[_The witness Neubacher took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

HERMANN NEUBACHER (Witness): Hermann Neubacher.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, what was your position before the war and during

the war?

NEUBACHER: For 5 years during the war I was abroad on diplomatic

missions. Before the war I was Mayor of the City of Vienna.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?

NEUBACHER: I do.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How long have you known him?

NEUBACHER: I met Kaltenbrunner for the first time in Austria in 1934 in

connection with the so-called appeasement action of the engineer

Reinthaller in Austria. Later I saw him again, after the Anschluss.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In the year 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the

RSHA. Are you acquainted with that fact?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I am.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether Kaltenbrunner was glad to take this

position?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner told me, I believe at the end of 1943, that he

did not wish to take that position, that he had declined three times but

then had received a military order to accept. He added that he had

requested and had been given a promise to be relieved of this office

after the war.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you made any observations from which may be deduced

how the defendant looked upon his task as Chief of the RSHA?

NEUBACHER: I had a number of conversations with Kaltenbrunner during my

official visits to the Main Office from time to time, but they all dealt

with foreign intelligence and foreign policy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The RSHA was in control of the Gestapo; are you familiar

with that fact?

NEUBACHER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: According to your knowledge of the defendant’s character

can you tell whether he had the prerequisites and the qualifications

necessary for the taking over of the police executive?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner, as far as I was acquainted with him, had no

knowledge of police work when he assumed his office. Besides, in the

year 1941 he wanted to abandon his police career.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What proofs do you have for this?

NEUBACHER: At that time I was a special representative for economic

questions in Romania. Kaltenbrunner told me that he did not like a

police career, that he did not understand anything about police work and

furthermore, had no interest for it. He was interested, however, in

foreign political affairs.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is really evidence which

ought to be given. It cannot affect his official position, the fact he

did not like it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner was called the successor of Heydrich. Does

this apply to him in the full sense of the word?

NEUBACHER: It cannot, and that I know because...

THE PRESIDENT: That’s a matter of argument. This witness’ opinion cannot

affect the position of Kaltenbrunner. This witness cannot testify

whether he was called a successor to Heydrich or another Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution speak in a disdainful way that

Kaltenbrunner was the successor of the ill-famed Heydrich. This witness

knows them both, therefore I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already admitted that he was the

successor of Heydrich. You may ask him if he was another Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please, will you tell whether he was called a second

Heydrich?

NEUBACHER: Himmler himself used this expression...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal feels that that is incompetent.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I understand. I now come to the next question:

Is there anything to show just why Himmler selected the Defendant

Kaltenbrunner?

NEUBACHER: From remarks which Himmler made to me...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the witness can give any

evidence as to what Himmler thought. Himmler appointed him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness, so far as I am told, will report something

from a conversation with Himmler, which clearly shows that Himmler

selected Kaltenbrunner, and no one else, because he did not fear

Kaltenbrunner in any way. The Prosecution contend exactly the opposite.

He therefore knows that the Prosecution’s contention is entirely

incorrect.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you can ask what Himmler said about

the appointment, if he said anything to this witness. You can ask him

what did Himmler say about the appointment to Kaltenbrunner.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please begin, Witness.

NEUBACHER: During the course of a conversation with Himmler when I was

at his office at headquarters to look at the death mask of Heydrich,

Himmler said to me that he had suffered an irreparable loss by the death

of this man. After Heydrich, there was not a single person who could any

longer direct this gigantic office. That could only be done by the man

who had built it up. Upon my question, “What about Kaltenbrunner?”

Himmler said as follows:

“Of course as an Austrian you are interested in that matter.

Kaltenbrunner will have to become familiar with the work. He is

now fully occupied with matters of interest to you, with foreign

intelligence.”

These were the remarks of Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you have any knowledge of the fact that soon after he

assumed office in the year of 1943, Kaltenbrunner assiduously tried to

establish contact abroad, because he considered the military situation

at that time as hopeless?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner was, as I know from many conversations, always

striving for a so-called “talk with the enemy.” He was convinced that we

could not come out of this war favorably without the use of some

large-scale diplomacy. I did not discuss further details with him

concerning the war. In Germany everyone was sentenced to death who, even

to one other person, expressed a doubt about the victory of Germany.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner support you in your efforts to mitigate

as much as possible the terror policy in Serbia?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I owe much to Kaltenbrunner’s support in this respect.

The German police offices in Serbia knew, through me and through

Kaltenbrunner, that the latter, as Chief of the Foreign Intelligence

Service, wholeheartedly supported my policy in the southeast area. I

succeeded therefore in making my influence felt in the police offices,

and the support from Kaltenbrunner was valuable to me in my endeavors to

overthrow, with the help of sensible officers, the former system of

collective responsibility and reprisals.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the basic attitude of Kaltenbrunner towards

the Jewish question?

NEUBACHER: Once, I spoke very briefly with Kaltenbrunner about this

subject. When rumors of a systematic action swelled up I asked

Kaltenbrunner, “Is there any truth in this?” Kaltenbrunner briefly told

me that that was a special action which was not under his command. He

kept aloof from the action, as far as I could observe, and later—I

believe it was at the beginning or the end of 1944—he told me briefly,

that a new course had been adopted in the treatment of the Jews. His

voice sounded the pride of his success.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner is characterized as “hungry for power.” Do

you know what kind of a life he led?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner led a simple life. He never acquired a

fortune...

THE PRESIDENT. The Prosecution has not called him “hungry for power.”

There is no charge against him as being “hungry for power.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: Hungry for power and cruel. Both of these words were

expressly used.

THE PRESIDENT: But being “hungry for power” or “cruel” is quite

different.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I am just asking about the first term.

THE PRESIDENT: I was just wondering where these terms were used.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Indictment contains both these terms: “hungry for

power” and “cruel”.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It certainly is not in the Indictment. We

find no allegation in the Indictment which reads “hungry for power and

cruel,” and we do not recollect any mention being made in the statement

in the Prosecution’s case.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But I would not have had notes taken on it otherwise. In

the Indictment there is a page with the heading “Summary and

Conclusion.” I am referring to the last paragraph, where it says:

“As all other Nazis, Kaltenbrunner was hungry for power. In

order to assure himself of power he signed his name in blood—a

name which will remain in memory as a symbol for cruelty,

for...”

THE PRESIDENT: Where are you reading from? What are you reading from?

DR. KAUFFMANN: From the Indictment, on the last page, under the heading

“Summary and Conclusion.”

MR. DODD: I think I can clarify the matter. It is rather clear that the

counsel is reading from my trial brief. The trial brief was never

offered in evidence in court, but it was handed to the counsel.

DR. KAUFFMANN: If that will not be maintained I do not need to ask any

questions on that point.

I now come to the next question. Do you know, Witness, whether

Kaltenbrunner gave an order for the evacuation of concentration camps?

NEUBACHER: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner, from your experience and observations,

do everything as chief of this office to mitigate inhuman measures or

prevent their application?

NEUBACHER: I must call your attention to the fact that I was abroad for

5 years and could little observe what was happening within Germany. As I

have come to know Kaltenbrunner, I do not doubt that he gave way to the

illusion that he was able to influence the course of events. He was in

no way capable of doing so.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thus, I come to the last question:

Do you know of a case where he used his power against a measure of the

Police to liberate two church dignitaries of the Orthodox Church in

Serbia?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I am familiar with that. These two church dignitaries...

THE PRESIDENT: How is this relevant to Kaltenbrunner?

DR. KAUFFMANN: He is accused of having persecuted the churches

throughout his whole policy. The Prosecution expressly accuse

Kaltenbrunner of persecuting churches, with the annihilation of

Christianity as his objective; this I can say with assurance is

contained in the records; and it is to this that my question refers.

THE PRESIDENT: The answer to it cannot answer any charge against

Kaltenbrunner, can it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: If a defendant tried to exterminate churches, then he

would not take a measure exactly opposite to that policy. The witness

will be able to attest to this fact.

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to churches or with reference to

individual people?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Individual people as representatives of the church of

course. I do not believe you can separate the two.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the question is incompetent.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. Then I have concluded my examining of the

witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

[_The witness Neubacher resumed the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Kauffmann?

DR. KAUFFMANN: My examination of this witness is finished.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Defense want to ask

questions?

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have some questions to put which are, of

course, not in any way connected with Kaltenbrunner, but which refer to

subjects which will have to be dealt with later during the case of the

Defendant Funk. Since the witness can be called only once, however, I

have no other choice than to put to the witness now these questions,

which really ought to be put later.

Witness, you said today that the German Foreign Service had sent you to

Romania—I believe—on questions of economy. Is it correct that during

the time you were working in Romania, you were also representing and

handling economic interests in Greece?

NEUBACHER: In the autumn of 1942, notwithstanding my assignment in

Romania, I received a special assignment, together with an Italian

financial expert, Minister D’Agostino, to prevent by proper methods the

total devaluation of currency and the total disruption of the economic

structure in Greece.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you suited for such a difficult task by

training and previous experience? Please tell us briefly, which posts

you held before, so that we can judge whether you were capable of

carrying out this task in Greece; but please, Witness, be very brief.

NEUBACHER: I was one of the foremost economic leaders in Austria. At the

age of 28 I was a director; at 30 I was the general manager of the

Viennese Settlement Corporation; and at the age of 33 I was directing a

large combine in the building trade and building material industry. I

was an executive of the Austrian National Bank and a member of the

Austrian Customs Auxiliary Council. I was a member of the Russian Credit

Committee of the City of Vienna and a member of the Commission of

Experts for the investigation of the collapse of the Austrian Credit

Bank Corporation. Therefore, I was qualified for this task by extensive

economic experience.

Moreover, I was quite familiar with the economic problems of the

Balkans, since I had last worked on economic questions relating to the

Balkans in the central finance administration of I. G. Farben in Berlin.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, several days ago when I visited you in prison, I

gave you a report of a commission of the Royal Greek Government,

addressed to the International Military Tribunal, and I asked you to

read it and state your opinion. Is this report correct?

Mr. President, it is Exhibit USSR-379, and it has the additional

Document Number UK-82.

Witness, in this report of the commission the matter is presented as if

the economy of Greece had been entirely destroyed by German authorities

and that Greece had been plundered, _et cetera_. In the end this

reflects on the Defendant Funk. Please do not go into detail, but tell

us briefly what is your impression in this connection.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to make the following

statement before the Tribunal: In regard to the report of the Greek

Government, which was presented before the Tribunal by the Soviet

Prosecution as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it seems to me

that the question of the Defense Counsel, asking the witness to give his

opinion on this particular matter, should be rejected because the

witness is not competent to give an opinion on the report of the Greek

Government. The Defense Counsel can ask him a concrete question in

regard to any particular fact, but that is all.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if it is desired, I can, of course, put the

questions individually. It will probably take a little longer, but if

the Soviet Russian Prosecution so desires I agree. May I now question

the witness? Witness, is it correct...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Dr. Sauter, what exactly is it that you

want to ask the witness about this report?

DR. SAUTER: The report of the Greek Government, which has been submitted

by the Russian Prosecution, states, for instance, that Germany in its

occupation of Greece plundered the country and brought about a famine by

exporting an excessive amount of goods. It states that the country was

charged excessive occupation costs, and that the country was heavily

prejudiced by the clearing system, _et cetera_. Through this witness,

who as the economic expert of the German Foreign Office handled these

problems in Greece at that time, I propose to prove: First, that these

statements are untrue; second, that this state of affairs prevailed

already when the German troops marched in and was not created by the

German authorities; and, last, that it was the Defendant Funk who tried

repeatedly to improve matters for Greece through the clearing system and

had considerable amounts of gold brought to Greece.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, can’t you put a few short questions to show that

the scheme which this witness introduced into Greece was in accordance

with international law and was not unfair to Greece? If you could do

that, that would meet the case, wouldn’t it?

DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is what I wanted to do, and I am sure that the

witness would have done so on his own initiative.

Now, then, Witness, are you acquainted with the viewpoint of the German

economic authorities, and particularly of the Defendant Funk, in regard

to the question of the clearing of debts incurred by Greece and the

question of how Greece was to be treated with regard to this clearing

system?

NEUBACHER: Concerning the mutual financial charges and obligations, I

spoke at one time to the Reich Finance Minister, Schwerin Von Krosigk,

and it was proposed that at some later date after the war the claims and

counter-claims were to be settled on the basis of a common denominator.

DR. SAUTER: And at that time, during the war, how was the question of

this clearing dealt with?

NEUBACHER: Regarding the economic events in Greece, I can give you

information based on my own observations only, starting with October

1942. At that time, when I first came to Athens, the Greek currency had

already been considerably devaluated, and the circulation of banknotes

had increased by something like 3,000 percent.

Greece also suffered an economic set-back due to the fact that, in

addition to a progressing inflation, an attempt had been made to

introduce in Greece a planned economy with ceiling prices along German

lines. The result was, of course, that the merchants selling Greek goods

suffered losses when they were paid later. On the other hand, when I

arrived there the importers of German goods made tremendous profits,

because they paid Reichsmark at the rate of 60 on the clearing and

resold the goods at a rate of about 30,000. This chaos, due to the

inflation in connection with the attempt of introducing a planned

economy on the German pattern, could be remedied only by transforming

the black market in Greece into a completely free market. The two

experts of the Axis Powers introduced this measure with considerable

success at the end of October 1942. Within a few weeks all shops and

markets were full of goods and foodstuffs; the prices of food dropped to

one-fifth and prices of manufactured products to one-tenth. This success

could be maintained for 4 months in spite of increasing inflation.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Neubacher, is it true that the Defendant Funk, who was

Reich Minister of Economy at that time, proposed during a conversation

or in correspondence he had had with you that, in spite of the shortage

of goods prevailing in Germany, a considerable amount of goods should be

sent from Germany and other European countries, particularly to Greece?

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk, with whom I discussed the difficulties

of my task, and I both fully agreed that a maximum of goods should be

transported to Greece, and certainly not only food. I secured not only

60,000 tons of food at that time but also German export goods, since it

was hopeless to try to stop an inflation or the effects of an inflation

on the prices, if there were no supplies. Reich Minister Funk supported

exports to Greece with the view to a restoration of normal market

conditions with every means at his disposal.

DR. SAUTER: You know, Witness, that since transport from Germany to

Greece had become impossible, the Defendant Funk made every effort to

have goods transported on neutral ships, furnished with British

navicerts, from Germany to Greece in order to combat as far as possible

the already impending famine.

NEUBACHER: I think that was between 1941 and 1942 when I had not yet

arrived in Greece. In 1943, when shipping in Greek waters had completely

stopped for us, because all ships had been torpedoed and the railroads

had become the object of incessant acts of sabotage and dynamiting, I,

with the help of the Swedish Minister, Alar, who directed the

International Relief for Greece, applied for British navicerts for food

transports to Greece. The British granted this application, and when our

own means of transport had ceased to exist, the Swedish boat _Halaren_

went from Trieste or Venice to the Piraeus once a month, loaded with

German food supplies for Greece.

DR. SAUTER: And Funk, the Reich Minister of Economy at that time, played

an important part in these actions, did he not?

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister of Economy Funk took a very positive interest

in the Greek question, a question which is unique in the history of

economy, and he supported me in my efforts with every means at his

disposal.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that the

Defendant Funk advocated in particular that the occupation costs should

be kept as low as possible, and that he took the view that it would be

preferable that a considerable part of the occupation costs should

rather be charged to the German account so that Greece should not be

overburdened? What do you know about that?

NEUBACHER: I know too little of the details of what happened in Berlin;

but at long intervals I reported to Reich Minister Funk about the

situation in Greece, and I know that he made my reports the basis for

his own interventions. He was perfectly aware of the fact that the Greek

economic problem during the war and within the blockade was so

infinitely complicated that all efforts had to be made to prevent a

complete dissolution of the monetary value and the economic structure;

and he intervened at all times in that respect.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Defendant Funk act in such a way that the Greek

currency, drachma currency, was devaluated, or that it deteriorated? Or

did he, on the contrary, endeavor to back the drachma value,

particularly for the purpose of preventing a catastrophic famine? Please

state briefly what you know about that.

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk always made every effort in the latter

direction. He proved that by enforcing exports to Greece and finally by

the grant of a considerable amount of gold for the purpose of slowing

down the Greek inflation—which grant, in accordance with the Four Year

Plan, involved the gravest sacrifice for Germany.

DR. SALTER: You say “a considerable amount of gold.” There was very

little gold in Germany during the war. Can you tell us how large the

amount of gold was which the Defendant Funk sent to Greece at that time

for the purpose of backing the drachma to some extent and preventing the

impending catastrophe? How large was the amount?

NEUBACHER: All told, one and one third million pounds sterling were

invested in Greece and Albania, to my recollection.

DR. SAUTER: One and one third million pounds sterling?

NEUBACHER: Greece and Albania got that amount.

DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I have a last question. Is it correct that

all these efforts on the part of the German economic management and the

German Minister of Economy were often frustrated and foiled,

particularly by Greek merchants? To quote just one example, there were

cases where German factories sold German engines for 60 drachmas to

Greek merchants—that is to say, 60 drachmas which had actually no

value—and the Greek merchant sold these same engines which they had

bought for 60 drachmas from Germans to the German Armed Forces at 60,000

drachmas apiece. These are supposed to be cases which you discovered and

on which you reported to the Defendant Funk, and that is why I am asking

you whether that is true.

NEUBACHER: I have the following comment to make about that. It did, in

fact, happen, but I want to state that the Greek businessmen had to do

that in consequence of inflation and the black market. The Greek people

are much too intelligent to be caught up in an inflation. Every child

there is a businessman. Therefore, the only possible method for

counteracting this obvious speculation, which in itself is not

dishonest, was that of converting the black market into a totally free

market on sound business lines; and that was the end of these

experiments.

DR. SAUTER: This transformation of the black market into a free market,

a problem which also played an important part in France, was brought

about by your activity in agreement with the Defendant Funk?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I introduced this measure together with my Italian

colleague D’Agostino at the end of October 1942.

DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, Witness.

Mr. President, I have no further questions.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, Members of the Military Tribunal, for

your information I am going to examine the witness on the question of

the Anschluss.

Witness, you have described to the Tribunal your economic activities.

Were you not active politically as well?

NEUBACHER: I was politically active as the chairman of the Austro-German

People’s Union.

DR. STEINBAUER: What were the aims of that Austro-German People’s Union?

NEUBACHER: The Austro-German People’s Union was an organization which

stood above parties and religious denominations, and which, in a

one-sided manner, aimed at revising the Anschluss prohibition in the

peace treaties by solving the question of the Austro-German Anschluss

peacefully through plebiscite. In the executive committee of this

Austro-German People’s Union, all parties were officially represented

with the exception of the National Socialist and Communist Parties. The

German organization of the same name was under the leadership of the

Social Democratic President of the German Reichstag, Paul Loebe.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have here a list of the executive committee

which is dated 1926. You appear as chairman and Staatsrat Paul Speiser

as deputy. Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is named as treasurer, and then

there is Dr. Benedikt Kautsky, one Georg Stern, Hofrat and President of

the Banks’ Association, and a certain Dr. Stolper. Is that correct?

NEUBACHER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Why did all these members who represented different

party lines and religious denominations strive toward the Anschluss at

that time?

NEUBACHER: After the conclusion of the Treaties of Versailles and St.

Germain, a movement on the broadest basis started in Austria for the

union of this country, which was suffering from severe economic

depression, with Germany. Men from all parties and all religions joined

this movement, as you can see from the names which you, Herr Doctor,

have just mentioned.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know by which way and under what conditions this

was intended in 1918, especially with regard to the position of Vienna

as capital of the Reich and seat of the Court?

NEUBACHER: There were no clear ideas about the technical form of such a

distant goal; but every Austrian, on the basis of a historically

well-founded pride, was agreed that the city of Vienna should rank as

the second capital of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry. The Tribunal isn’t really concerned with

whether or not any Anschluss was desirable, or whether it was just or

not. The Tribunal is concerned with whether it was obtained by violence

and force. Most of this evidence does not seem to be relevant at all.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, unfortunately I must say that my opinion

differs from that of the Tribunal, because I believe—and that applies

not only to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, but also to the other

defendants who participated in the Anschluss, namely, Göring,

Ribbentrop, Papen, Neurath—that it is important to know the economic,

political, and cultural auspices and the political situation of Austria

at the time when these men were striving toward an Anschluss. Therefore,

I am of the opinion that it is important to ascertain just what the

general attitude was. I have taken the liberty of including in my

document book a short historical report to clarify the various views.

Witness, then, in 1938 you became Mayor of the City of Vienna?

NEUBACHER: That was after the Anschluss.

DR. STEINBAUER: At the same time, Seyss-Inquart was Reichsstatthalter

for the Gau of Vienna, or rather the State of Austria; is that correct?

NEUBACHER: I became Mayor of Vienna under Seyss-Inquart on the morning

of 13 March 1938, when he was still Austrian Federal Chancellor. At that

time Seyss-Inquart was Federal Chancellor of Austria.

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. How long did you remain in office as Mayor of

the City of Vienna?

NEUBACHER: According to the Austrian Law, until February 1939. Then

Bürckel became Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, and thereby

automatically supreme head of the communal administration. Thus...

DR. STEINBAUER: That is enough. Thank you. And what was the relationship

between Seyss-Inquart on the one hand and the Commissioner for the

Reichsvereinigung, Bürckel, on the other hand?

NEUBACHER: The relations were notoriously bad. Bürckel disregarded the

authority of the Reichsstatthalter, Seyss-Inquart. He ruled over his

head, and he tried by every method of slander, intrigue, and provocation

to overthrow Seyss-Inquart and remove him from office. And he succeeded.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to question?

COL. AMEN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: No questions?

COL. AMEN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: There are still six interrogatories outstanding. I hope

that I will be permitted to submit them as soon as they are received;

and may I also reserve for myself the right, in connection with the

application I made 2 days ago, to apply for some one of the witnesses in

writing, that is, witnesses from among those who appear in the

affidavits submitted by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean you want to cross-examine somebody from whom the

Prosecution has submitted an affidavit?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of affidavits which have already been

put in?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am speaking of the affidavits which were submitted for

the first time 2 days ago.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks you should make up your mind

very soon as to whether you want to cross-examine those persons.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Certainly. I intended to put that application to you, but

the Tribunal told me to make that application in writing.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Apart from that, I have finished my case for today.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we understood that Dr. Dix wanted to have the

question of his documents settled on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

Did you anticipate that that would take long?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I might just consult Mr. Dodd—I don’t think

it will, but I would just like to verify that, if Your Lordship will

allow.

THE PRESIDENT: What does Dr. Dix say?

DR. DIX: I do not think it will take long, perhaps a quarter of an hour.

However, I shall have to reply to the Prosecution, and therefore the

length of my reply depends upon the length of the statement made by the

Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, there would seem to be some advantages in

taking it now, because otherwise we have got to stop at some particular

time, and we shan’t know how long it is going to take. If we take it

now, it does not so much matter, and then we could go on with Dr. Thoma

afterwards.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, my friend Mr. Dodd

thinks it will take about a half hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Thoma, you have no objection to that, have

you?

DR. THOMA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have before me an index which is submitted by

Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

First, I assume that I should proceed by taking up the exhibits to which

we have objected.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not sure that I have that index before me. Have

you got a copy of it we could have?

MR. DODD: I have just the one copy, which was supplied to us by Dr. Dix.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it been supplied to the Tribunal?

MR. DODD: I don’t think so; I don’t know.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could indicate what the documents are without

our having them before us. Would you give the numbers when you indicate

the documents?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.

As to the first four documents, Number 1 is a book by Sir Nevile

Henderson, _Failure of a Mission_. Number 2 is also an excerpt from that

book; so is Number 3. We object to all of those on the ground that they

only represent the opinion of Sir Nevile Henderson; they do not recount

historical fact. Number 4 is an excerpt from a book written about Dr.

Schacht by a man by the name of Karl Bopp. We object to that on the same

ground; that it is the opinion of the author and not pertinent here.

Exhibit Number 5 is an excerpt from the book written by Mr. Sumner

Welles, _The Time for Decision_. Our objection to this excerpt is based

on the same grounds; it contains only an opinion of Mr. Welles and,

however valuable in some places, it is incompetent here.

Exhibit Number 6 is the book by Viscount Rothermere which was already

passed upon by the Tribunal with respect to the application of the

Defendant Göring. We renew the objection that was made at that time,

citing again that it is only the opinion of this gentleman and is of no

value before this Tribunal.

Exhibit Number 7 is the Messersmith affidavit, which was offered in

evidence by the Prosecution. We have no objection to that, of course.

Exhibit Number 8 is also a Prosecution exhibit. No objection.

Number 9, likewise.

Number 10 is an affidavit or declaration by the late Field Marshal Von

Blomberg, and we have no objection to that.

Passing on, we have no objection until we reach Exhibit Number 14,

Ambassador Dodd’s diary—and it is not really an objection there. We ask

that we be given the dates of the entries—they have not been given to

us thus far—or the pages from the diary from which it is intended to

quote.

We go on to Exhibit Number 18. The intervening exhibits, of course, we

have no objection to...

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I understand this is really a question of what

shall be translated, is it not?

MR. DODD: Yes. We are objecting now, because we want to save the labor

of the translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then you go on to 18.

MR. DODD: Yes. Number 18 consists of three parts: (a), (b), and (c).

They are statements of Paul Boncour, of Briand, and of Lord Cecil. They

are statements about Germany’s right to rearm. We object to them because

they are not statements made by officials of any of these

governments—of these two governments. No source is given in the excerpt

which is to be quoted, and it appears that they are nothing more than

opinions, given after these men had retired from office.

Passing on, then, we come to Exhibit Number 33. That is a speech by Dr.

Schacht in 1937. Our only question about it—we are not questioning at

all its relevancy, of course, but we would like to know whether or not

the original is available. We have not been able to find out yet.

Number 34 is a speech by Adolf Hitler. It is very brief, and I am rather

loath to make too much objection to it, except that I cannot see its

relevancy here. It does not seem to pertain to any of the issues that

have been raised in this place, and unless Dr. Dix has something in mind

that we have not been apprised of, we would object to it.

THE PRESIDENT: What does it deal with, Mr. Dodd?

MR. DODD: It deals with rearmament, generally; but it does not say

anything about Dr. Schacht or any of the allegations here. It seems to

be just a general statement about rearmament.

We have an objection to Exhibit Number 37. It is a letter from Dr.

Schacht to Mr. Leon Fraser. Our objection is that we would like to know

whether or not the original is available; and if it is—why, we would

have no objection.

Number 38 is a newspaper article from a newspaper in Zürich, Switzerland

about what Dr. Schacht’s thoughts were; and we object to that. The

author is unknown, to begin with. It is only a newspaper account and

seems to be immaterial and unimportant here.

Exhibit Number 39 is a letter written by one Richard Morton, addressed

to the Solicitor of the Treasury in Great Britain. It was forwarded here

to the General Secretary, I believe. In any event, we object to it on

the ground that it is not competent. It purports to tell what Morton

thought about Schacht and about some assistance that Morton received

from Schacht. We would suggest that if Dr. Schacht’s counsellor, Dr.

Dix, feels that Morton has really some pertinent and relevant testimony

to give here, it could be done by way of an interrogatory. He is in

London, and it would be, we submit, a more proper way to proceed, rather

than offering this letter, which was written without any direction or

basis.

Then we move down to Exhibit Number 49, being correspondence between the

publisher of Ambassador Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile Henderson. It is

reprinted in the volume containing Dodd’s diary. It is rather vague to

me just what the relevance of the entry is here, or how it could be

shown in that fashion.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it long?

MR. DODD: Not very long, no.

Now, I am a little bit confused about the last few exhibits, running

from 54 to 61. We are only informed that 54 is the record of Göring’s

testimony before this Tribunal, and so on—the record of so and so

before the Tribunal: three excerpts from Göring’s testimony and four

from the statements of Lt. Brady Bryson, made in connection with the

Prosecution’s presentation of the case against the Defendant Schacht. I,

of course, simply say that it is unnecessary to have these translated or

do anything more than refer to them. They are already in the record, and

I do not know just what Dr. Dix has in mind. I have no objection, of

course, to his reference to them or any other such use as he may

properly make.

THE PRESIDENT: Are those excerpts long?

MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know. It is just a matter of copying them over

again from the record. They are already in the record of this Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: You see, if Your Honor pleases, I do not have them before me.

That amounts to our view on the applications of Dr. Schacht’s counsel at

this time. If there are any questions, I should be glad to answer them.

I have not gone into much detail here.

THE PRESIDENT: No, that is all right. Dr. Dix can answer now. Yes, Dr.

Dix.

DR. DIX: Concerning the objections raised to Numbers 1 to 6, I readily

admit to Mr. Dodd that these documents are matters of argument rather

than evidence. Schacht will argue the fact that prominent persons abroad

represented the same views which were the basis for his entire attitude,

including the question of rearmament. He will quote these opinions; and

I, too, in my final speech, shall refer to these passages for the

purpose of argument. If Mr. Dodd says, therefore, that this is not so

much evidence as it is argument, he is right. But, in my opinion we are

not now arguing the question of what is to be officially submitted as

evidence to the Tribunal according to procedure. We are merely

arguing—or rather we are discussing—whether these documents should be

translated, so that if Schacht quotes them during his examination, or if

I quote them during my speech, the Tribunal would be able to follow the

quotation easily. We have observed that the Tribunal—and this seems

fairly obvious—prefer the documents which are being quoted here to be

submitted in translation so that they can follow exactly. Therefore,

regarding Numbers 1 to 6—and, incidentally, the same applies to all the

documents contained in Exhibit Number 18—I am not attempting to have

them admitted in evidence: I am merely recommending that they be

translated in the interest of everyone concerned, so that in case they

are quoted the translation can be given to the Tribunal. It is merely a

question of being practical. This applies to 1 to 6 and all under 18.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, hasn’t the Tribunal already ruled that both the

document books of Viscount Rothermere and the speech or book by M. Paul

Boncour are not to be put in evidence and are not to be referred to?

DR. DIX: I only know of one ruling of the Tribunal to the effect that no

arguments regarding the justice or injustice of the Versailles Peace

Treaty will be admitted. We shall, of course, obey that ruling of the

Tribunal. But we will not quote these passages in order to discuss the

justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty. That is not Schacht’s

intention or mine. To cite an example:

The Prosecution considers that a certain attitude of Schacht’s proves

that by backing armament he supported and wanted aggression. He wants to

disprove this by referring to the fact that certain prominent foreigners

took the same view, and that these men could not possibly mean to

further German aggression by adopting that view. That is only one

example. But at any rate the purpose is not to give academic lectures on

the justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty—which I had not

intended in any event, since I feel that such arguments would find but

deaf ears. It is not my habit to use arguments which I believe will

receive no response. May I continue?

Concerning Number 18 may I—I beg to apologize. I have just heard Mr.

Dodd’s statements, and I must reply at once. I must first assemble the

material. I have noted down that under Number 18, which I have just

mentioned—and this also applies to Numbers 1 to 6—Mr. Dodd is missing

the sources. That may be due to the fact that he has had only the index

to the document. The sources and documents are quoted in the actual

quotations.

I now turn to Number 37. It is Schacht’s letter to a certain Fraser. I

understood Mr. Dodd to say that he was raising no objection but that he

merely wanted to know where the original document is located. It is a

letter from Schacht to Fraser, the late president of the First National

Bank. The original of that letter—if it still exists—would be among

the papers left by the deceased Mr. Fraser, to which I have no access,

nor has any one else.

One moment, Mr. President. Schacht tells me that he has only a copy

which bears his signature and, therefore, is a so-called auto-copy. This

auto-copy was deposited in Switzerland during the war because of its

contents. This auto-copy, signed personally by Schacht, is here, and the

copy in the document book has been taken from it. The fact that it is a

true copy has been certified by Professor Kraus, and I think that as far

as possible it has been adequately identified. So much for Number 37.

Then I have made a note regarding Number 34. Just one moment, please.

Number 34 is another case where the source was missing. The same applies

as above. The source is stated in the document book—namely, _Dokumente

der Deutschen Politik_. This compilation has been used a great deal as a

source of evidence. Then objections have been raised...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the objection to 34 was not that the original

was not available, but it was a speech by Hitler which was about

rearmament and did not seem to be relevant.

DR. DIX: Yes, that is correct. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Mr. Dodd, of course, could not recognize the relevancy of the document.

Schacht could recognize it, since he alone knows his inner development.

This is a speech of Hitler’s in which there is a passage which confirmed

the slowly developing suspicion on Schacht’s part that this policy not

only would lead to a war of aggression, but that possibly Hitler

actually desired the war. This suspicion was particularly roused by this

passage in the speech made by Hitler in the Reichstag on 28 February

1938. This speech is an important milestone in presenting Schacht’s

inner attitude toward Hitler and his policy, beginning with Schacht’s

adherence in the year 1933 through the turning-point when distrust

started and developed into opposition, which was increased to continuous

preparations for revolt. For that reason, I believe it is relevant

evidence. That is Number 34.

Then there is Number 38. That is the article from the _Basler

Nachrichten_. In my opinion it is evidence of the greatest importance.

At any rate, I shall fight to my very last breath to have that document

admitted. Subject: Before the war—the fight against the war; during the

war—the fight and the attempts to bring about an early peace, the fight

against the spreading of the war.

In 1941—that is to say, before Russia’s entry into the war and before

the entry of the United States into this war—Schacht had a conversation

with a political economist from the United States, which he did not

recollect until an acquaintance sent him the article which had appeared

in the _Basler Nachrichten_ of 14 January 1946. He said, “Of course, now

I remember. Four years ago, in the spring of 1941, I had this

conversation with an American political economist.” The name, he has

still forgotten. This conversation shows once more the efforts he made

as late as 1941 to tie threads and get contacts to prevent any spreading

of the war, particularly by opening _pourparlers_ with the United States

and the men around President Roosevelt.

We have no other evidence to prove the fact that this conversation took

place, since we cannot call upon this professor, because Schacht has

forgotten his name. But it is the professor himself who is anonymously

speaking in this newspaper edition of 14 January 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, what is the nature of the conversation which you

say is reported in this newspaper?

DR. DIX: It is a fairly long article. Perhaps I may pick out a few

points so that the Tribunal can understand the nature of the

conversation. The professor relates in this interview that at that time

Schacht took an extremely critical attitude toward the National

Socialist system of government; that he had pointed out the dangers of

maintaining such a system because this would lead to a complete

mortification of intellectual activities. Thereupon, he goes on further

to tell the professor that this war was entirely senseless, and that,

when considered from a higher level, it would be senseless and futile

even for a victorious Germany. He explained to the professor that every

means should be employed to stop the war, because in an orderly

world—in a world put in order by a just peace—the governments would

automatically become liberal. In the end he suggests, therefore, that an

attempt should be made at all costs to establish contact between the

nations, particularly with representative men from the United States,

before Russia and America entered the war.

He goes on to regret that Roosevelt—I beg your pardon—he goes on to

name Roosevelt—and his friends—as the very man who could carry out the

great task of helping to contrive such a meeting artfully and carefully.

It is an attempt, Your Lordship, similar to the one which appears in the

letter to Fraser, which I quoted before. Fraser, too, belonged to the

closer—at any rate, let us say to these people who had access to

President Roosevelt. It is the last desperate effort, relying on the

confidence Roosevelt had in him personally, to contribute his part to

bring about peace before it was too late.

Such an attitude is, of course, of extraordinary relevancy in rebutting

the charge of aggression, and that is why I think that the Tribunal

should under any circumstances admit this article as evidence. We

cannot, after all, assume that this professor is not telling the truth.

Technically, it might be possible to try to discover his name from the

_Basler Nachrichten_; but I am afraid that the _Basler Nachrichten_ will

not disclose the name without having made further enquiries from the

professor in America. It is questionable whether he will permit his name

to be disclosed, and we may have serious difficulties. Since personal

experience shows that the professor’s report in the _Basler Nachrichten_

is true, then why would he not speak the truth here? Moreover, he is a

respected man. That is why I think that this piece of evidence is

equivalent to a personal examination of the professor. Therefore, I urge

you to admit this document not only for translation but also in

evidence. That was Number 38.

As to Morton, I am perfectly agreeable to sending an interrogatory to

Morton; but I believe that this would be a superfluous effort. Actually,

I need this letter of Morton’s only to prove the fact that Lord Montagu

Norman, on his return from a BIZ meeting to England in 1939, told this

man Morton—who was a respected citizen of Frankfurt am Main, associated

with the Metallgesellschaft and later emigrated—that Schacht was in

considerable personal danger on account of his political attitude. That

is the main fact which I am to prove with this letter, and it is

contained in the letter. This letter was not written by Morton to me or

to Schacht. It is a letter which was addressed to the Solicitor of the

Treasury, and from there it was given to the Prosecution here, and the

Prosecution has been kind enough to inform us of the letter. We thought

it would be too much trouble to have Morton called as a witness. I am

perfectly willing to draft a questionnaire, but I think it would be a

more simple and just as reliable a method if the Tribunal permitted me

to quote two short passages from that letter. I am, however, equally

prepared to send an interrogatory to London. That is Number 39.

Regarding Number 49, this is correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson

and the editor of the diary of the late Ambassador Dodd. It is of the

greatest importance in establishing the reliability of the statements in

the Dodd diary, which not I but the Prosecution has quoted repeatedly to

the detriment of Schacht, as far as I can remember. In order to prevent

any misunderstanding, I should like to emphasize that we are far from

questioning the reliability of the late Ambassador Dodd. Both Dr.

Schacht and myself knew him personally, and we consider him to be an

absolutely honorable man. But the Tribunal know that this diary, which

was based on hasty notes made by the ambassador, was edited by his

children after his death. Therefore, it is possible that mistakes may

occur, bad mistakes. This becomes evident in the correspondence between

Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor of the diary, where Sir Nevile

Henderson points out that a conversation, or several

conversations—which according to the diary Dodd is supposed to have had

with him—were quoted quite wrongly. I believe there can be no better

proof of the unbiased unreliability of this diary—I repeat, only the

unbiased unreliability—than this correspondence between Sir Nevile

Henderson and the editor. Therefore, in order to test the credibility of

this evidence which was produced by the Prosecution, and to reduce its

value to the proper proportion, I ask to have this document admitted in

evidence.

Regarding Numbers 54 to 61, I do not intend in any way to introduce

evidence by means of these documents. It is perfectly agreeable to me if

they are not translated, but the thought I had in mind was merely that

of making the work of the Tribunal easier. I will examine Schacht with

reference to these passages of Göring’s testimony. If the Tribunal

believe that it is not necessary to have these excerpts available when

they are quoted or if it prefers to use the record only or have the

record which is here brought up for use, then of course it will not be

necessary to translate these passages. It is, therefore, merely a

question of what the Tribunal consider to be the most practical way. We

have made the excerpts, and if the Tribunal wish, they will be

translated.

Now there is left only the affidavits. Mr. Dodd did not mention them;

but I think at the time when Sir David and I discussed the witnesses and

affidavits here in court in open session the affidavits had already been

admitted by the Tribunal. Of course, reserving the right of the

Prosecution to ask counter questions or call the witnesses for

cross-examination after having read the documents, that is their

privilege. We have been satisfied with affidavits instead of the

personal appearance merely in order to save time; but if the Prosecution

wishes these witnesses, from whom we have affidavits, to appear, then,

of course, the Defense is perfectly agreeable to this.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents on behalf of

the Defendant Schacht.

The following documents will be translated:

Number 7, Number 8, Number 9, Number 14, Number 18, Number 33, Number

34, Number 37, Number 38, Number 39, and Number 49.

With reference to documents 54 to 61, which are already in the record,

they will not be translated, but Dr. Dix is requested to give references

to those documents in his document book.

Documents 1 to 6 will not be translated at all.

I meant that the documents which I have not alluded to will be

translated—the documents which I have not referred to specifically will

be translated.

Now, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, first of all I am submitting copies of the

documents which were granted me this morning and which are from

Rosenberg’s publications—_Tradition and Our Present Age_, _Writings and

Speeches_, _Blood and Honor_, _Formation of the Idea_, and _The Myth of

the 20th Century_—as evidence of the fact that the defendant did not

participate in a conspiracy against the peace and in the psychological

preparation for war. These excerpts contain speeches which the defendant

made before diplomats, before students, before jurists, and are meant to

prove that on these occasions he fought for social peace, and that, in

particular, he did not want the battle of ideologies to result in

foreign political enmity. In these speeches he advocated respect for all

races, spoke against the propaganda for leaving the church, advocated

freedom of conscience and a sensible solution of the Jewish problem,

even giving certain advantages to Jews. In particular, he called for

equality and justice in this matter. I ask the Tribunal to take official

notice of these speeches, and with the permission of the Tribunal I call

the Defendant Rosenberg to the witness stand.

[_The Defendant Rosenberg took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

ALFRED ROSENBERG (Defendant): Alfred Rosenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—to speak the pure truth—and withhold and add

nothing.

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. THOMA: Mr. Rosenberg, will you please give the Tribunal your

personal history.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you have not given your exhibits any exhibit

numbers, have you?

DR. THOMA: Yes, I have. That is Rosenberg-7(a).

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, they have all been numbered?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. When you refer to any of the documents, you

will give them their exhibit number.

DR. THOMA: Yes, indeed.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you give the Tribunal your personal

history...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute, Dr. Thoma. For the purposes of the

record, you see, which is contained in the transcript, I think you ought

to read out a list of the documents which you are putting in, stating

what the exhibit numbers are. Have you got a list there of the documents

you are going to offer in evidence?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you just read it into the record?

DR. THOMA: Exhibit Rosenberg-7, _The Myth of the 20th Century_.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-7(a), _Gestaltung der Idee_ (_Formation of the

Idea_); Rosenberg-7(b), Rosenberg, _Blut und Ehre_ (_Blood and Honor_);

Rosenberg-7(c), Rosenberg, _Tradition und Gegenwart_ (_Tradition and Our

Present Age_); Rosenberg-7(d), Rosenberg, _Schriften und Reden_

(_Writings and Speeches_); and Rosenberg-8, _Völkischer Beobachter_,

March and September 1933.

THE PRESIDENT: That one was excluded by the Tribunal. Numbers 7(e) and 8

were excluded.

DR. THOMA: I did not cite 7(e) but Rosenberg-8.

THE PRESIDENT: You cited 8, though.

DR. THOMA: Yes, I mentioned Rosenberg-8, and I beg to apologize.

THE PRESIDENT: Number 8 is excluded, too.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Mr. Rosenberg, please give the Tribunal

your personal history.

ROSENBERG: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Reval in Estonia. After

having graduated there from high school I began to study architecture in

the autumn of 1910 at the Institute of Technology at Riga. When the

German-Russian front lines approached in 1915, the Institute of

Technology, including the professors and students, was evacuated to

Moscow, and there I continued my studies in this capital of Russia. The

end of January or the beginning of February 1918 I finished my studies,

received a diploma as an engineer and architect, and returned to my

native city.

When the German troops entered Reval, I tried to enlist as a volunteer

in the German Army, but since I was a citizen of an occupied country, I

was not accepted without special recommendation. Since in the future I

did not want to live between the frontiers of several countries, I tried

to get to Germany.

To the Baltic Germans, notwithstanding their loyalty toward the Russian

State, German culture was their intellectual home, and the experience I

had had in Russia strengthened my resolution to do everything within my

power to help prevent the political movement in Germany from backsliding

into Bolshevism. I believed that this movement in Germany, because of

the precarious structure of the system of the German Reich, would have

meant a tremendous catastrophe. At the end of November 1918 I travelled

to Berlin and from there to Munich. Actually, I wanted to take up my

profession as an architect, but in Munich I met people who felt the way

I did, and I became a staff member of a weekly, which was founded at

that time in Munich. I went to work on this weekly paper in January 1918

and have continued in literary work since that time. I lived through the

development of the political movement here in Munich until the Räte

Republic in 1919 and its overthrow.

DR. THOMA: You just mentioned Germany as your intellectual home. Will

you tell the Tribunal by which studies and by which scientists you were

influenced in favor of the German mentality?

ROSENBERG: In addition to my immediate artistic interests in

architecture and painting, I had since childhood pursued historical and

philosophical studies and thus, of course, instinctively I tended to

read Goethe, Herder, and Fichte in order to develop intellectually along

these lines. At the same time, I was influenced by the social ideas of

Charles Dickens, Carlyle, and, with regard to America, by Emerson. I

continued these studies at Riga and, naturally, took up Kant and

Schopenhauer and, above all, devoted myself to the study of the

philosophy of India and related schools of thought. Later, of course, I

studied the prominent European historians of the history of

civilization; Burckhardt and Rohde, Ranke and Treitschke, Mommsen and

Schlieffen. Finally, in Munich I started to study modern biology more

closely.

DR. THOMA: You frequently mentioned in the course of your speeches “the

embodiment of the idea.” Was this due to Goethe’s influence?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is a matter of course that the idea, to see the world

as an embodiment, goes back to Goethe.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To Dr. Thoma._] The Tribunal, you see, want you to

confine yourself to his own philosophy and not to the origins of these

philosophies, insofar as you are referring to philosophical subjects at

all.

DR. THOMA: How did you come to the NSDAP and to Hitler in Munich?

ROSENBERG: In May 1919 the publisher of the journal which I mentioned

was visited by a man by the name of Anton Drexler, who introduced

himself as the chairman of a newly founded German Labor Party. He stated

that he advocated ideas similar to those expressed by this journal, and

from that time I began to have connections with a very small group of

German laborers which had been formed in Munich. There in the autumn of

1919 I also met Hitler.

DR. THOMA: When did you join Hitler?

ROSENBERG: Well, at that time I had an earnest conversation with Hitler,

and on that occasion I noticed his broad view of the entire European

situation.

He said that in his opinion Europe was at that time in a social and

political crisis, such as had not existed since the fall of the ancient

Roman Empire. He said that seats of unrest were to be found everywhere

in this sphere, and that he was personally striving to get a clear

picture from the viewpoint of Germany’s restoration to sound conditions.

Thereupon, I listened to some of the first speeches by Hitler which were

made at small meetings of 40 and 50 people. I believed, above all, a

soldier who had been at the front, and who had done his duty silently

for 4½ years, had the right to speak now.

At the end of 1919, I entered the Party—not before Hitler, as it is

contended here, but later. In this original Party I was assigned Number

625 as a member.

I did not participate in setting up the program. I was present, however,

when this program was read and commented upon by Hitler on 24 February

1920.

DR. THOMA: Then you gave a justification for the Party program and

probably wanted to solve the problems which referred to the social and

political crisis. How did you picture the solution?

ROSENBERG: In response to different inquiries regarding the 25 points of

the program, I wrote a commentary at the end of 1922, which has been

read to the Tribunal in fragments. Our general attitude at the time may

perhaps be stated briefly as follows:

The technical revolution of the 19th Century had certain social and

mental consequences. Industrialization and the clamor for profit

dominated life and created the industrial state and the metropolis with

all its backyards and estrangement from nature and history.

At the turn of the century, many people who wanted to regain their

homeland and its history turned against this one-sided movement. The

revival of tradition, folk song and folklore of the past, originated

with the youth movement of that time. The works of art, for instance, by

Professor Schultze-Naumburg and by some poets were a characteristic

protest against this one-sided movement of the time, and it is here that

National Socialism attempted to gain a foothold—in full consciousness

though, that it was a modern movement and not a movement of

retrospective sentimentality. It linked itself with the social movement

of Stöcker and the national movement of Schönerer in Austria without

using them in their entirety as a model.

I should like to add that the name “National Socialism,” I believe,

originated in the Sudetenland, and the small German Labor Party was

founded under the name of “National Socialist German Labor Party.”

If I may say so, what finally animated us in essence and the reason for

our calling ourselves National Socialists—for, you see, many terrible

things have been delivered during these 3 months by the Prosecution, but

nothing has been said about National Socialism—we were, at the time,

aware of the fact that there were two hostile camps in Germany, that in

both camps millions of decent Germans were fighting; and we found

ourselves facing the problem of what could be acceptable to both these

camps from the viewpoint of national unity and what was preventing an

understanding between these two camps. In short, at that time as well as

later we explained to the proletarian side, that even if the

class-conflict had been and still was a factor in social and political

life, nevertheless, as an ideological basis and permanent maxim it would

mean eternal disunity of the nation. The direction of a movement for

social appeasement or any kind of social conflict by an international

center was the second decisive obstacle to social reconciliation. The

call for social justice, raised generally by labor, was, however,

justified, worthy, and necessary. Concerning the bourgeoisie, we

believed we would be able to establish that in some cases the

reactionary caste prejudice of privileged circles had worked to the

detriment of the people and secondly that the representation of national

interests should not be based on privileges of certain classes; on the

contrary, the demand for national unity and dignified representation was

the right attitude on their part. From this resulted the ideas which

Hitler...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, would you try to confine the witness to the

charges which are against him? The charges against the defendants are

not that they attempted to reconstruct Germany, but that they used this

form of reconstruction with a view to attacking outside—races and

nations outside.

DR. THOMA: But, in my opinion, we have to devote some time to

Rosenberg’s train of thought to determine the motives for his actions;

but I will now ask him this:

Did you realize that these questions of socialism and the questions of

labor and capital were in truth international questions? And why did you

fight against democracy as a matter of international struggle?

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think this is a continuation of this same

line of examination, and I should like to say that no one in the

Prosecution has made any charge against this defendant for what he has

thought. I think we are all, as a matter of principle, opposed to

prosecuting any man for what he thinks. And I say with great respect

that I feel very confident that is the attitude of this Tribunal.

Therefore, we think it is entirely unnecessary to spell out whatever

thoughts this defendant had on these subjects, or on any other, for that

matter.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the defendant is also accused of fighting

democracy; and that is why I believe I should put this question to him.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the question?

DR. THOMA: Why he was fighting democracy—why National Socialism and he

himself fought against democracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that has got anything to do with this

case. The only question is whether he used National Socialism for the

purpose of conducting international offensives.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, National Socialism as a concept must be

dissected into its constituent parts. Since the Prosecution maintains

that National Socialism was a fight against democracy, a one-sided

stress on nationalism and militarism, he ought now to have the

opportunity to say why National Socialism supported militarism, and

whether that was actually the case. National Socialism must be analyzed

as a concept in order to determine its constituent parts.

THE PRESIDENT: What National Socialism was has already been shown to the

Tribunal, and he is not disputing the fact that there was a Führer

principle introduced into Germany. There is no question about that, why

it was introduced. If it was introduced for solely internal purposes

there would be no charge in respect of that. The only charges are that

National Socialism was used for the purpose of making aggressive war and

perpetrating the other crimes which we have heard of.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the charge of waging a war of aggression was

preferred because it was a war against democracy based on nationalism

and militarism.

THE PRESIDENT: Democracy outside Germany, not in Germany.

DR. THOMA: Then I should like to ask the defendant how he will answer

the charge that National Socialism preached a master race.

ROSENBERG: I know that this problem is the main point of the Indictment,

and I realize that at present, in view of the number of terrible

incidents, conclusions are automatically drawn about the past and the

reason for the origin of the so-called racial science. I believe,

however, that it is of decisive importance in judging this problem to

know exactly what we were concerned with.

I have never heard the word “master race” (“Herrenrasse”) as often as in

this court room. To my knowledge, I did not mention or use it at all in

my writings. I leafed through my _Writings and Speeches_ again and did

not find this word. I spoke only once of super humans as mentioned by

Homer, and I found a quotation from a British author, who in writing

about the life of Lord Kitchener said the Englishman who had conquered

the world had proved himself as a creative superman (Herrenmensch). Then

I found the word “master race” (“Herrenrasse”) in a writing of the

American ethnologist, Madison Grant, and of the French ethnologist,

Lapouge.

I would like to admit, however—and not only to admit, but to

emphasize—that the word “superman” (Herrenmensch) came to my attention

particularly during my activity as Minister in the East—and very

unpleasantly—when used by a number of leaders of the administration in

the East. Perhaps when we come to the question of the East, I may return

to this subject in detail and state what position I took in regard to

these utterances which came to my attention. In principle, however, I

was convinced that ethnology was, after all, not an invention of the

National Socialist movement, but a biological discovery, which was the

conclusion of 400 years of European research. The laws of heredity

discovered in the 1860’s, and rediscovered several decades later, enable

us to gain a deeper insight into history than many other earlier

theories. Accordingly, race...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant is going back now into the

origins of the views which he held. Surely, all we have got to consider

here is his statement in speeches and in documents and the use to which

he put those statements, not as to whether they were 400 years old, or

anything of that sort.

DR. THOMA: The defendant just spoke about the racial problem and I will

take the opportunity to speak on the so-called Jewish problem as the

starting point of this question. I would like to ask the defendant the

following question: How was it...

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, already my colleague, Mr. Dodd, pointed out

that the Prosecution has submitted to the defendant an accusation

stating in concrete terms his crimes: aggressive wars and atrocities. I

suppose that the most correct way of carrying on the interrogation of

his client on the part of Dr. Thoma would be to ask him questions

directly connected with the charges of the Prosecution. I do not suppose

that the Tribunal intend to listen to a lecture on the racial theories,

National Socialism, or other theories.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I shall deal with the individual questions

later; but, since the ideology and the philosophy of the Nazis has been

called criminal here, I think the Defendant Rosenberg should be given

some opportunity to state his views.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Of course, it would be better, and perhaps

more appropriate, Herr Rosenberg, if you were a little more brief in

some respects.

Now I would like to ask the following question: You believed that the

so-called Jewish problem in Europe could be solved if the last Jew left

the European continent. At that time you stated it was immaterial

whether such a program was realized in 5, 10, or 20 years. It was, after

all, merely a matter of transport facilities, and, at the time, you

thought it advisable to put this question before an international

committee. How and why did you arrive at this opinion? I mean to say,

how, in your opinion, would the departure of the last Jew from Europe

solve the problem?

ROSENBERG: In order to comply with the wish of the Tribunal, I do not

want to give a lengthy exposition of my views as evolved from my study

of history—I do not at all mean the study of anti-Semitic writings but

of Jewish historians themselves.

It seemed to me that after an epoch of generous emancipation in the

course of national movements of the 19th Century, an important part of

the Jewish nation also found its way back to its own tradition and

nature, and more and more consciously segregated itself from other

nations. It was a problem which was discussed at many international

congresses, and Buber in particular, one of the spiritual leaders of

European Jewry, declared that the Jews should return to the soil of

Asia, for only there could the roots of Jewish blood and Jewish national

character be found.

But my more radical attitude in the political sphere was due partly to

my observations and experiences in Russia and partly to my experiences

later in Germany, which seemed to particularly confirm their

strangeness. I could not conceive how, at the time when the German

soldiers returned, they were greeted by a Jewish university professor

who explained that the German soldiers had died on the field of

dishonor. I could not understand that lack of reverence could go so far.

If it had been but an individual reaction, one could have said that the

man had slipped. But in the course of 14 years, it became apparent that

it was indeed the expression of a definitely alienating tendency.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I believe we should also discuss the fact

that opposition was partly due to the contradiction provoked by certain

National Socialist newspaper articles.

ROSENBERG: The statements of the opposite side, as they appeared

constantly during these 14 years, had in part already appeared prior to

the rise of the National Socialist movement. After all, the incidents of

the Räte Republic in Munich and in Hungary took place long before the

National Socialist movement was in a position to gain influence.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, what did you have to say to the fact that in

the first World War 12,000 Jewish soldiers died at the front?

ROSENBERG: Of course, I have always been conscious of the fact that many

Jewish-German citizens were assimilated into the German environment, and

that in the course of this development many tragic individual cases

appeared, and that these, of course, deserved consideration. On the

whole, however, this did not involve the entire social and political

movement, especially since the leading papers of the so-called

democratic parties recognized the increase of unemployment in Germany

and suggested that Germans should emigrate to the French colonies, to

the Argentine, and to China. Prominent Jewish people and the chairman of

the Democratic Party suggested three times quite openly that, in view of

the increase of unemployment, Germans should be deported to Africa and

Asia. After all, during those 14 years just as many Germans were

expelled from Poland as there were Jews in Germany, and the League of

Nations took no effective steps against this violation of the pact in

favor of the minorities.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the leader of the foreign policy

office of the Party. What was your function?

ROSENBERG: The Foreign Policy Office was founded in April 1933. After

its accession to power, many foreigners came to Germany in order to

obtain information about the origin and nature of the National Socialist

Party. In order to create an information center for the Party, the

Führer assigned me to direct this office. As I said, it was the task of

this office to receive foreigners who were interested in these problems,

to give them information, to refer them to the proper organizations of

the Party and the State, if they were interested in the labor front, the

youth problem, the winter aid work, and so forth. We were also

interested in working provisionally on certain initial suggestions made

to us in the field of foreign trade and, if they deserved support, in

transmitting them to those departments of the government particularly

concerned.

Furthermore, we studied the foreign press in order to have good archives

for future research work and to inform the Party leadership politically

by short excerpts from the foreign press. Among other things, I am

accused here of having written articles for the Hearst press. On

invitation by the Hearst combine, I wrote five or six articles in 1933

or 1934; but, after I had met Hearst once for about 20 minutes at

Nauheim, I did not see him or speak to him again. I heard only that the

Hearst combine did get into extraordinary difficulties because of the

favor shown me by publishing my impartial statements.

DR. THOMA: As the chief of the Foreign Policy Office did you at times

take official political steps?

ROSENBERG: In the documents presented here, Document Numbers 003-PS,

004-PS, and 007-PS, the activity of the Foreign Policy Office had been

discussed and submitted; and in regard to this activity I could give a

brief summary to the Tribunal and read from the documents.

DR. THOMA: But I would like you to tell us what steps you took as the

chief of the Foreign Policy Office to reach a positive agreement among

the European nations.

ROSENBERG: Adolf Hitler called a meeting at Bamberg, I believe in 1927,

at which he stated his foreign political conviction that at least some

nations could have no direct interest in the total extinction of central

Europe. By “some nations” he meant particularly England and Italy. After

that in wholehearted agreement with him, I tried to find a way to an

understanding by personal contacts I had made. Frequently, I had

conversations with British Air Force officers of the British Air Forces

General Staff. On their invitation I visited London in 1931, and at that

time had purely informal conversations with a number of British

personalities.

And when, in 1932, at a meeting of the Royal Academy of Rome, the topic

“Europe” was discussed, I was offered an opportunity to speak, and I

made a speech about this problem in which I explained that the

development of the last centuries had been determined mainly by four

nations and states—namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy. I

pointed out that, first of all, these four should define their vital

interests so that shoulder to shoulder they would defend the ancient and

venerable continent of Europe and its traditions. I believed that these

fourfold national roots of the rich European culture represented a

historical and political legacy. Excerpts of my speech were published,

and parts of it with approval have been translated for the Tribunal.

On the last day of the conference, the former British Ambassador to

Italy, Sir Rennell Rodd, came to me and told me that he had just left

Mussolini who had told him that I, Rosenberg, had spoken the most

important words of the conference.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, may I ask you, please, to be a little more

brief.

ROSENBERG: In May 1933 I was again in London, this time by Hitler’s

personal order; and I visited a number of British ministers, whose names

are not relevant here, and tried again to promote understanding for the

sudden and strange development in Germany. My reception was rather

reserved, and a number of incidents occurred which showed that the

sentiment was very repellent. But that did not prevent me from keeping

up these personal contacts and from inviting a great number of British

personalities to come to Germany later. It was not within the scope of

my assignment to do that.

THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you ask the defendant what the agreement[A] was

to be about? Why doesn’t he tell us what the agreement was to be about

instead of going on talking about an agreement in the abstract?

-----

[A] The President’s question is in response to the foregoing answer of

the Defendant Rosenberg, in which the interpreter said “to bring about

an agreement” instead of “to promote understanding”.

-----

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I asked the defendant that question because he

took steps to come to a positive understanding with England and worked

toward that goal. The defendant is accused...

THE PRESIDENT: But what was the understanding about?

DR. THOMA: We were concerned with the fact that the defendant went to

London in order to...

THE PRESIDENT: I want you to ask the defendant. I don’t want you to tell

me.

DR. THOMA: I have just asked him, Mr. President.

The defendant is accused of having participated in the Norwegian action,

in that he advocated the violation of Norwegian neutrality.

[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question. How did you meet

Quisling?

ROSENBERG: I met Quisling in the year 1933, when he visited me, and I

had a discussion of 20 minutes’ duration with him. Subsequently, an

assistant of mine, who was interested in Scandinavian culture and had

written books about it, corresponded with Quisling. It was all of 6

years before I saw Quisling again, and I did not intervene either in the

Norwegian political situation or in the Quisling movement until he

visited me in June of 1939, when the tension in Europe had increased,

and expressed his apprehensions about the situation in Norway in the

event of a conflict. He said it was to be feared that Norway would not

be able to remain neutral in such a case, and that his home country

might be occupied in the North by Soviet troops and in the South by the

troops of the Western powers, and that he viewed things with great

concern. My staff leader made a note of his apprehensions and then

reported them to Dr. Lammers, as it was his duty to do.

DR. THOMA: When was that?

ROSENBERG: That must have been in June 1939. Thereupon Quisling asked

one of my assistants to help to maintain German-Norwegian understanding

and especially to acquaint his Party with the organization and

propaganda of our Party movement.

Thereupon, in the beginning of August there were, I believe, 25

Norwegians in our training school in order to train for this propaganda

work and then to return home.

DR. THOMA: What were they trained in, and how?

ROSENBERG: I did not see them, nor did I speak to them individually.

They were taught how to carry on more effective propaganda, and how the

organization of the Party in this field had been built up in Germany. We

promised to assist them in this field.

Suddenly, after the outbreak of the war, or shortly before—I do not

remember exactly—Hagelin, an acquaintance of Quisling’s, came to me

with apprehensions similar to those expressed by Quisling. After the

outbreak of the war, this assistant of Quisling’s reported various

details about the activity of the Western Powers in Norway. Finally, in

December of 1939, Quisling came to Berlin with the declaration that, on

the basis of exact information, he knew that the Norwegian Government

was only seemingly neutral now, and that in reality it was practically

agreed that Norway should give up her neutrality. Quisling himself had

formerly been a Minister of War in Norway and therefore, he should have

had exact knowledge of these things.

In accordance with my duty as a German citizen, I recommended that the

Führer should hear Quisling. The Führer thereupon received Quisling

twice, and at the same time Quisling, with his assistant, Hagelin,

visited Navy headquarters and gave them identical information. I spoke

once to Raeder after that, and he also recommended to the Führer that he

listen to Quisling’s report.

DR. THOMA: Then you personally transmitted only those reports which

Quisling had given you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I would like to emphasize that although Quisling visited

me, I had not been engaged on this question—I had not been involved in

these political affairs for 6 years. Naturally, I had to consider it my

duty to forward to the Führer reports which, if correct, were a

tremendous military threat to Germany, and also to make notes of, and

report to the Führer, those things which Quisling told me

orally—namely, his plan to bring about a political change in Norway and

then to ask Germany for support. At this time—I do not know, this

development has been described in those documents produced by the

Prosecution in words which express it much more precisely than I could

summarize it here. In Document Number 004-PS, my staff leader made a

short summary of it about 1½ or 2 months after the Norwegian operation.

DR. THOMA: This document—I would like to call the attention of the

Tribunal particularly to this document—was compiled immediately after

the Norwegian operation while the impression of its success was still

fresh, and it describes the measures which were taken quite

unequivocally. It states clearly that Quisling was the instigator, that

he suddenly turned up at Lübeck and made reports, that he begged that

his people be trained further, and that he came back again and again and

always informed Rosenberg about the new developments in Norway.

THE PRESIDENT: What document are you referring to?

DR. THOMA: Document Number 004-PS, Exhibit GB-140. That is in Document