerably in these affairs.
(MILCH: I refer to the smaller authorities, the executive ones.)
That has been spoiled—pardon me if I have to bring this up—because all
departments, even armaments over there, were of the opinion up to 4
January, that my claims and, especially, my figures, were crazy.
(MILCH: But only people who could not understand such figures.)
Up to 4 January it was the same everywhere, from the military commander
to the German Ambassador and the German armament departments. Up to then
all the agencies in France had in general held the opinion: it has not
been decided yet by any means, Sauckel’s figures are not correct, so we
have to take it easy here. And that penetrated naturally down to the
lower ranks of French authorities too.
MILCH: That is just what I mean about the differences of opinion between
you and Minister Speer. You say: The best thing for me is to approach
the protected industries; Speer says: Leave those people alone, take 80
percent away from the others. And if one is neutral, one has to say,
always with the provision that these 20 percent in the S-plants really
achieve something for us, Speer is right when he says: Please do not
touch my 20 percent; there are enough among the 80 percent for your use.
And now I say: Why do you not take the others? Is it so difficult to
approach them?
SAUCKEL: No. I need the people as well. The fact is that Speer’s plants
are filling up nowadays. For instance, I received the information the
day before yesterday that the urge to work for the protected industries
is especially strong in France just now and so the supply of skilled
workers to Germany is practically cut off. Skilled workers can only be
found in these plants.
KEHRL: May I explain briefly the opinion of my Minister? Otherwise the
impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer
had been unclear or unreasonable, and I want to prevent this. Seen from
our viewpoint, the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943
manufacturing for Germany was done in France only to a relatively modest
extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German
capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and
moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of
Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany.
(SAUCKEL: Some were recruited forcibly.)
The drafting started after the recruiting no longer yielded adequate
results.
SAUCKEL: Out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany,
not even 200,000 came voluntarily.
KEHRL: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure
was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this
recruitment no longer yielded satisfactory results, we started drafting
according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the
success was rather good. Up to eighty percent of the age group were
registered and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year.
Following developments in the Russian war and the hopes raised thereby
in the western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups
became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; viz.,
the men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by
simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport
or by leaving the transport en route. When they found out through these
first attempts during the months of July and August that the German
executive either was not able or was not willing to catch these shirkers
and either to imprison them or take them forcibly to Germany, the
readiness to obey the call-ups sank to a minimum. Therefore, relatively
small percentages were caught in individual countries. On the other
hand, these men, moved by the fear the German executive might after all
be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch
factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and
assistance from the small partisan groups there.
* * * * *
MILCH: Another question. Since now through the transfer of various
industries so much is covered by French labor, as in the textile
industry, etc., a corresponding number of German workers would
necessarily become free as a result of that.
KEHRL: Then they will not be requisitioned here, though they would have
been formerly.
TIMM: Nobody is going to be released. Probably other requests will be
sent to the same factories.
SAUCKEL: In this respect I must also draw attention to the fact that the
German factories which were shut down were much more up to date and
probably worked with less personnel than the French factories.
MILCH: But we want all the factories to work for armaments.
KEHRL: That would also result in spreading the risk in case of air
warfare.
MILCH: I believe the system to be good, as a still more severe
commitment of workers for Germany would have the effect of making a
considerable part of them remain over there for good. I wish you had
something to back you up so you can have enough power to get it done. I
do not think that anyone in France will enforce it.
SAUCKEL: But they will all right, if Germany goes at this thing the
right way. It is not the insignificant French workman who should be
punished, but the French policeman, who, instead of supplying people to
Germany, goes to them beforehand and says: I’m coming tomorrow; you’d
better get out. The French subordinate and intermediary authorities have
to be punished.
MILCH: Even if Bichelonne and Laval have the best intention there will
be resistance from the mayors, the gendarmes, and the prefects, just
because these people are afraid that, first, they will be called to
account afterwards for it, and, second, because of their patriotism,
which makes them say: We must not work for the enemy of our country.
Therefore, I would like to have an authority in our administration which
would force these people to do it, because then the French could say: If
you force us, we will do it, but voluntarily we will not do it. The same
applies to Italy. There they say: Who knows who will win, whether it
will be Mussolini or Badoglio or the King; only, if you force us, we are
ready to do it. Therefore, we have to have something on our side which
will exercise this pressure. I don’t see at all why big divisions should
be necessary for this. The existing forces should be sufficient to
accomplish it.
TIMM: I have the feeling that we are sticking too closely to the figures
and are neglecting the qualitative side of the question. The present
development may permit us to fulfill our programs with regard to
figures, but in the demands made by the factories the important thing
for them is to have so many metal workers, etc. Then we practically have
to say: You will only get unskilled workers.
KEHRL: We realize that. The plants are getting unskilled workers, at the
utmost it may be possible to obtain skilled workers by transferring
plants from Italy to Germany.
SAUCKEL: Then in the course of the year the factories will declare: We
cannot use these workers. And over against this you have the fact that
in France we have a reservoir of unused skilled workers.
MILCH: I am not worrying about that. Naturally our plants will say: We
want skilled workers. But they also need a certain number of unskilled
workers.
TIMM: Will it not happen that the officers making the demands say one
day: But we know that in the French plants there is an excess of skilled
workers which cannot be justified?
MILCH: That should be discussed again later with Speer himself. First,
Speer must have the proper perspective to see what has happened as the
result of all his agreements.
I can imagine that first the _numerus clausus_ is introduced at once, so
that the extent of the output in the S-plants is fixed, and that
secondly it is decided later on that if a part of the S-plants has not
worked properly after a certain period, they lose their protection again
and the people from these plants can be transferred as a unit. I can
foresee already now that in air armaments, part of the plants will turn
out such bad production that I shall not be interested in keeping them
up. So, protection for certain plants will simply be discontinued. And
this will have a positive effect on the other plants, too, because they
will say: If we don’t do our work properly, we shall be transferred. Now
during the transfer it is necessary to see that people really do arrive
and do not run away before or during the transfer. If a transport has
left a town and has not arrived, 500 to 600 persons from this place must
be arrested and sent to Germany as prisoners of war. Such a thing is
then talked about everywhere. If actions like this and other similar
ones are carried out often, they would exert a certain pressure. The
whole thing would be made easier if we had control of food. The stuff
offered by the black market has to come from a certain depot, and there
we ought to cut in.
KEHRL: That is difficult. The transport of food by parcel post has taken
on extraordinary proportions in France.
MILCH: If I were military commander, I would simply confiscate the whole
of the parcel post!
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 48-D
EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE
OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD, 4 APRIL 1944
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Central Planning Board
Z.P. 18 Secr. St. Papers Pl. 030056
Berlin, 8 April 1944
[Signed] DR. GOERNER
Top Secret State Matter
_REPORT ON THE 56TH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD ON 4 APRIL 1944_
_Building Allocation 1944_
* * * * *
The _Jaegerstab_ is to get a quota of 550 million including 150 million
definitely pledged from the reserve and the _air administration_ is to
have a quota of 200 million; both are to be checked against each other.
Regarding the air administration quota, precise details (as to specific
amounts, number of workers required, quantities of material, etc.) are
to be submitted, building projects for the supplying industry (optical
glass) are to be transferred to the office of armament supplies, trial
projects are to be discussed between the commissioner of building and
air H.C., the remaining demands are to be cleared between air chief
administration and the Chief of the General Staff.
* * * * *
The quota recipients will be informed of their respective quotas as of
guiding figures within the limits of which the commissioner of building
may give assignments. The quota recipients themselves are, on the basis
of these guiding figures, to re-plan their projects by concentrating on
priority issues and to report which of their building projects will have
to fall out including the resulting figures. Field Marshal Milch will
report to the Fuehrer on the total situation of building. Reports on the
quotas Air Ministry, Navy, Army, and Reichsbahn are to be sent to Field
Marshal Milch forthwith.
Demands of labor, building materials, etc., as resulting from the quota
allocations are to be discussed with the planning office by the quota
recipients taking into account such amounts of the quota as were already
used up for building purposes since 1 January 1944.
[Typed signature] STEFFLER.
Present:
Field Marshal Milch
Reich Minister Funk
State Secretary Koerner[97]
President Kehrl[98]
Dr. Ing. Goerner
Min. Rat Steffler