Commitment of Manpower from the East. Circular Decree of the Reich
Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
Interior dated 20 February 1942—S IV No. 208/42 (foreign workers).
Enclosed I am sending you general regulations concerning the recruiting
and the committing of manpower from the East for your information and
careful attention.
I have the following additional directives for the Security Police and
the SD [Security Service]:
_A. MANPOWER FROM THE ORIGINAL SOVIET RUSSIAN
TERRITORY_
_I. General security measures._
1. The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet
Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment
of foreigners in spite of the special standards of their way of living,
since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers
and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at
the place of work, scarcely be effected. The Security Police is charged
with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do
everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the
possibilities of danger to a minimum. Since enforcements cannot be
counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police
administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged
with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the
Security Police within the sphere of their jurisdiction.
* * * * *
_III. Combatting violations against discipline._
1. According to the equal status of the manpower from the original
Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must
be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations
against discipline, including work refusal and loafing at work, will be
fought exclusively by the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. The smaller
cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to
instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as
provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards
shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But
this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be
informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when
conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work.
2. In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the
disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police
office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as
a rule only with strict measures, that is, with transfer to a
concentration camp or with special treatment.
3. The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner.
4. In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at
the Reich Security Main Office, stating personal data and the exact
history of the act.
5. Special treatment consists of hanging. It should not take place in
the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower
from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special
treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which
led to this special treatment.
6. Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional
reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested.
* * * * *
_IV. Subversive activities against the Reich._
Anti-Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology,
propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the
strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer
through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of
perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by
special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp
may be considered.
_V. Criminal violations [Kriminelle Verfehlungen]._
1. As a matter of principle, criminal violations—regardless of whether
committed inside or outside the camp—shall be punished by state police
measures. * * *
2. Criminal offenses [Kriminelle Delikte] are generally to be punished
as violations against discipline, that is, the state police measures
provided for, shall take place in cases of smaller violations, and
special treatment shall take place in cases of crimes—such as, murder,
homicide, and robbery.
3. Concerning capital crimes against German persons, punishment by
criminal court procedure may, however, in an individual case appear
suitable. If the (superior) state police agency considers this
opportune, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney, under
the provision that pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count
on the death penalty for the perpetrator.
_VI. Sexual Intercourse._
Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet
Russian territory. Because of their closely confined quarters they have
no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse occur
nevertheless—especially by the individually employed manpower on the
farms—the following is directed:
1. For every case of sexual intercourse with our German countrymen or
women [deutschen Volksgenossen oder Volksgenossinnen] special treatment
is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian
territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower.
2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the
conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to
be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a
concentration camp.
_VII. Measures against fraternization with manpower from the original
Soviet Russian territory._
1. Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of
manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German
population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic
ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not
directly pertaining to the work and, if possible, to avoid every
solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original
Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps
are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the
individual case.
2. If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse or
commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian
territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested.
3. The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich
and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings
great dangers to be dealt with by the Security Police; therefore, it
should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a
rule, the transfer to a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will
be proper; this also applies to cases of sexual intercourse.
_VIII. Search._
* * * * *
2. When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment.
* * * * *
_B. MANPOWER FROM THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND
FOREIGN MANPOWER, NOT OF POLISH ORIGIN,
FROM THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT AND FROM
THE ANNEXED EASTERN TERRITORIES_
_I. General._
1. This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state
police. In view of the political attitude of these nations, or ethnic
groups [Volksstaemme] toward the Reich on the one hand and their
position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the
regulations valid for foreign manpower in general, but are subject to
special limitations in their way of living.
2. These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of
this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing
of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of
the Secret State Police to be especially watchful about the observation
of the mentioned principle. The Secret State Police has to inform the
offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant
communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of
work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual
billeting in spite of existing collective quarters, position superior to
that of a German worker, etc., must not be tolerated. As far as these
people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully
against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct
will be met with state police measures.
3. This manpower must, however, by no means be put on the same level as
the Poles or the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, on
account of their nations’ fundamental antagonism toward the Polish
people and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to
them—especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service
among this manpower—since their rather receptive attitude toward the
German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could
stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled.
* * * * *
_III. Fighting against breach of labor contract._
1. The fight against breach of labor contract of this manpower is
principally the duty of the Secret State Police.
2. This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of
the Reich trustee of labor, with the means at his disposal in the
regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no
active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are
necessary, the Reich trustee of labor will transfer the proceedings to
the Secret State Police.
3. In every case, however, it is the task of the (superior) state police
agency to check whether the violation of the working duty by this
manpower is not caused by the plant through breach of contract as well
as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower
appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state
police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower.
4. In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in
case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a
correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe
repetition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested.
In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the
Reich trustee of labor has to be informed each time about the decision.
_IV. Criminal violations._
* * * * *
3. * * *. Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage
are to be punished, as a matter of principle, by state police measures
(special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of
the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, pursuant
to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the
perpetrator. In these cases it is to be ascertained what the outcome of
the trial is; should, against expectations, a death sentence not be
passed, a report has to be made to me, attaching copy of the judgment.
Inquiry proceedings concerning other offenses are, as a rule, to be
transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of
crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all
against punishing purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state
police measures.
* * * * *
_VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans._
1. The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well
as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the General
Government and from the annexed eastern territories with Germans is
punishable by severest penalties. (Changed by Circular Decree dated 23
October 1943.) The workers will be thoroughly instructed through the
attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) [not reproduced] in the foreign
languages when they report upon their arrival at the local police
offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected
through the Party administration offices.
2. The district [Kreis] police offices have received instructions to
arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report
them to the competent (superior) state police agency.
3. For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with Germans, special
treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a
concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of
Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicable
for the treatment of the involved German persons.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS[78]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 13
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO ROSENBERG, 24 APRIL 1942, AND
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON SAUCKEL’S LABOR
MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, 20 APRIL 1942
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
GBA
Berlin W. 8, 24 April 1942
Mohrenstrasse 65
(Thuringia House)
Phone: 126571
[Stamp]
Bureau of Ministry [Ministerbuero]
received 27 April 1942, No. 0887 Min. 28/v
Dr. K.P. has been informed
Very esteemed and dear Party Member Rosenberg:
Enclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please
excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.
Heil Hitler!
Yours,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
5 copies
copy for Mr. Wittenbacher.
[Signed] WACHS
Chancellory 1 May 1942
[Kanzlei]
[Stamp] MISCHKE
read: ILFL/KS 4.5.42
filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg
To The Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories,
Party Member Rosenberg
Berlin
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation
20 April 1942
Sckl./We.
_The Labor Mobilization Program_
* * * * *
The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich
and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting
armed forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of
the armed forces and also for the nutrition of the homeland. The raw
material as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their
human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the
profit of Germany and their allies.
* * * * *
VII. * * * Should we succeed with the help of the Party to convince all
the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of
the labor mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed to take
good care of and keep up the morale of all the men, women, and the
German youths who work within the labor mobilization program under
extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical and
mental capabilities of endurance are concerned and should we furthermore
be able, also with the help of the Party, to use the prisoners of war as
well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without
harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and
nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult
part of the labor mobilization program.
_The Task and its Solution_
(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can assure you,
nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor problem of
all times, especially with regard to figures.)
* * * * *
B. _The Solution_:
* * * * *
3. The armament and nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only
to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign
labor.
Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found
when I took charge of my mission.
The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of
May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the
availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an
increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well
as of agricultural labor in the sector of the German food economy.
All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the
East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the
German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be
brought to the highest possible level.
It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of
foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that
purpose is the occupied territories of the East.
Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of
the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not
succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis,
we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.
* * * * *
_Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers_
The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a
gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has
become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of
labor program in this war.
All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to
exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable
degree of expenditure.
It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and
mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he has proved himself
the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him
correctly and humanely, even when we expect useful work of him.
As long as the German armaments industry did not make it absolutely
necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet
prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the
Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the working
capacity of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.
* * * * *
Therefore, I want to impress most cordially but also most emphatically
upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the
labor mobilization program, the necessity to comply with all these
necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National
Socialist principle:
Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work,
that is, for the future of our Nation!
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
[Stamp]
(The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS[79]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 16-A
EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL REPORT OF THE MINISTRY
FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES, 30 SEPTEMBER 1942,
CONCERNING THE STATUS OF EASTERN LABORERS
Berlin NW 7, Hegelplatz 2, 30 September 1942
Central Office for Members of Eastern Nations
Ih (ZO)
Subject: Present situation of the Eastern Labor Problem
* * * The manner and method by which the problems created through the
importation of millions of members of the eastern peoples into the Reich
are being solved is relevant with respect to two big tasks:
1. the development of the _war situation_,
2. the enforcement of the German _claim for leadership in the East_
after the end of the war.
* * * * *
* * * The facts which, by the fall of 1942, have been changed only
partially or incompletely, are, among other, as follows:
1. The _definition_ of workers from the occupied territories of the USSR
was narrowed down to the legal labor and social labor concept of
“Eastern workers”; thereby, a particular “employment relationship of a
special type” was created among “foreigners”—something which had to be
looked upon, by those affected, as degrading.
2. The _drafting_ of eastern male and female workers often occurred
without the necessary examination of the capabilities of those
concerned, so that 5 to 10 percent sick and children were transported
along. On the other hand, in those places where no volunteers were
obtained, instead of recruiting them pursuant to labor conscription law,
coercive measures were used by the police (imprisonment, penal
expeditions, and the like).
3. The _allocation_ to enterprises was not undertaken by considering the
occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment
of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps.
4. The _billeting_ did not follow the policies for other foreigners, but
was done like for civilian prisoners, in camps which were fenced in with
barbed wire and were heavily guarded and which they were not permitted
to leave.
5. The _treatment_ by the guards was, on the average, without
intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in
enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were
exposed to the ridicule of the Poles and Czechs, among other things.
6. The _food_ was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the eastern
laborers employed in industry and mining that, on the average, the good
capability of the camp members dropped quickly and many sicknesses and
deaths occurred.
7. _Payment_ was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the
industrial worker would be left on the average with 2 or 3 RM each week,
and the farm laborers with even less, so that the wage transfer to their
homes became illusory, not to mention the fact that no procedure was as
yet developed for such transfer.
8. The _postal service_ with their families was not feasible for months
because of the lack of preparatory measures, so that instead of factual
reports, wild rumors arrived in their countries—among others, by way of
emigrants.
9. The _promises_ which had been made time and time again in the areas
of enlistment were in gross contradiction with the facts mentioned under
3 to 8.
Apart from the natural impairment of morale and working capacity
resulting from these measures and conditions, the result was that the
_Soviet propaganda_ seized upon this matter and exploited it carefully;
for this, an ample basis was provided not only by the actual conditions
and the letters which reached the home country [of the workers] in spite
of the initial blockade, as well as by stories of fugitives and such,
but also by the clumsy publications in the German press about the
respective legal regulations. As early as April 1942, Commissar of
Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in his _note_ to the enemy powers referred to
this, especially in section III of that note in which among other things
it is stated:
“The German administration is stamping under its feet the long
recognized laws and customs of warfare by ordering its troops to
take into captivity the male civilian population, in many places
even the women, and to apply to them the kind of regime, which
the Hitlerites have introduced for the prisoners of war. This
does not only mean _slave labor_ for the captured peaceful
inhabitants but in most cases also inescapable death by
starvation or death through sickness, corporal punishment, and
organized mass murders.
“The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear which has
been very widely practiced by the German-Fascist Army at the
time of its advance is taking on a mass character; it is carried
out at direct orders of the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the
immediate rear areas during the retreat of the German Army. In a
series of documents which have been found by units of the Red
Army at the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a
reference to the Order of the High Command under No. 2974/41 of
6 December 1941 which orders the deportation of all grown men
from the occupied places to prisoner of war camps. * * *
“Sometimes, all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men
were torn away from their families, or mothers were separated
from their children. Only the smallest number of these deported
people have been able to return to their homes. _These returnees
report about unheard-of degradations, heaviest forced labor,
enormous numbers of deaths among inhabitants because of
starvation and tortures, about the murder by the Fascists of all
the weak, wounded, and sick._”
* * * * *
The effects of this large-scale radio, press, and leaflet propaganda
which is based on documentary evidence, a propaganda operating even into
German-administered territories, must be considered as one of the main
reasons for this year’s stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as
the threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the
General Government.
In the meantime, after a _betterment of the condition of the eastern
laborers_ had been insisted upon, not only by the Main Office for
Politics in the Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories,
which has been able to find support in the repeated requests by the High
Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged with the
responsibility for all labor employment as well as the Department of
Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision
of the eastern laborers—those previously existing legal and police
rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 camps in
the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. * * *
In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in many
cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the
Plenipotentiary General of Labor Allocation, the _total situation_ of
the eastern laborers (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be
considered _unsatisfactory_, * * *.
There remains such a _quantity of grievances and problems_ that it would
be impossible to relate now.
* * * * *
[Signed] GUTKELCH
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS[80]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 19-A
EXTRACTS FROM TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM, SIGNED BY
BRAEUTIGAM,[81] 25 OCTOBER 1942, CONCERNING
EFFECTS OF SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM
Copy
Top Secret Matter of State [Geheime Reichssache]
[handwritten:] II 1 1161/44 g Rs.
Memorandum
In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the
destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the Greater
Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial
territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation.
* * * With the instinct characteristic of the eastern peoples, even the
primitive person has soon found out that for Germany, the slogan
“liberation from Bolshevism” was merely a pretext, in order to enslave
the Slavic peoples of the East in her own manner. But lest any doubts at
all exist as to this German war aim, the German public is, to an ever
increasing extent, unabashedly pointing at this intention. Not only for
Germany is the conquered territory publicly being claimed as
colonization area, but even for Germany’s bitter enemies, the Dutch and
Norwegians. * * *
* * * * *
Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be
named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of
thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps.
Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is
especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for
prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, while complaints about the
treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and
English, have not been heard of. It is obvious that nothing was so
suitable for strengthening the resistance of the Red Army as the
knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to be met.
To be sure, the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by
unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate
of the prisoners of war. However, this improvement is not to be ascribed
to political insight, but to the sudden realization that our labor
market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the
grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the
occupied eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger
like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany.
Now the food question suddenly no longer existed. With the usual
unlimited abuse of the Slavic humanity, “recruiting” methods were used
which probably have their model only in the blackest periods of the
slave trade.
A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or
age, the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately
that many more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious
illnesses and other incapabilities for work. It need not be emphasized
that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the
resistance of the Red Army; of course, these methods were used only in
the Soviet Union, and in no way remotely resembled this form in enemy
countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy
for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National
Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in
spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this
bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to
break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously, the Main Department for
Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring
workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation.
Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost
efforts with a minimum of food. Here, as well, not political insight,
but merely the most primitive biological knowledge has led to an
improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are
to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that
these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters,
movies, restaurants, etc., and may leave the house at the most three
hours a week, except for duty purposes.
In addition, there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reich
Commissariat itself. With an unequalled arrogance, we put aside all
political knowledge and, to the happy surprise of all the colored world,
treat the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories as whites of class
2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany
and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no
social services must be given them. Their sustenance interests us only
insofar as they are still capable of labor, and, in every respect, they
are given to understand that we regard them as of minute value.
* * * * *
Berlin, 25 October 1942
[Signed] BRAEUTIGAM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-61
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 20
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO THE PRESIDENTS OF LABOR OFFICES,
26 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING DEPORTATION AND
EMPLOYMENT OF POLES AND JEWS
Copy
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin S.W. 11, Saarlandstr. 96
26 November 1942
Va 5431/7468/42 g
To the Presidents of the Landes
Labor Offices (excl. Labor
Office Brandenburg)
Special-delivery letter
Secret
Subject: Employment of Jews. _Specif_: Replacement of Jews in
war-essential jobs by Polish labor.
In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security
Service, Jews still employed will now be evacuated from the territory of
the Reich and replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General
Government.
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service has informed
me on 26 October 1942, that it is anticipated that during the month of
November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in
order to make room there for the resettlement of Germans.
Poles slated for evacuation, as a result of this measure, will be
committed to concentration camps and put to work insofar as they are
criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, if fit for labor,
will be transported without their families to the Reich, particularly to
Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation
offices to serve as replacements for Jews to be eliminated from armament
factories.
The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of
Polish labor will be deported _at once_. This will apply first to Jews
engaged in unskilled labor since they can be exchanged most easily. The
remaining so-called “qualified” Jewish laborers will be left in the
industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently
familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be
determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual
industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum.
I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the
labor offices concerned accordingly.
To the President of the Landes Labor Office Brandenburg, Berlin W. 62
I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as the
removal of Jews allocated for work concerns your district, too, I
request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the
competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the
Security Service.
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS[82]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 21
EXTRACT FROM ORDER OF MUELLER, 17 DECEMBER 1942,
CONCERNING PRISONERS QUALIFIED FOR WORK
TO BE SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Berlin, 17 December 1942
The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
B. Nr. IV 656/42 Secret
Secret
Distribution—Secret:
All Commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service
All Chiefs of State Police Headquarters
For information:
The Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office,
SS Obergruppenfuehrer [Lt. Gen.] Pohl
All Higher SS and Police Chiefs
The Inspector of Concentration Camps
For reasons of war necessity, which need not be specified here, the
Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered on 14
December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be
committed to the concentration camps before the end of January 1943.
In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:
1. As of now (and for the time being, until 1 February 1943) eastern
workers or such foreign workers, who have been fugitives, or who have
broken contracts, insofar as they do not belong to allied, friendly, or
neutral states, are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest
concentration camps under observance of the simplest formalities listed
under No. 3. In order to eliminate or forestall complaints by outside
public offices, explanations will be furnished, if required, stating
that the measures are essential for reasons of public security on the
basis of the facts in the individual cases.
2. The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police and the
Security Service, and the Chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will
make immediate checks, applying especially rigorous and strict
standards, on (a) prisons, and (b) labor correction camps. All prisoners
fit for work, if at all possible physically and from a humanitarian
aspect, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp,
according to the following instructions, even if criminal procedures
have already been or will be instituted in the near future. Only such
prisoners who are to remain in solitary confinement, for investigation
purposes, may be left.
* * * * *
By order:
[Signed] MUELLER
Certified correct.
[Signed] HELLMUTH
[Seal of Secret State Police] Chief Secretary of Police
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS[83]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 25
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM GERMAN-APPOINTED UKRAINIAN
MAIN COMMITTEE TO FRANK, FEBRUARY 1943
Copy
Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytch,
Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee
Krakow, February 1943
To the Governor General,
Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
Your Excellency:
Complying with your request I am sending you this letter, in which I
should like to state briefly the critical conditions and the distressing
incidents which are creating an especially grave situation for the
Ukrainian population in the General Government. * * *
* * * * *
_II. Measures of labor procurement._
The general nervousness is enhanced yet by the wrong methods to obtain
labor, which have been used increasingly in recent months.
The wild and ruthless manhunt carried on everywhere in towns and
country, in streets, public squares, railway stations, even in churches,
as well as in homes at night, has badly shaken the sense of security of
the population. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized
anywhere and at any time by the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and
being taken into an assembly camp. The family does not know what has
happened to him, until weeks or months later one or the other gives news
of his fate by a postcard.
I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
_a._ During such a drive a schoolboy in Sokal lost his life and
another was wounded (App. 2).
_b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with
identity cards, were assigned in Krakow to a transport of
“Russian prisoners of war” and delivered into a punishment camp
in Graz (App. 3).
_c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany
by the labor office in the middle of January, were sent via East
Prussia to Pskov in Russia, where most of them died as a result
of the very severe conditions (App. 4).
_d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment
(Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys from classes (Biala
Podlaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieszow) (App. 5).
* * * * *
_III. Question of Personal Security._
Of a much worse character are the mass executions of absolutely innocent
persons * * *.
* * * * *
_Appendix 12_
* * * * *
As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the
shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great
indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian
population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews are
coming to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is
commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German
sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian
“Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).
The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German
authorities and even keep away from the communal kitchens, for fear that
those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
* * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 30
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 14 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING
LABOR QUESTIONS
G.B.A.
April 14th, [1943]
Sckl./We.
Forwarded We.
[in ink] April 15th
To the Fuehrer
Obersalzberg
My Fuehrer,
As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the
eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers
from the east for the German war economy in the coming months.
The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfilment of
the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas, too,
will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.
With the addition of about 150,000 workers who furthermore may be
obtained from Poland and from the other territories, it will then be
possible by summer again to put 5-600,000 workers at the disposal of
German agriculture and 1,000,000 workers at the disposal of the armament
and other war industries.
I ask for your approval to have the new French workers come into the
Reich under conditions similar to those of the last group. I have taken
contact with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW).
Since the largest part of the Belgian civilian workers and prisoners of
war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar
statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000
Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a
very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has
repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my
Fuehrer.
1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of
Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added
to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this
year.
As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their
feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably
regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich
presents a shining example compared to the methods of the capitalist and
bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and
blunders still occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with
the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.
In addition to the foreign civilian workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war
are also employed in the German economy.
2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches
of the German war economy:
Armament 1,568,801
Mining industry 163,632
Building 218,707
Transportation 199,074
Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544
Other branches of the economy 480,298
In addition to the foreign workers, 5 million male and female German
workers were channelled into the German war economy proper through
transfer from enterprises unimportant to the war effort, to
war-essential industries, etc.
* * * * *
Yours faithfully and obediently,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
The following persons received a copy of the above version:
Reich Marshal Goering
Reichsleiter Bormann
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels
Additional text on the original letter to the Fuehrer.
Since I will be in the eastern territories on April 20th, I ask you, my
Fuehrer, to accept in advance my most sincere congratulations along with
those of my district [Gau] and my family.
Let me assure you that the district [Gau] of Thuringia and I will serve
you and our dear people with all our strength.
It is the most fervent wish that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the
best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete
satisfaction.
Faithfully and obediently yours
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 33
LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 3 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING
FOREIGN LABOR SITUATION
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
1751/43 [pencilled]
forwarded on 6 June 1943
Berlin W 8, 3 June 1943
To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany
The Fuehrer’s Headquarters.
My Fuehrer,
I beg to be permitted to read to you [a report] on the situation of the
labor allocation for the first 5 months of 1943.
The following number of new foreigners and prisoners of war was for the
first time put at the disposal of the German war industry:
January 1943 120,085
February 1943 138,354
March 1943 257,382
April 1943 160,535
May 1943 170,155
————
TOTAL 846,511
I may remark that it was possible to reach this figure of 850,000 only
under great difficulties which had not existed during the previous year
and only because all labor allocation agencies, particularly also in the
occupied territories, approached their task with the greatest devotion.
Unfortunately, quite a number of our officials and employees became
victims of assassination, attack, and the like, by partisans.
In addition to the labor forces put at the disposal of the economy
within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were made available
within the occupied territories by the agencies of the Labor Allocation
Administration to the Organization Todt as well as to the enterprises
working for the German war economy in the East and the West.
Furthermore, it was possible to assign to the Wehrmacht, in addition to
a large number of laborers, some considerable numbers of labor
volunteers.
Moreover, by virtue of the order concerning compulsory registration,
dated 27 January 1943, the following number of men and women are made
available.
│ Men │ Women │ Total
February │ 14,594 │ 163,012 │ 177,606
March │ 45,606 │ 494,931 │ 540,537
April │ 19,315 │ 269,374 │ 288,689
May │ 11,485 │ 186,683 │ 198,168
│ ———— │ ———— │ ————
TOTAL │ 91,000 │ 1,114,000 │ 1,205,000
However, approximately 600,000 of these persons are available only for
less than 48 hours of work per week.
Altogether German war industry recruited 2,000,000 laborers during 5
months of 1943.
Furthermore, as regards wage control and increase of the output of the
laborers in the various European territories, especially in France,
negotiations were conducted as well as arrangements made and regulations
issued, which enabled us to keep the wage system in the occupied
European territories in order to secure, as far as possible, the living
conditions of laborers working for German interests, in spite of the
difficult conditions created by the war, and to increase production by
means of wage regulations also in these territories. The coordination of
these measures was achieved through agreements with the respective
armament and agricultural agencies, as well as with the Reich
Commissioner for Price Control.
Heil!
Yours faithfully and obediently,
[Signed] SAUCKEL
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3000-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 34
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT RENDERED TO RIECKE,
MINISTERIALDIREKTOR IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE,
28 JUNE 1943, ON EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE EAST
Freitag, Chief of Main Office III
with the Commissariat General in Minsk
Minsk, 28 June 1943
Secret!
[stamp]
Main Group Food and Agriculture
Rec’d. 14 July 1943; no encl.
III E 733/43 Secret
To Ministerialdirektor Riecke
in Berlin
Subject: Report on experiences in political and economic problems in the
East, particularly the Commissariat General White Ruthenia.
* * * * *
* * * The task of the military agencies and, subsequently, of the German
administration, is: “Exploitation of the region for the German war
economy,” and the motto: “Everything you do for Germany is right,
everything else is wrong!”
* * * * *
* * * The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had
disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and
weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and
economic effect * * * From * * * White Ruthenia, approximately 50,000
people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to
be obtained. Considering the total population of 2.4 million, these
figures are impossible * * *.
* * * * *
* * * Due to the sweeping drives [Grossaktionen] of the SS and police in
November 1942, about 250,000 acres of farmland are left unused, as the
population has gone and the villages have been razed.
* * * * *
[Signed] FREITAG
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS[84]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 35
EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY LEYSER TO ROSENBERG, 30 JUNE 1943, ON CONDITIONS
IN THE DISTRICT ZHITOMIR
The Commissioner General
Zhitomir, 30 June 1943
Secret
Oral report on the situation in the general district [Generalbezirk]
Zhitomir, by Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at a conference with
Reich Minister Rosenberg, in Vinnitsa, on 17 June 1943.
Mr. Reich Minister,
* * * * *
The symptoms created by the _recruiting of workers_ are, no doubt, well
known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations.
Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment of
labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. _In most
cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force._ The
population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the
transports to the Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from
the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems.
* * * * *
To date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to the
Reich from the general district Zhitomir. It can be taken for granted
that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to
approximately 200,000.
* * * * *
The struggle which has to be carried on is hard and full of sacrifices.
But it will and must be carried through. Enormous moral forces have been
mobilized in the personnel of the civil administration in their daily
efforts. The successes which they were able to achieve so far are
impressive, particularly with regard to the resistance encountered. May
I, therefore, be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank all
my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are
practically on the front. I can promise your Excellency, that we all
shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered.
[Signed] LEYSER
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 39
EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE, 18 FEBRUARY 1944, CONCERNING
THE RELEASE OF INDIGENOUS LABOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH
The City Commissioner in Kaunas.
Kaunas, 18 February 1944.
_PROCUREMENT OF INDIGENOUS WORKERS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE REICH_
Numerous drives for the purpose of recruiting indigenous workers for the
Reich have taken place since the entry of German armed forces into the
general district [Generalbezirk] Lithuania in June 1941. A few weeks
after the entry of the German troops, thousands of Lithuanian male and
female farm workers were recruited at the instigation of the military
administration, to work for 6 months on large estates in the Gau East
Prussia. _Unfortunately, the promises made then were not kept._ These
farm workers were not released after 6 months nor after 12 months; their
families remaining behind were left without any support for months; they
were for a long time refused a short vacation in Lithuania, and now it
is even considered to transfer these farm workers, recruited in 1941 for
6 months, to the armament industry in the Reich.
The second major drive was started by the armed forces in the spring of
1942 and concerned the _collecting of approximately 7,000 male workers
as so-called transport helpers_. The action, which was rushed into
without sufficient propaganda preparation, was greatly handicapped by
unwise measures on the part of the nervous armed forces command. Thus
for instance, the Lithuanians, ordered to the official agencies “only
for registration”, were not allowed to return home and were taken away
under military escort to the local barracks, leaving them no way of
either saying good-by to their families or putting in order their most
important personal affairs. No wonder that the enemy propaganda
exploited this “blemish” with avidity comparing the procedure with the
deportation methods used barely a year ago by the Soviets.
Until most recent times, numerous additional drives have been undertaken
for the purpose of obtaining volunteers for the armed forces, the police
and the Reich Labor Service, or for obtaining workers for the armament
industry in the Reich. * * *
* * * * *
Finally it must be recalled that the indigenous administration in its
present form and since its inception _has completely failed_ in the
question of procuring workers for the Reich. * * *
* * * * *
3. Gauleiter Sauckel requested that _30,000 indigenous workers for the
Reich_ be recruited at short order and be shipped to Germany. At a
conference between the Commissioner General and the First Councillor
General [Ersten Generalrat] on 7 September 1943, the latter offered to
assume the entire responsibility for the execution of this drive for the
native administration and to recruit and ship the specified number of
30,000 workers by 7 November 1943.
* * * * *
4. In the meantime, Gauleiter Sauckel made an _additional demand_ to the
effect that the general district Lithuania had to furnish _100,000
native workers_ (instead of the 30,000 demanded up until now) _for the
Reich_. At a conference with all the general councillors on 24 January
1944, the commissioner general did not leave any doubts as to the fact
that this number would have to be furnished regardless of any
consideration, even at the risk of leaving many work projects in the
general district unfinished and permanently removing workers needed on
jobs in the country. The responsibility for the execution of this new
drive lies again in the hands of the local administration, and, with the
consent of the commissioner general, indigenous conscription commissions
have been formed with all district chiefs and all chiefs of judicial and
local districts. The total number to be made available has been divided
up into contingents, and the quota to be furnished by every mayor or
district chief was exactly determined. This is the way the matter looks
in the district of the City of Kaunas:
New quota, to be supplied 7,000 workers
20 percent addition 1,400 workers
———————
TOTAL 8,400 workers
In the district of the City of Kaunas, according to the records of my
labor office on 1 February 1944, there were 7,000 unfilled jobs in
industry and the agencies of the armed forces, police, etc., so that to
all intents and purposes 15,400 workers would have to be found in the
city of Kaunas alone, in order to comply fully with the demands of the
Reich and the local economy. _And all that with a total indigenous
population of only a little over 130,000._
* * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-103[85]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 40
EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE (GERMAN-APPOINTED) POLISH MAIN COMMITTEE
TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND ON THE CONDITIONS OF POLISH WORKERS
IN GERMANY, 17 MAY 1944
Polish Main Committee
5 Vischer Street, Krakow
Krakow, 17 May 1944
To the Administration of the General Government,
Main Department Internal Administration,
Dept. Population and Welfare,
13 University Street, Krakow
No. Pa 1/724
————
6699/44
Subject: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich.
The living conditions of about 2 million Polish male and female workers
in the Reich have given rise to shortcomings which are largely lowering
the will and the capacity to work of many workers, endanger their health
and even their lives, and also have a strong influence on the situation
of their families within the General Government, thus directly affecting
the sphere of our own work.
These bad conditions are felt with particular intensity by those groups
of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been
lodged in large camps [Massenlagern]. With regard to workers on the
land, they occur as individual cases and are more easily dealt with. * *
*
* * * * *
Food relief allotments—We receive letters from the camps for eastern
workers and their large families, beseeching us for food. The quantity
and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called fourth
category of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies
spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time,
cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a
meager addition of potatoes now and then, is a hunger ration for a heavy
worker.
Sometimes punishment consists of starvation, which is inflicted e.g.,
for refusal to wear the badge “East”. Such punishment has the result
that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony). The
consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and
tuberculosis. The spread of tuberculosis among the Polish factory
workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the
community camps, because energy spent in the heavy work assigned to them
cannot be replaced.
* * * * *
The quantities of bread and [other] food fixed for Polish children in
the camps is thoroughly insufficient for building up substance for
growing and developing their bodies. In some cases children up to the
age of 10 and even more are allotted 200 grams of bread daily, 200 grams
of butter or margarine and 250 grams of sugar monthly, and nothing else
(factory in Zeititz, near Wurzen, Saxony). * * *
* * * * *
_Care of Children_—* * * An indication of the awful conditions this may
lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers (camp
for eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are
cases of 8-year-old, weak and undernourished children put to forced
labor and perishing from such treatment. * * *
_Health Care_—The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the
state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by many cases
of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to
the General Government unfit for work. Their state of health is usually
deteriorated past hope of recovery.
The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and
malnutrition is not recognized as a disease condition until the illness
manifests itself in high fever and fainting spells.
* * * * *
_Protection of the Family_—Grave depression is caused among the eastern
workers by the order forbidding marriage among them within the borders
of the Reich. * * * No less suffering is caused by the separation of
families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from
their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.
* * * * *
_Religious Care_—If under these bad conditions there is no moral
support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at
least such moral support which the religious feeling of the Polish
population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination
of religious services, worship, and religious care from the life of the
Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when
there is a religious service for other people, and other measures show a
certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and
outlook of the workers. * * *
* * * * *
[Stamp] THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE
[Signed] [name illegible]
President
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 208-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 55
REPORT BY SAUCKEL, 7 JULY 1944, ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
OF LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1944
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin W8, 7 July 1944
65 Mohren Street
Thuring House
Secret
NR 520/44/g Dr. ST/Ka
_Special Delivery Letter_
To: All Top Reich Authorities
The Reich Leader of the NSDAP
All Top Army Agencies
All Gauleiters
Subject: Accomplishments of the Labor Mobilization in the first half of
1944.
Enclosed I am submitting the total figures on additional manpower placed
at the disposal of the German war effort by the German Labor Offices in
the first half-year of 1944. They represent only such manpower that was
not previously employed in the German war effort.
According to the quota of 4,050,000 laborers set for this year,
2,000,000 new workers would have had to be secured in the first half of
the year. Because of increased difficulties in Italy and in the occupied
Western countries, regrettably one-half million less than that were
found. If despite the known difficult situation it was possible to
mobilize 1,500,000 people in the first half of the year, it is solely
due to the exertion of all available energy.
Since the Proclamation of 17 February 1944, around 62,000 women have
reported for “Voluntary Honorary Service,” and 52,000 of them have
already been assigned to work.
Heil Hitler!
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation
Berlin, 7 July 1944
_New Manpower Placed at the Disposal of the Economy
between 1 January and 30 June 1944_
A. Entire Economy:
Total 1,482,000
Of these were: Germans 848,000
Foreigners 537,400
War prisoners 96,600
B. Breakdown of allocation of [the persons listed under] A:
Agriculture and Forestry 231,000
Of them, foreigners 156,000
Mining 46,000
Of them, foreigners 34,000
Metal industry 415,000
Of them, foreigners 250,000
All other [branches of] economy 790,000
Of them, foreigners 194,000
C. Origin of foreign labor:
Occupied Eastern Territories 284,000
General Government 52,000
Protectorate 23,000
France, excluding Northern France 33,000
Belgium, including Northern France 16,000
Netherlands 15,000
Italy 37,000
Rest of Europe 77,400
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS[86]
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 56
MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE ON 11 JULY 1944 ATTENDED BY MILCH, CONCERNING
THE LABOR PROBLEM
_LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE
REICH CHANCELLERY ON 11 JULY 1944 1600 HOURS_
Name Official capacity Agency
Dr. Kuehne Chief of Mil. Adm. [illegible]
(1) Warlimont General of Artillery [Lt. OKW
Gen.]
Dr. Kohlhaase Director of Labor Section of the Supreme
Commissioner, Adriatic Coast,
Trieste
Dr. Landfried State Secretary, Chief of Italy
Mil. Adm.
(2) Walter Funk and Albert Speer
Milch [illegible]
(3) Krosigk
(3) Steengracht State Secretary Foreign Office
Abetz Ambassador German Embassy in Paris
Hanel [?] Major General Armaments Commissioner Staff,
France
von Linstow Colonel, GSC Military Commander, France
Sass Colonel, GSC General [Plenipotentiary] for
Italy
Franssen Major General Armaments Inspector, Belgium
Waeger Major General Armaments Office
Sarnow Ministerialdirektor Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section
Koegel Lieut. Col., GSC Gen. Staff of Army, QM Section
Reeder Chief of Mil. Adm. Brussels
Heider Chief of General Staff Brussels
(4) Ley
(5) Sauckel Labor Plenipotentiary Berlin
H. Backe Minister Reich Food Ministry
Marrenbach Chief [of Dept.] German Labor Front
Leyers Armaments Plenipotentiary Italy
Also present:
Ministerial Direktor Klopfer (Party Chancellery)
Ministerialrat Froehling
Ambassador Rahn
Dr. Huber
(6) Chief of Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner
General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann
Colonel Meixner (OKW)
(1) United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See vols. X and XI.
(2) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of Major War
Criminals, vols. I-XIII, Nuremberg, 1947.
(3) United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker et al. See vols. XII, XIII
and XIV.
(4) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major
War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
Berlin, 12 July 1944
_To Rk. 5815 C_
Subject: Stepped-up Procuring of Foreign Manpower
Executive Conference, 11 July 1944
_Note_
Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs
and representatives indicated in the attached list of those present. No
guarantee can be given for the completeness of the list, as not all
participants signed the register.
_Reich Minister Dr. Lammers_[87] reported by way of introduction on the
various proposals on hand by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor
Allocation calculated to bring about the increase in labor in Germany
which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited
the theme of the discussion by saying that all possibilities were to be
examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be
offset, for example, the question of the reestablishment of an
acceptable price and wage differential between the Reich and non-German
territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the
solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion
could be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must
be examined how the police agencies, regarding the inadequacy of which
the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation has serious complaints,
could be strengthened, on the one hand, through bringing influence to
bear on the foreign governments and, on the other, through reorganizing
the indigenous police forces by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, the
police or other German agencies. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then gave
the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Gauleiter
Sauckel.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ stated that the present deficit of the half-year
program for 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be filled by 30 June of the
current year, totals 500,000. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured
up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were
apprentices and women, two categories which cannot be regarded as
full-fledged workers. Of the 560,000 foreigners put to work,
three-fourths came from the East alone. This result was a scandal
considering that the German people now are mobilized for work to the
fullest extent and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German
authorities in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers
were still idling. In mobilizing the manpower we did not exert the
necessary severity and, in particular, we were unable to achieve the
necessary unity of the German authorities. It was quite improper for
German authorities to interfere irresponsibly in the tasks of the GBA
[Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation]. He had to have much greater
freedom of action, just as was the case in 1942. With the present
methods of recruitment for voluntary employment we would not make any
progress, for one thing because any volunteers still available exposed
themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow
countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly hired and decently
treated at their jobs, they would do completely satisfactory work.
Attention to the wage and price questions connected with the subject was
desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If no
effective action were taken now, our manpower mobilization program would
fail, with the consequence that the combat troops would no longer
receive the weapons they need.
_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, stressed that the
Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same
standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. The
Foreign Office, however, could do nothing except press the foreign
governments more or less urgently to meet German demands, and this has
been done consistently up to the present. The police power was handled
by others who, therefore, would now have to voice their opinion on the
subject of the conference.
_The Deputy for the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont_, referred to a
recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had
to put themselves at the disposal of the task to secure manpower.
Wherever the Wehrmacht was not employed exclusively in essential
military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal
defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be
_assigned_ for the purposes of the GBA [Sauckel]. General Warlimont made
the following practical suggestions:
_a._ The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over
the additional task of securing manpower in the partisan areas.
Everyone who cannot fully show cause for his presence in these
areas is to be seized for labor;
_b._ When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food,
are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for
labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the
Wehrmacht;
_c._ The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the
areas near the front is to receive special attention with the
assistance of the Wehrmacht.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ accepted these suggestions with thanks and said that
he expected that a certain measure of success would no doubt be achieved
by these means.
On behalf of the _Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France_,
the _Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder_, put up for
discussion the possibility of expanding the Military Police, now
totaling only 70, and of the Civilian Searching Service
[Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 strong). If
the Military Police were increased to 200, appreciable results could be
achieved. Upon inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont
promised on behalf of the OKW that the searching service would be
reinforced.
On further inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, as to whether the
population suitable for work could not be taken along as the troops
withdrew from an area, _Colonel Saas_ ([_Plenipotentiary_] _General for
Italy_) stated that Field Marshal Kesselring had already directed that
the population in a zone of 30 kilometers’ depth behind the front was to
be “captured”. This measure, however, could not be extended to areas
extending farther behind the lines, because of the most severe shock
that would be inflicted on the whole structure of these areas,
especially in regard to the industry still in full production.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ was of the opinion that widest circles of the
Wehrmacht saw something disreputable in the labor recruiting program.
There had been actual instances where German soldiers had endeavored to
protect the population from being taken away by German labor recruiting
agencies. Therefore it was essential to explain to the front troops the
extraordinary importance of labor recruiting. In contrast to the much
too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war
for the fighting troops, on occupying a new territory, to put the entire
population to work at once. The question for the administration thus was
not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. It would be
necessary to establish a few object lessons, and the passive resistance
would quickly change into active cooperation. Nor ought one to shrink
from proceeding drastically against the administrative heads
[Behoerdenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor recruitment. Not the
small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible
administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other
means too must be applied. Thus it would be advisable to remove a large
part of the exceptional Italian crops in order to improve the rations of
the German and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the
entirely insufficient rations for the Italian military internees who
were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute
for these military internees gradually altered. This would release a not
inconsiderable labor potential.
_Reich Leader Dr. Ley_ underscored these statements and suggested the
establishment of a searching service made up by all German forces in the
non-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless recruiting in
large areas.
These proposals were countered by the following objections:
_Reich Minister Funk_ holds that ruthless raids would entail
considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German
territories. The same opinion is held by the _Chief of the Military
Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried_, who believes
that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and
fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers
and flee to uncontrollable areas.
_Reich Minister Speer_ states that he had an interest in both promoting
increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production
in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of
the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western
territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The
Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as
long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing,
especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration,
in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize
sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively
small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for
stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not
to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually
with clean methods.
On behalf of the _Military Commander in France, Chief of Military
Administration Dr. Michel_, referred to the statements of State
Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was
similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in
France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not
yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French
authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower
and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing
to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities,
exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population.
_Ambassador Abetz_ confirmed these statements. The application of severe
measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail.
Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In
these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would
no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then
these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would
also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which
was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In
this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire
industries in a body.
The _Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner_, declared himself
willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his
disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For
all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable
whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In
his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on
the foreign governments.
_State Secretary von Steengracht_, Foreign Office, commented to the
effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were
entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon
requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these
orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power
of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to
a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no
longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to
exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not
expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked
Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.
_Ambassador Rahn_ believes that there is still a sufficient number of
workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out,
although 2/3 of the Italian territory and population had been lost. He
had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was
generally successful until the fall of Rome, as could be seen from the
fact that it was possible to seize 200,000 Italians for military
service. Since that time the situation in Italy had become extremely
difficult, however, as the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the
Italian people. The German authorities had done what they could to
neutralize these effects and to that end had merged all executive power
in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of
violent methods on a large scale was impracticable because it would
cause complete disorder and disrupt production. The best example for
this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the
strikes in Turin, when 10 percent of all factory labor forces were to be
conscripted because they were shirkers. A force of 4,000 Germans was
brought together for that purpose. The result was that the food and
power supply of Turin was cut off by the resistance movement so that
250,000 workers had to stop working. This could not be tolerated in view
of the substantial contribution of the Italian armament industry to the
war effort. Field Marshal Kesselring declared that continuation of
forced recruitment would cause not only the loss of the armament
production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater
of war. In the face of this statement the hardiest political will must
keep silent. The only thing which could be done was the execution of the
forced recruitment in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn
believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:
_a._ The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.
_b._ To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with
machinery and workers.
_c._ The transfer of wage savings of the Italian workers in Germany to
their homeland, which is not functioning well, is to be ensured. For
this purpose an automatic procedure is to be introduced which Ambassador
Rahn had already proposed in another connection.
_d._ The system of the induction of age classes will be resumed when the
German military authorities consider the time ripe.
In answer to the reported remark of Field Marshal Kesselring, _General
Warlimont_ (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The
OKW’s approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed.
_Gauleiter Sauckel_ declared that all these proposals were inadequate
since they were not suited to mobilize the masses of manpower which he
needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in
practice since the labor mobilization authorities had at no time limited
themselves to any single method. He still had to name as seriously
damaging to the execution of the labor mobilization plan the fact that
his far-reaching jurisdiction and powers had been made the subject of
discussion. What he needed, as already said, was “elbow room”.
At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Gauleiter Sauckel
declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which
he would consult with the interested parties and which then would be
submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for endorsement and translation
into law. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation presents his demands as
follows:
_a._ The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among
the interested parties and will be carried out jointly.
_b._ The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation receives
permission to establish local security and recruiting machineries for
labor recruitment, which will operate on the basis of his orders and
directives without interference by other offices.
_c._ The regulations on recruitment of labor for Germany promulgated by
French and Italian authorities are to be given solid foundations by
concrete implementation orders which guarantee the most active
collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower.
After these statements were made Reich Minister Dr. Lammers closed the
meeting, pointing out that he would leave the further handling of the
problem to those concerned, as proposed.
[Initialed] L. [LAMMERS]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 1
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE ATTENDED
BY MILCH ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION ON VISIT TO FUEHRER HEADQUARTERS
ON 19 FEBRUARY 1942_
* * * * *
16. Upon recommendation of Field Marshal Milch, the Fuehrer decides that
the 6-month contracts for foreign workers should be dropped and that tax
regulations, which stand in the way against this measure, are to be
rescinded. Rather, contracts are to be introduced which would provide,
in the event of employment of longer duration (exceeding six months), a
single lump sum compensation of some kind—also in view of the fact that
there would be a corresponding saving of the cost of travel back and
forth.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 32
EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES,
21 AND 22 APRIL 1942
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE
OF 21 AND 22 APRIL 1942_
* * * * *
SPEER:
20. The Fuehrer explains clearly in an elaborate form that he does not
approve the bad food dispensed to the Russians. The Russians must
absolutely be given sufficient food, and Sauckel has to see to it that
this food will now be guaranteed by Backe.
21. The Fuehrer is surprised that the civilian Russians are kept like
prisoners of war behind a barbed wire fence. I told him that this was
due to a decree issued by him. The Fuehrer knows nothing of such a
decree. I request the documents pertaining thereto to be included in the
forthcoming Fuehrer file and at the same time to see to it that Sauckel
will arrange to have the civilian Russians no longer treated like
prisoners of war.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 2
EXTRACT FROM THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE MINUTES
OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943
Berlin, 8 January 1943
_POINTS OF DISCUSSION AT THE FUEHRER CONFERENCE
OF 3, 4, 5 JANUARY 1943_
* * * * *
SPEER:
55. The Fuehrer demands unequivocally that in no case must it be
permitted that France be less burdened than Germany. Germany must
sacrifice her blood for this war. We must insist that France intensify
her economic contribution. Any French workers on that job showing signs
of resistance will be deported, if necessary, as civilian internees. At
the slightest attempt of sabotage the most rigorous measures must be
taken. Any maudlin humanitarianism is out of place.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS[88]
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 3
REPORT FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 10 MARCH 1943, CONCERNING
DIFFICULTIES ORIGINATING FROM THE DRAFT OF
MANPOWER IN FORMER SOVIET TERRITORIES
_Teletype_
10 March 1943
To the Fuehrer
Fuehrer Headquarters
_With the urgent request to be submitted to the Fuehrer in person
immediately for decision_
Subject: Difficulties originating from draft of manpower in former Soviet
territories.
My Fuehrer,
You may be assured that the labor assignment is being pushed by me with
fanatical will but also with circumspection and with due consideration
for economic and technical as well as human necessities and conditions.
Replacement for soldiers who will be relieved and the stockpiling of
additional labor needed for the armament programs can and will be
carried through, notwithstanding the fact that especially during the
last two winter months the greatest difficulties had to be overcome. Yet
it was possible to make 258,000 foreign workers available to the war
economy for January and February alone despite the fact that in the East
transports practically ceased. The employment of German men and women is
in full progress.
Inasmuch as the difficulties of the winter months will now gradually
disappear, and as preparations were made by me, also the transports from
the East can again be resumed in full measure. Although the yield of the
registration and employment of German men and women is excellent, the
employment of the strongest and most efficient foreigners who are used
to work cannot be neglected.
Unfortunately, some of the commanding generals [Oberbefehlshaber] in the
East have prohibited the compulsory enrollment of men and women in the
conquered Soviet territories for—as Gauleiter Koch[89] informs
me—political reasons.
My Fuehrer, in order to enable me to carry out my assignment, I ask that
these orders be rescinded. I consider it entirely impossible that the
population of former Soviet nationality could be accorded a greater
measure of consideration than our German people on whom I have been
forced to place very drastic measures. Should it no longer be possible
to enforce the compulsion to work in the East, nor to draft labor, then
the German war economy and agriculture will likewise no longer be able
to fulfil their tasks in full measure.
I myself am of the opinion that under no circumstances should the
commanders of our armies give credence to the Bolshevist propaganda of
atrocities and defamation. After all, it is to the interest of the
generals themselves that replacements for the troops be made in
opportune time.
I take permission to point out that—without wishing to discredit their
best will—it is impossible to put German women—entirely inexperienced
in work—into the place of hundreds of thousands of excellent workers
who now have to go to the front as soldiers. It must be possible for me
to replace them with people from the Eastern territories.
I myself report to you that all foreign nationals who are working with
us are being treated satisfactorily according to humane standards; that
they are being treated correctly and fairly; they are being fed, housed,
yes, even clothed. Because of my own experience in the service of
foreign nations, I am even bold enough to claim that never before have
foreign workers been so decently treated anywhere in the world as is
being done by the German people during this the hardest of all wars.
I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to cancel orders which prevent the
enrollment of foreign male and female workers and to kindly advise me
whether my concept of the assignment as laid down herein still is
correct.
I ask your permission to report to you in person on several important
points of the labor recruitment early next week, possibly on Tuesday.
In lasting gratitude, loyalty and obedience, yours,
[Signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 33
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 30 MAY 1943
Obersalzberg, 1 June 1943
_Fuehrer Conference on 30 May 1943_
* * * * *
SPEER:
[Marginal Note] Schieber, Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, Keitel, Waeger.
19. The coal situation causes the Fuehrer to call a meeting with
Pleiger, Sauckel, Backe, and Keitel.
At this meeting will be discussed the allocation of sufficient labor for
the coal district, the removal of Russian prisoners of war from farming
and small war industries (insofar as they are employed as unskilled
labor) and their replacement by other workers from the Ukraine, Poland,
etc.
Furthermore it is intended, if possible, to raise the food rations of
the German miners, even above present levels. The Russians are to get
plentiful additional rations, which will be individually allotted by
plant managers on the basis of efficiency.
Additionally the German workers—and particularly also the Russian
prisoners of war—will receive bonuses for higher production in the form
of tobacco and similar items.
The details are to be discussed in a preliminary conference so as to
establish uniform data as regards quantities, etc., for submission to
the Fuehrer.
On no account must we capitulate to existing conditions on the coal
question. Coal is _the_ critical basis for maintaining our production
and the entire domestic economy.
[Marginal Note] Saur, Kippung, Milch, Dornberger.
20. The Fuehrer desires that in areas which are certainly recurrent
targets of enemy air attacks (Ruhr District, Krupp-Essen) about 100 to
200 rocket projector batteries be installed, which experimentally are to
fire a steady stream of rockets set for the computed altitude of the
enemy formations.
Some of these rockets will, on detonating, loose wire coils. The Fuehrer
expects, after all, significant and not only psychological effects from
massed, unaimed fire against concentrated air attacks on these targets.
Milch and Dornberger are to state their views on the subject.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 4
EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF
11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943
14 September 1943
_FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 11-12 SEPTEMBER 1943_
* * * * *
DETHLEFFSEN:
16. The Fuehrer brings up the question of air force matériel production
and the discussion with Messerschmitt, and asks for my personal
intervention with the Reich Marshal [Goering] and Field Marshal Milch to
cut down appreciably on the number of aircraft types.
17. The Fuehrer approves Messerschmitt’s recommendation that a monthly
conference be held on questions pertaining to developments and
productions for the Luftwaffe, on the introduction of new types and
modifications with the participation of construction designers and
production experts. This is to be discussed with Field Marshal Milch.
MILCH:
18. The Fuehrer is displeased that the long-range Messerschmitt plane
had not yet been taken up by the Luftwaffe. M. is said to have been
unable to obtain the support of the Luftwaffe for it.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-124
DEFENSE EXHIBIT 34
EXTRACT FROM FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944,
CONCERNING SPEER’S REPORT ON THE FRENCH
LABOR SITUATION
6 January 1944
_FUEHRER CONFERENCE OF 1-4 JANUARY 1944_
* * * * *
[Marginal Note] Kehrl, Waeger.
The Fuehrer has been informed of the differences of opinion with the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. According to my arguments,
the principal thing is to exploit the industry of France for Germany to
a larger extent, in order to be able to locate there about 1 million
additional workers. However, Sauckel is of the opinion that first of all
workers have to be brought to Germany.
The Fuehrer explains that in his view the transfer to France is of
extreme importance, be it only on account of the possibility to increase
the production of iron connected therewith. In spite of this, in his
opinion, one cannot do without bringing additional French labor to
Germany. It must, therefore, be attempted to find a happy union of both
things. In this connection he proposes to designate protected works in
France, in order to induce the French to work in these plants just
through the pressure of allocation of labor for Germany. Upon my
statement that the protected plants have already been established, he
affirms again the importance of this institution and the necessity to
create here a basis of long-range confidence. He thinks that it is my
affair whether I will be able to do without French labor or not; Sauckel
could be only happy if I would do without them.
Upon my reply that this is not the only problem, but that also the
question of the _executive power_ is involved, since otherwise a loss of
prestige for Germany and a disorder in the allocation of French labor
would be inevitable, the Fuehrer declares that this is, of course, one
of the most important bases for further discussions. I then told him
that on 3 January there will be a meeting between Himmler, Keitel,
Sauckel, and myself (Kehrl) (is the Foreign Office to be included?), at
which these problems will be discussed. Subsequently there shall be a
meeting with him, at which the possibility of executive power in France,
as far as the allocation, and the transport of French workers to Germany
is concerned, will be laid before him. (Kehrl to do advance work, that
we also make a claim for executive power for the protection of the
factories in France against terror bands.)
-----
[74] The basic importance of this Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 was
emphasized by the IMT Judgment. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vol.
I, pp. 188 and 200, Nuremberg, 1947.
For translation of entire document see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
vol. VII, pp. 847-854, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1946.
[75] When the prosecution introduced this document in evidence, the
following colloquy ensued (Tr. p. 49):
JUDGE SPEIGHT: Do you establish a chain between all of these documents
which you read and the defendant?
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor please, the prosecution, in presenting these
documents, has in mind to give an over-all picture of the way slave
labor was treated in Germany, going back to the early days showing that
this defendant knew because of attendance at the May 1939, conference
that slave labor was going to be employed. Then as Air Ordnance Master
General, later as Chief of the Jaegerstab, and later as a member of the
Central Planning Board, we will connect him with enterprises involving
slave labor.
JUDGE SPEIGHT: Very well.
[76] Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. See
case of United States _vs._ Wilhelm von Leeb, et al., vols. X, XI.
[77] For more complete translation of document see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. V, pp. 744-754, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[78] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 46-59, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[79] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 130-146, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[80] For complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 242-251, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[81] Otto Braeutigam, member of the Economic Political Department of the
Foreign Office. As of May 1941 detached by the German Foreign Office to
Rosenberg’s Agency, the Eastern Ministry (Ost-Ministerium).
[82] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 778-9, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[83] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 79-93, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[84] For more complete translation of document, see Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, vol. III, pp. 234-238, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1946.
[85] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
vol. VIII, pp. 104-107, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1946.
[86] For more complete translation, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
vol. VI pp. 760-772, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
[87] United States _vs._ Ernst von Welzsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII,
XIII, XIV.
[88] After Dr. Bergold read this document into the record he made the
following statement (Tr. pp. 520-521):
“Which proves that until March 1943, the commanders in the
conquered territories were opposed to the labor conscription,
and that it was Sauckel who demanded that this opposition be
removed, because he was of the opinion that foreign people had
to produce the same as the German people. It is further
important that he didn’t declare that to the Fuehrer alone but
also to the defendant [witness] Speer and the defendant Milch.
Accordingly, the defendant [witness] Speer later on will attest
that never before have foreigners been treated so fairly. In
other words, he lied to the men who were to work with him.”
[89] 1130-PS. See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, pp. 797-799,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
2. THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD
_EXCERPT FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION
REGARDING MILCH’S ACTIVITY IN THE CENTRAL
PLANNING BOARD, 6 JANUARY 1947_[90]
MR. DENNEY: We come now to the part of the proof which places the
defendant in the very center of the Slave Labor Program.
We have shown that from the outset of the war and prior thereto, he was
thoroughly informed of the Nazi plan for total war, which contemplated
the full use of all human material resources within the homeland. We
will show he was active in the formation and announcement of decisions
of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board exercised
jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use. He
carried out the master plan for requisition, allocation, and use of
human raw material for the war machine. There are words we will have by
necessity to repeat as we introduce the documents—requisition,
allocation, and use.
Our evidence will show that Milch, a member of the Central Planning
Board, belonged to an organization—and here again we have another
important word “belong”. He was one of two most essential men in the
Planning Board that guided the decisions of that organization.
We will present to the Court excerpts from the minutes of some 12
conferences at every one of which Milch was present, starting with the
first held in April 1942 and ending with the fifty-eighth held in May
1944. Actually, he was at all but eight conferences, and we use the
figure “eight” advisably. We are not sure, he may have been in some of
those. There is no question that he was in every one of those meetings
which we introduce here. On occasions when Speer was not present Milch
presided. We will show he actively participated when the Central
Planning Board arrived at decisions with respect to the request,
allocation, and use of this labor.
We will show he was active in the formation of the announcement of
decisions of the Central Planning Board. We will show the Board
exercised jurisdiction in the matter of procurement, allocation, and use
of labor. And all of them were prisoners of war and were allocated to
the German war effort. Requisition, allocation, and use were the
dominating voice. Decisive influence, active participation, forced
labor, illegal occupation—these are the words with which we are
concerned, and these are the things with which he concerned himself.
Evidence
_Prosecution Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 48-B Stenographic record of the 447
first conference of the
Central Planning Board on 27
April 1942.
R-124 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 448
transmitting the statutes of
the Central Planning Board.
1510-PS 58 Extracts from decree of 16 450
September 1943, defining the
duties of the Planning Office
of the Central Planning
Board.
3721-PS 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452
September 1945, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central
Planning Board.
NI-1098 63 Extracts from affidavit of 456
Fritz Sauckel, 22 September
1946, regarding the
jurisdiction of the Central
Planning Board.
R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 457
eleventh conference of the
Central Planning Board, 22
July 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from report on the 459
seventeenth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 28
October 1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 461
minutes of twenty-first
conference of Central
Planning Board, 30 October
1942.
R-124 48-B Extracts from stenographic 465
minutes of the twenty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 3 November
1942.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 467
minutes of the thirty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1943.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 471
minutes of the thirty-sixth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 22 April
1943.
R-124 48-A Report of the forty-second 475
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 23 June 1943.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 478
minutes of the fifty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1944.
R-124 48-B Report on the fifty-third 479
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1944.
R-124 48-A Extracts from stenographic 484
minutes of the fifty-fourth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 1 March 1944.
R-124 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498
fifty-sixth conference of the
Central Planning Board, 4
April 1944.
NOKW-287 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 499
April 1943, concerning the
protection of industry.
R-124 48-A Speer’s minutes of a conference 501
with Hitler on 8 July 1943.
R-124 48-A Extract from the report by Saur 502
of the conference with the
Fuehrer, 5 March 1944.
_Defense Documents_
Doc. No. Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document Page
R-124 5 Extract from the stenographic 509
report of the eleventh
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 22 July 1942.
R-124 6 Extract from the stenographic 510
minutes of the twenty-second
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 2 November
1942.
R-124 7 Extract from the stenographic 510
minutes of the thirty-second
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 12 February
1943.
R-124 8 Extract from the stenographic 511
minutes of the thirty-third
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 16 February
1943.
R-124 9 Extract from stenographic 516
minutes of the thirty-ninth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 23 April
1943.
R-124 31 Extracts from the stenographic 517
minutes of the fifty-fourth
conference of the Central
Planning Board, 1 March 1944.
_Testimony_
Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert 502
Speer before commission on 19 February 1947