FROM OUR RETURN FROM THE WAR UP TO THE TEMPORARY DISCONTINUANCE OF
MY PERSONAL INTERCOURSE WITH THE CHANCELLOR--GLIMPSES OF THE
DIPLOMATIC WORLD--COMMISSIONS FOR THE PRESS
After a few days’ rest we returned again to our former work at the
office, accustoming ourselves to it once more, so that everything
fell again into the old groove. The only difference for me was that
I continued to enjoy the privilege accorded to me at Versailles,
of access to all documents of a political character received by or
despatched from the Foreign Office. Some of these were entrusted to
my diary in the form of short summaries, or longer notices, together
with many of my experiences and observations of that period, and an
anthology of the tasks set to me by the Chief, which, as formerly,
I noted down at once for future use. And now these faded leaves may
themselves speak.
_March 24th, 1871._--To-day, as also during the last few days, read
old and recent despatches and other correspondence. It is reported
from Vienna that Beust has been “much affected” by the telegrams
exchanged by the Emperors William and Alexander, as from these it
would appear as if the forbearance shown by the Austrians up to the
last hour were not voluntary. A wire has been sent informing him that
the telegram of the German Emperor was a purely personal act, and
was despatched without the knowledge of the Minister. M. in Cassel
reported that Madame Guisolphe from Versailles had been with Napoleon
at Wilhelmshöhe; further, that Count Clary, passing as a M. Bertram,
had, shortly before our departure, twice visited Versailles at the
instance of the ex-Emperor, and then returned to Wilhelmshöhe; and
finally, that Count Meulan had also been there on a visit, and that his
communications appeared to afford Napoleon great satisfaction. Horace
Rumbold, the English Chargé d’Affaires at St. Petersburg, is stated,
in a report from that capital, to be vehemently hostile to Prussia as
well as to Russia. According to a despatch sent to Bernstorff on the
17th of March, in which a desire is expressed that Loftus should be
recalled, the latter had declared that England forbade the bombardment
of Paris, and would know how to prevent it through the influence of the
Crown Princess. A communication from Stockholm states that the King of
Sweden had also written to General Brincourt of the French Guards, who
had formerly been in Metz, and was there made prisoner by the Germans,
a letter in which he expressed sentiments of a strongly anti-German
character.
_March 29th._--A letter from St. Petersburg reports that Oubril has
been selected for the Russian Embassy in Paris, and that the Grand
Duchess Hélène wishes him to be succeeded in Berlin by Walujeff,
and not by the francophil Albedinski--also not by Orloff, who is
very sensitive, and whose policy is governed by the treatment which
he receives. The Emperor Alexander will nominate Walujeff if the
Emperor William desires it, and she, the Grand Duchess, is prepared
to communicate his wishes. Field Marshal von Berg, of Warsaw, is
understood to be very well affected towards us.
_April 7th._--Bucher told me this evening that “the venerable” Abeken
drafted the Treaty of Olmütz, which is hardly calculated to add to our
respect for the Herr Geheimrath, who passed through the room at the
time, whistling as he went.
_April 8th._--It is reported from Weimar, with “satisfaction and
pleasure,” that for some time past there has been a marked change for
the better in the political sentiments of the Grand Duke. “While his
Royal Highness has never spoken to the writer on political subjects
since the spring of 1866, and always carefully avoided touching upon
them even at the most decisive moments, turning the conversation to
private matters, he recently at a Court concert spoke to the writer
on the internal affairs of the German Empire, and expressed his warm
approval of the first parliamentary speech made by the Chancellor
against the Ultramontanes.” The report continues: “The Grand Duke
returned to the same subject yesterday at dinner, and spoke in high
praise of the Chancellor, whom he had desired to thank personally the
last time he was in Berlin, but had been unable to find at home.” The
communication concludes as follows: “It is to be hoped that the ice is
now broken, and that our relations with the Grand Duke will improve.”
It was probably on one of the immediately preceding or following
days of April that the Chief gave me the ideas for an article for
the press which I here reproduce: “On the formation of the Centre
Party, in which Savigny rendered considerable assistance, the public
was inclined to believe that the latter, who had been a Government
official up to 1866, wished to continue to support the Government.
In this view, however, the change which had taken place in his
attitude was overlooked. After the first draft of the Constitution
of the Confederation he was thought of for the post of Chancellor of
the Confederation, which, however, would then practically have had
only the importance of a presiding Minister, such as the Austrian
representative had formerly been at Frankfurt. But the Diet amended
the Constitution so as to make the Chancellor of the Confederation
a responsible Minister, and the position became entirely different.
It gave the Chancellor complete control of the affairs and policy of
the Confederation, and it had never been the intention of the King
to appoint Herr von Savigny to such a post. To the latter, however,
this was a severe disappointment, aggravated further by physical
discomforts, the worst of which was the necessity of again removing
from the apartments in the Chancellerie of the Confederation, which he
had already occupied and had arranged very comfortably.”
_April 10th._--Wollmann told me to-day that recently an indignant
communication with documentary enclosures had been received from
Fabrice, reporting that ----, who had been acting as Prefect in a
French provincial town, had been found guilty of serious misbehaviour.
Fabrice had for a long time regarded him as unfit for the post. Now, on
his departure, however, he was found in possession of 41,000 francs,
which he had concealed in some old clothes, together with a number of
silk curtains and chair covers, with which he wished to pack his boxes
on leaving. Finally, when receiving money from the French, he allowed
the latter less than 3 francs 75 centimes for the thaler, which was the
rate at which he paid it over to the Treasury, and put the difference
into his own pocket. Hardly credible, yet W. says that he has himself
seen the general’s letter.
_April 14th._--The Chief wishes to have the sensational stories
published by the _Avenir de Loire et Cher_ and the _Revue des Deux
Mondes_ contradicted in the press, and the real facts related--but
“not in the Berlin papers.” According to these romancers, we took away
with us the silver and table linen from Madame Jesse’s house, and the
Chancellor tried to extort a valuable clock from the poor oppressed
lady. The Minister at the same time gave me the necessary particulars.
The article appeared in the _Kölnische Zeitung_, of the 18th of April.
_April 16th._--Wrote the following article for the _Kölnische Zeitung_,
on information received from the Chief: “Is there not a proverb to the
effect, What is sauce for the goose is sauce also for the gander? For
some considerable time past, the west end of Paris has been bombarded,
and, indeed, without previous notice. A hail of shells has fallen on
the Turkish Legation, and there has been a similar downpour in the
immediate vicinity of the American Legation, so that Mr. Washburne
found himself obliged to remove to another part of the city. That
is done on behalf of a Government to whom these diplomatists are
accredited, yet, lo and behold, they make no complaint. Nor apparently
do any of their colleagues. If we Germans had no memory, we should
consider this silent resignation quite proper, as no one who takes
up his residence in a fortress is justified in protesting if he has
to share its fate, a rule which applies to diplomatists as well as
to all other mortals. But, having a memory, we may be permitted to
ask why did the diplomats residing in Paris shriek and protest so
loudly against our bombshells, when the majority of those gentlemen
were no longer accredited to any one, and therefore had no official
character? We refer to the declaration of eighteen foreign Ministers,
Chargés d’Affaires and Consuls-General, dated the 13th of January in
the present year, denouncing the bombardment of Paris by the German
army, and complaining that the citizens of neutral States were being
wounded and exposed to constant danger. It was further urged that the
bombardment had been begun without previous notice, thus depriving the
diplomats in question of the opportunity of warning their _protégés_.
Feeling their responsibility, they joined in a resolution, which was
unanimously adopted, in which they referred to the principles and
usages of international law in support of their demand, that measures
should be taken to enable them to bring the persons and property of
their countrymen into a place of safety. Nothing whatever of this kind
has taken place now. Shall we try to solve the riddle by assuming that
personal partisanship was the motive of the complaint, partisanship
against Germany and for France?”--I then quoted the names of the
diplomats who had formerly protested and were now silent.
_April 17th._--The Chancellor wishes to have the following inserted in
the _Kreuzzeitung_, with reference to an article in the _Standard_,
as reproduced by the _National Zeitung_: “The rumour as to a desire
being felt here in Berlin, that France and England should no longer be
represented in the capital of the German Empire by Ambassadors, but
only by simple Ministers, has afforded the _Standard_ an opportunity of
arguing in favour of such an alteration, as it ascribes the existing
usage mainly to the love of pomp and magnificence peculiar to the
Second Empire. We do not know what truth there is in the rumour in
question, but the grounds which lead the English newspaper to regard
it as probable seem to us very far fetched. Another consideration,
however, lies much nearer to hand, namely, whether the old diplomacy,
with its formalities and struggles for precedence, which have delayed
many a congress for weeks, can under any circumstances maintain
its position at the present stage of development of international
intercourse. A speed is now required in the transaction of business
which was not dreamt of in former times, and railways and telegraphs
furnish the means of achieving it. The prerogative which is put forward
in support of the maintenance of Ambassadors, namely, their personal
access to the Sovereign, is to our thinking largely outbalanced
by the mediæval pretensions in the matter of precedence, which a
diplomatic representative cannot forego so long as he bears the title
of Ambassador, but which nevertheless render him anything but welcome
at the Court to which he is accredited, to his colleagues, and to the
Government of the country.”
_April 18th._--Bucher brings me down the following sketch for an
article for Brass (_Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_): “Revolutions
usually proceed too slowly for the taste of the revolutionaries. Their
aspirations fly far in advance of the sluggish reality, and many a
soldier of liberty has already had to console himself with Lessing’s
observation, according to which there have been at all times, men who
had a just idea as to the future of the human race, but who made the
mistake of thinking that changes could be produced in months and years
for which history required generations and centuries. One of the most
remarkable features of the drama which is now being played in France
is that the development of affairs proceeds too rapidly for most of
the revolutionists, events outstripping the thoughts, wishes, hopes
and interests of individuals. On the 12th of March, a popular assembly
was elected by universal suffrage throughout the whole country, and a
government established by that body. On the 18th of March, the red flag
was in all seriousness hoisted in Paris. Garibaldi, on whose appearance
before a representative European mob at Geneva some years ago the Alps
bowed down their heads in veneration, and who a few years previously
had been fondled by the highest circles of the British aristocracy,
found himself obliged to decline the leading part for which he had been
cast in the drama. It is now the turn of the Poles. The friends of the
Poles in London, and the diplomatists of the Hôtel Lambert in Paris,
who have been working for that cause for forty years past, cannot
bridge the gulf which separates them from General Dombrowski. According
to a communication published yesterday, Count Ladislaus Plater will
not hear of any solidarity between the Polish emigrants and the Paris
Reds--each side must remain responsible for its own actions. Will this
communication, however, cause the world to forget that the bulk of
these Poles in every country have stood on the side of those parties
that fight against the State and undermine social order, and that the
fact of their having done so has been proclaimed both by the Polish
emigrants themselves and by others as one of their titles to fame? On
the contrary, we are convinced that in Count Plater’s protest, the
world will recognise an indirect acknowledgment that this has always
been the case, and will see in the events on the Lower Danube a new
proof that up to the present no change has taken place in this respect.”
_Evening._--Called to the Chief, who wishes to have the following
inserted in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_:--“A meeting of
Catholics of all ranks and professions, which has been held at Munich,
has passed a resolution begging King Lewis to use every legal means
to avert the dangerous consequences of the dogma of Infallibility, to
prohibit its propagation in public educational institutions, and to
take speedy and energetic measures for regulating the relations between
Church and State in harmony with the Constitution. The petition which
was drawn up was signed on the spot by some two hundred persons, and
is now being circulated in various places for the purpose of obtaining
fresh signatures. Similar petitions are being prepared in most of the
Bavarian towns. It was to be expected from the beginning that this
movement would extend from the learned classes and the clergy to the
general public. The fact that this has occurred at the present moment
may unquestionably be attributed to the course taken by that party in
the German Reichstag which claims to monopolise the name of Catholic.
Its members have now had a proof that they made a mistake when at a
political meeting, which was summoned on a purely sectarian basis,
they formed themselves into a party which, dismissing all political
considerations, assumes an attitude of aggression towards the other
parties, and of defiance towards the Federal Government. The first
lesson which these gentlemen received through their defeat in the
Reichstag does not appear to have led them as yet to a recognition of
their error, as instead of seeking for its cause in themselves, they,
like all those who have a lust of power, try to make others responsible
for it, and pronounce the allied Governments to be guilty of criminal
neglect in not rushing to their assistance. Perhaps the movement in
Bavaria will convince them. If not, future events will do so. The
logic of facts, which wreaks vengeance upon them, will not cease with
the present step. The effacement of all political character on the
part of the Clericals must bring about an alliance against the latter,
between all other parties having political aims, whatever differences
may exist amongst them; and the attack which this non-political party
has undertaken to make will lead the political groups to adopt the
necessary means of defence against future assault.”
According to a report from Munich, the influential Cabinet Councillor
Eisenhart, and the Ministers Von Lutz and Von Schlör, manifest a
leaning towards the Döllinger movement, and if the latter should
develop a tendency to form a community of “Old Catholics”--that is to
say, of those who do not accept the dogma of Papal infallibility--the
Government would be prepared to protect them in their rights of
property. Read a letter from Switzerland, which has been sent to our
Minister at Berne with the remark that it has come from a shrewd
observer. The letter says that the Germans were themselves in fault
for the disorders at the Peace Celebration in Zurich. They had bragged
of successes for which they had not fought; and, indeed, up to the
present, they had been mere parasites. If the “respectable” Swiss press
now confirm the reports of these Germans who put everything in a false
light, that is due in the first place to the Liberal party, which wants
to make capital out of the affair against the democratic element, and
in the second place to the Gothard party, which is acting with the
former, and which fears that for some reason Germany may withdraw from
the promotion of the Tunnel project.
_April 20th._--We hear from Vienna that Beust is trying to draw nearer
to the Hohenwart and Klerhalm Ministry, as there is now a power in the
public life of Austria which is stronger than the Imperial Chancellor,
and which, although it now spares him, could at a later moment bring
about his fall. Many things which now happen probably have their origin
in the Cabinet of the Emperor, and are therefore due to Herr von Braun,
who is married to a Frankfurt lady, and who is in regular intercourse
with the ex-Senator Bernus, who, in turn, has frequent meetings with
Frese. Among the drafts is an instruction to W. in Munich, dated the
18th instant, which runs as follows: “In my telegram of the 7th I
referred to the attitude of the Clericals in the Reichstag, where their
hostility to the Imperial Government is becoming more evident from
day to day. At first it might have been expected that the party which
was being formed, even if it had a strongly Catholic tendency, would
not subordinate all political questions to sectarian differences, but
would, to some extent, join with the Imperial Government upon the basis
of Conservative principles and the honourable promotion of the common
national interests, supporting it in the same way as the strictly
orthodox wing of the Evangelical Church has done, without sacrificing
their independence. In consequence of this expectation, the Government
had observed a friendly attitude towards the party, and in the debate
on the Address had avoided any rejoinder to the plea openly put forward
for German intervention in Italy, in order to leave free play to the
expression of the various aspirations and views. That debate, and still
more those that followed on the introduction of certain fundamental
alterations in the constitution of the Empire, showed clearly that
the Clerical Party had developed into a close organisation on a
purely sectarian basis, and were prepared to sacrifice all national
and political interests to those of their creed. The result is that
they have made opponents of all the other parties, and particularly
of those Catholics who remain faithful to the national cause, finding
no support on any side except among the Hanoverian Separatists and
the Poles. I greatly regret these tactless and inept proceedings,
which aggravate the strain of sectarian differences. I learn that the
Clerical Party regards the failure of its efforts to find support in
the Federal Council as a sort of declaration of war on the part of the
Government. The allied Governments, on the other hand, find that the
aggressive tendencies of this party, which is only a continuation of
the attitude long since adopted, and, unfortunately, still maintained
by the Clerical press, naturally affects their position, and must force
them into taking defensive measures of a more effective character, and
oblige them on their side to assume the aggressive. The uncompromising
attitude of the Clericals greatly promotes the Döllinger movement, and
helps to win sympathy for it in circles which previously held aloof
from it, where the course taken is regarded as confirmation of the
assertion of Döllinger and his friends respecting the incompatibility
of Clerical and Ultramontane tendencies with the demands of a national
commonweal.” W. was to speak confidentially to Bray in this sense. I
find from one of W.’s reports that this has been done. The Bavarian
Minister has, indeed, expressed his agreement with the foregoing
statement, but the chief cause of his regret is that the foolish course
taken by the Clericals in the Reichstag has rendered it impossible for
the Government to co-operate with them, a policy which would, in his
opinion, have been desirable, and will now oblige it on principle to
oppose them. Döllinger, in his opinion, had also gone too far.
_April 21st._--This morning the Chief wished to have an article written
for the _Kölnische Zeitung_ calling attention to the contrast between
the intellectual impotence of the French and their self-conceit, and
to the circumstance that in recent times they have always had to
trust to foreigners for their salvation--a theme for which he gave me
the ideas. The article ran as follows: “The forces at the disposal
of the insurgents number about 120,000. In addition to these may be
reckoned some 10,000 or 12,000 more or less convinced Republicans who
have come from abroad, from the provinces, from Belgium, and from
England; and perhaps an equal number of criminals and misdemeanants.
A large proportion of the National Guards, who are only serving under
compulsion, long for the moment when they shall be obliged to lay
down their arms. The remainder consist of workmen who prefer the pay
of the Commune, the daily excitement and amusement of chasing former
gendarmes and policemen, to a peaceful return to their workshops. That
cannot last long. It would be unnatural if, among these thousands of
idle workmen and insurgents under duress, a disgust for such a life
did not make itself felt, together with a surfeit of the hardships of
the soldier’s trade, and a loosening of discipline. For the moment,
indeed, Dombrowski, who enjoys a certain popularity, succeeds in
holding them together. This is a new symptom of the extraordinary
intellectual poverty and weakness of will which characterises the
Frenchman of to-day, and particularly the Parisian. They boast of being
the centre of civilisation, the focus of the intelligence of our time;
and yet, lo and behold, in the recent crises they have always selected
foreigners for their leaders, and have sought their salvation abroad!
After the fall of the Empire they allowed themselves to be tyrannised
by Gambetta. At the same time they placed their hopes in Garibaldi,
another Italian, who would now be Dictator in Paris had he desired it.
Instead of Garibaldi, they must now depend upon Poles of the notorious
guild of ‘barricade heroes’--such as Dombrowski, Okolowitch, &c.;
while, finally, there is an almost universal wish entertained by the
party of order, who are dissatisfied with the lack of energy manifested
at Versailles, that the Germans--again foreigners--should undertake
the restoration of law and order.” The following is an almost literal
reproduction of the Chancellor’s own words: “Scarcely another people in
the whole world would condescend in such a pitiful way to borrow its
heroes from abroad. With the exception of these Parisians, who boast
of being the cream of civilisation, but who in reality are merely the
redskins of the pavement, as empty-headed and weak-willed as savages,
none would submit to be driven by energetic, although otherwise
insignificant, foreigners towards ends that are in every respect
opposed to their own interests. Truly a repulsive and most pitiable
degeneracy!”
_April 24th._--Called to the Chief this evening, and received
instructions and materials for an article in the _Kölnische Zeitung_,
which ran as follows: “If the French ship which came to Glückstadt
to convey 40,000 French prisoners of war back to their country was
obliged to return without having effected its object, the reasons were
very clearly indicated by the Imperial Chancellor in his last speech
in the Reichstag. According to the Preliminary Peace, the prisoners
were to be surrendered; but, on the other hand, the French Government
was not at liberty, until after the signature of the final treaty, to
station any troops between the Seine and the Loire, with the exception
of 40,000 men in Paris. In consideration of the embarrassment caused
to the Government of M. Thiers by the Communist rising, no objection
was raised on the part of Germany to the collection of a force of
over 40,000 men near Versailles; and, indeed, this measure was for a
time endorsed by the liberation of a large number of prisoners. The
Germans were, however, under no obligation to do this. On the contrary,
their obligation ceased so long as the French Government was not in
a position to fulfil its share of the undertaking to establish and
maintain a neutral zone between the Seine and Loire. The concessions
made on the German side in the matter of the liberation of prisoners
were voluntary concessions, mere acts of a complaisance dictated by
our own interest, the continuance of which depended entirely upon
circumstances, upon the good will manifested at Versailles, and upon
the confidence which may be reposed in Berlin, in the loyalty to
its treaty engagements, as well as the energy and capacity of the
Versailles Government. But there was also another consideration.
Notwithstanding the order issued by Favre, all the German prisoners in
the hands of the French have not yet been sent back, although their
liberation should have taken place immediately after the Convention
of the 28th of January. This is doubtless due to the independent
position of the French Minister of War, as well as of the Chief of
the Admiralty, who have shown a reluctance to discharge strictly
and speedily the engagements entered into by Favre and Thiers for
the release of some fourteen hundred German officers and soldiers,
who are still held as prisoners, as, amongst other matters, for the
surrender of the merchant vessels that had not been condemned before
the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace. Can the Versailles Government
fairly expect us to make further concessions when it has itself
contumaciously neglected the fulfilment of its own obligations for
fully three months?”
_April 29th._--The Minister wishes the following explanation of the
“double face” of the Paris Commune inserted in the press: “Many reports
from Paris, and all those originating with persons who have access to
the Government at Versailles, allude only to one of the tendencies
which have contributed to the revolution in Paris and the foundation of
the Commune. They represent it, namely, as the work of the cosmopolitan
revolutionary spirit and as an attempt to realise socialistic and
communistic chimeras. The truth of this is not to be denied. It is a
cosmopolitan revolutionary spirit which united under the communistic
flag MM. Dombrowski, Okolowitch, Stupny, Landuski, Burnaki and other
Polish ‘heroes of the barricades,’ together with the Garibaldians
and the crowd of Belgian and English members of the International,
and which won for them the sympathies of Bebel and Schraps in the
Imperial Diet. It is the grossest form of Communism that has united
these champions of revolt, with fifteen to twenty thousand liberated
criminals and the rest of the dregs of modern civilisation. But in
addition to the fantastic and criminal cravings of which these are the
representatives and tools, there is another element involved in the
present Revolution that should never be lost sight of. This movement,
which is thoroughly well founded, and is supported by order-loving and
sensible citizens, aims at a more reasonable municipal organisation by
the curtailment of an unnecessary and burdensome State guardianship.
This tendency is explained by the history of France. The tyrannous
municipal policy of Hausmann, which had a highly prejudicial effect
upon the interests of the Corporation of Paris, is a striking example
of the evils referred to. If the Parisians were given a municipal
constitution approximating to that of the Prussian towns in the
Hardenberg period many thoughtful and practical men in Paris who are
now opposed to the Versailles Government would be satisfied, and would
be no longer inclined to encourage the Revolution by their passive
support.”
_April 30th._--Yesterday and to-day read a number of interesting
documents treating of negotiations with Cluseret, the present general
of the Commune, and took note of them for future use. In the first of
these, dated the 10th instant, Fabrice was instructed by telegraph to
say in reply to Cluseret that he would listen to any overtures which
the latter might desire to make to him, and bring them to the knowledge
of the Chancellor. The telegram then continued: “If he should then
call upon you it might be possible, without actually negotiating, to
lead him to say how the Commune would propose to raise the money for
us. You might also be able to bring home to him the helplessness of
the whole affair, and in that way form an opinion as to the prospects
of an attempt at mediation between Paris and Versailles. In reply to a
despatch of the 21st of April, in which Fabrice says that the Commune
has no money, and that in order to raise some it has already seized
upon the property of societies and individuals, the Chief said that the
general should nevertheless sound them as to the surrender of Paris to
us, but only for purposes of information and report. The idea that the
Commune could be really considered solvent had been entirely foreign to
the telegram of the 10th instant. It was only a reconnaissance for the
purpose of ascertaining the intentions and resources of the holders of
power in Paris. Fabrice reports from Soissy on the 27th instant that
Holstein, who had remained behind with him, had had a meeting with
Cluseret, and that the Commune was disposed to pay a sum of 500,000,000
francs, of which 300,000,000 was in hand, in the form of securities
belonging to the city, while the remaining 200,000,000 could be raised
by the sale of the Octroi dues. In return for this the Germans would be
required to abstain from taking any part in the stoppage of supplies,
and not to deliver any of the forts occupied by them to the Versailles
Government. A desire was also expressed that we should endeavour to
bring about an understanding as to a _modus vivendi_ between the two
belligerent parties. There was a twofold basis upon which this could
be effected. One was that the city should be disarmed, but should not
be occupied by the troops of the Versailles Government, and that it
should be granted a communal administration, together with security
against a recurrence of Hausmann or Pietri Budgets. The second was
the dissolution of the present National Assembly, which had exhausted
its mandate, and a fresh appeal to France, whose decision would be
accepted by Paris. Cluseret had described the Socialist and other
excesses as a phase of this ‘drôle de mouvement’ which had now passed
away. He treated the military siege of the city as an impossibility,
but begged, in the event of Versailles being, in spite of all human
probability, victorious, that they should not be permitted to destroy
Paris. This, as well as the expectation that we might mediate, was only
a desire on their part, and not one of the conditions of payment. The
Frenchman then observed that negotiations with us would subject him to
less suspicion in Paris than would negotiations with the Versailles
Government. He further promised to release all German prisoners as
soon as he was informed who and where they were, and also to move at
once for the liberation of the Archbishop, whose imprisonment was an
inheritance from the first phase of the movement. Finally, he repeated
that the only important points were our neutrality and the abstention
from interference with their supplies, as from a military standpoint
the Versailles people caused him no anxiety.”
The Chief replied on the same day, that from this it appeared, if
Cluseret’s views could be accepted as authoritative in Paris, that
mediation between the latter and Versailles was not hopeless; those
views being more moderate than he had expected, particularly with
regard to disarmament. Fabrice might try to ascertain what Favre
thought of the first alternative. In the meantime our attitude should
be made to correspond with Cluseret’s expectations by observing
neutrality, and taking no part in the maintenance of the cordon round
Paris. A despatch setting forth the reasons for this course would be
sent to him, Fabrice, that day. The telegram concluded: “The demands of
the French negotiators in Brussels with respect to the five milliards
and the Eastern Railway show _qu’on se moque de nous_.”
These telegrams were supplemented by a further communication dated
the day before yesterday, which said that Fabrice should keep up the
relations that had been established with Cluseret, and should try to
ascertain whether he was of opinion that in case of the disarmament
of the city and its non-occupation by the Versailles troops it could
be garrisoned by our soldiers. If that were the case it would be
desirable to make a serious endeavour to mediate with Versailles.
Communal independence, after the fashion of the Prussian municipal
regulations, was not in itself an unreasonable demand, if no efforts
were made to secure communistic adjuncts. Perhaps it would be possible
to sever the reasonable communal movement from the international one.
If in doing this we succeeded in occupying Paris with the approval of
the two parties, guaranteeing communal independence until the French
had come to an understanding among themselves, and intervening with a
strong hand in restoring domestic peace in France, we should improve
our own position and gain fresh securities against possible bad faith
at Versailles. In these circumstances Fabrice was to avoid taking sides
in any way against the Parisians.
The despatch mentioned in the last telegram of the 27th of April, which
was to be forwarded by courier on the same day, began by referring to a
telegram from Fabrice, according to which Favre begged in a formal Note
that the French troops might be permitted to pass through our lines
over the Northern Railway and force their way into Paris; further,
that the German military authorities should call upon the insurgents
to disarm the enceinte, in accordance with the Convention of the 28th
of January; and, finally, that the French army might be permitted to
pass through the district and gate of St. Ouen. It runs as follows:
“The French Government requests us to permit the passage of their
troops through St. Ouen. This lies within the neutral zone, where the
presence of both armies is forbidden by the Convention of the 28th of
January. In order to enable us to agree to this we should be convinced
that any arrangements we may come to with the French Government would
be carried out by the latter. This conviction has been shaken by the
dilatoriness of the French in the fulfilment of previous obligations,
and by certain indications of a tendency to place an arbitrary
interpretation, contrary to their true sense, upon stipulations that
are now in force. The French Government is in arrears with the greater
part of the money payable for the maintenance of our troops, with
the release of German prisoners of war, and with the issue of clear
and peremptory instructions to the Governors of the Colonies and the
Commanders of the naval stations in Eastern Asia for the suspension
of hostilities. The disposition to put a construction upon agreements
which they never had, as well as to extend and override them without
an understanding with us, is betrayed by the collection of 140,000
troops, where they are only justified in having 100,000; in the attempt
to reduce the war indemnity by making payments below par; and in what,
to my astonishment, appears to be the manifestation of a desire for
the commencement of the evacuation of the districts occupied by us.
If the French Government should really assert that we are bound, upon
the payment of the first half milliard, and before the conclusion of a
definitive peace, to any sort of evacuation, that circumstance would
destroy all my confidence in its loyalty, as during the negotiations no
other view was ever held than that a definitive peace must precede any
evacuation by us of this side of the Seine.
“It was then supposed that the conclusion of a definitive peace would
take place previous to any payment by France. M. Thiers expressed his
intention to commence his financial operations after a lapse of two
months at the earliest, and considered that the definitive treaty would
be concluded in from four to six weeks. There was no question that the
whole present occupation was regarded as a guarantee to us for the
conclusion of the definitive peace; and the terms clearly show that
all the evacuation yet to take place was subordinated to the final
peace, and that the payments only affected the various stages of these
evacuations. The sentence following these stipulations, according to
which the evacuation is to take place after the conclusion of peace
and after the payment of the first half milliard, was not contained
in the original text. M. Thiers wished to have it concluded, and M.
Favre considered it superfluous. I declared myself in favour of its
inclusion, as on the day before I had agreed that a comparatively
large and important stage of the evacuation should be made dependent
upon this first payment, which might be reckoned on the basis of the
proportion between the entire territory occupied and the whole five
milliards. M. Thiers kept me to my word, which I acknowledged; but
there was never any question of the evacuation of this side of the
Seine before the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace.
“Should the French entertain any doubt on this point your Excellency
will explain to M. Favre that I would rather advise his Majesty to
_immediately_ renew hostilities than submit to such a falsification of
the spirit in which the Versailles negotiations were conducted.
“The decision of his Majesty with respect to our expected co-operation,
direct or indirect, will depend, on the one hand, upon military
considerations which are still under discussion, as well as upon
the contents of the French official overtures announced in your
Excellency’s telegram No. 196. On the other hand, we must take
advantage of the present situation with the object of removing every
uncertainty which the French may endeavour to read into our agreements.
Should your Excellency really have occasion to suppose, as would
appear to me from the contents of your reports of the 22nd and 23rd
instant, that the French intend to interpret the treaty of peace as if
the sentence in Article 3--_L’evacuation des départements--s’opèrera
graduellement après la ratification du traité de paix definitif_--were
modified by that which follows it, separated only by a semi-colon:
_après le versement--la rive droite_, in such a way that the words of
the first sentence, from _après_ to _definitif_, would be rendered of
no effect for the territory in question, your Excellency will please
demand from the French Government, in the form of an ultimatum, a
clear explanation upon this point. Were this to be refused I should
lose all faith in its intention to honourably fulfil its treaty
obligations, and it would then become desirable to renew the military
operations as early as possible. We will not permit ourselves to
be cozened out of our present position, but will, on the contrary,
hold fast to it until the definitive peace has been concluded to our
satisfaction. We have made these stipulations in order that we may
be able to bring pressure to bear with this object. So long as the
obligations undertaken, but not yet fulfilled, by France with respect
to the indemnity and the prisoners of war remain unfulfilled, and so
long as the above-mentioned doubt as to the intentions of the French
Government respecting the interpretation of the preliminary peace and
the conclusion of a definitive treaty is not removed, I must advise his
Majesty against every form of support for the Versailles Government;
and instead of any such support, I must recommend that a demand be at
once addressed to the French authorities to reduce the number of their
troops in accordance with the terms of the treaty, or to be prepared
for a renewal of hostilities.”
_May 1st._--According to a communication of yesterday’s date, from
Fabrice, Colonel de la Haye had said to him, that probably a memorial
from Thiers would be received, and not the Note from Favre, which had
been announced, and that Favre had repeatedly declared that France
was now fulfilling the obligations which she had undertaken, would
continue to do so, and was prepared to conclude peace, and to recognise
the preliminaries as merely intended to lead up to it. In return, he
asked for permission to attack Paris by way of Epinay, and the Northern
Railway line, through St. Denis, and that the Commune should be called
upon, in accordance with the Convention, to withdraw its troops from
the enceinte. The colonel requested Fabrice to inform the Chancellor of
this. Should the latter decline, the French Government would be able
to say, in the presence of Europe, that it had discharged its duty to
the best of its ability, but that Germany prevented it from offering
an effective resistance to the insurrection. Favre declared that he
had exhausted all his resources, and that it was now necessary to know
whether Prussia wished to favour the Government or the Commune. De la
Haye had expressed a strong desire that Fabrice should not communicate
this statement to the Chief, before the receipt of Thiers’ memorial.
Fabrice, first of all, begged the Frenchman to hasten the despatch of
the letter, but, also before that was done, to explain to Favre the
significance and consequences of the demand which he expected us to
make upon the Commune for the disarmament of the enceinte, a point
upon which Favre did not, at the moment, appear to be quite clear. To
this the Prince replied immediately, that we were not _bound_ by any
Convention to help the French Government, although we were justified
in demanding from it the disarmament of the enceinte, and eventually
enforcing the same, if we found it to be in our interest. The latter,
however, was not the case. We had no interest in overthrowing the
opponents of the French Government at the cost of German blood, so
long as that Government did not carry out the stipulations of the
preliminary treaty, but sought, on the contrary, to alter them to
our prejudice. With the object of dissipating the mistrust that had
arisen in this way, by means of a personal discussion of stronger
guarantees, or of a fixed term for the payment of the five milliards,
the Chancellor finally proposed to Favre that they should meet at
Frankfurt or Mainz on any day he chose to select. As I saw later, Favre
telegraphed that he would be in Frankfurt on Friday, and the Chief
replied that he would arrive there on Saturday--perhaps because he
considers Friday unlucky.
_May 2nd, evening._--On the instructions of the Prince wrote an article
for the _Kölnische Zeitung_, which was dated from Lagny, and was based
on the foregoing despatch and other information. It was to be submitted
for approbation upstairs to-morrow, before being despatched. It ran
as follows: “The conduct of the French Government in the matter of
the execution of the preliminaries of peace is quite enigmatic, not
to use the stronger term of prevarication. In the position which it
occupies towards the insurrection in the capital, which is growing
more and more serious, it stands in urgent need of the good will of
the Germans, of their indirect assistance, or, at least, of their
neutrality. Yet up to the last few days it has shown itself extremely
remiss in the fulfilment of the treaties concluded with us in January
and March, quibbling in a very suspicious way over their most important
stipulations, seeking in Brussels, as we hear, to enforce views which,
if adopted in the definitive treaty, would bring about a change, by
no means favourable to Germany, of the basis secured by us in the
preliminary peace at Versailles. Moreover, it would appear that these
unacceptable proposals are brought forward merely with the object of
protracting the negotiations, and, in the interval thus gained, of
securing, through the suppression of the insurrection of the Paris
Communists, a position which would perhaps permit them, with some hope
of success, to demand easier terms from those who have the control
of our policy. M. Thiers’ Government only paid the maintenance money
in a tardy way, and under the pressure of threats from the Germans.
It temporised with the liberation of the German prisoners who still
remain in France, and it shirked in like manner the just demands
of the Germans for the surrender of the prize vessels that had not
been condemned before the conclusion of the preliminary peace. There
is reason to believe that it collected more troops near Versailles
than had been agreed to in Berlin in view of so desperate a conflict
with a powerful insurrection. It expressed an opinion that we were
bound to evacuate the forts of St. Denis and Charenton--not after the
ratification of the definitive peace, but after the receipt by us of
the first half milliard. Finally, it caused proposals to be made in
Brussels respecting the payment of the five milliards which were in no
sense justified by the preliminary treaty, and which, if accepted--a
thing utterly inconceivable--would delay the payment to a late period,
and, besides, would leave Germany only four-fifths, and perhaps only
three-fifths, of the war indemnity guaranteed in the agreement of
the 26th of February. It is not to be wondered at if these and other
similar facts have shaken the confidence which was felt at first on
the German side in the loyalty of the leading French statesmen, if
suspicion has begun to be felt, and if some disinclination exists to
continue the favours which have already been extended to the French
Government in dealing with the insurrection--favours which the latter
sorely needed, and, it seems, formally asked for--until mistrust
has been dispelled by explanations of an unequivocal character, or,
perhaps, entirely removed by fresh guarantees. It is reported that
the Chief of the Executive has been left in no doubt upon this point,
and it is now stated here that M. Favre, who is understood to have
given least ground for want of confidence, will in a few days have a
conference with Prince Bismarck, for the purpose of giving explanations
and coming to an understanding. It will take place, as we hear, at
Frankfurt. It is to be hoped that this meeting will clear up the
situation and hasten the conclusion of a definitive peace.”
_May 3rd._--The foregoing article was returned to me unaltered from
upstairs, and is now on its way to Cologne. Among the documents
received, the following is of importance: F. reports from Soissy, on
the 1st instant, that on the previous day Cahn, who is now attached
to the Swiss Embassy, was authorised at the instance of Cluseret to go
through the French prisons to find what Germans were detained there, in
order that they may be set at liberty. Cluseret had also stated that
he had proposed the liberation of the Archbishop. It was true that
part of the Committee was opposed to this measure, but the life of
his Eminence was nevertheless perfectly safe. A meeting with Cluseret
was arranged for on the 1st instant. Cahn, however, came instead, and
reported that Cluseret was now replaced by Captain Rossel as Minister
of War for the Commune. Cahn was then instructed to see the latter, and
ask him whether he maintained the decision of his predecessor as to the
liberation of the German prisoners, and to seriously warn him against
any ill-treatment of the Archbishop. The telegram adds that this will
give the Commune an opportunity of entering into relations with us. If
they do not avail themselves of it, doubtless an anti-German intrigue
will have had something to do with the fall of Cluseret. The supply of
provisions for Paris is seriously retarded on the north side, owing to
the exceptional vigilance of the French administration, which is very
well informed.
According to a report from St. Petersburg of the 26th of April,
the King of Denmark has written to the Tsarevna, asking her to beg
the Emperor Alexander to bring up the question of North Schleswig
in Berlin. The Grand Duchess did not give her father’s letter to
the Emperor himself, but applied to the Empress, who afterwards
communicated its contents to him. Although the Emperor Alexander had
said nothing on the subject to R., he nevertheless observed that he
greatly desired to have a talk with the Emperor William, and hoped
to see him in June either in Berlin or at Ems. The Grand Duchess
Hélène informed R. of this, and asked what reply she should give to
the Tsarevna, who had repeatedly inquired whether he had not said
anything on this affair. The Grand Duchess was of opinion that our
Government, whose German sentiments were doubted by no one, could now
in its hour of triumph more easily make concessions than before. The
matter might one day become unpleasant, and counter-concessions of a
commercial character (?) could now be demanded from Denmark, which
would secure the position of individual Germans in the territory to be
ceded. R. replied that Germany would be prepared to make concessions,
but that Denmark would not be satisfied with what could be granted.
The reason of the Emperor Alexander’s great anxiety to see the affair
settled is that he knows how eagerly the Danish Court stimulates the
anti-German sentiments of the heir to the Russian throne. The same
authority reports that the French Government, through the Marquis de
Gabriac, their present representative in St. Petersburg, has complained
to Gortschakoff that we are no longer as friendly as we were, and
requested him to mediate between France and ourselves. This request
was, however, declined, attention being called to the obligations
undertaken in the preliminary peace, the fulfilment of which was the
right means of securing the good will of Germany. At a Court ball the
Emperor Alexander also observed to the marquis: “_Remplissez d’abord
loyalement vos engagements et après je serai votre avocat, si vous
aurez des raisons de plainte. Aujourdhui ces raisons je ne les vois
pas._”
_May 4th._--The Chancellor, who leaves for Frankfurt to-morrow, wishes
the _Kölnische Zeitung_ to write somewhat as follows on the object
of the journey: “The personal conference between Prince Bismarck
and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the necessity of which
has been felt for some considerable time past, will have begun by
the time these lines go to press. To-morrow morning at 8 o’clock the
Imperial Chancellor, accompanied by the Councillors of Embassy Bucher,
Count Hatzfeldt, and the Attaché Count Wartensleben, will leave for
Frankfurt, where Jules Favre will probably have already arrived.
Apparently the French have come to understand that their interests
urgently require the removal of the suspicions which have arisen in
regard to their good faith since the arrangement at Versailles. We
ourselves must also know exactly where we stand with them. It is
necessary to hasten the conclusion of a definitive peace. Some progress
must finally be made in that matter, and France must cease to imagine
that we will allow ourselves to be kept dangling in suspense, or to
be imposed upon and manœuvred into an unfavourable position. She must
respect our rights and not endeavour by pettifogging subterfuges to
whittle down, or perhaps, indeed, disown the consequences of the
preliminary peace. It may be taken for granted that the principal
subjects to be dealt with at Frankfurt will be the manner of payment
of the war indemnity of five milliards of francs, the surrender of
the German merchant vessels which were not condemned by the Prize
Courts before the signature of the preliminary treaty, the position of
the Eastern Railway--which, after the Versailles arrangement, can no
longer be regarded as an open question, although it has been treated
as such by the Government of M. Thiers--and finally the regulation of
the frontier. On the German side, however, it will be sought first of
all to clear up the situation, and hasten the negotiations for peace,
which have been brought to a standstill through the unjustifiable
demands of the French. It is to be hoped that the Frankfurt
negotiations will open the eyes of those members of the French
Government who have not yet succeeded in thoroughly understanding the
position of affairs, and in recognising the legitimacy of the claims
based upon it from the German standpoint, and their necessity from the
French standpoint. In all probability they will not fail to receive a
serious and unequivocal reminder of this necessity from our side.”
_May 6th._--Again a few comic episodes to break the monotony of these
grave affairs. Prince Peter of Oldenburg, who seems to be a very
ancient gentleman, writing from St. Petersburg, sent the Chief a
memoir which he forwarded to the Emperor on the 1st of April (not as
a joke for All Fools’ Day), in which, after proclaiming his strictly
monarchical, legitimist, conservative and religious principles, he
argues, in an extremely prolix and nebulous fashion, in favour of
perpetual peace, and begs the Chancellor to summon a Conference for the
Abolition of War. This _magnum opus_ ought to be laid in its author’s
coffin. Wollmann says that Abeken is in the habit of keeping the
envelopes of letters from the King in order, as he is reported to have
said, “that the handwriting of his Imperial and Royal master should
not be trampled upon by muddy shoes.” He is said to have whole bundles
of these relics in his possession. Very touching! Bucher afterwards
confirmed the fact that Abeken had actually delivered himself of the
above remark. He appears to have acquired this tender sentimentality
during his stay in the East. He ought to have been Councillor of
Embassy to the Dalai Lama.
_May 14th._--The Chief is again here. Count Wartensleben, who was with
him at Frankfurt, told me to-day that he had been out driving with
the Chancellor several times outside the town, and while they were
walking about in the woods the latter gave him numerous particulars
of his negotiations with the Frenchmen. “Once,” said the Count, who
by the way is a very pleasant young man, “in speaking of the German
negotiators at Brussels, he remarked to me, ‘It is very unlucky for
those gentlemen that we cannot conclude our business there.’ (Possibly
on account of the gratuities in the way of orders.) ‘I am particularly
sorry for poor Balan. But what can one do? The snipe must be shot where
it rises.’ Another time (it was after the first conference with Favre
and Pouyer-Quertier) he looked very fagged and worried, and on my
asking him about it he replied that the French had proved exceptionally
obstinate. He told me then how he managed to secure himself an ally
against them. He said, ‘I proposed to Favre to bring M. Goulard to the
Conference as he was a member of the National Assembly. Favre was at
first greatly surprised at this suggestion, and would not hear of it.
I pointed out to him, however, that it would be to his own advantage.
Goulard would feel flattered and would be grateful to him, and would
furthermore as one of the negotiators support him, Favre, in the
National Assembly. Favre thereupon consented.’ But it was also of great
advantage for the Chief (continued Wartensleben), as when Favre finally
consented, the little gentleman in the white necktie and high stand-up
collar was also grateful to him for being admitted to the negotiations,
and when the two others were inclined to refuse something he always
spoke in favour of giving way--it could be managed, he would himself
take the responsibility for it, he thought that one really might agree
to it. Eventually Favre thanked the Chief formally for his advice to
include Goulard.”
_May 15th._--On the instructions of the Chief, wrote to Brass
respecting an article in No. 113 of the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung_, that the Prince did not consider it proper for a journal
which was praised in another paper to reproduce this praise, and he
positively prohibited all such misconduct in future.
_May 17th._--Yesterday and to-day again read a number of telegrams
and other documents received and despatched, which threw light on
the Frankfurt negotiations and recent events in Paris. The Chief
had from Frankfurt addressed an inquiry to Fabrice as to whether he
believed that progress had been made in the fusion between the Comte
de Chambord and the Princes of the House of Orleans, and whether it
had a prospect of success. Count Arnim thought it had. The Republican
form of government in France was more to our advantage, and therefore
he would not oppose it unless he were compelled to. A telegram to
Moltke on the 18th instant informed him that the Chief hoped to bring
about the conclusion of a definitive peace at Frankfurt. Some of the
conditions would, however, be that we should assist as far as possible
in promoting the speedy occupation of Paris, which would then be in
our interest, without exposing our men to danger, and in particular
that we should consider the question of the passage of the French
troops through our lines, of calling upon the Commune to evacuate the
enceinte, of cutting off the supply of provisions, and of immediately
liberating 20,000 prisoners of war for use in Algeria and the larger
towns of the south. In case it were possible to secure at Frankfurt
a peace which should receive the approbation of the Emperor, Moltke
was requested to take the necessary preparatory measures for the
above purposes. A short telegram of the same day, addressed to Thile
and which was to be communicated to Delbrück, says that on the two
preceding days the Chief was engaged in negotiations for fifteen
hours, and had sent Favre a “strong ultimatum.” Another telegram
reports to the Emperor that, according to the French Ministers, the
stability of the present Government will in a great measure depend
upon the speedy conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace. On the
11th a further telegram was sent to Moltke saying that, from Fabrice’s
reports, the French generals, believing they could themselves dispose
of the Communists, would endeavour so to arrange matters that they
could dispense with our co-operation. But in that case also it would
be desirable to mass our troops near Paris, as we could thus bring
pressure to bear upon the French National Assembly in connection with
the ratification of the treaty which would be discussed in about ten
days, by exciting the apprehensions of that body as to the decision
which we might take if the treaty were rejected.
Again a comic interlude between the serious scenes of the drama.
Fabrice sends a report from Lieutenant von Mirbach, of the Guards,
at St. Denis, which reached him through General von Pape, with the
extremely naïve marginal note: “Most obediently submitted for kind
consideration with the object of promoting the accession to the French
throne of Prince Frederick Charles.” The document in question was to
the following effect. Persons of all ranks and conditions, and quite
recently an Attaché of the American Embassy, had inquired whether it
was true that Prince Frederick Charles had been selected as the Regent
of France. As far back as the winter a party had been formed with that
object. Merchants, bankers, manufacturers, many citizens of standing
and repute, “including even noblemen,” wished to offer the throne
to the Prince, and were sure of the support of their friends, their
employees, and of a part of the press. “Influential agents and leaders
of the National Guard, and even some important members of the Commune,
are understood to be well disposed towards this plan. The American
inquired whether a deputation from this ‘Prussian’ party would be well
received.” The writer had been informed by the “rich M. Vincent,” the
Commandant of the National Guard in Versailles, and by M. de Bastide,
that the same scheme had been discussed in that town. Obviously some
one has been playing off a joke on the lieutenant, for, although we
live in an age of miracles, it would be a miracle of miracles if a
French party were now found to desire for their ruler a nephew of our
old Master, after the efforts made by France to prevent the election
as King of Spain of the Prince of Hohenzollern, who is only a remote
relative of the Emperor William.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army Corps in Compiègne has
been informed that a conference took place on the 11th instant at
Soissy between General von Schlotheim and General Borel, the chief of
MacMahon’s staff.
“MacMahon desires to deliver the main attack on Paris on the west front
of the enceinte, from the Bois de Boulogne or Billancourt against
the bastion of the Point du Jour. In order to prevent the insurgents
from continuing their resistance in the city from point to point, he
wishes, at the same time--that is, during the same night--to endeavour
to surprise the north front, and seize some positions in the north of
Paris. Ten or twelve thousand men would be employed for this purpose,
who would start in the evening from Gemevilliers, and march by way
of Villeneuve, La Garonne and St. Denis, as also through Epinay,
St. Denis, and Aubervilliers, towards the gates of La Chapelle and
La Villette. With the assistance of some of the commandants of the
National Guard, with whom an understanding was being entered into, and
by taking advantage of the railway, and of the numerous conveyances
which still frequented the main roads, it was considered possible to
bring small detachments of trustworthy troops right into the city.
In case the attack were repulsed, MacMahon binds himself to withdraw
all the troops employed by him along the same route, on the same day,
behind the rayon on this side, that is to say, behind the left bank
of the Seine. By this means the proximity of French and German troops
for any length of time would be avoided. Permission could hardly be
refused for the French troops to march through St. Denis, although
they are on no account to be allowed to tarry or post reserves there.
General Borel was obviously desirous of preventing all co-operation
on the part of the German troops and of the forts occupied by us, and
gave it clearly to be understood that he regarded such direct support
as undesirable on political grounds. He did not believe the insurgents
would venture to pursue the storming parties in case the latter did
not succeed--an opinion which is also shared here--and he positively
denied that the French Commander-in-Chief intended to bombard the north
front, or to proceed to a regular attack upon it if the surprise were
to fail. As, according to these overtures, the French were prepared to
forego our co-operation, and our own forces in and behind the forts
are quite sufficient, I have, as already reported in a telegram of the
10th instant, given up the idea of a concentration of further troops
outside Paris. In accordance with the wishes of the French Government,
I consider it desirable in the first place to avoid everything that
would attract the attention of the insurgents to the north front, and
thereby endanger the success of the surprise. At the same time we
consider it necessary to avert, as far as possible, all accidental
losses to our troops should the insurgents, after repelling an attack,
open fire with their artillery on the retiring French columns. In
the event of his Majesty the Emperor and King afterwards expressly
ordering the German troops to co-operate in the attack on Paris, I
venture to express the humble opinion that, in view of the situation at
the present moment, when the resistance is already organised and the
insurgents are accustomed to fire, a simple bombardment of the enceinte
would scarcely secure our object. It might then be desirable to proceed
against the nearest gates and bastions with a battering train posted on
the plateau of Romainville, and probably an occupation of the enceinte
would only be attended with decisive success after we had advanced as
far as Buttes Chamont, as this position commands the greater part of
the northern half of Paris.”
Bucher informed me this evening that Professor Aegidi of Bonn has
entered the Foreign Office as Councillor in charge of press matters,
and is to undertake the appointment of agents, journalists, and other
such gentlemen. He added: “Something has already been said in the
newspapers on the subject. One newspaper contained a note, which had
doubtless been provided by Aegidi himself, to the effect that he would
replace Abeken, who had begun to grow old and weak. That ruffled our
friend very considerably, and he grew as red as a turkey-cock as he
remarked: ‘In such circumstances one can only wish to retire at once on
his pension.’” Bucher further stated that Aegidi had been recommended
by Keudell, whose cousin he had married, and who had previously secured
him the position at Bonn after he had failed in Hamburg. In conclusion
Bucher said: “Keudell has already appointed many useless people and
expended large sums upon them. For example, some time ago he took up a
Dane, whom he employed as an agent and richly remunerated, but who did
absolutely nothing.” I recalled the case of Rasch, and B. said that he
too had advised against employing him, describing him as a conceited
blockhead to Keudell, who nevertheless sent him to Garibaldi with
20,000 thalers.
A telegram of the 15th instant from Fabrice states that the French
had demanded in a despatch that the cordon drawn round Paris should
be made complete so far as the German troops were concerned, as it
was important that the leaders of this criminal undertaking (the
Commune) should not escape the hands of justice. In reply to the French
Government, Fabrice said that Borel had come to no understanding
with the Third Army Corps respecting a blockade of the city. If the
cordon was to be drawn at an early date, it would have to be preceded
by an arrangement of that kind. The Chief telegraphed at once that,
according to the understanding arrived at in Frankfurt, we were bound
to completely isolate Paris as soon as the French desired it, to permit
the Versailles troops to march through our lines, and to call upon the
Commune to withdraw from the enceinte. We were not bound, however,
to emphasise this demand by force of arms. But the three points in
question must be carried into effect by the Commander-in-Chief, as we
should otherwise commit a breach of the agreement entered into with the
French Government.
It previously appeared from a pencil minute by Abeken on a report from
Fabrice that we had offered, or that the French had demanded, something
more than this, namely, in addition to the complete isolation of the
city and the passage of the French troops through our lines, we should,
in case the French Government asked for our support, give it in the
shape of an artillery attack upon the enceinte, and, if the French
storming parties were to fail, use all our forces to prevent a pursuit
on the part of the Parisians.
_May 20th._--According to a report from Stuttgart of the 17th instant,
von Wachter, the Würtemberg Minister for Foreign Affairs, had remarked
that King Charles now considered Würtemberg not to have been properly
treated in connection with the Frankfurt treaty of peace (on the
previous day he had known nothing about it), and he appeared to feel
hurt at this. The Würtemberg Minister at Munich has reported that
the treatment of Bavaria in connection with the conclusion of peace
is greatly blamed in competent circles there, and that Count Quadt
has been instructed to give expression to this dissatisfaction. It
is doubtless Bavaria, therefore, that has altered the sentiments of
Würtemberg.
Count von F., who has been in London, has informed Balan that the
French Ambassador to the English Court, as well as the Duc de Grammont,
have attracted a great deal of attention by their want of tact. The
former had remarked to the Count in a reproachful tone that the
Socialists in Paris had been principally recruited in Belgium. Grammont
predicted the approaching return of Napoleon to France, and added, “_Et
alors on va bientôt mettre fin à cette ridicule chose qu’on appelle la
Belgique._” Prince Napoleon, on the other hand, had observed to the
Count that the neutrality of Belgium was an advantage to France during
the last war. Baron Baude, the French Minister in Brussels, had stated
in the presence of the English Minister d’Anethan that immediately
after the Versailles troops had taken possession of Paris the National
Assembly would proclaim the Comte de Chambord as King.
_May 24th._--To-day read and noted down the draft of a despatch by
the Chief respecting the International, and joint action on the part
of the Governments against this organisation of the Socialist party.
This is to be utilised in the press. The despatch is dated the 7th
instant, and is addressed to Schweinitz in Vienna. Drafted at first by
Abeken, the Chancellor struck out all but eight or ten lines, and then
completed it in his own hand. Thus transformed it reads as follows:
“The events that have occurred in Paris during the last few weeks
and days, have disclosed in the most unmistakable fashion the common
organisation of the Socialistic elements in European countries, and
the dangers with which the State is threatened by that organisation.
In Germany the influence of the Communistic working class associations
is evident in the large centres of industry in our western provinces,
and particularly in the manufacturing districts of Saxony. Herr Bebel,
a member of Parliament, who is said to receive pecuniary support
for his agitation from the funds of the late King of Hanover, has
in the Reichstag given open expression to the criminal intentions
of his party. Certain symptoms would go to show that in Austria,
and indeed in Vienna itself, this agitation is making way among the
workers. If your Excellency considers that the desire, and indeed the
necessity, of opposing these movements of disaffection is felt by the
Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government, please initiate a confidential
discussion of ways and means. In my opinion, the first step would be an
exchange of views respecting the extent and direction of the Socialist
organisation, and the recognition of the principle that Socialist
menaces to life and property, such as have been carried into execution
in Paris, belong to the category of ordinary crime, and not to that of
political offences.”
I here add the contents of some other documents on the same subject
received and despatched later.
Writing on the 3rd of June, R. reported that the Emperor Alexander
said to him that he intended to discuss with the Emperor William and
the Chief the question of the means by which the European monarchies
could be protected from the Socialist danger, and in particular from
the International. In his opinion all the Governments of Europe should
unite and assist one another in the struggle against this enemy. The
Emperor will have a memorial on the subject drawn up by the Minister
of Justice, in which, in particular, evidence will be adduced with the
object of proving that the members of these Socialistic associations
should be treated, not as political offenders, but as ordinary
criminals.
During the second week of June, Bucher was much occupied in studying
the International; and despatches drawn up by him were sent to
Florence, Brussels, Vienna, and London. These were intended to pave
the way for a joint intervention of the Governments against the
agitation of the Communists. That addressed to Brassier St. Simon was
dated the 9th of June, and that to Bernstorff the 14th. The following
passage occurred in the former: “However much the ultimate aims of
the revolutionary elements may differ in various countries, according
to the conditions of the latter, yet their immediate purpose is in
every instance the same, namely, the overthrow of the existing order
in the State. It therefore follows that all existing Governments have
a common interest in opposing them. When the State is defeated by the
revolutionary movement in any one country, as was the case in Paris for
two months, its power will be reduced in all other countries, and that
of its opponents proportionately increased.”
On the 12th of June, the Chief’s answer, in which he gave an account
of the steps already taken, was despatched to R. He had first sent the
enclosed despatch to General von Schweinitz, and afterwards caused
the latter to speak to Count Andrassy, who (perhaps in consequence
of a private request on the part of the Chief) had already mooted
the subject confidentially, in the same way as he had done to Count
Beust. He (the Chief) then had copies of the despatch sent to the
representatives of the Empire in Brussels, Florence, Dresden, and
London, with the addition in each instance of some further observations
more applicable to the special conditions of the country in question.
In Brussels he had had attention called to the fact that Belgium,
on account of its geographical position and its condition in regard
to languages and industry, was most exposed to danger; that in the
year 1868, on the occasion of the first International Congress of the
Working Classes, Belgium was the scene of the first proclamation
of Communism; and that, according to the statement of the leaders
of the Paris Commune, Belgium had been chosen as the next field for
their practical operations. In Florence he pointed out that the great
associations which kept up disturbances in Italy, if they did not
follow the same ends as the Communists, were still at one with them in
their immediate task, namely, the overthrow of the existing Government
and form of State, and were intimately associated with them, as was
evident from the appearance of the Garibaldians in Paris. In Dresden
it was pointed out that the industrial districts of Saxony furnished
the largest contingent of Socialist members to the Reichstag. And,
finally, in London it was shown that there the Communist associations,
which had in the fifties given rise to criminal trials in Germany and
France, together with the international union of the working classes,
an offspring of that association, were founded in London, which was
their official centre.
Count Waldersee (at present interim representative of Germany at
Versailles) has been instructed to inform M. Jules Favre, in connection
with his circular of the 6th instant, of our readiness to co-operate.
All these communications contained as an enclosure an article from _The
Times_, apparently based on official information.
About the middle of June Beust suggested that a “Note” should be sent
asking for information respecting the Socialist organisation. The Chief
believes that Beust’s proposal contemplates “blue-book lucubrations,
which would only hamper the attainment of the real object in view,”
as it would give warning to the Socialists and furnish the European
press with a theme for denouncing new “Karlsbad resolutions,” and, to
judge from the bias displayed in other complicated compilations of a
similar character, the Austrian Chancellor would not be above making
capital out of it for the benefit of his own popularity. The Minister
was therefore to inform him that we were prepared, without any official
demand on his part, to furnish him with the results of our observations
upon the connection between the Communistic parties. A letter, dated
the 26th of June, and addressed to S., contains the following further
remarks: “I find him (Baron von Gablenz) much more disposed to meet
our views in the matter of joint action against this danger (the
Socialistic agitation) than has hitherto been the case in Vienna. He
was of opinion that the Emperor Francis Joseph was very favourably
inclined towards the understanding we had suggested.... I have not
concealed from him, however, that Count Beust’s desire to see this
suggestion embodied in the form of a ‘Note’ has, to some extent, cooled
our zeal.”
B. reports, under date of the 1st of June, that Baron d’Anethan is
in perfect agreement with the proposal of the Chief for an exchange
of communications on the extent and direction of the Socialistic
agitation, and also as to the recognition of the principle that
Socialistic threats against life and property should be included
in the category of ordinary crimes. He furthermore considers it
absolutely necessary that the Governments should unite in establishing
an international principle, and, acting on that basis, should proceed
against the revolutionary agitation with inexorable rigour. The Belgian
Minister strongly condemned the attitude of England, and expressed the
apprehension that it would be difficult to procure the adhesion of the
English Government to a common understanding.
There are grounds for believing that the motive for raising the whole
subject was less the danger of the Socialist organisation (which,
however, was strongly emphasised by me in the press under instructions
from the Chief, and afterwards on my own account in the pamphlet _Zur
Geschichte der Internationale_, Leipzig, 1872) than the opportunity
which would be thereby afforded of bringing all the Powers together for
the consideration, in common, of _one_ question; and, in particular,
of producing a _rapprochement_ between two of them. In other words,
the main object of the manœuvre was to maintain the antagonism between
Russia and France--the land of the Commune, by exaggerating the danger
of the International, and to win over Austria.
I now return to the chronological order of my diary, observing at the
same time that some of the most important notes and instructions which
I received from the Chief at that time cannot be reproduced, as the
slips upon which they were written have been mislaid.
_May 30th._--The _National Zeitung_, commenting in an exceptionally
violent and discourteous tone upon an article in Brass’s paper, spoke
of “the Mamelukes of the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_,” of a
“coarseness and boorishness, that can only be explained by the habits
of literary menials,” and of the “tone of the Imperial Chancellor to
which the anti-Parliamentary press, watching his every gesture, and
exhibiting the zeal of a retriever, barks in eager response.” The
Chief wished to have a reply written to this article, somewhat to
the following effect. It was not necessary to enter into the attacks
made upon the newspaper. The specimens quoted from the organ of MM.
Bamberger and Lasker would suffice to show that persons who gave
vent to their own irritation in that style were hardly entitled to
complain of the manner in which others expressed themselves. But
when the article charges the Imperial Chancellor with adopting an
unseemly attitude towards the Reichstag, whereas his attitude has been
eminently prudent and patriotic, when it accuses him of “domineering
over men,” and of “demanding blind submission,” it may well be asked
what part of the verbatim reports has given rise to these invectives.
(From this point on dictation.) “We, who have not left these reports
unread, as the author of this philippic would appear to have done,
fail to find anything in the expressions of the Imperial Chancellor,
but a declaration, for which he gave his reasons, that the motion
under discussion was unacceptable, and that if it were maintained
he could not undertake the responsibility for the administration of
Alsace-Lorraine, during the period of provisional government. If any
one discovers, in what he said, anything which would appear to justify
in any way the charges in question, we would ask him to remember
that a tone of bitterness and violence was _first_ adopted by the
Reichstag, and exactly by that party which takes credit for prudence
and patriotism--and in general not without justification. We at least
fail to recognise as models of prudence and patriotism, the sallies
of Herr Bamberger in the last debate, in which he fell upon the Post
Office officials. ‘When all is said, we are curs,’ and ‘Look out for
the whip,’ were some of the flowers of rhetoric with which he presented
the Government--and Herr von Hoverbeck’s feats of eloquence on the same
occasion leave us in the same difficulty.”
_May 31st._--Wrote to Brass to-day on the instructions of the Chief
respecting the leading article in No. 124 of the _Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung_, which struck the Prince as too vehement in its
attack upon the National Liberals. I recommended greater moderation
and dignity. In reply, Brass excuses himself on the ground that he
received that article from an official source, and was, therefore, in a
dilemma--which is very probable.
A letter is to be sent to Vienna to-day, saying that Favre had stated
at Frankfurt that a proposal from Beust in favour of the Pope had
been submitted to the Versailles Government. This was made in such a
form as to give rise to the inference that it was in harmony with the
intentions of the Emperor William, as it referred to intimations from
Count Bray, and Bavaria would not, presumably, adopt a policy on that
question which deviated from that of the German Empire. S. is then
requested to make guarded inquiries as to whether the Bavarian Minister
for Foreign Affairs has taken any, and if so, what, steps in that
direction. Of course, there was no doubt as to Bray’s personal views in
the matter, but only a desire that, should he have actually taken such
steps in Vienna, no room should have been left for misconception as to
the personal and individual character of his action. The German Foreign
Office had had no share in it, and “we have,” the letter concludes,
“avoided, up to the present, expressing any opinion on the Roman
question, or on the attitude of the German Empire towards it.”
_June 5th._--Wrote an article, dated from Darmstadt, for the _Kölnische
Zeitung_. The Chief gave me the information. The article ran as follows:
“However much our new Ministers may adapt themselves to circumstances,
it is nevertheless no secret that the feeling in the spheres above
them still continues unfavourable to the new state of things in
Germany, and that it is sought here to preserve as much as possible
of the old arrangements without causing too great offence. Whatever
the spontaneous initiative of the powers that be fails to do in this
direction is supplied by the very considerable influence of Prince
Alexander, who is still associated with those circles in Vienna which
in German affairs have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing, and which
now as formerly exercise a kind of co-regency that makes itself felt in
many different ways. A case in point is the maintenance of the Legation
in Vienna, which has long since lost all importance, particularly since
the foundation of the German Empire through the Versailles Treaties.
We hear on good authority that the present holder of that office,
Heinrich von Gagern, the whilom President of the Frankfurt Parliament,
requested several months ago to be allowed to retire from his post,
at the same time recommending that it should be abolished, but he
received a negative answer. He is now understood to have repeated his
request and recommendation to the new Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and--as we are informed--Herr von Lindelhof was not unfavourably
disposed, particularly as there is no prospect of the representative
body continuing to vote supplies for this post, which has become
purely ornamental, as a necessary item of expenditure. In the highest
quarters, however, a different view prevails, which is evidently due
to the Prince, and if Gagern is permitted to resign he will have a
successor. It is understood that in these circumstances the prospective
successor would be von Biegeleben, the Prince’s intimate friend, a
statesman as Ultramontane as could be found in the Episcopal Palace at
Mainz, and as anti-Prussian as could be desired anywhere. I report
this merely as a symptom of the sentiments prevailing in competent
quarters here. Given adequate power, mischief can be wrought even
without a Legation, but when that element is lacking, all diplomatic
posts become merely ornamental, not to say ridiculous.”
_June 7th._--According to a communication from Bernstorff of the 3rd
instant, Brunnow reports that Napoleon has greatly aged and become
very infirm. He speaks with gratitude of our Emperor and without
hatred of Prussia; while, on the other hand, he is strongly incensed
against Thiers and Favre, who will be overtaken by the just vengeance
of Heaven for having brought about the overthrow of the Empire. Their
punishment has already commenced in the severe conditions to which they
have been compelled to allow the country to be subjected. According to
this report, the Emperor did not express any hope of his restoration.
The Empress, however, is full of courage, and has great expectations.
The Bonapartists share her views. Some of them look forward to a
restoration of Napoleon; and others, though a minority, to the regency
of the Empress. Hopes are entertained that although Germany might
not give any direct assistance to a restoration, it would moderate
the conditions of peace if Napoleon were re-elected. In case of a
plebiscite also, Germany might be helpful in the occupied provinces.
Some are in favour of a national vote, as they feel sure of the rural
population; while others are for violent measures, relying upon 180,000
soldiers. In their opinion, the main point is that neither the Comte de
Chambord nor any one of the Orleans has any prospect of success.
The following communication was sent to Fabrice on the 4th inst.:
“As the Government of which M. Thiers is the head has concluded a
definitive peace with us, it is in our interest, and in that of our
international position, to recognise only the present Government in
France, so long as no other Government has been evolved out of it in
a legal way which would secure for the future the execution of the
Treaty of Peace, and the maintenance of the present relations between
the two countries. The present Government is bound by its past, and
by its entire position, to fulfil its obligations towards us, and
it therefore finds a support in Germany. Any other Government which
may seize power in an irregular way may possibly seek its salvation
by sacrificing to popularity the treaties concluded with us, and in
that manner force us to renew the war. We have, therefore, not only
an interest in the maintenance of the present Government, but also
the right to withhold our recognition from any violent change in the
form of government, however brought about, and to make our decision
dependent upon the guarantees provided for our treaty interests. It
must, furthermore, be remembered that everything calculated to disturb
order, which is scarcely restored as yet, must prejudicially affect
the power of France to meet its obligations towards us within the
periods laid down in the treaty, whoever may be at the head of affairs,
and that we must therefore desire to avoid every crisis which would
lead to a renewal of civil war. You will please express yourself in
this sense to the French Government, and make it clear to them beyond
all question that in those portions of the country which we occupy
we shall recognise no alteration in the form, and no change in the
principal holders of power, which does not arise out of the existing
situation in the regular way, and in accordance with the laws now in
force. We are giving evidence of the confidence which we repose in
the present Government by rapidly reducing the German forces in the
occupied districts. Should new movements in France force us to doubt
the maintenance of the peace which has been concluded, your Excellency
is aware that within fourteen days we could again put the same army in
the field which we had in France last winter.”
_June 11th._--Fabrice telegraphed the day before yesterday to the Chief
stating, _inter alia_, that the rapid withdrawal of our troops outside
Paris and elsewhere before the payment of the first half milliard was
obviously exercising an influence upon the temper and behaviour of the
population, whose attitude would grow more and more confident, if not
hostile, as the evacuation proceeded. Washburne had confidently advised
prudence, and in speaking to Holstein had described the sentiments
of the Parisians towards the Germans as doubtful, adding that the
Government lacked the power, and perhaps the will, to counteract this
tendency, and that the protection of the Germans in Paris depended
solely upon the German garrisons still in the neighbourhood. No
reliance could be placed upon the future development of affairs in
France. The first two milliards would be paid in order to give Germany
a sense of security. The balance of three milliards, however, would
not be paid--as had been openly stated by personages in authority,
not soldiers--while, on the other hand, there was a determination to
recover the ceded territories.
The Chief thereupon telegraphed to the Saxon General yesterday
that neither were we bound nor did we intend to reduce the zone of
occupation, and that we should certainly not evacuate the forts before
the date specified in the Treaty of Frankfurt. If we reduced the
number of our troops in the occupied districts, it was not that we
trusted France, but only that we had confidence in our own rapidity of
mobilisation. It was possible that the French would not carry out the
treaty of peace in full, and even that they intended to attack us, but
as soon as the mobilisation of the French forces rendered the latter
eventuality probable, or if there were a wilful delay in the payments
to be made, a force of 600,000 could, within a fortnight, be put into
the field between Metz and Paris. He, Fabrice, should permit no doubt
to exist upon this point. It was cheaper to strengthen our forces
outside Paris as required than to leave them there for an indefinite
period. There was no disposition to conceal the possibility of a
renewal of the war, but on the other hand such a renewal was not feared.
_June 19th._--This morning read a number of telegrams which have
been exchanged between Waldersee and the Chief, from which it would
almost seem as if it might come to hostilities if the French only
had sufficient power. On the evening of the 15th instant their
troops stationed near Lilas pushed forward their outposts to within
twenty-five paces of ours, and on ground that belonged to us. The
Chief, upon advices to this effect from Waldersee on the 16th instant,
immediately instructed him to demand the punishment of the officers who
had been guilty of this breach of existing arrangements, adding that
our men had received instructions to attack the French troops posted
within rifle range of them if the latter did not withdraw in the course
of the day. He would also immediately advise the King to withdraw the
orders for the recall of all our troops until satisfaction had been
received. A telegram to the like effect was at the same time despatched
to Favre. It concluded as follows: “_Les protestations du commandant
allemand contre cette violation des stipulations en vigueur sont
restées infructueuses. Je regrette vivement un incident qui trouble
les relations de confiance mutuelle qui commençaient à naître._” The
Frenchmen were greatly frightened by this _Quos ego_, particularly
MacMahon, who immediately ordered the withdrawal of the troops from a
position in which they had no right to be.
Favre has declared that Pouyer-Quertier cannot pay the first half
milliard before the 15th of July, as the Ministry of Finance has been
destroyed (by the Communists). Moreover, the restoration of order,
mentioned in Article 7 of the treaty, has not yet been completed. In a
telegram sent to Waldersee the day before yesterday the Chief described
these observations as “impudent,” and instructed Waldersee to tell
Favre that if the money is not paid on the 1st of July, France will
have failed to fulfil its obligations under the article in question.
Waldersee further reported the day before yesterday that he had
presented his credentials to Favre, and was then received by Thiers.
His reception by both gentlemen was exceedingly polite and amiable.
A 6 per cent. voluntary loan of two milliards, with a 15 per cent.
payment on account, was to be placed on the market on the 26th of June.
With the money raised by this means, and with some other funds at the
disposal of the Government, a payment of 375 million francs would
be made. Thiers assured him that with the best will in the world he
could not promise him the complete payment of the first half milliard
before the 10th of July, as nobody could foresee at the present moment
how the subscriptions would go. He, Waldersee, had, however, insisted
upon the 1st of July, as otherwise we should be driven to question
the good will of the French, and moreover--owing to certain financial
arrangements--we required the money at that date. Thiers replied that
he both desired and hoped to be able to begin the payment on the 1st,
but it was a physical impossibility for him to collect the whole sum
before the 10th. Waldersee had not stated that the proposal would be
accepted in Berlin.
The Chief thereupon telegraphed the same day that the proposal of
M. Thiers was incompatible with the 7th Article of the Frankfurt
Treaty of Peace, and could not, therefore, be accepted without
counter-concessions. The telegram continues: “Besides, the
understanding at first was that the occupation of Paris should be
taken as the term for this payment, and it was only in consequence
of a concession made by us out of complaisance that the expression
‘_rétablissement de l’autorité_’ was inserted in the French draft of
the treaty. Furthermore, through an oversight, the payment of the
following 125 millions was fixed in the French draft at sixty days
after the payment of the 375 millions, instead of thirty days, or sixty
days after the occupation of Paris, as M. Pouyer-Quertier himself
had proposed. In the presence of the unconciliatory attitude which
the French negotiators now manifest, we see no occasion to show them
any favour without counter-concessions. If, therefore, the French
Government does not make the payment provided for by the treaty on the
1st of July, we must regard it as a failure to fulfil its obligations
under Article 7. I beg your Excellency to leave M. Favre in no doubt
upon this point.”
_June 20th._--Again an amusing interlude provided by the diplomatic
world. Von K., a Russian envoy abroad, has addressed to the Emperor
Alexander a long memorial dated the 25th of May, or the 6th of
June according to our calendar. This document, which deals with the
Socialist parties and agitation in Germany, includes the following,
among a number of other extraordinary whimsicalities: “Wuttke (Our
Leipzig Professor and Puzzlehead), _un des piliers républicains en
Saxe, a dit dernièrement assez haut pour être entendu à Dresde: ‘Dans
cinq ans il n’y aura plus de princes.’_” Most wonderful and admirable
knowledge of affairs and men! Wuttke, a pillar and prophet of Saxon
Republicanism! And this is the sort of stuff which a diplomatist
reports with a serious face!
_June 22nd._--Under instructions from the Chief utilised in the press
the main ideas of a memorandum written by Bucher on the Paris Commune,
and the reasons why it was not supported in the provinces. This
document, which was dated the 17th instant, was forwarded to Vienna.
(...)
The following appears in the _Volkszeitung_ to-day: “We have been
requested to publish the following letter: ‘Desiring an audience of his
Serene Highness Prince Bismarck, I addressed him as he was passing in
the street, for the purpose of obtaining permission to present myself.
Hardly had I spoken to the Prince before two detectives laid hold of
me by both arms and wanted to arrest me. In spite of my protest that I
was under no obligation to accompany two civilians, and moreover that
I had committed no offence, I was dragged through the streets to the
police station in the Taubenstrasse. I was then taken in charge of a
policeman to the Molkenmarkt, where I was kept in custody for the whole
night, being liberated at 11 o’clock next morning, with the remark that
my arrest was doubtless due to a misunderstanding. I leave the whole
affair to the judgment of the public. H. L. Back.’”
_June 23rd._--Called this morning to the Chief, who showed me the
above letter. He was in good humour, and while dressing he gave me the
following account of the incident. “As I was leaving the Reichstag
on my way home an exceptionally greasy individual, evidently a Jew,
came up and said he wished to have an audience of me. I declined,
but he remained at my side and kept on talking to me, I would surely
not refuse a German writer such a request, as he had something of
importance to communicate to me. Yes, but I do though, I replied, I
never give audiences to German authors. He continued to follow me,
however (with the fly-like persistence, obtrusiveness and foolhardiness
of the young Jew), and while he kept on talking he pressed so close to
me that he trod on one of my spurs, breaking it off. I wheeled round
and was about to chastise him physically, when the two policemen took
him in charge. He really was exceptionally greasy, one could have
scraped the pot-house fat off him.” Wrote a paragraph on the subject
for the papers.
Called again to the Minister later on, and received instructions for
an article on certain pretended revelations of a M. de Vallon in the
Versailles Assembly, which had been commented upon in the _National
Zeitung_. He read through and corrected this article before it was
sent off. In giving me the information, he said: “Favre has here
made several erroneous statements. He gave an inaccurate account of
the facts in his speech of the 19th instant, in which he referred to
Vallon’s assertion that he, Favre, had told him I had been disposed
at Ferrières to conclude peace on the cession of Strassburg and its
environs. He declared that at that time there had been no negotiations
respecting peace, though M. de Bismarck had, indeed, told him that it
would be possible to negotiate on the conditions indicated by M. de
Vallon in the National Assembly. Say, with reference to that point,
that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had thereby given evidence
of a defective memory. Or, better still, say: It is quite conceivable
that all the details of several long interviews have not been retained
with equal clearness by all those concerned in them. According to the
reports now before us, the question of the armistice occupied the
first place, as a means of preparing the way for peace through the
convocation of a National Assembly; but the peace itself was also
discussed. M. Favre himself says this in his report of September last
to the Government of National Defence, describing the occurrences at
Haute Maison. There we read: ‘After I had made known the intentions of
the French Government by means of a circular, I desired to ascertain
those of the Prussian Minister. It seemed to me out of the question
that two nations, without first ascertaining each other’s views, should
continue a war which, notwithstanding its advantages for the victor,
would be a cause of great suffering. Brought about by the will of one
individual, this war had no longer any _raison d’être_ when France had
again become her own mistress. I vouched for her love of peace, and at
the same time for her resolve not to accept any conditions which would
transform this peace into a short and threatening armistice. M. de
Bismarck replied that if he were convinced of the possibility of such a
peace, he would sign it immediately.’
“On this occasion M. Favre also ascertained the conditions put forward
by Germany, and these were by no means restricted to the cession of
Strassburg and its environs. M. Favre’s above-mentioned report goes
on to say: ‘On my pressing him very strongly with respect to the
conditions, he told me plainly that the security of his country imposed
upon him the necessity of retaining the territory which would guarantee
the same. He repeated several times: Strassburg is the key of the
house. (I said _our_ house.) I begged him to speak still more plainly.
That is useless, he replied, as we cannot come to an understanding;
that is a matter that can be settled later. I requested him to do so
immediately. (The following is given in italics in the article.) He
then said to me that the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine
and a portion of the Moselle department, with Metz, Château Salins,
and Soissons (incorrect, it was Saargemund which was mentioned) were
indispensable to him, and that he could not forego them.’”
About the same time, probably shortly before the above article was
written, the following communiqué was prepared for the _Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung_ under instructions from the Chief, who also saw
and corrected it before it was sent to the press. He struck out the
portions within brackets, although they were almost literally his own
words: “Reports reach us daily of bad treatment and serious prejudice
to their rights to which the Germans in France, and particularly those
in Paris, are subjected. Bankers dismiss German clerks who have served
them long and faithfully; manufacturers announce that they will no
longer employ German workpeople; even academies and institutions,
centres of French learning (and, as one would wish to think, of French
wisdom), indulge in anti-German demonstrations, and decline in future
to elect any corresponding members from among the German citizens
of the Universal Republic of Letters. All these, more or less petty
expressions of bitter resentment, may be merely regarded as symptoms
of a feeling which is of significance for the future, and against
which we must secure ourselves. But the French, and particularly the
Parisians, have gone further in the petty warfare, which they carry on
in continuation of the great war now concluded. Incited by an unbridled
press, they have permitted themselves to adopt towards those Germans
who have returned to France, either to put their affairs in order, or
to reopen business, an attitude which would be regarded by civilised
nations as improper, even in time of war. They have prevented Germans
from opening their shops, and have wrecked German establishments. They
have prohibited other Germans from attending the Bourse, and have
arrested harmless German subjects, simply because they were Germans.
That is not an affair of the _future_, but of the immediate present,
and demands immediate redress. We have concluded peace, and we honestly
and sincerely desire to maintain it, but of course, on the assumption
that the French people preserve this peace, which was sought for and
demanded by their Government. If the offences in question are not
(speedily and thoroughly) checked, and if the French Government does
not protect peaceful and law-abiding Germans, we must, in the interest
of German subjects, and in view of the honour of Germany, decide upon
the reprisals to be exercised. We should not be surprised if, then,
for every German illegally arrested and not released immediately upon
representations being made, arrests of French citizens were ordered in
those districts of France which we temporarily occupy. We should not
consider it out of order, if the evacuation of certain departments were
postponed until these passions had calmed down, and indeed, according
to circumstances, these regrettable occurrences might lead to fresh
action against Paris, which is the seat of the evil.”
_June 24th._--Wrote the following article for Brass from materials
supplied by the Chief, whose attention was called to the matter by
an article in the _Schlesische Zeitung_, on “Napoleon and the Men of
the 4th of September”: “Trochu’s attempt to exculpate himself before
the bar of public opinion has failed conclusively. His speech only
confirmed the fact that he had betrayed the Emperor by using, in
order to bring about his fall, the forces entrusted to him. It was
principally through the men on the 4th of September that he came to
the head of affairs. He was chiefly responsible for the continuation
of the war from that date. And in addition to his treason came his
incapacity. He was constantly giving assurances that he had plans which
would infallibly succeed, and yet when they were carried out not one
of them was really successful. When he finally, however, with brazen
impudence charges the Prussians with having supported the Commune and
with complicity in the scenes of terror enacted since the outbreak
of the Socialist conspiracy, it may be pointed out (1) that German
policy would have incurred no reproach before Europe if it had shown a
certain readiness to meet the Commune during the first weeks following
the 18th of March, when it had not as yet disclosed its true nature,
particularly as there appeared to be very little good will and very
considerable equivocation on the other side; (2) that there has been
no question of any kind of complaisance on the part of the Germans
towards the Commune, to say nothing of an understanding or of support,
and that, on the contrary, everything which was permissible in the
circumstances was done to assist the Versailles Government in its
preparations to suppress the rising, and during the fighting itself. It
is therefore to be expected that the members of the French Government,
who are better informed, will contradict the assertions of the General,
which if not mendacious are at least utterly erroneous. We still await
such a correction. If this disavowal were not made we should consider
it desirable that the matter should be taken up on the German side and
that those diplomatic documents should be published which show that
assistance was really given and in what manner, and that this was done
at the wish and request of the Versailles Government.”
_June 30th._--During the last few days again read a number of
interesting documents despatched and received. Tauffkirchen, the
Bavarian representative at the Curia, reported from Rome on the 21st
inst. that the Pope had spoken to him on the previous day of the danger
by which society was threatened by the Communists. “They are,” he said,
as he drove away some flies from his table, “like these insects. It is
no use to kill a few, still less to drive them away. General measures
must be taken to prevent their entrance and propagation.” Respecting
the removal of the Italian Government to Rome, a recent despatch says
that if the King proceeds thither the foreign representatives will
follow him in accordance with diplomatic custom. If the Minister for
Foreign Affairs were to reside there without the sovereign, it would
then depend upon the requirements of business whether, and for how
long, an envoy would go to Rome for purposes of personal communication.
France and Austria had instructed their representatives to follow the
Minister to Rome, irrespective of the circumstance whether Victor
Emmanuel went there or not; in that case, however, they were to take
leave of absence, leaving a substitute in charge. A despatch from
Waldersee, dated the 25th instant, contains the following sentence:
“It is not in the interest of the Empire that the different Federal
States should maintain separate envoys abroad. We may, however, await
their gradual disappearance as a work of time, and as the result of
the Budget debates in the several States.” According to a report from
Tauffkirchen, Prince Löwenstein-Heubach, who has gone to Rome on behalf
of the Clericals, threatened Cardinal Antonelli with the consequences
of any disavowal of the Centre party in the Reichstag.
_July 2nd._--The Chief asked me yesterday if I had not, in accordance
with his instructions, informed Brass[4] that he should cease his
attacks upon the French Government. I replied: “Yes, several times,
both by letter and verbally.” He then said: “That must be put a stop
to. But I believe he is paid by Napoleon.” To-day he wished me to send
Brass the following article, for which he gave me the ideas. “There has
been much discussion of the question, whether the war indemnity imposed
upon France by Germany is too high, and whether the former will be able
to bear the burden of those five milliards. Some answer the question in
the affirmative, some in the negative, while others remain in doubt.
Now, however, we may consider the point as settled, by the programme
which M. Thiers has submitted to the National Assembly, first, as
regards the loan and the financial position of France, and then with
respect to the future of the country in general. Undoubtedly France
is obliged to exercise greater economy than she has hitherto done.
She must increase the productiveness of her resources, and administer
them with the utmost care. Notwithstanding this, M. Thiers has no idea
whatever of reducing the army or the navy, which nevertheless offer
the largest field for economies. On the contrary he desires to bring
both up to the highest figure they have yet reached, and to keep them
at that point, and what is more, he wishes to have the army reinforced
by a reserve of 900,000 men. This clearly proves to us that the idea
of France being entitled to dominate Europe has by no means been given
up in Government circles at Versailles, and that now, as formerly,
they hold fast to the statement in which M. Thiers during his autumn
tour expressed the hope and self-confidence of the French politician:
‘_L’Europe ne veut pas changer de maître._’ Indeed, now that the French
Government thinks of submitting the same military Budget, and the
French seem to consider that they can bear their old military burdens
even under more unfavourable conditions than prevailed formerly,
the indemnity demanded must be regarded rather as too low than too
high. Moreover, France is nowhere endangered or threatened, and these
formidable armaments can therefore only betray aggressive aspirations,
the expression of which must be looked upon as a direct threat to her
neighbours. On both these grounds there ceases in our opinion to be any
moral obligation to show indulgence in the matter of the indemnity.”
_July 5th._--This afternoon Keudell brought down from the Chief an
article which appeared in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of the
2nd inst., which began with the words “Der Telegraph.” The Chief had
written on the margin, “This article is contrary to the instructions
given. The Minister of the Interior is to be written to respecting
a warning to the editorial staff, or the withdrawal of all favours.
Strict daily supervision necessary.” Keudell said the Chancellor was
furious with Brass, and almost believed that he was paid by Napoleon to
make mischief between ourselves and Versailles. He then begged me to
write the necessary letter to the Minister of the Interior.
The article of the 2nd of July was the last which I wrote for the
Foreign Office from the direct personal instructions of the Chancellor.
From that time forward the direct intercourse with the Chancellor,
which I had hitherto enjoyed, was transferred to the new “Press
Councillor,” Aegidi, who had been here for some weeks, but had not been
received by the Prince until eight or ten days after his arrival, and
who, even then, was not employed immediately.
I did not know at the time what was the reason of the change, and
Bucher also was unable to explain it. He was afterwards of opinion that
Aegidi was introduced by Keudell, who intended to leave the Foreign
Office and take an appointment abroad, in order that he might be kept
informed of what was going on here. It would be his business also to
see that the press men should not cease to accord him that recognition
which he, as Personal Councillor, Treasurer and Administrator of
Pensions, was accustomed to receive from time to time, but that it
should, on the contrary, continue to flow in a stronger and deeper
stream. I cannot say whether the former surmise was correct. I will
show later on, when I come to deal with Herr von Keudell himself, that
the other point did not remain any mere suspicion. For the present I
will only remark that the censer, which used to be swung before the
latter in the press, was much more frequently in use after the arrival
of his _protégé_ in Berlin, and that the smoke of the incense recalled
in a very suspicious way Aegidi’s own style. (...)
James Ludwig Carl Aegidi, a Protestant, son of a doctor in Freienwalde,
was born in 1825. He studied law at Königsberg, Heidelberg and Berlin,
and was married to a Fräulein von Senden, a cousin of Keudell’s....
A few days after Aegidi’s arrival Keudell, speaking of him to me,
credited him with “exceptional scientific knowledge, relations with
almost all literary circles, and the tact which was desirable for
mediating between the Chief and the daily press.”
The following chapters will show the nature of those relations and
this tact. Let one proof suffice for the moment. Some months after
the appointment of the new Councillor the following was to be read in
the _Spenersche Zeitung_, with which he had exceptionally intimate
relations: “A Berlin correspondent of the _Pester Lloyd_, recalling
the circumstance that the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, which
is regarded as a semi-official organ, received some sharply worded
_démentis_ during the summer of the present year, draws attention
to the fact that for a short time past the journal in question has
again come to be considered as official in the highest sense. The
correspondent writes that, ‘Since Professor Aegidi, who is at the same
time one of the most eminent and respected of German professors of law
and a spirited publicist, has been in charge of the press department
of the Foreign Office, much more attention has again been paid to the
newspapers. He has taken care, in particular, to maintain a certain
continuity of views in the official press. The _Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung_ has again become the principal official organ, and since the
1st of December all the leading articles published under the heading
“Political News of the Day,” dealing with foreign affairs, the affairs
of the Empire, the relations of the Federal States to the President of
the Council, as well as those on Church and State, may be considered
as the direct expression of the views held by the highest officials of
the Empire.’ The correspondent states he is informed, on trustworthy
authority, that for the most part Professor Aegidi himself edits the
‘Political News of the Day,’ utilising for the purpose the information
which he receives direct from the Chancellor.”
The Chief was beside himself at this article. Aegidi was summoned
before him, and returned--as a gentleman in the Central Bureau
remarked--looking quite crestfallen and red in the face. He denied
that he had prompted the communication in the _Pester Lloyd_. We soon
ascertained, however, that it had emanated from one Julius L., a writer
of the lowest rank and the most unenviable reputation, who had formerly
served Keudell, and was now intimately associated with Aegidi.
I ought, perhaps, to have now tendered my resignation. Certain
considerations, however, prevented my doing so for some time. There
was still something for me to learn, and I soon observed that I could
yet do good service. It was also conceivable that my old relations
with the Prince might be restored, as a man of Aegidi’s character,
with his self-seeking, mercurial exuberance of zeal, and his almost
Jewish vanity, would sooner or later render himself impossible. I
therefore remained, and fell in with the wish of the Councillor to
“enter into friendly relations with him,” so far as that was possible.
Subsequently, however, when he attempted to give me instructions, as
a kind of superior, I once and for all entered an energetic protest
against such presumption, and declared that I could only carry out
such instructions as he could assure me were the direct expression
of the Chief’s desire, thus taking up a position towards him, not of
subordination, but of equality. I did well in deciding to remain yet
a while. I learnt a great deal more, as I still had access to the
documents received and despatched, and became more and more intimate
with Bucher. The hoped-for opportunities of serving the Chief at the
same time as the representative of Keudell’s interests, and without his
knowledge, occurred more frequently than I had expected, although my
personal intercourse with the Chief was not renewed for the time being.