[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
N U R E M B E R G
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y
1 9 4 7
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME XI
O F F I C I A L T E X T
I N T H E
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
P R O C E E D I N G S
8 April 1946-17 April 1946
CONTENTS
One Hundred and Second Day, Monday, 8 April 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 35
One Hundred and Third Day, Tuesday, 9 April 1946,
Morning Session 73
Afternoon Session 107
One Hundred and Fourth Day, Wednesday, 10 April 1946,
Morning Session 152
Afternoon Session 190
One Hundred and Fifth Day, Thursday, 11 April 1946,
Morning Session 224
Afternoon Session 253
One Hundred and Sixth Day, Friday, 12 April 1946,
Morning Session 289
Afternoon Session 328
One Hundred and Seventh Day, Saturday, 13 April 1946,
Morning Session 365
One Hundred and Eighth Day, Monday, 15 April 1946,
Morning Session 396
Afternoon Session 428
One Hundred and Ninth Day, Tuesday, 16 April 1946,
Morning Session 460
Afternoon Session 491
One Hundred and Tenth Day, Wednesday, 17 April 1946,
Morning Session 525
Afternoon Session 568
ONE HUNDRED AND SECOND DAY
Monday, 8 April 1946
_Morning Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
I want to ask you some questions about the shooting of officers who
escaped from Sagan Camp. As I understand your evidence, very shortly
after the escape you had this interview with Hitler at which certainly
Himmler was present. That is right, isn’t it?
WILHELM KEITEL (Defendant): The day after the escape this conference
took place with the Führer and with Himmler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, you say that at that conference Hitler
said that the prisoners were not to be returned to the Wehrmacht but to
remain with the police. They were really your words. That is right,
isn’t it?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what you said. So that is what you say
took place. In your own mind you were satisfied when you left that
conference that these officers were going to be shot, were you not?
KEITEL: No, that I was not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you agree with this? You were
satisfied that there was a grave probability that these officers would
be shot?
KEITEL: As I rode home I had a subconscious concern about it. It was not
expressed at the conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you sent for General Von Graevenitz and
General Westhoff, did you not?
KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t know if you can remember, because
General Westhoff was a comparatively junior officer compared with
yourself, but he says that it was the first occasion on which you had
sent for him. Does your memory bear that out?
KEITEL: No, I did not call him. But he had been brought along to be
introduced to me. I did not know him. I had summoned only General Von
Graevenitz.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had never met him before? Do you agree that
you had never met General Westhoff before, since he had come into that
job?
KEITEL: I had never seen him before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what he said. Now you agree, as I
understand your evidence, that you were very excited and nervous?
KEITEL: Yes, I vented my disagreement and my excitement very strongly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that you agree with General Westhoff that you
said something to this effect, “Gentlemen, this is a bad business” or
“This is a very serious matter” or something of that kind?
KEITEL: Yes, I said, “That is an enormously serious matter.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff said, in the next
sentence, what you said was, “This morning Göring reproached me in the
presence of Himmler for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It
was unheard of.”
KEITEL: That must be a mistake on Westhoff’s part. It was a day later.
We were then at Berchtesgaden and Generals Von Graevenitz and Westhoff
called on me the next morning. And it must also be a mistake that I
mentioned the name of the Reich Marshal Göring in this connection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you were not very sure about that, were you,
as to whether or not Göring was present. You were not very sure, were
you?
KEITEL: I only became uncertain about it when in a preliminary
interrogation I was told that witnesses had stated that Göring was
present; thereupon I said it is not completely impossible but that I did
not recall it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, to put it quite right, when you were
interrogated, an American officer put exactly the sentence that I put to
you now. He put that sentence to you from General Westhoff’s statement.
Do you remember that he read what I have read to you now? “Gentlemen,
this is a bad business; this morning Göring reproached me in the
presence of Himmler for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It
was unheard of.” Do you remember the interrogator put that to you?
Didn’t he?
KEITEL: It was something like that at the preliminary interrogation, but
I said that I was not certain that Göring was present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was going to put exactly what you said—and
you listen carefully, and if you have any disagreement, tell the
Tribunal. You said, “I request that you interrogate Jodl about the whole
incident and the attitude which I displayed during the whole conference
in the presence of Göring, of whose presence during that conference I am
not absolutely certain, but Himmler was there.” That was your view when
you were interrogated on the 10th of November, wasn’t it? You said,
“...during the whole conference in the presence of Göring, of whose
presence I am not absolutely certain....” That was your view on the 10th
of November?
KEITEL: There must have been some misinterpretation in the minutes,
which I never read. I expressed my uncertainty about the presence of
Göring and in the same connection put the request to interrogate General
Jodl about it, since, in my opinion, I was not sure that Göring was not
present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that you did ask that General Jodl
should be interrogated?
KEITEL: I made that proposal, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, what do you complain about as to the
next sentence? “...during the whole conference in the presence of
Göring, of whose presence during that conference I am not absolutely
certain....” Wasn’t that your view?
KEITEL: Yes, I was rather surprised at this interrogation and when I was
told that witnesses had confirmed that Göring had been present I was a
little uncertain in this matter and asked that General Jodl be
interrogated. In the meantime it became entirely clear to me that Göring
was not present and that I was right as I had at first said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Had you discussed it with Göring while you were
both awaiting trial?
KEITEL: After my interrogations I had the occasion to speak with Reich
Marshal Göring and he told me, “But you must know that I was not there,”
and then I remembered fully.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, as you say, the Reich Marshal said to you
he had not been present at the interview. That is right, is it not?
KEITEL: General Jodl also confirmed to me Reich Marshal Göring was not
present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did you tell General Von Graevenitz
and General Westhoff that Himmler had interfered and that he had
complained that he would have to provide another 60 to 70 thousand men
for the Landwache? Did you tell them that?
KEITEL: No, that is also a misinterpretation. I did not say that. It is
not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that Himmler had interfered.
KEITEL: I said only that Himmler had reported the fact of the escape and
I intended not to report it to Hitler on that day, since a number of
escapees had been returned to the camp. I did not intend to report to
the Führer on that day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, whatever you said to General Von
Graevenitz, you agree that General Von Graevenitz protested and said,
“Escape is not a dishonorable offense. That is specially laid down in
the Convention.” Did he not say that?
KEITEL: Yes, it is true he said that. But I would like to add that the
statement of General Westhoff is a reminiscence which goes back over
several years.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but you agree, as I understand your
evidence, that General Von Graevenitz did make a protest about the
action that was taken, is not that so?
KEITEL: Yes, he did so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then when he made the protest did you say
words to this effect? I am reading of course from General Westhoff’s
statement, “I do not care a damn. We discussed it in the Führer’s
presence, and it cannot be altered.” Did you say words to that effect?
KEITEL: No, it was not like that, but I do believe I said something
similar.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Similar?
KEITEL: But we are not concerned with...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Similar, to that effect?
KEITEL: I said something similar.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And after that did you say that your
organization, the Kriegsgefangenenwesen, were to publish a notice in the
prison camps where prisoners of war are held, telling all prisoners of
war what action had been taken in this case, in order that it would be
deterrent to other escapes?
Did you instruct these generals, your heads of the Prisoners of War
Organization, to publish a notice in the camps saying what action had
been taken in order to act as a deterrent?
KEITEL: I gave this due consideration while reading a report by the
British Government and I came to the conclusion that there must be some
confusion as to when I gave these instructions. I am sure I did not do
so at this conference. That was later, several days later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will find it is stated in the
statement of General Westhoff that we put in, at the bottom of Page 3.
General Westhoff says:
“The Field Marshal gave us detailed instructions to publish a
list at the camps, giving the names of those shot as a warning.
That was done. That was a direct order that we could not
disobey.”
And in the statement which your counsel has put in, General Westhoff
says:
“This must stop. We cannot allow this to happen again. The
officers who have escaped will be shot. I must inform you that
most of them are already dead and you will publish a notice in
the prison camps where prisoners of war are held telling all
prisoners of war what action has been taken in this case in
order that it will be a deterrent to other escapes.”
KEITEL: May I make a statement to this?
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): The British Prosecutor is
referring to a document which I submitted in my document book. I assume
that is correct. And it is a document which the French Prosecution
wanted to submit and to which I objected, since it is a compilation of
interrogations which Colonel Williams prepared. I submitted this
document so as to furnish proof at the hearing of General Westhoff that
this document does not agree in 23 points with the testimony given by
him. He has given me the necessary information. But he will first be in
the witness box tomorrow. I therefore ask, if the British Prosecutor
appeals to the Witness Westhoff, to produce at least his statement which
he made under oath at the request of the American prosecutor Colonel
Williams. This affidavit up to now has not been produced, whereas all
other pieces of evidence from him contain only reports which have never
been submitted to Westhoff for his signature, or for his
acknowledgement, nor have been confirmed by his oath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My point was to make quite clear that I was not
putting anything in from the first statement which was not contained in
the defendant’s document book. I thought that the complaint would be the
other way, that if I took our own evidence alone that then it would be
said that it is slightly different, for the difference is immaterial
from the documents submitted in the defendant’s document book. I have
carefully collated them both. There is practically no difference between
them but I thought it was only fair to put both sets of words.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): The Tribunal thinks
the cross-examination is perfectly proper. Of course if Dr. Nelte does
call General Westhoff as a witness, he will be able to get from him any
corrections which General Westhoff thinks are necessary, which he makes
to the affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, what I want to know is: Did you give
orders to General Von Graevenitz and General Westhoff that it was to be
published in the camps as to what measures had been taken with regard to
these officers?
KEITEL: Yes, but several days later; not on the same day that these
officers were with me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How long later?
KEITEL: I believe 3 or 4 days later, but I can no longer tell you
exactly; in any event, not before I found out that shootings had taken
place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, 3 or 4 days later would be just when the
shootings were beginning, but what was published? What did you say was
to be published as to the measures that had been taken?
KEITEL: In the camp a warning was to be published. In my opinion, we
were not to mention shootings but only warn that those caught in flight
would not be returned to the camp. I cannot remember the exact wording.
It was traceable to an order which I had received from the Führer
resulting from a conference I had with him on the matter of shootings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, is this a fair way to put your
recollection of the order: That it was probable, according to your
recollection, that those who attempted to escape would be handed over to
the SD and, certainly, that very severe measures would be taken? Is that
a fair way of putting your recollection of the order?
KEITEL: My recollection is that a warning, that is a threat, was to be
published to the effect that those who attempted to escape would not be
returned to the camp. That was the contents of this publication,
according to my recollection, which I then forwarded. I myself did not
word it. Besides, only the administration of the camp, or rather the
Luftwaffe were to be notified.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff was not content with an
oral order and came back to you with a draft order in writing, did he
not?
KEITEL: I do not believe that he came to me. I believe he sent me this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, but when I said “came back to you,”
I was talking generally; you are quite right that he passed on for your
consideration a draft order in writing for you to approve; that is
right, isn’t it?
KEITEL: I do not believe that it was an order; but as far as I remember
it was just a memorandum, a note. However, I must add that I was first
reminded of this matter in the course of the interrogation by Colonel
Williams.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, what General Westhoff says, is:
“Contrary to Feldmarschall Keitel’s order, I pretended that I
had not understood properly. I worked the thing out on paper. I
said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, ‘I want to have the word “shoot”
included, so that Keitel can see it in writing. He may adopt a
different attitude then.’”
Now, this is a bit later:
“When I got the thing back, he had written the following in the
margin: ‘I did not definitely say “shoot”; I said “hand over to
the police or hand to the Gestapo.”’”
Then adds General Westhoff:
“So, that was a partial climb down.”
Now, did you put a note on it: “I did not definitely say ‘shoot’; I said
‘hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo.’” Did you?
KEITEL: I cannot remember the exact wording of the note—as little as
General Westhoff. But I did make a notation in the margin to the effect:
“I did not say ‘shoot’...”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see the point that I’m putting to you,
Defendant? I want you to have it perfectly clear. Rightly or wrongly,
General Westhoff believed that you had inserted the word “shoot”; and
General Westhoff, to protect himself, put it back to you; and then you
say, “I did not definitely say ‘shoot’; I said ‘hand over to the SD or
the Gestapo.’”
KEITEL: No, I did not say “shoot” either, but Colonel Williams said I
had written in the margin, “I did not say ‘shoot.’” That is on record in
the minutes of my interrogation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, what I want to know—and it is
perfectly clear—is, do you deny that that in substance represents what
you put in the document: “I did not definitely say ‘shoot’; I said,
‘hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo’”? Did you put
words to that effect on the document?
KEITEL: It is probable that I wrote something similar to that for I
wanted to make clear what I had said to those two officers. What I said
was nothing new, but it was a clarification of what I had said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next point that I want to direct your
attention to: Had you an officer on your staff called Oberst Von
Reurmont, on your PW staff, Kriegsgefangenenwesen?
KEITEL: No, he was never on my staff.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was his position in the OKW?
KEITEL: I believe there was a Colonel Reurmont. He was a department
chief and had nothing to do with the prisoner-of-war system; he was
department chief in the general Wehrmacht office.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your office.
KEITEL: In the office, in the general Wehrmacht office under General
Reinecke, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that on 27 March, that is on a
Monday, there was a meeting, in which Colonel Von Reurmont took the
chair, attended by Gruppenführer Müller from the Gestapo, Gruppenführer
Nebe, and Colonel Wilde from the Air Ministry, from their PW inspector
of 17; do you know that?
KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about it. It has remained entirely
unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you had this
colonel in your office, a colonel from the Air Ministry, two extremely
important officials from the police, and they have a meeting to discuss
this matter 2 days after you had your first meeting, 1 day after you had
seen Von Graevenitz and Westhoff, and you did not know a word about it?
KEITEL: No, I knew nothing about this meeting. I cannot remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, most of us are very familiar with the
working of service departments. I do ask you in fairness to yourself to
consider this. Are you telling this Tribunal that no report was ever
made to you of that joint meeting between the representative of the OKW,
high police officials, and the Air Ministry? And it never came up to
you? Now, really think before you answer.
KEITEL: I cannot remember even with the best of my will. I was surprised
by the communication about this conference, and I can remember nothing
about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that—I put it in Colonel Welder’s
statement when I was cross-examining the Defendant Göring—he said that
at that conference it was announced that these officers were to be shot
and that many of them had been shot? Did no report come to you that
these officers were being shot and were to be shot?
KEITEL: No, not on the 27th. It was already discussed a while ago, when
I received the first report. At that time I knew nothing about it; on
that day, or even on the day following this conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agreed, though, that you got to learn, as I
understand you, that they were being shot on the 29th; that would be a
Thursday?
KEITEL: I can no longer say what day, but I do remember that it was
later. I believe it was several days later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us, Defendant, make every point in
your favor. Let us take it that it was, say, Saturday the 31st, or even
Monday, the 2d of April. By Monday, the 2d of April—that is 9 days
after the escape—you knew then that these officers were being shot?
KEITEL: I heard about it during these days, perhaps around the 31st,
through the Führer’s adjutancy when I again came to the Berghof for a
situation briefing. I was not told though, that all of these officers
had been shot; some of them had been shot while attempting to flee. I
was told that a little before the beginning of the conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were not all shot until the 13th of April,
which was nearly another fortnight. Were you told of the manner, in
which they got out of the cars to relieve themselves and were then shot
in the back of the head by someone with a revolver? Were you told of
that?
KEITEL: No, I found out only through the adjutant that a report had been
given to the Führer that shootings had followed the escape.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to one other point,
later on. You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, on behalf of the
British Government, made a statement in the House of Commons later on,
toward the end of June. Remember that?
KEITEL: Yes. I recall that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is it correct, as General Westhoff said,
that you had told your officers not to make contact with the Foreign
Office or the Gestapo, to leave this matter alone and not try and find
out anything about it? Is that right?
KEITEL: I told them that since the Wehrmacht was not concerned with the
means of searching for and catching the escapees, nor concerned with
what happened afterwards, the office for the prisoner-of-war matters
could not give any information on this subject as it did not deal with
the matter itself and did not know what had really happened. That is
what I said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then the answer is, yes, that you did tell your
office to leave the matter alone and not to get in touch with the
Foreign Office or the police?
KEITEL: No, that is not quite right. The chief of the Amt Ausland was
connected with the Foreign Office. I only instructed that the officers
should not give any information about this case or any matters connected
with it, since they had not participated and knew only from hearsay what
had happened.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should have thought that my previous
question—you just repeated the effect of my previous question; I won’t
argue with you. I will come to the next point. You had an officer on
your staff named Admiral Bürckner, didn’t you?
KEITEL: Yes, he was chief of the Amt Ausland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was liaison between your office and the
Foreign Office?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you give him orders to prepare an
answer to England, an answer to Mr. Eden’s statement?
KEITEL: It is possible that I told him that, even though he could not
receive any particulars from the offices of the Wehrmacht.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to read it again; I read the reply
a day or two ago. But eventually the reply was drawn up, I think, by the
Foreign Office in conjunction with Oberstleutnant Krafft of your office,
wasn’t it?
KEITEL: No, at that time...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Krafft...
KEITEL: I gave instructions that the answer was to be dealt with by the
RSHA but not by the prisoner-of-war department. I did not give any
instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Krafft.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t he go to Berchtesgaden to assist the
representative of the Foreign Office and Hitler in drawing up a reply?
KEITEL: I do not know. I did not speak with him nor did I see him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that when they saw the reply, according
to General Westhoff, all your officers touched their heads and said,
“Mad.” You have seen that statement, haven’t you, “When we read this
note to England in the newspaper we were all absolutely taken aback; we
all clutched our heads—‘Mad’—we could do nothing about the affair.”
All your officers and you, yourself, knew the reply was an utter and
confounded lie. Wasn’t it a complete and utter lie? You all knew it.
KEITEL: They all knew it. I, too, learned of the reply; and it was clear
to me that it was not based on the truth.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that it comes to this, Defendant, doesn’t
it—that you will go as far as this: You were present at the meeting
with Hitler and Himmler. That is what you say. At that meeting Hitler
said that the prisoners who were caught by the police were to remain in
the hands of the police. You had a strong probability that these
prisoners would be shot and with that you used this incident as a
deterrent to try and prevent other prisoners of war escaping. All that
you admit, as I understand your answers this morning, don’t you?
KEITEL: Yes, I do admit; but I have not been interrogated on this matter
as to just what my position was with Hitler, and I have not testified as
to that, and that I did not give this warning, but that this warning was
an order of Hitler and was the cause for another severe collision
between Hitler and me when the first report of shootings reached me.
That is how it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I won’t go through the details again.
One other point: When did you learn of the use of cremation and the
sending of cremation urns to this camp?
KEITEL: This remained unknown to me and I do not recall ever having
heard of it. The matter was afterwards purely a concern of the
Luftwaffe, in which I was later involved, through my simple presence; I
do not know whether I ever heard or saw anything about this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you will agree with me, Defendant, that
anyone in the world who has had to deal with prisoner-of-war problems
would be horrified at the thought of bodies of shot officers being
cremated; it is simply asking for trouble, isn’t it, from the protecting
powers and everyone else, to put it at its lowest? You will agree with
that; I am sure you have had a good deal more to do with prisoners of
war than I. Don’t you agree it would horrify anyone who has to deal with
prisoners of war that bodies should be cremated—that the protecting
powers at once would be put on suspicion?
KEITEL: I am entirely of the same opinion that it is horrible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And if any service finds that its camps are
receiving 50 urns of ashes of cremated bodies of escaped prisoners of
war, that would be a most serious matter which would be taken to the
highest ranks of any service, isn’t that so?
KEITEL: Yes, even though I had nothing to do with the prisoner-of-war
camps of the Luftwaffe apart from having inspectional powers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I won’t ask you further about the Luftwaffe. Now
I think we can deal quite shortly with the question of the lynching of
Allied airmen.
[_Documents were handed to the defendant and also to the Tribunal._]
Now, Defendant, I would like to remind you that there was a report of a
conference on the 6th of June, Document 735-PS, which has been put in
against the Defendant Ribbentrop; it is a report of General Warlimont,
Exhibit GB-151, with regard to the criteria to be adopted for deciding
what were terror-fliers. You must remember the document, because you
yourself dealt on Friday with the note...
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...against legal procedure, which you already
dealt with.
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you said during your evidence—you remember
you told us why you did not want legal procedure: Because it was a
difficult problem for a court-martial to decide and also it meant a
3-month delay in reporting the death sentence to the protecting powers.
KEITEL: Yes, I did make those statements.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then you said that you had a discussion with
Göring, who said that lynching should be turned down. Do you remember
saying that on Friday.
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was not accurate, was it? Because I
want to just show you what did happen. That document which you annotated
was the 6th of June. And on the 14th of June...
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...it is Document D-774, which will be Exhibit
GB-307, initialed Warlimont—your office sent a draft letter to the
Foreign Office for the attention of Ritter, sending on this formulation
of what were terror-fliers. And if you look it over it says that it is
necessary to formulate, unambiguously, the concept of the facts which
are to constitute a criminal act. And then the draft letter, Document
D-775, Exhibit GB-308, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, for
the attention of Colonel Von Brauchitsch, which says that:
“On the basis of the preliminary talks and in agreement with the
Reich Foreign Minister and the head of the Security Police and
SD”—the Defendant Kaltenbrunner—“the following facts are to be
considered terroristic acts which are to be taken into
consideration when publishing a case of lynch law or which
justify the handing of enemy airmen from the Air Force Reception
Camp of Oberursel to the SD for special treatment.”
And then you set out what was agreed and you say:
“Please obtain the consent of the Reich Marshal to this
formulation of the facts and, if necessary, give the Commandant
of the Air Force Reception Camp of Oberursel verbal instructions
to act accordingly.
“It is further requested that you obtain the Reich Marshal’s
consent also to the procedure intended for the handling of
public announcements.”
And then if you look at Document D-776, Exhibit GB-309, that is a letter
from you to the Foreign Office, a draft letter for the attention of
Ritter, dated the 15th of June, to the same effect. You ask him to
confirm by the 18th. And then Document D-777, Exhibit GB-310, is a
similar draft letter to Göring, marked for the attention of Colonel Von
Brauchitsch and asking him to reply by the 18th. Then Document D-778,
Exhibit GB-311, records a telephone call from Ritter saying that the
Foreign Office will have to delay a couple of days in giving their view.
Document D-779, Exhibit GB-312, gives the first note from the Defendant
Göring. It says on 19 June:
“The Reich Marshal has made the following notes with regard to
the above letter:
“The population’s reaction is, in any case, not in our hands;
but, if possible, the population must be prevented from acting
against other enemy fliers”—I ask you to note the word “other,”
that is, enemy fliers that do not come within the category of
enemy terror-fliers—“to whom the above state of affairs does
not apply. In my opinion, a state of affairs as above can
also”—and I ask you to note the word “also”—“at any time be
tried by a court, as it is here a question of murders which the
enemy has forbidden his fliers to commit.”
Then, in Document D-780, Exhibit GB-313, there is another copy of the
memorandum from the Foreign Office which I read in some detail when I
was presenting the case against the Defendant Ribbentrop; and it is
interspersed with comments of your officer, General Warlimont, in
general agreement with the memorandum. I do not want to go through that
again.
Then, in Document D-781, Exhibit GB-314, your office wanted to get quite
clear what the Defendant Göring meant, so you write to him again for the
attention of Von Brauchitsch:
“It is unfortunately not possible to gather from your letter
whether the Reich Marshal has concurred with the facts
communicated to him, which in the publication of a case of lynch
law are to be regarded as terroristic actions, and whether he is
prepared to give the Commandant of the Air Force Reception Camp
of Oberursel the verbal instructions to this effect.
“It is again requested that the Reich Marshal be induced to give
his consent and that this office be notified if possible, by the
27 instant.”
Then, just passing along, Document D-782, Exhibit GB-315—it says that
the Foreign Minister will reply in a day or two; and in Document D-783
of the 26th, that will be Exhibit GB-316, comes the answer, a telephone
memorandum, a telephone call, adjutant’s office of the Reich Marshal,
Captain Bräuner:
“The Reich Marshal agrees with the formulation of the concept of
terror-fliers as stated and with the proposed procedure. He asks
for information this very day about measures taken.”
So it is not right, is it, Defendant, that Defendant Göring disagreed
with the procedure? Here is a call from his adjutant’s office—and it is
noted by your office—saying that he agrees with the formulation of the
concept and with the proposed procedure. This must be right, must it
not?
KEITEL: Yes. I had never seen this document; but I understand, under the
applied measures, transfer to the Oberursel camp for Air Force prisoners
of war, not lynch law. Perhaps I may add something about the discussion
I had with the Reich Marshal...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear. I am not going through the
correspondence again. I pointed it out as we went along. Your letters
are saying both lynching and the measures to be taken for the
publication of lynching and the other procedure of segregating these
people in the hands of the SD, pending confirmation of suspicion of
terror-fliers. It is quite clear. I have taken you through nearly 10
letters in which it is stated implicitly that it is put to the Reich
Marshal on both these points, publication of lynching and segregation
from other prisoners of war. He is saying, “I agree with the proposed
procedure.”
KEITEL: May I add something?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, do.
KEITEL: I recall very distinctly my discussion with Reich Marshal Göring
at the Berghof. We waited for Hitler who was to give a speech to the
generals. This must have been at about the same time. In this discussion
two points were mentioned. Point one was the conception of the
desired—or how should I say—of the planned or the conceived lynch law.
The second question was that my influence with Hitler had not been
strong enough to definitely settle this matter. These two points I
talked over with Göring that day. We established that the entire method
discussed here should be the prerequisite for the free use of lynch law,
that we agreed that as soldiers we rejected it; and secondly, I asked
him most urgently to use his influence with Hitler again so that he
might desist from such measures. This discussion took place at the
Berghof in the anteroom of the hall where Hitler addressed the generals.
I remember this very distinctly.
I just looked over the correspondence which was exchanged all along. I
only recognize certain fragments. They deal with the deliberations on a
measure desired by Hitler which, thank goodness, never was adopted, as
corresponding orders were not issued.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next document, Document
D-784, Exhibit GB-317. That is a note from General Warlimont to you.
Paragraph 1 says that the Foreign Office has agreed; Ambassador Ritter
telephoned on the 29th that the Reich Foreign Minister has agreed to
this draft. Paragraph 2 says:
“The Reich Marshal is in agreement with the formulation of the
concept of ‘terror-flier’ as proposed by the OKW and with the
method suggested.”
That is sent to you, and on it there is a penciled note, initialed by
Warlimont:
“We must act at last. What else is necessary for this?”
Didn’t you act on it?
KEITEL: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, why...
KEITEL: As a matter of fact...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why, if you did not act on it, were you
asking the Luftwaffe, 4 days later if they had given instructions to the
camp at Oberursel? Look at Document D-785, Exhibit GB-318.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it appears to be initialed by the
defendant—D-784.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My copy is initialed “W”, Warlimont.
THE PRESIDENT: D-784, on the copy I have, is initialed “K” at the top,
alongside Warlimont’s note.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes. I am sorry, My Lord. The fault is
entirely mine. My Lord is quite right.
[_Turning to the defendant._] So, before I pass from D-784, that was
submitted to you and initialed by you?
KEITEL: No, I only put my “K” on Document D-784 to show that I saw it. I
wrote nothing on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the document was submitted to you, and so
you did see that document? You knew that both the Foreign Office and
Göring were agreeing to this procedure being adopted?
KEITEL: I read it. I wrote “K” on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And 4 days later, in D-785, your department is
asking Göring through Von Brauchitsch as to whether they have been
carried out:
“Please report whether instructions have been given to the
Commandant of the Air Force Reception Camp of Oberursel in the
sense of the statements of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, Operational Staff, of 15 June, or when it is intended to
do so.”
KEITEL: I have not seen this document before, but it seems to me to
confirm the accuracy of my viewpoint, that in these inquiries to the
Reich Marshal the transfer to Oberursel was the only point in question
and not whether he wanted lynch law, approved it, or whether he
considered it as right. That seems to be quite obvious from this
question. I do not know anything about the question itself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Please look at Document D-786, Exhibit GB-319.
You were going beyond that the next day. This is the 5th of July. It is
actually a report of the meeting on 4th July. It says that Hitler
decreed the following:
“According to press reports, the Anglo-Americans intend in the
future to attack from the air small places, too, which are of no
importance militarily or to the war economy, as a retaliatory
measure against the ‘V-1’. Should this news prove true, the
Führer wishes it to be made known through the radio and the
press that any enemy airman who takes part in such an attack and
is shot down will not be entitled to be treated as a
prisoner-of-war, but, as soon as he falls into German hands,
will be treated as a murderer and killed. This measure is to
apply to all attacks on small places which are not military
targets, communications centers, armament targets, and the like,
and therefore, are not of importance to the conduct of war.
“At the moment nothing is to be ordered; the only thing to be
done is to discuss such a measure with the Wi. Rü and the
Foreign Office.”
So that, far from modifying the matter, you were increasing the severity
of the measures to be taken, that is to say, Hitler is increasing the
severity of the measures to be taken.
KEITEL: I do not remember this; but if that note was made at that time,
something like that must have been mentioned by him in this conference,
but I do not remember the incident.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to put this point to you. You have
said twice, on Friday and again today, that no order of the Wehrmacht
had been issued. It would not need an order of the Wehrmacht to
encourage the population to lynch fliers who had crashed. All that would
be required to produce that result would be to hold off the police from
arresting people who murdered them, would it not? You would not need an
order of the Wehrmacht to encourage your population to murder fliers who
had crashed, would you?
KEITEL: No, there was only the Wehrmacht which exclusively had the right
to take a shot-down or landed airman into custody, and protect him
against lynching of the population, and prevent anything like that from
happening.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will agree with me that once an American or
British airman was handed over to the SD, his chance of survival would
not be—what—one in a million? He would be killed, would he not?
KEITEL: I did not know it then; I only heard it here. I did not know it
at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will agree that that was in fact what
happened; when an airman was handed over to the SD, he would be killed,
would he not? That is what would happen?
KEITEL: I did not know that it was so, but in this...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not saying what you believe. Now we know
what would happen?
KEITEL: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have told us several times that you did not
know anything about the SD. In fact, at one time, you were a sort of a
court of appeal from the SD in France, were you not? You confirmed the
killings by the SD in France, did you not?
KEITEL: I do not recall that I should have made any regulation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: French Exhibit, Document Number RF-1244. I am
afraid that I do not have a German copy, but this is what it says:
“Paris, 6 August 1942.
“In the criminal proceedings against the French citizens:
“(1) Jean Maréchal, born on 15 October 1912.
“(2) Emmanuel Thépault, born on 4 June 1916.
“Field Marshal Keitel, acting within the powers given to him on
26 and 27 June 1942 by the Führer in his office as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, has refused to pardon these two
men condemned to death and has ordered that the sentences should
be executed within the scope of the general punishments.”
They were condemned by the Tribunal de la Feldkommandantur at Evreux,
and this was sent to the Commandant de la Police de Sûreté et du
SD—sent to the Commandant of the Police of the Sûreté and of the SD.
Does that not show that you were dealing with a confirmation of
sentences of death and passing on your confirmation to the SD?
KEITEL: This entire incident is an enigma to me. It happened in several
cases that the Führer, to whom I submitted all decisions which, as
Supreme Commander, he had to ratify—that I may have put the signature,
“By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Keitel.” By order—that
might have been possible, otherwise I know nothing about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it does not look like that. Let me remind
you of the words, “Maréchal Keitel, dans le cadré des pouvoirs qui lui
ont été donnés les 26 et 27 Juin 1942.” That date. It is acting within
the powers given to you by the Führer. Had you not been given the
powers?
KEITEL: No, I did not have any such powers in that case. That is a
mistake. However, I may have put a signature, “By order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Keitel, Field Marshal.”
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I was going to pass on.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, isn’t Document D-775 relevant to that? The last
line of the first paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am very grateful to you.
THE PRESIDENT: D-775. As I understand it, the defendant was saying that
he did not know what would necessarily happen to these prisoners if they
were handed over to the SD. Those are the last words of the first
paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very good, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The words are, “...the handing over of
airmen from the Air Force Reception Camp at Oberursel to the SD for
special treatment.”
We know, Defendant, that “special treatment” means death. Didn’t you
know, in 1944, what “special treatment” meant?
KEITEL: Yes, I know what “special treatment” meant. I do know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is just one other point in the
document which my friend General Rudenko put to you—on Saturday, I
think it was, or Friday evening—Document EC-338. You remember General
Rudenko put this. This document is the report of Admiral Canaris about
treatment of prisoners of war, dealing with the position of the Soviet
Union as not being signatory to the Convention. You remember the point
that Admiral Canaris put to you, that although they were not
signatories, since the 18th century there had been established a
practice that war captivity was neither revenge nor punishment, but
solely protective custody. Do you remember the document? It was a report
from Canaris to you as of the 15th of September 1941, putting out the
position of prisoners of war of a country that had not signed the
Convention. You remember, you said you agreed with it but that you had
to put on this statement that it was nonsense from the point of view of
the present situation because it arose from a military concept of
chivalrous warfare, that this was the destruction of an ideology. You
said that you had to put that on, on Hitler’s instructions. Do you
remember?
KEITEL: I had submitted to him the procedure and I asked that he read
this, and upon that, I wrote out this note.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, there is a Paragraph 3-aa which I want
you to have in mind at the moment on the point I am dealing with now:
“The screening of the civilians and politically undesirable
prisoners of war, as well as the decision over their fate, is
effected by the action detachments of the Security Police...”
Sicherheitspolizei—that is underlined in purple, that is, it is your
underlining, and opposite it is your pencilled note, “very efficient.”
That is, “action detachments of the Security Police, very efficient.”
Then it goes on, “...and the SD.” Then Admiral Canaris says, “...along
principles which are unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities.” And you have
put opposite “unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities”: “not at all.” Do
you remember doing that?
KEITEL: I cannot recall it at the present moment. I must have made this
remark in reference to the fact that this was unknown to the Wehrmacht.
I think that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, it is perfectly clear. Admiral Canaris
says it is unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities, and you put opposite to
that, in your penciled notation, “not at all.” You could not have gotten
that from Hitler; that must have been your own point, was it not, if you
put in, in pencil, “not at all”? You must have thought that they were
known to the Wehrmacht.
KEITEL: Not at all.
[_The defendant read the document._]
I cannot clarify this statement. I put these remarks down in a hurry. I
cannot identify or define them, neither can I give any clear
explanation, because I do not know. However, I have the recollection
that I wanted to make, or did make, a note to the effect that it
remained unknown to the Wehrmacht and that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to take you quite shortly on
the last of my points, and then ask you one question about it. You have
said to the Tribunal, I should think probably at least 25 times, that
you were not interested in politics, that you simply took your orders as
to military preparations. I just want to ask you a little about that.
First of all, let us take the Austrian problem. I only want to put one
document to you there. You remember Defendant General Jodl’s account in
his diary about the pretended military movements which, according to
Defendant Jodl—I gather that you said that General Lahousen took a
different view—had an immediate effect in Austria? Do you remember
that? You must remember that.
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you suggested, did you not, these false
military movements?
KEITEL: No, I neither devised nor suggested them; but it was an
instruction of the Führer as he dismissed me that evening. I would not
have thought of that myself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have the document books that I gave you.
Just look at that. It is 113 of the German document book.
It is 131 of Your Lordship’s document book, the larger document book.
Now, this is your document of the 13th, Defendant.
KEITEL: Yes, I recall.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it says, if you look at Paragraph 1, to take
no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe, no troop
movements or redeployments, to spread false but quite credible news
which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against
Austria. And it is through people in Austria and your customs personnel
and through agents that you sent out the news, and by a make-believe
wireless exchange and through maneuvers.
Now, you put that up to Hitler, and on the 14th Captain Eberhard gives
the information by phone that the Führer has given his approval on all
points. You were putting up what the false news and the false
preparations were to be in order to get a political effect in Austria,
were you not?
KEITEL: I made the proposal on the basis and instigation of instructions
which had been given to me on my return to Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I only want to deal quite shortly with
this, and I think I can, but I want to show the same point with regard
to Czechoslovakia.
Before you became Chief of the OKW you had been under Von Blomberg at
the Ministry of War. Had you seen Von Blomberg’s plan for the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, the directive dated 24 June 1937?
KEITEL: Yes, I knew that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have?
KEITEL: Yes. It was no directive for an invasion; it was the annual
preparatory work for mobilization. That is what it was and what I know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, Paragraph 2 reads:
“The task of the German Wehrmacht is to prepare in such a way
that the bulk of the whole strength can break into
Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, with the greatest force.”
I should have thought that was a preparation for an invasion. All I
want, at the moment, is to know this: You knew of that plan, Defendant,
did you not?
KEITEL: I believe, yes, that I read it at that time, but of course I do
not remember the details any more.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you told this Tribunal that the first that
you heard of the Führer’s plans against Czechoslovakia in 1938 was the
interview with the Führer that you had on 21 April 1938. It is very easy
to forget something, and I am not putting it to you that you are lying,
Defendant, on this point. But that is not accurate, is it? You had
correspondence with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as early as the 4th of
March, 6 weeks before, on this point, had you not, about the liaisoning
with the Hungarian High Command? Isn’t that correct?
KEITEL: I cannot remember that; I have no idea.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at it. You see my point? You are
stating that you were not dealing with politics, but if you will look at
this document that I will give you in a moment—it is 2786-PS—you will
see that it is apparently a letter from the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to
you:
“Most Honored General: Enclosed I forward to you the minutes of
a conference with the local Hungarian Ambassador for your
confidential cognizance. As you can judge from it, Mr. Sztojay
suggested that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia be
discussed between the German and Hungarian Armies. I have many
doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with
Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, danger exists
that other parties as well would be informed about this.
“I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me briefly
whether any commitments were made here in any respect.”
And the Foreign Ministry encloses the minutes of his conversation with
the ambassador.
KEITEL: I remember this incident only so far as an invitation by General
Von Ratz was concerned. I did not know at all just what was to be
discussed. Von Blomberg had been invited by Von Ratz also, and in my
ignorance I questioned Hitler whether I should make such a visit. Hitler
agreed and told me that he considered it appropriate. However, an
operational General Staff meeting did not take place, it was just a
hunting visit with General Ritter von Ratz.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will recess now.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you very few questions on this
part of the case, Defendant. Do you remember you told the Tribunal that
on the 21st of April, when you saw Hitler, that he had either read to
you or handed you a copy of the minutes which appear there, taken by
Schmundt, about the basis of the “Fall Grün” against Czechoslovakia?
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, isn’t this really a matter of argument rather
than a matter for cross-examination? The witness says that insofar as
the part he took in all these matters, it was military. The case of the
Prosecution is that the part he took was political.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if I may say so, it is a very fair
comment and received with greatest respect. The difficulty is, when a
witness has said several times “it is political”—I mean, “it is only
military”. I wanted to bring out the points that show it is political
and I don’t want to cross anything which the Tribunal had in mind.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal have all the documents before
them upon which they can judge, really, unless you have new documents.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there are not; and, My Lord, I will of
course, accede at once to what the Tribunal says. My Lord, I should like
to point out one document.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think the Tribunal does feel that the
cross-examination is apt to get a little bit too long and sometimes too
detailed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I am sorry if that has
been done, but, My Lord, the witness was in examination-in-chief, I
think, 2 full days and in examination by the other defense counsel for
half a day, and so far the Prosecution have only spent just 4 hours. So
I hope Your Lordship won’t hold it too much against us. My Lord, the
only document which I should like to—I shall not pursue the point in
view of what Your Lordship has said—it is Page 31 of the document book.
I only wanted you to have this in mind, because Your Lordship will
remember that the witness said that the state of German preparations was
such that he himself and the other generals did not think that a
campaign against Czechoslovakia would succeed. Your Lordship will see
that on that day General Halder, then Chief of Staff, said that the
operation will definitely succeed and almost will be reached in the
second day. My Lord, I only want to pass on that and I think it is only
fair that the Tribunal should have that point in mind. I don’t think it
has been referred to before. I will leave that point, as Your Lordship
has indicated, and I will leave the other points on this part of the
case, which I intended to do. I only want to deal with a different point
entirely and then I shall finish.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, the document which I have now
passed to you is a document which gives the account of a conference
between Hitler and yourself on the 20th of October 1939 with regard to
the future shape of Polish relations, and I want you to look at
Paragraph 3, the second subparagraph. I want to put one interview to you
that arose out of that. That paragraph says:
“The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from forming a
ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain
low. We want only to draw labor forces from there.”
Now, do you remember General Lahousen giving evidence? He said that
Admiral Canaris had protested vehemently to you against, first of all,
the projected shooting and extermination measures that were being
directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, nobility, and
clergy, as well as elements that could be regarded as embodiments of the
national resistance movement. According to General Lahousen, Canaris
said:
“Some day the world will make the Armed Forces, under whose eyes
these events have occurred, also responsible for these events.”
Do you remember Admiral Canaris saying that to you or words to that
effect?
KEITEL: I know only what General Lahousen testified here in court. I do
not know anything about what Admiral Canaris said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Lahousen never give you any warning of any
kind as to the fact that the Armed Forces might be held responsible for
these actions that were being taken in Poland?
KEITEL: No. It was also my opinion that the Armed Forces would be made
responsible, if such actions were taken without their approval and
without their authorization. That was also the reason for the
conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was a point that did worry you very
much; didn’t it?
KEITEL: Yes, I was extremely worried and I had very serious discussions
about it, but not at that particular time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And wouldn’t it be fair to put it this way, that
if you had known at the time all that you know now, you would have
refused, even with all that you have told us, you would have refused to
have anything to do with actions that produced concentration camps, mass
murder, and misery to millions of people, or do you say that you still,
knowing all that you know now, would have gone on with these actions?
KEITEL: No; I am convinced that if the German Armed Forces and their
generals had known it, then they would have fought against these things.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If
Your Honors please, I have just one question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] A few days ago, on the morning of the 3rd
of April, when you were on direct examination, we understood you to say
that you had the feeling that you must accept responsibility for orders
issued in your name, orders which you passed on, which were issued by
Hitler; and on Friday afternoon, when Sir David was examining you, we
understood you to say that as an old professional soldier you, of
course, understood the traditions and indeed the principles of that
profession that oblige a soldier not to carry out any order which he
recognizes to be criminal in character. Is that understanding on our
part correct?
KEITEL: Yes, I understood that.
MR. DODD: So that it is fair to say to you that under the obligations of
your oath as a professional soldier, you did acknowledge carrying out
criminal orders?
KEITEL: One can hardly put it that way. What should be said is that the
type of government we had at the time and the authority of the head of
state permitted such legislative power that the executive organs were
not conscious of carrying out illegal orders. Of course, I was also
aware of the fact that deeds were committed which were incompatible with
right and justice.
MR. DODD: I understand you to say you did, with knowledge, carry out and
pass on criminal or illegal orders. Is that a fair statement?
KEITEL: I did not have any inner conviction of becoming criminal in
doing so, since after all it was the head of the state who, as far as we
were concerned, held all the legislative power. Consequently I did not
consider that I was acting criminally.
MR. DODD: Well, I do not want to devote any more time to you except to
say this, to suggest to you that I think your answer is not responsive.
You told us that some of these orders were violations of the existing
international law. An order issued in that form and on that basis is a
criminal order, is an illegal order, is it not?
KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. DODD: Well, when you carried them out, you were carrying out
criminal orders in violation of one of the basic principles of your
professional soldier’s code, no matter by whom they were issued.
KEITEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I do not propose to put any further questions
to the defendant regarding the actual facts involved in the case. It
appears to me that after his frank statements, the objective facts have
been clarified as much as is possible in this Trial.
Regarding the facts subjectively seen, it is necessary according to my
conception, particularly with reference to the last question which has
been asked by the American prosecutor, that certain supplementary
statements be obtained.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Once more, therefore, I am having the
Canaris document shown to you, USSR-356, from which General Rudenko has
presented to you your handwritten note and also the documents submitted
by the British Prosecutor, D-762, 764, 766, 765, and 770.
According to statements made during the cross-examination your
explanation regarding responsibilities appears to require a
supplementary clarification. You have said that you passed on Hitler’s
orders in cognizance of their contents. And now I come back to Mr.
Dodd’s question and in light of the judgment to be passed on you, I must
ask you, for it is of the greatest importance, how was it possible and
how do you want to explain that these ruthless orders, in violation of
the law of war, could be carried out by you or how, as it says in the
note on the Canaris document, you could support them? You did have
objections. You told us so. This is a matter that can be explained only
by you, by yourself, since it is a personal affair and cannot be
clarified with the help of documents, as such. A number of times you
have told me, and now again you have emphasized it, that you desired to
help us find a thorough and truthful explanation for everything.
Thus, I am asking you how was it possible and how do you explain that
those orders and instructions were carried out and passed on by you and
how is it that no effective resistance was met with?
KEITEL: About this clearing up, I realize that many orders and also
notes which I wrote on documents that have been found and orders which I
passed on, must seem incomprehensible to third parties, to outsiders,
and particularly to foreigners.
To find an explanation for this, I must say that you had to know the
Führer, that you have to know in what atmosphere I worked in, day and
night, for years; you must not fail to consider just what the
circumstances were, under which these events occurred. I have often
testified here that I wanted to give expression to my scruples and
objections, and that I did so. The Führer would then advance arguments
which to him appeared decisive and he did so in his own, I must say,
forceful and convincing way, stating the military and political
necessities and making felt his concern for the welfare of his soldiers
and their safety, as well as his concern about the future of our people.
I must state that, because of that, but also because of the
ever-increasing emergency, militarily speaking, in which we found
ourselves, I convinced myself and often allowed myself to become
convinced of the necessity and the rightness of such measures. So I
would transmit the orders that were given, and promulgate them without
letting myself be deterred by any possible effects they might have.
Perhaps this may be considered as weakness and perhaps I shall be
accused of the same guilt. But at any rate, what I have told is the
truth. During the examination by Sir David I myself admitted and
acknowledged that I often had serious conflicts of conscience and that I
often found myself in a position where I myself in some way or another
was able to draw the consequences of these matters. But never did it
enter my mind to revolt against the head of the state and the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces or refuse him obedience. As far as I am
concerned, and as a soldier, loyalty is sacred to me. I may be accused
of having made mistakes, and also of having shown weakness towards the
Führer, Adolf Hitler, but never can it be said that I was cowardly,
dishonorable, or faithless.
This is what I had to say.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I have reached the end of my examination. I
should like to ask you, if I may, only that the documents which have
been offered to the Tribunal in the course of this examination, bearing
the Numbers 1 and 2 in Document Book 2, named Documents Keitel-8 and
Keitel-9, be admitted in evidence without the necessity of my reading
any parts thereof. The Prosecution know the documents and they are
agreeable.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, there is one question I should like to ask
you. Are you suggesting that you ever put your protest or objections to
the orders of Hitler in writing?
KEITEL: Once I handed him a protest in writing, yes. That I know for
certain. In the other cases, and as far as I can recollect, the matters
were discussed verbally.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you keep a copy of that protest?
KEITEL: I have nothing left, Mr. President, not a single piece of paper.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you keep a copy of the protest? I did not ask you
whether you had a copy; I asked you whether you kept a copy. Did you
make a copy?
KEITEL: I had a draft as well as the handwritten document which I also
had given to him through the chief adjutant. I think I had the draft in
my personal files, but now I no longer have it and I do not know where
these files have gone. They could possibly have been in the hands of the
chief of the Armed Forces central office, who dealt with personal
matters in my office, or later on they may have got into the hands of
the chief adjutant of the Führer, General Schmundt, I do not know.
There, I think, the original of that document I sent at that time ought
to be available.
THE PRESIDENT: And what was the occasion of the protest?
KEITEL: It was made in connection with another crisis in our
relationship during which he had expressed his distrust, and in
connection with the current controversies on basic matters of the
conduct of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: But when?
KEITEL: I believe it was in 1940—1939-1940, in the winter of 1939-40.
THE PRESIDENT: And you cannot say more about it than that it was made on
basic matters?
KEITEL: I clearly asked for permission to resign on account of the
accusations made against me and for the reasons which I was quoting.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to his seat.
[_The defendant left the stand._]
DR. NELTE: May I ask permission to submit the two documents to the
Tribunal? I mentioned them before.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. Are you going to call in any more
witnesses?
DR. NELTE: I had asked the Tribunal to call to the stand the witness Dr.
Lammers.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: Witness Dr. Lammers, please.
[_The witness Lammers took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name in full.
HANS HEINRICH LAMMERS (Witness): Hans Heinrich Lammers.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. NELTE: Witness, I principally wished to question you on the OKW, its
competencies, and the position held by the Defendant Field Marshal
Keitel as Chief of the OKW. We have talked about the matter during our
discussions, but since this will have been sufficiently clarified after
the statements made by Göring and the defendant and statements yet to be
made by other witnesses, and also to save time, I do not propose to ask
you in general or in detail on this subject. But I would like you, as
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, to answer questions which others may
not know as well as you do—you, who had participated in some way or
other when certain decrees, and particularly that of the 4 February
1938, were drafted. May I ask you, therefore, to tell me, first of all,
what brought about the big reshuffle of 4 February 1938?
LAMMERS: The Führer informed me that the Minister of War, Von Blomberg,
was going to leave his position and that on that occasion he wanted to
make certain other changes of personnel in the German Government and
that in particular the Foreign Minister Von Neurath was going to retire
and that here, too, a change would take place and that, furthermore, in
the High Command of the Army, certain changes were about to be made.
Subsequently, the Führer gave me the order to draft a decree regarding
the leadership of the Wehrmacht. I was to participate in this in
collaboration with the Wehrmacht Department of the War Ministry. As a
guiding principle the Führer gave me the following instructions:
“In the future I no longer want to have a Reich Minister for
War; and in the future I no longer want a Commander-in-Chief of
the Wehrmacht who stands between me as the Supreme Commander,
and the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.”
Accordingly, the decree was drafted, in which, to start with, the High
Command of the Armed Forces became a military staff which was to be
under the direct orders of the Führer. The Führer desired that there
should be no independent authority here, which would stand between him
and the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.
Consequently, the then-appointed Chief of the OKW, General of Artillery
Keitel, had no direct power of command over the branches of the
Wehrmacht. Such power of command was out of the question if only for
reasons of authority.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this not been really covered by the Defendant Keitel
himself? No question in cross-examination has been put to him to
challenge any of his statements upon the organization of the OKW;
therefore, it seems to the Tribunal it is not necessary at all.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I already told that to the witness in my
introductory words, I asked the witness only to tell me what brought
about the reshuffle of 4 February 1938 and therefore he had to talk a
little about the decree of 4 February 1938. I shall try and make Dr.
Lammers’ examination as short as possible. I believe also that the
circumstances surrounding the Chief of the OKW have been fully
clarified, but it is, after all, a fundamental question. If a man of the
standing of Dr. Lammers can confirm it, it would probably increase the
value of the evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution had put any questions in
cross-examination suggesting that there was any inaccuracy in the
evidence which the Defendant Keitel had given upon the subject, then, of
course, it would be open to you and it would be necessary for you to
call other evidence upon it; but, when the subject is not challenged in
any shape or form, it is not necessary to confirm it.
DR. NELTE: In that case, Mr. President, I need not ask the witness any
questions at all since the subject on which I was going to examine him
was the position of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, his
position as a Minister, his functions as a so-called chairman of the
Reich Defense Council, and his functions as a member of the Three Man
College. In all these cases, no questions have been raised by the
Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did raise the question as to
whether the Defendant Keitel took part in any political action and upon
that you may question him.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.
[_Turning to the witness._] Dr. Lammers, what can you say from your
personal knowledge, about the question as to whether the Defendant,
Field Marshal Keitel, had to occupy himself with political matters on
the strength of his position as Chief of the OKW, or did occupy himself
with them?
LAMMERS: As Chief of the OKW, he had, in reality, nothing at all to do
with political matters. The way I understand your question is that you
want me to say whether Herr Keitel, in his capacity as Minister of War,
did concern himself with political matters. I do not quite understand
your question.
DR. NELTE: This has nothing to do with his position as the Chief of the
OKW or Chief of Staff, nor has it anything to do with his functions in
the Ministry of War. What I want you to testify to is—do you know
whether the Defendant Keitel, during the time when he had held the
position of Chief of the OKW, dealt with political questions, that is to
say, primarily with foreign political questions?
LAMMERS: I cannot make any statement regarding the great political
issues, particularly foreign political affairs, as far as Herr Keitel is
concerned, since I, myself, had nothing to do with these questions.
DR. NELTE: All right, then. In that case I want to ask you a concrete
question: You know that Field Marshal Keitel was present at receptions
when President Hacha came, when there were meetings with other
statesmen. In some cases you were probably also present. Can you say
whether during such receptions, it was the function of Field Marshal
Keitel to take part in the political discussions or not?
LAMMERS: As far as I know, Herr Keitel often took part in such
discussions with foreign statesmen. I, myself, as a rule did not take
part. You have mentioned President Hacha. It was an exception that I was
there, for matters regarding the Protectorate were not regarded as
foreign political matters by us. I hardly ever was present at foreign
political discussions with competent men from abroad, at discussions of
a political nature, and I cannot say, therefore, to what extent Herr
Keitel did participate during such conferences. I assume though that he
was frequently present during such conferences.
DR. NELTE: In other words, you cannot answer that question on the
strength of your knowledge. In that case, I am asking you: In accordance
with the wishes of Hitler, the author of the decree of 4 February 1938,
with whom you have discussed its purposes, should the man who was to
take over the position of Chief of the OKW have any political functions?
LAMMERS: In my opinion he was not to have any political functions as
Chief of OKW, for he was immediately subordinate to the Führer.
DR. NELTE: Did it ever, at any time, become known to you, or did you
ever get the impression that Field Marshal Keitel was a political
general, in the sense that it was customary to call him a political
general?
LAMMERS: I never had that impression.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask the witness
since everything else he was to make statements on has already been
clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you may have
misunderstood what I said to you about whether you should ask any
questions about the Defendant Keitel as a member of the Reich Defense
Council. If this witness can give any evidence upon that point, you may
question him upon it.
DR. NELTE: Witness, in the Reich Defense Law of 1938, you, as Chief of
the Reich Chancellery, were appointed a permanent member of the Reich
Defense Council. Do you know if this Reich Defense Law, including the
Reich Defense Council, ever became effective?
LAMMERS: The Reich Defense Law was made but was never promulgated as
such. Therefore in my opinion, it has never become a law. The contents
of the Reich Defense Law were partially applied as, so to speak, secret
instructions of the Führer. The Reich Defense Law provided for a Reich
Defense Council. That Reich Defense Council, as such, as far as I know,
never convened. I, at any rate, have never received an invitation to
attend a meeting, and, in my recollection, I have never taken part in
any meeting of this Reich Defense Council.
Two meetings; however, were supposed to have taken place, as I have
heard, which have been called meetings of the Reich Defense Council. But
I believe that these meetings, because of the large number of people
attending them—I think there were 60 or 80—were meetings called by the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan in this capacity. I do remember having
partaken in such meetings. Apart from that, after the Reich Defense Law
had been formulated, I heard so little of it during the subsequent years
that I myself did not remember that I had been appointed a permanent
member of this Reich Defense Council. At any rate, in such meetings, if
they were meetings of the Reich Defense Council, in which I had
partaken, no matters directly concerned with the defense of the Reich
were discussed.
DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about the tasks which the Reich Defense
Council were supposed to have?
LAMMERS: I know no more about their tasks than was contained in the law,
which was not published; and as far as I can recall, these were only
general descriptions, very general, of the tasks to be performed, all
pertaining to the defense of the Reich.
DR. NELTE: It has been stated by the Prosecution here that the Reich
Defense Council was an instrument for the planning of aggressive war. At
any rate, an instrument for aggressions and for rearmament. Is there
anything you know as to whether the Reich Defense Council was directly
or indirectly involved in undertaking or carrying out such tasks?
LAMMERS: Nothing at all is known to me about that.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put now a few questions to you regarding the
Secret Cabinet Council of which, according to the law, you were supposed
to be a member. Defendant Keitel was to have been a member of the Secret
Cabinet Council, and it does, in fact, say so in that law. What can you
tell us about that law?
LAMMERS: When Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister, the Führer
wanted to give Von Neurath as much prominence as possible in the eyes of
the world, and he ordered me to draw up a decree regarding a Secret
Cabinet Council of which Herr Von Neurath was to be President, with the
title President of the Secret Cabinet Council. Other members were, as
far as I can recall, the Reich Foreign Minister; the Deputy of the
Führer, Reich Minister Hess; Field Marshal Keitel; and I, myself. I
think that is all.
But I gathered from statements made by the Führer that the creation of
this council was purely a formal matter which was to procure a special
position for Herr Von Neurath in the eyes of the public. I was convinced
that the Führer would never call a meeting of the Secret Cabinet
Council. In fact, the Secret Cabinet Council has never actually met, not
even for a constitutional meeting. It never received any task from the
Führer through me; it merely existed on paper.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, if it was a secret, how could it affect the
public?
LAMMERS: Through the promotion of the Reich Minister Von Neurath it was
to be shown to the public that there were no fundamental differences of
opinion between the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister Von Neurath
justifying his resignation. It was to be demonstrated that all was well
between the Führer and Von Neurath; that in fact, because of his
valuable knowledge of foreign political matters, Herr Von Neurath had
been given, so to say, a higher position in the foreign political field
by being appointed President of the Secret Cabinet Council.
DR. NELTE: This, in other words, was a sort of camouflage for his
resignation?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I have another question. Field Marshal Keitel, as Chief of
the OKW, has been accused of having countersigned certain laws, and I am
now asking you what was the significance of the fact that the Chief of
the OKW countersigned the laws?
LAMMERS: Since he was exercising the authority, of the Minister for War,
he was obliged to countersign these laws. He assumed the responsibility,
_vis-à-vis_the Führer, that the Armed Forces, and everything connected
with the former Ministry of War were given proper consideration.
Keitel could only exercise his war ministerial authority by mandate of
the Führer, as specified in the decree, and as a result he was obliged
to ask the Führer whether he could countersign or not. His authority as
Minister for War was limited, in comparison, with that of any other
minister who simply applied his signature as an ordinary minister,
whereas Field Marshal Keitel could only exercise his war ministerial
authority by mandate of the Führer.
DR. NELTE: In other words, if I understand you correctly, you want to
say that Field Marshal Keitel was not a Minister?
LAMMERS: He was not a Minister as becomes clear from the decree which
expressly states that he only had the rank of a Minister.
DR. NELTE: Do you mean, in other words, that if he had been a Minister
that you would not have had to give him full ranking of a Minister? But
then, he was also a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of
the Reich. Did not that make him a minister?
LAMMERS: Nothing was altered in his position in the Reich Government
through that membership.
DR. NELTE: You mean no, don’t you?
LAMMERS: Yes, I mean no.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 1400.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the other defendants’ counsel who wish
to ask questions of this witness?
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): Witness, can
you recall what Hitler said in the Cabinet meeting, regarding his
political aims and the program of the new Government?
LAMMERS: Hitler delivered a very long speech, in the course of which the
individual ministers also had a chance to speak. One of the details I
remember particularly is that the Führer talked, first of all, about the
removal of unemployment, something which would definitely have to be
achieved. Secondly, he spoke about the fact that an economic revival of
Germany would have to be provided for. And thirdly, he talked in detail
about the fact that a revision of the Versailles Treaty would have to be
effected, and that we would have to try to put an end to the defamation
of Germany which was contained in the Versailles Treaty, and that one
would have to strive to achieve equality of rights for the German Reich
within the circle of nations.
All these statements of Hitler’s were then written down in a special
Government declaration. I also recollect that in that Government
declaration the protection of positive Christianity was mentioned in
particular. I cannot recall the special details. But these, I am
convinced, are the main points concerned.
Nothing was discussed which would have required special secrecy. And
what was discussed was, in the main, contained in the Government
declaration which was published in the press.
DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler say anything at all, during this Cabinet meeting,
about the fact that he was going to alter the system of government and
that he wanted to govern dictatorially?
LAMMERS: Herr Hitler expressed his opinion to the effect that the
present parliamentary system, prevailing up to that time in Germany, had
been a failure.
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking about a meeting. What was the date of
the meeting you are referring to?
LAMMERS: It was the first Cabinet meeting which the Defense Counsel
inquired about. It took place on 30 January 1933, on the day after the
seizure of power. The Führer stated that the present governmental system
had been a failure. Furthermore he said that the result of that failure
had been that the Reich President was obliged, in a state of emergency,
according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, to govern by means
of emergency decrees, and that the only possibility was to create a
stable Reich Government, a government which would be in power for many
years. And further, how one could create such a government would be
something which would have to be agreed upon first with the Reich
President and the Reichstag.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler say, during this Cabinet meeting, that he
wanted to concede to the NSDAP a specially favored position of power?
LAMMERS: He said that the NSDAP, as the strongest party, would naturally
have to have due influence in the German Government. He said nothing to
the effect that he wanted to put an end to the other parties that still
existed and were still represented in the Cabinet, the German
Nationalists and the Stahlhelm group.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler explain his foreign political aims during
this first meeting and did he say, in particular, that Germany would
definitely have to be freed from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty
and would again have to take the place befitting her in the community of
nations?
LAMMERS: I answered that question already in the affirmative before.
Those were the foreign political aims, the complete revision of the
Versailles Treaty.
DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler also mention at the time that for the achievement
of these foreign political aims one would have to run the risk of
another war, possibly even of a preventive war?
LAMMERS: As far as I know and as far as I remember, no mention was made
of war, certainly not of a preventive war or an aggressive war.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler, in the period following, in Cabinet
sessions or during any other meetings of all or numerous ministers,
present a comprehensive plan for the achievement of his foreign
political aims?
LAMMERS: No, I knew of no comprehensive plan except the general points I
have mentioned. Neither during that meeting nor during later meetings
did Hitler elaborate a general plan. In my opinion, he never did discuss
and describe in detail any comprehensive plans of a long-term character
at all.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, what caused Hitler a) to appoint Hess Deputy to the
Führer of the NSDAP and b) to make him a Reich minister?
LAMMERS: He appointed Hess Deputy to the Führer, I believe, because he,
as Chancellor of the Reich, no longer wanted to attend to the business
of the Party and had to have a responsible man for the technical
leadership of the Party.
He appointed Hess Reich Minister in order to create a link between Party
and State; to have a man in the Cabinet who was in a position to
represent the wishes and views of the Party in the Cabinet. Perhaps he
was thereby hoping to create a united front between Party and State,
something which became a law later on.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, were the leading generals, a) before and b) after
seizure of power, in contact with the Reich directorate and the
Political Leadership Corps of the Party?
LAMMERS: Before the seizure of power, as far as I know, contact between
the Party and the generals did not exist as such. There could only have
been cases of personal contact between individual members of the Party
and individual generals.
After the seizure of power I had the opportunity of being present when
the Führer, at the beginning of February 1933, had the high-ranking
generals, the commanders-in-chief, introduced to him, and I had the
impression that the Führer did not know most of these men, for they were
all introduced to him—I stood nearby—and it was my impression that he
had known only a few of these men previously.
After the seizure of power, of course, the relations between the Party
leaders and the high-ranking generals became closer—after the Party had
gained a strong position in the State. But what I would like to say is
that relations, general relations, between the Party, that is to say
between the Reich directorate of the Party and the Political Leadership
Corps of the Party on the one side, and the high-ranking generals and
perhaps also the generals with lower rank, on the other side—that these
relations never went beyond the purely formal, beyond so-called social
relations which were based on duty requirements at chance meetings, on
festive occasions and public demonstrations, _et cetera_. I feel that
the general relations between the Reich Directorate and the Political
Leadership Corps of the Party on the one side, and the generals on the
other, were in no instance any closer than that.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the character of these relations change after
Hitler became the Head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces?
LAMMERS: As far as the high-ranking generals are concerned, I am of the
opinion that in principle nothing changed, for the high-ranking generals
regarded the Führer not as the leader of the Party but as the Head of
the State, and they considered him the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. Consequently, they did not believe that they had to establish
any particularly close relations with the Party.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did joint meetings and conferences take place for
the discussion of political aims between the Reich Government, the Reich
Directorate of the Party, and the high-ranking generals?
LAMMERS: Such joint meetings or conferences are out of the question.
They never took place. That would also have been impossible because of
the large number of people involved.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, were members of the Reich Government, the Reich
Directorate of the Party and the high-ranking generals in a position to
present their views to Hitler with regard to important questions
involving the welfare of the nation, particularly on questions which
concerned war or peace?
LAMMERS: Jointly, these three groups, if I may say so, naturally could
not voice an opinion at all, for they had no connection with each other
in any way. But neither could any of these groups—the Reich Directorate
of the Party, the Reich Government, and the generals—voice its opinion,
in the first place because they were not informed at all about the
Führer’s political and economic aims. What attitude could they take?
They were simply taken by surprise by the actual execution, by the
accomplished facts, and any subsequent voicing of an opinion would have
meant a “stab in the back” of the Führer’s policy.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, then a general political plan on Hitler’s part—in
which these most important groups were active participants—did not
exist at all, and therefore there could be no talk of a conspiracy?
LAMMERS: I know of no such general plan, but I can assure you of one
thing, that the large majority, the large majority of ministers never
knew anything of any such general plan. Just how far the Führer informed
individual persons of such plan, I do not know. I was not present on
such occasions. The Führer may have discussed some sort of plans with
one person or another, perhaps with a member of the Party of the Reich
Directorate or the generals; but just what was discussed on such
occasions I do not know. And of course I cannot say whether in such
cases these gentlemen agreed or disagreed with the Führer. I also do not
know whether shortly before the execution of any large-scale political
plans, such as for instance the march into Czechoslovakia or something
like that, whether, shortly before, they could still advise the Führer
as to whether they agreed or were opposed, or whether they merely
received an order which they had to execute.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, if I understand you correctly, then you obviously
want to say that all decisions of any magnitude were made by Hitler
alone?
LAMMERS: The large-scale political decisions were certainly made by him
alone, at most with some few persons being consulted and participating,
but never with the Reich Government participating, for the Reich
Government—if I may go into detail about this—it was when we left the
League of Nations that Hitler for the last time informed the Reich
Government before taking an action. Then followed as a large, important
action, the march into the Rhineland.
The Cabinet was informed that we were going to withdraw from the League
of Nations; it was still informed beforehand.
No one was informed of the march into the Rhineland; the Führer informed
the Reich Cabinet only after the march had taken place. On the occasions
of the march into Austria, the march into the Sudetenland, the march
into Prague, the outbreak of the Polish war, the beginning of the other
campaigns against Norway, France, Russia, and so forth, the Reich
Government were consulted by the Führer neither beforehand, nor were
they informed subsequently; and consequently there were certain
ill-feelings among all the ministers because they were in no instance
informed in advance of these large-scale plans which had certain
implications for the non-military departments as well, and because the
Reich Government did not learn until later of the accomplished facts.
Thus, to this extent I can say that all these decisions were made by the
Führer alone; and to what extent he consulted persons individually I do
not know. However, on the whole, the large majority of the ministers
were not informed of all these actions; they just had general
information such as any newspaper reader and any radio listener has; or
they, as I for instance, sometimes heard of such a matter a few hours
before, when it was made known to the press. There was no questioning of
the Führer or any information from him beforehand.
DR. SEIDL: Please tell me now just how it actually came about, that the
entire governmental power was thus transferred to the Führer?
LAMMERS: That transfer was accomplished, I might say, by way of a
gradually developing state customary law.
DR. SEIDL: Slowly, please.
LAMMERS: First of all, the Führer and the Reich Government had been
given, by the well-known Enabling Act of the Reichstag, the power to
alter the Constitution. The Reich Government made use of this power in
their actual legislation and, of course, use was also made of it by way
of passive endurance and by creating a state customary law as was
actually recognized in all countries. Thus in the course of the first
years, and also during the later years, it came about quite naturally by
way of a state customary law, that the Führer acted more independently
than would actually have been possible according to the Weimar
Constitution. From the beginning important political questions were all
removed by the Führer from the jurisdiction of the Cabinet.
Even in 1933 and 1934, when Hindenburg was still alive, the Führer did
not wish general political questions to be raised in the Cabinet by any
minister. I repeatedly had to have various ministers informed that they
were to refrain from bringing up questions which did not directly affect
their department for discussion in the Cabinet.
For instance, I had to pass on such information to those gentlemen who
wanted to discuss church policy. I had been forbidden to put any general
political questions on the agenda of a Cabinet meeting. If, in spite of
that, a minister raised a political question during a meeting of the
Cabinet, then the Führer generally interposed and silenced the minister
concerned, or referred him to a private discussion. Things developed in
this way in the course of time.
After Von Hindenburg’s death, when the Führer became the Head of State,
such debates in the Cabinet were stopped altogether. Nothing of this
sort could be debated any more. The ministers were not allowed to feel
that they were political ministers. I had to inform various gentlemen
repeatedly, by order of the Führer, that they were requested to refrain
from voicing their opinions in regard to such questions during Cabinet
meetings.
Then came the time, which I have already described, during which the
larger-scale actions took place and there were no more Cabinet meetings.
In this connection the Führer acted alone, and all declarations which
were made on behalf of the Reich Government were made by him alone,
acting on his own and without previous consultation with the Cabinet. I
must admit that the Cabinet very often complained about that but could
not prevail against the Führer.
Thus gradually the governmental power—if I interpret “Regierung”
according to the conception of “government” laid down in Anglo-Saxon
law—then after 1936 there was no longer any complete Reich Government
at all consisting of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Ministers, that
is, a collective, unified body. The Führer was the Reich Government, and
this power had slipped into his hands—and one will naturally say that
it should not have slipped into his hands. All I can say to this, is
that it may have been wrong, it may have been stupid, but it was not a
crime. It was a political development such as has happened repeatedly in
history. I might recall the fact that in ancient Rome, where the senate
had the power and that there...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal really does not want to hear a history of
ancient Rome.
LAMMERS: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have described the development of the transfer
of governmental powers into Hitler’s hands...
LAMMERS: Yes, but not completely.
DR. SEIDL: In that case, please continue with your account. But all
descriptions...
THE PRESIDENT: We have had quite enough. We quite understand that he is
saying that Hitler took over all powers and would not listen to any
debate at all. It is perfectly clear that he said so.
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
Witness, will you please tell me one more thing about the last question
in this connection? Please tell me whether you as Reich Minister and
Chief of the Reich Chancellery considered legal the development you have
just described.
LAMMERS: I regarded this development, in the first place, from the point
of view of constitutional law. I have discussed these questions
repeatedly with Hitler, and I consider this development perfectly legal
and, if it is desired, I can explain my reasons in detail.
In particular, I considered this development legal in view of the
well-known Enabling Act and later laws which gave the Reich Government
plenipotentiary powers and because of which the Reich Government, in
turn, were in a position to delegate some of these powers to the Führer
and to transfer this power. In that manner that which the Reich
Government, as soon...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal is not really interested in
whether or not it was legal. What the Tribunal is interested in is
whether crimes against other nations were committed. We certainly do not
want to hear this in such great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the main point of the Indictment is Count One of the
Indictment; and that is concerned with the Conspiracy charged by the
Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: The main point in the Indictment is not whether it was in
accordance with German law that Hitler should take over the powers of
his Government. There was no such point made in the Indictment.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now turn to some questions which concern the
Defendant Dr. Frank. Since when have you known Dr. Frank? What were his
activities up to the outbreak of the war?
LAMMERS: I became acquainted with Herr Frank in the course of the year
1932. If I understand you rightly, you want to hear about his activities
only from the outbreak of the war?
DR. SEIDL: Up to the outbreak of the war.
LAMMERS: He was Chief of the Legal Division of the Party, then Chief of
the National Socialist Lawyers’ Association (Juristenbund) which later
on became the so-called Lawyers’ League (Rechtswahrerbund). Then he
became a member of the Reichstag, and at the time of the seizure of
power in 1933, he became Minister of Justice in Bavaria. At the same
time he became Reich Commissioner for Legal Reforms.
Later on—and I do not remember the exact year—he became Reich Minister
without Portfolio; and he was the President of the Academy of German
Law. He finally became Governor General.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the Defendant Frank’s posts proved to us
already, I should think, probably more than once. We do not require them
from Dr. Lammers.
DR. SEIDL: I can put another question to the witness.
Witness, what was the relationship between Frank and Hitler?
LAMMERS: The relationship between the two was, at the beginning, I
should like to say, good and proper, but not particularly close. At any
rate, during the whole time he did not belong to those who could be
called the closest advisers of the Führer.
DR. SEIDL: What was Frank’s attitude towards the “Police State” and the
question of concentration camps?
LAMMERS: Frank repeatedly made speeches in public in which he stood up
for the constitutional state, for right and law, by attacking the
“Police State” and in which—although not in very strong terms—he
always took a stand against internment in concentration camps, because
such internment was without a legal basis. These speeches made by Frank
were frequently the cause of severe disapproval on the part of Hitler,
so that in the end the Führer instructed me to forbid his making
speeches and he was forbidden to publish the printed version of these
speeches. Finally, Frank’s activity in standing up for the
constitutional state resulted in his being removed from his office as
the Reich Chief of the Legal Division of the Party.
DR. SEIDL: Was he not dismissed from his position as President of the
Academy of German Law for these reasons?
LAMMERS: Yes, that happened at the same time—and also from his position
as Chief of the Lawyers’ League.
DR. SEIDL: Another question: Did Dr. Frank as Governor General have
considerable power, or was it not rather the case that his power in many
respects was greatly infringed upon?
LAMMERS: One can certainly say that in many respects his power was
infringed upon.
There are a number of reasons—first of all, as is self-evident, the
Armed Forces. But they bothered him least of all, for in the occupied
territories, the Reich commissioners were never members of the High
Command of the Armed Forces. That was always separate.
Then Göring, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, had comprehensive
powers to issue orders to both the Party and the State in all occupied
territories, therefore also in the Government General, and thus could
give orders to the Governor General and could, when it was necessary in
the interests of the whole, countermand and annul the latter’s decrees.
Thirdly, Frank’s powers as Governor General were considerably limited
through the police, since Himmler as Chief of the German Police had
direct police powers which he was, to be sure, to co-operate with those
of the Governor General but which he did not always do. The Governor
General suffered a further loss of power through the fact that Himmler
was Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality and as
such could undertake resettlements and did do so without consulting
Governor General Frank in any way.
Then, there were certain infringements in favor of the Plenipotentiary
for the Allocation of Labor, but in my opinion the infringement of power
in this field was very slight, for Gauleiter Sauckel always, where
possible, came to an agreement with the local offices beforehand.
Finally there were powers reserved for Reich Minister Speer in the field
of armament and technology. There were still other powers reserved for
the postal service, the railroads, _et cetera_. But in the main, these
are the gaps, as you call them, Dr. Seidl, in Frank’s power.
DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, was Frank’s basic
attitude towards the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and what was the
policy he tried to carry through?
LAMMERS: In my opinion Frank always tried to pursue a policy of
moderation and to create an atmosphere of friendship towards Germany in
Poland. To be sure, he very often was unable to achieve his aim,
especially because of the fact that the powers of the police and
Himmler’s powers were too great in the field of resettlement, so that
his measures and his intentions suffered set-backs. He found it
difficult to achieve his aims.
DR. SEIDL: Did Dr. Frank occupy himself with Germanization aims or did
he rather, whenever he could, oppose the policy of resettlement pursued
by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German
Nationality?
LAMMERS: I should not have thought that Frank would be so foolish as to
have germanizing intentions or to want to make Germans of Poles. He
probably tried to win the people of German origin in Poland for the
cause of Germanism. He had many difficulties with regard to the
resettlements, since he was not consulted beforehand and since, by way
of resettlement, people were simply shoved into the Government General.
In that respect he and I agreed entirely. I have repeatedly told the
Führer that these mass resettlements could not take place, all at once,
without the agreement of the Governor General, and that the Governor
General could not govern if he did not know about these resettlement
measures in advance and if he could not even exert an influence in
connection with these measures.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you stated earlier that the entire Security Police
and the SD in the Government General were directly under Himmler or the
Higher SS and Police Chief. Did Governor General Frank not try to
protest against the policy of force employed by these two men and to
relieve the situation?
LAMMERS: On this point he addressed repeated complaints to me, so that I
might take them to the Führer, which, however, I could do only in part.
In one point, however, we did want to help him. In the Government
General there had been established a Secretariat of State for the
security system. This was under Krüger, then Higher SS and Police Chief.
This, however, functioned for only 4 to 6 weeks and then differences of
opinion in this field broke out once more. The State Secretary for
Security, Krüger, stated, “I receive my orders from Himmler.” If the
Governor General complained about that, then Himmler said, “These are
all unimportant matters. I certainly must be able to rule on them
directly.” The Governor General said, “But for me they are not
unimportant; even those things are important to me.”
The channels of command and the co-operation with the Governor General
were not being observed, and it is therefore perfectly understandable
that Herr Frank had a very difficult position with respect to the police
system.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly, both
orally and in writing, declared his intention of resigning and the
reasons for it?
LAMMERS: He repeatedly offered his resignation, because of these sharp
conflicts which he had, with Himmler in particular, and because Hitler
usually decided that he was in the wrong and Himmler in the right. Many
statements of his intention or desire to resign were brought to me, some
of which I was not even allowed to submit to the Führer. But I informed
the Führer of the Governor General’s intentions of resigning and the
Führer several times refused Frank’s offer to resign.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that Reichsführer SS Himmler was working towards
having Frank removed?
LAMMERS: Reichsführer Himmler personally was indubitably an opponent of
Frank’s. There is cause for me to assume from various disapproving
statements made by Himmler with regard to Frank that Himmler would have
liked it very much if Frank had been removed from his position; and
Reichsleiter Bormann who also was not very well disposed to Frank’s
personality, would have liked it also.
DR. SEIDL: Who in the Government General had jurisdiction over the
concentration camps and was the competent official as far as their
establishment and administration were concerned?
LAMMERS: The concentration camps were under Himmler, and organs and
departments under Himmler’s control were responsible for the
administration and organization. There was an economic department, I
believe, attached to the SS, which was responsible for administration;
but concentration camps as such were under Himmler’s jurisdiction.
DR. SEIDL: Who was responsible for all questions connected with the
so-called Jewish policy in the Government General?
LAMMERS: In occupied territories the Jewish policy, I might say, in its
larger implications was handled by Himmler, who directed it. But, of
course, the Governor General was also concerned with matters in the
field of Jewish policy or with measures against the Jews, for instance,
the combating of spotted fever, and, I think, the marking by means of a
visible sign. All personal measures were proposed to the Governor
General by the Police. But the main policy in Jewish questions, as I
learned afterwards, was handled entirely alone by Himmler, who had been
given these powers by the Führer.
DR. SEIDL: Is it true that the Governor General, as early as 1940,
continuously raised complaints regarding the activities of the Higher SS
and Police Chief Krüger?
LAMMERS: I can confirm that. That happened several times. In particular
these complaints were made because the SS and Police courts were
assuming powers in the Government General which they did not actually
have. Consequently, they deprived the Governor General, the only
authority competent in this respect, of the administration of justice.
There were also shootings of hostages. He repeatedly complained about
that. I want to state that all complaints were addressed to me—there
were no complaints to me but they were merely always directed to me—so
that I could submit them to the Führer.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General continuously made
objections about the extensive claim made by the Reich on the Government
General, particularly in reference to grain deliveries?
LAMMERS: He had often raised objections but the demands which were put
to him were even increased. He did, for the most part, fulfill them,
which must have been extremely hard for him.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that the Governor General protested against the
removal of art treasures by Himmler’s organization?
LAMMERS: Yes; I have only a very faint recollection of that. It is
possible that he also complained about the removal of art treasures, but
I cannot remember any details in that connection.
DR. SEIDL: And now the last question. Is it true that the Governor
General, in many documents, from as early as 1940 on, made proposals to
the Führer regarding the improvement of living conditions of the
population in the Government General and that the Führer only very much
later acknowledged that the high policy which had been advocated by
Frank from the very beginning was correct?
LAMMERS: Herr Frank had often objected to a policy of exploitation and
pronounced himself in favor of a policy of reconstruction, in cultural
matters as well. He had suggested, for instance, that Polish advisory
committees be assigned to the authorities under the Governor General and
to the district chiefs, and so forth; that was refused. He spoke in
favor of the creation of high schools, theological seminaries, and
similar cultural aims, all of which were rejected.
On one occasion he had submitted a long memorandum. This referred to a
Polish organization which called itself “The Plough and the Sword.” It
had offered to co-operate with the Germans, and Frank submitted detailed
proposals in a long memorandum, saying that these Poles could be won
over to co-operate only if they were met on proper terms. All these
suggestions, coming from Frank, were turned down by Hitler. It is not
correct for you to say, Dr. Seidl, that it was not until the last moment
that the Führer agreed to these suggestions; all I can say is that they
were all turned down without exception.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): By a decree of 17
July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg was appointed Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. Would you please tell the Tribunal very
briefly by means of what decrees his authority in the East was limited?
LAMMERS: I can do that very briefly by repeating what I said before. The
same limitations which applied to the Governor General also apply to
him—these limitations which I have just listed; but I have to add one
thing more to that.
The position of Reich Minister Rosenberg was made particularly difficult
through the fact that the difference of opinion which existed between
him and Minister Goebbels in the field of propaganda was especially
detrimental for him. For in the Führer’s opinion Rosenberg was to decide
on the Eastern policy and Goebbels was to decide on the propaganda, and
these two things could not always be co-ordinated. There were strong
differences of opinion between Rosenberg and Goebbels which could be
settled only after lengthy negotiations. But the practical success was
always slight, because the difference of opinion, which had scarcely
been settled, arose again without delay in the next few weeks. There was
also another limitation which is different from the case of the
Government General, that is, that Rosenberg had two Reich commissioners
for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Reich Commissioner Lohse and Reich
Commissioner Koch.
DR. THOMA: I am coming to that later.
Can you remember that before the 17 July 1941 decree there had been a
conference with the Führer, on the day before, on 16 July 1941, during
which, right from the beginning, Rosenberg complained that his ministry
was to have no police powers and that all police powers were to be
transferred to Himmler?
LAMMERS: Herr Rosenberg was, of course, not quite in agreement with the
vesting of police powers in Himmler. He did object to that but without
success. Police matters in other occupied territories had been ruled
upon in the same way as in this case. The Führer would not depart from
his views.
DR. THOMA: In the general instructions to the Reich commissioners there
is a passage where it says that the Higher SS and Police Chief is
directly subordinate to the Reich commissioner himself. Did this mean
that the Police Chief could also give orders to the Reich commissioner
in technical matters?
LAMMERS: Normally, no; Himmler had reserved technical instructions for
himself. The SS and Police Chief was instructed to get in touch with the
Reich commissioner and, of course, to take into consideration the
latter’s political instructions, but not the technical ones.
DR. THOMA: Not the technical ones? Please tell the Tribunal, but also
quite briefly, what Rosenberg’s political concepts were, from the
beginning until the end, with reference to the treatment of the Eastern
peoples.
LAMMERS: In my opinion he always wanted to pursue a moderate policy.
Beyond a doubt he was opposed to a policy of extermination and a policy
of deportation, as was often preached. He made efforts to create order
in the field of agriculture by means of his agrarian policy, likewise to
create order in the field of education, church matters, universities,
schools, and so forth. But he had little success, since one of the two
Reich commissioners, namely Koch, in the Ukraine, opposed Rosenberg’s
measures, or rather simply disregarded Rosenberg’s orders in respect to
these matters.
DR. THOMA: I am thinking about the large political conceptions. Did he
ever mention to you that he had the idea of leading the Eastern peoples
to a certain autonomy and of allowing them such an autonomy?
LAMMERS: Yes, I can answer that in the affirmative.
DR. THOMA: Did he also mention to you that he intended that sovereign
right should be extended to the Occupied Eastern Territories?
LAMMERS: Whether he said it in just that form, that I cannot recollect.
At any rate he was in favor of establishing a certain independence for
the Eastern peoples.
DR. THOMA: That is to say autonomy. And was it for this reason that he
was so deeply interested in tending to the cultural life of these
Eastern peoples?
LAMMERS: Yes. He was particularly interested in that. I know that
because he also took an interest in the school system, the church, and
the universities.
DR. THOMA: Was that possibly the cause of the conflict which he
especially had with Reich Commissioner Koch?
LAMMERS: That and many other things. Koch was above all a strong
opponent of the agrarian policy. That agrarian policy which Rosenberg
considered especially favorable in the interest of his aims was
sabotaged by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Can you mention any other fields in which Koch made
difficulties for the Minister for the Eastern Territories?
LAMMERS: I cannot at the moment recollect any.
DR. THOMA: Do you know that there was a final row between the two when
you were given the order, in collaboration with Bormann, to conduct
negotiations between the two, and that Rosenberg refused and demanded
that the matter be brought before the Führer?
LAMMERS: The differences of opinion between Rosenberg and Koch were very
numerous. They filled volumes and volumes of records. The Führer had
given the order that Bormann and I should investigate these matters.
Many weeks of investigation ensued; and after the investigation I must
say there was never a decision made by the Führer. The Führer always
postponed making a decision on these matters. On one occasion—perhaps
that is the case which you, Dr. Thoma, are thinking of—the differences
of opinion were again particularly sharp. The Führer then sent for
Rosenberg and Koch, and instead of settling these differences of
opinion, again no agreement was reached. Instead of a real decision, the
compromise was made that these two gentlemen should meet once every
month and co-operate. That was naturally, in the first place, an
unbearable situation for Rosenberg, that he, as the minister in charge,
should in every instance have to come to an agreement with the Reich
commissioner subordinate to him; in the second place, it could hardly be
carried out in practice. Firstly, the two gentlemen met no more than
once or twice at most, and then when they did meet no agreement could be
reached, and in the long run the Führer thought that Koch was in the
right.
DR. THOMA: How could it be seen that Koch was considered right?
LAMMERS: Because the Führer reached no decision in regard to the
complaints made by Rosenberg which, in my opinion, were justified. Thus
the things accomplished by Koch remained.
DR. THOMA: Defendant Rosenberg says that the result was that Hitler gave
him the order to confine himself in the administration of the Eastern
territories to the most basic lines. Is that right?
LAMMERS: That was approximately the Führer’s order. Both had agreed to
come to a mutual understanding on the matter about which the Führer had
misgivings.
DR. THOMA: What form did Rosenberg’s relationship to the Führer take and
when was Rosenberg’s last report to the Führer?
LAMMERS: As far as I know, Rosenberg visited the Führer at the end of
1943 for the last time; and even before that he had always had
considerable difficulties in getting to see the Führer. He was not very
often successful.
DR. THOMA: Did this tense situation have the result that Rosenberg
offered his resignation in the autumn of 1940?
LAMMERS: Yes, it was not actually an application for resignation, since
the Führer had prohibited such applications, but he did say that if he
could no longer conduct affairs to the Führer’s satisfaction, he would
like to be removed from office, thus, in the end, it amounted to an
application for resignation.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell the Tribunal to what extent Rosenberg had
influence and popularity among the population in the Occupied Eastern
Territories? Is it correct, particularly, that a number of church
leaders in the Occupied Eastern Territories sent telegrams of thanks to
him because of his tolerant attitude and because he allowed them to
practice their religion freely?
LAMMERS: I know of that only superficially, from personal statements
made to me by Rosenberg. He may have once told me something like that.
DR. THOMA: I have another question. It has repeatedly come to light
during this Trial that Hitler’s military entourage considered him a
military genius. What was the situation in the administrative sphere?
Hitler was above all the supreme legislator, the supreme chief of
Government and Head of State. Did his administrative entourage encourage
him in the belief that all his decisions were correct and that he was
doing something extraordinary, or who did strengthen him in this belief?
LAMMERS: In this sphere, too, the Führer had an extraordinarily quick
power of perception and almost always a correct evaluation of affairs.
He was in a position to make frequent use of the large-scale policy
which he alone had to determine for legislation and administration. It
was then the task of the gentlemen who were to carry this out; above
all, the ministers—I, too, to a certain extent—to shape into an
appropriate form those suggestions and basic thoughts which he had
formulated. If any objections did arise in this connection, the Führer
was for the most part willing to listen to them, as long as they did not
touch the principle of the matter; he was thus ready to listen to
questions of severity, mitigation, or greater stringency, if necessary,
or to questions of formulation and construction, but not if a basic
tendency was being attacked. Then one had great difficulties with him.
DR. THOMA: And as far as individual problems were concerned, did he
personally make the pertinent decisions about everything, or was he
hampered in any way by his purpose, by certain aims which he had in
mind?
LAMMERS: Very little was reported to him. Normally, in the last years I
made official reports every 6 or 8 weeks; in other words six or eight
times a year or perhaps, at the most, 10 times. On these occasions,
problems could not be discussed. Generally speaking, the Führer left the
administration to his ministers...
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard it over and over again about Hitler.
DR. THOMA: I have only one more question. Did you know anything
regarding the fact that Hitler had decided to solve the Jewish question
by the final solution, that is, by the annihilation of the Jews?
LAMMERS: Yes, I know a great deal about that. The final solution of the
Jewish question became known to me for the first time in 1942. That is
when I heard that the Führer supposedly, through Göring, had given an
order to the SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich to achieve a solution of the
Jewish question. I did not know the exact contents of that order and
consequently, since this did not come within my jurisdiction, at the
beginning I took a negative attitude, but then as I wanted to know
something I, of course, had to contact Himmler. I asked him what was
really meant by the idea of the final solution of the Jewish question.
Himmler replied that he had received the order from the Führer to bring
about the final solution of the Jewish problem—or rather Heydrich and
his successor had that order—and that the main point of the order was
that the Jews were to be evacuated from Germany. With that statement I
was satisfied for the time and waited for further developments, since I
assumed that I would now in some way—I really had no jurisdiction
here—I would obtain some information from Heydrich or his successor,
Kaltenbrunner.
Since nothing did come I wanted to inform myself about this, and back in
1942 I announced a report to the Führer, whereupon the Führer told me
that it was true that he had given Himmler the order for evacuation but
that he did not want any further discussion about this Jewish question
during the war. In the meantime or shortly afterwards—this was already
at the beginning of 1943—the RSHA sent out invitations to attend a
meeting on the subject, “Final Solution of the Jewish Question.” I had
previously sent out an order to my officials that I was not defining my
attitude to this matter, since I wanted to present it to the Führer. I
merely ordered that, if invitations to a meeting were sent out, one of
my officials should attend as a so-called “listening post.”
A meeting actually did take place afterwards to discuss this question,
but without results. Minutes were taken and the various departments were
supposed to express their attitude. When I received these minutes I
found that they contained nothing vital. For a second time I forbade
taking a definite attitude. I myself refused to take a stand and I
remember it very well indeed, because I received a letter which, first
of all, was signed by some unimportant man who, as far as I was
concerned, had no right to sign. He asked me why I had not yet taken a
stand. Secondly, the tone of the inquiry was very unfriendly; he said
that everybody had expressed an opinion except me. I ordered that the
reply be made that I refused to define my views since I wished to
discuss the matter with the Führer first.
In the meantime I once more turned to Herr Himmler. He was of the
opinion that it was necessary to discuss this question since a number of
problems would have to be solved, particularly since the intention of
achieving a final solution of the Jewish question would probably extend
to persons of mixed blood, first grade, and would also extend to the
so-called “privileged” marriages, that is to say, marriages where only
one party was Aryan whereas the other party was Jewish. The Führer
stated once more that he did not wish to have a report on it but that he
had no objections to consultation on these problems. That some
evacuations had taken place in the meantime had become known to me. At
that time, at any rate, not the slightest thing was known about the
killing of Jews; if crass individual cases came up, I always addressed
myself to Himmler and he was always very willing to settle these
individual cases.
Finally, however, in 1943, rumors cropped up that Jews were being
killed. I had no jurisdiction in this field; it was merely that I
occasionally received complaints and on the basis of these complaints I
investigated the rumors. But, as far as I could tell, at any rate, these
rumors always proved to be only rumors. Every one said he had heard it
from somebody else and nobody wanted to make a definite statement. I am,
in fact, of the opinion that these rumors were based mostly on foreign
broadcasts and that the people just did not want to say from where they
had the information.
That caused me once more to undertake an investigation of this matter.
First of all, since I, for my part, could not initiate investigations of
matters under Himmler’s jurisdiction, I addressed myself to Himmler once
again. Himmler denied any legal killings and told me, with reference to
the order from the Führer, that it was his duty to evacuate the Jews and
that during such evacuations, which also involved old and sick people,
of course there were cases of death, there were accidents, there were
attacks by enemy aircraft. He added too, that there were revolts, which
of course he had to suppress severely and with bloodshed, as a warning.
For the rest, he said that these people were being accommodated in camps
in the East. He brought out a lot of pictures and albums and showed me
the work that was being done in these camps by the Jews and how they
worked for the war needs, the shoemakers shops, tailors shops, and so
forth. He told me:
“This is the order of the Führer; if you believe that you have
to take action against it then tell the Führer and tell me the
names of the people who have made these reports to you.”
Of course, I could not tell him the names, first of all because they did
not want to be named, and secondly, they only knew these things from
hearsay, so as I said, I could not have given him any definite material
at all.
Nevertheless, I once again reported this matter to the Führer, and on
this occasion he gave me exactly the same reply which I had been given
by Himmler. He said, “I shall later on decide where these Jews will be
taken and in the meantime they are being cared for there.”
Then he said the same thing Himmler had said, which gave me the
impression that Himmler had told the Führer that Lammers would come and
probably report to him something about this.
But that final solution of the Jewish problem was nevertheless in my
portfolio and I was determined to bring it up once again with the
Führer. I succeeded in doing so on the occasion of some particularly
crass cases in connection with this question, cases which were such that
the Führer let me talk to him about it. By way of example I should
mention the entire case.
If a Jew was married to a German woman then he was considered
“privileged,” that is to say, he was not evacuated. But if the wife had
died...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please...
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I myself should like to ask the witness to
speak more briefly. But I ask that this particular question be admitted.
In my opinion the witness is trying to describe how this entire final
solution of the Jewish problem was carried out in secret and with
deception being practiced on Hitler’s entire entourage, and that is why
I ask that the witness be allowed to finish his statement since this is
a very decisive point in the discussion.
[_Turning to the witness._] But, Witness, please be quite brief. I am
now putting this question to you: Did Himmler ever tell you that the
final solution of the Jewish problem would take place through the
extermination of the Jews?
LAMMERS: That was never mentioned. He talked only about evacuation.
DR. THOMA: He talked only about evacuation?
LAMMERS: Yes, only about evacuation.
DR. THOMA: When did you hear that these 5 million Jews had been
exterminated?
LAMMERS: I heard of that here a while ago.
DR. THOMA: In other words the matter was completely secret and only very
few persons knew of it?
LAMMERS: I assume that Himmler arranged it so that no one learned
anything about it and that he formed his Commandos in such a way that
nobody knew anything about them. Of course, there must be a large number
of people who must have known something about it.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell me what people must have known something about
it, apart from those who actually carried out these exterminations? Who,
apart from those people, must have known something about it?
LAMMERS: Well, to start with, Himmler must have passed his order on to
other people; and there must have been certain leading officials, and
these leading officials must, of course, have had other leading
officials subordinate to them who took charge of the Kommandos and who
kept everything completely secret.
DR. THOMA: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): Witness, you have
already talked about a number of questions which are also of importance
for the defense of Defendant Frick, since he was a member of the Reich
Cabinet. Can you tell me on the strength of what position, or what
position it was, that you are enabled to give these answers? I repeat,
can you tell me what your position was within the Reich Cabinet which
enables you to answer these questions?
LAMMERS: You mean my own?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
LAMMERS: I was State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery and I was the
intermediary between the Führer and the Reich ministers, with two
exceptions: the Führer either had direct communication with these
gentlemen or the men in question had a way prescribed to approach the
Führer other than through me. There were a number of things which did
not go through my hands, but which the ministers submitted to the Führer
directly. These were all matters of high policy, particularly of high
foreign policy. Only in 1937, on the occasion of certain changes in the
Cabinet, did I receive the title “Reich Minister,” but my tasks did not
change. In particular, I also had no departments.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me when the very last meeting of the
Reich Cabinet took place?
LAMMERS: The Reich Cabinet met for the last time in November 1937. To be
sure, in 1938, at the beginning of February, there was one more
so-called “information conference” of the ministers, during which the
Führer announced the change which had been made in the Cabinet involving
Herr Von Blomberg and Herr Von Neurath. The last Cabinet meeting in
which actual consultation took place, namely in regard to the draft of a
penal code, took place in November 1937.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me something about any attempts after
that date to get the ministers together?
LAMMERS: After that date I continuously attempted to effect a
concentration of the Reich Cabinet, a reactivation, I might say. This
was continuously refused by the Führer. I had even prepared a draft, a
draft for a decree according to which ministers should at least come
together to consult with each other once or twice a month under the
chairmanship of Reich Marshal Göring, or, if he were prevented from
attending, with me as acting chairman. The ministers were to come
together and hear informal reports. That was turned down by the Führer.
Nevertheless, the ministers had an urgent desire to meet. My next
suggestion was that I invite the ministers once or twice a month to a
social evening, a beer party, so that we could get together and talk. To
that the Führer replied, “Herr Lammers, this is not your concern; it is
my concern. The next time I go to Berlin, I will do that.”
THE PRESIDENT: What are all these details about beer drinking? If they
did not meet and he applied to the Führer, asking them to meet, and they
never did, that is sufficient. What is the good of going into detail?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct, therefore, to say that the Reich
Ministers had to work on their own in their departments, in their
special field of activity, and that a Reich Cabinet as such, which
decided questions of policy and was informed and held discussions, did
not exist any more at all?
LAMMERS: Actually the ministers were no more than the highest
administrative chiefs of their departments. They could no longer act in
the Cabinet of the Reich Government as political ministers. I tried to
describe that earlier. No more meetings took place; conferences were
even forbidden. So, how could it have been possible for them to exchange
views?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about Hitler’s statement
considering the Reich Cabinet as a defeatist club, which he did not want
to see anymore?
LAMMERS: In connection with my attempts to reactivate the Reich Cabinet
through certain meetings, the Führer told me that this would have to be
stopped since an atmosphere might arise which he would not like. He did
not use the words “defeatist club” in my presence, but Reichsleiter
Bormann told me that he said, “The ministers are not to meet; that might
become a defeatist club.”
DR. PANNENBECKER: It has been discussed here frequently that a Reich
Minister on his own could not resign. Do you know anything about Frick
making an attempt to resign his post as Reich Minister?
LAMMERS: In spite of this prohibition by the Führer, Frick repeatedly
stated his wish to be relieved of his office if he no longer enjoyed the
Führer’s full confidence and if the Führer would not receive him any
more. He told me that frequently; but I cannot recall a written
application for resignation. Frick’s wishes to resign were always passed
on to the Führer by me although the Führer always rejected such
communications very bluntly.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In August 1943 Frick left his post as Reich Minister
of the Interior. Do you know any details of what he himself said in that
connection?
LAMMERS: At that time Herr Frick himself told me, “I am happy to leave
my post as Minister of the Interior, but please see to it that the
Führer does not make me Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, as he
intends to do. I do not want that office. I want to retire.” And I told
that to the Führer.
The Führer ordered Frick to come to headquarters. Before Frick went in
to see the Führer alone, he told me that he did not, under any
circumstances, want to accept the position of Reich Protector, but when
he came back from the Führer he had, nevertheless, changed his mind and
had accepted the office. If I am right this must have been in August
1943.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Frick’s position as Plenipotentiary General for Reich
Administration is also one of the points against him in the accusation.
Do you know anything about the appointment of that office?
LAMMERS: As Reich Plenipotentiary for Administration he had the task of
co-ordinating other ministries. The following were co-ordinated: the
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for
Education, the Ministry for Churches, and the National Office for
Regional Planning. He co-ordinated them under his administration and
represented them, so to speak, in the Ministerial Council for Defense of
the Reich, which came into being in 1939 with the outbreak of the war.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me on the basis of what regulations Frick
was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration? There
are two Reich defense laws, one of 1935 and one of 1938.
LAMMERS: The Defense Law of 1935 I can no longer remember. The draft of
the Reich Defense Law of 1938, which was not published, allots to the
Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration a great number of tasks
which, however, were never passed on to him. He had merely the task of
co-ordinating the various departments, which I have just mentioned. At
any rate he never exercised actual powers as Plenipotentiary General for
the Reich Administration to the extent to which they were allotted him
in the Reich Defense Law.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In this connection one also talks of the powers of a
so-called Three Man College. This consisted of Plenipotentiary General
for Reich Administration Frick, Plenipotentiary General for Economy
Schacht—later Funk—and the Chief of the OKW. Can you tell me what
powers these three exercised?
LAMMERS: The expression Three Man College is first of all quite false;
it is not a concept in constitutional law but merely a term of
convenience, a term used by officials. These three people, the
Plenipotentiary General for Administration, the Plenipotentiary General
for Economy, and the Chief of the OKW, each had the power to issue
decrees, but they were obliged to have the consent of the other
two—that is, with the agreement of the others, anyone could give orders
in his field. A meeting of this committee, this so-called Three Man
College, never took place. The decrees issued by it are very few,
insignificant, and quite unimportant. For instance, I can remember that
this committee ruled on the question of reducing the numbers of judges
in the disciplinary chambers; that is in civil service matters. A second
task in this sphere—in all, there were six to eight decrees at the
most, but altogether quite unimportant.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In addition there was later on the Ministerial Council
for Defense of the Reich. Can you compare these two groups, those three
and the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich?
LAMMERS: Do you mean the Three Man College for the Ministerial Council?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
LAMMERS: First of all, after the Ministerial Council for Defense of the
Reich was established, it was my principle to stalemate this Three Man
College if possible, since it was not at all necessary. The Ministerial
Council for Defense of the Reich had the task of issuing decrees with
legal effect but it actually had nothing to do with the Defense of the
Reich. Military matters were never discussed in this Ministerial Council
for Defense of the Reich, nor did it deal with foreign policy or
propaganda. In the main it issued decrees which had the effect of laws.
Meetings took place only until December 1939, and after that the members
communicated with each other by writing for the purpose of issuing
decrees. Political debates never took place.
DR. PANNENBECKER: A Central Office was founded in the Ministry of the
Interior for the occupied territories. This Central Office has been
cited by the Prosecution as evidence of the fact that Frick had
considerable administrative powers, and hence responsibility for the
occupied territories. Are you able to say anything about that?
LAMMERS: The Central Office had, in the main, two tasks. One was the
obtaining of civil servants, the other was assisting in the issuing of
laws and decrees in occupied territories. Such an office was necessary
because the occupied territories required personnel and because the
Reich commissioners in the occupied territories were directly under the
Führer’s command. Written communications went in part through me. If
personnel was to be provided for within this framework, then I would
have had to do it. But I had no instrument for it. I had only a staff of
12 senior officials and I had no organization in the country; I had no
executive officials in those countries. Therefore the Minister of the
Interior was brought in, since he had the whole civil service apparatus
at his disposal.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You just said that the Central Office gave some
assistance in issuing decrees for the occupied territories. Was it
possible for the Central Office to issue a decree for, let us say,
Norway?
LAMMERS: For what?
DR. PANNENBECKER: To issue a decree for some occupied territory, for
instance Norway.
LAMMERS: No, not of itself—at the most after the Reich commissioner had
agreed.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Was it at all customary for the Central Office at any
time to issue a decree for a certain occupied territory?
LAMMERS: To my knowledge that has never happened. I do not know of a
single case where the Central Office issued a decree.
DR. PANNENBECKER: A decree by the Reich Minister of the Interior has
been cited which ruled on the question of citizenship, also with
reference to occupied territories.
LAMMERS: Yes, about German citizenship probably.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
LAMMERS: Yes, but that was certainly an internal German matter.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did the Central Office have any right to issue
instructions either to the German Plenipotentiary in the occupied
territory, say the Reich Commissioner for Norway...
LAMMERS: No, they had no such right at all.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Or did they have a right to issue instructions to
lower offices—German offices—or to the occupied territories
themselves?
LAMMERS: No, they did not have the right to give instructions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: The Prosecution have further stated that the Central
Office also had the right to issue instructions in those territories for
which it had not been specifically appointed. Is there any legal
provision or any practical case where the Central Office interfered with
jurisdiction in the occupied territories?
LAMMERS: No case is known to me.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it then correct to say that the chiefs of the civil
administration in the occupied territories were always directly
subordinate to Hitler as the Führer, no matter what their official
designation was?
LAMMERS: In the occupied territories the Reich commissioners of the
so-called chiefs of the civil administration were directly subordinate
to the Führer.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did Frick, as Minister of the Interior, have the power
to issue orders for the occupied territories insofar as the German
Police was active in the occupied territories?
LAMMERS: No, the police authority in occupied territories was vested
solely in Himmler who was to act in agreement with the Reich
commissioners. The Minister of the Interior had nothing at all to do
with the police in occupied territories.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Must it not be concluded from that that this matter
came within the competency of the Reich Minister of the Interior insofar
as Himmler was subordinate to the Reich Ministry of the Interior?
LAMMERS: There would have been at most a power to issue orders for
Germany but not for the occupied territories, and to what extent this
power existed for Germany herself is also problematic.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I shall come to that later in detail. Can you tell me
what powers the Minister of the Interior had in the police field during
that time when the police were still under the jurisdiction of the
provinces of Prussia, _et cetera_, that is, from 1933 to 1936?
LAMMERS: Well, his powers were in any case very limited, but I cannot
tell you the details.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did the Reich have the right of supervision?
LAMMERS: Yes, the old right, as it was formerly—the Reich had only the
ultimate supervision.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Of course, you know that later on, through a decree,
Himmler was appointed Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in
the Ministry of the Interior, do you not? Do you know who created that
designation, “Reichsführer SS” and so forth?
LAMMERS: Yes, I had something to do with it at the time. The proposal of
such a title originated apparently with Himmler. I objected to this
title from the very beginning for two reasons. Two entirely different
matters were being lumped together: the Reichsführer SS, which is a
Party affiliation, and the Police, which is a State concern. On the one
side was the Reichsführer SS who has the rank of a Reichsleiter in the
Party, which is equivalent to that of a Reich minister; on the other
side the Chief of Police, who has the position of a State Secretary in
the Ministry of the Interior and who is subordinate to the Minister of
the Interior. But Himmler insisted on this designation, and the Führer
considered that he was right.
My objections to this designation proved to be correct in practice, for
the Minister of the Interior’s right to issue instructions to the Police
now became extremely problematic, since Reichsführer Himmler, as far as
the police officers were concerned, was, at the same time the SS Führer
and could give them orders in his capacity as Reichsführer SS, and the
Ministry of the Interior could not interfere. It was also a practice of
his that he usually made the other police officials SS leaders. One
therefore could never know exactly in what capacity the person concerned
was acting, whether he was acting as member of the SS, or as a member of
the Police. And the question of authority in the Ministry of Interior
afterwards became almost devoid of meaning, because Himmler dropped the
last words of the designation, “Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior,” and completely separated himself from the
Ministry of the Interior as far as having an office in the building and
the mode of procedure were concerned, and no longer felt himself in a
subordinate position.
When Minister Frick lodged a complaint about this with me, which I was
supposed to take to the Führer, the Führer told me, “Tell Herr Frick
that he should not restrict Himmler as Chief of the German Police too
much; with him the Police is in good hands. He should allow him as much
free rein as possible!”
Thus for all practical purposes, though not by a special decree, the
Minister of the Interior’s authority to give orders was very sharply
limited, if not even suspended.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You have just said that Himmler, on his own,
arbitrarily exercised jurisdiction over police organizations without
bothering about what Frick wanted. But then there was still another
channel for commands issued to the police, orders given by Hitler
himself. Did he give them to Frick as the competent minister, or did he
give them to Himmler?
LAMMERS: Normally the Führer gave these instructions to Himmler. If he
gave instructions to me which concerned police matters then I generally
passed them on through the Minister of the Interior, or at least I
informed him about them.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about whether concentration camps
were included in the budget of the Reich or whether they were in the
budget of the SS?
LAMMERS: As far as I know—but I cannot say this for certain—the funds
for concentration camps did not appear in the budget of the Reich. It
was rather this way: The Reich Minister of Finance paid a yearly lump
sum to the Party through the Reich Treasurer, who had to distribute it
to the various Party organizations. The Reichsführer SS received a lump
sum from the SS with which he probably financed this matter. I also
cannot recollect that I ever saw any part of the Reich budget in which
the concentration camps were mentioned.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about the fact that Himmler
opposed the Minister of the Interior’s right to interfere in this field,
giving as his reason the fact that the funds for concentration camps had
been provided for?
LAMMERS: No, I do not know anything about that.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I now have some questions referring to another field.
Do you know anything about Hitler’s efforts to kill incurably insane
persons painlessly?
LAMMERS: Yes, this idea occurred to Hitler in the autumn of 1939 for the
first time. On that occasion the State Secretary in the Ministry of the
Interior, Dr. Conti, received the order to investigate this question. He
was told to discuss the legal aspect of the matter with me. I spoke
against the execution of any such program. But since the Führer insisted
on it I suggested that this matter should be given all legal guarantees
and be ruled upon by a law. I also had an appropriate draft for a law
worked out; thereupon State Secretary Conti was relieved of this task,
and in 1940 it was given over to Reichsleiter Bouhler. Reichsleiter
Bouhler reported to the Führer, but I was not present. Then he came to
see me. I showed him my draft of the law and stated the objections I had
to the matter and he left again. Then I presented the drafted law to the
Führer; he did not approve of it, but he did not reject it altogether.
Later, however, ignoring me, he gave Reichsleiter Bouhler and the
medical attendant, Professor Dr. Brandt, then attached to him, plenary
authority to kill incurably insane people. I had nothing to do with the
drafting of this plenary power. As far as I was concerned, the matter
was settled, as the Führer did not want me and had given the work to
others to do.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You have just said that the Führer gave the task to
State Secretary Dr. Conti in the Ministry of the Interior. Did that
order from Hitler pass to Conti through Frick?
LAMMERS: I do not know. State Secretary Conti was called by telephone by
the adjutant’s office of the Führer or by Reichsleiter Bormann; and
whether that went through Frick or not, I do not know.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything at all about whether Frick
himself participated in these measures in some form or other?
LAMMERS: No, nothing about that is known to me.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Then I have a last group of questions, referring to
the Protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia. When, in August 1943, Frick was
appointed Protector for Bohemia and Moravia did the formal authority of
the Reich Protector remain the same as before?
LAMMERS: No. These powers were deliberately altered and in such a way
that the Reich Protector from then on was to become a more or less
decorative figure. The political direction of the Protectorate was to be
transferred to State Minister Frank. The Reich Protector was merely the
German representative in the Protectorate with very little actual power.
He co-operated in forming the government in the Protectorate.
Furthermore he had the limited, rather small right of nominating civil
servants, which in the main applied to the medium and lower grade of
civil servants; and then he had the right of granting pardons. And in
general the State Minister for Bohemia and Moravia, Frank, was obliged
to keep the Reich Protector informed. In the main these were the rights
of the Reich Protector. Apart from that it was Hitler’s wish that the
Reich Protector did not spend too much time in the Protectorate. In fact
I have had to pass this information on to him several times.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You said that the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia during Frick’s time was the head of the German administration.
Was State Minister Frank under Frick?
LAMMERS: Yes, he was subordinate but the relation was rather that of the
head of the State to the head of the Government; State Minister Frank
had the political control.
DR. PANNENBECKER: But is it not right to say that Minister Frank was
directly subordinate to the Führer?
LAMMERS: I do not believe that that was the situation. I do not remember
the decree. He was not directly under him—I cannot say that for certain
now. At any rate the Führer received only Frank and not the Reich
Protector for political discussions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I do not have the decree with me. I shall have to
clear that up later.
Do you know anything about the fact that Frick expressly demanded this
division of authority and that, to start with, he had refused to accept
the position of a Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; and that this
division of authority did not take place until he said that he could not
assume outer responsibility for something which was not his inner
responsibility?
LAMMERS: I have already mentioned the fact that Minister Frick refused
to accept this position, and when this decree appeared, in which the
rights of the Protector were laid down—a decree which was not
published—Dr. Frick quite rightly had misgivings, thinking, “As far as
the outside world is concerned, I shall have responsibilities which are
not known at all.” So we published a notice in the press. In that it
stated that the new Reich Protector would have only such and such
rights, as I previously listed here, such as the nomination of civil
servants, the right to pardon and the right to co-operate in the forming
of a government in the Protectorate. Thus it was stated to the outside
world that Frick no longer had the full responsibility which former
Reich Protectors had perhaps had.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you know anything about the fact that the reason
for this division of responsibility in the Protectorate was that Hitler
did not think that Frick would be hard enough to handle matters there?
LAMMERS: That was obviously the reason, yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In that case I have no further questions.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): As a supplement to the
statements already made by the witness, I have still a few questions.
Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Funk beginning with the year 1933 was the
Press Chief of the Reich Government. That is known to you?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: You yourself were at that time already in your office, were
you not?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Did the Defendant Funk in this capacity as Press Chief of
the Reich Government exercise any influence on decisions made by the
Reich Cabinet or on the contents of bills of the Reich Cabinet?
LAMMERS: That question must be answered in the negative. At the most, he
may have had an influence from the journalistic point of view, that is,
for an attractive title for a law, or some sort of popular wording, or
something like that. But he did not vote on the contents of the laws. In
his position as Press Chief, he was first Ministerial Director and then
State Secretary; he had nothing to say about the contents.
DR. SAUTER: Then why was he, as Press Chief of the Reich Government,
invited at all to attend the meetings of the Reich Cabinet at that time?
LAMMERS: Well, because of the reporting to the press afterwards.
DR. SAUTER: That is to say, only to inform the press of the discussions
and decisions of the Reich Cabinet? And he had no influence whatsoever
on decisions or not on the bills either?
LAMMERS: Yes, that is right.
DR. SAUTER: But without having any influence on decisions or the
authority to propose laws.
LAMMERS: Yes, that is right.
DR. SAUTER: In this capacity as Press Chief of the Reich Government, the
Defendant Funk had, as you know, to give reports regularly on press
matters to the then Reich Chancellor, Hitler. Do you know when these
regular reports made by the Press Chief of the Reich Government to
Hitler ceased?
LAMMERS: At the latest they ceased 1 year later. These were joint
conferences. Funk and I, at the beginning, had as many as three to four
meetings a week with the Führer, and this lasted through the summer of
1933. During the winter the meetings became fewer, then became more
frequent again, and ceased altogether in 1934, after Von Hindenburg’s
death.
DR. SAUTER: Who made these press reports to Hitler after that?
LAMMERS: The Press Chief Dr. Dietrich.
DR. SAUTER: Excluding Dr. Funk?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Funk later on became President of
the Reichsbank. Do you know anything about who had to decide about
credits given, or to be given, to the Reich by the Reichsbank?
LAMMERS: That decision was the Führer’s. The way it happened in practice
was that the Minister of Finance submitted the application for a credit.
That was done in duplicate. One letter with the appropriate order was
directed to the Reich Minister of Finance, and the second letter with
such an order was addressed to the President of the Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, these technical details do not really interest
us. We are only interested in this: Did Dr. Funk, as President of the
Reichsbank have any influence on the question of whether and to what
extent the German Reich could claim credit from the Reichsbank? Only
this interests us.
LAMMERS: I can answer that only by citing technical details. All I
received were those two documents from the Finance Minister. It was
entirely a matter of having them signed. They were signed in one second
by the Führer and then they were sent back. I never had an order to
negotiate with Herr Funk or with Herr Schacht or with the Minister of
Finance. It was entirely a matter of having them signed, nothing else.
DR. SAUTER: So that according to your knowledge these instructions came
from Hitler and not from the Reichsbank president?
LAMMERS: The instructions were signed by the Führer.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, you have already mentioned once the so-called
Committee of Three or Three Man College, which was formed in the later
years. Regarding this Committee of Three the Prosecution maintain that
Funk was also a member of this committee, and that this committee
represented, so to speak, the highest court as far as the legislation of
the Reich Government during the war was concerned.
LAMMERS: One cannot say that at all. I have already stated that these
three men, each acting independently, had the right to issue decrees
with the consent of the two others, and that there were very few and
quite insignificant decrees.
DR. SAUTER: You mean decrees of little importance, decrees for his
department?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Furthermore, Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Göring stated during
his examination that the powers which Dr. Funk had as Plenipotentiary
for Economy—I think in 1938—were transferred for the most part to the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan, that consequently Dr. Funk’s powers,
generally speaking, existed only on paper. I should be very interested
in knowing whether these powers of the Plenipotentiary for Economy were
transferred to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, in other words,
Göring, formally, as well as in fact.
LAMMERS: That was based on a decree of the Führer and a special order
issued by the Führer.
DR. SAUTER: When was that, approximately?
LAMMERS: The Four Year Plan was set up in 1936, and it was extended in
1940 for another 4 years. These special powers which Herr Funk later
surrendered to the Four Year Plan were based on an agreement between
Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Funk, an arrangement which, as far as
I know, had the Führer’s approval.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, you have already told the Tribunal that since
1938, I think, no more meetings of the Cabinet took place and that in
the end Hitler even prohibited informal discussions among ministers. Can
you tell us anything as to whether and, if so, how often the Defendant
Dr. Funk had an opportunity, during the 7 years he was Minister, to talk
to Hitler, to report to him, and so forth?
LAMMERS: Well, during the first years, as I have said, he reported
frequently as Press Chief.
DR. SAUTER: And later as Minister of Economics?
LAMMERS: Later, as Minister of Economics, he very rarely came to the
Führer. At many conferences he was not consulted, even at conferences in
which he ought to have been consulted. Quite often he complained to me
about that. I tried in every way to do my best to include him in such
conferences, but I did not always succeed.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, I have noticed that minutes have been read here
in which it is clearly said, and I think by you, that the Defendant Funk
as Minister for Economics has asked you that he be permitted to
participate in this or that important conference, and that you had
expressly stated in that record that the Führer had refused that, or
that the Führer had prohibited it. May I show you an example? I remember
a meeting of 4 January 1944, Document 1292-PS, concerning questions of
labor employment. In those minutes it says—once more said by you—that
Funk’s request to be able to participate had been refused. Can you
remember such cases and can you give us the reasons?
LAMMERS: Yes, I can remember such cases, but I do not know whether they
were mentioned in the minutes. Probably I informed Herr Funk that I had
made the greatest effort to have him participate in these conferences;
the Führer, however, had refused.
DR. SAUTER: The reason?
LAMMERS: Frequently the Führer made objections; those were various
reasons in the case of Funk. He was sceptical about him and did not want
him there.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, in April of 1941 you are supposed to have informed
the Defendant Dr. Funk that Rosenberg had received an order from Hitler
for a uniform treatment of the problems in the Eastern Territories.
Besides giving that message to Funk you are supposed to have passed it
on to Göring and Keitel. From that fact the conclusion has been drawn by
the Prosecution that Funk was one of the influential persons concerned
with the preparation for aggressive war against Russia.
Can you tell us whether and, if so, why you also passed that message on
to the Defendant Funk at that time?
LAMMERS: Either the Führer told me to do so—which I do not think was
the case—or I believed that from the economic point of view Funk would
be interested in this information. I passed it on to him as a special
personal gesture; I do not remember any particular reason now. I
certainly must have passed the same message on to others, but not in
writing; the others probably received it orally.
There was no question at all of an aggressive war when Rosenberg was
given that task by Hitler. He was supposed to be merely a sort of
political commissioner for the Eastern Territories. He was to study the
conditions of the peoples there.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, roughly at the same time, that is to say, the
spring of 1941, and shortly before the beginning of the Russian
campaign, you are supposed to have had some further discussions with the
Defendant Funk on the subject of what turn the foreign political
situation in respect to Russia might possibly take in the near future.
On that occasion you are supposed to have told Defendant Funk something
regarding the reasons why Hitler believed in the possibility of a war
against Russia. What did you tell Defendant Funk at that time regarding
these preparations for the war undertaken at one time or another?
LAMMERS: It must have been what I knew myself at the time, namely,
information which the Führer had given me, that troop concentrations in
Russia had been observed, which allowed the conclusion to be drawn that
an armed conflict with Russia might occur. These were the words the
Führer used. He believed that things would come to a head with Russia
and therefore wished that one man, and that was Rosenberg, should
concern himself with Eastern questions, since the possibility of an
armed conflict with Russia did exist. That is probably what I told Funk.
I cannot imagine what else I could have told him.
DR. SAUTER: At that time, Dr. Lammers, you are supposed to have
mentioned not only troop concentrations on the Russian side along the
Eastern frontier of Germany, but also the Russian march into Bessarabia.
LAMMERS: Yes, it is possible that that was the case. The Southeast, at
any rate; and perhaps I mentioned that the discussions which had taken
place with Russia, with Molotov, were unsatisfactory.
DR. SAUTER: In that connection, since you now refer to the discussion
with Molotov, you are supposed to have told Defendant Funk in particular
that Russia was making considerable claims on the Balkans and in respect
to the Baltic Sea, and that because of these claims Hitler was reckoning
with the possibility of war. Could that be correct?
LAMMERS: It is possible that we have talked about it, but I cannot
remember for certain.
DR. SAUTER: And you know, Dr. Lammers, that in this connection an
organization was established under the heading “Central Planning?” Do
you know that?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Defendant Funk was also made a member of the Central
Planning, and I think that was at the end of 1943. Is it correct that
Funk, when he joined the Central Planning, was no longer at all
interested in the use of workers for German production, and why was that
so?
LAMMERS: I believe that Funk’s only interest in the Central Planning was
to receive raw materials for civilian production.
DR. SAUTER: For civilian production at home?
LAMMERS: Yes, at home. That was his interest in the Central Planning,
since he was responsible only for the distribution of these economic
goods, and civilian production had been transferred to Minister Speer.
DR. SAUTER: When?
LAMMERS: I think that was at the very moment when the Minister for
Armament and Munitions was converted into a Minister for Armament and
War Production. I think that was in 1942. Thus Funk was, of course, very
interested in raw materials; but the employment of labor, in my opinion,
interested him very little, since he did not have enough raw material at
all to allow civilian production to go on.
DR. SAUTER: And then, Dr. Lammers, I have one last question: Can you
remember that Defendant Funk in the year 1944—it is supposed to have
been in February and also a few times during subsequent months—visited
you and told you of his trouble because of the unsatisfactory position
which he was occupying as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary for
Economics, and that on this occasion he talked to you about the question
of whether his conscience would allow him to retain his position as
President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics, and, if so,
why he did so and why he did not place this office at the disposal of
somebody else? Perhaps you can say something about this?
LAMMERS: I have frequently discussed these questions with Funk.
DR. SAUTER: When?
LAMMERS: In 1943, but particularly afterwards in 1944. I know that he
was considerably worried about this and that he wanted very much to have
an opportunity to take his worries to the Führer personally. If he did
remain in office then it was only because he realized that during
wartime he could not resign from his post; that would not be the right
thing for a good German, to resign during wartime. But he had the most
fervent wish to be able to report to the Führer about the economic
situation and mainly about the particular impressions which the
Gauleiter in the individual districts had. He had the most fervent wish,
once for all, to report to the Führer and learn at least something about
the war situation and talk about the question of ending the war. That
was since the beginning of September. I made several attempts to submit
the matter to the Führer; and I nearly succeeded later by camouflaging
the real reason and pretending there was another important reason, some
question of finance.
I submitted the matter to the Führer; but the Führer sized up the
situation, and, although Herr Funk had been waiting at my office for
days for the report, he refused the request, probably because of
Bormann’s efforts towards this end. With the best intentions Funk did
not succeed in seeing the Führer and I did not succeed in taking him to
the Führer.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have otherwise no further question.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, if you
wish to close the session at 5 o’clock, I must say that I shall not have
finished by 5 o’clock; and I am reluctant to break off my examination. I
leave it up to the Tribunal whether we should extend the session or
whether we should break off now.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better go on, Dr. Dix; we have nearly 10
minutes.
DR. DIX: Witness, other witnesses and you too—you on the strength of
vast experience and your position as Chief of the Reich Chancellery from
the seizure of power until the collapse—have stated that applications
for resignation were prohibited by Hitler. I therefore do not want to
put any more questions on that subject; I merely want to discuss the
attempts to resign which Schacht actually made. I ask you first of all
to answer the general questions with “Yes” or “No.”
Did Schacht send in applications for resignation or not?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: I should now like to discuss with you the individual
applications for resignation. I cannot expect you, without any help, to
recall individual occasions. I permit myself therefore to help your
memory along a little in connection with the first question.
Please recall March 1937, when Schacht stopped Reichsbank credits, that
is, gave notice with reference to them and you visited him in connection
with this. Was that the first application for resignation?
LAMMERS: I remember that very exactly, since Herr Schacht’s application
for resignation was very unpleasant for Hitler; and he gave me the task
of straightening the matter out with Schacht. Thus I made several
personal visits to Schacht, but he refused to withdraw his application
for resignation; and he gave, as his reason, the fact that he could not
approve any longer the Führer’s credit policy and that he was afraid of
inflation and would have to protect the German nation from that. As for
the freedom of action, he had to...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into details? We gather
that there are several offers to resign. Is it necessary to go into the
details of each one?
DR. DIX: In that case we leave it. It is enough for me, Dr. Lammers, if
you confirm that in March 1937 Schacht made his first application for
resignation.
LAMMERS: And then there was a compromise and Herr Schacht, first of all,
was to remain in office 1 more year, although the law called for a term
of 4 years.
DR. DIX: Please try to remember what happened further in August 1937.
Göring had issued a decree concerning mines. It was Schacht’s view that
this was an unwarranted interference with matters under his
jurisdiction. Did a second application for resignation follow?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: And did not Schacht write a letter on that occasion addressed
to Göring, 5 August, a copy of which he sent to Hitler? Can you remember
that?
LAMMERS: Yes. It was because of that letter that Hitler dismissed
Schacht afterwards.
DR. DIX: Now we come to the war. Did Schacht also repeat his
applications for resignation during the war? Please recall the summer of
1941 and a memorandum which Schacht sent to Hitler regarding the
necessity of a speedy conclusion of peace?
LAMMERS: The first application for resignation was handed in because it
had been prohibited to listen to foreign broadcasting stations. Schacht
was thereby forbidden to listen to many foreign stations; and he
complained about it and handed in an application for resignation,
whether in writing or verbally, I do not know. The request was refused,
and later he submitted a memorandum in which he discussed the end of the
war and the political and economic situation. I had to tell Schacht, in
answer to this memorandum, that the Führer had read it and had nothing
to say in reply. Thereupon, in 1942, Schacht again asked me to ask the
Führer if he was disposed to receive another memorandum. At this the
Führer gave me the order to write to Schacht and tell him to refrain
from submitting any further memoranda.
DR. DIX: I could, Mr. President, recall the important points of this
memorandum of the summer of 1941 for the witness. If the Tribunal is
familiar with the details of this memorandum, which we do not have and
which we could ascertain only on the basis of the witness’ memory by
asking him questions, then I should like to present to him the exact
contents of this memorandum. If on the other hand the Tribunal is of the
opinion...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you the memorandum?
DR. DIX: No, we do not have the memorandum—only in memory—that is to
say, Schacht remembers it.
THE PRESIDENT: If the memorandum is lost and you can prove the loss, you
can put the contents of it to the witness. If the contents are not
relevant it is no good even for the witness. Are the contents of the
document relevant?
DR. DIX: These points which I want to submit I do consider relevant. It
is not very long either. It is not long.
THE PRESIDENT: So far as the question of proof is concerned, the rule
is, I think, if the document has been lost, you can prove the contents
of it and you can put it to the witness. Yes, you can put the main
points to him, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: The question which you put to me involves considerable
responsibility. At the moment I can merely assure you that I am
convinced that the memorandum has been lost; but whether I can prove it,
the negative fact that it is lost, that is something I cannot say at the
moment. I am convinced it is lost.
THE PRESIDENT: Herr Schacht presumably is going to say it was lost. You,
of course, cannot prove it yourself but I mean you can prove it by
Schacht.
DR. DIX: Yes, Schacht will prove it when he becomes a defendant on the
stand.
[_Turning to the witness._] This was in September 1941, that is to say,
after the great successes in Russia by the German Army. Then Schacht
wrote in this memorandum to Hitler that Hitler had now reached the peak
of his success and that this was the most favorable moment for him to
aim at peace. In the case of any further duration of the war...
MR. DODD: I suggest, would it not be more proper for counsel to ask this
witness, first of all, whether or not he recalls the contents of the
memorandum before reading what purports to be the contents?
THE PRESIDENT: I think he should, yes.
DR. DIX: I did not remind him of the contents; I just wanted to recall
to him the individual points. Dr. Lammers has already said that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better put it to him sentence by sentence
and not all at once.
DR. DIX: But, I am not proposing to read it, Your Honors, I am merely
trying to repeat the contents as Schacht remembers them. I cannot read
it, of course, since I do not know it.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you ask the witness if he remembers what the
contents were, not putting it in a leading form.
DR. DIX: Yes, I shall certainly ask him. But I think he has already
answered, that he no longer remembers all the details, therefore I
wanted to aid his memory by recalling the main points.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him what he does remember of it.
DR. DIX: Well then, Dr. Lammers, without my presenting the main points
to you, what do you remember?
LAMMERS: I think that in this memorandum Herr Schacht set forth the
economic capacities of Germany and of foreign countries, that he pointed
out that this period in 1941—I believe it was in the autumn—was the
most favorable moment for peace negotiations, for bringing the war to an
end. He also explained the world situation but I cannot remember how. He
sketched the political situation in other countries. He talked about
America, Italy, Japan, and he compared the factors. After the Führer had
looked at the memorandum he put it aside and he said, “I have already
disapproved of that; I do not want that.”
Further details I do not know.
DR. DIX: When you mention “other countries,” do you remember that he
stated that Italy’s withdrawal was merely a question of time, since the
opposition group around the King would not rest until Mussolini was
brought down?
LAMMERS: Yes, it is possible that it did say that, but I cannot remember
definitely.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD DAY
Tuesday, 9 April 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Lammers resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: Witness, it has been pointed out that I am putting my question
too soon after your answers and that you are replying to my questions
too quickly.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
I should like to take up a matter before the examination of the
witnesses, if I may ask the indulgence of the Tribunal.
I regret to say that this matter of printing documents has proceeded in
its abuses to such an extent that I must close the document room to
printing documents for German counsel. Now, that is a drastic step, but
I know of nothing less that I can do and I submit the situation to the
Tribunal.
We received from the General Secretary’s office an order to print and
have printed a Document Book Number I for Rosenberg. That document book
does not contain one item in its 107 pages that, by any stretch of the
imagination, can be relevant to this proceeding. It is violent
anti-Semitism and the United States simply cannot be put in the
position, even at the order—which I have no doubt was an ill-considered
one—of the Secretary of the Tribunal, of printing and disseminating to
the press just plain anti-Semitism; and that is what this document is.
Now, I ask you to consider what it is.
I should say it consists of two kinds of things: anti-Semitism and what
I would call, with the greatest respect to those who think otherwise,
rubbish. And this is an example of the rubbish we are required to print
at the expense of the United States and I simply cannot be silent any
longer about this:
“The philosophic method suited to bourgeois society is the
critical one. That holds true in a positive as well as a
negative sense. The domination of purely rational form, the
subjugation of nature, the freeing of the autonomous
personality, all that is contained in the method of thinking
classically formulated by Kant, likewise, the isolation of the
individual, the inner depletion of nature and community life,
the connection with the world of form which is contained in
itself and with which, all critical thinking is concerned.”
Now, what in the world are we required to print that for?
Let us look at some of the anti-Semitism. Now, let us look at what we
are actually asked here to disseminate, Page 47 of this document book:
“Actually, the Jews, like the Canaanites in general, like the
Phoenicians and Carthaginians, represent a bastard
population...”
And it goes on largely upon that theme. Then it goes on:
“The Jews are arrogant in success, obsequious in failure, shrewd
and crooked wherever possible, greedy, of remarkable
intelligence, but nevertheless not creative.”
I do not want to take this Tribunal’s time, but last night we received
an additional order to print 260 copies more of this sort of thing, and
I have had to stop the presses; and we cannot accept the duty of
printing this stuff unless it is reviewed by the Tribunal.
Most of this book, as far as we have been able to check it, has already
been rejected by the Tribunal; and nobody pays the least attention to
the Tribunal’s rejection, and we are ordered to print. Now, with the
greatest deference, I want to say that the United States will print any
document that a member of this Tribunal or an alternate certifies, but
we can no longer print these things at the request of the German counsel
nor at the ill-considered directions which we have been receiving.
DR. THOMA: At the moment I want merely to explain that on 8 March 1946 I
was expressly given permission by the Tribunal to quote excerpts from
philosophical books in my document book. Consequently, I have based my
work on the assumption that Rosenberg’s ideology is an offspring of the
so-called new romantic philosophy and have quoted philosophical excerpts
from serious new romantic philosophical works, works which have been
recognized by science.
Secondly, Your Honors, I have earnestly endeavored not to submit any
anti-Semitic books. What has just been read to me must be simply
translation mistakes.
I have quoted the work of a famous Evangelical theological teacher,
Homan-Harling; and secondly, I have quoted a work of a recognized Jewish
scholar, Isma Elbogen; and, thirdly, I have quoted from an excerpt from
the periodical _Kunstschatz_ written by a Jewish university professor,
Moritz Goldstein. I have deliberately refrained from bringing
anti-Semitic propaganda into this courtroom. I request, therefore, that
the documents quoted by me be investigated to see whether they are
really trash and literary rubbish. I still maintain that the works which
I have quoted were written by American, English, and French
scholars—recognized scholars—and that the quotations which Mr. Justice
Jackson has just read about the bastard race, _et cetera_, come as far
as I know, from non-German scholars. But I should have to look at that
once more. At any rate, may I ask the Tribunal that my compilation of
excerpts be investigated to see whether it is in any way nonscientific
or not pertinent.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks that there must
have been some mistake in sending to the Translation Division this book
of documents without having it presented to Counsel for the Prosecution
first. The Tribunal made an order some time ago, saying that Counsel for
the Prosecution should have the right to object to any document before
it is sent to the translation department.
Some difficulty then arose because documents had been mostly in German.
There was a difficulty about Counsel for the Prosecution making up their
minds as to their objections until they have been translated. That
difficulty was presented to us a few days ago; I think you were not in
court at the time, but no doubt other members of the United States
counsel were here. We had a full discussion on the subject, and it was
then agreed that Counsel for the Prosecution should see Counsel for the
Defense and, as far as possible, discuss with them and point out to them
the documents which Counsel for the Prosecution thought ought not to be
translated, and, in case of disagreement, it was ordered that the matter
should be referred to the Tribunal. So that so far as the Tribunal are
concerned, they have done everything that they can to lighten the work
of the Translation Division. Of course, insofar as documents have been
presented to the Translation Division for translation, which the
Tribunal had already denied, that must have been done by mistake because
the General Secretary’s office, no doubt, ought to have refused to hand
over to the Translation Division any document which the Tribunal had
already denied. But the general principles which I have attempted to
explain seem to the Tribunal to be the only principles upon which we can
go, in order to lighten the work of the Translation Division. That is to
say, that Counsel for the Prosecution should meet Counsel for the
Defense and point out to them what documents are so obviously irrelevant
that they ought not to be translated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if Your Honor pleases, I do not think it is a
mistake. It arises from a fundamental difference which this Tribunal has
not, I think, made clear.
What the issues here are—counsel says that he thinks he should try the
new romanticism of Rosenberg. We are charging him for the murder of 4 or
5 million Jews. The question here is one of ideology. The only purpose
in ever referring to the anti-Semitic sentiments is the motive. There is
no purpose here in trying the question of anti-Semitism or the
superiority of races, the fundamental difference in viewpoint. They
believe—and, of course, if they can try this issue with this Tribunal
as a sounding board, it forwards their purpose—they believe in trying
that issue.
The first thing we get is this book with the order to print it. We
cannot tell when they are going to present something in the document
room. I simply must not become a party to this spirit of anti-Semitism.
The United States cannot do it. And the Tribunal’s directions to counsel
are simply being ignored; that is the difficulty here.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know if you have in mind the order which we made
on 8 March 1946, in these terms:
“To avoid unnecessary translation, Defense Counsel will indicate
to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents which
they propose to use, in order that the Prosecution may have an
opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. In the event of
disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense as to the
relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will decide
what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only
the cited passages need be translated, unless the Prosecution
require the translation of the entire document.”
Now, of course, if you are objecting to that ruling on principle, well
and good, but the ruling seems to the Tribunal, up to the present at any
rate, to be the best rule that can be laid down, and we reiterated it
after full discussion a very few days ago.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am calling Your Honor’s attention to the fact
that Your Honor’s order is not being observed and that we are being
given these documents to print without any prior notice. The boys in the
pressroom are not lawyers; they are not in the position to pass on these
things. I do not have the personnel; my personnel, as this Tribunal well
know, is reduced very seriously. I cannot undertake it in the pressroom
here after an order comes from the General Secretary’s office—a review
of what can be done.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, but did you...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The order is not being carried out; that is the
difficulty.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that none of these documents were submitted to
the Counsel for the Prosecution?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The documents were not submitted to Counsel for
Prosecution. They came to the pressroom with an order to print from the
General Secretary’s office. That is what I am arguing, a grievance; one
I shall have to remedy. We are in the very peculiar position, Your
Honor, of being asked to be press agents for these defendants. We were
ordered to print 260 copies of these stencils that I have. The United
States cannot be acting as press agents for the distribution of this
anti-Semitic literature, which we have protested long ago was one of the
vices of the Nazi regime, particularly after they have been argued on
and have been denied by the Court. This, it seems to me, is a flagrant
case of contempt of court, to put these documents through after the
Tribunal has ruled on them and ruled out this whole document book of
Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, so far as these documents have been denied,
they ought never to have been submitted to the translation department.
Might not the Tribunal hear from Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, because he was
here on the previous occasion, the last occasion that we dealt with this
subject?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, my understanding of
the matter is that the Rosenberg documents had been processed—that was
what we were informed—before our last discussion of the matter, and I
therefore suggested to the Tribunal that the practical application of
the proceeding should begin with the documents of the Defendant Frank.
That is what I said to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Then my recollection is that, after we made this rule of
8 March 1946, Counsel for the Prosecution—I think all four prosecutors,
and I rather think the document came in signed by the United States, but
I am not certain of it—pointed out that there were great difficulties
in carrying out this ruling of 8 March, because of the difficulty of
Counsel for the Prosecution making up their minds about what documents
were irrelevant, having regard to the fact that they had to be
translated for them to do it. Is that not so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That difficulty arose with Dr. Horn over the
Ribbentrop documents.
THE PRESIDENT: But a written application was made to the Tribunal to
vary this rule of 8 March 1946, and it was then after that that we had
the subsequent discussion in open court when we came to the conclusion
that we had better adhere to the ruling of 8 March 1946. And I see from
Rosenberg that the documents, these documents, had been processed
already beforehand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Since our last discussion, of course, we have
been trying to get this procedure going. Dr. Dix has met Mr. Dodd and me
on the Schacht documents, and I understand that other learned Defense
Counsel are making arrangements to meet various members with regard to
theirs. But before this time, before the matter arose sharply on the
Ribbentrop documents, there had not been any discussion with Counsel for
the Prosecution. That is the position.
THE PRESIDENT: But what I am pointing out is that that was because the
Prosecution were not carrying out the rule of the 8th March 1946. It may
have been impossible to carry it out, but they were not carrying it out.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know exactly how Your Lordship means,
“The Prosecution were not carrying it out.”
THE PRESIDENT: Both the Prosecution and the Defense, I suppose; because
the application which came to us after the ruling of 8 March 1946 was
made on behalf of the Prosecution that they had such difficulties in
getting translations for the documents that they proposed another
ruling.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if we have not carried it
out. It is the first time that anybody suggested this to me...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not mean to criticize you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all have taken immense trouble. Everyone
co-operated in every way. I was not aware that we were at fault; I am
very sorry if we were.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not mean that, Sir David, but I think there was a
difficulty in carrying this out, and I think there was a proposal that
the rule should be varied. I will look into that and see whether I am
right about it. I remember seeing such an application, and then we had
the subsequent discussion in open court in which we decided to adhere to
this rule of 8 March; and no doubt this difficulty has arisen, as you
pointed out, because of the Rosenberg documents’ having been processed
before.
Probably the best course would be now...
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._]
Mr. Justice Jackson, wouldn’t the best course be for you to object in
writing to all the documents which you object to, and then they will be
dealt with by the Tribunal after argument.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But, Your Honor, the Tribunal has once rejected the
documents, and yet we get an order to print. The Tribunal’s orders are
not being observed, and—I do not want to criticize counsel—but we have
had no opportunity to pass on these. These stencils that I stopped
running last night are not anything that has been submitted to us. They
have no possible place in the legitimate issues of this Tribunal, and we
will get nowhere talking to Dr. Thoma about it. He thinks their
philosophy is an issue.
What I think must be done here, if we are going to get this solved, is
that the Tribunal—if I may make a suggestion, which I do with great
deference; I may be a biased judge of what ought to be done; I never
pretended to complete impartiality—that the Tribunal name a master to
represent it in passing these things. We won’t finish this by discussion
between Dr. Thoma and anybody I can name. My suggestion is that an
official pass on these documents before they are translated. If the
master finds a doubtful matter he can refer it back to you. We should
not be in the position either of agreeing or of disagreeing with them in
any final sense, of course. I realize it is too big a burden to put on
the Tribunal to pass on these papers in advance and too big a burden on
the United States to keep printing them. Paper is a scarce commodity
today. Over 25,000 sheets have gone into the printing of a book that has
been rejected. I think there is no possible way except that a lawyer
with some idea of relevance and irrelevance represents this Tribunal in
passing on these things in advance, rather than leaving it to counsel.
I would not even venture to sit down with Dr. Thoma, because we start
from totally different viewpoints. He wants to justify anti-Semitism. I
think it is not an issue here. It is the murder of Jews, of human
beings, that is an issue here, not whether the Jewish race is or is not
liked by the Germans. We do not care about that. It is a matter of
settling these issues.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): With
the Tribunal’s permission, I would like to add a few words to what Mr.
Jackson has said.
I do not wish to criticize the counsel either, but the Tribunal has
already said that there may possibly be a mistake. And I would like to
draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this mistake took
place too often. I will permit myself to remind you about the documents
in connection with the Versailles Treaty, which were rejected by the
Tribunal in the most decided manner as not relevant; the Tribunal will
remember also that a considerable amount of time was spent in listening
to the reading of the documents presented by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Horn.
And I would like to remind the Tribunal about another fact, when another
decision of the Tribunal was violated. Perhaps it was done by mistake;
perhaps not. It took place when one of the documents which was presented
by Dr. Seidl was published in the papers before it was accepted by the
Tribunal as evidence. And it seems to me that it would be very useful if
the Tribunal could, for the purpose of saving time, guarantee more
effectively that the rules set out by the Tribunal should be obeyed, not
only by the Prosecution, who always follow them carefully, but also by
the Defense Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: I am very much disconcerted by the reproach that I have not
followed the instructions of the Tribunal. During discussions regarding
which documents were admissible, I explained in detail just which
philosophical works I want to quote from and why. It has been stated
during the case for the Prosecution, that Rosenberg invented his
philosophy for the purpose of aggressive war and for the committing of
war crimes, _et cetera_. I considered it my duty to prove that this
so-called national...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell the Tribunal where the Prosecution states
that he invented his philosophy, whether in the Indictment or in the
presentation?
DR. THOMA: I can prove it. It appears in the Churchill speech; and also
in the speech by Justice Jackson there are similar expressions that
Rosenberg’s philosophy had led to that.
THE PRESIDENT: You say it appears in Churchill’s speech?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What have we got to do with that? I asked you whether the
Prosecution alleged it in the Indictment or alleged it in the course of
the presentation of the Prosecution, and you answer me that Mr.
Churchill...
DR. THOMA: No, it is not Churchill, but rather Mr. Justice Jackson. In
his presentation he said things, the sense of which was about the same.
Consequently I felt that it was my duty to present to the Tribunal that
philosophy which, before Rosenberg, raised similar arguments and which
is indeed the philosophy of the entire world.
Regarding the presentation of the document book, the following happened:
The Translation Division asked me to submit my document book without
delay, as they had time at the moment to deal with it before it was
handed to the Tribunal. So the Translation Division actually received
this document earlier than the Tribunal. But the Tribunal in their
resolution of 8 March 1946 had expressly given me permission to use
quotations from these philosophical works; they refused me only the
anti-Semitic works of Goldstein, Elbogen, and Homan-Harling.
Consequently I immediately informed the Tribunal that documents were
contained in my document book which had not been granted me.
And now, Your Honors, something of great importance: I have just
ascertained that the quotation which Mr. Justice Jackson has just read
comes from a French research scholar, Mr. Larouche.
Secondly, I have marked with red pencil those passages in my document
book which were to be translated. The passage quoted by Mr. Justice
Jackson was not marked in red and was not meant to be included in the
document book. This is a regrettable error.
Thirdly, I should like to refer to the fact—my attention has just been
called to this—that the passage reads literally, “Rosenberg developed
the philosophical technique of the conspiracy and thus created an
educational system for an aggressive war.” That was the expression in
Mr. Justice Jackson’s presentation. I therefore felt justified in
pointing out that this entire philosophy was already in the air and was
a philosophical necessity which had to make its appearance. I therefore
believe that I have cleared myself of the accusation of not having
obeyed the ruling of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, were these documents sent to the
pressroom or were they sent to the translation department?
DR. THOMA: In my opinion, they were sent to the Translation Division,
since this department had told me that they had time at the moment, but
expected a terrible rush soon. I had my document ready and I gave it to
the Translation Division.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson stated apparently that they had been
sent to the pressroom and were being disseminated to the public in that
way, but on the outside of each document book there is this notice that
they are not to be publicized until they are presented before the
Tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as
evidence. Therefore, any documents which are sent to the translation
room are not disseminated, or ought not to be disseminated to the press
and ought not to be publicized until they are presented before this
Tribunal.
There seem to be a number of misunderstandings about this which seem to
have arisen principally from the fact that you submitted your documents
to the translation department before they had been submitted to the
Tribunal, and therefore some of them got translated which were
subsequently denied by the Tribunal. Is that right?
DR. THOMA: No, Your Honors, that is not right. First of all, this was
actually a matter of internal procedure in the various offices of the
Translation Division. I gave the Translation Division this document book
because they asked me to do so, and then...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say who had asked whom. I said that the
translation department got the documents for translation. They received
them before they were submitted to the Tribunal, and, in consequence,
they translated certain documents which were subsequently denied by the
Tribunal.
DR. THOMA: The only rejected works were, as is known, the three
anti-Semitic works. That these documents from the courtroom reached the
press I naturally did not know. I was merely trying to lighten the work
of the Translation Division. I subsequently informed the General
Secretary that I had submitted the document book and I referred him to
it. The quotations from my philosophical works, however, were granted to
me later. I want to point out again that I was always of the opinion
that this was an entirely internal matter and that these documents could
by no means reach the press. I was not informed about that. I am very
well aware that quotations not read in court are not supposed to reach
the press. I have adhered to that rule. Nothing has as yet been stated
in court and therefore it should not reach the press.
THE PRESIDENT: As you no doubt know, the first granting of documents
when they are applied for is expressly provisional, and afterwards you
have to submit your documents in open court, as Dr. Horn did, and then
the Tribunal rules upon their admissibility; and this other rule was
introduced for the purpose of preventing undue translation. It was
decided then that after the Tribunal had given its provisional ruling as
to what was provisionally relevant, you should then submit the passages
you wanted to quote, to the Prosecution Counsel to give them an
opportunity to object, so that the translation department should not be
unduly burdened. That, as you have explained and as Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe has said, was not carried out in your case, partly
possibly, because, as you say, the Translation Division was prepared to
undertake certain work. Therefore, documents were submitted to them
which the Tribunal subsequently ruled to be inadmissible.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I correct something which has led to
misunderstanding? I did not mean to say that counsel had sent the
documents to the press in the sense of a newspaper press. They were sent
to the press, the printing press. They were, of course, printed. The 260
copies we were ordered to print contained the usual release notice that
they were not to be released until used. They have not reached the
press, and I did not mean to say that they had been sent to the
newspaper press; they were sent to our printing press.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Your Honors, before a resolution is made to the matter under
discussion, I should like to make just a few remarks, not referring to
the case of Rosenberg but to the Defense in general. Very serious
accusations against the entire Defense have been raised. The expression
was used that the Prosecution was not the press agent of the Defense.
The accusation was raised that the Defense were trying to make
propaganda, and then these accusations reached their peak in the most
serious charge which one can possibly make in reference to a participant
in a trial, that of contempt of Court.
In the name of all Defense Counsel I oppose these heavy accusations with
the best and strongest argument possible, that of an absolutely clean
and pure conscience in this respect. Anyone who has listened to the
debate of the last 30 minutes must have recognized that the differences
of opinion, which have cropped up here and on which the Tribunal will
now have to announce a decision, are due again to misunderstandings
which have occurred in this courtroom.
Mr. Justice Jackson has generously made it clear that he was not talking
about the newspaper press when he said “press,” but about the printing
press. My colleague Dr. Thoma has stated that the only reason why these
documents went to the Translation Division, was the fact that the
Translation Division, very understandingly and reasonably from their
point of view, had said, “We do not have very much work at the moment.
Please let us have it, and we can start to translate it.” I believe that
we could avoid all these difficulties if we mutually agree that both
parties, the Prosecution and the Defense, are working with good will and
loyalty, and that the thought of deliberately disregarding the rulings
of the Tribunal is far from us. Errors and mistakes can always happen.
May I just remind you that this leakage of news to the press, that some
announcements were released to the press before they were actually the
subject of proceedings here in court, that that was something that
happened quite frequently at the beginning of the Trial. I do not want
to mention examples since the Tribunal knows that it was not the
Defense. I do not know who it was; at any rate it was not the Defense.
But I make no charges. Things like that do happen, and such an apparatus
as this Trial must have a breaking-in period. There was no ill will at
that time either. But I remind you that it was we, the Defense—I was
the spokesman—who quite energetically supported the ruling that only
such matters should reach the press as had been introduced into the
record here in the public sessions, and that it was after that that the
Tribunal passed its ruling. Previously it had been different.
I never considered that an insult, but rather merely the God-given
dependence of human beings. For instance, it was impossible for me to
get the Charter, the basis of our Trial, at the beginning of the Trial,
but eventually it was graciously placed at my disposal by the press.
Thus whenever so complicated an apparatus is set in motion, there are
naturally many errors and mistakes. But we have now already begun with
Sir David to deal with questions of documents in the most practical
manner possible. As long as we had only the German text, we conferred
with the Prosecution in order to find out what passages the Prosecution
believe they can object to. There were technical difficulties,
linguistic difficulties, as long as we had only the German text and the
Prosecutors spoke other languages. I spoke to the Prosecution, and we
realized the problem confronting the other partners. But that, too,
could be solved with good will; when necessary we used an interpreter.
Thus it was an excellent and a practical method, first, for saving the
Translation Division unnecessary work and, secondly, for saving the
Tribunal unnecessary decisions. And it was working beautifully; it had a
good start. I want to claim for the Defense—and I am sure that Sir
David will not contradict me—that this was really our idea as well as
the practice to co-operate in coming to an unofficial agreement
beforehand by conferring with the Prosecution.
The Defense in this Trial are in a very difficult position. I think
every one of you will admit that human ability and an almost exceptional
degree of political tact is required in order to defend in this Trial
without ever making some small mistake. At any rate, I, for myself, do
not claim that I am absolutely sure of myself in this respect or that I
will not perhaps commit some small faux pas. We find ourselves in a very
difficult situation, difficult as far as the world is concerned,
difficult as far as the Tribunal are concerned, and difficult as far as
the German public is concerned.
May I urge Mr. Justice Jackson to appreciate our difficult task and not
to raise such accusations as those which, unfortunately, we often have
to read in the German press. We cannot always, when we are attacked in
newspaper articles in which unjust accusations are raised against us,
run to the Tribunal and say, “Please help us.” The Tribunal have more
important tasks than that of continuously protecting the Defense.
However, as to the particular accusation that National Socialist
propaganda or that anti-Semitic propaganda is being made here, I think I
can say, with a clear conscience, that none of the Defense Counsel, no
matter what his own philosophy or what his political views in the past
may have been, has ever dreamed of trying to use this courtroom to make
ideological propaganda for the dead—I emphasize the word “dead”—world
of the Third Reich. That would not only be wrong; it would be worse than
a wrong; I might say, using Talleyrand’s words, that it would be
unbearable stupidity to do a thing like that.
But, just because we are being attacked and because we cannot defend
ourselves, and because we cannot decently ask the Tribunal to protect us
against every accusation, I am asking Mr. Justice Jackson to clear the
atmosphere somewhat and to state to us that these serious
accusations—contempt of Court, anti-Semitic propaganda, or National
Socialist propaganda, and so forth—were not really meant to be raised
seriously.
I think that the friendly co-operation which has existed between us and
the Prosecution so far—I must openly confess that I look back to this
co-operation with gratitude and that I wholeheartedly acknowledge the
help and comradeship which these gentlemen have shown me. This should be
preserved. Where would it lead us, if we were to oppose each other here
like fighting cocks in the cock-pit? We are all pursuing the same aim.
Not only do I ask him to do this but, knowing him as I do, I am sure
that even without my request he will make a statement in order to clear
the atmosphere in regard to this accusation which is extremely painful
not only for the Defense but also for the entire Court.
May I thank you, Your Honor, for being good enough to listen to me for
so long; but I believe that the matter was sufficiently important to
call for further co-operation, without friction and in the interest of
the cause, between the Prosecution and the Defense.
DR. THOMA: Your Honors, I ask to be permitted a few words in order to
make a factual correction.
I should like to quote exactly in which passage it becomes apparent that
Rosenberg is being held solely responsible for the mistaken ideology. It
says in the presentation of the case for the American Prosecution, on
Page 2254 (Volume V, Page 41) of the German transcript, that Rosenberg
remodeled the German educational system in order to expose the German
people to the will of the conspirators and to prepare the German nation
psychologically for a war of aggression. That is a quotation which is
here at my disposal.
Secondly—one word more, I am forced to reply in person to the
accusation raised by Mr. Justice Jackson—I must state something which I
should normally not have said in this courtroom, namely, that I have
told Herr Rosenberg repeatedly, “Herr Rosenberg, I cannot defend your
anti-Semitism; that, you have to do yourself.” For that reason I have
limited my documents considerably, but have considered it my duty to
place at Rosenberg’s disposal every means necessary for him to defend
himself on this point.
I should like to draw your attention once more to the fact that this
passage which has been quoted by Mr. Justice Jackson was not marked in
red in the document book and has been included by error.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly do not want to be unfair to our
adversaries; I know they have a very difficult job. However, I hope the
Tribunal has before it—and I shall withdraw all characterizations and
let what I have to say stand on the facts—the order of 8 March 1946,
Paragraph 3 thereof. I call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact
that that reads, “The following documents are denied as irrelevant:
Rosenberg...” And then follows a list of documents: _Kunstwart_,
_History of the Jews in Germany_, _History of the Jewish People_. Those
are the only three that I shall take time to call to your attention.
Two days after that order Rosenberg’s counsel filed with this Tribunal,
on 10 March 1946, a rather lengthy memorandum in which he renewed his
request for quotations from the books listed.
On 23 March 1946, this Tribunal again denied that request as irrelevant.
I will now hand to you the stencils which we were ordered, by the order
of 8 April 1946, to print. They are a little difficult to read. The
first is a quotation from the _History of the Jewish People_, one of the
prohibited books. The next is a quotation from _Kunstwart_, another of
the prohibited documents. And the third is from the _History of the Jews
in Germany_, the third of the books that I have mentioned.
We have not had time to examine all of these stencils, but a hurried
examination of them indicates that they are very largely, if not
entirely, quotations from the prohibited documents.
I will make no characterization of it; I simply rest on those facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, doesn’t the whole point turn upon
the date at which those documents were submitted to the translation
department? Because what Dr. Thoma says is that in consequence of the
translation department’s being ready to accept documents, he handed them
in before they were actually denied by the Tribunal. And if that is so,
it would be obvious, would it not...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: My Lord, I do not know what he said. I did not
understand that they were handed in before 8 March 1946. But in any
event, even if they were translated, the order to us to print is dated 8
April 1946 and was delivered with them on 8 April. Now certainly there
was time after the denial to have stopped our spending of money and
effort printing things that had been prohibited, and which were
prohibited twice.
I will not characterize it; the facts speak for themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, can you help us about the dates at all? Can
you help us as to this? Mr. Justice Jackson has stated that after these
three documents had been refused in the first instance, you then renewed
your request for them on 10 March 1946 and that on 23 March 1946 they
were finally denied.
Well now, when did you send the documents to the translation room?
DR. THOMA: The documents, I believe, were given to the Translation
Division before 8 March. There was a session regarding the admissibility
of documents; and it was about that time, before a decision had been
made, that the Translation Division had been in touch with my secretary
and asked her to hand in the document book, since they had heard that it
was ready.
I then endeavored in this courtroom to have the philosophy admitted and
had the impression that the Tribunal would not want to agree to these
documents. Thereupon I once more submitted a written application to the
Tribunal in order to have these documents admitted. When I was then
informed that the anti-Semitic books would not be permitted—and that
was a few days after the date of this decision—I informed the Tribunal
that I wanted to draw their attention to the fact that books which had
not been approved were being translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, quite naturally, you are not able to give us
the exact dates at this moment, but we will look into this matter fully.
DR. THOMA: I should like once more to draw your attention to the fact
that I myself pointed out that there are excerpts in the document book
which had been refused. I beg you to draw from that the conclusion that
I was not trying to do anything which was not permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, if the document had been denied, the proper
course would have been to withdraw the documents from, or to communicate
with the Translation Division notifying them that they should be
withdrawn.
However, the Tribunal thinks that the best course in this matter would
be for the Tribunal to consider Mr. Justice Jackson’s suggestion. That
is, in order to relieve the Prosecution of the task of deciding or
objecting to the documents which are to be submitted to the translation
rooms, that matter should be considered by somebody deputed by the
Tribunal as a master.
The Tribunal thinks that Mr. Justice Jackson or the prosecutor’s
committee should apply in writing to strike out all the irrelevant
documents of which they complain in the document book on behalf of the
Defendant Rosenberg, which has been submitted.
Third, for the present the Tribunal would adhere to the system which
they have established with the consent of the prosecuting counsel.
The only thing I need add to that is that I find that I was right in
saying that the Court Contact Committee of the Prosecutors did apply to
the Tribunal on 29 March 1946—I have the document before me—requesting
the Tribunal to vary the ruling which they had made, namely, Ruling 297,
made on 8 March 1946.
DR. THOMA: I actually visited the officer and told him that the
documents must be taken out, that they must not stay in. However, it
transpired that hundreds of copies had already been bound and prepared
and I was told, “Well, after all, they are not going to be quoted, so
they might as well stay in since they are not going to be quoted.” I
expressly made the request to have them taken out of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I did not mean that the Tribunal were asking
the Prosecution to apply in writing to strike out documents which have
already been rejected. Those documents, of course, will go out without
any application; but if and insofar as there are other documents
contained in the Rosenberg document book to which the Prosecution
object, then they might conveniently apply, although, of course, that
matter will have to be discussed in open court.
As I have already pointed out, the granting of any documents is
expressly provided to be provisional, and the application for the final
admission of the documents has to be made in open court.
The Tribunal will have a report made to it by the General Secretary as
to these dates and these matters. And now the Tribunal will adjourn for
10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have come to the conclusion that it will
save time if the defendants are called first as the first witness in the
case of each defendant; and, therefore, in the future the defendant must
be called first unless there are some exceptional reasons, in which case
defendant’s counsel may apply to the Tribunal and the Tribunal will
consider those reasons for calling the defendant in some position later
than first witness.
Yes, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: Witness, I had started to say that it had been pointed out to
me that I had asked my questions too quickly after you had given your
answers and that you were answering too quickly after I had put the
question. The interpreters cannot follow, nor can the stenographers. I
ask you, therefore—and I shall do the same—to pause after each
question. I am sure that the Tribunal will not interpret these pauses as
meaning that you are not sure of your answers.
Yesterday you made detailed statements to the Tribunal regarding the
various applications for resignation which Schacht presented to Hitler
and regarding various moves and proposals for peace which Schacht made
or wanted to make, orally or in writing, during the war to be delivered
by you to Hitler. We were speaking about such a memorandum of the summer
of 1941, and I had the feeling that the Tribunal have procedural
objections because I was putting the contents of the document to the
witness and having him confirm them. The copy of this document is in the
strong box which has already been mentioned repeatedly and which was
confiscated on Schacht’s estate by the Red Army when the Red Army
marched in. Despite all efforts the Russian Delegation have not yet
succeeded in getting this strong box.
Although some rather good passages are contained therein, I am perfectly
willing to break off here and to put these questions to Herr Schacht if
the Tribunal would prefer that. May I have the Tribunal’s decision on
this question; if necessary I can cease to discuss the memorandum any
further.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had no objection to your asking this witness
about it, but they thought you ought not to put a leading question and
that you ought to ask the witness if he remembers the document and what
the contents of the document were; not to put to him that it was such
and such in the document or some other passage in the document, but just
to ask him what the contents of the document were.
DR. DIX: The dividing line between leading questions and putting the
contents of a document to the witness, a document which the witness does
not remember exactly, is rather fluid. Therefore, I should prefer to
have Herr Schacht give the rest of the contents of the memorandum; then
we would avoid these difficulties. I shall therefore leave this point
and proceed to another field.
Witness, you quite correctly stated yesterday in answer to a question in
connection with the defense of Funk by my colleague, Dr. Sauter, how it
was the practice in 1939, that Hitler simply decreed that the Reichsbank
would have to give so much credit. I want to avoid a mistaken impression
on the part of the Tribunal as to the former position of the Reichsbank
in regard to this question.
You know that by Hitler’s decree, the Reichsbank in January 1939 lost
its former independence. In this decree Hitler ordered that he would
decide what credits the Reichsbank would have to give; and this
restricted decree of Hitler’s was announced and became effective as a
law in June 1939.
Therefore, in order that the Tribunal get a proper impression of the
general and also of the former position of the Reichsbank, I am asking
you how the situation was before January 1939, that is, during Schacht’s
term in office as Reichsbank President, which ended, as is known, in
January 1939. Was it possible at that time for Hitler simply to decree
that so much credit was to be given, or was the Reichsbank still
independent and could it refuse such credit or cancel it?
LAMMERS: I do not remember the legal regulations which existed in this
connection to such an extent that I can give a complete answer as to
when and how they were altered. I can confirm one thing, however; that
is that during the period when Herr Schacht was President of the
Reichsbank he must have made certain difficulties for the Führer with
reference to the granting of these credits. I was not present at the
discussions between the Führer and Schacht, but I know from statements
made by the Führer that regarding those credits he met with considerable
difficulties and restraints on Schacht’s part, restraints which finally
brought about Schacht’s resignation from his position as President of
the Reichsbank. On the other hand, I know that at the moment when Funk
became President of the Reichsbank, these difficulties ceased to exist.
These were obviously removed by legal regulations and also by orders
which the Führer had given; for when Funk became President of the
Reichsbank, these credits were simply handled in the way which I
described yesterday, when I described the technical procedure; in the
main orders for credits and Reich loans from the Reichsbank were merely
a simple matter of signature for the Führer. They were a matter...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think he is able to answer your question,
really. I do not think he is able to answer the question which you put
to him, which was as to the position before 1939, so I think you must
rely upon the decrees and documents.
DR. DIX: One moment, Herr Lammers: I shall clarify that right away. You
have just stated how things were handled in practice in 1939, in the
books. Do you not remember that the Reichsbank had previously been
independent as far as the Government was concerned?
LAMMERS: Yes, I do remember. I also recollect that certain legal
alterations were made, but I cannot remember just when. Without seeing
the law books I cannot tell you exactly the contents of these legal
regulations, just what the limitations were in terms of figures. All I
do know is that the position of the President of the Reichsbank was
later reduced considerably according to orders coming from the Führer.
DR. DIX: That is enough. Now, as to the same subject: It is very
difficult even for a German who has lived here the whole time but
particularly for a foreigner, to understand the powerful machinery of
the Third Reich. I think that in spite of the statements that you made
yesterday in answer to the questions which my colleague, Sauter, put to
you, not everything has yet been said and that you can say still more to
inform the Tribunal. If I did not know what you know, if I were an
outsider, then your statements of yesterday would give me the
impression: Well, it was like this—the Reich Minister of the Interior
could not give orders to the Police; the Reich Minister of Economy did
not direct economy independently; all Reich Ministers were without
official authority and could not give instructions as far as the Reich
commissioners for the occupied territories were concerned.
MR. DODD: If Your Honors please, I respectfully suggest that Dr. Dix is
really testifying here. I think perhaps he could put his questions more
simply and we can get along faster and get the answer better.
DR. DIX: I shall put my questions more precisely, but I cannot put that
question precisely unless I first of all ascertain, by means of
statements, what has not yet been said up to now. Otherwise the most
precise and shortest question cannot be put, for the Tribunal would not
understand what I am aiming at. I can assure Mr. Dodd, I shall not ask
anything of an uncertain nature; rather I shall put a very precise
question. Let us proceed at once.
[_Turning to the witness._] We have already talked about the office of
the Reichsbank President. Now I should like to ask you: If all these
ministers were so hampered in respect to their authority, who were the
men and who were the authorities who could interfere in departmental
jurisdiction and who held the real power? That is my question. And I
might mention that as far as Frank is concerned, Himmler’s interference
has already been mentioned. But we must go into that question more
deeply so that the Tribunal can see clearly what we are talking about.
LAMMERS: The infringement on the authority of the individual ministers
arose because of the number of institutions which the Führer had created
obviously quite consciously as a counterpoise, I might say, to the
various ministers. That is the one faction. Secondly, it was done
through offices created on a higher level, which, in the interest of a
certain uniformity in particular fields, were to have sole authority. In
the last category the typical example is, in the first instance, the
Four Year Plan. In this connection the Führer desired a comprehensive
unified direction which was not to depend on the wishes of the ministers
of the departments, and consequently, he created the Four Year Plan. In
other sectors, in some way or other, the minister was confronted with a
counterpart; for instance, by the appointment of Herr Ley as Reich
Commissioner for Housing the Minister for Labor lost his jurisdiction in
the important field of housing. He was relieved of one of his main
duties by the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, Herr Sauckel, in the field of labor employment. As
far as economy was concerned, the Minister of Economy, as I have already
mentioned, was considerably limited in his powers by the setting up of
the Four Year Plan and the powers given to it and later, in addition to
that, by the powers which were transferred to the Minister for Armament
and War Production. In the Ministry of the Interior the actual authority
of the Chief of the German Police...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that once the general aspect
of the matter has been explained by the witness the matter can be
explained by the defendants themselves from their particular point of
view. I mean the witness is now explaining to us, and probably
indicating he will do it at some length, that with reference to the Four
Year Plan, for instance, there was to be a unified command which was not
to be interfered with by individual ministers. That explains the general
system and when it comes to the individual defendants they can explain
how it applied to them, and, therefore, we do not want this dealt with
at any great length or in any great detail.
DR. DIX: I shall take that into consideration and ask merely a few more
concrete questions.
It is not merely a question, Your Lordship, of the ministers having had
to hand over certain fields in their departments to third persons, but
there is also the fact that third persons, because of their authority,
actually interfered in a field which was really under the jurisdiction
of the minister. And now I shall give the witness a lead: What was, for
example, the position of Reichsleiter Bormann?
LAMMERS: The Reichsleiter Bormann was a successor to Reich Minister
Hess.
DR. DIX: And as far as interference in the ministries is concerned?
LAMMERS: He was appointed secretary to the Führer by the Führer and was
thereby directly included in the State sector. As Chief of the Party
Chancellery he was merely the successor to Reich Minister Hess, who was
supposed to represent the wishes and ideas of the Party. The fact that
he was appointed secretary to the Führer, which meant that in the State
sector a considerable number of things would have to go through
Bormann’s hands gained him a strong position in the State affairs. I had
to experience this personally to a large extent, since I, who originally
had at least been able, on occasion, to report to the Führer alone,
could no longer do that and could get to the Führer only by way of
Bormann. Most of my reports were given in Bormann’s presence and
everything which I formerly had been able to dispatch to the Führer
directly, even pure and simple matters of State, had now to go through
the Secretary of the Führer, through Bormann.
DR. DIX: This resulted, of course, in Bormann’s influence in the various
ministries?
LAMMERS: Yes, he had that influence, for all departmental matters which
I could not settle by reporting them to the Führer directly or by asking
for his decision had to be made in writing and had to go through
Bormann. I would then receive word from Bormann saying this or that is
the Führer’s decision. The possibility of a personal report, which would
have enabled me to speak on behalf of the minister for whom I was
reporting, was lacking. They were not my own affairs; they were always
complaints or protests or differences of opinion among the members of
the Cabinet which I finally could no longer take to the Führer
personally.
DR. DIX: Thank you, that is enough.
And what you say about Bormann, does that not apply to some extent to
the Gauleiter, too, who also interfered in the ministries?
LAMMERS: Gauleiter as such, had, of course, to go through the Party
Chancellery; that was the prescribed channel for them. Since the
Gauleiter as a rule, however, were at the same time heads of Prussian
provinces or Reichsstatthalter these two positions were, of course,
somewhat mixed up; and a number of matters, instead of going through the
prescribed channels from the minister concerned and through me, went
directly from the Gauleiter to Reichsleiter Bormann. There are, in fact,
cases where this channel was chosen deliberately.
DR. DIX: Thank you. Regarding the position of Himmler in the same
respect, that of the appointment of a third person with authority, you
made statements yesterday in connection with the cases of Frank and
Frick. Can your statement be extended, in fact, to all leading
ministries, with reference to the increased power given to Himmler and
the SS and his Police?
LAMMERS: I did not quite understand the question.
DR. DIX: You did not hear the question?
LAMMERS: I did not understand the question completely.
DR. DIX: Well, under the heading “interference with other departments”
you have talked about Bormann and you have talked about Gauleiter;
yesterday you talked about Himmler, his Police, and his SS with
reference to the cases of Frick and Frank. I am now asking you whether
this increasing power of Himmler’s and the SS did not similarly affect
the other ministries?
LAMMERS: To a considerable extent in the most varied fields.
DR. DIX: That exhausts that question.
I am now coming back to Schacht. We have talked about the applications
for resignation. Now we come to the actual dismissal. Ministers who were
dismissed were usually given a letter of dismissal by Hitler?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: And this letter of dismissal, I assume, was drafted by you and
discussed with Hitler?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Was considerable attention paid by Hitler to the wording of
this letter of thanks on the occasion of a dismissal?
LAMMERS: Hitler usually looked at it carefully and he frequently made
his own improvements, a sharper or a milder wording.
DR. DIX: The two letters of dismissal, Your Honors, which concern
Schacht’s dismissal from his office as President of the Reichsbank and
as Minister without Portfolio are included in my document book as
evidence. Therefore I do not propose to put them to the witness to any
extent. There are only two sentences I propose to quote in the letter of
dismissal from Hitler to Schacht on the occasion of his dismissal from
his position as President of the Reichsbank: “Your name particularly
will always be connected with the first period of national rearmament.”
Schacht considered that this sentence was written deliberately and that
it contained a slight reprimand, a limitation of the praise he was
getting. What is your view to this question, as one concerned in the
drafting of that letter of dismissal?
LAMMERS: As far as I can recollect, I drafted the letter in such a way
that a general expression of thanks was made to Schacht. This additional
sentence is due to a personal insertion by the Führer, as far as I can
recollect, because it was not like me to make such a subtle difference
here.
DR. DIX: In a later letter of dismissal of 22 January 1943, not signed
by Hitler, but by you by order of the Führer it is said:
“The Führer, with regard to your general attitude in this
present fateful struggle of the German people, has decided to
relieve you temporarily of your office as Reich Minister.”
Herr Schacht’s feeling regarding his personal safety could not have been
exactly pleasant when he read that sentence.
May I ask you, since you drafted this letter on Hitler’s order, was
Schacht’s anxiety unjustified?
LAMMERS: As to the reasons which caused the Führer to dismiss Schacht, I
know merely that a letter from Schacht to Reich Marshal Göring caused
the Führer to dismiss Schacht from his position. The Führer did not
inform me of the actual reasons. He was very violent and ordered me to
use this text, implying that he even wanted it to be somewhat sterner,
but I put it in the rather acceptable form which you find in this
letter. The Führer did not tell me, of course, what further measures
were intended against Schacht. But he had expressly ordered me to use
the word “temporarily.”
DR. DIX: A last question: Originally I had intended to ask you in
detail, as the person best informed on these points, about the slow
development from the year 1933 until Hitler’s complete autocracy. The
answers which you gave to my colleagues yesterday have, in the main,
settled these questions. I do not want to repeat them. But two questions
I should like to have clarified. The Enabling Act of 1933—that is the
law by which the Reichstag deprived itself of its powers—did this law
empower Hitler, the Reich Cabinet, or the Reich Government?
LAMMERS: This Enabling Act gave legislative powers and the right to
alter the Constitution to the Reich Government, and the Reich
Government, in turn, used this power to alter the Constitution, both
expressly as well as by implication, by creating public law based on
usage which...
DR. DIX: Yes, thank you. You explained that yesterday. You do not need
to go into that again. Yesterday you pointed out that this Reich
Government consisted not only of National Socialists but that the
majority of their members belonged to other parties. You mentioned only
members of the German National Party, such as Hugenberg, Dr. Dorpmüller,
and Gürtner, and you mentioned the Stahlhelm, the head of which was
Seldte; but you forgot—and that is why I am asking you—to mention the
Center Party. Is it true that Herr Von Papen came from the Center Party?
LAMMERS: Yes, I admit that is correct; but I do not know whether Herr
Von Papen was a member of the Center Party or not.
DR. DIX: In my opinion you talk in rather scholarly and euphemistic
terms about public law based on usage. I am going to give it a different
name, but let us not discuss that. All I want you to tell me is whether
during that gradual development toward complete dictatorship by Hitler,
there were some other laws which were important and, as such,
significant?
Do you not consider the law after Hindenburg’s death which unified the
offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President with the result
that the incumbent of this office became simultaneously the supreme
military commander to whom the Wehrmacht swore their oath—do you not
consider that law a further milestone in that development?
LAMMERS: That law was one of the most important milestones in this
development, particularly because, by decree of the Reich Government, it
was confirmed by a plebiscite with nearly 100 percent votes.
DR. DIX: And no further laws were issued to support this development?
LAMMERS: No, I do not know of any.
DR. DIX: Nor do I.
And the other question is whether a combination of terror and ruse can
be called public law based on usage and whether one should want to call
it that. That is a question I do not want to raise at the moment; I
think we are of different opinions in that connection.
Your Lordship, I have now finished my questions to the witness Lammers
on behalf of my client. But my colleague Dr. Kubuschok is away on duty.
I do not think the airplane took off yesterday and therefore I do not
think that he can be back. He asked me to question the witness on behalf
of Herr Von Papen, and I wanted to ask the Tribunal whether I may ask
the witness the question now—there is only one short question—or
whether I should wait until Papen’s defense comes up at the proper time.
THE PRESIDENT: No, now, because this witness will not be called again
except for some very exceptional reason.
DR. DIX: No, I meant, did you want me to ask the question later today,
when Von Papen’s turn comes in the proper sequence of defendants?
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on now. I think you had better ask it now.
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] Please call to mind the Röhm
Putsch. Papen’s experiences during that revolt will be discussed later.
But do you remember that Von Papen, who was Vice Chancellor at the time,
demanded his dismissal from Hitler on 3 July 1934, and received this
dismissal?
LAMMERS: Yes, I cannot tell you whether the date is right, but it
happened right about that time.
DR. DIX: Do you also remember whether a short time afterwards, probably
only a few days afterwards, between 7 and 10 July, you went to see Herr
Von Papen by order of Hitler and asked him whether he was prepared to
accept the position of Ambassador to the Vatican?
LAMMERS: I can remember that I visited Von Papen and, acting on the
Führer’s order, was to give him the prospect of another position and
that this concerned a position with the Holy See. But whether I had been
ordered to make him a direct offer, that I cannot recollect now.
DR. DIX: Do you remember what Papen replied to that?
LAMMERS: At that time he was not very much inclined to accept such a
position.
DR. DIX: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, on 21
March 1942 Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary for Allocation of
Labor. What were the reasons for Sauckel’s being chosen for this
position?
LAMMERS: The Führer was of the opinion that the allocation of labor had
not been pushed with the necessary intensity by the Reich Minister for
Labor and that this task would, therefore, have to be transferred to a
particularly energetic person.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Führer demand the use of foreign workers with
particular emphasis?
LAMMERS: He demanded that all laborers who could possibly be made
available should be used.
DR. SERVATIUS: Particularly with reference to foreign laborers?
LAMMERS: Yes, foreign countries were also mentioned in that connection,
because at home we had exhausted all possibilities.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive the assignment of informing the highest
offices in the occupied territories of the demand that they do their
best to support Sauckel’s task?
LAMMERS: That happened very much later. First the appointment of the
Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor took place and was announced to
all important offices. I do not think I added any particular demand to
that. But at the beginning of 1944 a conference took place at the
Führer’s headquarters dealing with the program of labor allocation for
the year of 1944. At the end of that conference, during which Sauckel
had been given a number of injunctions expressed in definite figures, I
had the task of writing to all offices concerned and telling them that
they should support the task Sauckel had just been given, with all the
powers at their disposal.
DR. SERVATIUS: You are talking about a meeting at the beginning of
January 1944. An extensive report which you prepared on that is
available. According to this report, Sauckel said during that meeting
that with regard to the number of foreign laborers he would find it
difficult or perhaps even impossible to fulfill the demands made by the
program. What was the reason he gave for that?
LAMMERS: The statement is correct, and the reason he gave was that the
executive power necessary for the carrying out of that task was lacking
in the various sectors. He said that if he were to fulfill his task,
then under all circumstances he should not have to rely on a foreign
executive power, as, for instance, was the case in France, but that
there must be a German executive power which supported his actions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he not talk about the fact that fulfillment of the
demand was impossible because of the danger of the partisans?
LAMMERS: He pointed out these difficulties repeatedly, namely, the
partisan danger; and it was regarded as self-evident that no recruitment
of labor could be carried out by him in territories where the partisans
were still fighting.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he demand the pacification of these agitated partisan
territories and demand executive powers in that connection?
LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he wish to have the authorities protected against
these resistance movements?
LAMMERS: Yes, he wanted the local office to take action, so that he
would have a free hand to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: I am quoting one sentence from the report, and I want you
to explain to me how that is to be understood. There it says:
“The Reichsleiter of the SS explained that the forces at his
disposal were extremely small, but that he would try by
increasing them and by using them more intensively to win
success for Sauckel’s actions.”
How is that to be understood?
LAMMERS: That referred mainly to the Russian territories, in which there
were partisans, and Herr Sauckel thought that he could not be active
there unless these territories were cleared up. Himmler, who was
present, promised to do his best, but he had misgivings as to whether
enough police battalions or other forces would be at his disposal.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it is right to say that it was a question of
safeguarding the authorities, of safeguarding the territories, and not a
transfer of the recruiting to the SS?
LAMMERS: A transfer of this recruiting to the SS, as such, was not
provided. The German executive power demanded by Sauckel referred in
every case to whatever executive power was available. In France, for
instance, it was not the SS but the field command who had to look after
that; and in Russia it was necessary, in part, for the police battalions
to pacify the partisan regions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I have a question regarding the Leadership Corps. A
document has been presented here under Number D-720. It bears the
signature of Gauleiter Sprenger and has no date, but it obviously dates
from the spring or the beginning of 1945. In this letter there is
mention of a new Reich health law, and it is supposed to contain a
ruling on people suffering from heart and lung diseases, who are to be
eliminated. It says that this law is to be kept a secret for the time
being. On the strength of that law these families could no longer remain
among the public and could not produce any offspring. Did you know
anything about that law?
LAMMERS: I did not understand the word. Did you say insane or what sort
of sick people?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is a Reich health law referring to people suffering
from heart and lung diseases.
LAMMERS: I know nothing whatsoever about that law.
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not understand you.
LAMMERS: I know nothing about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Would you have had to know about it?
LAMMERS: Yes, the Minister of the Interior would have had to know about
it. Health matters were dealt with in his ministry. It never reached me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness,
one day after the German troops marched into Austria a law was
published—on 13 March 1938—which has the heading, “Law for the Reunion
of Austria with the German Reich.” Seyss-Inquart and his Government were
surprised by the contents of this law. I now ask you whether you know
the details as to how this law was decreed in Linz on 13 March 1938.
LAMMERS: Like every other radio listener I heard about the march of
German troops into Austria through the radio. And since I assumed that I
might be needed I went to Vienna. At that point the law had already been
signed and published. I did not participate in the drafting of this law;
the Minister of the Interior and State Secretary Stuckart drafted that
law. I did not work on it at all, because I did not even know that this
action was to take place.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did these gentlemen you just mentioned tell you,
perhaps, why this law was published so precipitately?
LAMMERS: It was the wish of the Führer.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. At the same time Dr. Seyss-Inquart was named
an SS Obergruppenführer, not an SS general, as the Prosecution have
stated and in addition the Führer promised him that within a year he
would be made a member of the Reich Government. In 1939 he actually did
become Minister without Portfolio. Did Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as
an SS Obergruppenführer and as Minister without Portfolio carry out any
functions of any kind?
LAMMERS: As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart did not become
Obergruppenführer but Gruppenführer. That was merely an honorary rank
which was given him. He had no authority in the SS and he never served
in the SS, as far as I know. He merely wore the uniform and later he
became Obergruppenführer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, this was purely an honorary rank, a
matter of uniform, as you correctly say?
LAMMERS: Yes, a sort of honorary rank.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you.
One year later Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Commissioner for the
Netherlands, and in the Law Gazette for the Netherlands
_Verordnungsblatt_ as well as in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, this
appointment was published. Do you know whether, apart from this
published decree which appointed him Reichsstatthalter he was also given
a duty within the framework of the Four Year Plan?
LAMMERS: From the moment of his appointment as Reich Commissioner for
the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart experienced the same limitations of
authority as I described yesterday in connection with Herr Frank and
Herr Rosenberg. In other words, certain powers were held in reserve for
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan who everywhere exercised
comprehensive command powers. To this extent his position was limited
from the very beginning.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the position of the German police in the
Netherlands? Was the German police directly under the command of the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart or was it under the Reichsleiter SS Himmler?
LAMMERS: The conditions here are exactly the same, or similar, as I
described them yesterday in connection with the Government General. The
Higher SS and Police Leader was at the disposal of the Reich
commissioner but his technical instructions came from Himmler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you.
Do you, Witness, recollect that at the beginning of 1944 you forwarded
to the defendant, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the
Netherlands, an order from the Führer according to which he should draft
250,000 workers in the Netherlands, and that Seyss-Inquart refused this?
LAMMERS: This is the letter which I mentioned previously when I was
being asked questions in connection with Sauckel. It is a circular
letter in which everybody was asked to support Sauckel’s action and
individual offices were given orders regarding the numbers of workers
they were to supply. However, I cannot remember whether the number was
250,000 workers in Seyss-Inquart’s case. But I do know that
Seyss-Inquart told me that he had considerable misgivings about getting
the number ordered of him. He wanted to take up these misgivings with
the Führer.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces): Witness, did Hitler come to power in 1933 with
the help of the Reichswehr, that is, was there any military pressure
employed at that time?
LAMMERS: I myself did not participate directly in the seizure of power.
I cannot tell you, therefore, the exact details. At any rate, nothing is
known to me about the Reichswehr’s having had any influence on the
seizure of power. I assume that if that had been the case one would have
heard about it.
DR. LATERNSER: In 1934 there followed co-ordination of the offices of
the head of the State and Reich Chancellor in the person of Hitler.
Could the military leaders have refused to swear the oath of allegiance
to Hitler without violating a law?
LAMMERS: The law regarding the head of the State was decreed
constitutionally and thereby the Führer became the Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces. Any possibility of resisting did not exist. That would
have been pure revolt; it would have been mutiny.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you ever hear that military leaders made proposals
regarding the starting or the preparation of an aggressive war?
LAMMERS: No, not in the least.
DR. LATERNSER: It is well known that Hitler did not permit military
leaders any influence upon his political decisions. Do you know of any
statements made by Hitler in which he denied the generals the right to a
political judgment?
LAMMERS: From the military point of view the Führer praised the generals
as a group and also individual generals very highly. As far as politics
were concerned, he was always of the opinion that they knew nothing
about politics and that one should, as far as possible, keep them away
from a position where political matters had to be decided.
DR. LATERNSER: It is also known that Hitler would not suffer any
contradiction. Was not that the real reason for Blomberg’s dismissal and
the dismissal of Fritsch and Beck—the fact that they repeatedly
contradicted him?
LAMMERS: Yes, I could assume that such personal differences in the end
did bring about the dismissal of Schacht, Blomberg, Neurath, and
Fritsch. But I was never present at such conferences and I cannot
therefore report what was said. But I do think that they often
contradicted the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler distrust the generals, particularly those of
the Army?
LAMMERS: One cannot generalize about that. The Führer was rather
reserved in his behavior toward most people. He told each one only what
actually concerned him. If you call that distrust, then this distrust
was present in his relations with almost all ministers and generals, for
nobody was told any more than the Führer wanted him to hear.
DR. LATERNSER: Among the circle of persons who had Hitler’s complete
confidence was there any military leader?
LAMMERS: I do not believe so. I do not know of one.
DR. LATERNSER: Now one last question: What was the reason for putting
most of the occupied territories under Reich commissioners and only a
few of them under military administration?
LAMMERS: As a rule it was the Führer’s wish that occupied territories be
administered by political leaders. He considered generals unsuited for
that task, because he accused them—I might put it this way—of having
no political instinct.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it not the plan to replace the military
administration in Belgium by a civilian commissioner even before 1944?
LAMMERS: That had long been provided for. Preparations had already been
made, but the Führer could not decide to put it in force, because he had
always been told that in the case of Belgium there were important
military reasons for not establishing a civilian administration, since
Belgium might possibly become again a zone of combat. So the decision
was postponed a year and still longer.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness,
there is one matter upon which I want to ask you—as to the powers of
Reich ministers under the Constitution of Nazi Germany. It appears, from
your testimony, that they were men with very little authority, or
jurisdiction, or power of command of any kind, that they were men of
straw. Is that so?
LAMMERS: Well, to say no authority goes too far. I mean in respect to
politics...
MAJOR JONES: But, they were of an extremely limited character. That is
what you are saying to the Tribunal, isn’t it?
LAMMERS: In the main they were administrative chiefs in their
ministries. They were not political ministers who were consulted in
regard to large-scale political matters.
MAJOR JONES: Less authority than the ministers of Germany had under the
previous Constitution?
LAMMERS: That, beyond doubt, was the case, for under the former
Constitution votes were taken and the minister could at least give
expression to his authority by voting against something in the Cabinet.
MAJOR JONES: I am now going to put to you some observations which you
yourself made in 1938 about the powers of ministers in the Führer’s
State. I am referring to Document 3863-PS. This is your comment on the
Staatsführer in the Third Reich:
“From this basic total concentration of supreme power in the
person of the Führer there results, however, no excessively
strong and unnecessary centralization of administration in the
hands of the Führer. In my general elaborations on the basic
concept of the Führer State I have already pointed out that the
respect for the authority of the subordinate
leader”—Unterführer—“by those beneath him forbids interference
with every one of his individual orders or measures. This
principle is applied by the Führer in his governmental
leadership in such a manner that, for example, the position of
the Reich ministers is actually a much more independent one than
formerly, even though today the Reich ministers are subordinate
to the Führer’s unlimited power of command, in respect to their
entire official sphere and in respect to every individual
measure and decision on the most trivial matters. Eagerness to
bear responsibility, resolution, energy, coupled with initiative
and real authority, these are the qualities which the Führer
demands above all of his subordinate leaders. Therefore he
allows them the greatest freedom in the execution of their
affairs and in the manner in which they fulfill their tasks. He
is far from exercising petty or even nagging criticism.”
That is a picture of the power of Reich ministers, which is very
different from the picture you are painting to the Tribunal, is it not?
LAMMERS: In my opinion there is not the least contradiction. All I am
saying here is that every minister normally had no say in respect to
large-scale politics. In his own sphere however, he was the supreme
administrative chief. I explained here that as a subordinate leader he
had the widest powers, insofar as the Führer had left him those powers,
and that the Führer did not narrow-mindedly interfere with these powers.
He did not think of doing that. This concerns matters of second- and
third-grade importance; large-scale politics were not discussed here.
MAJOR JONES: You see, your picture of the administration of this vast
State of Nazi Germany is a picture of one man deciding all principal
matters himself out of his own intuitive powers. Is that the picture you
seek to present to this Tribunal?
LAMMERS: Yes. The Minister was the supreme leader in his own sphere and
insofar as he was not limited, he had greater powers than any minister
previously had had, because the Führer did not interfere in small
matters.
MAJOR JONES: In the case of the Defendant Funk, for instance, you say
that he was a small man with no authority, with no influence upon the
decisions of affairs. Is that so?
LAMMERS: Regarding the large-scale political issues he had no authority.
But within his department he had considerable influence. But those were
matters of second- or third-grade importance.
MAJOR JONES: But decisions, but as to profound important economic
questions like the amount of wealth that was to be extracted from the
occupied territories, the Führer’s decisions were based upon the
representations and recommendations of ministers like Funk, were they
not?
LAMMERS: I do not know that. The finance policy in occupied territories
was handled by the Minister for the Eastern Territories or the Reich
commissioners together with the Reich Finance Minister.
MAJOR JONES: But as to decisions on economic matters concerned with the
occupied territories, like recommendations as to occupation costs, as to
the technique of purchasing on the black market, men like Funk had to
give recommendations for determination of policy on these matters, did
they not?
LAMMERS: He co-operated, yes, but he had no authority as Reich
commissioner in the occupied territories. The Reich commissioner was
directly under Hitler.
MAJOR JONES: All these ministers co-operated in their sphere and were
indispensable to the running of this Nazi State, were they not?
LAMMERS: Yes, of course, co-operation was a necessity. This does not
mean that Funk had power to issue orders in the occupied territories. He
certainly had none.
MAJOR JONES: You, so far as Funk is concerned, were concerned with
making quite clear what his position was in the State. Do you recollect
that you were concerned with clearing up the matter as to whether he,
Funk, was directly subordinate to the Führer or not? Do you remember
that?
LAMMERS: Yes, of course Funk, as Minister, was under the Führer.
MAJOR JONES: And he was advising the Führer himself, was he not?
LAMMERS: He very rarely saw the Führer.
MAJOR JONES: But, in the vital sphere of the financing of rearmament,
for instance, he had important decisions to communicate to the Führer
and advise the Führer upon, did he not?
LAMMERS: I do not know to what extent the Führer sent for him for I was
not present at conferences regarding armament credit and rearmament.
MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one further question regarding
ministerial matters. Ministers without portfolio did continue to receive
communications as to the Reich Cabinet, did they not?
LAMMERS: They received texts of subjects up for discussions.
MAJOR JONES: The Defendant Frank, for instance, was a Minister without
Portfolio?
LAMMERS: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: He continued to receive communications in his capacity as a
Minister without Portfolio?
LAMMERS: He received all the texts which were received by other
ministers, provided there was a general distribution.
MAJOR JONES: And indeed, when he was the Governor General of the
Government General, he maintained a ministerial office to deal with the
incoming matters of the Reich Cabinet?
LAMMERS: Who are you talking about? Frank?
MAJOR JONES: I am now talking about the Defendant Frank, yes.
LAMMERS: Frank had an office in Berlin where ministerial matters were
delivered to him.
MAJOR JONES: So that the Reich Cabinet did not actually meet, but it
continued to exist, did it not?
LAMMERS: The Reich Cabinet existed only for those legislative and
administrative matters which could be handled in writing and by means of
circulating letters.
MAJOR JONES: And the members of the Reich Cabinet, like Frank, continued
to receive communications as to the legislative tasks and performances
of the Reich Cabinet, even though they were not available for
conferences or meetings?
LAMMERS: They got such communications.
MAJOR JONES: I think it is time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you some questions about the
Defendant Frank. Frank is a friend of yours, is he not?
LAMMERS: Frank?
MAJOR JONES: Yes.
LAMMERS: No, I have no very close connection with Frank.
Before answering this question, I would like permission to return to a
document which you submitted to me previously, and which I have just now
been able to finish reading. I would like to say just two sentences in
connection with that document.
MAJOR JONES: If the Counsel for the Defense desire you to return to it,
I have no doubt they will draw your attention to the matter in due
course.
Will you now deal with the question that I put to you on the Defendant
Frank? You say he is not a friend of yours?
LAMMERS: I did not know him particularly well, and I had no closer
relation to him than with any of the other people in the Reich
Government.
MAJOR JONES: Would it be right to say, like yourself, he was one of the
leading Nazi jurists?
LAMMERS: Well, I never really thought of myself as a leading National
Socialist jurist.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you were not a leading jurist, or that
you were not a National Socialist?
LAMMERS: I considered myself in the first place as a lawyer, an expert
on constitutional law, which I have been for many years, in fact, since
the year 1920 and under other governments; then I joined the National
Socialist Party and naturally in my position in the National Socialist
State, I made every effort to propagate the National Socialist idea of
law.
MAJOR JONES: And you have said that so far as Hans Frank was concerned,
he was a jurist who opposed the arbitrary use of power by the Police.
LAMMERS: He did that in some of his speeches; and the Führer did not
approve of these speeches.
MAJOR JONES: He was a man who believed in fair trials, was he?
LAMMERS: What kind of trials do you mean? I cannot hear you; there is
such noise.
MAJOR JONES: Criminal trials.
LAMMERS: I did not hear the word.
MAJOR JONES: He was in favor of fair trials and he resisted, the
arbitrary power of the SS? That is your evidence, is it?
LAMMERS: He told me that repeatedly, and he frequently expressed this
view in his speeches, too.
MAJOR JONES: And you say he was a man who favored a liberal
administration in the territory of which he was Governor General? Is
that so?
LAMMERS: I am sorry, but I cannot follow this. There is so much noise
that I can barely hear half of what you are saying; the other half is
completely lost.
MAJOR JONES: Well, we will try again. Did you ever hear of the “AB
Action,” for which Frank was responsible in the Government General?
LAMMERS: That is an action of which I know nothing at all. Someone
mentioned this name to me about a week ago and said that Frank was
accused of this AB Action. I do not know of any AB Action.
MAJOR JONES: You were getting frequent reports by Frank as to the
administration of his territory, were you not?
LAMMERS: Reports were occasionally sent in.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Frank never informed you about the AB
Action?
LAMMERS: Yes. I do not know what the AB Action is.
MAJOR JONES: I will remind you. It was an action which resulted in the
slaughter of the flower of the Polish race, of the Polish
intelligentsia.
LAMMERS: I know nothing about such an action.
MAJOR JONES: If you will look at the Document 2233-PS, which has already
been exhibited as USSR-223, and which is Frank’s diary, you will see the
history of this action and perhaps you will then remember something of
the circumstances of it.
LAMMERS: What page is that, please?
MAJOR JONES: On Page 8 of the annex to that text. You will see on that
page that the action started on the 16th of May with a conference at
which Frank, the Governor General, and Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart,
Secretary of State Bühler, SS Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and a Colonel
Müller were present. You will see there that Frank decreed, with
immediate effect, that the task of carrying out an extraordinary
pacification program be given to the Chief of the Security Police, to
commence immediately. The more important details of the action were then
discussed, and Brigadeführer Streckenbach was formally given the
necessary authority by the Governor General. The Governor General
ordered a detailed report to be made on the 30th of May.
Then, I want you to look at Page 2 of that text, at a report of the
conference on the 30th of May, where you, and what is more important,
this Tribunal, may be able to judge what kind of jurisprudence Nazi
jurists believed in.
You will see, on Page 43 of the English text of 2233-PS, a report of the
Police conference on the 30th of May, where Frank and Krüger and others
were present.
LAMMERS: I was never present at these conferences of the Government.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to see how far removed Frank, the apostle of
decency in administration, was from the true Frank that was Governor
General of Poland. You will see there that Frank states, “If I had not
the old Nazi guard of fighters of the Police and SS here in the country,
with whom could we then carry out this policy”? The report, which the
Tribunal is already familiar with, goes on to describe how, now that the
German aggressions in the West were in full swing, it was possible for
Frank to go through with this action against the Polish intelligentsia.
LAMMERS: If the entries in the Governor General’s diary do not agree
with what I gathered from the speeches which he made in public, I cannot
make any comment. I do not know what he said about this. It may be that
many of his speeches contradict other speeches which he made at a
different time. What I said concerned only those speeches of which the
Führer disapproved, to which he objected, and which led to Frank’s being
forbidden to make speeches or to have them printed. I was referring to
those speeches. I cannot say at the moment what other speeches the
Governor General made and what he entered in his diary.
MAJOR JONES: Let us be quite clear. Do you know that the regime of Frank
in the Government General was a murderous one?
LAMMERS: I never heard anything about that.
MAJOR JONES: Did you receive any reports from him, or from other
sources, of misgovernment in the Government General?
LAMMERS: Complaints about misgovernment in the Government General came
in frequently from Frank himself as well as from other departments
against Frank.
MAJOR JONES: Did you have knowledge of the utter ruthlessness of Frank’s
methods in the Government General?
LAMMERS: I only heard half your question.
MAJOR JONES: You were receiving reports from Frank as to what he was
doing in the Government General, were you not?
LAMMERS: Yes. Reports came in frequently and I immediately passed them
on to the Führer as transmit matters. Most of them went to Reichsleiter
Bormann or the adjutant office of the Führer. These were reports...
MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. If you deal with the questions I put to you,
we shall get on much faster, you know. Just answer the question I put,
briefly. I am going to put to you one message which Frank’s diary
indicated that you received. At Page 41 of the English text of Frank’s
diary, there is this entry for the 5th of August:
“The Governor General sends the following teletype to Reich
Minister Dr. Lammers:
“The city of Warsaw is for the most part in flames. Burning down
the houses is also the surest way of depriving the insurgents of
hiding places. After this rising and its suppression, its
deserved fate of complete annihilation will rightfully overtake
Warsaw or be imposed upon it.”
Do you recollect receiving that teletype?
LAMMERS: To my knowledge this report did come in and was immediately
transmitted to the Führer. However, I was not concerned in the action
itself; that was a military measure and military reports normally went
straight to the Führer. In all probability I passed on this teletype
message not only to the Führer, but probably also to the Chief of the
OKW.
MAJOR JONES: I am not concerned with the action you took in these
circumstances; I am concerned with your knowledge, because you have
denied to this Tribunal, time and time again, that you ever knew
anything of these abominations that were going on under the Nazi regime.
So just deal with the question of your knowledge at the moment.
You have said...
LAMMERS: I know that this report was received...
MAJOR JONES: And that was a characteristic Frank message, was it not?
LAMMERS: And that an annihilation action had been decreed in Warsaw and
that there was fighting in Warsaw. After all, I had no right to give
orders to the Governor General. I could only transmit his report to the
Führer. The report was meant for the Führer and not for me personally.
MAJOR JONES: You say that Frank was opposed to the institution of
concentration camps. That is your evidence, is it not? Is it your
evidence that Frank was opposed to concentration camps?
LAMMERS: Yes. Frank himself told me that in principle he was opposed to
internment in concentration camps, for he agreed with my view that such
a proceeding must at least have a legal basis.
MAJOR JONES: That is what he told you?
LAMMERS: Yes, he told me that. Yes.
MAJOR JONES: Just let me read to you one brief extract from his diary to
show why he disapproved of concentration camps. I am reading from Page
45 of the diary. He is referring to the Polish intelligentsia, and he
says:
“First, we do not need to deport these elements to the
concentration camps in the Reich, because then we should only
have annoyance and unnecessary correspondence with their
families; instead we shall liquidate matters in the country
itself.”
Then he goes on to say that:
“...we do not intend to set up concentration camps in the real
sense of the term, here in the Government General. Any prisoners
from the Government General who are in concentration camps in
the Reich must be put at our disposal for the AB Action, or
dealt with there. Any one who is suspected here must be
liquidated immediately.”
That is why Frank opposed the institution of concentration camps. He
believed in immediate murder, did he not?
LAMMERS: It may be that Frank’s diaries and his actions do not agree
with what he told me, but I only know what he told me to be his opinion
of concentration camps. I do not know what he wrote in his diaries nor
do I know what he did in practice, I had no right to exercise
supervision over the Government General.
MAJOR JONES: You have spoken of the battle between Frank and various
other Reich commissioners and Reich ministers and the SS. I suggest to
you that the battle between Frank and the SS Brigadeführer Krüger was a
battle for power, a battle between personalities, and was not connected
in any way with Frank’s desire to see decency and justice determine the
administration of the Government General.
LAMMERS: If you mean that Frank’s statements to me do not agree with his
actions, you must question Herr Frank on the point. I am not responsible
for his actions. I can say only what Herr Frank told me.
MAJOR JONES: You see, you were receiving reports not only from Frank
himself but from the SS, were you not?
LAMMERS: A great many reports came in to me and were passed on in the
routine way, for I was but a channel for such reports. In any case,
reports from the SS in most cases did not go through my office.
MAJOR JONES: You were another of these highly placed post offices on
which the Nazi Reich was founded, were you?
LAMMERS: I am sorry, I did not understand that.
MAJOR JONES: Do you remember communicating with Himmler about the
situation in the Government General?
LAMMERS: Yes, certainly. I know that Himmler would have liked to remove
Governor General Frank from the Government General. He would rather have
had some one else as Governor General.
MAJOR JONES: You submitted a report to Himmler on the strength of a
discussion you had had with SS General Krüger, did you not?
LAMMERS: I cannot recall a discussion with General Krüger at the moment,
unless I am given more exact information as to when it took place.
MAJOR JONES: Will you just look at the Document 2220-PS, which is
Exhibit USA-175. That is your report to Himmler. You will see that that
report is dated the 17th of April 1943, addressed to Himmler, with
reference to the situation in the Government General. I just read some
of it; it has not been read before:
“Dear Herr Reichsführer:
“We had agreed at our conference on 27 March of this year that
written material should be prepared on the situation in the
Government General, on which our intended mutual report to the
Führer could be based.”
That was the mutual report of the SS and yourself, and then the next
paragraph reads, “The material...”
LAMMERS: That was a report made on instructions given me by the Führer
to investigate certain complaints made against Frank. A series of
complaints against Frank had been received and the Führer had given
instructions that Himmler and I should investigate the matter. That is
the matter we are concerned with now.
MAJOR JONES: And you and your colleague, Himmler, you see, were actively
interested in this matter. I just want you to look further at this
report. You will see that in the report itself it is headed, in
Paragraph A:
“The tasks of the German administration in the Government
General.
“The German administration in the Government General has to
fulfill the following tasks:
“1. For the purpose of guaranteeing the food supply for the
German people, to increase agricultural production and to
collect it as completely as possible, to allot sufficient
rations to the native population occupied with work important
for the war efforts, and to deliver the rest to the Armed Forces
and the homeland.”
Then it goes on to deal with the difficulties of extracting sufficient
manpower and wealth from the territory of the Government General for the
benefit of the Third Reich. And then towards the end it deals
specifically with the utilization of manpower, and it is to that
paragraph that I desire to draw your particular attention. Have you
found the paragraph headed, “Mobilization of manpower,” dealing with the
difficulties that the administration in the Government General was
confronted with? I draw your attention to it because it contains this
sentence: “It is clear that these difficulties have been increased by
the elimination of Jewish manpower.”
LAMMERS: Where is that, please?
MAJOR JONES: It is in the paragraph headed, “Mobilization of manpower.”
LAMMERS: Yes, but that is not my report.
MAJOR JONES: But you said that in your covering letter that the
memorandum was checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, who agreed with
it in full. You recollect in your covering letter you indicated that
this memorandum had received your consideration. Now, whether you wrote
that or not, is not the matter that I am concerned with at the moment.
What I want you to explain to the Tribunal is, first of all, did you
appreciate that this report contained the sentence, “It is clear that
these difficulties of manpower have been increased by the elimination of
Jewish manpower?”
LAMMERS: May I please be allowed time to read this document through? I
cannot reply to documents several pages long unless I have read them. I
find it quite impossible; and I ask for time to read this report which
is several pages in length.
MAJOR JONES: You have the time required; but I only want you to concern
yourself with one sentence, you see. You can take it that in the last
paragraph but one of that report there appears this sentence about the
elimination of Jewish manpower, and what I am going to suggest to you is
that...
LAMMERS: No—where is that? I have not read this sentence. I have not
yet found the place. Where can I find it? Is it at the top or at the
bottom of the page? If I may read the whole page, I will find the
sentence; I will need a few minutes for this. Can you give me the
approximate place? This is evidently Krüger’s report and he probably
means the further evacuation of the Jews to the East. I do not know what
you mean by “elimination.” With the best intentions I am not in a
position to give an explanation on the spur of the moment of one
sentence taken out of a context of 14 pages. It is absolutely
impossible.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that elimination of Jewish manpower is to be
translated as emigration of Jewish manpower?
LAMMERS: I do not know. I will have to read the complete document in
order to give you an explanation of the report. There are 14 closely
written pages in it, not written by myself; and I do not know what the
connection is.
MAJOR JONES: You know, do you not, that Hans Frank himself was in favor
of a policy of extermination of the Jewish people?
LAMMERS: I do not know whether he held this view. He told me exactly the
opposite, and as a witness I can only tell you what he said to me and
not what he said elsewhere.
MAJOR JONES: You see, this Tribunal has had read to it extracts from
Frank’s diary in which he says that, “My attitude towards the
Jews...”—and this is found at Page 12 of the German copy—“My attitude
towards the Jews is such that I expect them all to disappear.” And he
says, as to the 3½ million Jews in the Government General, that, “One
cannot shoot them or poison them, but we will be able to take steps in
order to successfully annihilate them. The Government General must
become as free of Jews as the Reich is.”
Are you saying that Frank did not express similar views to you?
LAMMERS: If Frank made these entries in his diary and if he actually did
say that, then it contradicts what he told me. That is all I have to say
on that point.
MAJOR JONES: Did you know that Frank’s diary indicates that on the 9th
of September 1941 there were 3½ million Jews in the Government General
and when he makes an entry on the 2d of August 1943, he says that only a
few labor companies are left? Did you not know that?
LAMMERS: I do not know that this happened because he told me nothing
about it. He himself must account for what he said in his diary. He
himself must establish whether he did it or not. I knew nothing about
these things.
MAJOR JONES: In view of your translation of “elimination” as
“emigration,” Frank says in connection with those millions that this
Tribunal knows were murdered, “All the others have, let us say,
emigrated.” Are you using the word “emigrated” in an equally cynical and
brutal sense as that?
LAMMERS: I am not in a position to comment on Herr Frank’s diary. Herr
Frank himself will have to do that.
MAJOR JONES: You, Witness, were from the beginning of this tale of
terror involved in assisting in drafting legislation towards achieving
the end of racial persecution, were you not? Is that not so? Did you not
put your signature to the Führer’s decree empowering Himmler to carry
out the necessary measures to eliminate from the territory of the Reich
racial elements that you, as Nazi, did not approve?
LAMMERS: I do not recall ever signing anything like that.
MAJOR JONES: Well, I will draw your attention to it. It is Document
686-PS, which is Exhibit USA-305. It is the decree of Hitler to
strengthen German folkdom. That is the title of it. It is dated the 7th
of October.
LAMMERS: Yes, I know of the decree.
MAJOR JONES: I thought it would not surprise you.
LAMMERS: But this says nothing about what you asserted.
MAJOR JONES: Just look at the first clause of it. It reads:
“The Reichsführer SS is responsible, in accordance with my
directives:
“1. For finally returning to the Reich all German nationals and
racial Germans abroad;
“2. For elimination of the harmful influence of such alien parts
of the population as represent a danger to the Reich and the
German people.”
Then it goes on with, “Formation of new German settlement districts, by
resettlement...” and it says:
“The Reichsführer SS is authorized to take the necessary
measures to carry out his duties.”
You signed that decree, did you not?
LAMMERS: It is correct, but it says nothing about killing Jews. It
speaks of the elimination of a harmful influence exercised by alien
populations. There is no mention of the elimination of aliens, but only
of the elimination of the influence of alien elements of the population;
the removal of a person’s influence does not mean the removal of the
person himself.
MAJOR JONES: Are you, as the head of the Reich Chancellery, the man who
knew all the secrets of the Third Reich, saying to this Tribunal that
you had no knowledge of the murder of millions and millions who were
murdered under the Nazi regime?
LAMMERS: I mean to say that I knew nothing about it until the moment of
the collapse, that is, the end of April 1945 or the beginning of May,
when I heard such reports from foreign broadcasting stations. I did not
believe them at the time, and only later on I found further material
here, in the newspapers. If we are speaking now of the elimination of a
harmful influence that is far from meaning annihilation. The Führer did
not say a word about murder; no mention was ever made of such a plan.
MAJOR JONES: I now want you to turn your attention to the Defendant
Rosenberg. You have told us that the first you heard of several of the
major military operations of the Third Reich, was through the
newspapers. Was it from the newspapers that you heard of the Nazi plans
to invade the Soviet Union?
LAMMERS: I learned of the war of aggression against Russia only when
everything was complete. The Führer never said a word about a war of
aggression against Russia before that. He spoke only of military
complications with Russia which might be imminent, but I did not
interpret that as meaning a war of aggression against Russia.
MAJOR JONES: Did you know that the war between Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union was a defensive war on the part of Nazi Germany?
LAMMERS: The Führer never told me anything except what I have already
stated here, that troop concentrations had been observed which led us to
the conclusion that military complications with Russia might be
expected. “I want to be prepared for any eventuality, and therefore Herr
Rosenberg is to deal with Eastern questions.” That was all I heard and I
was completely unaware of the fact that a war of aggression was to be
waged against Russia.
MAJOR JONES: Just one minute.
LAMMERS: From various incidents it could be inferred that we had to
expect an attack; at least, it was represented to us in that way, as far
as we were informed.
MAJOR JONES: But you—you know, Witness, that as early as the 20th of
April 1941 Hitler was planning and plotting the details of action
against the Soviet Union. Just look at Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143,
will you? That, as you will see, is a decree of the Führer, dated the
20th of April 1941, and let me remind you that the invasion of the
Soviet Union by Nazi Germany did not take place until the 22d of June.
On the 20th of April you signed that decree in which Hitler named
Rosenberg as “My Commissioner for the central control of questions
connected with the East European region.”
LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct. I have never testified to anything else.
That was the assignment, the first assignment which Rosenberg was given,
and on this occasion the Führer spoke of possible military complications
with Russia and granted Rosenberg his authority.
MAJOR JONES: Just a minute. Answer the question I am putting to you at
the moment. You can give your explanations later. You look further down
that Document 865-PS. You see it is a letter from you to Keitel, dated
the 21st of April, in which you say:
“Herewith I am sending you a copy of a Führer decree of the 20th
of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter
Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of the
question of the East European region. In this capacity,
Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make all the necessary preparations
for a possible emergency with the greatest speed.”
Are you saying that these activities of yours and Rosenberg, at that
time, were not connected with aggressive plans on the part of Nazi
Germany?
LAMMERS: I most certainly will not say that. By an emergency the Führer
meant, as I said before, that the Führer believed that there might be
war with Russia. That was the emergency which led to Rosenberg’s
assignment. There is not a word here about a war of aggression and,
indeed, there was no question of it.
MAJOR JONES: You know that Rosenberg was in communication with other
government departments of the Third Reich, in connection with this
preparation for aggression against the Soviet Union, weeks before the
invasion took place; do you not?
LAMMERS: Whom is he supposed to have influenced? I did not hear whom he
is supposed to have influenced.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps I was not understood. He was collaborating with
other departments of the Third Reich weeks before the invasion happened.
LAMMERS: He may have worked with other departments in carrying out his
assignment, but I do not know to what extent or with what purpose. Nor
do I know what other assignments he was given by the Führer.
MAJOR JONES: At least you do know that Hitler made clear to Rosenberg
before he took office, what the main principles of Nazi policy towards
the conquered territories of the Soviet Union was to be, do you not? You
attended the conference of Hitler on the 16th of July 1941, when he set
out his principles and aim with regard to the Soviet Union?
LAMMERS: This happened after the outbreak of war but not before it.
Previous to this, there was never any discussion about a war of
aggression in my presence.
MAJOR JONES: You said that Rosenberg was a man who believed again in
liberal treatment for those whom the Nazi armies conquered, but you were
at Hitler’s conference in July 1941, in the very first weeks of this
man’s responsibility, and you heard Hitler in that conference
enunciating a program of terror and brutality and exploitation, did you
not?
LAMMERS: On 16 July Herr Rosenberg had already raised objections to it.
MAJOR JONES: But they were doubts which did not cause him to leave his
post and he continued until the Red Army made his position somewhat
uncomfortable in the East, did he not?
LAMMERS: Yes, but he always followed principles of moderation. I have
discussed Rosenberg’s activities only generally. I cannot testify to all
the special measures which he took and I can but tell you what Rosenberg
told me, the complaints he made to me personally and what he described
to me as his aims. If he acted at all differently, I know nothing about
it.
MAJOR JONES: You were familiar with the conflict between Rosenberg and
Koch, the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, were you not?
LAMMERS: Yes, I know all about that. Rosenberg was always in favor of
moderation and reasonable application of all political measures. Koch
inclined towards a more radical solution.
MAJOR JONES: When you say a “more radical solution,” what do you mean by
that, “mass murder”?
LAMMERS: No, I do not mean that at all.
MAJOR JONES: But you did in fact know that Koch was a murderer, did you
not?
LAMMERS: That Koch was a murderer?
MAJOR JONES: Yes.
LAMMERS: I do not know the particulars. I had no control of it.
MAJOR JONES: I will just draw your attention to them. Look at the
Document 032-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-321, the document which has
not yet been exhibited. That is a report dated the 2d of April 1943,
from Rosenberg to Himmler, with a copy to you. It is a report on the
murder of the people of the Zuman wooded area so that there could be
established a place for Reich Commissioner Koch to hunt in.
LAMMERS: I know of this complaint and I even submitted it to the Führer.
Herr Rosenberg explained that Reich Commissioner Koch had had a large
wooded area cleansed of all towns and villages too because he wanted to
hunt there. That was submitted by Rosenberg to the Führer as a
complaint.
MAJOR JONES: And this word “cleansed”—does that mean emigration or does
that mean murder?
LAMMERS: “Cleanse” means to free the area.
MAJOR JONES: I do not want you to shut this document. I just want you to
look at this document because you have denied knowledge that Koch was a
murderer. In Paragraph 2 of the report you see this:
“I have just received the following report from an old Party
comrade who has worked for 9 months in Volhynia and Podolia with
a view to preparing to take over a district commission or a main
division in the General District of Volhynia and Podolia. This
report reads:
“‘On orders from the highest quarters, steps were taken to
evacuate the whole district of Zuman. Germans and Ukrainians
both stated that this was done because the entire wooded area of
Zuman was to become a private hunting ground for the Reich
Commissioner. In December 1942, when it was already bitterly
cold, the evacuation was begun. Hundreds of families were forced
to pack all their belongings over night and were then evacuated
a distance of over 60 kilometers. Hundreds of people in Zuman
and its vicinity were shot down with the aid of an entire police
company, because they had communist sympathies. None of the
Ukrainians believed this...’”
Have you not found it, Witness? Because I want you to follow this, you
see. Have you found it?
LAMMERS: No, I have not found it yet.
MAJOR JONES: It is very difficult to follow these embarrassing parts of
the document, you know.
LAMMERS: Yes, I have found the place.
MAJOR JONES: I will read the last sentence, in order to refresh your
memory as to these murders:
“‘Hundreds of people in Zuman and its vicinity were shot down
with the aid of an entire police company, because they had
communist sympathies. None of the Ukrainians believed this; and
the Germans were also puzzled by this argument, because even if
this was done for the security of the country, it would, at the
same time, have been necessary to execute elements infected by
communism in other regions. On the contrary it is flatly
maintained all over the country that those men were ruthlessly
shot down without trial simply because the evacuation was too
extensive and could not possibly be carried out in the short
time at their disposal and because, in any case, there was not
enough space available at the new spot where the evacuees were
to be settled.’”
Do you mean to say that after reading that report you did not know that
Koch was a murderer?
LAMMERS: On receiving that report I did everything in my power. The
report was immediately submitted to the Führer, and if it is true, I
admit it was murder; but I do not remember this report just now. If he
killed these people, he is a murderer; but I am not Herr Koch’s judge.
Rosenberg complained very bitterly about this matter and it was
immediately passed on to the Führer.
MAJOR JONES: Rosenberg continued in office with this man as one of his
commissioners, did he not?
LAMMERS: The Führer asked Bormann and myself to decide; and he tried to
console Rosenberg. Rosenberg tried to resign repeatedly but was not able
to do so.
MAJOR JONES: I want to turn to another territory so that you can give
further information to the Court as to the conditions in the occupied
territories because what I am putting to you generally, you see, is that
the battles that were going on there were battles between ruthless men
struggling for power and that there was totally absent from this scene
of Nazi control any person who was pressing for human decency, pressing
for human pity. You were not pressing for either of those things, were
you?
LAMMERS: I did not hear; what would I not initiate? There are continual
disturbances on this channel. Will you please repeat the question.
MAJOR JONES: You, in the situation in which you found yourself, were not
acting on the side of human decency in this regime, were you?
LAMMERS: I was always on the side of human decency and pity. I have
always done such things. I have saved the lives of perhaps one to two
hundred thousand Jews.
MAJOR JONES: All you did was to forward annihilation reports to the
Himmlers and Bormanns and Hitlers, was that not so?
LAMMERS: I never transmitted annihilation orders.
MAJOR JONES: There is one matter which went through your hands relating
to the Defendant Keitel and the ruthless policy that Terboven was
carrying out against the Norwegian people. I draw your attention to the
document...
LAMMERS: I only asked Herr Keitel to define his point of view and I
objected to the Führer against the shooting of hostages. My subordinates
can vouch for that.
MAJOR JONES: I just want to draw your attention to Document 871-PS,
which will be Exhibit GB-322, which is a letter from Keitel to yourself
and is related to the report by Terboven in Document 870-PS, which my
learned friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put in in connection with the
Defendant Keitel.
Now, you will see that that letter, 871-PS, is a letter from Keitel to
yourself and it says in the first paragraph:
“In connection with the problem of checking sabotage in Norway,
I agree with the view of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied
Norwegian territories to the extent that I expect results from
reprisals only if they are carried out ruthlessly and if Reich
Commissioner Terboven is authorized to have the offenders shot.”
LAMMERS: I submitted that to the Führer expressing at the same time my
views on the shooting of hostages; and my representations to the Führer
were successful.
MAJOR JONES: You were successful in what respect?
LAMMERS: The Führer, in a discussion in which Terboven participated,
expressly stated that the shooting of hostages was not to take place on
the scale he and some others wanted. Hostages were to be taken only from
the offenders’ intimate circle.
MAJOR JONES: So the effect of your intervention was that the murders did
not take place on the scale that Terboven wanted to commit them, did it?
LAMMERS: Yes, Terboven wanted hostages shot on a large scale but the
Führer did not approve of that and I objected to every shooting of
hostages. The officials of the Reich Chancellery know that and can vouch
for it.
MAJOR JONES: And as a result...
LAMMERS: Yes, it is true that I received this letter. Matters took the
following course: First I received Terboven’s request and then I wrote
to Field Marshal Keitel and told him that I intended to submit
Terboven’s request to the Führer. I asked him to comment on it. Then the
teletype came from Keitel and the request was submitted to the Führer.
Terboven’s request was watered down. The Führer took the position that
the most important thing was to apprehend the miscreants and hostages
were to be taken, only in case of necessity. There was no mention of
shooting them.
MAJOR JONES: Witness, you know perfectly well that over all the
territory where Nazi power ruled hostages were taken, fathers and
mothers were killed for the actions of their sons against the Nazi
regime. Are you saying you do not know that?
LAMMERS: No, I did not know that for I was not the controller of the
occupied territories and I have never been there myself.
MAJOR JONES: But you were receiving regular reports from there and you
were the link between the ministers of the occupied territories and
Hitler. Just a minute—you were the link between the—now will you
please listen to my question? You were the link between the ministers of
the occupied territories and Hitler, were you not?
LAMMERS: Not in all cases. A great many of them went through Bormann,
especially Terboven. My subordinates in the Chancellery can vouch for
that. Terboven constantly avoided sending his reports through me and
sent them through Bormann.
MAJOR JONES: You were working hand in hand.
LAMMERS: Yes, I had to collaborate with him.
MAJOR JONES: You were working hand in glove with Bormann, you know, were
you not?
LAMMERS: Yes, I had to work with him.
MAJOR JONES: You had to work with him? You were the head of the Reich
Chancellery.
LAMMERS: In order to submit proposals to the Führer I had to work
through Bormann. I had to collaborate closely with him in order to have
the sanction of the Party in countless instances where the sanction of
the Party was prescribed, and for that reason I was forced to work
closely with Bormann.
MAJOR JONES: Did you find it distasteful to work with Bormann?
LAMMERS: I did not find it distasteful. It was my duty to work with him.
MAJOR JONES: Of course I am suggesting to you, you see, that the power
which you and Bormann exercised was very great.
LAMMERS: Yes; it was also exercised in a very one-sided manner; for
Bormann could see the Führer every day and I could see him only once
every 6 or 8 weeks. Bormann passed on to me the Führer’s decision and
had personal interviews with the Führer, but I did not.
MAJOR JONES: You were seeking to the very end to maintain your
collaboration with Bormann, were you not?
LAMMERS: I had to work with Bormann; that was the only way in which
certain things could be brought to the Führer’s notice at all. During
the last 8 months of the Führer’s regime I had no interviews with him
and I could only achieve through Bormann the things which I did
accomplish.
MAJOR JONES: You wrote to Bormann, you remember, as late as the first of
January 1945, a letter, Document D-753(a), Exhibit GB-323.
LAMMERS: Yes, I remember. The letter contains—I can tell you that from
memory without reading the letter—my complaints about the fact that I
was no longer admitted to the Führer’s presence and said that this state
of affairs could not go on any longer.
MAJOR JONES: And you say in that letter in the last paragraph but one:
“For our former harmonious co-operation has for a long time been
a thorn in the flesh of various persons who would like to play
us off one against the other.”
That is the last paragraph but one of your letter, right at the end of
it.
LAMMERS: Where is the place?
MAJOR JONES: The last paragraph but one of your letter, the last
sentence but three.
LAMMERS: The sentence before the last?
MAJOR JONES: The one before.
LAMMERS: “In conclusion I would like to say,” is that the paragraph you
mean?
MAJOR JONES: The sentence before that, “For our former harmonious
co-operation...”
LAMMERS: Yes, but I would like to add that at the end I repeated my wish
for our cordial personal relations and I repeat that it was a New Year’s
letter and when I write to some one wishing him luck for the New Year, I
cannot write that things went badly the year before; so in order to
maintain cordial relations I say that everything went well.
MAJOR JONES: You were not seeking to shift responsibility in this matter
to Bormann. You were the link between the occupied territories and
Hitler.
LAMMERS: I was; but not exclusively, only for matters of secondary
importance. The Reich commissioners were directly responsible to the
Führer.
MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you some questions now, not about terror
which existed in the territory that Germany conquered, but about the
terror in Germany itself. You have testified as to the Defendant Frick
that as Minister of the Interior he was in effect a man without power, a
man of straw. That is the rough effect of your evidence, is it not?
LAMMERS: I said that he had no influence on the Police.
MAJOR JONES: Did you not know that appeals against arrests in
concentration camps went to Frick?
LAMMERS: Yes, many cases were referred to Frick.
MAJOR JONES: Do you know whether he exercised his power in any
substantial way for the victims who were in those camps? Did you not
hear my question?
LAMMERS: I cannot hear it all; I can hear about half of what you say.
Other voices keep on interfering on my channel. Perhaps I had better
take the earphones off.
MAJOR JONES: No, put them on. Just try again, just put them on, will
you? Put your earphones on, will you and just try—patiently, you see, a
little patience.
Is it not a fact that Frick was the person to whom petitions for release
from concentration camps went?
LAMMERS: Frick received such petitions, of course; but a great many
petitions of that kind came to me, too; and I took care of them. I
treated them as petitions to the Führer. They were given careful
attention and I frequently secured the release of certain people in this
way.
MAJOR JONES: But what did Frick do in his capacity as having authority
in these matters?
LAMMERS: Frick often passed on such complaints to me to be reported to
the Führer. It is impossible for me to know what he did with all the
other complaints.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to listen to an affidavit by a Dr. Sidney
Mendel, a Doctor of Law, which is Exhibit GB-324 (Document Number
3601-PS). He says that he is a Doctor of Law, that until the end of 1938
he was a member of the Berlin Bar and admitted as an attorney-at-law to
the German courts. His legal residence is now 85-20 Elmhurst Avenue,
Elmhurst, L.I., State of New York.
In his capacity as attorney he handled numerous concentration camp cases
in the years 1933 to 1938. He remembers distinctly that in the years
1934 and 1935 he approached, in several cases, Frick’s Reich Ministry of
the Interior as the agency superior to the Gestapo for the release of
concentration camp inmates. Frick’s Ministry had special control
functions over concentration camps.
The deponent further states that he informed the Ministry about illegal
arrests, beatings, torture, and mistreatment of inmates, but the
Ministry declined the release and upheld the decisions of the Gestapo.
That was Frick’s attitude towards these matters, was it not?
LAMMERS: I really do not know what steps Frick took with regard to
complaints received. You will have to ask Dr. Frick.
MAJOR JONES: But you have testified on his behalf, you see—of Frick. If
you now say you know nothing about him, then I shall not trouble you
further with the case of the Defendant Frick; but you gave evidence for
him, you know.
LAMMERS: I could only speak generally on his attitude on the Police but
I cannot possibly know what steps he took in regard to letters which he
received.
MAJOR JONES: You said that in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
Frick again was a man without power. That was the effect of your
evidence, was it not?
LAMMERS: I said then that he was mainly a decorative figure. That does
not mean that he received no petitions or requests; but I do not know
what he thought fit to do.
MAJOR JONES: You say he was a decorative personality. That is a matter
of taste. But one of his functions, at any rate, was that he was the
person to decide whether death sentences in his territory were carried
out or not. That is not a small matter for the human beings in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, you know.
LAMMERS: Yes, please delete the word “decorative.” I mean more
decorative than active, like the head of a state, for instance, who
usually deals with certain matters only. Frick was in that position. He
was the head of the German organization and had authority to remit
sentences. That was a very important matter, of course; I do not doubt
it.
MAJOR JONES: You know, Witness, perfectly well that it was within
Frick’s power to reprieve the death sentences that were being carried
out in the territory of Bohemia and Moravia, do you not?
LAMMERS: Yes, certainly that was in his power; there is no doubt about
it.
MAJOR JONES: And I suggest to you that Frick did not exercise clemency
or influence by moderation, but on the contrary enforced brutal means
against the victims of Nazi administration in that unfortunate part of
Europe.
LAMMERS: Frick was empowered to use his own judgment in the matter of
remitting sentences. I do not know on what principle he based his
actions.
MAJOR JONES: You were concerned with Frick and the Ministry of Justice
in the drafting of penal laws against Poles and Jews in the annexed
Eastern territories, were you not?
LAMMERS: There was a proceeding pending at the Ministry of Justice at
one time; and the Ministry of Justice corresponded with me, but I
believe nothing ever came of the matter.
MAJOR JONES: You had no part in the drafting of that legislation, did
you?
LAMMERS: No, I am not acquainted with it. I believe no special law was
issued; as far as I remember, it was left to the Gauleiter to establish
laws. I do not know.
MAJOR JONES: The laws were left to the Gauleiter, to the Kochs and the
Franks and the Rosenbergs; is that what happened?
LAMMERS: No, we are talking about the provinces of West Prussia and of
Posen now; that is what our correspondence was about.
MAJOR JONES: I now want you to answer some questions about Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn for 10 minutes?
MAJOR JONES: If Your Lordship pleases.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lammers, can you hear what I say?
LAMMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you kindly try and answer the questions after
they have been put to you and not break into the questions? Try and wait
for a moment until the questions have been put because the interpreters
and the reporters are finding it very difficult to take down what you
say and to interpret what you say.
MAJOR JONES: I want to deal with your relations, for the moment, with
Seyss-Inquart. You were receiving reports from him as to his
administration in the Low Countries, were you not?
LAMMERS: It was like this: Every three months or so, a general report
was sent in and then passed on to the Führer. We also received
individual reports.
MAJOR JONES: And in the Low Countries, as elsewhere, you know that the
object of German administration was to extract and exploit that
territory for the German advantage as much as possible, do you not?
LAMMERS: Our aim was naturally to make use of the occupied countries for
our war production. I know nothing about any orders for exploitation.
MAJOR JONES: To reduce their standard of living, to reduce them to
starvation, that was one of the results of the Netherlands policy. You
knew that, did you not?
LAMMERS: I do not believe that we went as far as that. I myself had
friends and relatives in Holland and know that people in Holland lived
much better than we did in Germany.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document 997-PS, which is already
Exhibit Number RF-122, which consists of a letter which you sent to
Rosenberg, the defendant, enclosing a report given to you by Stabsleiter
Schickedanz to the Führer, together with a report delivered by Reich
Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart, about the period from May 29 to July 19,
1940. If you look at Page 9 of your text, Page 5 of the English text, of
997-PS, you will see there is a first statement of the outlines of
German economic policy in the Low Countries. You will see the paragraph
is marked on your copy, so that your difficulty of finding where these
passages are, might be eliminated. You see it reads, “It is necessary to
reduce consumption by the population...”
LAMMERS: It goes without saying that in wartime consumption by the
population must be reduced. There is no intention of gaining supplies
for the Reich.
MAJOR JONES: Just one moment and I will read out the passage to you:
“It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a
large number of economic and, in addition, police measures had
to be taken. The first of these were intended to reduce the
consumption of the population in order, partly to gain supplies
for the Reich and, partly, to secure a uniform distribution of
the remaining stocks.”
That is a very concise statement of the economic policy that
Seyss-Inquart was pursuing towards the Dutch people, is it not?
LAMMERS: Yes, it is also a very reasonable policy. Supplies had to be
reduced in order to distribute them equally and to gain some for the
Reich. In any case, the report is not mine but was made by Herr
Schickedanz, and I do not know if it is correct.
MAJOR JONES: But the object of this reduction of consumption of the
population was to benefit the Reich so that the territory of the Low
Countries should be robbed in order that the Reich should profit. That
was the whole policy, was it not?
LAMMERS: That is certainly not here. It says here, firstly, that
supplies must be acquired for the Reich; and secondly, that the various
supplies must be equally distributed; that means among the Dutch people.
There is not a word about a policy of exploitation.
MAJOR JONES: If it please the Tribunal, they have the document and can
read the language in which it appears.
[_Turning to the witness._] I want you now to turn your mind to the
Defendant Sauckel. You, Witness, knew quite well of the vast program of
enslavement of the people conquered by the Nazi forces that Sauckel was
engaged upon, did you not?
LAMMERS: I have seen Sauckel’s program and also the regulations he drew
up to enforce it. I did not have the impression that it was a program of
slave labor. Sauckel was always very kind and very moderate in his views
and he made every effort to recruit the necessary quotas of foreign
workmen by means of voluntary enlistment.
MAJOR JONES: Are you suggesting that you thought that the millions of
foreign workers that Sauckel dragged into the Reich came there
voluntarily?
LAMMERS: They did not all come voluntarily. For instance, they came from
France through a compulsory labor law introduced by the French
Government. They did not come voluntarily but due to a measure decreed
by the French Government.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at one of the first reports that you
received from Sauckel on his labor program. It is Document 1296-PS,
Exhibit Number GB-325. It starts with a letter from Sauckel to you dated
the 29th of July 1942:
“Dear Reich Minister,
“I enclose for your information a copy of a report to the Führer
and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich. Heil
Hitler! Yours faithfully”—signed—“Fritz Sauckel.”
LAMMERS: Yes, this report must have reached me.
MAJOR JONES: Yes. And you must presumably have examined it, did you not?
LAMMERS: Yes, not now; it was submitted to me for information.
MAJOR JONES: And you examined it at the time?
LAMMERS: I assume that I read it, that I glanced through it quickly. It
was of no further interest to me.
MAJOR JONES: You will see in the first page of the report itself that it
indicates, for instance, that in the period from April to July 1942,
which was the first period of activity of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary
General for Manpower, he had obtained a total of 1,639,794 foreign
workers, and of those you see that 221,009 were Soviet Russian prisoners
of war. You saw that, did you not?
LAMMERS: I probably read it. I had no reason to object to it. Sauckel
was not under my orders. He was really under the Four Year Plan, as the
signature here shows; but for all practical purposes he was immediately
under the Führer. He sent the reports straight to the Führer, and the
only reason why I myself did not pass this report on to the Führer was
because I knew that the same report had reached the Führer via
Reichsleiter Bormann. Otherwise I had nothing at all to do with this
matter.
MAJOR JONES: But you knew perfectly well that it was wickedly wrong, did
you not, to compel soldiers that had been captured in battle to go to
work against their own country?
LAMMERS: It was Sauckel’s job to arrange that with the offices with
which he worked. I never bothered about this question. That was a matter
for Sauckel to arrange with the appropriate departments, with the
Wehrmacht, and possibly, in respect to international law, with the
Foreign Office. Moreover, I see no mention of prisoners of war here.
MAJOR JONES: I do not want to suggest that you are...
LAMMERS: I have not yet read anything about prisoners of war.
MAJOR JONES: Just look at the first page of the report. There is no
mystery about this, you know. You can read German perfectly easily.
LAMMERS: Yes, but I cannot read reports of several pages in one minute.
MAJOR JONES: Just look at the first page of the report.
LAMMERS: Yes, now I see it.
MAJOR JONES: And you knew it at the beginning of the questioning of this
matter...[_The witness attempted to interrupt._] Just a minute, if you
please. When I am speaking would you mind waiting until I have finished
before you interrupt. Otherwise the translation machinery is not able to
offer a prompt translation. You see from that report, quite clearly, do
you not, that in the very first 4 months of Sauckel’s career as a slave
driver, he obtained 221,009 Soviet prisoners of war to work in this
labor machine?
LAMMERS: The details did not interest me. I had no authority to
supervise Sauckel. A report was sent in stating how he had done this. As
to whether he had a right to do it, that was a question which he had to
settle in agreement with the appropriate departments. I did not
investigate the matter because the report was only sent to me for
information.
MAJOR JONES: You have testified on Sauckel’s behalf that he resisted the
suggestion that the SS should work in this sphere of labor personnel.
Did you not say that?
LAMMERS: No, I did not say that. I merely said that he did not want to
have the SS alone, but that he wanted support from any executive
authority which was available at the moment; it is obvious, of course,
that in the partisan regions this would be mainly Police and SS.
MAJOR JONES: And quite simply, you knew that Sauckel was asking for more
help from the SS to get more labor. That is what he was after, was it
not?
LAMMERS: Yes. Otherwise he could not work in these regions, if order was
not maintained.
MAJOR JONES: Just look at the Document 1292-PS, which is Exhibit USA-225
and RF-68. That is the report of a conference on the allocation of labor
in 1944, the 4th of January, the minutes of which you wrote yourself, so
that if anything you say is to be relied upon, that is your report. You
will see that at that conference Hitler was there, Sauckel, Speer,
Keitel, Milch, Himmler.
LAMMERS: The new work program for 1944 was made out and I was instructed
to inform the departments concerned. I took part in this conference only
because it concerned a measure in which the respective fields of a
number of offices had to be made known. Otherwise I would not have
participated in this at all.
MAJOR JONES: And in that conference Hitler said that Sauckel must get at
least another 4 million workers for the manpower pool, did he not?
LAMMERS: That is possible. The Führer asked more of Sauckel than Sauckel
thought he could provide.
MAJOR JONES: And Sauckel said that whether he could do that depended
primarily on what German enforcement agents will be made available; his
project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents. And then
your record goes on:
“The Reichsführer SS explained that the executives put at his
disposal were very few in number but that he”—that is to say,
Himmler—“would try to help on the Sauckel project by increasing
their number and working them harder. The Reichsführer SS
immediately made 2,000 to 2,600 men from the concentration camps
available for air-raid precautions in Vienna.”
That is to say, it is clear from that report, is it not, that Sauckel
was seeking more help from the SS and that Himmler was saying he would
do his best to help him? Is that not so?
LAMMERS: There is no doubt of that, but Sauckel did not want to have
help from the SS only, he wanted to get any help he needed in the
country in question by the appropriate service, as I said before, the
Feldkommandantur, for instance.
MAJOR JONES: There is a last document which I want to put to you on
Sauckel. It is Document 3819-PS, Exhibit Number GB-306, a small part of
which was read into the record by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. That is a
report from Sauckel to Hitler, dated 17 March 1944. I take it that you
probably saw a copy of that report, did you not?
LAMMERS: I do not know.
MAJOR JONES: Just look at it, because it is most illuminating on the
attitude of Sauckel toward the assistance of the SS and the German
Police.
LAMMERS: Yes; this is dated 11 July 1944. I have one here which is dated
11 July 1944.
MAJOR JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, he is saying that he has in his hand a
document of 11 July 1944. The document you referred to was 17 March, was
it not?
MAJOR JONES: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] You have got your minutes of the conference.
Is there not attached to it a report of Sauckel dated 17 March?
LAMMERS: There is a report attached here dated 5 April.
MAJOR JONES: I shall not proceed with that part of the document, My
Lord.
[_Turning to the witness._] If you will turn to the document dated 12
July, that will do for my present purposes. You remember that is your
own report of the conference of 12 July 1944 on the question of the
increased procuring of foreign manpower. And you opened that conference,
Witness, did you not?
LAMMERS: I was always a neutral agent. If there were any differences of
opinion, I offered my service as go-between.
MAJOR JONES: What were you neutral about, Witness?
LAMMERS: I was not in charge of an office. The other departments had
their own departmental interests.
MAJOR JONES: You were not being an honest broker between Sauckel and
Himmler, were you?
LAMMERS: I frequently had to try to effect a compromise between various
people, including on occasion Himmler or Sauckel, when a dispute arose;
and I think I need not blush to say that in that case I was an honest
broker. I wanted to bring about an agreement between these two so that
it would not be necessary to involve the Führer in such differences of
opinion.
MAJOR JONES: Just look at the manner in which you opened that
conference. You said there—it is the second sentence under your name:
“He limited the subject of the discussion to an examination of
all the possible means of making good the present deficit of
foreign workers.”
Then you say in the next question:
“The question of whether and in what form greater compulsion can
force people to accept work in Germany must remain in the
foreground.”
The operative word is, you know, “compulsion.”
LAMMERS: Yes; they were obviously thinking of female labor and of a
reduction of the age limits set for juvenile workers.
MAJOR JONES: Just go on to the next sentence of your statement:
“In this connection we must consider how the executives, whose
inadequacy is the subject of strong complaints by the
Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor, can be strengthened on
the one hand by the exercise of influence on the foreign
governments and on the other by the expansion of our executive
forces and the intensified use of the Wehrmacht, the Police, or
of other German services.”
That is how you opened that conference, you know.
LAMMERS: That is quite correct. These were the problems that had to be
discussed.
MAJOR JONES: To produce more forced labor and discover by what
terrorizing by the police and what pressures by Ribbentrop the results
could be achieved? That was the object of the conference, was it not?
LAMMERS: No, our object was not to consider how we might terrorize
people but how we could carry out official decrees with the necessary
executive power to back them up. Surely no terrorist measures are
implied in saying that something must be done in a matter. I could
describe a case in France, for instance. The workers recruited by
Sauckel in France were brought to the railroad station by French
executives for transportation as prescribed by the French compulsory
labor decree. Everything was in order...
MAJOR JONES: Just answer my questions, will you? You are going on to a
different matter.
LAMMERS: I did not suggest terrorist measures. Some compulsion must be
exercised by every state authority; but to talk of compulsion is by no
means terrorism, or a crime, or violation.
MAJOR JONES: I just draw your attention to the contribution of General
Warlimont in this discussion, where he said that:
“The troops assigned to fighting the partisans will take over,
in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan areas.
Everyone who cannot account satisfactorily for his presence in
these areas is to be seized.”
And you said:
“On further inquiry by the Reich Minister, Dr. Lammers,”—this
is on Page 10 of the English, record—“as to whether members of
the population fit for employment could not be withdrawn along
with the troops, Colonel Saas, Plenipotentiary for Italy, stated
that Field Marshal Kesselring had already decreed that the
population of an area extending to a depth of 30 kilometers
behind the front was to be ‘captured’.”
The whole emphasis of that conference was on the use of force, was it
not, and the collaboration of the executive agencies of the State to
procure the necessary forced labor for the Reich?
LAMMERS: A certain degree of coercion was to be applied undoubtedly.
MAJOR JONES: There are only two more matters, My Lord, which I feel that
it is my duty to put to the witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] On the question of the massacre of the
Jewish people, you said in your evidence before the adjournment that you
had saved 200,000 Jews yourself. Do you remember saying that to the
Tribunal?
LAMMERS: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: You saved them from extermination, you meant, I take it?
LAMMERS: No. I merely saved them from evacuation and nothing else. I
found out afterwards, of course—now—that in actual fact I really did
save them from death. You have...
MAJOR JONES: You know you have testified—just a moment—you have
testified to the Tribunal as to a conference which took place early in
1943 where you were invited by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt to send a
representative to the conference dealing with the Jewish problem. Do you
remember saying that to the Tribunal?
LAMMERS: Yes, the matter was discussed. It was a conference of experts.
MAJOR JONES: That was the famous conference which Eichmann presided
over, do you remember?
LAMMERS: That I do not know. I did not attend it myself; I merely sent a
subordinate.
MAJOR JONES: The invitation to attend the conference, that came from
Kaltenbrunner, did it not?
LAMMERS: The invitation came from the RSHA.
MAJOR JONES: Not from Kaltenbrunner personally.
LAMMERS: I do not know.
MAJOR JONES: And you sent a representative to the conference, did you
not?
LAMMERS: Someone had to go as my representative; and he had specific
orders simply to listen and not to make any comments during the
conference, because I reserved for myself the right to report this to
the Führer.
MAJOR JONES: Was your representative at this conference instructed by
you to take no attitude? Was that what you said to the Tribunal?
LAMMERS: He was given express orders not to make any comments. My State
Secretary, who gave him the instructions, can confirm this. He could not
do so in any case, since no decisions were reached. But he was not to
make any comments on his own initiative because I intended to discuss
this question, which was at that time described as “the final solution
of the Jewish problem,” with the Führer. For this reason, I deliberately
gave the order, “No comments!”
MAJOR JONES: You sent Gottfried Bohle as your representative to that
conference, did you not?
LAMMERS: I did not send him; my State Secretary sent him, and he was not
even the competent expert, but was accidentally...
MAJOR JONES: Just answer my questions, briefly, won’t you? Gottfried
Bohle made a report to you, did he not?
LAMMERS: I received a short written report, not a verbal report.
MAJOR JONES: And did that report indicate to you that Eichmann was
planning extermination?
LAMMERS: No, there was nothing about that; and we did not know about it.
At least, I cannot remember that there was anything in it that would
have caused me to take any immediate action.
MAJOR JONES: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that concentration camps
were not mentioned in the Reich budget. Do you remember saying that?
LAMMERS: That what was included?
MAJOR JONES: Yesterday...
LAMMERS: I do not know. I did not find or read anything about it.
MAJOR JONES: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that nothing was mentioned
in the Reich budget about concentration camps.
LAMMERS: I did not find anything and I did not read anything on that
subject. I do not know anything about it. Such matters did not interest
me much anyway.
MAJOR JONES: You are saying now that you do not know whether there were
any references to concentration camps in the budget or not?
LAMMERS: I could not say for certain. I do not remember any specific
mention of the concentration camps in the budget.
MAJOR JONES: Does it surprise you to know that for the 1939 budget for
the armed SS and concentration camps in the Ministry of the Interior
budget there was a sum of 104,000,000 marks and 21,000,000 marks set out
as expenses for these items? Did you know that?
LAMMERS: I did not study every item of the budget drawn up by the
Minister of the Interior. I did not read any budgets at all. I was
interested only in my own budgets in the Reich Chancellery; I did not
read those of other offices. I had no reason to do so.
MAJOR JONES: Did you know that there were over 300 concentration camps
in Nazi Germany?
LAMMERS: No, I did not know that.
MAJOR JONES: How many did you, as head of the Reich Chancellery, know of
the existence of?
LAMMERS: I only knew about a few.
MAJOR JONES: Only a few.
LAMMERS: Three at the most.
MAJOR JONES: Are you solemnly, on oath...
LAMMERS: But I did know that others existed.
MAJOR JONES: Are you solemnly, on oath, saying to the Tribunal that you,
in the very center of the web of Nazism, did not know of the existence
of more than three concentration camps?
LAMMERS: Yes, I do mean to say so. I was not in the very center of
Nazism; I was the head administrative official who did administrative
work for the Führer. I did not concern myself with concentration camps.
I knew of some concentration camps, that is of two or three; and it was
clear to me that others must exist. I cannot say more under oath.
MAJOR JONES: I put it to you that you knew quite well of this regime of
terror but continued to serve in it until the last. Is that not so?
LAMMERS: What regime of terror? The concentration camp system existed. I
knew that; everyone knew that.
MAJOR JONES: But that did not trouble your conscience, I take it.
LAMMERS: That they existed? I submitted my proposals with regard to the
concentration camps to the Führer; and he excluded me from the entire
question as early as 1934 after I had made suggestions to him about
concentration camps, and turned the whole matter over to Himmler to whom
I had to transmit all complaints about concentration camps. I had
nothing whatever to do with concentration camps except when I received
complaints which I considered as being addressed to the Führer. I
pursued them as far as was possible and had them remedied in part.
MAJOR JONES: You, of course, were an SS Obergruppenführer. Perhaps you
did not recognize terror when you heard and saw it.
LAMMERS: I was SS Obergruppenführer, which was an honorary rank, just as
I said before of Seyss-Inquart. I performed no official duties in the
SS; I had no command, no authority, or anything.
MAJOR JONES: And you profited considerably, you and your Nazi
colleagues, from this regime, did you not? You, as the Comptroller of
the Reich Chancellery funds, can probably assist us in that matter.
LAMMERS: What did I have? Considerable what?
MAJOR JONES: Funds, money, marks, Reichsmark.
LAMMERS: Yes. I had an income, naturally.
MAJOR JONES: And you were responsible for distributing...
LAMMERS: Not as an SS Führer.
MAJOR JONES: As Reich Chancellor you were responsible for distributing
the largess of the Nazis among yourselves, were you not?
LAMMERS: I was in charge of the Führer’s funds; and on his instructions
I made the necessary payments out of those funds. I could not spend
money as I pleased.
MAJOR JONES: You, as Reich Chancellor, delivered a million Reichsmark to
Dr. Ley, did you not?
LAMMERS: That was a donation that the Führer specifically granted to
Ley. I did not do that on my own initiative.
MAJOR JONES: And Ribbentrop was another recipient of a million, was he
not?
LAMMERS: He received a million in installments, first one half and then
the other.
MAJOR JONES: And Keitel was another millionaire, was he not? He received
a million, did he not?
LAMMERS: He received a sum of money and an estate, because the Führer
renewed the practice of the old Prussian kings of granting land and
money to his generals.
MAJOR JONES: And you yourself received 600,000 marks, did you not?
LAMMERS: I received 600,000 marks on my 65th birthday. I received this
sum because I had never received anything in my previous positions,
since I had never asked for it—also because I had twice been bombed out
and had no house or property of my own. The Führer wished me to buy a
small house.
MAJOR JONES: That is all.
If your Lordship will allow me to clarify the exhibit numbers of the
documents I have put in: Document 3863-PS is Exhibit GB-320; 2220-PS is
USA-175; 686-PS is USA-305; 865-PS is USA-143; 032-PS is GB-321; 871-PS
is GB-322; D-753(a) is GB-323; 3601-PS is GB-324; 997-PS is RF-122;
1296-PS is GB-325; 1292-PS was USA-225 and RF-68; 3819-PS was GB-306.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, have you put in the budget which shows
the figures that you gave us?
MAJOR JONES: It is on Page 1394 of the 1939 budget. For the purposes of
the record, it will be Exhibit GB-326 (Document 3873-PS).
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MAJOR JONES: The Prosecution will have an extract made from this vast
volume, My Lord, for the purposes of the court document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal thought that there was going to be only
one cross-examination of the witnesses who were not defendants.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Delegation wished to question the witness
Lammers. It was suggested that the interrogation be split up into two
parts, some of the questions to be asked by the British Delegation and
the others by the Russian Delegation.
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases...
THE PRESIDENT: Was this the one case that was mentioned?
MAJOR JONES: This is the exceptional case, My Lord, and the agreement
was made before the new regime of cross-examination was introduced. My
colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, and I did agree to share the work; and
there are very few matters which Colonel Pokrovsky has indicated which
he desires to put; and that was in agreement between the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: On 6 November 1945 you were interrogated by a
representative of the Soviet Prosecution. Do you remember this
interrogation?
LAMMERS: Yes, I do remember an interrogation by a representative of the
Soviet Prosecution.
COL. POKROVSKY: You testified at the time that Hitler...
LAMMERS: Yes. I testified.
COL. POKROVSKY: You do not know what I am talking about, so do not
hurry.
Now, you testified that Hitler authorized you to render your help to
Rosenberg. You remember that, do you not?
LAMMERS: Yes, Rosenberg was to take over the political work in
connection with Eastern problems.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is correct. What was your help to Rosenberg?
LAMMERS: To begin with, it only meant that I had an interview with him
at which he discussed his plans for a possible administration to be
established. The Führer had given him instructions to consider how, in
the case of war with Russia, the country might be occupied and
administered. For this Herr Rosenberg...
COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, wait a moment. I did not ask you what the
Führer asked Rosenberg to do. I am asking you, what did the Führer
authorize or ask you to do? You said, “To help Rosenberg.” Exactly what
form did your help to Rosenberg take? You assisted in... [_The witness
attempted to interrupt._] Wait a minute. Did you participate in the
development—wait a moment, please listen to my question. Did you
participate in working out a plan for the economic organization of the
Eastern territories? Do you understand me?
LAMMERS: I did not take part in working out the organization of the
economy.
COL. POKROVSKY: I want you to take a look at Document Number 1056-PS. Do
you recall this document now?
[_The document was handed to the witness._]
LAMMERS: I must see it first.
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, that is the reason why it was given to you.
LAMMERS: I do not seem to recognize this document, nor do I believe that
I prepared it. It is obviously a plan drawn up by Herr Rosenberg.
COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, you affirm that you did not know
anything; and you do not know anything at all about this document?
LAMMERS: It is possible that Herr Rosenberg handed me a plan of the
kind, but at the moment I cannot say whether I ever had these 30 pages
in my hands or not. I do not know.
COL. POKROVSKY: Yesterday you testified before the Tribunal—and your
testimony was very detailed—in regard to the economic administration of
Eastern territories. How could you give any truthful testimony if you
did not know anything at all about this basic document? This particular
document really defines and determines the structure of the
administration in territories which were under Rosenberg. Do you
understand me?
LAMMERS: I cannot give any opinion as to what is contained in this
document. I cannot form an opinion of a document of 30 pages in one
moment here. Please let me have the document so that I read the whole of
it. I do not believe that I ever had this document in my hands.
Rosenberg attended to organization in the East. I simply co-operated in
a decree, a basic decree, in which Rosenberg was given the authority in
the East. I was not at all interested in the details.
COL. POKROVSKY: If your memory is so weak in regard to this document,
then would you please be good enough to look at another document? It is
less than 30 pages long. Now, you will be shown a document signed by
yourself. It deals with the question of the Soviet prisoners of war. It
is Exhibit USSR-361. There is one passage marked in this document which
says that the Soviet prisoners of war should not be treated according to
general rules, but be put under the charge of the Ministry for the
Eastern Territories. Have you found the place? [_There was no
response._] Witness Lammers, I am asking you...
LAMMERS: I have not found the place.
COL. POKROVSKY: Take a look at the second page.
LAMMERS: The appendix?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, yes, in the appendix. For your convenience, the
place is marked with a pencil.
LAMMERS: Not here. There is no marked passage in the one I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document I have—if it is the same
one, 073-PS is in paragraphs. Might you refer him to the paragraphs?
COL. POKROVSKY: Just a minute, please.
Unfortunately the paragraph is not mentioned in the excerpt I have.
However, the exact place will be shown to the witness.
[_The place in the document was indicated to the witness._]
This place is really marked with a pencil. He simply did not notice it.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did you find it?
LAMMERS: Yes, I have it now.
COL. POKROVSKY: And now have you convinced yourself that it is marked
with a pencil?
LAMMERS: Yes, the Foreign Office...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about that. I am interested in
another place where it says, “The exception to this regulation is the
Soviet prisoners...” Did you find it?
LAMMERS: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: “The exception to this regulation is the Soviet
prisoners of war”—that is what I am interested in—“who are under the
charge of the Minister administering Occupied Eastern Territories, since
the general Geneva Convention does not...”—and so forth.
Did you find the place?
LAMMERS: Yes, I have the place.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you sign this document?
LAMMERS: I did not sign this document, because it has been drawn up by
the Foreign Office. I simply signed a letter forwarding this memorandum
from the Foreign Office to Minister Rosenberg for his information.
COL. POKROVSKY: Also, with a covering note. You also sent your letter...
LAMMERS: In this covering note I say that I am enclosing a memorandum
from the Foreign Office, “The Foreign Office comments on your letter,
_et cetera_; and I may inform you of this.” I simply acted as
intermediary and forwarding office. I did not draw up the memorandum or
sign it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then do I understand you, in this way, that you actually
substantiated the authenticity of this document, the document that went
through your hands?
LAMMERS: I do not know; I can only substantiate...
COL. POKROVSKY: How could you not say it? You told us you were
forwarding it; you gave this document and forwarded it to somebody else.
Did you send it to some address?
LAMMERS: I sent on the document signed. I signed the letter informing
Herr Rosenberg of the attitude taken by the Foreign Office. Whether the
enclosure is authentic or not, I do not know.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am quite satisfied with this answer.
On 8 April, here before the Tribunal, you stated that the solution of
the Jewish problem was referred by Hitler to Göring and Heydrich and
later on to Heydrich’s successor, Kaltenbrunner. Now, I want you to tell
us exactly how Göring, Heydrich, and Kaltenbrunner participated in
solving the Jewish problem.
LAMMERS: I only knew that a Führer order was transmitted by Reich
Marshal Göring to Heydrich, who was at that time head of the RSHA. I
believe that it was then transferred to Kaltenbrunner’s authority. This
order was called, “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem,” but no one
knew what it dealt with or what the term meant. In the period which
followed I made several efforts to clarify the real meaning of the term
“final solution” and what was to happen. I attempted yesterday to
explain this question, but I was not allowed to say all I wanted.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, it is not sufficiently clear exactly through whom
and how—in what way—you attempted to clarify the meaning of the
expression, “final solution of the Jewish problem.” To whom did you
appeal? Whom did you ask?
LAMMERS: At first I appealed to Himmler and asked him what the meaning
of it was. Himmler told me that the Führer had ordered him to evacuate
the Jews who were still in Germany, and this led to a number of problems
referred to as the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem.” That is what
I said yesterday.
COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, wait a minute. You said that Hitler charged
Göring and Heydrich, and subsequently Kaltenbrunner, with the solution
of this problem. Did you address yourself to Göring in regard to this?
to Heydrich and to Kaltenbrunner? Did you ask them that question, the
question in which you told me you were interested?
LAMMERS: No, I cannot remember doing that, because I believed that
Göring was merely transmitting the Führer’s order. I have no knowledge
of Keitel’s participation; I did not hear of that until today.
COL. POKROVSKY: Who has been talking of Keitel? He was not mentioned at
all; it was Heydrich.
LAMMERS: Heydrich had this assignment. I discovered from the reports of
my assistants that such an assignment existed. I was interested in
ascertaining what kind of assignment it was, and I applied to Himmler
for information.
COL. POKROVSKY: And so you were not successful?
LAMMERS: I did not see a written order.
COL. POKROVSKY: Yesterday you said, “all except me” expressed their
opinion on Jewish problems. Who are all these, “all” except you? You
remember that testimony yesterday?
LAMMERS: I testified yesterday that I had spoken to Himmler about this
question and that I reserved for myself the right to report to the
Führer. I also testified that I had this interview with the Führer but
that the Führer was very difficult to persuade in these matters. I also
testified yesterday that there were rumors about Jews being killed which
led me to make investigations. I further testified yesterday that these
rumors, as far as I could find out, were gossip. So there was nothing
else for me to do but to go to the Führer in this matter—first to go to
Himmler, and then to the Führer.
COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, I do not ask you what you said yesterday. I do
not want to hear your testimony for the second time. What I am
interested in, and what I want to clarify at the moment, is the fact
that you mentioned yesterday that, “All except me expressed their
opinion in regard to the Jewish problem.” “All” means whom? Name them.
Whom do you mean? And answer my question directly.
LAMMERS: I do not understand the question “all.”
COL. POKROVSKY: I will repeat this question for the third time, so that
you can understand it better: Yesterday you said, when you were
testifying on the solution of the Jewish problem, “All except me
expressed their opinion and defined their attitude in regard to the
Jewish problem. I was also asked to give my opinion.” Do you remember it
now?
LAMMERS: Yes, I remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.
LAMMERS: The word “all” refers to all the departmental representatives
invited to attend their conference. The heads of the departments
concerned were invited to attend all these RSHA conferences. That is
what “all” applies to.
COL. POKROVSKY: Which of the defendants here were present?
LAMMERS: There were no ministers present at all. This was merely a
conference of experts. I was not there. I do not know who attended this
conference.
COL. POKROVSKY: You were present at the conference in Hitler’s quarters
on 16 July 1941? You understand what conference I mean, do you not? That
is the one which was for the purpose of considering objectives of war
against the U.S.S.R. Do you understand it now?
LAMMERS: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was Keitel present at the conference?
LAMMERS: To my knowledge, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you not remember what Keitel said about the aims of
the war against the U.S.S.R.?
LAMMERS: I cannot remember whether he mentioned that subject.
COL. POKROVSKY: And did you stay until the end of the conference?
LAMMERS: I assume I stayed to the end.
COL. POKROVSKY: And Keitel, too? And Keitel also stayed until the end?
LAMMERS: I cannot remember that now. I assume that he did but he may
have left earlier.
COL. POKROVSKY: You cannot be positive about it?
LAMMERS: No, I cannot be certain.
COL. POKROVSKY: On 13 October 1945, you were interrogated by a
lieutenant colonel of the American army, and on that occasion you
testified that Rosenberg was appointed Minister for the Eastern
Territories according to the personal wish of the Führer. Do you
remember this testimony?
LAMMERS: I know that I testified.
COL. POKROVSKY: Further, you testified, on the same day and during the
same interrogation, that you did not recommend Rosenberg for this post,
since you had certain objections in regard to his candidacy. What were
the objections against Rosenberg’s candidacy?
LAMMERS: There were many objections to Rosenberg’s appointment. These
were specifically raised by Bormann. Reichsleiter Bormann did not want
to have Rosenberg in this position.
COL. POKROVSKY: Tell us something about your objections. What were your
own objections?
LAMMERS: I submitted the question to the Führer at the time whether, if
military complications arose, it was necessary to have such a man at all
for the East; and, if so, whether Rosenberg was the right man to
organize the matters.
COL. POKROVSKY: That was in April 1941?
LAMMERS: I no longer remember; it was in the spring.
COL. POKROVSKY: On orders from Reich Minister Rosenberg, forced labor
was introduced, forced labor for the Jewish population of the Eastern
regions, on 16 August 1941. Everyone of Jewish origin between the ages
of 14 and 60 had to perform forced labor. If they refused to work they
were liable to be executed. Do you know about this order or not?
LAMMERS: I did not know of it. I cannot recall it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Take a look at this document and try to remember.
Mr. President, this document is printed on Page 50 of the second part of
Göring’s Green Folder, which is already submitted to the Tribunal under
Document Number EC-347.
LAMMERS: I cannot remember this document.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right. We will let that go. Take a look at another
document. Perhaps your memory will be somewhat better in regard to this
document.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, in that last document that you were
referring to, have these paragraphs of the ordinance been read into the
record?
COL. POKROVSKY: I would not be quite positive about that, Mr. President;
I do not know whether this particular paragraph was read into the
record. All the second part of Göring’s Green Folder was presented to
the Tribunal in evidence and listed under Exhibit USA-320 (Document
Number EC-347). The document about the preliminary investigation bears
the Number EC-347. This part was read into the record. I think that
inasmuch as the witness does not remember this document now, we shall
touch upon it when it is needed more urgently at the interrogation of
another defendant.
Now, we will take care of something else.
[_Turning to the witness._] Take a look at the Führer directive of 29
August 1941. This document, of course, will be easy to remember, since
your signature appears on it. This is a directive in regard to the
economic measures in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
This document, Your Honors, is also one of the documents of the second
part of Göring’s Green Folder. It is presented to the Tribunal in
English.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, do you recognize this document?
LAMMERS: Yes, I signed this document. This is a measure which the Führer
decreed at the Reich Marshal’s suggestions.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well; and how do you explain the fact that Keitel
was signing directives or orders like this one, concerning general
governmental matters of the Reich which were not of a military nature?
How do you explain this? Why should it be signed by Hitler, Keitel, and
Lammers?
LAMMERS: This was a Führer decree; and Führer decrees were attested by
myself and also signed by Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, if the Wehrmacht
was in any way interested. They might also be signed by Bormann as a
third member, if Party interests were involved. That caused Bormann’s
signature...
COL. POKROVSKY: Bormann’s signature is not here. It is signed by Hitler,
Keitel, and Lammers. Is that right?
LAMMERS: It was signed first by Keitel because it dealt with the
occupied regions in the East.
COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, Keitel was responsible for all
legislation in occupied territories; is that so? Do you hear my
question? Was the Defendant Keitel responsible for all legal measures in
occupied territories? Do you hear my question?
LAMMERS: The signature does not involve any responsibility...
COL. POKROVSKY: Then why his signature and what was the purpose of his
signature? Just for decorative purposes?
LAMMERS: Since he was interested or concerned in the matter, he attested
that, along with us, but to speak of responsibility...
COL. POKROVSKY: You should know better than anybody else. All the same
it is not quite clear why there was any necessity to have his signatures
on the document; and his signature is right above yours. What does it
deal with?
LAMMERS: It was probably assumed that this decree would affect Wehrmacht
interests. Field Marshal Keitel must know better than I do why he signed
it at that time.
COL. POKROVSKY: You read this document yourself, and you could see very
well for yourself that the Armed Forces are not affected by it.
I have two more questions for you. You testified today that
Seyss-Inquart received SS rank and uniform but he did not have the
rights of a commander of the SS. Is that correct?
LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, then, should one conclude after this that the rank
of a police official and the police uniform were really an honorary
distinction in the Reich?
LAMMERS: Seyss-Inquart did not belong to the Police but to the General
SS.
COL. POKROVSKY: But the SS was actually being used for police measures,
was that not so?
LAMMERS: No, the general SS had no police assignments; that is not
correct. And the SS uniform represented a special distinction in the
Reich.
COL. POKROVSKY: He received his uniform as a sort of reward for certain
work he had done?
LAMMERS: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, I want to ask you one last question...
LAMMERS: It was not always a reward for exceptional service, but certain
leading personages in the Reich received...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am satisfied with your answer and I do not need any
further details. Now I want to ask you one last question. On 17 January
the Defendant Keitel sent an application to the Tribunal to have you
brought in as a witness. He stated in his application that you could
testify here before the Tribunal that he, Keitel, as the head of the
Armed Forces along with the military agencies under his charge in the
occupied territories, opposed Rosenberg’s plunder squads and issued
orders for their arrest. You were called before the Tribunal to answer
this question and for some unknown reason this was the only question not
put to you. I would like you to answer this question now. What do you
know about the struggle of Keitel and the Armed Forces against
Rosenberg’s looting squads, as Keitel calls them?
LAMMERS: I know only that Rosenberg was commissioned to buy up objects
of art and that he was also commissioned to get furniture in the western
occupied territories which was needed for the offices in the East. He
received this assignment in his capacity of Minister of the Reich.
COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, evidently you misunderstood me. [_The witness
attempted to interrupt._] Wait a moment. Now, we are not talking about
the worries of Rosenberg; but I am asking you what you know about the
fight of the military command against Rosenberg’s looting squads—to use
Keitel’s words. Do you understand my question? Do you know anything at
all about this or do you know nothing?
LAMMERS: No, I know nothing about that.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I am quite satisfied. I have no further
questions to ask the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, in order to be accurate: I understood
you to say with reference to that document that you were putting to the
witness just now, of 2 June 1941, that this document had no reference to
military authority. But Paragraph 2 of it says: “To achieve this end
he”—that is Göring—“may give direct orders to the respective military
authorities in the Eastern Occupied Territories.” Therefore, it is not
accurate to say that the document does not refer to the military
authority at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: I suppose that the Tribunal remembers the testimony
which was given here in regard to the circumstances under which Keitel
signed general directives and general law. He explained it by saying
that all these orders and directives were of an operational staff
nature.
In this particular case the question concerns but a general Reich office
which has directly nothing to do with staff affairs.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to argue with you. I only want to point out
it was not accurate to say that the document did not refer to military
matters at all.
Dr. Nelte, do you want to re-examine?
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I should be grateful if Colonel Pokrovsky
would make clear his last question to the witness, Dr. Lammers. He has
stated that the Defendant Keitel called Dr. Lammers as a witness to the
fact that he, Keitel, had opposed the efforts made by Rosenberg’s
special staff in the Eastern territories. Did I understand him
correctly? Perhaps the translation from Russian into German was not very
good.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I understood the question, but I
understood the witness was not able to answer it. But I do not think it
can be of very great importance. The witness was not able to answer the
question.
DR. NELTE: No, I thought that the Soviet prosecutor meant that Dr.
Lammers had been called as a witness to give certain evidence and I did
not ask the witness any such question. I only want to make it clear that
this is not the case; otherwise I have no query on the matter, nor have
I personally any further questions to put to the witness on behalf of
the Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the Tribunal think that it is necessary
for you to go into that. You have covered the ground fully in your
examination-in-chief. Then, Dr. Nelte, have you any other witnesses to
call?
DR. NELTE: I can finish in half an hour tomorrow morning. I have no
further witnesses to examine.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): I would
like to ask two or three questions about the Reich Cabinet. You said the
first meeting was on 30 January 1933 and the last was in November 1937.
Were there any other meetings in 1937?
LAMMERS: No, the Cabinet meetings were not replaced by any other
meetings.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. Would you listen? You
said there was a meeting in November 1937. Were there any other meetings
in the year 1937?
LAMMERS: Yes, there were some before that. There were several Cabinet
meetings but not very many. There were comparatively few in 1937.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many would you say in 1937?
LAMMERS: How many? There might have been five or six Cabinet meetings. I
do not think there were more.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know how many there were in...
LAMMERS: There may have been less.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know how many there were in 1936?
LAMMERS: There were rather more Cabinet meetings then, but not as many
as at the beginning of 1933 and 1934. The number of Cabinet meetings
has...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is enough, thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have no questions to put to the witness,
but I simply wanted to interpose a few remarks on the following matter:
My colleague, Dr. Nelte, has dispensed with the examination of further
witnesses. By so doing he has dispensed with Colonel General Halder,
among others and, of course, he is entitled to do so, although in
dispensing with the examination of the witness Halder, he is encroaching
on my rights. The Tribunal will recall that when a written statement by
the witness Halder was submitted, the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor, if Dr. Nelte does not call General Halder then
you can apply for calling him yourself and the matter will be
considered. Presumably you have already asked for him and you have been
referred to the fact that he has been specified by Dr. Nelte. Now, Dr.
Nelte has not called him. You can renew your application if you want to,
in writing.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that that point of view
is quite correct. When the written statement was presented by the
Russian Prosecution it was stated, upon objection by the Defense, that
the witness Halder should be called for cross-examination and in
agreement with my other colleagues, I changed this so that Halder would
be heard during the proceedings for the Defendant Keitel. Dispensing
with this witness will encroach upon my rights. I believe, consequently,
that I have a right to ask that the witness be put at my disposal for
interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we will consider the matter of General
Halder and let you know in the morning. It is 5 o’clock now.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I should have liked to ask the witness some
questions which have been made necessary by the cross-examination and
which touch on certain questions...
THE PRESIDENT: You cannot do it tonight at any rate. We will consider it
and let you know tomorrow morning, but you cannot do it tonight.
DR. SEIDL: I simply wanted to bring it up so the witness would still be
at hand tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, he shall be at hand.
MR. DODD: Your Lordship, if I may have one minute of the Tribunal’s
time, Justice Jackson asked me to bring to the attention of the Tribunal
for its information these facts apropos of the discussion of this
morning.
We have received from Colonel Dostert the original transcript which was
handed to him by Dr. Thoma and it shows that there was a red line drawn
in the margin beside this passage which was translated and mimeographed
and included in the document book. Dr. Thoma this morning felt that he
had not underlined it and he also felt that there was undoubtedly a
mistake in the translation and Colonel Dostert tells us that there is no
mistake in the translation and that it was underlined.
THE PRESIDENT: Well now, Dr. Nelte, we should like to know what your
position is about General Westhoff and—I think it is the
Obergruppenführer Wielen or something of that sort. You were given the
opportunity of calling those witnesses and we understand you do not
desire to do so.
DR. NELTE: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I think that the cross-examination
has made it clear that the Prosecution has abandoned the original charge
against Keitel, namely, that he issued an order, or transmitted an order
from Hitler, to the effect that the 50 Royal Air Force officers should
be shot.
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe confronted the defendant with the four points of
which he accused the Defendant Keitel in connection with this case; and
the defendant admitted these four points.
Since I named General Westhoff as a witness only to testify that Keitel
did not issue the order and he did not pass it on, and as Westhoff was
not present at the conference at the Obersalzberg and has no first-hand
knowledge, there is no further need for me to call this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you, of course, are to decide whether you call
him or not. But unless Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe says that he has withdrawn
any charge against Keitel I do not think that you ought to refrain from
calling him on the ground that a charge has been abandoned. There has
not been any express abandonment of any charge. Subject to anything that
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe says I should not have thought that that would be
a good reason for not calling him, but it is entirely a matter for you.
Yes, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is no abandonment of any charge.
In fact, the Prosecution stands by what is stated by General Westhoff in
his statement which I put to the Defendant Keitel. That is the evidence
for the Prosecution and the Prosecution stands by that as it is put in.
DR. NELTE: May I ask whether the Prosecution wish to assert that General
Westhoff has testified that Keitel did issue this order or transmit it?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you have seen the document which contains an
excerpt of the statement by General Westhoff. You therefore know what he
says in that statement. The Tribunal, subject to what counsel desires to
address them on the subject—they will, of course, hear them—but the
Tribunal propose to call General Westhoff themselves in order to hear
his statement whether he adheres to his statement; and also Wielen,
Wielen’s evidence, of course, is principally against the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner.
DR. NELTE: Then may I also ask the Prosecution to submit to the Tribunal
the affidavit deposed by General Westhoff with regard to this matter, so
as to make clear...
THE PRESIDENT: When you say affidavit, do you mean the statement?
DR. NELTE: No; I mean the affidavit, not an unsworn statement. So far,
the Prosecution have dealt only with statements not made under oath.
Apart from these, however, Colonel Williams required and received an
affidavit from the witness Westhoff, and this affidavit contains a
precise statement from Westhoff to the effect that he does not wish to
say and never has said that Keitel ever issued or transmitted any such
order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no affidavit. I have checked with Mr.
Roberts and we have not got one. There were two interrogations, if my
recollection is correct, one which was early and one on 2 November.
There were two interrogations, one of which I put in. They are in Dr.
Nelte’s document book. I have no affidavit. If I had, of course, I
should produce it at once. I do not know where Dr. Nelte got the
information, but certainly no affidavit has ever been brought to my
attention.
THE PRESIDENT: The only thing the Tribunal has got is a statement made
by General Westhoff which is annexed to the report of a certain
brigadier whose name I have forgotten. Oh yes, Brigadier Shapcott. The
course which the Tribunal proposes to do is to call General Westhoff and
to ask him whether his statement made in that document is accurate and
also true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Prosecution has not the slightest objection
to that.
THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will have General Westhoff and also
Wielen—they will be here tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH DAY
Wednesday, 10 April 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. THOMA: High Tribunal, Mr. President, I stated yesterday that the
Lapouge passage was not marked red in my document book and should not be
read. My assertion was not correct. I made this assertion for the
following reasons:
My client, Herr Rosenberg, sent me the following note yesterday while I
was delivering my case: “The passages in the document book to be cited
are certainly marked in red; the other parts do not have to be
translated at all.” The passages referred to in the French text had not
been marked. I consequently assumed that the passages should not be
translated. This communication from Rosenberg, however, had a different
meaning. Rosenberg had made a sign in certain documents that were marked
in red to indicate that these passages do not have to be read. That
includes the quotation from Lapouge, and therefore the error occurred.
I also said yesterday that the passage cited by Mr. Justice Jackson was
incorrectly translated. That, too, was an error which occurred on my
part apparently because the emphasis of the word “Bastardisierung”
shocked me. I presume that “miscegenation” was meant. I request the
translation department to pardon me. The document book itself...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal quite understand that there must
have been some mistake, and no one, I hope—and certainly not the
Tribunal—is accusing you of any bad faith in the matter at all. The
Tribunal quite understand that there must have been some
misunderstanding or some mistake which led to whatever happened.
DR. THOMA: I thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, permit me to ask the Tribunal a short question
related to procedure matters in the case of Westhoff. Yesterday I stated
the reasons why I believed I could forego calling the witness Westhoff.
According to the explanation of the British Prosecution the error has
been cleared up, and therefore my assumption is no longer true. I should
like now to ask the Tribunal, “Is the original situation thereby
automatically restored, and may I also claim to examine this witness
before the Court as a defense witness, or must I make a formal
application to be authorized to call this witness again?”
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal do not desire you to make any
formal application. You can ask the witness any questions when he has
answered the questions which the Tribunal will put to him, and the
Prosecution, of course, can also ask him questions.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl, I think you wanted to put some questions
to this witness, did you not, on behalf of the Defendant Frank? We hope
that they won’t be very long.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution asked you a question yesterday in
connection with the AB Action. For your information AB Action means
extraordinary pacifying operations. It was necessary in connection with
uprisings during 1940 in the Government General. In this connection the
Prosecution read you a quotation from Frank’s diary of 16 May 1940. I
want to read to you, first of all, one further sentence from this same
citation, from the same entry. It reads as follows:
“Every arbitrary action is to be prevented with the most severe
measures. In every case the point of view which takes into
consideration the necessary protection of the Führer’s authority
and of the Reich must be in the foreground. Moreover, action
will be postponed until 15 June 1940.”
The Prosecution then read you a further citation from 30 May from which
one could draw the conclusion...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not think that you really can read
passages of Frank’s diary to the witness. I mean, you are re-examining
to clear up. He had not seen the diary.
DR. SEIDL: I shall ask him a question. Before that, however, I must read
another short passage; otherwise he cannot understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the question? You can put the diary to Frank when
you call Frank.
DR. SEIDL: The witness was heard yesterday in connection with this AB
Action, and he was presented with a passage from this diary that must
have given him the impression that a rather large number of Poles had
been shot without any court proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: What question do you want to put?
DR. SEIDL: I want to ask him whether he knows Ministerial Counsellor
Wille, what position he occupied in the Government General, and what
kind of assistance this Dr. Wille could possibly give if he had anything
at all to do with this action.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, ask him that, Dr. Seidl, if you like, but the diary
has no relevance to that question at all.
DR. SEIDL: But the question can only be answered sensibly if I, Mr.
President, read him the corresponding passage from the diary. Otherwise
he certainly won’t see the connection.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not see the connection, either, and the
Tribunal thinks there is no point in reading the diary to him.
DR. SEIDL: That will become apparent, Mr. President. I ask to be allowed
to read one more passage from the diary, namely of 12 June 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Seidl. You can ask him your question, but you
can’t read the diary to him. You stated what the question was, whether
he knew somebody held a certain position in the Government General. You
can ask him that question.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you know Ministerial Counsellor Wille?
LAMMERS: No, I can’t remember him.
DR. SEIDL: You also do not know that he was the head of the main justice
division in the Government General?
LAMMERS: No; that, too, I do not remember.
DR. SEIDL: Then the one question is already settled.
The second question which I had to present to the witness is related
again to an entry in Frank’s diary in connection with concentration
camps. I can, however, also ask this question only if beforehand I can
read the witness a corresponding passage from the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Tell us what the question is.
DR. SEIDL: The question would have read, “Is the point of view expressed
in the entry in Frank’s diary”—which I intended to read—“the correct
point of view? Does it agree with his first explanation on Monday, or is
the view expressed in the passage from the diary which the Prosecution
presented yesterday the correct one?”
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal think you can put the question, if you
put it in the form, “Do you know what was the attitude of Frank towards
concentration camps?”—if you put it in that way—“and what was it?”
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness has already answered this question
in his direct examination. He declared that Frank held a negative
attitude toward concentration camps. Yesterday, however, an excerpt was
read to him from Frank’s diary which could prove the opposite. However,
there are dozens of entries in Frank’s diary that corroborate the point
of view of the witness and which contradict that which was presented by
the Prosecution. I can therefore only ask the witness a sensible
question if I read him something from the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, all those matters can be gone into with Frank.
You can prove then every passage that ended in argument; you can prove
every passage in the diary which is relevant; and you can put the most
necessary passages to Frank.
DR. SEIDL: The third question would have been in reference to the
telegram...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, it is only a very exceptional privilege that
you, as counsel for Frank, are allowed to re-examine at all, and the
Tribunal have expressed the opinion to you that they do not think this
is a matter on which you ought to be allowed to re-examine. The person
to re-examine is the one who calls a witness in the first place. We
can’t allow, in ordinary cases, re-examination by everyone.
DR. SEIDL: I then renounce any further question to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
And now the Tribunal wishes to have General Westhoff brought in.
Sir David, could you find me the German version of General Westhoff’s
statement in these papers here?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I looked for it, but could not find it, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You can’t find it?
[_The witness Westhoff took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name?
ADOLF WESTHOFF (Witness): Adolf.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
WESTHOFF: Adolf Westhoff.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
General Westhoff, you made a statement before Brigadier Shapcott or
before Captain J. B. Parnell, did you not?
WESTHOFF: I do not know the captain’s name. I made a statement in
England.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. On the 13th of June 1945?
WESTHOFF: That is possible, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t know English, I suppose?
WESTHOFF: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will read you—have the Prosecution got another
copy of this document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, Sir David, if you would follow me whilst I
read it and draw my attention to any passages which are really
relevant...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Since it is a considerably long document, I don’t wish to
read it all to the witness.
What the Tribunal wants to know, General Westhoff, is whether you adhere
to this statement or whether you wish to make any alterations in it. And
I will read to you, so that you may remember it, the material passages
from the statement.
WESTHOFF: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: “I was in charge of the ‘General’ department
(Abteilung ‘Allgemein’) when the shooting of the escaped R.A.F.
P.W. from Stalag Luft III took place. It was the first occasion
on which Feldmarschall Keitel had sent for me. I went with
General Von Graevenitz. He had been sent for and I was to
accompany him. A certain number of officers had escaped from the
Sagan Camp.”
Am I going too fast?
“I don’t remember how many, but I believe about 80...”
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, can I be of service to the Tribunal by handing
him a German translation which has been placed at my disposal by the
Prosecution?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to Dr. Nelte.
THE PRESIDENT: General Westhoff, would you read that statement of yours
through as quickly as you can? You will be able to see what are the
really material passages, and then tell the Tribunal whether that
statement is correct.
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is still another part of the statement
which I have also received from the Prosecution. It was a very extensive
compilation. May I also in addition submit this to the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that he has not the whole document?
DR. NELTE: No, he does not have all of it yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, certainly.
DR. NELTE: I received it from the Prosecution in three sections and I
should now like to give him these three parts so he may have it
complete.
THE PRESIDENT: The statement that we have here in English is five pages
done in type, and is certified in this way:
“This appendix contains an accurate translation of oral
statements made to me by Major General Westhoff on 13 June 1945
in reply to questions concerning the shooting of 50 R.A.F.
officers from Stalag Luft III. Dated this 23rd day of the ninth
month of 1945. J. E. Parnell, Captain, Intelligence Corps.”
Is that on...
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I do not know whether General Westhoff was not
perhaps interrogated several times. In this document he also made
statements regarding the whole policy regarding prisoners of war—in
other words, not only about the Sagan case. We are here concerned with a
continuous report, and the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: The only document which is in evidence is this document
which I have in my hand, which is annexed to the report of Brigadier
Shapcott.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I looked at the document, the part that
Dr. Nelte has. I think my German is sufficient to identify it. It is the
same document. If Your Lordship will look at Page 2, Your Lordship will
see the passage, “Generalinspekteur, General Roettig.” My Lord, that is
where it starts, and I have checked it as to the last paragraph. It is
the same, “I cannot remember having received any reports....” As far as
my German goes, that is the same here; so this part of the document is
the last half of the document that Your Lordship has.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Yes, Dr. Nelte, and Sir David, perhaps the best
course would be if Sir David put the passages upon which he relies to
the witness, and the witness could then be asked whether those were
accurate.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And Dr. Nelte can ask any questions that he wishes to
after that.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, counsel is going to ask you
questions upon this document now, so you need not go on reading.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, have you had a chance of reading the
first paragraph of this statement?
WESTHOFF: Yes, I have read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is that correct? Is that true?
WESTHOFF: There are a few things in it that are not entirely correct.
For instance, on the first page there is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it, then I read it to you, and see
how far it is correct:
“I was in charge of the ‘General’ department (Abteilung
‘Allgemein’) when the shooting of the escaped R.A.F. P.W. from
Stalag Luft III took place.”
That is correct, is it not?
WESTHOFF: Here is missing the phrase, “... when the shooting took
place.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now:
“It was the first occasion on which Feldmarschall Keitel had
sent for me. I went with General Von Graevenitz. He had been
sent for and I was to accompany him.”
Is that right?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “A certain number of officers had
escaped from the Sagan Camp. I do not remember how many, but I
believe about 80.”
That is correct, too?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next sentence:
“When we entered, the ‘Feldmarschall’ was very excited and
nervous, and said, ‘Gentlemen, this is a bad business.’”
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then:
“We were always blamed whenever P.W. escaped. We could not tie
them to our apron strings!”
That is your own comment. Then you go on as to what the Field Marshal
said:
“This morning, Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler
for having let some more P.W. escape. It was unheard of!”
You go on with your comment that:
“Then they must have had a row because the camp did not come
under us; it was a G.A.F. camp.”
Is that correct, that the Field Marshal said:
“This morning, Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler
for having let some more P.W. escape?”
WESTHOFF: Not in Himmler’s presence, but in Hitler’s presence. Hitler’s
presence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It ought to be in Hitler’s presence?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next sentence:
“All G.A.F. camps came directly under the G.A.F. itself, but the
inspector of P.W. camps was in charge of all camps for
inspection purposes. I was not inspector yet.”
We have had all that explained. I do not think that there is any dispute
about the organization. I won’t trouble you about that. We have gone
into that in this court in some detail. Unless the Tribunal want it, I
did not intend to trouble this witness again. You say, “I was not
inspector yet. General Von Graevenitz was inspector, and all camps came
under him in matters concerning inspection and administration.”
Then you say:
“Göring blamed Keitel for having let those men escape. These
constant escapes were a bad show. Then Himmler interfered—I can
only say what the Feldmarschall told us—and he complained that
he would have to provide another 60,000 or 70,000 men as
‘Landwachen,’ _et cetera_.”
Is that right? Did the Field Marshal say that?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the second paragraph:
“Feldmarschall Keitel said to us, ‘Gentlemen, these escapes must
stop. We must set an example. We shall take very severe
measures. I can only tell you that the men who have escaped will
be shot; probably the majority of them are dead already.’ Keitel
said that to us at the conference.”
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you say:
“We were amazed as that was a conception we had never come
across before. The affair must have happened in March. We were
sent to the ‘Feldmarschall’ in Berlin a few days after the
escape, not on that account but for some other business. We knew
they had escaped, and we were taken by surprise by that
declaration at the conference.”
Then you go on again with your account of the conference:
“General Von Graevenitz intervened at once and said, ‘But, Sir,
that is out of the question. Escape is not a dishonorable
offense. That is specially laid down in the Convention.’”
Is that correct, that General Von Graevenitz said these words?
WESTHOFF: General Von Graevenitz made objections with reference to the
Geneva Convention, but there is missing in this report the fact that the
Field Marshal said to General Von Graevenitz that this was a matter of a
Führer decree. That is missing here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look at the next sentence that I
was going to read to you, you say:
“He”—that is General Von Graevenitz—“raised these objections,
whereupon Keitel said, ‘I do not care a damn; we discussed it in
the Führer’s presence, and it cannot be altered.’”
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: No. The Field Marshal said, “That is a matter of indifference
to me. That is a matter of indifference to me.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be easier, General, if you told
the Tribunal now, to the best of your recollection, what did the Field
Marshal say after General Von Graevenitz had made his objections?
WESTHOFF: I have deposed a sworn statement to the Court on that subject,
which I might perhaps read:
“Regarding the presence of General Von Graevenitz and myself at
the headquarters in March of 1944, Field Marshal Keitel...”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Westhoff, the Tribunal may want that
later. It would be easier if you would try to stick to this statement
for the moment—whether it is right or wrong at the moment—and then we
will deal with any other one later on. It is just this point, if you
could direct your mind to it: After General Von Graevenitz had made his
objection, as you have told us, on the ground of the Convention, what
did the Field Marshal say? What did he say at that point? If you would
just try and do that, it would be a great help to us all.
WESTHOFF: The Field Marshal then said, “It is now a matter of
indifference; we must set an example.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought you said that he did mention that
there was a Führer decree to that effect, or a Führer order, or
something of that sort. Did he mention that?
WESTHOFF: That he had already said at the very beginning, that this was
a matter of a Führer decree.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In the next paragraph you point out in this
statement—and I think it is only fair to yourself to read it; it is the
second sentence:
“But in this case none of our men”—the men of the
Wehrmacht—“had shot any of the P.W. I made inquiries at once.”
Then you say:
“None of them had been shot by a soldier, but by Gestapo men
only or else police sentries. That proves that probably
Himmler—of course, I do not know whether he made the suggestion
to the Führer, or how they arranged it. It should be possible to
find that out from Göring, who was present at the conference.
Naturally, I do not know.”
Do you remember making these answers?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, you say again:
“At any rate, it is a clear fact that our men did not shoot any
of them; they must all have been shot by policemen.”
And you point out in the last sentence:
“But in this particular case, only those caught by our people
were brought back to the camp, that is, those caught by
soldiers.”
Now, in the next paragraph you say that you had no authority to give the
police orders, and you repeat that the members of the Wehrmacht did not
shoot any of them. And then in the third sentence you say:
“I had a report sent me at once, and told General Von
Graevenitz, ‘Sir, the only thing we can do is to see that no
dirty business is carried out where we are in charge.’”
Is that right: Does that correctly describe what you did, General?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you go on to say, a sentence or two later,
that you were faced with a _fait accompli_; and then you say, after
repeating General Von Graevenitz’s protests to Field Marshal Keitel,
when he had said, “That’s quite impossible, we cannot shoot any people”:
“How the shooting was carried out I heard from the
representative of the protecting power, Herr Naville, of
Switzerland.”
Is that right?
WESTHOFF: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did you hear of the shooting?
WESTHOFF: I turned to the Gestapo and wanted the particulars of the
shootings for the Foreign Office, and I did not get them. The
representative of Switzerland, Herr Naville, whom I had sent to the
camp, visited me on his return, and from him I learned the only thing
that I ever heard about this matter, namely, that apparently a
prisoner-of-war who had returned to the camp had seen that the escaped
airmen had been driven out of the Görlitz Prison on a truck heavily
chained and under strong guard. That is the only thing I learned about
this affair at all, and I have up to now not found out in what way these
airmen perished. The Gestapo refused to inform me of this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is correct that generally what
information you did receive you received from the representative of the
protecting power. I don’t know if you remember whether his name was
Naville or not. But it is right, isn’t it?
WESTHOFF: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What information you did receive—you tell us
that it was very little—you received from the representative of
Switzerland, of the protecting power. Is that right?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want to deal with the next bit in
the statement where you tried to get in touch with the Foreign Office,
and if you look down the paragraph you will see that you say:
“At any rate, we did not get any news, and so it was pointed out
to the Field Marshal that such a state of affairs was
impossible, that we had to get in communication with the Foreign
Office. Then he emphatically stated that it was forbidden to get
in touch with the Foreign Office.”
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will read on, two sentences:
“Then the affair was raised in the House of Commons in England,
and then a note was sent by our side. Then I was quite suddenly
called up by Admiral Bürckner of the Foreign Department
(Amtsgruppe Ausland) in the OKW, which keeps contact with the
Foreign Office. He called me up by telephone at night and said,
‘The Feldmarschall has given me orders to prepare an answer for
England immediately. What is it all about? I don’t know anything
about the case.’ I said, ‘Herr Admiral, I am sorry, but General
Von Graevenitz received strict orders not to talk to anyone
about it. Nothing was allowed to be put down in writing either.
Apart from that, we ourselves were faced with an accomplished
fact. This order was apparently issued by Himmler, and the
position was such that we could do nothing more at all about
it.”
Is that a correct account?
WESTHOFF: Here again the word “Himmler” stands where the word “Hitler”
should stand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That should be Hitler. Apart from that, that is
correct? I mean, in substance is that a correct account of the
conversation between Admiral Bürckner and yourself?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You then go on to say that Admiral Bürckner
wanted you to tell him about the affair; that you only knew what the
gentlemen from Switzerland had told you; and that you had made various
attempts to approach the Gestapo. And then, if you look at just before
the end of that paragraph:
“Then the Foreign Office itself got into touch and took charge
of this affair. Then another of my men, Lieutenant Colonel
Krafft, went to Berchtesgaden while I was on a journey. At that
time a note to England was to be prepared. Then, when we read
this note to England in the newspaper, we were all absolutely
taken aback. We all clutched our heads. Mad! We could do nothing
about the affair.”
Is that correct? Did you say that, and is that correct?
WESTHOFF: The matter was then turned over to the Foreign Office, and the
Foreign Office was charged with the preparation of a note to England. At
this discussion Lieutenant Colonel Krafft was apparently called in as a
specialist for the Sagan case to clarify any doubts, if such were still
at hand. That is not to mean at all, however, that Lieutenant Colonel
Krafft was in any way concerned with the preparation of the note; that
was purely a matter for the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office had only
called him in so that, if there were still any doubts about the matter,
they could be clarified on the spot.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General, the next part of the statement I
did not intend to read unless the Tribunal wanted it, because you are
making quite clear that in your opinion the Inspector General, General
Roettig, had nothing to do with the affair at all. And if you accept it
from me that that is the substance of the next two paragraphs, I won’t
trouble you with it in detail. You are making clear that General Roettig
had nothing to do with it. Is that right?
WESTHOFF: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. If you will look at the first
sentence—I thought it represented it fairly. Look at the first
sentence:
“Generalinspekteur General Roettig had nothing to do with it,
nothing at all. He did not have any hand in the affair at all.
He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these
matters were taken out of his hands, apparently at that
conference with the Führer in the morning, that is to say, the
conference between Himmler, Field Marshal Keitel, and Göring,
which took place in the Führer’s presence.”
Is that right? I only wanted to put it shortly that you were trying to,
and quite rightly if it is true, to give your view that General Roettig
had nothing to do with it. Is that right, that is, that sentence I read
to you?
Did you say, “yes”?
WESTHOFF: The Inspector General was responsible for measures to prevent
escape, but had nothing to do with this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no difference between us. That is what
I was suggesting. Now, I’d like you to look at the next paragraph. It
also deals with General Roettig. Then, after that, you explain the
position of the officers. You say this:
“I only know an order existed that only officers, and, I
believe, only those who were caught by the Gestapo, should be
handed over to them.”
Then you say—you talk about intelligence—I don’t want to trouble you
about that. Then, if you would look at the next paragraph:
“I received a report from the camp saying so-and-so many men had
been shot whilst attempting to escape. I did not hear from the
Gestapo at all. It is like this. The reports are sent to the
camp. Then the camp informed us that a certain number of men had
been recaptured and a certain number shot. Things are reported
in that way. The Gestapo sent me no information whatsoever; they
merely told us casually whenever we made inquiries, that they
had recaptured a certain number.”
Now the next sentence I want you to look at carefully:
“The Field Marshal gave us detailed instructions to publish a
list at the camp, giving the names of those shot, as a warning.
That was done. That was a direct order which we could not
disobey.”
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: It was ordered that a list of all those who were shot be
posted up in the camp as a warning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then the next sentence says:
“Apparently the bodies were burned and the ashes put into urns
and sent to the camp.”
And then there is arrangement about the burial.
Then you say that that raised great difficulties. A sentence or two
later you say that matters of that sort were always passed to higher
authority. They went to the Party Chancellery, and then there was hell
to pay. The cremation of prisoners of war was forbidden.
And then later on, when you say that you raised the question of it being
contrary to the Convention, you say:
“Whenever I addressed the Officers’ corps and said, ‘Gentlemen,
we only act according to the Convention,’ someone from higher
authority from the Party Chancellery, arrived the following day
and said, ‘Gentlemen, the Convention is a scrap of paper which
doesn’t interest us.’”
Is that correct as to the general procedure?
WESTHOFF: It is not entirely correct. The OKW took the point of view
that the Convention should be observed, but the prisoner-of-war affairs
as such in Germany were only apparently in the hands of the OKW. The
people who really formed the decisions on prisoner-of-war affairs were
the Party and economic offices. Thus, for example, my office had to
submit to the deputy of the Party Chancellery every order that was
issued, and the Party Chancellery decided how this order was to be
issued, and not the OKW at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to go into it in detail. You had an
interview with Bormann’s deputy, Friedrich, at the Party Chancellery.
And then in the next long paragraph beginning, “The Air Force P.W. camps
were under G.A.F. administration...” We have gone into that, if Your
Lordship agrees, in detail—the Air Force side of it. I did not intend
to put that.
Then I want you to come to where it says, in the paragraph after you
talked about the question of handing over prisoner-of-war camps to
Himmler’s organization—you see it reads, “We were told all men who get
away are to be shot!” It may be the beginning of the next paragraph in
my English version. Do you see it after a long paragraph about Air Force
camps?
WESTHOFF: What page please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The trouble is the pages are different, but it
begins, “We were told all men who get away are to be shot...” It is the
third last paragraph of the document. If you start from the end of the
document, you will see a paragraph: “I cannot remember...” One before
it: “We arranged with the ‘Feldmarschall’...” It is the one before that:
“We were told all men who get away are to be shot...” Have you got it?
“The ‘Feldmarschall’ prohibited anything concerning this to be
put into writing. Nothing at all. Only the camp was to be
informed in order to put them in the picture. I discussed the
matter with Graevenitz once more. I can’t tell you the exact
details anymore. We contacted the Gestapo regarding the return
of the bodies. We had to have them back. Then Von Graevenitz
left for the front.”
Now it is the next bit I want you to look at carefully.
“I then said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, ‘I won’t do it like that;
I am going to cover myself at all costs so that we are not
involved in it afterwards. It is true the “Feldmarschall” has
forbidden it to be put in writing, but I want to have it in
writing. It must be signed by the Führer.’”
Now that is what you said to Krafft—comparatively unimportant.
WESTHOFF: That is not entirely correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us what you would like altered in it.
WESTHOFF: I wanted it in writing, signed by the Field Marshal, and for
this purpose I issued a memorandum describing this discussion. And thus
I had the Field Marshal’s signature with my office for future events so
that I would have something in writing to prove it actually true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at the next sentence. I think
that entirely agrees with what you have said:
“Contrary to Feldmarschall Keitel’s orders—I pretended that I
had not understood properly—I worked the thing out on paper. I
said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, ‘I want to have the word “shoot”
included so that Keitel can see it in writing. He may adopt a
different attitude then.’
“When I got the thing back, he had written the following in the
margin: ‘I did not definitely say “shoot”; I said, “Hand over to
the police or hand over to the Gestapo.”’”
WESTHOFF: That is not entirely correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What change would you like to make in that,
General?
WESTHOFF: I stated that clearly in my sworn statement, that the Field
Marshal had written on the margin, “I did not say ‘shoot,’ but ‘turn
over to the Gestapo.’”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the same as is in this statement? It
says he wrote in the margin, “‘I did not definitely say ‘shoot.’ I said,
‘hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo.’”
WESTHOFF: Well, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted this to be quite clear, General. The
draft order or note of information that you had put up to the Field
Marshal contained the word “shoot”?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now there is only one other bit. You go on to
say:
“We arranged with the ‘Feldmarschall’ to have the matter
submitted to the Führer. We had the feeling that there was
something not quite in order.”
And then you say that you had to approach the police authorities on a
slightly lower level, and about 10 lines down you say this:
“In the end, I could not get where I wanted with this affair. So
I went to Berlin myself—it was the only time I ever saw
Kaltenbrunner—and I said to Kaltenbrunner, ‘This matter is
still outstanding. It should be submitted to the Führer. I can’t
carry on like this. A decision must be made some time. But apart
from that, I am of the opinion that the whole affair should be
dropped. The whole thing is madness. It has already led us into
so much unpleasantness and is so monstrous that I am still of
the opinion that this affair should either be stopped in some
way or the Führer be dissuaded from continuing it any further.’”
Is that generally, again, in substance, a correct version of what you
said to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
WESTHOFF: This does not directly concern this matter, however, but
rather an order that was to be issued by Wagner in connection with it
and to be submitted to the Führer in two ways, one via the chief of the
OKW and the other via Himmler. This order had been submitted to Keitel
in draft form which then went to the Gestapo. The Gestapo read this
draft, and then the matter was carried no further. I was never able to
find out why this was so, and for this reason I myself duly addressed
Kaltenbrunner about this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was this the order in its final form, that
escaped prisoners of war should be handed over to the Gestapo or the
police?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So this, General Westhoff, if I may have
your attention, was really dealing with the future, was it? This was
dealing with what was to be done in the future?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I don’t think one need go into it in
details again, unless the Tribunal want. My Lord, the rest of the
statement is only a general account of the attitude of the British
prisoners of war, and I have no complaint about it at all.
My Lord, there is one problem that has arisen which perhaps the
Tribunal, would now consider the convenient time. My friend, Colonel
Pokrovsky, has certain quite different matters with regard to the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war which he wanted to raise with this
witness, and perhaps the Tribunal would consider it a convenient time to
do it.
THE PRESIDENT: It probably would be more convenient if Dr. Nelte put his
questions to this witness, if he has any, first, before Colonel
Pokrovsky.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should respectfully agree to clear up this
topic first.
THE PRESIDENT: Unless Colonel Pokrovsky’s questions might relate to the
Defendant Keitel?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They do relate, of course, to the position of
the OKW with these prisoners of war, but they have nothing to do with
Sagan.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, have you any questions you want to put to this
witness?
DR. NELTE: Witness, what was just read to you was called a “statement”
and was presented here. Have you ever given this statement in complete
form orally or in writing?
WESTHOFF: I was interrogated on different occasions, and this
interrogatory which has been presented to me is a summation of my
testimony. Of course, I found errors here and there because it has been
summarized, and the questions have been omitted.
DR. NELTE: In other words, this is a summation of the answers you gave
to questions at various interrogations?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Was this summation ever submitted to you?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. NELTE: I had the impression that the passages read to you here just
now were on occasion very long and that you actually answered always
only the latter part of these passages. I should like to ask you whether
after this interrogation in London you were not again interrogated?
WESTHOFF: I was interrogated here in Nuremberg.
DR. NELTE: By Colonel Williams?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: What did Colonel Williams say to you at the conclusion of
this interrogation? What did he request of you?
WESTHOFF: At the conclusion of the interrogation, Colonel Williams asked
me to describe briefly the basic central point of my testimony and to
sum it up in a sworn statement.
DR. NELTE: Did you swear to this statement before Colonel Williams?
WESTHOFF: Yes, I swore to it.
DR. NELTE: Now, I should like first of all to go through with you the
interrogation that you had with Colonel Williams, and which is to be
found in Document RF-1450. I am having this document handed over to you.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by Document 1450?
DR. NELTE: RF-1450 is contained in the document book, in my document
book as Number 5.
THE PRESIDENT: But you mean RF-1450, do you?
DR. NELTE: Yes, RF. This document is entitled, “Summary of Interrogation
of General Adolf Westhoff by Colonel Curtis L. Williams, on 2 November
1945.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute, Dr. Nelte. Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal think
that you can put to this witness, “Did you or did you not make a
different statement in an interrogation at some other time?” But the
document that you are referring to now is a document which the Tribunal
refused to admit on your objections. When the French presented that
document, you objected to it and it was therefore not allowed to be put
in, so that the proper way in which to put the question now is, “Did you
say to Colonel Williams so-and-so?”
DR. NELTE: I have here a compilation of those points in the document or
in the notes of Colonel Williams which according to your declaration are
supposed not to be correct. I now ask you, what did you, or did you not
upon being questioned by Colonel Williams...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it is not right for you to say that they are
different—you must ask him questions about it, not make statements
yourself.
DR. NELTE: What did you say to Colonel Williams to his question, whether
the prisoner-of-war camps in their entirety were supposed to be
subordinate to the OKW and to Field Marshal Keitel?
WESTHOFF: The prisoner-of-war camps were subordinate to the OKW only to
the extent that the OKW had the legal control of them and insofar as the
protective powers, that is, the International Red Cross was involved.
The OKW did not have the power to give orders or dole out punishment in
the camps.
DR. NELTE: What did you answer to Colonel Williams’ question, on the
right of the OKW regarding the inspection of the camps?
WESTHOFF: The OKW was entitled to inspect. That can be seen also in my
official orders in which it states clearly that the inspector was
entitled to inspect the camp.
DR. NELTE: What did you answer to Colonel Williams’ question, to whom
Stalag Luft III, Sagan, was subordinate?
WESTHOFF: Stalag Luft III, Sagan, was subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, because the Commander-in-Chief of
the Luftwaffe, on his own wish and already at the beginning of the war,
had all prisoner-of-war camps containing airmen placed under his
control.
DR. NELTE: Did you answer to one of Colonel Williams’ questions that
Göring, Himmler, Keitel, and Hitler had decided to shoot the officers
who escaped in Sagan?
WESTHOFF: No, that is a mistake. Colonel Williams asked me what the
Führer had said to Field Marshal Keitel; thereupon, I answered clearly
that I could give no information about this, since I had not taken part
in that conference. I could only make statements about the conference
which Field Marshal Keitel had with General Von Graevenitz.
DR. NELTE: Did you answer Colonel Williams that Field Marshal Keitel,
during this conference with Graevenitz, said, “This is my order”?
WESTHOFF: No, the Field Marshal could not issue an order regarding the
shootings, since the shootings were not within the competence of the
Wehrmacht but in that of the Gestapo.
DR. NELTE: During your interrogation, particularly also with Colonel
Williams, did you state clearly that it never had been a question of an
order issued by Keitel himself or of an order which Keitel transmitted
to you on higher orders?
WESTHOFF: It concerned information given to General Von Graevenitz. That
is also stated with no reservations in my sworn statement.
DR. NELTE: Then, if I understand you correctly, you declare that Field
Marshal Keitel never issued an order of his own nor ever expressed the
idea that he at all wanted to give you an order regarding a shooting of
the officers?
WESTHOFF: No, that he could also not do.
DR. NELTE: During the previous interrogation by the prosecutor there was
talk of a report which the camp commander at Görlitz is supposed to have
delivered to you. This is also in the notes. Did you ask for or receive
a report from the camp commander?
WESTHOFF: I had no personal connection at all with the camp commander at
Görlitz. That must be a confusion with the statement of the Swiss
representative, Naville.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that during the discussion between Keitel, on
the one hand, and General Von Graevenitz and you, on the other, two
matters were brought up: First, the case of the escaped Royal Air Force
officers; and, second, the question as to what should be done in the
future, or how escapes should be prevented?
WESTHOFF: Yes, that is so.
DR. NELTE: I now have questions to ask you which I request you to
answer, if possible, with “yes” or “no.” Is it true that in the first
case, namely, the affair of the 50 Royal Air Force pilots, only
conversation afforded the possibility of gaining information of what had
happened in the higher circles?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Did General Graevenitz, upon his return from headquarters,
not say to you, “What can we do at all if the Gestapo once gets things
into their hands”?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: In other words, it is clear from your whole conversation with
Keitel, that it was a question here of an order directed to Himmler from
Hitler?
WESTHOFF: In regard to the shooting, yes.
DR. NELTE: After Professor Naville visited the Sagan Camp, did he say to
you that his impression was that certainly stronger forces were at work
here against which the OKW could do nothing?
WESTHOFF: Yes, he said that.
DR. NELTE: With reference to the escaped pilots, did the OKW do anything
regarding their capture or treatment, or was it clear that in this
respect this matter was unfortunately settled so far as the OKW were
concerned?
WESTHOFF: The OKW could do nothing further because the matter had been
taken entirely out of their hands.
DR. NELTE: Accordingly, then, it is not correct to say that, after this
discussion between Keitel, Graevenitz, and Westhoff, a conference was
again called by the OKW?
WESTHOFF: No, there was no further conference in the OKW.
DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted in which Colonel Walde—it is
Document D-731, Mr. President—in which Colonel Walde deposes—and to be
sure, he says at the beginning that he had to reconstruct from memory
what had happened—according to his recollection, he believed that the
OKW had called a conference that took place in the Prinz
Albrechtstrasse. Do you know anything about that?
WESTHOFF: I only know about this conference from you yourself. It could
not have been called by the OKW, for then it would have been held by us
in Torgau. Without a doubt, however, it was held in Berlin, as you told
me, and that is no conference called by the OKW.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that prisoner-of-war officers recaptured by the
Wehrmacht were again put in the Sagan Camp and also remained there?
WESTHOFF: Yes, that is right.
DR. NELTE: Were recaptured prisoners of war, who were turned over to the
camp in any case, let out again?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. NELTE: On the other hand, is it true that you gave the camp
commander strict orders on the part of the OKW that recaptured prisoners
should under no circumstances be let out of the camp again?
WESTHOFF: The order was not given by me to the camp commander but to the
commanders in the military administrative districts in charge of
prisoners of war.
DR. NELTE: But by them to the camps?
WESTHOFF: To the camps, yes.
DR. NELTE: An order was mentioned to the effect that the names of the
escaped prisoners who had not come back, were to be published. You
stated before “as a warning.” In order to clarify this question—the
purpose of this order which, of course, came from above—I should like
to ask you whether Field Marshal Keitel did not say as justification, “I
hope, however, that the prisoners will be so shocked by this that in the
future they will not escape any more”?
WESTHOFF: Yes, the Field Marshal said that.
DR. NELTE: You deposed, or rather, it was read to you that Field Marshal
Keitel said to you and General Von Graevenitz that nothing should be put
down in writing about the whole matter, nor should it be discussed with
any other office.
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Is it then correct to say that you drew up a memorandum
regarding this matter, namely, the conference, and had it submitted to
Keitel?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that Field Marshal Keitel did not find fault
with this fact as one might certainly really have expected but wrote his
initial “K” on the upper corner of this memorandum?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Is it furthermore correct that you, because you had to
report, repeatedly got in touch with the Reich Security Main Office in
order to find out something about the fate of these unfortunate
officers?
WESTHOFF: Not only did I get in touch with the Reich Security Main
Office but, since I myself did not succeed in this effort, I also
reported the matter to the General Office of the Wehrmacht, but as far
as I know, it also did not succeed in this effort.
DR. NELTE: Is it further correct that you asked the representative of
the International Red Cross, Dr. Naville, to visit the Sagan Camp in
connection with this event?
WESTHOFF: I brought about this visit, yes.
DR. NELTE: Is it furthermore true that Field Marshal Keitel called you
up and told you that the Foreign Minister had to have precise knowledge
of the whole occurrence, in order to draw up a note of reply?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And that consequently you were to tell the Foreign Office
about the occurrence in all its details?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Did Keitel say on this occasion that you were to conceal
anything or to put anything in a false light?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. NELTE: Was the OKW involved in the composition of the note as it was
sent in final form?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that your representative, Lieutenant Colonel
Krafft, was ordered by the Foreign Office to attend a meeting in
Berchtesgaden for the sole purpose of giving correct information in
reply to possible further inquiry by the representative of the Foreign
Office, in case the information were demanded?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Is it finally correct that Lieutenant Colonel Krafft reported
to you that the Foreign Office had presented a note to Hitler, and
Hitler had rejected it and then composed the text himself?
WESTHOFF: So far as I recall, that is right.
DR. NELTE: The second part of the conferences between Keitel,
Graevenitz, and Westhoff concerned itself with the question of what
action should be taken in the future. You stated in this connection that
an order was to be drawn up, and that it was a question of certain
spheres of competence that had to be discussed with the Reich Security
Main Office. Tell me in this connection what, if anything, did the Reich
Security Main Office or Himmler have to do with the administration of
prisoners of war?
WESTHOFF: Himmler was responsible for the security of the Reich and,
insofar as all the prisoners of war were concerned, he had to concern
himself with the search for all escaped prisoners.
DR. NELTE: Did he, because of this, come into conflict in any way with
your OKW Prisoner of War Department?
WESTHOFF: Insofar as we often asked, whenever prisoners of war escaped,
what had been done with them and received no information, or information
with which we could do nothing, for which we had no use.
DR. NELTE: Does that mean that it was possible that Himmler or his
office gave you no information when they caught prisoners of war?
WESTHOFF: That is absolutely possible, and we also supposed that such
was the case repeatedly.
DR. NELTE: Did you on one occasion, while drawing up or drafting orders
which were concerned with the treatment of escaped prisoners of war, use
the words “Stufe III”?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. NELTE: Do you know whether the meaning of these words signifying a
death sentence were known at all in the OKW?
WESTHOFF: They were not known to me. I was asked about that the first
time in London and had to state then also that I could not give any
information about that.
DR. NELTE: When you say, you personally, then you probably mean the
organization as well, since you belonged to the OKW.
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I have a document here, Number 1514-PS. It concerns a
collective order of the commander of Wehrkreis VI regarding the
treatment of escaped prisoners of war. You will see in this order a
whole number of references to years as far back as 1942.
I ask you now according to your knowledge and experience, would not an
order supposed to have been issued on 4 March 1944 also have been
entered here, had its contents been very important?
WESTHOFF: If it was a question of a secret order, yes.
DR. NELTE: It is in the German...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Nelte. Aren’t you getting very far away
from the subject upon which this witness was being examined? I mean, he
was being examined about an interview which he had with the Field
Marshal Keitel, and here you are asking him about something which has
nothing to do with that at all, as far as I am able to see.
DR. NELTE: I believe that I shall make clear that this has something to
do with the second part of this conference, namely, regarding the
treatment of recaptured escaped officers. These are preparatory
questions that I must ask to make clear, in my opinion...
THE PRESIDENT: But it is a very long cross-examination of a witness whom
you did not wish to call. The Tribunal wish you to make your
cross-examination as brief as possible.
DR. NELTE: I shall make it as brief as the interests of the defendant
permit.
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it not customary in the German system of
issuing orders that in referring to an order issued by higher
authorities the date and archive number is given?
WESTHOFF: Yes, always.
DR. NELTE: Did you ever give any information to the representatives of
the protecting powers or to the International Red Cross that prisoners
of war, of whose capture you were fully aware, that these had not been
recaptured?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about—and here I have the last document
shown you, 1650-PS...
[_Document 1650-PS was submitted to the witness._]
THE PRESIDENT: What was the point of showing 1514-PS to him? He has not
been asked any relevant questions about it at all.
DR. NELTE: From this document I found corroboration of the answer of the
defendant through the witness that if an order had been issued on 4
March 1944, as it was presented here, it would have had to be contained
in this document.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think it is a waste of time, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: I shall be through in a few minutes, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, would you please look on Page 3 of
this document, under Number 2. It reads:
“The OKW is requested to inform the prisoner-of-war camps that
in the interest of camouflage the recaptured officers are not to
be turned over directly to Mauthausen but to the local State
Police authority.”
Did you ever in your activity in the OKW know anything of such a request
or such an order?
WESTHOFF: That is not familiar to me. That also took place at a time
when I was not chief.
DR. NELTE: But on taking over on 1 April 1944 you must have known of all
important events or must have taken note of them?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Did you ever find out in this connection that such a document
had been presented?
WESTHOFF: No, I do not know of it.
DR. NELTE: And now the last question. Look at the first page of this
document. It is a teletype from the Chief of the Sipo and SD, of 4 March
’44. It reads in the first part as follows:
“The OKW has ordered the following: Every recaptured escaped
prisoner-of-war officer”—_et cetera_—“is, after his recapture,
to be turned over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD with the code
word ‘Stufe III’....”
The Defendant Keitel has stated here that he does not know of such an
OKW order.
I ask you, did you find such a command, such an order in the files, in
the files which must have been presented to you when you took over
office on 1 April 1944?
WESTHOFF: I did not find such an order, but an order of this kind
existed without a doubt.
DR. NELTE: In what way?
WESTHOFF: So far as I recall, General Graevenitz brought this order
either from the field headquarters or from the General Office of the
Wehrmacht.
DR. NELTE: How is it possible then that such an order was not in your
files?
WESTHOFF: Because there was an order that this order was to exist only
orally.
DR. NELTE: Then please tell me what the procedure was when such an order
was given orally.
WESTHOFF: It could be transmitted orally.
DR. NELTE: That is, your office?
WESTHOFF: It was then transmitted through the Chief of the Prisoner of
War Department.
DR. NELTE: Chief?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And you know that such an order was transmitted?
WESTHOFF: General Von Graevenitz brought such an order with him and, as
far as I know, the order was also transmitted further.
DR. NELTE: Then you certainly must have known what “Stufe III” meant?
WESTHOFF: No, that I did not know. I have said that I knew only that
there was an order to turn over these recaptured prisoners to the
Gestapo but I cannot remember details because I never saw a written
order.
DR. NELTE: Can you then state that this order, as you see it there
before you, was issued by the OKW?
WESTHOFF: No, that I cannot say.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President;
permit me to put only a few questions which refer to the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner. Witness ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we are going to call the Witness Wielen
afterwards. You realize that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But you want to ask this witness questions, don’t you?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The name Kaltenbrunner has been mentioned here, and I
have only a few questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you mentioned a little earlier that
you spoke with the Gestapo, and that you received no information from
the Gestapo. Do you know with whom you spoke at that time?
WESTHOFF: No. The conferences with the Gestapo took place continuously.
In cases when we missed prisoners of war and we did not know where they
were, we continuously made inquiries at the Gestapo. But, on one
occasion I was with Kaltenbrunner—namely, on the occasion of some other
matter which had nothing to do with Allied prisoners of war—and since
this occasion gave me the opportunity to talk to Herr Kaltenbrunner
personally, I immediately brought the matter up for discussion and tried
to have that order rescinded. Kaltenbrunner and Müller were present at
the time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on in Berlin after the Sagan case you talked to
Kaltenbrunner personally?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the Sagan case discussed there?
WESTHOFF: I talked about the Sagan matter there with Kaltenbrunner, and
I expressly pointed out that this was an unbearable situation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: About how long after the Sagan case was that?
WESTHOFF: I cannot tell you that any more now; it may have been 4 weeks
later.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was Kaltenbrunner’s view on this problem? What did
he tell you?
WESTHOFF: Kaltenbrunner himself said next to nothing to me, but rather
Müller carried on the conversation, and I left without having been given
either “yes” or “no.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Müller also present during the second conference in
Berlin?
WESTHOFF: I was in Berlin only once.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Wasn’t the subject of that conversation in any way the
question as to how one was to form the prisoner of war system in the
future?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, the Sagan case was discussed exclusively?
WESTHOFF: Not the Sagan case exclusively. But I was ordered to see
Kaltenbrunner for another reason, namely, because of German prisoners of
war, but made use of the opportunity to discuss this case with him at
once. That is the only time that I saw Kaltenbrunner at all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference you neither received a positive
nor negative answer?
WESTHOFF: That is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the impression with which you left that
conference?
WESTHOFF: The impression was that apparently not much could be done.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you then report to your superiors about this
conference?
WESTHOFF: Yes, I duly informed the General Office of the Wehrmacht about
it at that time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the content of that report?
WESTHOFF: That I had again spoken with Herr Kaltenbrunner about it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, that alone, Witness, would certainly not be enough.
In this important matter you must certainly have reported then about the
business of that conference, not just about the fact?
WESTHOFF: Of course, I reported about the business; that I had brought
the matter up again, and that the Gestapo took the attitude that they
wanted to wait.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, did you depose
the statement from your own knowledge or did you learn of this fact only
through Field Marshal Keitel, namely, the fact that the meeting
mentioned by you between Hitler, Himmler, and Keitel regarding the
escape of these 80 flyers is supposed to have taken place in the
presence of Reich Marshal Göring?
WESTHOFF: I learned of it through Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
[_Dr. Laternser approached the lectern._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, if you are going to ask questions on
behalf of the High Command—is that what you wanted to do?
DR. LATERNSER: I was going to ask the witness a few questions on behalf
of the OKW and the General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has given his evidence about the fact that
the OKW had nothing to do with these matters in connection with
prisoner-of-war camps and he has not been cross-examined with reference
to that by the Prosecution; so that the matter is not in dispute. And
therefore it appears to the Tribunal that no question need be put by
you.
You better specify your question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, up to now the procedure has been that
whenever a witness appeared, every Defense Counsel had the opportunity
to ask this witness questions which he considered necessary. Are we now
going to depart from that?
THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you to argue the matter; I asked you to
specify your questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, were you yourself active in the
Eastern campaign?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?
WESTHOFF: First of all in command of a battalion and then a regiment.
DR. LATERNSER: In what sector was your unit engaged?
WESTHOFF: To begin with, in the Ukraine; later before Leningrad, and
then at Staraya-Russa.
DR. LATERNSER: Before the beginning of the Eastern campaign did you give
special instructions to your company commanders?
WESTHOFF: In what respect?
DR. LATERNSER: After you had received the order to attack, I assume you
must have gathered your company commanders together as battalion
commander and discussed some orders with them before the beginning of
the campaign.
WESTHOFF: I told them how they had to conduct themselves during the
battle, how they had to behave toward the Russian population, and how
they had to act toward the prisoners of war.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, and what kind of instructions did you give your
company commanders?
WESTHOFF: I very briefly gave the company commanders instructions that
every prisoner-of-war was to be treated as he would like to be treated
himself were he to become a prisoner.
DR. LATERNSER: You said that specifically?
WESTHOFF: Yes, that was ordered.
DR. LATERNSER: How did the troops behave when they marched in?
WESTHOFF: We fought practically all the way to Kiev, and were marching,
and had hardly any contact with the civilian population.
DR. LATERNSER: During the advance into Russia did you notice
considerable destruction?
WESTHOFF: Partly, yes; in part, villages had been destroyed. Also small
towns had been destroyed.
DR. LATERNSER: Railways?
WESTHOFF: Railways also, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Industrial works?
WESTHOFF: Yes—I saw that afterwards outside of Leningrad—yes indeed!
DR. LATERNSER: In your sector was the order carried out by which Soviet
Russian commissars were to be shot after being taken prisoners?
WESTHOFF: We had nothing to do with that. Prisoners of war that we took
were all sent back to the division right away. We ourselves, the troop
commanders—regimental and battalion commanders—had nothing to do with
it, had even no opportunity at all to do this.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have not answered my question correctly. I
have asked you whether you had applied the order.
WESTHOFF: I know nothing about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you ever receive the order to take action against the
Jewish population in Russia?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Did your troops ill-treat or shoot civilian persons or
prisoners?
WESTHOFF: No! There was a special order for the maintenance of
discipline, stating that this was not to be permitted.
DR. LATERNSER: Was plundering allowed?
WESTHOFF: No, this was strictly forbidden.
DR. LATERNSER: Did any plundering occur?
WESTHOFF: Not by my troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Did members of your unit commit rape?
WESTHOFF: No; in no case known to me.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the civilian population compelled to clear the houses
for complete occupation by the troops?
WESTHOFF: No. There was merely an order saying that those houses in
which the offices were set up had to be cleared. Other houses did not
have to be evacuated, and as a rule the system was that I, for example,
whenever I was billeted, would always sleep in the same room with the
people who lived there.
DR. LATERNSER: Have you experienced destruction which was not due to
military necessity?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Have you on occasion or frequently fed the hungry
civilian population from the field kitchens?
WESTHOFF: The regiment was ordered that all food which was surplus in
the regiment was to be issued to the population mostly at midday or in
the evening, so far as we had any contact at all with the population.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And then one last question: Do you consider it
possible that German soldiers invited Russian children for coffee, and
then killed these children by giving them poisoned cake?
WESTHOFF: No.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: You aren’t suggesting, are you, that this witness is one
for the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: No, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that you ought to be entitled to
examine every witness who has any military rank on behalf of the High
Command.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as far as I understood it, it has been the
rule up to now, and the procedure has been, that every means of
evidence—thus also witnesses who are brought in here—could be examined
by everyone of Defense Counsel; and I have adhered to that rule up to
now, and also felt that it was my duty to put those questions which I
have put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I asked you very simply: Are you
suggesting that you are entitled to ask questions on behalf of the High
Command of every person who is called here who has any military rank?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it seems to me that would be highly cumulative. We
shall then have evidence on behalf of the High Command from possibly 30
or 40 witnesses. And when you say that it has been allowed in the past,
every other member of the Defense has been confined to evidence, so far
as possible, which is not cumulative. That is the reason why I
interrupted you, because it seems to me if you are going to do that, to
claim the right to ask questions of everybody who has military rank—and
you have done it up to now—the evidence is going to be extremely
cumulative on your part.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Laternser, the questions you have been
putting to this witness are questions directed to show that the
regimental officers and soldiers in the German Army behaved properly and
could not be expected to behave improperly. That does not seem to be
really relevant to the questions to whether the High Command is a
criminal organization or not. And in any event it is—in my opinion, at
any rate—cumulative if you do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, already so much heavily incriminating
material regarding the Wehrmacht has been presented, especially by the
Russian Prosecution, that the Russian Prosecution are definitely of the
opinion that relevant orders were issued from above, that is to say,
issued by the people comprising the circle of the General Staff and the
OKW. By questioning this witness, who was a regimental commander, I
wanted to establish whether any effects extended downwards. This
statement has confirmed me in the fact that this is not the case.
Otherwise, I must...
THE PRESIDENT: Anyhow, Dr. Laternser, we have your position now, and the
Tribunal will consider how far you may be allowed to proceed in future.
DR. LATERNSER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me, Witness, that on 28 December 1945 you
were interrogated by a representative of the Soviet Prosecution; is that
not so?
WESTHOFF: Yes, sir.
COL. POKROVSKY: You gave correct and accurate testimony, did you not?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Would you please confirm some of your answers to the
questions that you were asked then? I will help you to recollect the
questions that were put to you.
WESTHOFF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: In your section there were, as you stated, six different
subdivisions or departments?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: You said that the first subdivision of the section—that
is, I mean the section (Allgemein Abteilung) which you headed from 1
March 1943 up to 31 March 1944—was dealing with prisoners of war. Is
that correct?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, the first subdivision of this section was concerned
in general with the treatment of prisoners of war and, in particular
with the questions of punishments and legal proceedings. This
subdivision got the reports on the moods and reactions and was in
constant touch with the Abteilung Abwehr (counterintelligence section).
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: With the Abwehr, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, in connection with the reply which you gave to that
question, I would like you to state to the Tribunal right now, just how
much or what did you know about the way the Soviet prisoners of war were
treated, both in concentration camps and during transference from one
camp to another.
WESTHOFF: As far as I know, until 1942, the Russian prisoners of war
were treated on the basis of purely political considerations. After 1942
this was changed, and in 1943, as long as I was in the German High
Command, prisoners of war were treated in accordance with the Geneva
Convention, that is to say, in all points their treatment was adapted to
that of the other prisoners of war. Their rations were the same as those
of the others, and their employment and their treatment was in every
detail in accordance with the treatment given prisoners of war of other
powers, with certain exceptions.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I am not mistaken, the fourth subdivision of your
department was especially concerned with the questions of feeding and
clothing the prisoners of war. Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: The task of Group IV was matters of administration. It had to
elaborate the instructions regarding rations, along with the Ministry of
Food and Agriculture. It also had to deal with clothing.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I understand you correctly you have stated that until
you took charge of the Prisoner of War Department the information which
you received about the Soviet prisoners of war was to the effect that
the Soviet prisoners of war were not treated according to international
law. Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: No, I said that prisoners of war during the first years were
treated on the basis of political considerations, which originated not
from the OKW but from Hitler personally.
COL. POKROVSKY: Just what do you want to say about that?
WESTHOFF: I want to say that they were not treated in accordance with
the Geneva Convention until 1942.
COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, not according to international law,
right?
WESTHOFF: I cannot give you any more detailed information on that, since
at that time I was still serving at the front and did not know details
regarding these regulations.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Tell me, was there in the OKW a special group
or section which dealt exclusively with railway transportation of
prisoners of war?
WESTHOFF: The OKW had attached to me a group which brought about the
transport of prisoners of war. The transport itself was not a matter for
the OKW but a matter for the individual camp commanders.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you aware under what conditions the transport of the
prisoners of war from one camp to another took place?
WESTHOFF: Transports of prisoners of war were ordered by the OKW. The
execution of such transports of prisoners of war was a matter for the
individual camp commandants who received their orders in this respect
from the commanders of prisoners of war in the military administrative
districts. The OKW had nothing to do with the actual transport.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question I asked is whether you are aware or were
informed under what conditions the transport from one point to another
took place. Do you know that thousands of prisoners died en route from
cold and hunger? Do you know anything about it at all?
WESTHOFF: The transports, during which prisoners of war died, can at
most be traced back to the earlier years when I was not yet in the High
Command. As long as I was there, I had no reports on a large scale
saying that people lost their lives in large numbers. The orders which
the OKW gave regarding transports of prisoners of war were clear-cut and
so given that the commanders of the camps concerned were responsible for
these transports being carried out in an orderly manner.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have just confirmed that you were aware of the fact
that en route prisoners of war died by thousands. Now I would like you
to look at a document, Document Number 1201-PS, Exhibit Number USSR-292.
It consists, Your Honors, of the minutes of the meeting of the war
economy administration of the OKW. It has not been submitted to the
Tribunal so far. It is dated 1000 hours, 19 February 1942. The minutes
were taken of the meeting which took place at the Reich Chamber of
Commerce. The report by Ministerial Director Dr. Mansfeld of the office
of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was heard.
The three lines which particularly interest me are underlined with red
pencil on the copy that is before you right now. Look at it, Witness. It
states there:
“The utilization of these Russians is exclusively a question of
transportation. It is senseless to transport this manpower in
open or unheated closed boxcars and then to unload corpses at
the place of destination.”
Have you found this place?
WESTHOFF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Have you heard anything about transports of this kind,
wherein, in place of a train of living persons, corpses were unloaded?
Have you heard anything about that before you took charge of your
particular job in the OKW? Has anyone reported to you about these
things?
WESTHOFF: I have heard nothing about these transports, as that did not
come under the jurisdiction of the OKW, but came, as is clear from this
document, within the sphere of the operational sectors. The jurisdiction
of the OKW comprised mainly the German Reich and the border states, and
only here did the OKW have authority over the prisoners of war—not in
the operational sector, not in the rear army area. To this extent, it is
a matter which did not come to the OKW at all. We received the prisoners
of war from the Army, and then we were informed that we would receive
so-and-so many prisoners of war, and we took them into our camps. What
happened to those people in the operational territory was something we
could not control in detail.
Apart from that, this story also goes back to 1942—the time when I was
still at the front.
COL. POKROVSKY: Look at the left side of the document at the top. There
is a note there that this comes from the War Economy and Armament Office
of the OKW does it not? Left, at the top, under the number K 32/510.
WESTHOFF: My office never had anything at all to do with the Armament
Office.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Does it not seem to you that this document
confirms the fact that the OKW knew about these transports?
No more questions, Mr. President, to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, as this document has not been put in
before, and as it does not appear whether it has been translated, should
you not read the first paragraph of it? It seems to contain material
evidence.
COL. POKROVSKY: I will read it now. The first paragraph of the document,
the way it appears in the Russian translation, reads like this:
“File note. Subject: Report of the Ministerial Director, Dr.
Mansfeld, of the Office of the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, on General Questions Regarding the
Allocation of Labor.
“Time: 19 February 1942. 1000 hours; place: Reich Chamber of
Economy; present: Dr. Grotius, Wi Rü Amt KVR.
“The present difficulties in the question of the utilization of
manpower would not have arisen had we decided in time to utilize
the Russian prisoners of war on a larger scale.”
This is the first paragraph, Mr. President. Further down there are three
lines which interest me in this document:
“There were 3,900,000 Russians at our disposal, of which at
present there are only 1,100,000 left. From November 1941 to
January 1942 alone 500,000 Russians died.”
Have I read sufficiently, Mr. President? It seems to me that that is
clear, and further reading of the document is superfluous.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
COL. POKROVSKY: “It will hardly be possible to increase the
number of the Russian prisoners of war employed at present
(400,000). If the typhus cases do decrease there may be a
possibility of employing from 100,000 to 150,000 more for the
economy. In contrast with that, the employment of Russian
civilians is constantly gaining greater importance. There are,
all together, between 600,000 and 650,000 Russian civilians
available, among whom 300,000 are skilled industrial workers and
from 300,000 to 350,000 agricultural workers. The utilization of
these Russians is exclusively a question of transportation. It
is senseless to transport....”—and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what you read before.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is right. I would like to direct your attention
once more to the fact that there is a stamp on the document, “The War
Economy and Armament Office of the OKW....”—left corner, at the top.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, that does not appear in our
translation, but I guess you are right. At least, I don’t see it. Could
you let us see your document?
COL. POKROVSKY: The original will be shown to you immediately. The stamp
is at the top, in the left corner.
THE PRESIDENT: These letters and numbers indicate OKW although they
don’t say it?
COL. POKROVSKY: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say that? I mean, the actual letters which are
there look to me like Rü III Z St AZ i K 32/510 Wi Rü Amt/Rü III Z St.
COL. POKROVSKY: When you decipher these abbreviations, which has already
been done by our American colleagues, then those letters and figures can
be understood as corresponding with the facts regarding the structure of
the OKW which are at the disposal of the American Prosecution. These are
customary abbreviations for the departments and offices.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to ask the witness whether he
knows anything about the employment of the man mentioned a little way
further down at the right, Dr. Grotius.
I will ask him.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, do you know who Dr. Grotius was and
whether he was employed in the OKW or in the Army?
WESTHOFF: No, I have never heard the name “Dr. Grotius”; I also never
had anything to do with him.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the document before you?
WESTHOFF: No, I have not got it any longer.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Just look at it and see whether the letters which
are put in the front of Dr. Grotius’ name indicate that he was a member
of the OKW?
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I did not put the question concerning Dr.
Grotius since the witness, as he has already told me, entered the Army
administration later, in 1943, whereas the document is dated 20 February
1942.
THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Do those letters in front of Dr.
Grotius’ name indicate that he was in the OKW?
WESTHOFF: I do not know what the letters are supposed to mean; the OKW
has also nothing at all to do with this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know what the letters on the top left hand side of
the document mean—the ones I read out just now to you?
WESTHOFF: Rü III?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
WESTHOFF: That is probably the Armament Office III. That is what it
probably means.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that would be in connection with the OKW, would it
not?
WESTHOFF: I am not informed about that since I have never had anything
to do with the armament departments. The High Command of the Army, at
least my office, had written communications only with the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor and the Speer
Ministry. Just how it was organized in detail is unknown to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you know of, or did you know, Dr. Mansfeld?
WESTHOFF: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you know Dr. Mansfeld?
WESTHOFF: No, I did not know him, and I have never heard his name.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question about Dr. Mansfeld could be asked probably
of the Defendant Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, technically speaking, the Tribunal
can’t accept from you that these letters at the top mean the OKW. It may
be perfectly true, but you can’t give evidence about it. So you can
prove it some other way perhaps.
COL. POKROVSKY: The scheme of the OKW has already been reported to the
Tribunal. Those persons who deciphered these abbreviations are
sufficiently competent in this matter, and it seems to me that the
witness’ affirmation in the court fully proves that the document in
question concerns Section III of the OKW. But, generally speaking, it
would, of course, be quite easy to prove by comparing it with the scheme
of the OKW. We will do it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
The Tribunal will adjourn now, and they will want the other witness,
Wielen, here at 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_ Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not know if Your Lordship wanted
the words for which these short collections of letters stand. I have
them if Your Lordship wants them—on the last document, 1201-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, thank you very much; yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think all that Your Lordship need
look at is where the name Dr. Grotius appears.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Wi. Rü Amt is the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt,
the Economic and Armament Office, which is, Your Lordship will remember,
General Thomas’ department of the OKW.
My Lord, the other letters “KVR” are Kriegsverwaltungsrat, War
Administration Counsellor.
My Lord, I do not think there could be any dispute that the document
comes from General Thomas’ department of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I say something in regard to this
document. I want only to point out certain considerations. It must be
ascertained from where the heading comes, that is, the first line. The
second line, which Sir David just referred to, begins with the letters
“AZ.” AZ (Aktenzeichen) means “file number,” in other words, a reference
to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office. It does not explain
however, the author of this document, which can only be ascertained when
we find out what the heading, or the first line, means.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you understand it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I understand it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LATERNSER: The author of this writing can be ascertained only if we
find out what the first line means; because the second line is only the
document file number, which is to be seen from the first two letters,
“AZ,” which means Aktenzeichen; and in this letter, reference seems to
be made to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office.
That is all I have to say in regard to this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if Your Lordship wants any further
information. It seems to me quite clear. That is, it is from the file of
the department I mentioned, the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You mean it goes back to the same letters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The same letters, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has just been explained to me that what Dr. Laternser
was saying is that the letters “AZ i. K. 32/510” only mean that it is
from the file of that department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. Then, to find the office whose
file it is, you get Wi. Rü again, which is the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt,
which is the Economic and Armament Office, and it is the Armament
Department, Number III.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Sir David, the Tribunal thought that the best way would be to put this
witness in the box and then to leave him to Counsel for the Prosecution
and the Defense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, my friend, Mr. Roberts,
is going to deal with this witness, and, My Lord, he has selected the
passages quite shortly from the statements which will be read.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_The witness Wielen took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you stand up please?
MAX WIELEN (Witness): Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
WIELEN: Max Wielen.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
WIELEN: Max Wielen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): Max Wielen,
you made two statements in London through Colonel Hinchley Cook.
WIELEN: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And are these photostats of the two statements—the first
one dated 26 August 1945, and the second dated 6 September 1945?
[_The documents were submitted to the witness._]
Are those the photographs of your true statements? Do you identify them?
Do you see your signature at the end of each?
WIELEN: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And in those two statements did you tell the truth?
WIELEN: Yes, I told the truth.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, perhaps I should now read some passages so that
they may go into the record.
[_Turning to the witness._] If you take the first statement first—the
statement begins with your name and the positions which you held in the
SS and in the Criminal Police. That is right, is it not?
WIELEN: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And now, will you just follow the beginning of this
statement.
WIELEN: Of which declaration, 6 September?
MR. ROBERTS: I said the first one.
WIELEN: The first one? I see.
MR. ROBERTS: Just follow it while I read. I will read the whole of the
first page:
“Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat, SS Obersturmbannführer...”
WIELEN: Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat of the Criminal Police, not of
the SS...
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want you to read it, just listen to me.
“...formerly officer in charge of the Criminal Police at
Breslau.
“I have to state in answer to the question, whether I know
anything about the shooting of English prisoners of war, Air
Force officers of the prison camp at Sagan, that I have
knowledge of this matter and wish to make the following
statement without reserve.
“The shooting took place on the express personal orders of the
former Führer, Adolf Hitler, and was carried out by the
officials of the Geheime Staatspolizei.
“The officer in charge of the Staatspolizeileitstelle at Breslau
was Oberregierungsrat, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Scharpwinkel.
His immediate superiors were the Chief of the Sipo, SS
Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, and the Chief of Amt IV of
the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SS Gruppenführer Müller. I am
unable to give the names of the officers in charge of other
districts of the Geheime Staatspolizei who carried out shootings
in their districts.
“I insert here a small chart showing the organization of the
Sicherheitspolizei....”
I now go to the bottom of Page 3 in the English copy, and it is at the
bottom of Page 3 in the copy in German, which the witness has in his
hands:
“During the course of time”—and this is talking about Stalag
Luft III—“99 escape tunnels had been dug. All of them had been
discovered by the military. The hundredth tunnel, dug in March
1944, proved successful to the extent that 80 officers were able
to escape.
“On receipt of a telephone message from the camp headquarters to
the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle, I gave the order for
‘Kriegsfahndung,’ in accordance with the emergency instructions
laid down. At Dr. Absalon’s suggestion, and having regard for
the time lag, ‘Grossfahndung’ was ordered. Moreover, the officer
in charge of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt had to be informed,
who approved and confirmed the order for ‘Grossalarm.’
“Gradually the search, which was carried out in all parts of
Germany led to the re-arrest of practically all the escaped
English officer prisoners, with the exception of three, I
believe. Most of them were recaptured while still in Silesia. A
few had got as far as Kiel, Strasbourg, and the Allgäu.
“It was then that one day at noon I received a telegraphic
instruction from General Nebe to proceed at once to Berlin to be
informed of a secret order. When I arrived in Berlin that
evening, I saw General Nebe in his office Am Werdierschen Markt
5/7. I gave him a short, concise report on the whole matter as
it stood at the time. He then showed me a teleprint order signed
by Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in which was stated that, on the express
personal orders of the Führer, over half of the officers escaped
from Sagan were to be shot after their recapture. The officers
in charge of Department IV, Gruppenführer Müller, had received
corresponding orders and would give instructions to the
Staatspolizei. Military offices had been informed.
“General Nebe himself appeared shocked at this order. He was
very distressed. I was afterwards told that for nights on end he
had not gone to bed but had passed the night on his office
settee.
“I, too, was appalled at the horrible step to be taken and
opposed its execution. I said that it was against the laws of
war; and that it was bound to lead to reprisals against our own
officers who were prisoners of war in English camps, and that I
absolutely refused to take any responsibility. General Nebe
replied that in this particular case I had indeed no
responsibility whatever, because the Staatspolizei would act
completely independently, and that, after all the Führer’s
orders had to be carried out without demur. I want to point out
that when I first refused I acted on impulse and feeling, well
knowing that I could not hope to prevail in view of the
conditions that had recently arisen within the
Sicherheitspolizei.
“Nebe then added that I, on my part, was, of course, under an
obligation to preserve absolute secrecy, and that I had been
shown the original order so that I should not make any
difficulties vis-à-vis the Staatspolizei. My own duties as
regards the transport of some of the prisoners would be
transferred to the Staatspolizei.
“In this connection I want to explain that until then the
bringing back of prisoners to the camp had been the
responsibility of the Kriminalpolizei; either they had to take
them back to the camp themselves, or they had to hold them until
they were fetched by the camp staff. In answer to a question, I
declare that Oberregierungsrat Dr. Schulze was present at the
discussion with General Nebe. He nodded his head in agreement
when I raised my objection, but otherwise took no part in it.
“On my return to Breslau, I learned from Dr. Scharpwinkel that
the Geheime Staatspolizei had been duly informed by
Gruppenführer Müller. I was not apprised of the actual
instructions. I also do not know whether a similar order was
issued to every officer in charge of the
Staatspolizeileitstellen, or whether orders were only given to
those in whose areas arrests had been made and executions were
to be carried out.
“According to instructions the police in the districts where
arrests had been made had to inform the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt
(Kriegsfahndungszentrale) by telegram or telephone that officer
prisoners of war had been taken into custody. The
Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau was also to be informed.
“How the shooting was carried out, I do not know; but I presume
that after the Staatspolizei had collected the officers
concerned from the prisons, they were shot in some remote
spot—forests, _et cetera_—with pistols, service pistols of the
Stapo.
“In answer to the question whether the officers were possibly
beaten to death, I state that I do not believe this, because the
Führer’s order specifically mentioned ‘shooting.’
“The Staatspolizei had, in accordance with instructions received
from RSHA, Department IV, described the shooting as if it had
occurred in transit for the purpose of self-defense or to
prevent re-escape. This I afterwards learned from Dr.
Scharpwinkel.
“Later the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau received a letter
from the RSHA, Department V, which had to be communicated to the
camp commandant with the request that its text should be made
known to the English officer prisoners of war in order to
frighten them. The letter explained that the shooting had
occurred for the above-mentioned reason. The text of the letter
was communicated to Oberst Lindeiner or one of the camp staff
officers.
“As regards the selection of the officers to be shot, a list had
been prepared by the camp authorities, at the request of
Department V, in which those officers who were regarded as
disturbing elements—plotters and escape leaders—had been
specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the
commandant or by one of his officers. Thereupon the shooting of
officers mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department
IV and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei of
the district concerned.”
I omit the next paragraph, and I go to the bottom of the English copy,
Page 4; at the bottom of the witness’ copy, Page 7. Witness, would you
turn to Page 7, please. You will find the passage marked in pencil at
the bottom of Page 7. Have you got the page? I carefully numbered the
pages.
WIELEN: There is nothing marked in this.
MR. ROBERTS: I know, but if you turn over the page you will get
something which is marked.
WIELEN: Nothing is marked on Page 7, but on Page 8...
MR. ROBERTS: You will find something marked at the very bottom of Page
7. At any rate, just follow these words—follow these words, will you:
“To revert to the shooting...”
WIELEN: Yes, I have found it now.
MR. ROBERTS: “...approximately 40 English officers who had not
been arrested by the Staatspolizei but by the Kriminalpolizei
had meanwhile been taken back to camp.”
When you said that—you just answer this question, Witness; you said
approximately 40 officers—you didn’t know the actual numbers, did you?
WIELEN: The number is not correct. It was not 40. I did not know at that
time.
MR. ROBERTS: That’s right, because it isn’t the correct number. I think,
50.
WIELEN: I made a mistake at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: That’s right.
“They had come to no harm whatsoever; I must assume that...”
WIELEN: Fifteen additional were brought back.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, yes. I just want you now to listen to it, if you will
be kind enough:
“...I must assume that their treatment was perfectly correct. It
had been impossible to avoid putting them into police prisons
due to the general conditions then prevailing.
“I do not know who interrogated the officers in the police
prisons. I assume this was done by the local police authorities,
as an interrogation must necessarily follow every notification
of arrest. I do not know the names of the officials of the
Staatspolizei or the Gemeindepolizei (small local police force)
who co-operated in this matter, but Dr. Absalon should be able
to supply the answer to this question.”
I go on to the paragraph beginning, “The urns...” if Your Lordship
please:
“The urns containing the ashes of the officers who had been shot
were transmitted by the Staatspolizei to the Kriminalpolizei.
Which crematoria had been used by the Staatspolizei, I am unable
to say. The urns were handed over to the camp commandant by
order of the RSHA for a military funeral. By this means the
return of the urns through the Kripo—the fact that the
Staatspolizei was connected with the matter was to be
camouflaged.”
Then I miss the next paragraph. Then I read one sentence, the next line:
“I do not know why five officers were interrogated in Berlin.”
And then, My Lord, I turn to Page 6.
And, Witness, would you go to the bottom of your Page 10—the bottom of
your Page 10—you just turn over the page in the ordinary way. My Lord,
I take the middle paragraph. Just two paragraphs out of Page 6:
“In a general way it may be of interest that, even before my
departure for Berlin, Kriminalkommissar Dr. Absalon had told me
that he had heard in Camp Sagan—he was told this in a very
secretive way—that shootings were to take place in order to
deter the officers. From this may be deduced the fact that the
camp had already been informed through military channels of the
order to shoot issued by Dr. Kaltenbrunner.
“It would be useful to ascertain what Göring knows about the
whole affair, because the Führer must surely have informed him
of the order, since it concerned a camp of the Luftwaffe.”
(Document Number UK-48.)
My Lord, that is all of that statement that I think I need to read. My
Lord, I am anxious to avoid reading as much of the second statement as I
possibly can, because there is a good deal of repetition.
Will you take the second statement now, Witness? That one, I am afraid,
has not been marked.
The third paragraph, My Lord, the third and fourth paragraphs on the
first page of the statement:
“As to when the Staatspolizei had begun with the shootings, I am
not in a position to say; but I imagine it happened when only
very few prisoners were still at large and their recapture could
no longer be reckoned with.
“As regards the lapse of time between the order for
‘Grossfahndung’ and being shown the order for the shootings,
this could only have been a matter of a few days. I can no
longer recall exact dates. I do know however, for certain, that
no shootings had taken place anywhere at the time when the order
was shown to me.”
Then, perhaps, I could read the last paragraph but one on that page:
“Before the last mass escape had taken place, I had heard
nothing about the prospect of more drastic measures to be taken
against the prisoners. I heard of it only after the final
escape, but before I had been shown in Berlin the order for the
shootings. It was then that Dr. Absalon had told me that he had
heard in Sagan Camp—from whom I do not know, although I believe
it was from Colonel Lindeiner—that in future shootings would
take place. When this particular order was shown to me in
Berlin, it appeared to me to be merely a proof that the military
were behind this brutal measure or at least had had knowledge of
it before the RSHA.
“As regards the expression ‘more than half’ in the order of
Kaltenbrunner, this is how the wording is now fixed in my mind.
It is, however, quite possible that a specific number was given,
and that I, in quickly glancing through the order, interpreted
it thus in my mind, ‘but that is more than half,’ and this is
what has now stuck in my memory.”
My Lord, perhaps I might read—omitting the first several paragraphs
which are really repetitions—a paragraph just a little more than
halfway down the page. It begins:
“I do not know how the Geheime Staatspolizei took over from the
local police prisons those officers who were to be shot. It is,
however, possible that the Stapo got into touch with the local
offices of the Kriminalpolizei.
“In Lower Silesia, the firing squads were detailed by the
officer in charge of the Staatspolizei, Dr. Scharpwinkel, or by
his orders. I never heard who belonged to these squads.”
Then the last paragraph on that page:
“I declare, in answer to the question as to why the Kripo did
not carry out the shootings, that in the execution of its duties
the Kriminalpolizei feel themselves bound by the provisions of
the Staatsprozessordnung and the Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, and that
their personnel were trained in accordance with these standards.
On the other hand, during the war, the Staatspolizei had,
incited by Himmler, become less scrupulous. They carried out
executions on the orders of the RSHA, or with the approval of
that department, whenever required. That is the reason why the
German citizens’ general detestation of the Staatspolizei did
not extend to the Kriminalpolizei.
“The urns were obviously returned to the Kriminalpolizei for the
sole reason that the intervention of the Staatspolizei should
not become publicly known; that is, the English officers in the
camp should not become aware of it.”
My Lord, I think that is all I need read.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions
of the witness?
DR. NELTE: Witness, during your activities and during this terrible
matter, were you in touch with the OKW or the defendant, Field Marshal
Keitel, in any way?
WIELEN: No, neither with the OKW nor with Field Marshal Keitel, nor with
any of the other high officers.
DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly when you stated that the order
that we are talking about here, so far as you know, went through the
following channels: From Hitler to Himmler, to the Reich Security Main
Office, and then the lower offices?
WIELEN: Yes, that is the correct organizational path.
DR. NELTE: By whom was the list of which you spoke demanded, the list
that was to contain the names of those who were the disturbing element?
WIELEN: That was asked for by the Reich Security Main Office.
DR. NELTE: In the second half of what was read just now, a sentence is
contained that reads: “The camp commander must have been informed
through military officers of the intended shooting ahead of time.”
Would you, with regard to this sentence...
WIELEN: Well, I should not like to repeat that here so strongly. It is
possible, since shootings might have been discussed in the camp, or the
fact that more ready use of firearms in general would be taken towards
English officers if escapes continued; but in this connection I know
nothing more specific, namely, in the connection in which this remark
was made.
DR. NELTE: Then you do not want to insist on the fact that we are here
dealing with remarks that were made before the escape?
WIELEN: Well, at least not so far as these shootings are concerned; at
least not in direct relationship to this particular escape.
DR. NELTE: But it is not possible to know ahead of time if someone is
going to escape. For that reason I ask you whether this remark is
related to some discussion that took place subsequent to the flight of
these officers and which perhaps was directed toward the future
prevention of escapes?
WIELEN: That is altogether possible because at Sagan attempts to escape
were made daily.
DR. NELTE: Then would you like to clarify the statement, according to
which Colonel Lindeiner is said to have stated that military officers
stood behind these measures and had been previously informed of them?
That is how...
WIELEN: I do not believe that I expressed myself just that way. Could
you please repeat that?
DR. NELTE: According to my notes, you said that Colonel Lindeiner stated
that military officers stood behind this measure and had been informed
of it ahead of time.
WIELEN: I do not think that I could have made such a statement.
DR. NELTE: Then do you want to say that you cannot state that Colonel
Lindeiner made such an assertion?
WIELEN: I never had the impression that Lindeiner was personally
informed in this matter. At any rate, I have not the slightest reason to
believe so.
DR. NELTE: No further questions, thank you.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, according to the minutes, you stated that the
Criminal Commissioner Absalon had informed you even before your
departure for Berlin that he had heard in Camp Sagan that shootings were
to take place.
WIELEN: I just spoke in connection with this same matter, yes.
DR. STAHMER: Is that what you just...
WIELEN: That is the same matter.
DR. STAHMER: Another question: During the discussion that you had with
General Nebe in Berlin, General Nebe said to you that the military
offices were informed, and stated more precisely what military offices
were concerned?
WIELEN: No, that was not told to me. Nor do I know whether this
intention was at all realized, because the military offices were
actually not to be informed, and this whole matter was to be regarded as
secret and was to be kept secret.
DR. STAHMER: In your testimony here, you mentioned Reich Marshal Göring.
Have you any documentary proof that Reich Marshal Göring knew of these
shootings, or is that merely conjecture on your part?
WIELEN: No, please consider from what was said and the way it was said,
that I wanted to leave that question entirely open. Therefore, I also
said that I did not know it positively, and had no evidence for it; but
since it concerned a Luftwaffe camp I ask or propose that the Reich
Marshal be heard, since he should be able to give information about it.
DR. STAHMER: In other words, it was only a suggestion on your part to
interrogate the Reich Marshal as to whether he was informed?
WIELEN: Because I had to leave this matter open, I made the suggestion
only in order to proceed further in the matter at all.
DR. STAHMER: That is all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you stated that the order had been given by
Kaltenbrunner and Müller. Now I ask you, was this order in the form of a
teletype or a telegraphic communication, or did you see the order with
the original signature?
WIELEN: I believe I can state definitely that it was a teletype
communication.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know for sure it was not an original signature?
WIELEN: It was not an original signature. In fact I felt doubts about
this later. You can very well imagine that I thought about it hundreds
of times, wondering whether it were not entirely possible...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Speak more slowly.
WIELEN: ...that it was Himmler’s signature; but from the organizational
point of view it would have had to be Kaltenbrunner who signed it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So, if I understood you correctly, you can also not state
definitely that the teletype really had Kaltenbrunner’s signature under
it, but rather you simply assume that from your knowledge of the
organization.
WIELEN: I was so impressed by the contents of the communication, by the
results, and by the necessity to prepare the working out of the whole
affair that I paid little attention to the mechanical matters, that is,
the externals involved. As a result, they did not imprint themselves on
my memory in such a way that I could make a statement about them with
definite reliability.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
Dr. Nelte, does that close the case for the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: As far as witnesses are concerned, that closes the case for
Keitel. I have a few further remarks to make with regard to the
presentation of evidence.
The Tribunal have approved an affidavit by Krieger by its ruling of 6
April 1946. I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put this affidavit in
evidence as Document Keitel-15. I have the German original here and I
should like to read only that part of the affidavit that describes the
relations between Hitler and Keitel. This involves three short
paragraphs:
“The relations between Hitler and former Field Marshal Keitel
were officially correct and, on Hitler’s part, appeared
confiding as a whole, springing from appreciation of or respect
for a zealous co-worker. Keitel’s attitude was upright and
soldierly. There was, however, no further friendly or
confidential note between them. Apart from official receptions,
and so forth, Keitel, as far as could be ascertained, hardly
took part with Hitler in informal conversations nor shared any
meals with him. Also, summons to discussions with Hitler outside
the official conferences, when there were no stenographers
present, were not observed.
“In preparing decisions or in formulating orders, Keitel gave
expression to his own opinions, even if they happened to differ,
in an unbiased, clear, soldierly manner. He apparently knew
exactly, from many years of collaboration with Hitler, the
limits of possibility as far as influencing his opinions or
decisions or changing his mind was concerned. For that reason he
generally accepted Hitler’s decisions as orders in a soldierly
manner. In individual cases he tried and succeeded by emphatic
reasoning in changing decisions, or at least in delaying them in
order to have them further examined.
“That Hitler, at least at times, did not trust Keitel completely
I believe I can conclude from one of Hitler’s remarks...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it appears to the Tribunal that it is not
really necessary to read this. Keitel has already said it, it is
cumulative to him, and the document itself is in evidence so we can read
it ourselves.
DR. NELTE: It is not necessary, but it simply corroborates what has been
testified to here. Therefore, I can...
THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient that you tell us that.
DR. NELTE: I have further received the answers to several
interrogatories that were permitted by the Tribunal.
First, there is the answer to the interrogatory by Herr Romilly. I can
put this sworn interrogatory in evidence before the Tribunal and can
forego any reading of it.
The same is true of the answers to the interrogatory submitted to the
witness Rotraud Roemer as to the question of the branding of Russian
prisoners of war.
The interrogatories of Professor Naville and Ambassador Scarpini are not
yet at hand. I shall submit them as soon as they arrive. There
remains...
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution had these documents?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you given numbers to these? You gave Document
Keitel-15 to the last affidavit. You ought to number the others.
DR. NELTE: Romilly is Document Keitel-16, and Roemer is Document
Keitel-17.
I have now only the affidavit of the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg. As
ruled by the Tribunal on 26 February, it was allowed that he be
interrogated. I have sent the original to the Prosecution and I ask to
be allowed to put in evidence the sworn answers of Von Blomberg. It is
in Document Book 1 and is known both to the Tribunal and to the
Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: That concludes my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you—Now, Dr. Horn, I think—Dr. Nelte, you are
lodging these original documents that are numbered Keitel-16, 17, and
18, you are lodging them with the General Secretary?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Nelte, we have not seen a translation of Keitel-16, but you are sure
that it has been translated, are you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have seen an English translation of it.
THE PRESIDENT: You have?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was shown to me when it came in. I am quite
sure I remember reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, perhaps the General Secretary’s department
will see that we are furnished copies of it.
Yes, I think that is the one. That is Keitel-16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, I think Romilly is Keitel-16. I have
seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Horn, do you remember that we read these documents at the time that
we approved of their admissibility?
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Yes, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: So perhaps it won’t take you long to introduce them in
evidence?
DR. HORN: I shall limit myself to a minimum, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. HORN: I should like to ask the Tribunal first to take judicial
notice of Document Ribbentrop-75, contained in Volume III, on Page 191,
of Ribbentrop’s document book. It is a question here of an agreement
between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland of the year 1919.
This agreement defines the rights of the German minority in Poland. In
Article 12 of this Treaty, which is on Page 3 of this document, it is
said that Poland agrees that insofar as the provisions of the above
article apply to persons of racial, religious, or linguistic minorities,
these provisions form the basis for obligations of international
interest and are placed under the supervision of the League of Nations.
In subsequent years Poland repeatedly violated this Treaty. That can be
seen from the two following documents, Document Ribbentrop-82, on Page
208 of Document Book Number 4.
This is a legal judgment by the Permanent International Court. It is of
10 September 1923. In order to save time I might just read the
conclusion, where it is said:
“The Court is of the opinion that the attitude of the Polish
Government defined under Points ‘a’ and ‘b’ does not stand in
accord with Poland’s international obligations.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, as well as
the next document, Document Ribbentrop-84, which is on Pages 212 and
212-a of the Ribbentrop Document Book Number 4. This, too, is a
statement on the part of a judicial committee of the League of Nations
on minority questions. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
this report.
Immediately after the Government had been taken over by Hitler, this
Government attempted to establish a good relationship with Poland. As
evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-85, which is on Page
213 of the document book. I am reading from Page 2 of that document.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is that Ribbentrop Document Book 4?
DR. HORN: It is Ribbentrop Document Book 4, Mr. President, Page 213. I
am reading from Page 214, center of the last paragraph, as follows:
“He, the Chancellor, wished only that the pending political
questions existing between Germany and Poland could be examined
and treated without passion by the statesmen of both countries.
He was convinced that some way out of the present untenable
position could be found. Germany desired peace. The forceful
expropriation of Polish territory was not his intention, but he
was reserving for himself those rights to which he was entitled
according to the pact, and he would insist upon them at any time
and whenever he thought fit.”
Concerning this conference, two official communiqués were issued by
request of the Polish Ambassador. This is Document Ribbentrop-86, which
is the German communiqué, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of it and also the next document, Document Ribbentrop-87, on Page
216 of the document book, which is the Polish communiqué. So as to save
time, I do not propose to read these communiqués.
On 15 July 1937 considerable parts of the German-Polish pact which was
signed in Geneva in 1922, regarding Upper Silesia, expired. The
necessity arose, therefore, to create a new pact between the two
countries, particularly since difficulties again arose due to the
question of minorities and the treatment of German minorities. As
evidence for this I refer to Document Ribbentrop-117, on Page 257 of the
document book, and I should like to read the second paragraph where it
says:
“The Reich Minister also pointed out to the Polish Ambassador
that the rigorous Polish point of view regarding the expulsion
of those who had indicated a preference for Germany could not be
accepted by us.”
THE PRESIDENT: I could not see that on Page 254.
DR. HORN: Page 257, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see it.
DR. HORN: The result of those conferences between Poland and Germany is
the pact which has been submitted as Document Ribbentrop-123, on Page
263 of the document book. This is a co-ordinated declaration by the
Polish and German Governments regarding the protection of their
respective minorities, which was published on 5 November 1937. So as to
save time, I can point out that the German minorities were given those
rights which are usual between civilized states in similar cases. May I
also point out that this agreement does not contain anything which can
be considered the sanctioning of any wrong previously committed in this
field, a point of view which was recently presented by the Prosecution.
So as to remove the difficulties between the Free City of Danzig and the
Polish Government which had arisen with regard to minorities and
economic matters, an agreement was reached on 5 August 1933, which is
Document Ribbentrop-127 and found on Page 270 of the document book. May
I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, too?
Since, in spite of these treaty agreements on the question of minorities
and the problem of the Free City of Danzig, difficulties between the two
nations continued to arise, Hitler gave the order to the Defendant
Ribbentrop, after the solution of the Sudeten-German question in October
1938, to commence negotiations regarding the Danzig and Corridor
questions as well as the question of minorities. For this reason the
then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, was invited to come to
Berchtesgaden. The discussions which took place on that occasion between
Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister are contained in Document
Ribbentrop-149, on Page 301 of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. May I
quote from Page 2 of the document to explain what the main features of
this conference were? On Page 6, it says:
“For Germany there was not only the Memel question, which would
be settled in a manner consonant with German views—for it
looked as if the Lithuanians would be willing to co-operate in
finding a reasonable solution—but within the direct
German-Polish relationship there was also the problem of Danzig
and the Corridor to be solved, which, from the point of view of
sentiment, was very serious for Germany.”
On Page 3 of the same document, last line of the next to the last
paragraph, it says Foreign Minister Beck promised that “he would,
however, be glad to give calm consideration to the problem.”
With that Germany considered that negotiations regarding this problem
had begun.
On 24 January, that is to say the following day, the then Reich Foreign
Minister Von Ribbentrop had another discussion with the Polish Foreign
Minister Beck during which the question of minorities was once more
touched on. That discussion is contained in Document Ribbentrop-150, on
Page 304. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
By invitation of the then Foreign Minister Beck, Reich Foreign Minister
Von Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 24 January 1939. Once more the entire
problem was discussed there.
On 21 March, after the Czech question had been settled, a reorganization
in the East became necessary. The then Reich Foreign Minister Von
Ribbentrop, therefore, asked the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939 to
come to visit him. The account of that conference is contained in
Document Ribbentrop-154, on Page 310 of the document book. May I quote
the third paragraph, Page 2, which is the leading point regarding that
conference:
“Generally, the decision on the Corridor was considered the
heaviest burden put on Germany by the Versailles Treaty.”
A few lines later the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop explained:
“A prerequisite for this was, however, that the purely German
city of Danzig should return to the Reich, and that an
extraterritorial motor road and railway connection be
established between the Reich and East Prussia.
“He promised that Germany would in exchange guarantee the
Corridor.
“Ambassador Lipski promised to inform M. Beck accordingly and
then to give an answer.”
May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well?
Although the German Government at that time expected that on the
strength of these discussions the question of the minorities and the
question of Danzig and the Corridor would find some solution, these
discussions had the opposite effect.
It appears from Document Ribbentrop-155, on Page 313, and Document
Ribbentrop-156, on Page 314 of the document book, that Poland at that
time ordered partial mobilization. That partial mobilization could have
been directed only against Germany.
Moreover, the settling of the Czechoslovakian question on 15 March 1939
had led to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The then Prime
Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the opposition, had opened
consultations with various European states. As evidence of this fact, I
refer to Document Ribbentrop 159, which is Page 317 of the document
book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on 26
March 1939. May I quote the beginning, which is as follows:
“On 21 March the British Government proposed first in Warsaw, as
well as in Paris and Moscow, that a ‘formal declaration’ by the
British, French, Russian, and Polish Governments shall be made.”
I shall then skip a few lines and quote further as follows—Line 7 from
bottom:
“The Polish Government, which ordered partial mobilization on 23
March, was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for
negotiations but rather demanded far more concrete commitments
from England on behalf of Poland. Therefore, also on 23 March,
Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in
London, Count Edward Raczynski, to submit to the British
Government the following proposal for an Anglo-Polish union:
“‘Referring to the English proposal’”—it says further on—“‘of
21 March, I request you to ask Lord Halifax if: (1) In view of
the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing
loss of time...’”
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I see no reason—if I may say so with
greatest respect—for reading any part of any of these documents. They
are all in evidence, or will be, I assume. All that needs be done, it
seems to us, is to give them numbers. I know that we read and commented
at the time we put in the Prosecution’s case, but the compelling reasons
for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these
defendants are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the
compelling reasons were that you were referring to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically
impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in
the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the one in
which the original was written. Now the defendants do have those
facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would
have submitted them and we would not have commented; but the necessity
for comment seemed very real to us, because we had to read everything
that we wanted into the record over the speaking system, and if we read
a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have presented
any reason of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the
Defense can do so, it can submit the whole document, and later on, as I
understand the rules and the Charter, Counsel will have an opportunity
to argue and comment about it as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued—I
think it was a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued
in favor of the defendants’ counsel being still entitled to read such
passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks; and we
adhered to that rule.
MR. DODD: I did not understand that Your Honors had already ruled. I
remember Dr. Dix’s statement. One of his principal reasons was that he
wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or
the public. If that is still his reason, they are all available; the
press can have them without having them read over this microphone.
However, I won’t press the matter if the Court has already ruled.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like
to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd’s proposal. I fully
support...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we
have made a specific ruling upon this subject, and, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great
discretion.
GEN. RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks
in regard to Mr. Dodd’s proposal.
As the Tribunal will remember, just before the start of the questioning
of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel,
and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be
accepted as evidence and what was to be declined...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if you are repeating, you are repeating
the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and, as I say, in the
opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and
has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark
that the Soviet Prosecution consider that Dr. Horn’s comments are
superfluous as the defendant has already given us too many comments on
the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every
possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.
DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that
I will be as brief as possible and that I shall read as little as
possible, only that which is necessary to make understandable why I am
presenting the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. HORN: I had last quoted some passages from Document Ribbentrop-159,
Page 317 of the document book, and I wish to briefly summarize what
these documents refer to.
This document contains the request from England to the Polish Government
to formulate the consultation into a concrete agreement. This agreement
was then in fact made, between 21 March and 26 March, between England
and Poland.
Furthermore, and as a parallel to this, there is the coalition policy on
the part of England which is proved by Documents Ribbentrop-182 to 186,
on Pages 370 and following of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. As is
shown in Document 182, the following states were concerned. I am quoting
from Document 182, at the bottom of Page 6:
“The following countries are said to have been invited to
participate in the question of guarantees: Russia, Poland,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely
established”—it says further—“that Hungary was not approached.
It was left up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Estonia, and
Latvia. The same is supposed to apply to Turkey with regard to
Greece.”
As evidence of this policy of coalition, I refer to Document
Ribbentrop-185, Page 372 of the document book. This is a telegram from
the German Chargé d’Affaires in London to the Foreign Office, and I
should like briefly to quote a few passages from that. They read:
“The available news proves clearly that the plan for a
declaration pre-announced by telegram on the part of Britain can
actually be divided into two parts. The first part deals with
guarantees to Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland; the second part
aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggression. The
British Cabinet is said to have been informed by a military
spokesman that Romania, because of her oil wells, will
definitely have to be protected against German military
seizure.”
The same subject is dealt with in Document Ribbentrop-186. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading from it. And I
also ask that Document Ribbentrop-183, which is on Page 375 of the
document book, be taken judicial notice of; once more, so as to save
time, I do not propose to read it.
Based on this policy of coalition on Britain’s part which was directed
against Germany, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Germany
and Italy was concluded on 22 May 1939. I am submitting it as Document
Ribbentrop-187, on Page 376 of the Ribbentrop document book. I request
the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading it.
The result of the guarantee given by England to Poland was that
Ambassador Lipski, on 26 March 1939, on the occasion of a conference
with the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, declared—and I am here
referring to Document Ribbentrop-162, and quoting from the third
paragraph:
“Mr. Lipski replied that it was his unpleasant duty to point out
that any further pursuance of these German plans, particularly
regarding a return of Danzig to the Reich, would mean a war with
Poland.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The same
applies to the previous document, Document Ribbentrop-160, on Page 320
of the document book, which refers to the consultations between Britain
and the governments previously mentioned.
On the strength of the declaration of Lipski which I have just
read—namely, that further pursuance of an attempt to alter the _status
quo_ regarding the Corridor and Danzig would mean war—the Reich Foreign
Minister declared to the Polish Ambassador on 27 March 1939—I again
quote from Document Ribbentrop-163, on Page 335 of the document
book—that this attitude of Poland could not be the basis for a
settlement of these questions so far as Germany was concerned. The
corresponding passage is the next to the last paragraph on Page 2 of
this document, where it says:
“In conclusion, the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer
knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They
had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which
Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could not
regard the proposal, submitted yesterday by the Polish
Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of the problems. The
relations between the two countries were, therefore, more and
more strained.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
So as to prove that the Anglo-Polish Pact for Mutual Assistance was
clearly aimed against Germany, I submit to the Tribunal as evidence
Document Ribbentrop-164, which is on Page 338 of the document book. I
quote the last two lines, where it says:
“...that the pact applied only in the case of an attack by
Germany. The Polish Government affirms that this is so.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document.
The result of the Anglo-Polish agreement of 6 April 1939, which has been
submitted by the Prosecution as Document Number TC-72, and which appears
on Page 337 of my document book, was the termination of the
Polish-German agreement of 26 January 1934, since Germany was convinced
that the Anglo-Polish guarantee declaration was contrary to the spirit
of this agreement.
Subsequently there were a number of excesses against the German
minorities in Poland. The documents referring to this are contained in
my document book under Documents Ribbentrop-165 to 181. I am asking the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of these numbers, and to save time I
shall limit myself to very short quotations.
I refer to Document Ribbentrop-166, which states that serious incidents
occurred in Pommerellen, Njevo, and Bromberg.
I also refer to Document Ribbentrop-167, on Page 353 of the document
book. This document shows that in the last days there was a public
declaration in Warsaw which openly appealed for a boycott of German
trade and handicraft.
Furthermore, as evidence for my statement, may I refer to Document
Ribbentrop-180, which is on Page 368 of the Ribbentrop document book.
May I read this brief report, which I quote as follows:
“During the last few months the German Foreign Office has
continuously received reports from the German Consulate in
Poland about the cruel treatment to which racial Germans are
subjected by the Poles, who have been more and more stirred up
and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In
Appendix 38 especially grave cases have been collected.”
From Document Ribbentrop-181, on Page 369 of the document book, it
appears that these clashes, as a matter of fact, took place with the
knowledge and under the protection of Polish statesmen and high
officials. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-181, but
for reasons of time I am not going to read from it, but ask the Tribunal
to take judicial notice of it.
At the beginning of August 1939 an acute crisis developed in
German-Polish relations. As evidence of this I present Document
Ribbentrop-188, on Page 381 of my document book. The cause was actually
a small one. There was dispute regarding the functions of the customs
officials on the Danzig frontier. Because of this dispute, the
diplomatic representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig made a
protest to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. This
protest is contained in Document Ribbentrop-188. It contained an
ultimatum, which becomes clear from Paragraph 3 of the document.
On 7 August the then President of the Free City of Danzig replied to
this as appears in Document Ribbentrop-189. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of this document also.
In Document Ribbentrop-190, on Page 383, the Reich Government warns
Poland not to deliver any ultimatum. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of this document, and I do not propose to read from it.
The next document I am presenting is Document Ribbentrop-192, which is
on Page 385 of the document book. This is a document from the Under
State Secretary at the Polish Foreign Ministry to the German Chargé
d’Affaires in Warsaw, and it is dated 10 August 1939. It appears from
the last two lines of the document that Poland would consider any
intervention of the Reich Government to the detriment of Danzig’s rights
an aggressive act.
These notes created an even more critical situation in German-Polish
relations. The Reich Government and their departments attempted, in the
time that followed, to avoid a threatening conflict. As evidence of this
I submit Document Ribbentrop-193, which is on Page 404 of the document
book; and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
This is a memorandum of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office
regarding—it is in Ribbentrop Document Book 6, Page 404—this is a
memorandum regarding a visit of the French Ambassador to the State
Secretary of the Foreign Office, Weizsäcker. During that conversation
the then State Secretary, Weizsäcker, emphasized that Germany had no
more urgent wish than German-Polish agreement regarding Danzig. The
French Ambassador assured him that his Government would co-operate in
these attempts.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, Document
Ribbentrop-193, and the next document, Number 194, on Page 406 of the
document book.
The last document concerns the discussion between the State Secretary
and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, during which the
German State Secretary pointed out the seriousness of the situation.
I read from Page 1 of the document, the third paragraph, fifth line, the
following sentence which characterizes the situation:
“Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector.”
Apart from that, the State Secretary pointed out that the situation
regarding Danzig had now reached extreme tension.
The next document I refer to is Document Ribbentrop-195, on Pages 408 to
415 of the document book. This document refers to a conference between
Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on 23 August 1939. This conference is
contained in Document Ribbentrop-199, on Page 422 of the Ribbentrop
document book. I also ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this
document, and, so as to clarify the content of that conference briefly,
I am going to refer to Page 4 of the document, where it says:
“He once more drew attention to the Danzig and Polish question
in connection with which England’s attitude was, ‘Better war
than something to Germany’s advantage.’”
The second paragraph after that reads:
“The Führer stated that the fact that England opposed Germany in
the Danzig question had deeply shaken the German people.
“Henderson then stated that one was merely opposing the
principle of force, whereupon the Führer wanted to know whether
England had ever found a solution by negotiation for any of the
idiocies of Versailles.
“The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Führer then stated
that, according to a German saying, it took two to make a
friendship.”
Because of the tense relations the late Prime Minister Chamberlain, on
22 August 1939, wrote a letter directly to Hitler. This letter is
Document Ribbentrop-200, on Page 426 of the document book. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also.
The next document is Document Ribbentrop-201, and it contains Hitler’s
reply to the British Prime Minister Chamberlain.
On 25 August 1939 there was yet another meeting between Hitler and
Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. That meeting is contained in Document
Ribbentrop-202, which is on Page 431 of the Ribbentrop document book.
May I refer to Paragraph 5, where Hitler emphasized once more that, “The
problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved.” On the
following page, in Paragraph 3 on Page 2, Hitler says:
“But after the solution of this problem he is prepared and
determined to approach England with a major, all-inclusive
proposal.”
This offer is contained in detail in the same Document Number 202.
Henderson made an entry regarding this discussion in his diary, which is
Exhibit Ribbentrop-195, and on Page 415 he refers to this last-mentioned
meeting of 25 August 1939:
“My interview with Hitler”—says Henderson—“at which Herr Von
Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present, lasted over an
hour on this occasion. The Chancellor spoke with calm and
apparent sincerity. He described his proposals as a last effort
for conscience’s sake to secure good relations with Great
Britain and suggested that I should fly to London myself with
them.”
Under Number 8, on the same page, 415, Henderson continues to say:
“Whatever may have been the underlying motive of this final
gesture on the part of the Chancellor, it was one which could
not be ignored...”
The next document, which gives in detail the course of events and the
crisis which led up to the outbreak of war, is Document Ribbentrop-208,
on Page 451 of the document book. To the extent that I do not read from
it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the entire document.
The first extract from this document, which is a telegram from Lord
Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw, states the following, and I quote:
“Our proposed reply to Herr Hitler draws a clear distinction
between the method of reaching agreement on German-Polish
differences and the nature of the solution to be arrived at. As
to the method, we wish to express our clear view that direct
discussion on equal terms between the parties is the proper
means.”
This request for direct negotiations is an essential part of the events
which followed.
Under Number 5 of the same document, on Page 452 of the document book,
it states as follows:
“As the Polish Government appear in their reply to President
Roosevelt to accept the idea of direct negotiations, His
Majesty’s Government earnestly hope that, in the light of the
considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, the Polish
Government will authorize them to inform the German Government
that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussions
with Germany.”
In the following document, which has the same number and is on the same
page, is a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax, which was
dispatched on 29 August 1939. Great Britain’s role as mediator is once
more clarified. It says under Number 3 of this document:
“Note observes that German proposals have never had for their
object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and declares
that the German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain
with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary.
German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of such
plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, 30th August.
“I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but,
after some heated remarks, both Herr Hitler and Herr Von
Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress
urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were
standing face to face.”
These proposals, which I have previously submitted in a special exhibit,
had the following reaction in Great Britain—I read from Page 453 of
Ribbentrop’s document book. It is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir
Nevile Henderson of 30 August 1939. It says:
“We shall give careful consideration to German Government’s
reply, but it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can
produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German
Government must not expect this.”
In the meantime the situation had become so serious that Sir Nevile
Henderson did not consider that a success of Britain’s action would be
possible. This is shown in the same document on Page 454. This is a
telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax. I am reading only a
short quotation, to save time, from Point 3 of the telegram:
“While I still recommend that the Polish Government should
swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact
with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that
they were prepared to make their own sacrifices for preservation
of peace....”
The Polish Government was, nevertheless, not willing to enter into
direct negotiations. This can be seen from the same document on Page
455, from which I will read only the first three lines. It is a telegram
from the British Ambassador in Warsaw to Lord Halifax, and it states:
“I feel sure that it would be impossible to induce the Polish
Government to send M. Beck or any other representative
immediately to Berlin....”
In the same telegram the British Ambassador emphasizes, under Number 4,
and I quote:
“I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government,
nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler’s reply until I
receive instructions, which I trust will be without delay.”
Through the failure to pass on the German Government’s proposals to the
Polish Government, direct negotiations were frustrated. As evidence of
the fact that the Polish Government, too, had no intention of entering
into such direct negotiations, I refer to Page 465 of the same document,
which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw. Once
more he is asking the Ambassador to invite the Polish Government to
enter into direct negotiations. I will not quote from this document, but
I will quote from the next document, Page 466, which is an extract from
the British _Blue Book_, and which refers to the Polish reaction. It is
a telegram from Sir Kennard to Lord Halifax, 31 August 1939.
I am going to read the first three paragraphs of this document. From
these paragraphs it becomes clear what the Polish attitude was regarding
the possibility of direct negotiations. I quote:
“M. Beck has just handed me in writing the Polish reply to my
_démarche_ last night.”
The second paragraph states:
“I asked M. Beck what steps he proposed to take in order to
establish contact with the German Government. He replied that he
would instruct M. Lipski to seek an interview with the Minister
for Foreign Affairs or State Secretary in order to say Poland
had accepted British proposals. I urged him to do this without
delay.
“I then asked him what attitude the Polish Ambassador would
adopt if Herr Von Ribbentrop, or whomever he saw, handed him the
German proposals. He said that M. Lipski would not be authorized
to accept such a document as, in view of past experience, it
might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum.”
This extract from the British _Blue Book_ proves that, as far as Poland
was concerned, all possibilities of clarifying the question of Danzig or
the minorities were refused. In this manner it was no longer possible
for the German Government or the British Government to discuss this
question with Poland any further. As evidence for further efforts, I
submit to the Tribunal Document Ribbentrop-209, on Page 494, of which I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. I will not quote from it, or
from Document Ribbentrop-210, which I also offer to the Tribunal for
judicial notice.
The next document is Document Ribbentrop-213, which is on Page 504-b of
my document book. This last document is an official German report
regarding the subject and basis of negotiations during the time of the
Polish-German crisis.
Since Poland was unable to discuss these questions of Danzig or the
Corridor with Germany, a war arose between these two countries. In my
final defense speech, I shall discuss specifically the legal aspect of
this war and its nature in respect to international law. What I want to
state today is that the lack of any effective international institution
for the alteration of the insufferable _status quo_ was the final reason
which led to the outbreak of war in 1939.
The next group of documents which I am submitting to the Tribunal are
those which refer to the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany.
These are the Documents Ribbentrop-216(a)—on Page 509 of the document
book—216(b), and 217. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
these documents, and, as far as evidence and the actual events are
concerned, I refer to the documents and statements which my colleague,
Dr. Siemers, will submit to the Tribunal when he speaks on behalf of
Raeder.
The next group of documents are those which refer to the occupation of
Holland and Belgium. They are Documents Number 218 and the following, on
Page 518 of the document book. The documents are contained in Document
Book Number 7. So as to explain the German viewpoint, I quote from
Document Ribbentrop-218 Page 518 in Document Book Number 7. I am going
to quote the following brief passages, Paragraph 2:
“As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of
England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately
imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through
Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. Germany has
recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and
Holland, it being a natural prerequisite that these two
countries, in the event of a war between Germany and England and
France, maintain the strictest neutrality.
“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”
On Page 2 in the same document, under Number 8, reference is made to the
evidence which was known to the German Government at the time and which
I will submit in due course in support of the assertion just made. It
says:
“Documents at the disposal of the German Government prove that
preparations by Britain and France on Belgian and Netherlands
territory are already far advanced.
“Thus, for some time, all obstacles on the Belgian border toward
France which might hinder the entry of the English and French
invasion army have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium
and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and
French officers, and their enlargement has been ordered. Belgium
has made transport facilities available at the frontier, and
recently advance parties of staff personnel and units of the
French and English Army have arrived in various parts of Belgium
and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further
information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish
conclusive proof that the English and French attack against
Germany is imminent and that this thrust will be directed
against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands.”
As proof of these statements I refer to Documents Ribbentrop-221 through
229, which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They are the
Anglo-French plans in preparation for violation of Holland’s and
Belgium’s neutrality in agreement with these countries.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal has to adjourn at 5 o’clock into a
closed session. They hope very much that you will conclude your
examination of these documents by then.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. So as to save time, I shall only
state briefly what these documents are. Document Ribbentrop-221 is the
proof of an intended intervention in Belgium. This is a report from the
military attaché at the French Embassy in London, General Lelong,
addressed to the Chief of the French General Staff for National Defense.
I am going to quote a very brief passage from it which says:
“Intervention in Belgium.
“The British Delegation readily recognized how uncertain the
conditions are for eventual intervention in Belgium. It was
proposed that we, in order to prevent a battle of junction on
the Belgian flatlands, must plan to organize our defenses at
least along the Schelde, or preferably, along the Albert Canal.
By request of the British Delegation, the following points have
been considered:
“(1) The possibility of intervention along the line
Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, assuming that it were possible to
organize such a position in good time.
“(2) The importance of holding the Belgian and Dutch territory
as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany.”
Again, to save time, I shall not refer to any other documents in
connection with this group. I merely ask the Tribunal that Document
Ribbentrop-219, on Page 521 of the document book, which is a memorandum
of the German Government to the Luxembourg Government, of 9 May 1940,
and Document Ribbentrop-220, should be taken judicial notice of, so that
I can refer to them when I present my case. Furthermore, I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of the Documents Number 230, 230(a),
231, 231(a), 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244,
and 245, which, again are documents which originate from the French
General Staff and are clear proof that on the part of Britain and
France, before 9 May 1940, detailed plans for military co-operation had
been prepared, and that British and American advance parties were
already on Belgian and Dutch territory before German troops crossed the
border. That is the end of this particular group.
I now come to those documents which I intend to submit to the Tribunal
with reference to the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. These are
Documents Ribbentrop-272 and the following, Pages 604 and the following,
of the document book. Here again, we are concerned with documents which
partly come from the files of the French General Staff. The first
document of the type is Document Ribbentrop-272, which is a note from
the German Government to the Yugoslav Government, dated March 1941. This
is concerned with the joining of the Three Power Pact by Yugoslavia.
This document shows that Germany and the Axis Powers did not intend to
put demands to Yugoslavia during the war at all, least of all with
reference to the march of troops through Yugoslav territory. Documents
Ribbentrop-273 and 274 contain the minutes of Yugoslavia’s entry into
the Three Power Pact on 25 March 1941, and connected with it is a note
from the Reich Government to the Yugoslav Government. With Document
Ribbentrop-277 I submit to the Tribunal a note from the Reich Government
to the Greek Government, which was handed to that Government after Greek
territory had been occupied by British troops. From Page 3 I quote the
following sentence:
“During recent days, Greece had become an operational territory
for British forces.”
Under Document Ribbentrop-278, I submit to the Tribunal an official
statement from the Reich Government, dated 6 April 1941, which is
addressed to both Yugoslavia and Greece. In this note the reasons are
stated which, after the Simovic revolt, led to military action by
Germany in Yugoslavia. These reasons can be found on Page 4 of this
document. As evidence that the statements contained therein are true, I
am referring to the so-called “Charité Files” which are the files of the
French General Staff.
This completes the group of documents with reference to Yugoslavia and
Greece, but I should like to add that once again I will rely on further
evidence which will be submitted by my colleague, Dr. Siemers, for the
Defendant Raeder, and which also refers to the German action against
Greece.
The next group of documents refer to Russia. They are the ones in
Documents Ribbentrop-279 and the following, which can be found on Pages
619 and the following of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of Numbers 279, 280, 282, 283, and 284. During the
presentation of my argument I shall refer to these documents further.
The next and last group of documents are those which refer to the
accusation against the Defendant Ribbentrop regarding the Anti-Comintern
Pact and his policy in connection with Japan and the U.S.A.
The first document of this type is Document Ribbentrop-291, on Page 652
of the document book. This document contains the text of the
Anti-Comintern Pact. Document Ribbentrop-281 refers to the extension of
the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Three Power Pact of 27 September 1940. I
submit these documents to the Tribunal as proof of the fact that
Ribbentrop and the Reich Government made efforts, by means of this
policy, to keep the United States out of the war. In spite of this
policy, an active support of our opponents by the United States took
place. As proof of this, I refer to the documents in Document
Ribbentrop-306 and Document Ribbentrop-308, on Pages 700 and 702 and
following of the document book. These documents are the last I am
submitting to the Tribunal with reference to the policy of Germany
during the years when the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister.
Finally I refer briefly to Document Ribbentrop-313. That is an affidavit
from the Legation Counsellor, Bernd Gottfriedsen. This affidavit
actually has nothing to do with the aggressive war, but it refers to
questions which have been brought up by the Prosecution in connection
with the case of Ribbentrop, and this affidavit contains statements
regarding the real estate property of the Defendant Ribbentrop and
regarding his ownership of art works.
May I point out that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen, as he has stated
in the affidavit, handled the financial affairs of the Foreign Office
and particularly those of the Foreign Minister. I will quote a brief
passage in connection therewith from question Number 5:
“Question: ‘What is the situation with regard to Von
Ribbentrop’s art possessions?’
“Answer:”—by Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen—“‘Herr Von
Ribbentrop was a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life.
During the time of his activities in the above-mentioned
department he acquired some paintings, for the most part on the
art market in Germany itself. Every one of these paintings was
acquired properly and, above all, at correct prices, and of
course paid for out of the private funds of the Reich Foreign
Minister.
“‘During the time he was Foreign Minister, Herr Von Ribbentrop
acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the
Foreign Office and German missions in foreign countries, which
became state property and were used accordingly. All these art
objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory.
No foreign art objects were acquired illegally, that is by
pressure, _et cetera_. Herr Von Ribbentrop’s private art
objects, too, were catalogued, and the objects themselves marked
distinctly by me.’”
I now skip one paragraph and read the end of the statement which says:
“‘During the war he did not acquire any art objects illegally
from any of the territories occupied by German troops, be it for
his own private use or for the Foreign Office of the Reich.’”
I should like to add that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen knew
thoroughly the private property affairs of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop,
and had annually made a survey of them together with a certified
accountant for the purpose of taxes and inventory.
Finally, I should like to quote a paragraph from the affidavit which is
Document Ribbentrop-317, and which is in the document book on Page 749.
This is an affidavit from Frau Von Ribbentrop given before a notary in
Nuremberg. It refers to accusations raised by the Prosecution in
connection with the Russian policy pursued by Ribbentrop. I am quoting,
as follows:
“In 1940 we had a very inadequate air-raid shelter in the
Foreign Office (official residence). During air raids,
therefore, on the order of Adolf Hitler, we used the air-raid
shelter of the Reich Chancellery, since he considered it
important that my husband, in his capacity as Reich Foreign
Minister, and the documents of the Foreign Office should be safe
from air raids. I was at that time expecting my youngest child,
which was born on 19 December 1940, and can therefore clearly
remember an air-raid which took place shortly before this event,
which caused us to go to the air-raid shelter of the Reich
Chancellery. On this occasion Adolf Hitler was also present and
came into our room in the shelter. He, my husband, and I sat at
a table in this room. In the course of our stay my husband spoke
at length of his efforts to induce Russia to join the Tripartite
Pact. He developed the possibilities of such diplomatic action
and his ideas of how he imagined the conclusion of such a pact.
I remember clearly that Adolf Hitler closed the conversation
with the words, ‘Ribbentrop, why shouldn’t we be able to manage
that, when we have managed so many things?’
“My husband presented his ideas with great _élan_ and with great
impressiveness. After he had finished I noticed that Adolf
Hitler, who had received my husband’s statements without
pertinent remarks, seemed to be a little absent-minded, so that
I had the impression that my husband’s statements had not made
any convincing impression.”
I have offered this affidavit so as to prove that at that time
Ribbentrop was still eager to avoid a conflict with Russia.
This ends the presentation of the documents on behalf of the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, could you inform us how far you have been able
to get with Dr. Thoma in connection with his documents, that is, the
Rosenberg documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the American delegation, the Soviet,
and the French are dealing with Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Mr. Dodd can tell us.
MR. DODD: Captain Krieger of our staff, Your Honor, has been in
consultation with Dr. Thoma and will continue to be, in an effort to
follow the procedures laid out by the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: While on that subject, if I may, I would like to inform the
Court that we have concluded our conversations with Dr. Dix, and we are,
I think it fair to say, at some differences. I think it would be
necessary to have a hearing by the Court on these matters that we do not
agree on. However, we have agreed to a considerable number of Schacht
items.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to insure is that there shall be no
delay at the end of Kaltenbrunner’s case with reference to Rosenberg’s
case. And as I understand it, the documents in the Rosenberg case, which
it has been suggested we might have to consider, are very numerous; and
the sooner the Tribunal gets to them the better.
MR. DODD: We shall be available at all times to talk with Dr. Thoma and
move right along—in the evening if he cares to do it.
THE PRESIDENT: It might possibly be desirable, it seems to me, to have
the documents which have been translated presented to the Tribunal
before the others; I mean to say not have them all together, because
there are, no doubt, various volumes.
MR. DODD: There are three so far; I understand there will be more. But
we will press it and continue to talk with Dr. Thoma, and just as soon
as possible on the first book we will be prepared to come before the
Court for a hearing.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, wouldn’t the best thing be for you to
submit the volumes which have been translated to the Court so that they
can consider them beforehand as we did with Dr. Horn’s books?
DR. THOMA: Yes, My Lord, that is possible. The documents have already
been processed. With reference to my Document Books Number 2 and 3, I
have discussed them with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, and we came to an
agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well you could specify that agreement in the books.
I suppose you could show which documents you were prepared to withdraw.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, as soon as possible you will let the General
Secretary have those books, showing the agreement which you have made
with Captain Krieger; is that right?
DR. THOMA: But I do want to point out that I have come to an agreement
with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, only with reference to Books 2 and 3
and that refers only to the Einsatzstab and the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories.
I have not yet come to an agreement regarding the philosophy and
writings of Rosenberg, but I shall do that in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: No; one—is that in Book 1?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you are unable to come to an agreement, you can
specify that, and we will consider those matters. Possibly you could
take some time with Captain Krieger—take time off from Court—in order
to come to an agreement with reference to Book 1 and with reference to
the other books.
How many more books have you got?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Four more?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see. So there is only one more to be
translated.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH DAY
Thursday, 11 April 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Sauter for the Defendant Funk.
Mr. President, on Saturday last, when sickness prevented me from
attending the session, the question came up in which sequence the
defense for the Defendants Dr. Funk and Dr. Schacht should be conducted,
and the President has expressed the wish to hear my statement on the
subject as soon as possible. I have discussed the matter with my client
and the defense counsel for Dr. Schacht and I agree to and suggest that
the defense for the Defendant Dr. Schacht come first and that the case
of the Defendant Funk, for reasons of suitability, should follow after
the evidence for the Defendant Schacht has been completed. For the
information of the Tribunal I wanted to inform you of that, Mr.
President. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: If Your Honors please, I should like to call the attention of
the Tribunal to the fact with respect to the documents for the Defendant
Rosenberg, we have finished our conversations with Dr. Thoma on a number
of matters which will require a hearing before the Tribunal. We were not
able to agree on a number of them and, as I said yesterday, we are
prepared to be heard on the applications of Dr. Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will arrange a time for that. Now, Dr.
Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I am now beginning the defense by
presenting evidence in the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I need
not emphasize how extraordinarily difficult this defense is, considering
the unusual severity of the charges brought against him. I intend to
present the evidence in the following way: With the permission of the
Tribunal, I shall read two small documents first from the short document
book; then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call the
defendant to the witness stand and after that I shall examine one or two
witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that that course would be appropriate
but I wanted to draw your attention...
Dr. Kauffmann, there were four witnesses who were called for the
Prosecution, Ohlendorf, Höllriegel, and Wisliceny—you asked for leave
at an earlier stage to cross-examine witnesses called for the
Prosecution, Ohlendorf, Höllriegel, Wisliceny, and Schellenberg; and the
Tribunal then ordered that they might be recalled for cross-examination
but that they must be called before your witnesses. Therefore, the
Tribunal wants to know whether you wish to call any of those for
cross-examination. You do not?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No, Mr. President, I do not wish to call Ohlendorf,
Wisliceny, Höllriegel, or Schellenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now read these two documents? To begin with there
is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Mildner in the document book. I am
asking that notice be taken of it. It is Document Kaltenbrunner-1. I am
now reading:
“Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Mildner, at present in
prison in Nuremberg, make the following affidavit in answer to
the questions put to me by attorney Dr. Kauffmann for
presentation to the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg:
“Question Number 1: Give particulars of your career.
“Answer: I was entrusted with certain tasks of the Gestapo for
about 10 years. From 1938 to 1945 I was subordinate to Amt IV,
which is the Gestapo of the Reich Main Security Office in
Berlin. I was in the RSHA in Berlin itself, for only about three
months, that is to say, from March to June 1944. The rest of the
time I was mostly chief of provincial branches of the Gestapo.
“Question Number 2: What can you say in regard to
Kaltenbrunner’s personality?
“Answer: From my own knowledge I can confirm the following: I
know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner personally. In his private life
he was beyond reproach. In my opinion his promotion from Higher
SS and Police Leader to Chief of the Security Police and the SD
was due to the fact that Himmler, in June 1942, after the death
of Heydrich, his chief rival, would suffer no man beside or
under him who might have endangered his position. The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner was, no doubt, the least dangerous man for
Himmler. Kaltenbrunner had no ambition to gain influence by
special deeds and eventually to push Himmler aside. There was no
question of lust for power in his case. It is wrong to call him
the little Himmler.
“Question Number 3: What attitude did Kaltenbrunner adopt toward
Amt IV (Gestapo)?
“Answer: I know of no specific limitation of the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner’s power with regard to the offices which were
under the RSHA. On the other hand, I can say that Müller, the
Chief of Amt IV, acted independently by virtue of his long
experience and did not give to anyone, not even the chiefs of
the other offices of the RSHA, any insight into his tasks and
methods of his Amt IV. He had, after all, immediate protection
from Himmler.
“Question Number 4: Did you ever see any executive orders by
Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: I have never seen any original order—that is to say,
something signed in handwriting—from the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner. I know quite well that orders for protective
custody bore facsimile signatures or typewritten signatures.
This was a routine initiated during Heydrich’s time.
“Question Number 5: Did orders for executions rest in
Kaltenbrunner’s or Himmler’s hands? Who was responsible for the
setting up and running of concentration camps?
“Answer: I know that execution orders rested in Himmler’s hands.
So far as I know no other officials of the RSHA could issue such
orders without his permission. I know, furthermore, that
concentration camps were run by a special main department,
namely, the SS Main Office for Economy and Administration, the
chief of which was Pohl. The concentration camps had nothing to
do with the RSHA. This applies to the whole administration,
food, treatment, camp regulations, _et cetera_. The inspector of
concentration camps was Glücks. The official channels were
therefore: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks, camp commandant.
“Question Number 6: Did Kaltenbrunner order any of the
concentration camps to be evacuated?
“Answer: It is not known to me that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
had issued any orders regarding the evacuation of concentration
camps.
“Question Number 7: Did Kaltenbrunner issue the order to arrest
all Danish citizens of Jewish religion and transport them to the
concentration camp at Theresienstadt?
“Answer: No. The reason why I can answer this question exactly
is because I, myself, as a member of the Gestapo, was concerned
with this matter in Denmark in September 1943. The Chief of the
Security Police and the SD had received the order in September
1943 to arrest all Danish Jews and transport them to
Theresienstadt. I flew to Berlin to have this order canceled.
Shortly afterwards an order of Himmler arrived in Denmark
according to which the anti-Jewish action was to be carried out.
Kaltenbrunner, therefore, did not issue the order. I did not
speak to him; in fact he was not even in Berlin.
“Read and found correct.
“Nuremberg, 29 March 1946; signed, Dr. Mildner.”
Then follows the certification.
The next affidavit comes from Dr. Höttl.
MR. DODD: We are faced with a new problem. I do not think this question
has arisen heretofore. The Prosecution submitted a cross-interrogatory
to this man Dr. Mildner, and we are not quite certain as to just how we
should proceed. Should we now offer our cross-interrogation, or at a
later stage?
THE PRESIDENT: We think you should read it now.
MR. DODD: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I just say one thing about that. This
is the first time that I hear that the Prosecution have also put
questions which have been answered by the same witness. I think this is
the first case of this kind which has been put before the Tribunal.
Would it not have been appropriate to have these answers communicated to
me, since I have put my affidavit at the disposal of the Prosecution a
very long time ago?
THE PRESIDENT: They certainly should be. The Tribunal thinks they
certainly should have been communicated to you at the same time that
they were received.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is the answer to be read nevertheless? I would rather
like to raise formal objection to that and ask the Tribunal for a
decision.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, why were these not submitted to Dr. Kauffmann?
MR. DODD: This cross-affidavit and interrogatory was taken only
yesterday, and the material just was not ready until this morning. We
regret that, and had it been ready it would, of course, have been turned
over to him. If he would like to have some time to look it over, we, of
course, would not object.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, in the circumstances we will postpone the
reading of these cross-interrogatories in order that you may consider
them, and, if you think it right, you may object to any of the questions
or answers and we will then consider that matter.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
May I now read the second and last document:
“Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the
following affidavit in answer to the questions put to me by
attorney Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International
Military Tribunal.”
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a number to this document?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, Document Kaltenbrunner-2.
“Question Number 1: Give details about yourself. What was your
official position in the SD? Where did you know Dr.
Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: I was born on 19 March 1915, in Vienna; by profession,
a historian. My occupation up to the time of the German collapse
was that of a sub-department chief in Amt VI, Foreign
Intelligence Department, of the RSHA. After Austria’s Anschluss
in 1938, I voluntarily joined the SD. Coming from the National
Catholic Youth Movement, I made it my aim to achieve a moderate
political course for my country.
“I made the acquaintance of Kaltenbrunner in 1938; he knew that
the above was my aim.
“In 1941, on personal orders of Heydrich, I was called before
the SS and Police Court for having religious ties and for lack
of political and ideological reliability, and I had to join the
ranks as an ordinary private. After Heydrich’s death I was
pardoned and, at the beginning of 1943, I was detailed to the
office of Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA. Here I was
in charge of matters relating to the Vatican, as well as of
matters relating to some states in the Balkans.
“When Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA at the
beginning of 1943, I was continually in touch with him at work,
particularly since he was endeavoring to draw the group of
Austrians in the RSHA nearer to him.
“Question Number 2: Give an estimate of the numbers involved at
the Main Office of the RSHA in Berlin.
“Answer: The Main Office in Berlin, Amt IV (Gestapo) had
approximately 1,500 members; Amt V (Criminal Police) 1,200; Amt
III and Amt VI (intelligence service at home and abroad) 300 to
400 each.
“Question Number 3: What is understood by SD and what were its
tasks?
“Answer: Heydrich organized the so-called Sicherheitsdienst
(known as the SD) in 1932. Its task was to give to the highest
German authorities and the individual Reich ministries,
information on all events at home and abroad.
“The SD was purely an information service and had no sort of
executive authority. Only individual persons belonging to the SD
were drafted to the so-called special action commands
(Einsatzkommandos) in the East. They thereby assumed executive
positions, and they resigned from the SD during that period.
There were special action groups and special action commands of
the Security Police and the SD up to the last; also in Africa,
and in Hungary, and Czechoslovakia even up to 1944. These
Kommandos had nothing to do with executions. Their tasks had in
the meantime assumed the nature of general security police
matters. As far as I know, executions were carried out only in
Russia, due to the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ by Hitler.
Whether these Kommandos stopped or continued their activity
after Kaltenbrunner was named Chief of the RSHA, I do not know.
“Question Number 4: Do you know about the ‘Eichmann Operation’
to exterminate the Jews?
“Answer: I learned details of the Eichmann Operation only at the
end of August 1944. At that time Eichmann himself gave me
detailed information. Eichmann explained, among other things,
that the whole action was a special Reich secret and was known
to only very few people. The total number of members of this
Kommando, in my opinion, could hardly have exceeded 100.
“Question Number 5: What do you know about the relations between
Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: I know nothing about the official relations between the
two. However, Eichmann may well have had no direct official
contact with Kaltenbrunner. He often asked me to arrange a
meeting with Kaltenbrunner for him. Kaltenbrunner always
refused.
“Question Number 6: What was the relationship between
Kaltenbrunner and Müller, the Chief of the Secret State Police
(Gestapo)?
“Answer: I cannot give any details about their official
relations. It is certain, however, that Müller acted quite
independently. He had gained great experience in Secret State
Police matters over a period of many years. Himmler thought a
great deal of him. Kaltenbrunner did not think very much of him.
Kaltenbrunner had neither technical schooling in police problems
nor any interest in them. The intelligence service took up the
main part of his attention and all his interest, especially
insofar as it concerned foreign countries.
“Question Number 7: Who was in charge of the concentration
camps?
“Answer: The SS Main Office for Economy and Administration had
sole charge of the concentration camps; that is, not the RSHA,
and therefore not Kaltenbrunner. He, consequently, had no power
to give orders and no competency in this sphere. According to my
opinion of him as a man, Kaltenbrunner certainly did not approve
of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. I do not
know whether he knew about them.
“Question Number 8: Did Kaltenbrunner issue or transmit an order
according to which enemy aviators who made forced landings were
to be given no protection in the event of lynch justice being
carried out by the population?
“Answer: No, I never heard about anything of the kind from
Kaltenbrunner, although I was with him a great deal. As far as I
can remember, however, Himmler issued an order of this kind.
“Question Number 9: Did Kaltenbrunner issue orders that Jews
were to be killed?
“Answer: No, he never issued such orders, and in my opinion, he
could not issue such orders on his own authority. In my opinion
he was opposed to Hitler and Himmler on this question, that is,
the physical extermination of European Jewry.
“Question Number 10: What church policy did Kaltenbrunner
pursue?
“Answer: As adviser on Vatican matters, I often had the
opportunity of speaking to him officially on this subject. He
immediately supported my suggestion, made to Hitler in the
spring of 1943, that a change in church policy should be
effected so that the Vatican could be won over as a peace
negotiator on this basis. Kaltenbrunner had no success with
Hitler, as Himmler opposed him violently. Baron Von Weizsäcker,
German Ambassador to the Holy See with whom I discussed the
matter, failed likewise in his efforts, the result of which was
that Bormann had an eye kept on him.
“Question Number 11: Did Kaltenbrunner intervene in foreign
policy in the interest of peace?
“Answer: Yes; in the Hungarian question, for example. When, in
March 1944, the German troops occupied Hungary, he succeeded in
persuading Hitler to be moderate and to prevent Romanian and
Slovak units from marching in as planned. Due to his support, I
was able to prevent a National Socialist government from being
formed in Hungary as planned, for another 6 months.”
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kauffmann, are you going to call the defendant?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have committed a small oversight. I did
not read Page 5 of my document book. Those are Questions 12 and 13 of
the affidavit, which I, inadvertently, did not read. I wish to apologize
and ask your permission to finish it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I continue on Page 5:
“Kaltenbrunner wanted the old Austria-Hungary to be
re-established on a federative basis. Since 1943 I had told
Kaltenbrunner that Germany must endeavor to end the war by a
peace at any price. I had informed him about my connection with
an American office in Lisbon. I also informed Kaltenbrunner that
I had recently made a contact with an American office in a
neutral country through the Austrian resistance movement. He
also declared his willingness to travel to Switzerland with me
and start personal negotiations with an American representative
in order to avoid further senseless bloodshed.
“Question Number 12: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner instructed
the Commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the
camp to the approaching troops?
“Answer: It is correct that Kaltenbrunner did give such an
order. He dictated it in my presence, to be forwarded to the
Camp Commandant.
“Question Number 13: Can you say something briefly about
Kaltenbrunner’s personality?
“Answer: Kaltenbrunner was a man completely different from
Himmler or Heydrich. He was therefore by conviction strongly
opposed to both of them. He was appointed Chief of the RSHA, in
my opinion, because Himmler did not want to run the risk of
having a rival like Heydrich. It would be wrong to call him
‘little Himmler.’ In my opinion, he was never in complete
control of the large office of the RSHA and, being very little
interested in police and executive tasks, he occupied himself
preponderantly with the intelligence service and with exerting
influence on general policy. This he regarded as his particular
sphere.”
This is followed by signature, date, and certification.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any more documents?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you wish to call the defendant?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER (Defendant): Ernst Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty
and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and
add nothing—so help me God.”
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During the last 2 years of the war, since 1943, you have
been the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Chief
of the Reich Security Main Office, the RSHA. You are aware, of course,
that you are under extremely serious charges. The Prosecution charge you
with having committed Crimes against Peace, and with having
intellectually aided and abetted or participated in the crimes against
the law of war and against humanity, and finally, the Prosecution
connect your name with the Gestapo terror and the atrocities of the
concentration camps. I now ask you, do you assume responsibility for the
Counts charged as outlined and which are known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: In the first place, I should like to state to the
Tribunal that I am fully aware of the serious character of the charges
against me. I know the hatred of the world is directed against me; that
I—particularly since Himmler, Müller, and Pohl are no longer
alive—must here, alone, give an account to the world and the Tribunal.
I realize that I shall have to tell the truth in this courtroom, in
order to enable the Court and the world to fully recognize and
understand what has been going on in Germany during this war and to
judge it with fairness.
In 1943—that is to say, 2 years before the ending of this war—I was
called into an office, which fact I shall explain in detail later on.
Right at the beginning, I would like to state that I assume
responsibility for every wrong that was committed within the scope of
this office since I was appointed Chief of the RSHA and as far as it
happened under my actual control, which means that I knew about it or
was required to know about it.
May I ask permission for my defense counsel to put questions to me so as
to direct my line of thought?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly describe, in rough outlines, your career
until you entered public life, and Austrian politics, that is until
about 1934.
KALTENBRUNNER: I was born in 1903. My father and my grandfather were
lawyers of repute; for the rest I am a descendant of farmers and
scythemakers. My mother is of modest descent. She was adopted by the
Belgian Ambassador to Romania and lived there for 25 years. During my
childhood, which I spent in the country with a family which took very
good care of me, I enjoyed on the one hand the best education and on the
other hand I became familiar with the life of the simple people. I
attended secondary school, high school, graduated, and in 1921 went to
Graz University. First I studied chemico-technical sciences at the
Institute of Technology and later on, when my father returned from the
war seriously ill and when the possibility arose that I might have to
take over his solicitor’s practice, I studied law. I completed these
studies with the degree of Doctor of Law and Political Science in 1926.
I had a hard time. I had to earn my own living and the expenses for my
studies. I had to work while I studied and for 2 years I worked as a
coal miner during the night shift; and I have to thank my fate that thus
I got to know the German workman much better than people usually do.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you be slightly more brief? Please get as quickly
as possible to the period after 1934.
KALTENBRUNNER: After leaving the University I had to complete 7 or 8
years work as a candidate for the bar examination in accordance with the
Austrian law, of which I spent one year in court as assistant and the
rest of the time in lawyers’ offices in Salzburg and Linz.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for one moment with a question. Is
it correct that in 1932 you became a member of the Party?
KALTENBRUNNER: I became a member of the Party in 1932 after I had
belonged for several years to the Non-Partisan Movement for the
Protection of the Austrian Homeland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you join the SS in that same year?
KALTENBRUNNER: I think it was at the end of 1932 or maybe at the
beginning of 1933.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that even before 1933, as maintained by the
Prosecution, you were public speaker of a Gau and legal adviser of an SS
sector?
KALTENBRUNNER: That statement requires clarification. It is true that I
made speeches in my own home province, the Gau Upper Austria, at
National Socialist meetings but primarily—or rather exclusively—to
promote the Anschluss movement. I was a legal adviser just as any other
lawyer of any party who, at that period of economic emergency, was
willing to give legal information and advice free of charge for some
hours at the end of the day to the needy, who in this case were National
Socialists.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that later, in 1934, the Dollfuss Government
had you arrested and that you, together with other leading National
Socialists, were sent to the Kaisersteinbruch Concentration Camp? What
was the cause for that?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is correct. I think that with regard to this point I
must briefly describe the political situation in Austria at the time.
The Government was in the hands of a group of men who had very few
followers among the people. There were two large groups of size which
did not participate in the Government; the first being the leftist
group, that is, the Social Democrats and Austro-Marxists, and the second
being the National Socialists, which was at that time a very small
group. The Government, then, did put not only the National Socialists
but also Social Democrats and Communists into their detention camps in
order to eliminate any political strife originating from meetings or
demonstrations. I was one of those National Socialists who were arrested
at that time, whose number was approximately 1,800.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have another conflict with them? And were you
eventually subjected to a trial for conspiracy against the Government
and thereupon discharged from the custody under which you had been
placed? Give in a few sentences the reasons for this procedure.
KALTENBRUNNER: This was considerably later. I was arrested in May 1935.
I should say first of all that in the meantime the National Socialist
attempt at revolt had taken place in Austria in July 1934. This attempt
at revolt, which unfortunately also included the murder of Dollfuss, was
defeated and avenged by most severe measures against a large number of
National Socialists. One particularly severe measure was the law by
which many thousands of National Socialists lost their jobs or
professional license and the necessity arose to bring about a
pacification, I should say a mitigation in principles of the Government
policy. That was primarily done by two men: Langot, then the Chief
Deputy of Upper Austria, and Reinthaller, a farmer and engineer. That
appeasement action started at the end of 1934 in September or October,
and I was invited to join that action.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please, if possible, get to the period of 1938,
in rough outlines?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was in no way implicated in this attempted revolt of
July 1934 and that is why I was invited to join in that appeasement
action. Within that program the Government themselves demanded that
certain men should maintain connections with the Party leaders, with the
SA, SS, and all organizations of the then forbidden movement. With the
knowledge and consent of the Government and the proper police
departments, I took up the connection with the SS.
In May 1935 I was arrested, suspected of establishing an illegal
connection with the SS and of being engaged in high treason activity. I
remained in custody for 6 months and was arraigned before the military
tribunal in Wels on a charge of high treason. I was, however, acquitted
of this crime since the Government themselves admitted that this
assignment had been granted to me with their knowledge. All that was
left over was a minor sentence for conspiracy which, however, was served
by my custody.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How did you participate in the Austrian revolution which
occurred in March 1938 and how did the SS participate?
KALTENBRUNNER: Shortly after my activities in connection with the
Reinthaller-Langot appeasement action, I got in touch first with circles
of the Anschluss movement clubs and second with those circles whose aim
it was to improve conditions in Austria peacefully, by an evolutionary
movement and development, and, on the other hand, to enlarge the
Anschluss movement so as to win over the government themselves to that
idea.
In 1937 and 1938 I attempted to come into closer personal contact with
Seyss-Inquart, later Minister, and I completely adopted his political
conceptions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you of the opinion that the plebiscite in Austria in
April 1938 corresponded with the wish of the nation?
KALTENBRUNNER: The plebiscite of 10 April 1938 was completely in
accordance with the will of the Austrian population. The result of 99.73
percent for Anschluss to the German Reich was perfectly genuine.
DR. KAUFFMANN: On the occasion of the Anschluss is it right that you
were promoted to SS Brigadeführer and leader of an SS sector?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but first I would like to add the following to the
question of the Anschluss:
The representation and opinion of the Prosecution are completely
incorrect when they think that National Socialism in Austria at that
time could in any way be compared with the development which had already
taken place in Germany. The development of Austrian National Socialism
was on the contrary completely different. The starting point was the
abnormal economic depression in Austria and beyond that the Anschluss
movement, and finally National Socialism made the Anschluss come true.
This course, from economic depression via Anschluss movement to National
Socialism, was the road of nearly all National Socialists, and the
ideology of the Party program of the time was in no way responsible.
I believe this has to be taken for granted and I believe I also ought to
say it first, that the Anschluss movement in Austria was backed by the
people; the fact that the plebiscite in the various provinces, like the
Tyrol or Salzburg, had already in previous years—I believe from 1925 to
1928—shown a result of more than 90 percent of the votes in favor of
the Anschluss should now be taken into consideration.
Back in 1928 the National Council of Austria and the Austrian Federal
Council signed the decree of the National Council of the year 1918 which
said that both these assemblies had resolved to join the Reich; and they
did not swerve from that resolution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, I do not think you need go into these
subjects as to reasons why they were in favor of the Anschluss in such
detail. Will you try to confine the witness to less detail and get on to
the material period?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I thought that the defendant was being held responsible
for his participation in the change of regime. Therefore I wanted to
have at least a few sentences said about that before this Tribunal, but
I am now prepared to change the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was giving us the figures in particular
plebiscites long before the Anschluss, and that seems to be quite
irrelevant detail.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, in September 1938, you were promoted to SS
Gruppenführer; is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. After the ensuing Anschluss I had to take over the
leadership of the General SS in Austria, namely, the SS Main Sector
Danube. At that time I had been promoted to brigade leader without going
exactly through the preceding ranks of SS leaders. And I think it was in
September that I was appointed Gruppenführer, so that my rank was made
the same as that of all the other main SS sector leaders in the entire
Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I question you regarding your further career in the
SS? Were you in 1941 appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria?
KALTENBRUNNER: In March 1938 I became a member of the Austrian
Government; that is, I had to take over the position of State Secretary
for Security in Austria, which was under the Ministry of the Interior.
That Austrian Government was dissolved in 1941; that is to say, their
activity was discontinued in favor of such bodies of administration
which prevailed in the Reich; consequently, the Office of State
Secretary for Security was also dissolved, and in order to retain me at
the same level in the budget, I was appointed Higher SS and Police
Leader, I think in July 1941.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And on 30 January 1943 you were appointed Chief of the
Security Police and the SD, that is, of the so-called Reich Security
Main Office. How did that appointment come about? Did you have
connections with Himmler? What was said between you and Himmler on the
occasion of your appointment?
KALTENBRUNNER: I must describe briefly my activities from 1941 to 1943,
that is, 2 years, so as to make it clear why I was called to Berlin.
The Prosecution charge that I had led the Security Police already in
Austria. In that respect the Prosecution are mistaken.
The State Police and the Criminal Police as well as the Security Service
in Austria were directed centrally from Berlin and were completely
removed from the power of Seyss-Inquart, then the responsible Minister,
and his deputy, Kaltenbrunner. My activity as Higher SS and Police
Leader in Austria—unlike the activity of the same men in the Reich—was
therefore limited merely to the task of representing or leading the
General SS, which in no way took up all my time.
During these 2 years I therefore followed out my intentions concerning
political activity and developed a rather large political intelligence
service radiating from Austria toward the southeast. I did that because,
in the first place, I regretted that the Reich did not make use of at
least the political and the economic resources, of all the resources
which Austria could have put at the disposal of the Reich, and because
the Reich with unequalled shortsightedness did not fall back upon
Austria’s most significant mission as an intermediary with the
Southeast. Thus, my reports met with increased interest in Berlin, and
since Himmler was continuously reproached by Hitler that his
intelligence service, which was run by Heydrich in the Reich, did not
furnish adequate reports on political results, Himmler, 8 months after
Heydrich’s death, felt obliged to look for a man who could free him from
Hitler’s reproaches that he had no intelligence service worth
mentioning.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did you discuss with Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: In December 1942 he ordered me to come to Berchtesgaden,
where he resided at the time, because the Führer’s headquarters were in
the neighborhood, on the Obersalzberg. He told me first of Hitler’s
reproaches and demanded that I create a central intelligence service in
the Reich. We had a lengthy discussion on this subject with reference to
my reporting activity of the previous years. He was then of the opinion
that the best solution would be if I were to take over the Reich
Security Main Office as a transition basis for the creation of such an
intelligence service. I refused to do that, giving detailed reasons,
namely, that I had maintained a watching and critical attitude in
Austria toward the over-all development in the Reich, especially the
inner political development. I explained to Himmler in detail why the
Germans in Austria were disappointed and where I saw dangers that the
same Austrians, who 4 years ago had turned with enthusiasm to the Reich,
would become tired of the Reich. I have...
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you for just one moment. It is correct,
of course, that you were made the Chief of the Reich Security Main
Office. Are you trying to say that you did not take over the executive
powers?
KALTENBRUNNER: I am coming to that immediately. But, I must now describe
that first conference with Himmler; the second one took place 2 weeks
later. On that occasion I was given the order; I am referring to the
first order.
But I should like to state right now—and this is drawn like a red
thread through my entire career to the last days of the war—that even
then I explained to Himmler on which essential points I differed with
National Socialism as to the home policy of the Reich, the foreign
policy, the ideology, and the violations of law by the Government
themselves. I declared to him, specifically, that the administration in
the Reich was too centralized; that Austria was violently criticizing
that centralized system, particularly since a federative status had been
granted to other countries, such as Bavaria. I told him that the
creation of a new German criminal law, the way it was attempted, was
wrong, and that German criminal law was casuistic. The Austrian criminal
law, based on a tradition of more than one hundred years, had proved to
be the best and had also been recognized abroad. I explained to him that
the concepts of protective custody and of concentration camps were not
approved of in Austria, but that every man in Austria wanted to be tried
before a court of law.
I explained to him that anti-Semitism in Austria had developed in a
completely different way and also required a different handling. No one
in Austria, I said, had ever thought of going beyond the limits of
anti-Semitism as laid down in the Party program. I also said that there
was hardly any understanding in Austria for the fact that the Nuremberg
Laws went beyond the Party program in this respect. In Austria, since
1934, there had been a peaceful, regulated policy to allow the Jews to
emigrate. Any personal or physical persecution of Jews was completely
unnecessary. I am referring to a document, which is somewhere in the
court record. It is a report from the Chief of Police in Vienna, dated,
I believe, December 1939, which proves in accordance with statistics
that between 1934 and 1939, I think, of a total of 200,000 Jews more
than half had emigrated to foreign countries. Those were the problems
which I discussed at that time...
DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did Himmler tell you?
KALTENBRUNNER: And I told Himmler at that time that he knew very well
that I had not only no training in police matters at all, but that all
my activity up to then had been in the field of political intelligence
work, and that therefore, when taking over the Reich Security Main
Office I did not only refuse to have anything to do with such executive
offices as the Gestapo and the criminal police, but that my task to
which he was appointing me, namely to set up and cultivate an
intelligence service, would in fact be impeded by that. I also said that
I was not only extremely different from Heydrich personally but that
also material differences existed insofar as Heydrich was an expert in
police matters, whereas I was not, and that the policy with which he,
Himmler, and Heydrich had already discredited the Reich could not be
carried on by me. My name, my honor, and my family were too sacred to me
for that.
He reassured me in this respect by saying:
“You know that in June 1942 Heydrich was assassinated and that
I, myself, since his death”—and this was about 6 or 7 months
after Heydrich’s death—“have been handling his entire office
myself. This is to continue insofar that I”—this means
Himmler—“will retain the Executive Offices for myself in the
future. For this purpose I have at my disposal my well-trained
experts, Müller and Nebe. You will not have to concern yourself
with it. You take over the Intelligence Service, that is Amt III
and Amt VI, as the transition basis for your Intelligence
Service.”
I told him at that time that an intelligence service could not be built
up on the SD alone. An intelligence service which until that time had
been so narrow-minded because of Heydrich, and which had been forced
more and more into executive work, is _a priori_ unfit to search for
intelligence material.
Secondly, I told him an intelligence service ought to be smaller and, in
particular, I considered it madness to have political and military
intelligence separated from each other. No country in the whole world
except Germany and France has adopted a two-division set-up for an
intelligence service. I therefore demanded from him that he first
procure a Führer order on the strength of which the intelligence system
of the Armed Forces, which rested in the OKW counterintelligence office
(Amt Abwehr), should be united with the SD and should be furnished a new
body of personnel, which ought to be selected and carefully screened...
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for a moment. Can you tell me in
one sentence whether that unification which you just mentioned took
place?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it did.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With Amt VI?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes...
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then another question...
KALTENBRUNNER: [_Continuing._] The union was achieved by an order of
Hitler dated 14 or 15 February 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am asking you: After what you have just explained,
did Himmler relieve you of the executive tasks and was it made known to
your section chiefs and others within the Reich Security Main Office
that you had been so relieved? Did this exemption of executive powers
become apparent outside the office; if so, how?
KALTENBRUNNER: After this conference with Hitler in December 1942, he
discharged me because I did not want to take over the Reich Security
Main Office under those conditions which he had offered to me, namely,
that the executive departments should be managed by himself as
previously. He was so angry with me that he did not give me his hand and
made me aware of his indignation in various other ways during the
subsequent weeks. Toward the middle of January, the 16th or 18th, I was
ordered by telegram to report to headquarters, which in the meantime had
been transferred to East Prussia. I assumed that I was to get a post at
the front because I had asked him for such a post. I went to
headquarters with complete front equipment because I thought I had
finally to expect the same fate that had been the fate of my brothers
and of my other male relatives. But I was wrong. He told me:
“I have talked to the Führer and the Führer believes that the
centralization and reorganization of the Intelligence Service is
the right thing to do. He will initiate the necessary
negotiations with the Armed Forces, and you will have to
organize and build up this Intelligence Service. It still holds
that I, with Müller and Nebe, will have direct charge of the
executive offices.”
If you ask me now whether this limitation must have become apparent at
once outside of the office, I have to answer that it was not publicized.
Therefore, formally the Prosecution are right in charging me: “As far as
the outside world is concerned, you never drew a demarcation line.” To
that I can say only that I believed I could rely on the words of my then
superior. He had stated it to me in the presence of Nebe and Müller and
had given them the personal order to communicate with him directly and
to report to him and receive the orders from him directly, just as it
had been done for the 8 months since Heydrich’s death.
I am stating here emphatically that the special assignments which had
been given to Heydrich, such as, for instance, the assignment with
regard to the final solution of the Jewish problem, were not only not
known to me at the time but were not taken over by me. Nominally I was
the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. As such, I considered the
Intelligence Service and the reorganization of this Intelligence Service
my proper sphere, as I have said before. The directives were given by
Himmler, but in State Police and Criminal Police matters things were
often done, as I found out very much later, in the name of the Chief of
the Reich Security Main Office, that is, in my name, without my knowing
of or seeing these orders when they were issued.
The chiefs of the Gestapo office and the Criminal Police office
sometimes carried out these orders from Himmler, as I said, in such a
way that they also signed my name as Chief of the Reich Security Main
Office and, as I probably might have to state in detail later, they so
continued routine habits which prevailed during Heydrich’s time, who
united all executive powers in his hand and who could delegate the
respective powers to Müller and Nebe. But I never had those powers from
the beginning, and therefore I could never delegate any partial powers.
Perhaps I ought to supplement the declaration of my responsibility in
this respect by saying that possibly I have not taken the necessary care
to make it clear that no order of the State Police or the Criminal
Police should bear my name. That I did not concern myself with that
sufficiently is Himmler’s fault but probably also my fault.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I draw your attention to the testimony given by
Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III, on 3 January 1946, here in court. I am
putting this testimony to you briefly, and will you please make your
comment. This testimony refers to the question of the executive power.
The witness Ohlendorf said, in reply to my question:
“If you ask the question whether Kaltenbrunner could bring about
executive actions I must answer in the affirmative. If you then
name Müller and Himmler, to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, then
I must point out that according to the organization of the Reich
Security Main Office Müller was the subordinate of
Kaltenbrunner, and consequently orders from Himmler to Müller
were also orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was obliged to
inform Kaltenbrunner of them.”
And then he goes on to say:
“I can say that I know absolutely that”—I refer to the
expression that often came up, namely—“‘to the last
washerwoman’ Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. As
to whether or not Kaltenbrunner had no authority at all in this
regard, I can make no statement.”
I am asking you now: Are the essential points of Ohlendorf’s testimony
correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It needs clarification. He is right insofar as nothing in
the construction, or rather organization of the Reich Security Main
Office had changed since Heydrich’s time. Therefore he could immediately
assume that there was an official channel Himmler-Kaltenbrunner-Müller.
But during the conferences, that is, when Himmler gave orders, it was
specifically not the case. And to the other remark, that Himmler
reserved for himself the decision to the last washerwoman, that proves
that the situation actually had changed insofar as, contrary to that of
Heydrich’s time, I, the medium between Himmler and Müller, was not
active, so that orders from Himmler went immediately to Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to the individual charges preferred by
the Prosecution and first submit to you a document for your statement.
It is the Document L-38, Exhibit USA-517. It is now Kaltenbrunner-3.
This deals with the charge preferred against Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, has this already got an exhibit number?
You do not want to give it another exhibit number.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well. If it is not necessary I shall be glad to drop
that.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The question here is, first, whether all
signed orders for protective custody bore your name either in facsimile
or typewritten; and the second question is whether you have given such
orders—that means whether these orders are authentic; and further, in
case both these questions are to be answered in the negative, whether
you had knowledge of these orders. Please, will you comment on this
document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I must say that not once in my whole life did I ever see
or sign a single protective custody order. During the interrogations
before the Trial a number of protective custody orders which bear my
name were put before me when I was being questioned. Every one of these
protective custody orders had this signature, that is, my name, either
typewritten or in teletype, and I think in one or two cases it was a
facsimile.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You will admit that, naturally, this statement of yours
is not very credible. It is a monstrosity that the office chief should
not know that such orders were signed with his name. How do you explain
this fact, a fact which appears from the documents which bear your
signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had not finished my explanation. I stated that this
signature “Kaltenbrunner” on protective custody orders can only have
come about through the fact that the office chief, Müller, signed the
name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office on these protective
custody orders, as he had done during Heydrich’s time when he was
allowed to do so, and that in addition he instructed his sections, for
instance, the protective custody section. Accordingly quite obviously he
continued to do so during my time, because otherwise these orders could
not have been put before me now. But he has never informed me of this
and he never had authority from me to do this. To the contrary, this was
out of the question and, on the other hand, superfluous, because he was
immediately under Himmler and he had authority from Himmler, so that he
just as well might have written “Himmler” or “By order of Himmler” or
“For Himmler.” I admit that this remains a fact about which the Tribunal
will not believe me, but nevertheless it was so and Himmler never gave
me a cause to define my attitude in this respect, since he had told me
that I was not to carry out these executive tasks.
DR. KAUFFMANN: This means you are trying to say that the use of your
signature was in fact a misuse?
KALTENBRUNNER: Müller did not have authority to use it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it known to you that protective custody was possible
at all, that it was admissible, and that it has been carried out very
often?
KALTENBRUNNER: As I stated, I discussed the concept “protective custody”
with Himmler as early as 1942. But I think even before that, already on
two occasions in detail, I have had correspondence about this concept
once with him and once with Thierack; I consider protective custody as
it was handled in the German Reich as being a necessity in the interests
of the State, or rather a measure which was justified by the war, only
in a small number of cases. Apart from that, I have declared myself
against and protested against this concept and against the application
of any protective custody as a matter of principle, and have often used
profound legal historical arguments as reasons. On several occasions I
had reported on that subject to Himmler and also to Hitler. I have, in a
meeting of public prosecutors—I think it was in 1944—publicly voiced
my views against it, since I have always been of the opinion that a
man’s liberty must be counted among his highest privileges and that only
a judgment of a court, firmly rooted in a constitution, should be
allowed to infringe on that liberty or to deprive him of it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now discussing with you the reasons stated in such
orders for protective custody. The following, among others, were given
as reasons: activities hostile to the Reich; spreading of atrocity
rumors; assault; refusal to work; religious propaganda. Please, will you
express your views on the reasons for these protective custody orders.
Are they to be approved of?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I consider these reasons for protective custody to be
wrong. I think I had better explain in detail. My attitude is due to the
fact that all the offenses which have been enumerated here might just as
well have been dealt with by due process of law in the state courts. For
that reason I consider protective custody as such to be wrong, and more
so if ordered for the reasons mentioned.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So that, if I understand you rightly, I can summarize
your attitude as follows: You want to say that you had no knowledge of
the protective custody orders, that you had no authority to issue them,
and that you did not sign them, but since these protective custody
orders were issued within the Amt IV, you ought to have had knowledge of
them. Is this summary correct or is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: We now come to another charge preferred against you by
the Prosecution. The Prosecution claim that you are the intellectual
principal or accessory in the crimes committed when you, as the Chief of
the Security Police and the SD, had civilians murdered and ill-treated
by the so-called Einsatzgruppen. I am going to quote a few sentences
from the testimony given by the witness Ohlendorf here in this courtroom
on 3 January 1946. Ohlendorf’s testimony incriminates you. I wish to
have your comment on it. Ohlendorf says with reference to the
Einsatzgruppen:
“After his entry into service, Kaltenbrunner had to concern
himself with these questions and consequently must have known
the background of the Einsatzgruppen which were under his
authority.”
He goes on to say with reference to the valuables taken away from the
executed persons that these had been sent to the Reich Ministry of
Finance or to the Reich Security Main Office, and he finally states that
the officer personnel for these Einsatzgruppen were recruited from the
leading personnel of the State Police and only in a small percentage
from the SD. What do you have to say in answer to the question whether
or not you knew of the existence and the significance of these
Einsatzgruppen?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no idea of the existence of these Einsatzkommandos
as described by Ohlendorf. Later on I heard that they existed, but this
was many months later. With regard to this point I want to say the
following: It is known to the Tribunal from Ohlendorf’s testimony and
from Hitler’s and Himmler’s decrees which have been discussed here that
orders for the killing of people had been given. These Einsatzkommandos
have never been reorganized during the time when I was in office. These
Einsatzkommandos which had been active up to that time were also
dissolved or had been put under different commands before I took over
the office. I do not know whether the witness Ohlendorf has stated here
just when he returned from his Einsatzkommando.
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1942.
KALTENBRUNNER: That is before I came into office. The Einsatzkommandos
must later on have come under the charge of the Higher SS and Police
Leaders in the occupied territories or, what is even more probable,
under the charge of the chief of the anti-partisan units. I cannot
answer your question precisely, since I have, as a consequence of my
imprisonment for 1 year, no possibility at my disposal for re-examining
the organizational scheme.
I think you also asked me whether it is known to me that valuables,
which had been taken away from executed persons, had been sent to my
office or the Reich Ministry of Finance. I know nothing of such
shipments but I do know that Himmler had given an order to
everybody—not only to the Security Police but also to other
organizations in the occupied territories, be it the Municipal Police or
the anti-partisan units or those sections of the Armed Forces which were
under his command—saying that all such property was to be surrendered
to the Reich Ministry of Finance.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were these Einsatzgruppen the result of an order from
Hitler or of an order from the Reich Security Main Office?
KALTENBRUNNER: It can only be due to an order from Hitler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You just said that in the course of time you heard about
the existence and significance of these Einsatzgruppen. Can you say
exactly on which date you gained that knowledge?
KALTENBRUNNER: I assume that this was at the time when I had my first
audience with Hitler, or it may have been on the following day when I
reported to Himmler, in November 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1943?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If you had knowledge at that time of the Einsatzgruppen
and their significance, then the question arises what your attitude
about them was and, in case you condemned them, what you did to have
them abolished? Did you have a possibility to do so or did you not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I said before that an Einsatzkommando was never set up
under my direction or my orders. The existence and the previous
activities of such Einsatzkommandos became known to me late in the fall
of 1943 and I knew that I would have to resist this misuse of the men
who were under the Reich Security Main Office. I think on 13 September
1943, I saw Hitler on the occasion of a visit of Mussolini who had just
been liberated. However, my attempt to talk to him failed, because of
this State visit. Consequently, in November, after Himmler had put it
off repeatedly, I had to go again to headquarters to report officially
on my activities up to that time. And on that occasion I talked to the
Führer about the facts on the Einsatzkommandos which had become known to
me; and not only about that, but also I had the first opportunity to
approach him about the entire Jewish problem, and about the orders
given, by him and by Himmler against the Jews which had also become
known to me at that time. However, I would like to make a detailed
statement on this subject, if you will go through that problem in detail
with me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now present...
KALTENBRUNNER: I should like only to add that the Einsatzkommandos no
longer came into the picture, so far as I was concerned, because the
entire personnel was committed to the anti-partisan fighting or rather
to the Higher SS Police Leader, I believe, on exactly the same day when
I entered my office in Berlin. I believe I can remember distinctly that
Von dem Bach-Zelewski was appointed Chief of anti-partisan fighting on
30 January 1943. This may also be the reason for the fact that I did not
see any reports from the Einsatzkommandos themselves.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now turning to another document, L-51, Exhibit
USA-521. This is an extremely incriminating document on which I want to
have your comment.
Zutter is the adjutant of the camp commander of Mauthausen. He reports
regarding a...
KALTENBRUNNER: Is this photostat copy the same?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is the same.
He is reporting regarding an execution order, referring to 12 or 15
American parachutists who were captured in 1945. Will you please look
through the document and state to the Tribunal whether you have given
this order, and whether you had authority to issue such an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. You have discussed this same document with me only
yesterday. Therefore it is known to me. I declare that this incident and
this order never did come to my knowledge until this document was put
before me or until its presentation by the interrogator.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know Ziereis?
KALTENBRUNNER: As I have already said once, I have never had authority
to sign on my own initiative a so-called order for execution, that is to
say a death sentence. Apart from Hitler nobody in the whole Reich had
such authority except Himmler and the Reich Minister of Justice.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With regard to this point, I wish to mention that the
Prosecution have also presented execution orders which bore the
signature of Müller. Do you want to say something about that?
KALTENBRUNNER: If an execution order had Müller’s signature, Müller can
have signed it only on the strength of an order from Himmler, or on the
strength of a sentence submitted by a court.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It suggests itself to say that if Müller had authority to
issue execution orders, then you ought to have had such authority to a
much higher degree? Is that right?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not so, because Himmler never gave me such
power; also the set-up of the chain of command—the State Police
remained under Himmler after Heydrich’s death even after I took
office—would have contradicted that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The incident referred to in this document is of such
importance, particularly since foreign parachutists are involved, that
one ought to suppose that it was known in the high offices in Berlin,
that means also in the Reich Security Main Office. Did you receive no
knowledge of the matter afterwards?
KALTENBRUNNER: I want to add the following statement: The incident
definitely did not come to my knowledge.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished with Document L-51?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No, I am still concerned with Document L-51, but I am
about to leave it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, ought you not to refer him to the particular
incident which is referred to toward the end of the document, where it
says, “Concerning the American military mission which landed behind the
German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in January 1945”? It
goes on, then, to say that the—I think it was adjutant of the camp
said, “Now Kaltenbrunner has approved of the execution. This letter was
secret and had the signature, ‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’”
I think you should put that to him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, certainly. He knows the document, and I believe he
knows every single word of this document, but I will put it to him
again.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here:
“I estimate the number of those persons captured to have been 12
or 15. They were wearing a uniform which was either American or
Canadian, brown-green color, and blouse and beret. Eight to 10
days after their arrival, the order for their execution was
received by means of a radio message, or a teletype.
Standartenführer Ziereis—that is the Camp Commandant—came to
see me in my office and said: ‘Now Kaltenbrunner has approved of
the execution.’ This letter was secret and had the signature,
‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’
“These men were then shot on the spot, and their valuables were
given to me by Oberscharführer Niedermeyer.”
Would you, very briefly, go into this?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is completely out of the question that this incident
was ever brought to my knowledge, or that it happened with my
participation. This is not only plainly a crime against the laws of
warfare, but it is, in particular, an action which could or necessarily
had to produce the most serious foreign political consequences.
Certainly, in such an incident it is out of the question that Müller or
even I, myself, as Müller’s superior, could have taken action; but in
such a case thorough discussions must absolutely have taken place
previously between Himmler, himself, and the Führer.
It is to be assumed, furthermore, that quite definitely someone—maybe
the competent section for international law—would have been consulted
on the subject first, and that such an action, of course, would have
been decreed either by the Führer or by Himmler. In any case, it would
have been an order from one of these two personalities. However, even
that is unknown to me.
If, therefore, this man Zutter relates here that the order bore my
signature, then this can only have been an order which, as I have
described before, bore my name falsely since I never had authority to
issue an order for execution. Therefore, the signature should have been
“Himmler” or “By Himmler’s order, Müller.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: So that you attribute this signature also to a misuse?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I believe that it does not concern my signature at
all here, but that Ziereis should have said “Himmler.” It cannot be
assumed that Müller would have signed his or my name in such a way.
DR. KAUFFMANN: We are now coming to another subject. I am referring now
to Document 1063(b)-PS, Exhibit USA-492, which is a letter from the
Reich Security Main Office, dated 26 July 1943. It has the signature,
“Signed, Dr. Kaltenbrunner,” and the letter is addressed to all Higher
SS and Police Leaders. It refers to the establishment of correctional
labor camps.
Will you please look through the letter? The Prosecution charges you
with the establishment of correctional labor camps. Please explain what
your attitude really was, and state whether that letter originated from
you.
KALTENBRUNNER: With regard to this point I have to make the following
statement: I conclude from the fact that my name is typewritten that
this order had not been shown to me before it went out: otherwise I
would have signed it in handwriting.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know of a Himmler order?
KALTENBRUNNER: As far as I can remember, I learned of it afterwards.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What is a correctional labor camp? Is it identical with a
concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, correctional labor camps were camps in which men were
put if they were Germans, if they had dodged the compulsory labor
service in spite of repeated reminders, or foreign workers who had left
their place of work without permission and had been arrested, or workers
who were caught during round-ups on trains, railway stations, and roads,
and who had no permanent labor contract. Confinement to such
correctional labor camps covered a period of 14 to 56 days.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It says in this letter that these correctional labor
camps, so far as administration and orders were concerned, are under the
State Police offices and, furthermore, under the commanders of the
Security Police and the SD. Did you have knowledge of that?
KALTENBRUNNER: A so-called breach of labor contract in the Reich or an
evasion of the Compulsory Labor Service by a German citizen is an
offense which actually could have been dealt with by the law courts just
as well. The law had provisions to that effect but because of the
enormous number of workers employed in the entire Reich—not only
Germans, who amounted to 15 or 20 million, but also 8 million foreign
workers—it would have been impossible to start hundreds of thousands of
proceedings in courts, in hundreds of thousands of cases, for failure to
work or breach of contract, or willful desertion from the place of work,
_et cetera_. It goes without saying that furthermore the police
departments had no kind of prison accommodations extensive enough to
give short-term sentences in such cases. For these reasons such
correctional labor camps were established at the headquarters of the
State Police or Criminal Police offices.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you, in principle, approve of the establishment of
such correctional labor camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, in principle I approved of them although I myself
did not participate in issuing this order. I did, however, learn of it
later and considered it proper in view of the labor shortage and the
conditions then prevailing in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have knowledge regarding the treatment of the
internees: for what period of time they were confined to these camps,
what their food ration was, and how they were employed?
KALTENBRUNNER: As I said, these correctional labor camps were designed
to impose confinement for a period not exceeding 56 days. Even this, I
believe, was possible only after a man had previously been sentenced for
3 similar offenses. Normally, confinement to correctional labor camps...
THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew the condition in the
camps? You are not answering it at all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please answer my question?
KALTENBRUNNER: I think you asked me...
DR. KAUFFMANN: I asked you whether you knew anything regarding the
treatment, the food, and the employment of the internees in these
correctional labor camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: I knew only that correctional labor camps had the task of
doing labor for public works, that is, in public construction work like
roads, railroad maintenance, and, in particular, for repair of damage
due to air raids. The internees of correctional labor camps have been
seen by the entire population when so employed. The impression which the
appearance of these internees made...
THE PRESIDENT: He still is not answering the question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I put three exact questions to you. I want exact answers
to these questions. Do you know anything about the treatment, the food
rations, and the employment? Did you have any knowledge of this, “yes”
or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: I said with regard to the employment...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have knowledge?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I did. The other two factors I did not know from
personal observation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did officers of Amt IV ever report to you on this?
KALTENBRUNNER: Not officers of Amt IV; but this problem has, of course,
been discussed repeatedly within the political home intelligence
service, namely, about the utilization of such labor for emergency work.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you see no cause to interfere?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no cause to interfere with these camps for any
misuse, since no case of abuse of camp internees was known.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to another document, Document Number
2542-PS, Exhibit Number USA-489. This is a statement, an affidavit by
Lindow. He states that until the beginning of 1943, and by order of
Himmler, Soviet Russian political commissars and Jewish soldiers were
taken out of prisoner-of-war camps and transferred to concentration
camps, to be shot. Furthermore, he states that Müller, the Chief of Amt
IV, had signed the execution order. If the Tribunal so desire, I shall
quote a few sentences from this document.
[_To the defendant_.] What is your statement with reference to this
document?
KALTENBRUNNER: This order of Himmler’s was not known to me, and may I
point out that it was used from 1941 until 1943, which means, in the
main, during the time when I was not in Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now reading a particularly incriminating
passage—Paragraph 4. Will you please make a statement regarding the
question whether this report on these facts also refers to the time
after 1943 or to the time before 1943, or whatever you may be able to
say about the date.
KALTENBRUNNER: I know the passage.
DR. KAUFFMANN: “In the prisoner-of-war camps at the Eastern
Front, there were small Einsatzkommandos which were led by
members of the Secret State Police of lower rank. These
Kommandos were attached to the camp commandant and had the task
of selecting those prisoners of war who were to be executed in
accordance with the orders issued, and of reporting their names
to the Gestapo office.”
KALTENBRUNNER: About this, I...
DR. KAUFFMANN: One moment. From Paragraph 2, I am quoting the last
paragraph: “These prisoners of war were first of all discharged as a
matter of form and then taken to a concentration camp for execution.”
Now I am asking you what knowledge did you have of these facts?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of these facts. Moreover, it is
impossible that I could have gained knowledge of them, of orders which
were issued in 1941 and which, as this witness says, continued to be
actually in force until the middle of 1943; it is impossible that, in
order to stop the execution of these orders, during the last days, I
could have in time...
DR. KAUFFMANN: But actually, it cannot be denied that within the Reich
Security Main Office there was a Section IV A 1, that is, a part of the
Gestapo, and that this section functioned from 1941 until the middle of
1943, and that it carried out such orders. It can be assumed obviously
that you, too, must have been informed about this extremely grave
situation, which was inhuman and prohibited by international law, does
it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was not informed of it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now turning to the subject of concentration camps
and the responsibility of the defendant in that sphere.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_ Afternoon Session_
MR. DODD: Dr. Kauffmann has told me that he had an opportunity to read
two cross-interrogatories which we wish to submit—the
cross-interrogatories of Dr. Mildner and Dr. Höttl. I told Dr. Kauffmann
that it might be well, in order not to disquiet the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner, if they were read before he completed his examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree that it would be better that this
cross-examination should be read now, so that the defendant can deal
with any points he wishes to deal with?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that will be satisfactory.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): The first affidavit, if it please the Tribunal is the affidavit
of Dr. Rudolf Mildner:
“I, the undersigned, Dr. Rudolf Mildner, made the following
affidavit in answer to cross-interrogations by representatives
of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, relating to my
affidavit of 29 March 1946, made in response to questions by Dr.
Kauffmann for presentation to the International Military
Tribunal:
“Question Number 1: Confirm or correct the following
biographical data:
“Answer: In December 1939 I became Chief of the Gestapo Office
in Chemnitz; in March 1941 I became Chief of the Gestapo Office
in Katowice; in September 1943 I became Commander of the Sipo
and SD in Copenhagen; in January 1944 I became Inspector of the
Sipo and SD in Kassel; on 15 March 1944 I was made Deputy Chief
of Groups IV A and IV B of the RSHA; in December 1944 I became
Commander of the Sipo in Vienna; in December 1944 I became
Deputy Inspector of the Sipo in Vienna.
“All of these appointments after January 1943 were made by
Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD.
“Question Number 2: Is it not true that while you were Gestapo
leader at Katowice you frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz
for imprisonment or execution; that you had contacts with the
Political Department (Abteilung) at Auschwitz during the time
that you were Chief of the Gestapo in Katowice with regard to
inmates sent from the district of Katowice; that you visited
Auschwitz on several occasions; that the Gestapo ‘SS
Standgericht’ frequently met in Auschwitz and you sometimes
attended the trial of prisoners; that in 1942 and again in 1943,
pursuant to orders by Gruppenführer Müller, Chief of Gestapo,
the Commandant of Auschwitz showed you the extermination
installations; that you were acquainted with the extermination
installations at Auschwitz since you had to send Jews from your
territory to Auschwitz for execution?
“Answer: Yes, these are true statements of fact.
“Question Number 3: With respect to your answer to Question
Number 5 in your affidavit of 29 March 1946, did all orders for
arrest, commitment to punishment, and individual executions in
concentration camps come from RSHA? Was the regular channel for
orders of individual executions from Himmler through
Kaltenbrunner to Müller, then to the concentration camp
commandant? Did the WVHA have supervision of all concentration
camps for administration, utilization of labor, and maintenance
of discipline?
“Answer: The answer is ‘yes’ to each of the three questions.
“Question Number 3-a: Is it true that conferences took place
between SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and SS
Obergruppenführer Pohl, Chief of the WVHA and Chief of
Concentration Camps? Was Dr. Kaltenbrunner acquainted with
conditions in the concentration camps?
“Answer: Yes, and because of these conferences and on the
occasion of discussions with the two Amt chiefs—Gruppenführer
Müller, IV, and Gruppenführer Nebe, RSHA, the Chief of Sipo and
SD—SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner should be acquainted
with conditions in concentration camps.
“I learned from SS Gruppenführer Müller, Chief of Amt IV, that
regular conferences took place between RSHA and Amt Group D of
WVHA.
“Question Number 4: Is it not a fact that in July or August of
1944 an order was issued to commanders and inspectors of the
Sipo and SD by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of the
Sipo and SD, to the effect that members of all Anglo-American
Commando groups should be turned over to the Sipo by the Armed
Forces; that the Sipo was to interrogate these men and shoot
them after questioning; that the killing was to be made known to
the Armed Forces by a communiqué stating that the Commando group
had been annihilated in battle; and that this decree was
classified top secret and was to be destroyed immediately after
reading?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question Number 5: With respect to your answer to Question
Number 7 of your affidavit of 29 March 1946, is it not a fact
that:
“a) After you sent a telegram to Müller requesting that the
Jewish persecution be stopped, you received an order by Himmler
that the Jewish actions were to be carried out?
“b) That you then flew to Berlin for the purpose of talking with
the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner, personally, but
that since he was absent you saw his deputy, Müller, Head of
Office IV of the RSHA, who, in your presence, wrote a message to
Himmler containing your request that the persecutions of the
Jews in Denmark be stopped?
“c) That shortly after your return to Copenhagen you received a
direct order by Himmler sent through Kaltenbrunner as Chief of
the Sipo and SD, stating that ‘The Anti-Jewish actions are to be
started immediately’?
“d) That for the purpose of carrying out this action the
Sonderkommando Eichmann, which was under the Gestapo, was sent
from Berlin to Copenhagen for the purpose of deporting the Jews
in two ships which it had chartered?
“Answer: Yes, to each question—a), b), c), and d).
“Question Number 6: Is it not a fact that the action of
Sonderkommando Eichmann was not a success; that Müller ordered
you to make a report explaining the causes for the lack of
success in deporting of Jews; and that you sent this report
directly to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner?
“Answer: Yes. That is right.
“I have read the above questions and answers as written and
swear they are true and correct....”—_et cetera_.
And now, may it please the Tribunal, the cross-affidavit of Wilhelm
Höttl...
THE PRESIDENT: [_To the defendant._] Did you want to say something?
KALTENBRUNNER: I wanted to ask the High Tribunal for permission to reply
immediately to this interrogatory, so that I...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will have an opportunity in a moment. The
purpose of having it read now was that your counsel might ask you any
questions with reference to it, and then you can make any comment that
you want to. Colonel Amen will go on and read the other
cross-interrogatory, and then your own counsel will continue your
examination-in-chief. Do you understand?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I understand. I merely wanted to suggest, since
these two matters are treated separately and concern two different
spheres, that I may first express my views and then later...
THE PRESIDENT: We cannot have the matter interrupted in that way. You
will be able to deal with it in a moment.
Go on, Colonel Amen.
COL. AMEN: The affidavit of Dr. Mildner dated 9 April 1946 will become
Exhibit Number USA-791 and the affidavit of Wilhelm Höttl which I am
about to read, dated 10 April 1946, will become Exhibit Number USA-792.
“I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the following
affidavit in response to cross-interrogation relating to an
affidavit executed by me on 30 March 1946 answering questions
put by Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International
Military Tribunal.
“1) With respect to question Number 3: Please give the following
information:
“a) Explain the basis of your statement that when persons
belonging to the SD were transferred to the Einsatzkommandos of
the Sipo and SD they resigned from the SD. Your attention is
invited to the fact that Ohlendorf, the head of the SD, has
testified to the contrary.
“b) Explain the basis for your statement that Einsatzkommandos
had nothing to do with executions. Your attention is invited to
the fact that your testimony in this regard is likewise in
direct conflict with the head of the SD, Ohlendorf.
“c) What was Hitler’s so-called ‘Commissar order’ and when did
you first acquire knowledge of this order?
“With respect to 1a): In my affidavit I did not speak of a
permanent separation from the SD but of a leave of absence for
the time of activity with an Einsatzkommando. By that was meant
that they did not exercise their SD functions during this time;
that this function was inactive.
“With respect to 1b): My affidavit appears to have been
misunderstood concerning this point. I did not state that
Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions but only that
not all Einsatzkommandos were concerned with executions. I
mentioned as an example the Einsatzkommandos in Africa, Hungary,
and Slovakia. In connection with that, I said that these
Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions; by that I
meant not directly with the actual executions.
“With respect to 1c): I, myself, do not know the so-called
‘Commissar Order’ of Hitler. Dr. Stahlecker, who commanded an
Einsatzgruppe of the Sipo and the SD in Russia, told me in the
summer of 1942 that the executions of commissars and Jews were
carried out on the basis of the Commissar Order which covered
the extermination of the Jews under the reason of their being
bearers of Bolshevism.
“2) With respect to question Number 4: Is it not a fact that
Heydrich, as Chief of Sipo and SD, gave the initial instructions
to Eichmann concerning the extermination of Jews; that in the
RSHA Eichmann’s immediate superior was Müller, Chief of the
Gestapo; that Müller was first the deputy of Heydrich and later
of Kaltenbrunner?
“With respect to 2): Yes, I heard from Eichmann, probably in
August 1944, that Heydrich had given him these directives. It is
also correct that Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, was Eichmann’s
immediate superior. As far as I know, Müller was the deputy of
Heydrich and later of Kaltenbrunner only in the field of the
Gestapo, as likewise were the other office chiefs in their
respective fields.
“3) With respect to question Number 5: Is it not a fact that you
know from your discussions with Kaltenbrunner and with Eichmann
that they came from the same community in Austria and were
exceptionally close friends; that Eichmann always had direct
access to Kaltenbrunner and that they frequently conferred
together; that Kaltenbrunner was well pleased with the manner in
which Eichmann carried out his duties; that Kaltenbrunner was
very interested in the extermination work performed by Eichmann;
that you personally know that Kaltenbrunner went to Hungary for
the purpose of discussing the extermination program in Hungary
with officials of the Hungarian Government and with Eichmann and
other members of his staff in Hungary? Please confirm or correct
these statements and make any statement necessary to clarify
your answer.
“With respect to 3): I heard from Eichmann that he knew
Kaltenbrunner from Linz and that they served there together in
1932 in an SS Sturm. I do not know that they were particularly
close friends or that Eichmann always had direct access to
Kaltenbrunner and that they conferred frequently.
“I do not know the details about their official relationship. I
do not know whether Kaltenbrunner also had conferences
concerning the program of extermination of Jews in Hungary
during his stays in Hungary in the spring of 1944. Winkelmann,
the former Higher SS and Police Leader in Hungary, must know
exactly about that, since, according to my knowledge, he,
together with Kaltenbrunner, visited persons in the Hungarian
Government.
“4) With respect to question Number 6:
“a) Is it not known to you that Müller, Chief of the Gestapo,
always conferred with Kaltenbrunner on matters of importance
relating to the functions of his office—particularly with
respect to executions of special inmates?
“b) Did you know that Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police
Leader and State Secretary for Security in Austria after the
Anschluss until his appointment as Chief of the RSHA, a period
of 5 years, during which time his attention was devoted
exclusively to police and security matters?
“c) What is the basis of your statement that the intelligence
service took up the main part of Kaltenbrunner’s attention and
all his interest?
“With respect to 4a): Details concerning the official
relationship between Müller and Kaltenbrunner are not known to
me. However, I could note on several occasions that Müller was
with Kaltenbrunner to report about the work of his department.
“With respect to 4b): Kaltenbrunner was not exclusively occupied
with police and security matters during his activity as Higher
SS and Police Leader in Austria or as State Secretary for
Security respectively. Without a doubt he had political
interests besides, since the Higher SS and Police Leaders were
the representatives of Reichsführer SS Himmler in all matters.
“With respect to 4c): I could note that by virtue of my official
relationship with him. Members of other departments also
frequently expressed themselves in the direction that he favored
and furthered Amt III, and particularly Amt VI and the Mil
(Military Amt).
“5) With respect to question Number 7: Answer the following:
“a) What did you personally have to do with concentration camps
and what, therefore, is the basis for your answer to this
question?
“b) Did you know that all orders for commitments to, releases
from, and executions in concentration camps came from the RSHA?
“c) Did you know that the RSHA gave direct orders to commandants
of concentration camps? State such orders of which you have
personal knowledge.
“d) What are the atrocities committed in concentration camps to
which you refer in your answer to this question, and when and in
what manner did you acquire knowledge that atrocities were
committed in concentration camps?
“With respect to 5a): Personally, I had nothing at all to do
with concentration camps. However, I liberated a number of
persons from concentration camps and therefore know the
difficulties that were made by the concentration camp staffs who
always called attention to orders of the WVHA of the SS in such
cases since the inmates were needed for the armament industry.
“With respect to 5b): It is known to me that orders for
commitments into concentration camps and discharges therefrom
came from the RSHA. I did not know that all such orders came
from the RSHA. I have no knowledge of orders for executions by
the RSHA.
“With respect to 5c): I do not know any details and do not know
personally any orders concerning this. In the cases in which I
intervened for discharges I addressed myself either to
Kaltenbrunner directly or to Amt IV. When the processing was of
long duration, I received the answer several times from
officials of Amt IV that difficulties had come about through the
WVHA of the SS.
“With respect to 5d): When Hungary was occupied by German troops
in March 1944, several of my Hungarian acquaintances went to
concentration camps. After I had achieved their liberation, they
told me of bad treatment and atrocities in the Mauthausen
Concentration Camp. At that time, I sent an official
communication concerning this to the director of the Linz
Gestapo Office, with the request to inquire into this matter
with the concentration camp commandant Ziereis. Ziereis,
however, denied this, as I was informed in the reply. In August
1944 Eichmann told me that there were extermination camps
(Vernichtungslager) besides concentration camps.
“6) With respect to question Number 9: What is the basis for
your opinion that Kaltenbrunner opposed Hitler and Himmler on
the program for the physical extermination of European Jewry?
“With respect to 6): Kaltenbrunner told me after his conference
with representatives of the International Red Cross in March
1945 that he was against Hitler’s and Himmler’s program on the
question of the extermination of the European Jews. In my
response to Question 9, that Kaltenbrunner had given no orders
for killing of Jews, the words ‘according to my knowledge’ are
missing.
“7) With respect to question Number 11: Who was the American
whom you told Kaltenbrunner that you had contacted in a neutral
country in 1943? Did Kaltenbrunner agree to travel to
Switzerland with you to meet a representative of the Allied
Powers with whom you were in touch through the Austrian
Resistance Movement; and, if so, whom?
“With respect to 7): The American liaison man in 1943 was a
member of the United States Legation in Lisbon. I am no longer
familiar with his name. The connection via the Austrian
Resistance Movement with an American organization in Switzerland
existed only from the beginning of fall 1944. Kaltenbrunner
agreed to travel there with me about 20 April 1945.
“8) With respect to question Number 12: On what date did
Kaltenbrunner order the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration
Camp to hand over the camp to approaching troops? At whose
insistence did Kaltenbrunner issue this order, and for what
reason?
“With respect to 8): I cannot state the exact date of
Kaltenbrunner’s order to the commandant of Mauthausen
Concentration Camp to hand over the camp to approaching troops.
It should have been during the last days of April 1945. It is
not known to me at whose insistence and for which reason he gave
this order; possibly this was connected with his discussions
with SS Standartenführer Becher whom I met with him at the time.
“The above statements are true; I made this declaration
voluntarily and without compulsion...”—_et cetera_—“Dr.
Wilhelm Höttl.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do the High Tribunal wish the defendant to state his
position or reply to these two documents?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I request that I may do so right away.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then please give us your views first on the Mildner
document. I shall call your attention, perhaps, to question Number 2
which seems relevant to me. It says:
“Is it not true that...in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to
orders by Gruppenführer Müller, the Commandant of Auschwitz
showed you the extermination installations...?”
It would seem from this that the Chief of Amt IV knew about these
matters.
KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, may I interrupt you.
As far as I could notice in the last sessions a procedure of so-called
surprise affidavits is being employed against me. This surprise
affidavit is applied for the first time in my case. In spite of that I
am glad and grateful, even without having had the opportunity to see
this affidavit before, to express my views on the whole and on each
point of this affidavit.
As to Dr. Mildner—question Number 1: He is asked about his position
which he held in the Security Service. He enumerated the positions which
he held from 1939 to 1944. During the time I was in office he served as
an inspector of the Sipo and the SD in Kassel, as a deputy in Amt IV, as
a deputy inspector in Vienna in 1944, and as a commander of the Sipo in
Vienna also in 1944. He said, “All of these appointments after January
1943 were made by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and the
SD.”
That is incorrect. I never appointed anybody to high positions such as
these held by Mildner.
Were Mildner asked about this before this Tribunal, he would have to
confirm that. He was apparently not questioned on that by the
Prosecution. In case of an appointment of an official for the Security
Police and the SD I was simply asked and notified in each case of such
an appointment of a functionary of the Security Police and SD, because
as an inspector of the SD and of the Security Police he had to have in
this capacity a strong intelligence section, that is, a subdivision of
Amt III and IV which were at my disposal as far as intelligence was
concerned, so that as Chief of the intelligence service I had to know
who was inspector of a subdivision in Vienna, Kassel, or in Copenhagen.
Later he also had to have my intelligence orders for his groups. That
was the only reason why I had to be notified of such appointments. It
was not within my competence to appoint any official of the Sipo; that
is a definite misrepresentation arising from this affidavit of Dr.
Mildner.
In reply to Question 2, if it is said that in his positions in Chemnitz
and Katowice, in the year 1939 and 1941, he had to transport prisoners
to Auschwitz for imprisonment and execution, then, in the first place,
this falls into the period before I had assumed office, and, secondly,
this was purely an executive measure of those agencies of which I was
never in charge and never took over. He therefore can never have acted
here as my deputy.
As to question Number 3, here the Prosecution accuses him:
“...That the Gestapo ‘SS Standgericht’ frequently met in
Auschwitz and you sometimes attended the trial of
prisoners;”—in other words that he attended the
executions—“that in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to orders
by Gruppenführer Müller ... the Commandant of Auschwitz showed
you”—that is Mildner—“the extermination installations; that
you were acquainted with the extermination installations at
Auschwitz since you had to send Jews from your territory to
Auschwitz for execution.”
In my opinion, I could perhaps only be incriminated on one point. The
question is this: “Did Mildner once, in the year 1943, see such
installations or did he attend the shootings?” First of all, the
Prosecution did not show whether this “one time” took place before or
after I assumed office.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please be a little briefer and more to the
point.
KALTENBRUNNER: Excuse me, Doctor, but I have to be able to refute every
single word.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want the witness to argue upon
this document. If he has anything to say about the facts, then he can do
it, but not argue on it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that is my opinion, also.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I am asking you—an especially important
and incriminating point, it seems to me, is question Number 3; explain
if you will, I read: “...did all orders for arrest...”—_et
cetera_—“individual executions from the RSHA”; and then: “Was the
regular channel from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to Müller, and then
to the concentration camp commandant?” And then the answer, “yes.”
Please answer briefly.
KALTENBRUNNER: I have already explained today that the authority and
power to order executions rested only to a small extent with the
Minister of Justice, and with Himmler. Nobody else in the entire Reich
had the possibility or the authority to order that. Further, despite the
official channels—Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, Müller—such an order from
Himmler was never forwarded to me; these orders must have gone from
Himmler to Müller. To put this question to Mildner is wrong for the
single reason that the man was not with me and cannot know whether I
ever received such an order from Himmler. It is only a conclusion which
he draws from the normal organizational set-up.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is a matter for the Defense later on; you need not
talk about that.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not looking at the words. What he is asked is,
“Was the regular channel...?” That is the question. What is the regular
channel for orders from Himmler to you and Müller?
KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, I have already explained the question how
Himmler himself ruled on the competencies. Just think of June 1942, of
Heydrich’s death. From that day on—it is a written order and was
announced publicly—Himmler took charge of the entire RSHA and assumed
all the duties which had been Heydrich’s. In January 1943 I was
appointed Chief of the RSHA, after it had been announced that the
executive power and competence of the State Police and Criminal Police
remain with Himmler, no change was to be made, and the Chiefs of Amt IV
and V, Müller and Nebe, would continue to be directly under Himmler. For
that reason the organizational scheme as it existed at the time of
Heydrich was no longer applicable for Amt IV and V when I joined the
staff.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, Question 3-a: There it says, “Was Dr. Kaltenbrunner
acquainted with conditions in the concentration camps?” Here also it is
not explained just what is meant by “conditions” in concentration camps,
but it is most likely to be interpreted that those conditions which have
been attested by witnesses are meant. The witness said, “Yes.”
KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, you are overlooking a very important
sentence, the last one, on Question Number 3. Here the Prosecution ask:
“Did the WVHA have supervision of all concentration camps for
administration, the utilization of labor, and maintenance of
discipline?” This sentence is tremendously important for the following
reasons: The Prosecution endeavor to shift the entire guilt for the
destruction of human life from the WVHA to the RSHA, and, if the High
Tribunal want to find the truth...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. This is again a long argumentative speech.
The only question which arises, it seems to me, upon this question 3-a,
is: Did a conference take place between Kaltenbrunner, Pohl, and the
chief of the concentration camps? If he says that they did not, then
that is an answer that he makes to the affidavit; that is the only
question of fact.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that was not the question; I am of the same opinion.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please answer “yes” or “no” to the
question which was just put to you. Did such conferences between Pohl,
Müller, and yourself take place?
KALTENBRUNNER: I never had conferences with Pohl and Müller. I had to
have semi-annual conferences with Pohl because Pohl was, as Chief of the
WVHA, the Finance Minister for the entire SS and Police and the funds
for my entire intelligence service had to come from Pohl insofar as the
Reich Finance Ministry did not provide for all the personnel.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, please answer one further question: Who was
responsible for the administration of concentration camps, the general
treatment, food, _et cetera_?
KALTENBRUNNER: The entire competence and jurisdiction in concentration
camps, from the moment an internee stepped through the gate of a
concentration camp until his release or his death in the concentration
camp, or—the third possibility—until the end of the war at which time
he was liberated, rested exclusively with the WVHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now another question for the complete clarification. I am
assuming that these things were exclusively under the jurisdiction of
the WVHA, which had nothing to do with the RSHA. But it is correct, is
it not, that only through measures of the Secret Police—by issuing
orders for protective custody—that internment in these camps could take
place. I just want to define clearly these limitations.
KALTENBRUNNER: There is no doubt that that is correct in respect to
individual internments on the basis of individual orders for protective
custody which, I admit, were partly based on illegal reasons, as I have
already stated. However, most of the internments did not take place on
orders from the RSHA but came from the occupied territories—and from
there came, for instance, the big transports which Fichte mentioned in
the first document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But then these are, without doubt, the offices which were
in charge of internments: the Gestapo offices or the Gestapo regional
head offices.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not alone.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But they did participate?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not alone. One way for internment was the order for
protective custody by the Gestapo, another one was the order for
protective custody by the Kripo or the courts.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, a further statement. Will you please make a
statement to Question Number 5, the action in Denmark?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you dealt with Question Number 4 yet?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Not yet, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I go over to Question Number 4. “Is it not
a fact that in July or August of 1944 an order was issued to
commanders...by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner, as chief...to the effect
that members of all Anglo-American commando groups should be turned over
to the Sipo by the Armed Forces?”
Mr. President, I wanted to deal with this question comprehensively at a
later time and by means of documents, but, if you wish me to, I can deal
with it now.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not care how you deal with it. I thought you were
taking him through this document.
KALTENBRUNNER: High Tribunal, may I perhaps answer it right away? The
answer to this question is very simple. The Prosecution itself, through
a document, has, in a completely different form, charged that the State
Police had incriminated themselves by falsifying the facts. In that
document the Prosecution states that Müller gave the approval; but here
the deponent is told, “issued...by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner as
Chief of the Sipo and SD.” And that document, as far as I recall—I do
not know the number—is signed by Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I will submit that document to you. It is Document
1650-PS, Exhibit USA-246. This document is headed, “Gestapo office,
Cologne; Branch Office Aachen.” It is a teletype and dated “4 March
1944; top secret”:
“Subject: Measures against escaped prisoners of war who are
officers or nonworking, noncommissioned officers, with the
exception of British and American prisoners of war.”
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that has nothing to do with it. This is a document
of March, and the document that the question refers to is in July or
August.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I cannot hear.
THE PRESIDENT: The document you have now put forward is a document in
March 1944. The Question Number 4 relates to a document in July or
August 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: July or August 1944? I have no such document, Your Honor.
Perhaps the defendant can tell us now whether such an order by Himmler
existed and whether such a Himmler order was transmitted by him—“yes”
or “no.”
KALTENBRUNNER: I heard about the existence of such an order for the
first time here. I believe it is a mistake on the part of the
Prosecution that the question was put to Mildner as July or August. I
believe the Prosecution means the document of 4 March 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you are saying that this order from July is not
known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know this order nor did I know about it during
my term of office.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is perfectly obvious, isn’t it, that
the document to which you are referring has nothing to do with this
question at all, because this document of March concerns measures to be
taken against captured, escaped prisoners of war who are officers or
noncommissioned officers, except British and American prisoners of war.
That is the document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not have a document of July or August 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know whether there is a document of July or
August 1944 at all. What I am saying to you is that the document which
you put to the witness now—of March 1944—can’t be the document
referred to in question Number 4, for it deals with an entirely
different subject.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. That is right, Your Honor. I believe I can explain
this, Mr. President. I assume that the testimony by the witness refers
to the so-called Commando order of Hitler of 18 October 1942, and that a
result of this order is meant here. I believe it is that way.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, can you tell us whether the Prosecution, in
putting this question, were referring to a document of March 1944, or
whether they were referring to a document of July or August 1942?
COL. AMEN: We, Your Lordship, were not referring to any document that
was brought up by the witness. But since that time we have confirmed
from another document—which I think we have here at the
table—referring to this same document or a document of that same date.
Now, the witness’ feeling was that that document had been destroyed
after reading. But that there was such an order apparently is borne out
by another document which we have here which has not come before the
Tribunal in any way at all. In other words, this document was brought up
in the first instance by the witness himself.
THE PRESIDENT: But has the document to which Dr. Kauffmann has referred
of March 1944 got anything to do with it?
COL. AMEN: That is not the document and has nothing whatsoever to do
with it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then shall I pass on to the next question, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is the question of the persecution of Jews in Denmark.
Will you make a statement to that?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement in the affidavit of Mildner which was read
by you this morning is alone correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that your statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: I never had anything to do with the removal of Jews from
Denmark. Such an order could have been given only by Himmler; and that
this was a direct order given by Himmler was confirmed by Mildner.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Point c) of the question Number 5 says, “That shortly
after your return to Copenhagen you”—that is, the witness
Mildner—“received a direct order by Himmler sent through Kaltenbrunner,
as chief...”
KALTENBRUNNER: I never had an order like that go through my hands and I
never received an order like that from Himmler. It is also absolutely
impossible, because Denmark had her own Higher SS and Police Leader who
was the direct representative of Himmler right there, and who was
immediately subordinate to him and not to RSHA. This Higher SS and
Police Leader was at the same time Commander of the Sipo.
Organizationally I could not give such an order to Denmark.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In Question Number 6 it is asked: “Is it not a fact that
the action of Sonderkommando Eichmann was not a success; that Müller
ordered you”—that is Mildner—“to make a report ... directly to the
Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner?”
The witness Mildner answered that in the affirmative. Is such a report
from Denmark known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I not only do not know this report, but I know with
certainty—I spoke to Himmler not once but a dozen times about
this—that he received every report from Eichmann directly, in many
cases without informing Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then let us turn to Höttl’s affidavit. As far as I can
see there are no important changes from the affidavit given me. Do the
High Tribunal wish for me to put questions on that matter?
Then let us turn to question Number 5b). It states:
“It is known to me that orders for commitments into
concentration camps and discharges therefrom came from the RSHA.
I did not know that all such orders originated with the RSHA. I
have no knowledge of orders for executions by the RSHA.”
What can you say to that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Orders for execution could only have come through RSHA
when Himmler had ordered Müller to forward these orders. But I believe
that took place only in a few isolated cases and mostly after Müller had
informed Himmler that a court had passed judgment.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, the defendant asked me several minutes ago
to make a statement with reference to Document 1063-PS which we have
discussed. He had contested his signature; I believe that he wishes to
say now that it is his signature. It is the document of the RSHA of 26
July 1943. Do you want the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, is it 1063-PS? Have you the original
there?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only a photostatic copy; not the original, Your
Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the question?
DR. KAUFFMANN: [_Turning to the defendant._] Are you ready?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. There is a mistake on your part, Dr. Kauffmann. I
have not contested my signature, but have stated that I must assume that
I received knowledge of this order only after it had been published and
that the original order presumably did not carry my signature. That is
what I said. But I do remember now, through the clause,
“certified-Employee,” that it was apparently an order of which the
original was signed by me at the time.
Furthermore I remember from the first few words of the decree, “The
Reichsführer SS has approved...” _et cetera_, that this order was based
on a personal report which I must have made to Himmler, and that with
this report—I call your attention to the date, 26 July 1943—I
apparently made the first attempt with Himmler to mitigate or alleviate
the conditions; namely, that in such cases for which people hitherto
were committed to concentration camps they should in minor cases no
longer be put in concentration camps but in labor education camps and
that there was to be a differentiation between concentration camps and
labor education camps. Therefore, in my opinion it was the result of my
first attempt with him against the system of concentration camps.
And third, I would like to point out that this decree carries the number
IIc and thereby is not a decree which came from the Police executive
offices such as State Police or Kripo but from the administrative level.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is a sufficient explanation.
The Prosecution hold you responsible for the commitment of politically
and racially undesirable persons into concentration camps. How many
concentration camps became known to you after your appointment as Chief
of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: At the time of my appointment I knew three concentration
camps. At the end of my official activity there were 12 in the entire
Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How many were there in all?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was a thirteenth. That was the SS prison camp near
Danzig. There were altogether thirteen concentration camps in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain the chart which you saw here with the
many red dots which were alleged to be concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: That presentation is definitely misleading. I saw this
chart hanging here. All the armaments centers, factories, _ et cetera_,
in which internees from concentration camps were used for labor must
have been characterized as concentration camps. I cannot explain in any
other way the deluge of red dots.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you differentiate between the smaller camps and the
regular concentration camps, and if so, why?
KALTENBRUNNER: The difference is very obvious for the following reasons:
Any worker who worked in armament industries—that is, each
internee—worked in the same enterprise, in the same factory, as every
other German or foreign worker. The difference was merely that the
German worker at the conclusion of his working hours, at the end of the
day, returned to his family, whereas the internee of the labor camp had
to return to the camp.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You are accused of establishing the Concentration Camp
Mauthausen, that you visited this camp repeatedly. The witness
Höllriegel, who testified here, said he had seen you in this camp. He
also claims to have seen you inspecting the gas chambers while they were
in operation. There is an affidavit of Zutter, who has already been
mentioned today and who claims to have seen you at the Concentration
Camp Mauthausen. From this the Prosecution conclude that you, too, must
have known exactly about these conditions which were beneath human
dignity. I am asking you now, is this evidence correct or wrong? When
did you inspect these camps, and what observations did you make?
KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony is wrong. I did not establish any
concentration camps in Austria where I was until 1943. I did not
establish a single concentration camp in the Reich from 1943 onwards.
Every concentration camp in the Reich as I know today, and as has been
proved here with certainty, was established on orders of Himmler to
Pohl. This applies also—and I wish to emphasize this—to the Mauthausen
Camp. Not only were Austrian authorities excluded from establishing the
Mauthausen Camp, but they were unpleasantly surprised because neither
was the conception of a concentration camp in that sense known in
Austria, nor was there a necessity for establishing concentration camps
anywhere in Austria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And now, in Germany, in the Reich proper?
KALTENBRUNNER: What do you mean by that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking regarding your knowledge of conditions there.
KALTENBRUNNER: I heard gradually more and more about conditions in
concentration camps. It is apparent that I must have heard of these
things already by way of the entire Reich intelligence service and its
news channels for home politics.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not, as testified by Höllriegel, see the gas
chambers in operation?
KALTENBRUNNER: Never; neither while they were operating nor at any other
time did I see a gas chamber.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast. Make pauses between your
questions and answers and don’t speak too fast. He said that he had
gradually by way of Intelligence, heard of the concentration camps in
the Reich. Is that right?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You heard gradually about conditions in
the concentration camps, that is what you said, is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you recall my last question?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether you saw the gas chambers in operation?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I already answered that I never saw a gas chamber,
either in operation or at any other time. I did not know that they
existed at Mauthausen and testimony to that effect is entirely wrong. I
never set foot in the detention camp at Mauthausen—that is, the
concentration camp proper. I was at Mauthausen, but in the labor camp,
not in the detention camp. The total complex of Mauthausen, as I
remember it today, extends over an area of 6 kilometers. Within this
area there is a space of perhaps 4½ or 5 kilometers of labor camps.
There are the largest granite quarries in Austria, and they were owned
by the city of Vienna.
DR. KAUFFMANN: A picture has been shown in which you appear together
with Himmler and Ziereis.
KALTENBRUNNER: I was just coming to that. The quarries belonged to the
city of Vienna. The city of Vienna had a vital interest not to be
excluded from the deliveries of granite which they used for paving the
streets of Vienna. Now, according to a Reich law, as I learned later,
this large quarry was expropriated from the city of Vienna by the
WVHA—Pohl—and the city of Vienna was excluded from the supply of
granite for quite some time. Now, the city turned to me to approach
Himmler on this. It happened that Himmler was visiting and inspecting
southern Germany and decided to visit Austria and Mauthausen and asked
me to see him there. In that way, it came about that I was with Himmler
at this quarry. Whether or not I was photographed at that time, I do not
know. I have not seen the picture and I cannot say whether I am in it.
I might add something. Neither at this time nor at any other time did
Himmler ever take me into a concentration camp or suggest that he do so;
as I learned later, he had certain reasons for not doing so. I would not
have attended such an inspection for I knew very well that as far as I
was concerned, he would, as he did with others whom he had invited on
such visits, show me “Potemkin villages” and not conditions as they
actually were; and, except for a handful of men in the WVHA, no one else
was allowed to see how things really were in concentration camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, may I ask you—you are speaking about a handful of
men—you did not belong to this group?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not. This handful of men were Himmler, Pohl,
Müller, and Glücks, and the camp commanders.
DR. KAUFFMANN: As far as Camp Mauthausen is concerned, there is a
document on which we would like to have your views. The Document Number
1650-PS, which has already been submitted, dated 4 March 1944, is the
so-called Bullet Decree. It deals with Camp III:
“Measures against recaptured prisoners of war, officers and
nonworking, noncommissioned officers, with the exception of
British and American prisoners of war.”
This document is known to the Tribunal in its contents. I do not believe
that I need read it. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner is to make a statement,
whether these facts became known to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the reference to it, the number.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1650-PS, Exhibit Number USA-246.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off for 10
minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, a report is made that the
Defendant Göring is absent from this session of the Court.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you the Document 1650-PS, and have you read it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have read it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: This, as emphasized, is the famous Bullet Decree. When
did you hear of this?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know the actual decree; this must have been a
decree issued long before I came into office. Neither had I seen this
teletype copy of the document given to me here.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am drawing your attention to the signature which reads
“Müller.”
KALTENBRUNNER: Actually, the man was entitled to sign such a decree if
it did in fact exist. But I have heard—this I would like to add—at the
time of 1944-1945 from the liaison officer between Himmler and Hitler by
the name of Fegelein when I made my report to headquarters, which at
that time, I believe, was already in Berlin, I heard the name Bullet
Decree, which to me was an absolutely strange conception. So I asked him
what it was. He replied that this was a Führer order and that he knew no
more than that, except that he had heard that this was a special type of
prisoner-of-war.
I was not satisfied with that reply, and so, on the same day, I sent a
teletype message to Himmler in which I asked him to look into an order
of the Führer which was called Bullet Decree. At that time I did not
know either that the State Police was concerned with the Bullet Decree.
Then a few days later, Müller came to see me on Himmler’s behalf, and
gave me a decree to read which, however, did not come from Hitler, but
from Himmler, in which Himmler stated that he was transmitting this to
me as a verbal order of the Führer. Referring to this, I replied to
Himmler that I noticed in this Führer decree that again the most
elementary principles of the Geneva Convention were violated, although
this had been going on from a time long before I had assumed office and
there had been other violations following that. I asked him to intervene
with the Führer, and I attached to this letter the draft of a letter
from Himmler to Hitler, asking the Führer (a) to cancel that decree, and
(b) at any rate, to relieve the subordinate departments of the burden on
their conscience.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the result?
KALTENBRUNNER: The result was positive. Although the Bullet Decree and a
number of other equally depressing orders were not repealed, it was
positive insofar as in February 1945 Hitler permitted me for the first
time to get in touch with the International Red Cross, an action which
had been strictly prohibited before.
DR. KAUFFMANN: This action with reference to the Red Cross was initiated
by you, and did this action refer to the inspection of concentration
camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: In that connection I must answer “yes” and “no,” for it
coincided with the request made by the Red Cross and its president,
Burckhardt, for immediate and direct contact. I would like to say the
attempt of both sides coincided.
But please do not misunderstand me. Apart from that there were, of
course, numerous attempts—I would almost like to say, behind Hitler’s
back—to get in contact with the Red Cross, in which connection I call
attention for instance to the continuous contact the Foreign Office had
with them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, you want to cite the
request to Professor Burckhardt to visit the concentration camps, as an
exonerating circumstance for yourself.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, of course, but I should like to talk about that
later in greater detail, because it is premature at this stage.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution have stated that during the time you were
in office two concentration camps had been newly established, Lublin and
Hertogenbosch. Did you hear anything about that? Who could have ordered
the establishing of these two camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know the date when these two camps were set up.
The one in Lublin and the other one in Hertogenbosch were subordinate
through the channel of the WVHA to the Higher Police and SS Leader of
the occupied countries in which they were situated, so that the main
offices in Berlin had nothing to do with them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, will you please answer this question with “yes” or
“no”: Had the concentration camp at Auschwitz been known to you as such?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not know about it until November of 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you, simultaneously with learning of the camp’s
existence, informed of the significance of this camp, namely, that it
was exclusively an extermination camp for Jews handed over by Eichmann?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, it could not have been known to anybody as such, for
the question put to Himmler, “Why was such a large camp being installed
there?” was always answered by him, “Because of the proximity of the
large armament works.” And I think he mentioned then Vitkovice and
others.
At any rate—and I think this must be emphasized—there was such a
complete secrecy regarding what went on in Auschwitz, that the
statements of not only the defendants but of anyone else who might be
asked by the Americans, “Do you know about it?” and answers in the
negative must be believed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The most atrocious excesses are connected with this camp
in Auschwitz. This concentration camp was under the spiritual leadership
of the infamous Eichmann. Now I am asking you: When did you get
acquainted with Eichmann?
KALTENBRUNNER: I became acquainted with Eichmann in my home town, Linz.
The Prosecution have stated—and today the attempt was made to establish
from an affidavit—that I was a friend, or at least a close
acquaintance, of Eichmann. I would like to make the following statement
on this with particular reference to my oath. I have a different
conception of a close acquaintance or even a friendship.
I learned of Eichmann’s existence in Linz because his father, as
director of an electrical construction company at Linz, consulted my
father as a lawyer, and thus they knew each other; and because, he, the
son of his father, attended the same high school as my brothers.
Therefore, the statement of Höttl that I had met Eichmann in an SS
platoon at Linz is wrong, because when I joined the SS Eichmann had
already fled to Germany, as I learned later.
Secondly, the Prosecution state that I met the same Eichmann for the
first time in 1932 and for the second time in February or March 1945.
Therefore, I did not see him for 13 years and after that last meeting I
never saw him again.
On the basis of these two personal meetings, I can draw the conclusion
that I was neither a friend of his nor that we were closely acquainted.
It is true that on that second occasion he accosted me and said,
“Obergruppenführer Eichmann is my name; I come from Linz too.” I said,
“Pleased to meet you. How are things back home?” But there was no
official contact.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness Lammers stated yesterday that in the RSHA a
conference took place regarding the so-called “final solution.” Did you
know about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I think that the witness Lammers, and another
witness, too, stated that Eichmann, possibly under my name, had called a
meeting at the RSHA in Berlin during February or March 1943, a so-called
discussion with department chiefs. I have to say to that, that nominally
I did commence my services in Berlin on 30 January, but in fact, until
May I was not in Berlin except for a few official visits, but in Vienna,
where I was enlarging my intelligence service in order to transfer it
eventually to Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: One further question to that. When did you hear, for the
first time, that the camp at Auschwitz was an extermination camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Himmler told me that in 1944, in February or March. That
is, he did not tell me, he admitted it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your attitude upon learning this?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not hear the question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What attitude did you adopt when you heard about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of Hitler’s order to Heydrich
regarding the final solution of the Jewish problem at the time I took up
my office. In the summer of 1943 I gathered from the foreign press and
through the enemy radio...
THE PRESIDENT: This is not an answer to your question. You asked him
what he did when he found out that Auschwitz was a concentration camp.
He is now making a long speech about Heydrich. You asked for his
attitude. I suppose you meant what he did when he first heard that
Auschwitz was an extermination camp, in February or March 1944. He is
now telling us a long story about something having to do with Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Please try to give me a direct answer to that question.
What was your attitude after you heard about that? Answer quite briefly
and very concisely, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Immediately after receiving knowledge of this fact, I
fought, just as I had done previously, not only against the final
solution, but also against this type of treatment of the Jewish problem.
For that reason I wanted to explain how through my intelligence service
I became acquainted with the whole Jewish problem, and what I did
against it.
THE PRESIDENT: We still don’t know what you did...
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did you do? I am asking you for the last time.
KALTENBRUNNER: In order to explain what I did I must explain how I
reacted, just as I have to tell you what I heard about it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Just explain to us your reactions.
KALTENBRUNNER: First I protested to Hitler and the next day to Himmler.
I did not only draw their attention to my personal attitude and my
completely different conception which I had brought over from Austria
and to my humanitarian qualms, but immediately, from the first day, I
concluded practically every one of my situation reports right to the
very end by saying that there was no hostile power that would negotiate
with a Reich which had burdened itself with this guilt. Those were the
reports I put to Himmler and Hitler, particularly pointing out also that
the intelligence sector would have to create the atmosphere for
discussions with the enemy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did the Jewish persecution end?
KALTENBRUNNER: October 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you want to say that this was due to your
intervention?
KALTENBRUNNER: I am firmly convinced that this is chiefly due to my
intervention, although a number of others also worked toward the same
end. But I do not think that there was anyone who kept dinning it into
Himmler’s ears every time he met him or that there was anyone who would
have spoken so openly and frankly and with such self-abnegation to
Hitler as I did.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was that instruction to Eichmann an instruction which
came from Hitler and Himmler to the RSHA and then to Eichmann, or was it
a strictly personal order outside the competence of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: Naturally I can only reconstruct the situation today,
since I was not there when these orders were issued; but I have reason
to assume that the channels for this order were: Hitler, Heydrich,
Eichmann; and that Himmler, shortly after Heydrich’s death, kept on
working with Eichmann and probably very often even excluded Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness Wisliceny, who was examined here—and this I
am going to put to you—stated on 3 January that practically the final
solution was carried out between April 1942 and October 1944. Wisliceny
referred to a personal order from Himmler and stated further that
Eichmann was personally charged with the task. But he goes on to say,
“The extermination of Jews continued under Kaltenbrunner without any
reduction or alleviation.” Reports made by Eichmann to that effect were
sent at regular intervals to Kaltenbrunner through Müller. It is stated
that in 1944 Eichmann called personally on Kaltenbrunner, and Wisliceny
affirms having seen Kaltenbrunner’s signature on such reports to
Himmler.
That was Wisliceny’s testimony. Now my question: Is this testimony true
in its essential points?
KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony is wrong, but I can clarify it. Wisliceny
may have seen my signature once, not on a report to Himmler which I had
received from Eichmann and Müller, but on a letter which I wrote to
Himmler, a copy of which I passed on to Müller and Eichmann for their
information and in which I referred to my last report—verbal report—to
Himmler regarding the Jewish question. It was on this occasion that, for
the first time, I heard of Eichmann’s activity in that respect, and, in
order to make it clear to Eichmann that I did not want to be associated
with that activity, I had Müller give this man a copy of the letter to
Himmler. In that letter I asked Himmler to define his attitude so that,
since the Führer again had ordered me to report to him, I could give the
Führer a full report on Himmler’s activities and therefore wanted an
early decision.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness Höttl has stated in an affidavit that he had
heard from Eichmann that a total number of 4 to 5 million Jewish persons
had been exterminated, about 2 million of them in Auschwitz. Have you
heard any such figures?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have never heard such figures. But I approached Himmler
on that subject and asked him whether he had any idea of all these
crimes so far. The reason I put that question to him was that he would
realize the extent of the catastrophe which was bound to follow. He
replied to me that he had no figures. I do not believe it. I believe he
had them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you want to assume a responsibility in this connection
or do you want to deny it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I must deny it completely, because I hope to be able to
prove through Burckhardt that there was nobody who exposed himself more
on this question in favor of another solution.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now referring to a document, which is Document
R-135, Exhibit USA-289. It is a letter from the Reich Commissioner for
Riga and dated 18 June 1943. It refers to an action against the Jews at
the Minsk prison. It is a letter from the commandant of the prison,
addressed to the Commissioner General for Bielorussia at Minsk. Please,
will you make a statement on that document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I can see from both the signature and the name of the
addressee that this letter could not have come to my knowledge. Nor have
I knowledge of its contents either. Presumably this is the result about
which the person is reporting in June 1943, of events which occurred
before I came into office, at any rate this must refer to events which
took place previously and which needed a certain amount of time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am coming to the next document, Number D-473,
Exhibit Number USA-522. It is a letter from the Chief of the Security
Police and the SD, dated 4 December 1944. From this also the Prosecution
conclude the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s great responsibility. It deals
with the combating of criminality among the Polish and Soviet Russian
civilian workers. As means for their punishment, the letter states, the
Criminal Police have at their disposal police detention and transfer to
a concentration camp of all asocial or dangerous prisoners. The document
has the signature, “Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” What are your views on that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have no recollection that I have ever signed any such
decree.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you deny having signed this letter at all? Or, to be
more accurate, do you know anything about the matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now submit Document 1276-PS, Exhibit Number USA-525.
The Prosecution have referred to this document. It is a consequence of
Hitler’s order dated 18 October 1942. According to this, parachutists
and sabotage troops are to be exterminated, and Commandos to be
surrendered to the SD. In a letter with the signature “Müller,” dated 17
June 1944, addressed to the High Command, it says that such parachutists
in British uniform were to be treated in accordance with Hitler’s order.
I am now asking you if you knew of this document signed by Müller, dated
17 June 1944, and if you had any knowledge at all of the matter
contained in this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of the matter or of this document. But
I should like to say the following in this connection: Later I received
knowledge of this Hitler order and of his basic attitude to this
question. I think it was at the Führer’s headquarters in February 1945;
and I have there, before witnesses, publicly stated that I was not only
personally opposed to such treatment of soldiers and prisoners, but also
that I would refuse to carry out any such order from Hitler. I think
another defendant here is calling a witness by the name of Koller, and I
request that you ask this witness, who was at that time the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, how I expressed it—I believe it was in Hitler’s
presence—what my attitude was regarding that question, which came to my
knowledge for the first time in 1945. I can do no more than I did before
this most powerful and almighty man Germany ever had, who declared, “He
who does not obey my orders, no matter who the commander, will be shot.”
I can do no more than what I did say in his presence to the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force and other officers: “I will not obey such an
order.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to Document 2990-PS, Exhibit Number USA-526.
This is an affidavit from the witness Schellenberg. According to it, in
1944 a meeting took place between Kaltenbrunner and Müller.
Kaltenbrunner is supposed to have stated that actions of the populations
against terrorist fliers must not be interfered with; that, on the
contrary, the hostile attitude of the population must be encouraged. I
shall quote a few sentences from the examination of the witness
Schellenberg on 3 January 1946, where he says:
“In 1944 on some other occasion during a conference I heard
fragments of a conversation between Kaltenbrunner and Müller.
The following remark by Kaltenbrunner remains clearly in my
recollection: ‘All departments of the Security Police and the
Sipo must be informed that actions on the part of the population
against British and American terror-fliers must not be
interfered with; on the contrary, the hostile attitude of the
population must be encouraged.’”
Do you know Schellenberg?
KALTENBRUNNER: Regarding Schellenberg I must say...
DR. KAUFFMANN: In a few sentences please.
KALTENBRUNNER: ...with reference to his credibility in the matter of
this document, that he was a protégé of Heydrich’s and when I took
office he was in charge of...
THE PRESIDENT: He wants to know whether you know Schellenberg. That is a
question you can answer.
The question was, “Do you know Schellenberg?” And he goes off into a
long speech without answering the question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know Schellenberg? “Yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, of course. He was the Chief of Department VI.
DR. KAUFFMANN: My question: What were the relations between you and the
Chief of Department VI? Do you regard this statement as true or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: That statement is not true, and I should like to give you
the reason so that the Tribunal can evaluate that statement.
Schellenberg was Himmler’s most intimate friend. By Himmler’s order, he
remained with him to the last day. He is the man who, on Himmler’s
behalf, established contact with the Swedish Count Bernadotte. He was
the man who, at the very last minute, through M. Muehse in Switzerland,
established a connection which was used to permit a very few Jewish
prisoners to go to Switzerland, the purpose of which was to create
quickly a favorable impression for Himmler and Schellenberg abroad. He
is the man who, together with another friend of Himmler’s, started an
action to make an agreement with an organization of rabbis in the United
States whereby they were to get him a favorable press in some of the
larger newspapers in America. I have criticized Himmler for these tricks
and complained and discredited them with Hitler, stating that it was
demeaning to the cause and the Reich that in so important a matter these
methods should be used by Himmler and Schellenberg. I said the only
correct way would be to establish contact with the International Red
Cross immediately. Consequently, I prejudiced Himmler before President
Burckhardt, and forced him to adopt a different attitude in this
question by asking Burckhardt personally to visit these camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But I put a completely different question.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but I had to say this so that you can see how
disappointed Schellenberg and Himmler were about what I was doing and
why he, now, is interested in accusing me, as has been done in the
affidavit, of breaking my word on international matters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that Schellenberg was in
opposition to you and against you, and is implicating you unjustly.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now then, in this Schellenberg document the event with
reference to these 50 fliers is mentioned; and Schellenberg states that
you, together with Müller and Nebe, had a conference and that all of you
were trying to find an excuse in order to keep the actual truth of these
events from the public. I am asking you: When did you first hear of the
shooting of these 50 fliers?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is the Case Sagan.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you hear of it? It is a simple question, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: The first time that case became known to me was about six
weeks after it happened.
DR. KAUFFMANN: My next question: Do you want to say that you were not
involved in the shooting in any way, that to the contrary you were only
much later able to investigate the matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, that is what I want to say.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also mean to say that the conference with
Schellenberg dealt exclusively with the later attempt to conceal the
truth of the matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: It can only have referred to that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am coming to Document 835-PS, Exhibit Number USA-527.
This document also is held against the defendant by the Prosecution. It
is the so-called Nacht und Nebel Decree, which is an order from Hitler
dated 7 December 1941. Is the expression “Nacht und Nebel Decree”
familiar to you? When did you hear of it for the first time?
KALTENBRUNNER: The first time I heard of it was in June 1945 in London.
[_A document was handed to the defendant._]
DR. KAUFFMANN: This document which I have submitted to you is a letter
from the OKW, dated 2 September 1944, addressed to the German Armistice
Commission. It is signed by Dr. Lehmann, and in it is stated:
“According to the decrees all non-German civilians in occupied
territories who have endangered the security and preparedness of
the occupying forces by means of terror or sabotage or in any
other way are to be handed over to the Security Police and the
SD.”
In the case of so important a matter, it appears improbable that the
matter and the Nacht und Nebel Decree were not known to you.
KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge and I beg to be given permission to
clarify the situation. May I first of all say that no document shows
better proof than this of the fact that an executive function is
wrongfully attributed to the SD. It says here on Line 4:
“...who have endangered...in any other way are to be handed over
to the Security Police and the SD.”
First of all, it is complete nonsense to state that one and the same
thing should be handed over to two different authorities; either it is
the Security Police or the SD.
This error in the use of the German language found its way into the
Führer decree because Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD,
was referred to in short as Chief of SD, but it is an absolute mistake.
Whereby, God knows, I am not trying to exonerate the SD from other
things which it may, perhaps, have committed, but I want to make it
clear that it is wrong to conclude from this that it had executive
powers.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but it is not only the question of the SD, but also
of the Security Police.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, and to that I want to say the following: This Führer
decree from the year 1941 was not known to me. I am asking you to put
yourself in my position. At the beginning of 1943 I came to Berlin. With
the exception of a few official visits I commenced my activity in May
1943. In the fourth year of the war the decrees and orders within the
Reich and also in the executive sector reached the thousands and were
accumulating on the desks and the cabinets of the civil servants. It was
absolutely impossible for any man even to read them all within a year,
and it was quite impossible for me to know of the existence of all these
orders even had I considered it my duty to do so. But it was not my duty
at all.
Then I am asking you to consider the following fact: The beginning of my
activity was February 1943. On 2 February Stalingrad was surrendered and
the largest military catastrophe...
THE PRESIDENT: This is a long speech in answer to a question as to
whether he had seen this letter. He says he did not see the letter. Then
he makes this long speech.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now putting this question to you: When did you
realize what significance this Nacht und Nebel Decree had and what it
meant regarding the treatment of persons it affected? Please give a
precise answer.
KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, the existence of the decree was unknown to
me. Had I known that this matter would be held against me here, then I
would have been able to nominate a witness in captivity in London who
can prove that even in London I had no idea that it existed. We have
talked about that in the cell.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The end result, therefore, is that you did not know?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, absolutely ignorant regarding that decree.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the Document 526-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-502, which has been used by the Prosecution.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
This refers to the landing of an enemy cutter in Norway on 30 March
1943. That report contains a sentence: “Führer order carried out by SD.”
The signature on that document is lacking. It is dated 10 May 1943. It
is a secret command matter and the heading is “Note.”
Please, will you make a statement regarding that sentence, “Führer order
carried out by SD.”
KALTENBRUNNER: The execution of such a Führer order is unknown to me. I
want to point out that this note is obviously one made by a military
department regarding an event which took place shortly after I had come
into office but at a time before I had come to Berlin. I could not have
had knowledge of it at all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It says at the end of the document, “Armed Forces report
dated 6 April 1943.” It states further as follows: “In northern Norway
an enemy ship carrying sabotage troops was forced to fight when
approaching the coast and was destroyed.”
Do you know anything about the connection of this Armed Forces
report—as far as you knew of it at all—with the actual decree?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. Of course, I read, daily, practically every incoming
Armed Forces report. But from its composition I am unable to determine
any participation of any military agency within my sphere.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to the next document which has been held
against the defendant by the Prosecution, Document L-37, Exhibit Number
USA-506. This is the so-called “responsibility of relatives,” that is to
say, it refers to crimes committed against relatives of the guilty
persons. This document refers to a letter from the commander of the
Security Police to the SD at Radom, dated 19 July 1944, according to
which male relatives of saboteurs are to be shot and female relatives to
be sent to concentration camps.
What is your explanation to the Tribunal with reference to that document
and the whole matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: The report commences with the words: “The Higher SS and
Police Leader East has ...” and so on and so forth, and then, “ordered”
or “issued the following order.”
The Higher Police Leader East is a department, which, as a department in
an occupied territory, is directly under the jurisdiction of the
Reichsführer SS and not under any central department in Berlin.
Therefore I could not have had knowledge of that order. The police
leaders in occupied territories were immediately subordinate to Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the next accusation of the Prosecution
regarding the concentration camp at Dachau. A document exists which has
the number Document 3462-PS, Exhibit Number USA-528. It is a statement
by the Gaustabsamtsleiter Gerdes.
The Prosecution are accusing the defendant of contemplating the wiping
out of the concentration camp at Dachau and its adjoining camps at
Mühldorf and Landsberg by bombs or poison. I shall read a few sentences
from that document. They are on Page 2 of the German text, near the end
of the page:
“In December 1944 or January 1945 I was in the office of
Gauleiter Giesler in Munich, Ludwig Street 28, and had the
opportunity of learning about a secret order from Kaltenbrunner.
Gauleiter Giesler received that order in my presence through a
courier and, after I had been given permission to read it, it
was destroyed in accordance with the remark on the document; ‘To
be destroyed after cognizance has been taken.’ The order which
was signed by Kaltenbrunner was worded roughly as follows:
“‘In agreement with the Reichsführer SS I have instructed all
higher police departments that every German who participates in
the future in the persecution and destruction of enemy fliers
will remain unpunished.’
“Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant contact with
him since he was considerably worried over the attitude of
foreign workers and particularly the inmates of the
concentration camps at Dachau, Mühldorf, and Landsberg, which
were in the path of the approaching Allied armies.
“On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I had a telephone call
from the Gauleiter ordering me to keep myself available for a
night conference. In the course of our conversation that evening
Gauleiter Giesler disclosed the fact to me that
Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner had given him instructions, in
accordance with an order from the Führer, that there should be
made an immediate plan regarding the liquidation of the
concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish work camps at
Mühldorf and Landsberg. The instructions stated that these two
Jewish work camps at Landsberg and Mühldorf were to be destroyed
by the German Air Force, since the sites of those two camps had
lately and repeatedly been affected by hostile bombing attacks.
The action was given the camouflage name ‘Cloud A-1.’”
KALTENBRUNNER: May I say something to that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: First, please, do you know Gerdes?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know Gerdes and I have never seen him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know Giesler?
KALTENBRUNNER: The last time I saw Giesler was in 1942, in September.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was an order of Hitler in existence regarding the
destruction of concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you give a reasonable explanation regarding this
document?
KALTENBRUNNER: To give a reasonable explanation for that document is
almost humanly impossible, because from the beginning to the end it is
an invention and a fake. I brand this document a complete and utter lie
coming from Gerdes, and I can only refer you to the deposition
supporting my statement by the Higher SS and Police Leader who was the
sole competent authority in Bavaria, Freiherr Von Eberstein, who himself
calls Gerdes’ statement completely incredible. I would like to refute
these accusations in detail as follows: He says:
“On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I had a telephone call
from the Gauleiter ordering me to keep myself available for a
night conference.”—He—“... disclosed ... that Kaltenbrunner
had given him instructions, in accordance with an order from the
Führer ...”—and so on.
Nobody in the Reich knew better than Hitler who was responsible for
concentration camps and how he had to give an order. He would never have
given me such an order and he could not have given it to me because I
was, on Hitler’s personal order, in Austria from 28 March until 15
April. As to the time from 10 April until 8 May, when I was captured,
including the few days when I was in Berlin I can state exactly just
where I have been and what I have done, so that the question of giving
an order in this connection is impossible. And, anyway, it must have
happened earlier, if the witness is talking about the middle of April,
which would mean that I would have had to talk to Hitler about this
before the middle of April, since otherwise he could not have been asked
to be available for a night conference by the middle of April.
The existence of Jewish work camps in Bavaria as branches of Dachau, was
completely unknown to me. And I am asking you to recognize the absurdity
of my sponsoring in April of 1945 such an order, when I tried in March
1945 to start discussions with the President of the International Red
Cross, Burckhardt, regarding the release and help to be given to all
Jews, and when I made all efforts to have him personally look after the
Jewish camps—in which I succeeded.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have any possibility at all to exert influence on
the German Air Force in this respect?
KALTENBRUNNER: I neither had the possibility of giving the Air Force
orders—I could only have asked the Chief of the Air Force to give them
and there, of course, it would have been turned down, because you must
realize that at this point, when everyone knew that the war had come to
an end, the Air Force would not have lent its hand to a terrible crime.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And now, with the permission of the Tribunal, and because
it is a terrible accusation, I am quoting a few sentences from this
document, because the Prosecution, too, have read these sentences into
the record. The document goes on to say:
“I was aware that I would never carry this order out.”—this is
Gerdes talking—“Since the action ‘Cloud A-1’ was supposed to
have been carried out already, couriers from Kaltenbrunner kept
arriving, and I was supposed to have discussed the details of
the Mühldorf and Landsberg action with the two district leaders
concerned. The couriers, who in most cases were SS officers,
mostly SS Untersturmführer, made me read and initial brief and
sharp orders. I was threatened with severe punishment including
execution in case of disobedience. I could always excuse the
failure to carry out the plan with bad weather for flying or
with lack of petrol or lack of bombs.
“Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered that the Jews should be
marched from Landsberg to Dachau, so that they should be
included in the poisoning action which was going on in Dachau,
whereas the action at Mühldorf was to be carried out by the
Gestapo. For the Dachau Concentration Camp Kaltenbrunner ordered
the action ‘Cloud Fire,’ which stipulated that the inmates of
the concentration camps at Dachau, with the exception of the
Aryan members of the Western Powers, were to be liquidated with
poison.
“Gauleiter Giesler received that order directly from
Kaltenbrunner and in my presence he discussed with the health
officer of the Gau, Dr. Harrfield, the procurement of the
necessary amount of poison. Dr. Harrfield promised that the
necessary quantity, in accordance with the order, would be
obtained, and he received instructions to wait my further
orders. Since I wished to prevent this action from being carried
out in any event, I gave no further instructions to Dr.
Harrfield. The inmates of the camp at Landsberg had hardly
arrived at Dachau when a courier from Kaltenbrunner brought the
order for the action ‘Cloud Fire’ to be carried out. I prevented
the execution of the two actions, ‘Cloud A-1’ and ‘Cloud Fire’
by telling Giesler that the front line was too near and to
convey that reason to Kaltenbrunner.
“Kaltenbrunner gave written instructions to Dachau that all
internees who were members of the Western European Powers were
to be loaded on lorries and transported to Switzerland, whereas
the remaining inmates were to be marched afoot into the Ötztal
territory (Tyrol), where the final liquidation of the internees
was to be carried out, in one way or the other.”
Perhaps you can explain in a few words, without going into detail,
whether or not this document contains the truth.
KALTENBRUNNER: This document is completely untrue.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is completely untrue?
KALTENBRUNNER: But, Doctor, I must have an opportunity to define my
views. I must be given an opportunity to clarify the details.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have already defined your attitude. If you have to
say anything important in addition to that, you can state it now.
KALTENBRUNNER: The following appears to be important to me: According to
his statement, I must have had dozens of couriers during my stay in
Austria. Two persons were in my company, my driver and my administrative
adjutant, his name was Scheitler, a man who had nothing to do with
intelligence and police. There were three of us. I had not even the
possibility of dispatching so many couriers.
Secondly, as far as Bavaria was concerned, there was no need for me to
carry out any preparations, not even under pressure from Himmler. Why?
Because, as far as Bavaria is concerned, plenipotentiary powers were
given to Obergruppenführer Berger, the same day I was given
plenipotentiary powers for Austria. So that there was no reason for me
to take such action.
Thirdly, I could not even have carried such insane orders regarding a
concentration camp in my heart when, at the same time, I was ordering
exactly the opposite. I am thinking of Mauthausen. I had given an order
to Mauthausen that the camp was to be completely handed over to the
enemy. If you can put yourself in Himmler’s place, then this would have
been completely wrong, since the real criminals were in Mauthausen,
whereas the people in Dachau had nothing or little against them. So that
even if you thought as Himmler—that the exact opposite would have been
necessary—from that point of view, too, it is completely insane to
accuse me of any such action.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Finally, the Prosecution hold you responsible for the
fact that you, as Chief of the Security Police and the SD, tolerated the
persecution of the church, particularly the Catholic Church, by the
Gestapo. I recall to you in this connection that the Department B-2 of
Amt IV was concerned with education and confessional questions, and
Department 1 of Amt IV with political Catholicism. Do you know anything
regarding the fact that within that department there was a twofold
policy regarding the churches with a so-called “immediate goal” and a
“distant goal”? By “immediate goal” they meant that the churches would
not be allowed to regain a single inch of ground; “distant goal”
signified the final destruction of the churches in Germany at the end of
the war. What do you know about these aims?
KALTENBRUNNER: All I can say to these theoretical statements is that
they were completely unknown to me. The church policy of the Reich, as I
had to recognize in 1943, was different. In 1943, to maintain Hitler’s
policy meant to achieve a covert truce with the churches, at least for
the duration of the war; that is, to refrain as much as possible from
attacks and to proceed only against individual misdemeanors by the
clergy, if express authorization had been forthcoming.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you? I am asking you: Did you in the
spring of 1943...
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I want to come to that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: ...did you undertake anything with Hitler, and what was
the result?
KALTENBRUNNER: Well, I just wanted again to give you a picture of the
state of affairs which I found. In spite of Hitler’s policy, I found
that Bormann was actively continuing the fight against the churches.
Therefore as early as March, I think, I wrote to Hitler, and later
requested verbally a full clarification of the church policy. I asked
him to alter it with a view to effecting a rapprochement. Above all I
wanted to bring about a different policy toward the Vatican.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not think there is any need for you to go into too
much detail.
KALTENBRUNNER: But I was blocked. First of all, Himmler opposed the idea
to Hitler, and, secondly, I had the very strong resistance of Bormann
against me. He even went so far as to undermine completely the
reputation of the German representative to the Vatican, Weizsäcker, by
sending a man to shadow him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough about that.
Mr. President, do you want me to go on, because it is now 5?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in a short time, we would like you to
go on. How long are you going to be?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I would say it would take me about another hour, since I
must discuss those documents which have been submitted by the
Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I will say the Tribunal will sit on
Saturday in open session until 1 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH DAY
Friday, 12 April 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner resumed the stand._]
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, yesterday the case of Sagan was dealt with
by the defendant, but regarding his own participation he said only a few
sentences. The Prosecution are assuming that he was an immediate
participant even before the fliers had been shot. The two witnesses,
Westhoff and Wielen, in my opinion, produced evidence in favor of the
defendant, and I am now asking the Tribunal to tell me whether the
defendant may have permission to speak in detail regarding the manner in
which he was actively involved in the affair, or whether the Tribunal is
satisfied with the treatment this problem has been given.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that if the defendant has knowledge of
the facts connected with it, he had better give them. He need not give
them in any greater detail than is necessary, but in view of the
evidence of the witness Wielen, I think he ought to deal with it.
DR. KAUFFMANN. [_To the defendant._] You stated yesterday that you heard
about the Case Sagan for the first time after the event had taken place.
Do you maintain that position today?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In what manner did you become acquainted with the Case
Sagan later on, and what did you do about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was never officially informed of Case Sagan, but
roughly 6 weeks after this event I received knowledge of it. At the time
these fliers escaped and at the time the orders were given—which in my
opinion went this way: Hitler-Himmler-Müller-Nebe, or possibly
Himmler-Fegelein-Nebe—I do not know, as at the time I was not present
in Berlin but was in Hungary and, with a number of stops, finally
finished up in a visit to Minister Speer in Dahlem. On 2 or 3 April I
returned to Berlin. Up to that time, no one had informed me of it. The
first time I heard of the affair was when the Foreign Office made
complaints, or rather, demanded from Nebe and Müller that the case
should be clarified so that they could answer a note which, I believe,
had been sent to the Foreign Office by the protecting power.
The description of the witness General Westhoff is, in my opinion,
misleading. I think he said something about mentioning the Case Sagan
approximately 4 weeks after the shooting, during another conversation
with me. I think that it was at least 6 weeks afterwards. It should be
possible to ascertain when the Foreign Office made that inquiry. Then it
would be possible to ascertain the exact date.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on, when you talked to Müller and Nebe, what was
devised as a camouflage for this matter and what was thought of?
KALTENBRUNNER: No camouflage was devised nor discussed in our office,
but when Müller and Nebe said that they would have to reply to the
Foreign Office’s inquiry and in that connection informed me of that
dreadful order for the first time, I asked them who had given that order
and they replied, “Himmler.” I told them that they ought to get in touch
with this superior immediately and ask him how the case should be dealt
with further. I refused to have any connection with that matter. It had
been unknown to me up to that time, and I considered it a dirty affair.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But was it not mentioned in that connection that it would
be said that the fliers had lost their lives through bombs or that they
had been shot while trying to escape? What do you know in that respect?
The witness Schellenberg has stated that there were such conversations.
KALTENBRUNNER: Such words may have been said, yes. It has been described
here how the large-scale searches were handled; and in connection with
these manhunts, there were shootings. Even Germans were shot in that
connection. An SS Oberführer in Alsatian territory was shot when he did
not answer a stop signal at a road block which had been erected in the
course of this search. Two or three of the fliers were killed by bombs,
as I was told. I think that was along the Baltic coast in Kiel or
Stettin, and I understand that two Criminal Police officials also lost
their lives in this accident. Their widows received pensions
subsequently. That is something that ought to be ascertainable. In this
connection bombing and losses through bombing were certainly mentioned,
but a camouflage of the whole affair was not discussed in our office; in
any case the answer was prepared by Müller, Nebe, and Himmler, in
Himmler’s headquarters. I know that immediately after the inquiry from
the Foreign Office these two left by air for Himmler’s headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you trying to say then that the statement according
to which these fliers had lost their lives by bombs, or had been shot
while escaping, did not originate from you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not; it did not originate from me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With reference to the church policy of Department IV, the
Prosecution are charging you with the following: so-called
Bibelforscher, or International Bible Students, had often been sentenced
to death on the strength of their inner convictions, only because they
refused to serve in the war in any way. My question to you is this: Do
you know of this state of affairs, and in what manner did you
participate in that matter?
KALTENBRUNNER: German jurisdiction used as a basis for proceedings
against this sect of International Bible Students was the law for the
Protection of the Defense of the German Nation. Under this law any one
who was interfering with German defense strength by refusing to serve in
the forces could be penalized with detention or death. According to this
law, military as well as civilian courts pronounced even the death
sentence also against these International Bible Students. Death
sentences, of course, were not pronounced by the Secret State Police.
In this connection it was often spoken of as an unjust harshness against
the attitude dictated to these sectarians by their creed. I approached
the Party Chancellery as well as the Ministry of Justice and Himmler and
Hitler during my reports, and pointed out these facts to them; during
several conferences with Thierack I demanded that this kind of
jurisdiction should be discontinued. As a result two things were done.
On the occasion of the first conference, after Thierack had made an
inquiry at the office of Bormann and Hitler whom he evidently did not
see personally, a directive was at once issued to the Public
Prosecutors’ offices stating that sentences which had already been
pronounced were to be stayed.
During a further conference another step was taken, which was that the
public prosecutors in general were given instructions not to demand the
death sentence any longer.
The third step was that International Bible Students were no longer
brought before the court.
I consider it a definite success of my personal intervention with
Thierack—which later had been discussed with Hitler himself—that this
jurisdiction against these sects was completely abolished.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now submitting a Document 1063...
KALTENBRUNNER: May I supplement my statement by saying the following:
These developments and this alteration of German law became also known
abroad at that time. I remember quite well that a very well-known
Swedish medical man thanked me personally and stated that this deed had
been well received in Sweden.
THE PRESIDENT: This really is an unnecessary detail about what happened
with some Swedish person outside of Germany, as to what they thought of
his actions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
I am now coming to Document 1063(d)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-219. This is
a directive from the Chief of the Security Police and SD, dated 17
December 1942. It is a secret letter, and it is addressed to all
commanders of the Security Police and SD; and it goes for information to
Pohl, to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and the inspectors of
concentration camps. It is a directive according to which at least
35,000 persons capable of work are to be transferred to concentration
camps by the end of January 1943 at the latest. The letter is signed by
Müller.
I am asking you, do you know of this letter, or do you know of any such
affair at all?
KALTENBRUNNER: I neither know the letter, nor do I know about the
affair.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number again?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1063(d)-PS, Exhibit USA-219.
KALTENBRUNNER: From the date of the letter, it becomes apparent that
this was written before I came into office. It was not made known to me
afterwards either. The signature is “Müller,” who acted on Himmler’s
behalf, as is shown from Line 2. It is a typical case, which proves how
unlimited Müller’s authority was and the extent to which he enjoyed
confidence, if he could issue a decree like this.
I gather from the whole content of this letter—it refers to a day at
the end of January 1943—that it is impossible that this affair had been
reported to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution hold you responsible in the following
connection: There was an agreement between the former Minister of
Justice Thierack and Himmler, dated 18 September 1942, according to
which Jews, Poles, and so forth, were to be subjected to penal police
proceedings instead of being dealt with by ordinary law courts. I ask
you: Did you know of this agreement; and, if so, what attempt did you
make so as to reinstate ordinary law proceedings so far as that was
possible?
KALTENBRUNNER: Such an agreement between Thierack and Himmler is not
known to me. As you said, it was made in the autumn of 1942, I believe.
But repeatedly, again and again, I worked towards the end and submitted
proposals that all police courts should be done away with in favor of
proper law proceedings. I am legally trained, and for that reason I have
more respect for the courts than Himmler. This was one of the main
reasons why we never understood each other, and it was one of the main
reasons for differences which cropped up even during our first
discussions in 1942 at Berchtesgaden.
I cannot understand Thierack either, his making such an agreement with
Himmler, because later on, as I know myself, he repeatedly spoke against
the police court system.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the question of whether you had knowledge
of the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, which was carried out in 1943.
A report is available on this from the SS and Police Leader in Warsaw,
whose name was Stroop. The report is addressed to the General of the
Police Krüger, and refers to the so-called solution of the Jewish
question in Galicia.
Now I ask you: When did you hear of this solution of the Jewish problem
in Galicia, and did you exhaust every possibility so as to possibly
prevent that solution?
KALTENBRUNNER: First of all, in this connection, I must state that I
perhaps did not know enough about the tremendous instrument of power
which Himmler had created by putting under his direct command the Higher
SS and Police Leaders, in the occupied territories. For SS and Police
Leaders, Stroop in this case, were subordinated to the Higher SS and
Police Leaders—in this connection for instance, General Krüger in the
Government General. No department in the Reich was informed of or
participated in any action, neither before nor afterwards, which was
ordered by Himmler through Krüger to Stroop. Certainly, Berlin did not
know anything of such an order in advance.
Afterwards—I cannot tell you how long afterwards—they wrote and talked
regarding the Warsaw Ghetto both in this country and abroad. Most
serious accusations were made in foreign countries.
Yesterday, I started to state here that in this connection I had
delivered to Reichsführer Himmler the first file documents which I had
in my possession on his measures and policies. I did that after
reporting to the Führer in November 1943. On that occasion I certainly
talked to him about Warsaw, too, since for one thing, he and his “final
solution of the Jewish question” were being criticized abroad.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was the date of that report in comparison to that
action against the Jews in Galicia?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot remember when that action was. My reports, first
to Hitler and a day later to Himmler, were in November 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to a document which has already been mentioned
by the Prosecution, Document L-53, Exhibit Number USA-291. The
Prosecution hold the defendant, as Chief of the Security Police and SD,
responsible for the cleansing—as it is put—at Security Police and SD
camps and concentration camps. This document is a letter from the
Commander of the Security Police and SD at Radom, dated 21 July 1944,
according to which the Commander of the Security Police and SD in the
Government General had ordered that all the prisons which are mentioned
must be cleansed and that their inmates must be liquidated. Look at this
document, sender and signature, and then make a statement in this
connection particularly regarding the question of whether you knew of
these events.
KALTENBRUNNER: I draw your attention to what I have just said. This
channel of command falls into the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and
Police Leader for an occupied territory. The channel for
orders—Himmler, Higher SS and Police Leader, his expert,
Commander-in-Chief and commander of the Security Police and SD—that
channel has nothing whatever to do with the centralized channel of
orders coming from Berlin.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that these Higher SS and
Police Leaders were immediately subordinate to Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, indeed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also want to say that you as Chief of the RSHA had
no possibility of interfering with orders and directives of such Higher
SS and Police Leaders?
KALTENBRUNNER: It was out of the question for they were immediately
subordinate to Himmler. There was no other way for opposing such men, as
is quite obvious from the interrogation of the Defendant Frank.
Repeatedly I have of course received information about wrongdoings and
crimes committed through these channels of orders. For instance, Krüger
in the Government General was most violently attacked by me. It was due
to me, too, that Krüger was removed from his position in Kraków, a fact
which must also be shown by Frank’s diary.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to another document—Number 1573-PS, Exhibit
USA-498. The Prosecution are holding the defendant as Chief of the RSHA
responsible that, under alteration of existing methods, slave workers
had been used in the armament industry. This document before us is a
secret order, which once again is signed by Müller. It is addressed to
all police service departments. The date is 18 June 1941. The order
refers to measures against emigrants and civilian workers from Russian
territories. It states that for the prevention of their unauthorized
return and any interference on their part, the persons concerned will be
arrested if the occasion arises. Until further notice these people
cannot change their place of residence unless they receive permission
from the Security Police; and if they leave their place of work without
this permission they will be arrested.
Were such events known to you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. In this respect, too, I can only point out that this
is an order from Müller which was given 1½ years before my appointment.
Müller, receiving orders from Himmler directly and enjoying tremendous
power and authority, saw no reason to inform me of this, even later on.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain it that Müller was in a position to
exercise such power, and that even during your term of office, 1943-45,
this state of affairs continued without your having the possibility of
stopping the man? Therefore I now ask you: Was it generally known to you
that Müller had this power? In this connection, will you tell the
Tribunal what the size of Department IV of the Secret State Police was
and how it might be explained that you were not informed about those
hundreds or even thousands of orders and instructions?
KALTENBRUNNER: Müller was the Chief of the Secret State Police
Department. I do not know when he was appointed, but I must assume that
it must have been in 1933, 1934, or at the latest 1935. But much
earlier, as I know today, he had the closest contact with Himmler and
later with Heydrich. He came from the Bavarian Landespolizei, where
Himmler met him. He had his personal confidence for at least 12 or 15
years. He participated in and carried out, with him, every action which
in the domain of State Police Himmler ordered in his eagerness for power
or in pursuance of his aims as Chief of the German Police. This
confidence I might say was continually increased for 12 or 15 years and
remained unshaken to the very last days of the war. Müller also remained
in Berlin after he had the order to remain with Himmler. Himmler relied
on him as his blind and trustworthy instrument.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, the question that you have put to him, or
the questions which you put—you put several—he does not seem to be
answering. The main question was whether he knew of these actions of
Müller. He is giving us a long speech now about how much confidence
Himmler had in Müller. He has not said anything else yet.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I think that this question particularly
ought to be dealt with at some length, because what the Gestapo and
Müller are being accused of, is what Kaltenbrunner is accused of as
Chief of the Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out to you was that you had asked him
several questions in one, and the main part of the question was whether
he knew that Müller had these powers and was exercising them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Answer that question right now briefly and clearly.
KALTENBRUNNER: The relations between Himmler and Müller were so direct
that there was no cause for him to give me any reports. I had no
knowledge, and as early as December 1942 Himmler stated clearly that the
chiefs of Departments IV and V were his immediate subordinates, as had
been the case since Heydrich’s death.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now it is going to be put to you that, based on certain
statements of witnesses and other evidence, it must be assumed that
conferences of department chiefs must have taken place between you and
Müller, and that it appears improbable that you were not aware in
general of the things which Müller decreed. Is that accusation
justified?
KALTENBRUNNER: It appears to be justified, but it is not. What is called
a conference of department chiefs here, was a joint luncheon which was
not taken every day but let us say three or four times a week, a joint
luncheon of adjutants, department chiefs, and any guests who might have
been in Berlin at the time. That personal atmosphere alone made it
impossible that internal or rather secret events might have been
discussed in front of all these people.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In 1943 and the following years, were you always in
Berlin—or I think I had better say—were you mostly resident in Berlin?
Or did your work as Chief of the intelligence service make it necessary
for you to leave Berlin often?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was frequently absent from Berlin. I think I can say
that half of all the working time was spent away from Berlin. I was
constantly in Berlin only from the moment the headquarters were
transferred there.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?
KALTENBRUNNER: That was in the months of February and March 1945. I was
not in Berlin even in April 1945 in two long periods from 28 March until
15 April, then from 19 April until the last day of the war. During the
years 1943 and 1944 I did not come to Berlin until May 1943, because up
to that time I had my own services in Vienna to reorganize so that they
could be transferred to Berlin. I think only once during the first or
second week in February 1943 did I stay in Berlin so as to pay visits,
and from the middle of February 1943 to February 1945 I was away on
trips for at least half the time. I have covered more than 400,000
kilometers by plane and car in my duties.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were your activities when you were absent from
Berlin? Did you have no direct contact with Müller during that time?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not with Müller. During all these journeys of
mine in the entire Reich, I never entered one single service department
of the Secret State Police. An exception is the Secret State Police
office in Linz where my family was living for a short while and from
where I could send teleprints to Berlin; taking advantage of the Local
State Police office for purely technical reasons. I had no other
teleprint facilities there.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now going to discuss an affair of which you are
accused by the Prosecution. In a few words, these are the facts
concerned: During the suppression of the revolt in Warsaw in 1944,
inhabitants of the city of Warsaw were taken to concentration camps. The
Prosecution put the figure at about 50,000 to 60,000. Further
deportations are supposed to have ceased due to an intervention of the
Defendant Frank with Himmler, you personally having been involved by the
fact that Defendant Frank and his State Secretary, Bühler, had asked you
to get these people out of the concentration camps and return them to
their homes. To begin with, I ask you, did such a conference on that
subject take place in your office?
KALTENBRUNNER: A conference between Bühler and myself took place. The
subject was something quite different and I am asking you to let me
state it clearly. The so-called uprising of Warsaw was quelled in a
purely military action. I think that this fight took place under the
command of the chief of the anti-partisan units, Von dem Bach-Zelewski.
I do not know which fighting units he was commanding, but I must assume
that there were mixed troop units of the Armed Forces and the Police.
Any participation of my office in this purely military action is out of
question from the start. What Himmler and the troop units did with the
prisoners was naturally not reported to me. The reason why Bühler came
to see me was quite a different one. Frank, I think, for 1½ years or
even longer, had been trying to get Hitler to employ a different policy
in the Government General. Frank was in favor of increased autonomy for
the Polish people. In October 1944, I think on the occasion of a Polish
National holiday, Frank had been planning to announce the increase of
their autonomy. Hitler’s refusal, in which he was encouraged by Himmler,
and also other factors, was apparent. Therefore he sent Bühler to me
with the proposal that I should make suggestions through the information
service to the same end, that is, the participation of the Poles in the
district administration and in the high positions of the Government. I
promised Bühler both these things. He went on to say, “On this occasion
Frank wants a generous amnesty to be pronounced in Poland and that
includes the release of the prisoners from the Warsaw uprising. Can’t
you help us with that?” I asked him, “Where are those prisoners?” He
replied, “Himmler has, at all events, sent them to prisoner-of-war
concentration camps.” My answer could only have been, “Then he must have
employed them in any case in the armament industry and it will be hard
to get them out from there, but I shall favor an amnesty.” According to
my knowledge that was the state of the case.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would it have been possible for you to bring about a
release by asserting your full influence?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, during the time I was in office, as I have repeatedly
stated during interrogations before the Trial, I have received at least
1,000 individual applications for release and every single case was put
before Himmler or sent to him—put before him mostly, since I put them
in my report file and discussed them with Himmler during my periodical
reports to him. In perhaps two-thirds of all the cases I was successful
to the extent that he arranged a release. But to such an extent as Frank
wanted to achieve from Himmler with the help of Bühler, I never had the
possibility of making a decision or of bringing about a decision; that
was entirely in Himmler’s hands and was determined by the policy which
he and Hitler agreed upon regarding Poland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now put before you a statement from the witness
Schellenberg. On 3 January this witness stated before this Tribunal that
the evacuation of the Buchenwald concentration camp had been ordered by
Kaltenbrunner. “Kaltenbrunner,” he said, “had stated yes, this is
correct; this evacuation is due to a Führer order which had been
confirmed to him, Kaltenbrunner, by the Führer.” Can you give an
explanation of this?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is quite definitely incorrect. It is
incorrect by the mere fact that Hitler quite definitely never ordered an
evacuation or a nonevacuation of concentration camps. Such an order
could only originate from Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Was there an affidavit or did he give the
evidence—Schellenberg?
DR. KAUFFMANN: It was a statement of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: It was given in evidence, was it?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is a statement of a witness on 3 January.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But, then, who did actually give such an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: It could certainly have been an order only from Himmler
himself. The channel of command is quite clear: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks,
and the camp commandant. It is not impossible that Himmler may have
given the order direct to the commandant of the camp. That I do not
know.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question. Did you gain knowledge of
this order?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I neither heard of it nor could these orders be in
any way connected with me, since I had ordered exactly the contrary
regarding Mauthausen. I shall explain later why, in the case of
Mauthausen, I was able to give an order for the first and only time. It
has to do with the powers given to me on 19 April 1945. Until then, I
never had any possibility at all of giving any such order in the name of
Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the same connection I am mentioning the statement made
3 January by the witness Berger. I read one or two sentences:
“The commandant of Dachau”—says Berger—“or his deputy,
telephoned about 12 o’clock and stated to me that he had
received this order, that is, the order for the evacuation from
Kaltenbrunner after he had been summoned by the Gauleiter of
Munich, the Reich Commissioner.”
I ask you: Do you know anything about the evacuation of Dachau?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. This statement of Berger must be doubted quite
definitely because he was the man who had been given full authority by
Himmler, concerning Bavaria and all the territory west of it. That was
given to him the same day I received full power regarding Austria.
Therefore it would be for me...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the concentration camp at Dachau come under Berger’s
sphere of power just mentioned by you, or did it come under your sphere
of command?
KALTENBRUNNER: Since Dachau is near Munich in Bavaria, of course it was
only Berger’s sphere of command.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Dachau evacuated at all?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know; I have never been to Bavaria after 19
April.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness refers to the date 23 April 1945, or a little
later, he says.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I forgot about that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Where were you at that time?
KALTENBRUNNER: On 19 April, at 3 o’clock in the morning, I left Berlin
and went via Prague to Linz, my goal being Innsbruck where I wanted to
meet Burckhardt’s representative again. From that moment onwards, I no
longer had any connection with Berlin nor did I ever set foot on
Bavarian soil or give orders there. My sphere of duty stopped at the
Austrian border.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain such a statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: The only way I can explain it is that this must be a
mistake and if I am put face to face with Berger, I am completely
convinced that it can be cleared up.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Could it have been an evacuation order bearing the
signature of Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly; perfectly possible.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Among other things you have been accused by the
Prosecution of having committed a crime against peace. Will you tell the
Tribunal whether you did anything, and if so, what during your time of
office, to bring the war to an end?
KALTENBRUNNER: I started my duty on 1 February 1943. The situation which
I found in the Reich was such that on this day—to be more exact, 2
February 1943, with the case of Stalingrad—it was my conviction that
the war was to be regarded as absolutely lost for Germany. The
conditions which I found, coming from a completely different atmosphere,
from Austria, only confirmed this point of view. I recall that I paid my
inaugural visit to Under Secretary of State Luther in the Foreign
Office—I think it was on 2 or 3 February. I talked to him from half
past 11 in the morning until 2 o’clock in the afternoon, suspecting
nothing. We were talking about foreign political intelligence tasks
which we would have to carry out together. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon
the same Under Secretary of State Luther was arrested by the Gestapo and
taken to a concentration camp.
I do not think I can explain with a more drastic example the situation
in which I was put and how such events...
THE PRESIDENT: What is this in answer to? What is the question it is in
answer to?
DR. KAUFFMANN: You ought to come to the point a little more quickly. The
question was what you did to bring the war to the quickest possible end?
KALTENBRUNNER: I could quote a lot of factors in this connection. My
first effort was in the spring of 1943; I think it was even in February
1943, when I favored a considerable alteration of the church politics in
order to win the Vatican for the first peace mediations. That was my
first effort in that direction.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now mention the name Dulles. Did you have direct or
indirect contact with him and what was the purpose of your taking up
those connections?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I was in contact with him, namely, through Höttl.
Since May 1943, I won over step by step, Höttl and other Austrians who
were politically in the opposition, and learned of their peace feelers
directed to foreign countries. Through these channels I heard of
Roosevelt’s representative for central Europe. I think he was his
economics expert, a Mr. Dulles, who was reported as being in
Switzerland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question in that connection. What
would have happened if Hitler or Himmler had heard of that attitude of
yours?
KALTENBRUNNER: My order to Höttl and my knowledge of his activity was,
if you interpret it strictly, high treason since the Führer’s views were
known to me at the time. They were that there should be no contact
regarding peace and no discussions about peace. Hitler changed his
opinion only on 15 April 1945 in a discussion with me in the presence of
a certain Wolf.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In the course of this so-called peace policy which you
have described, did a representative make journeys to Switzerland so as
to make contact with the so-called Mr. Dulles?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, there was a large number of journeys, and indeed not
only by Höttl but by several other persons. For instance, I point out a
discussion which I had with a Count Potocki, whom I asked to get in
touch with such circles and forward the same information to
Anglo-American circles in Switzerland.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I think we can leave this subject. In my opinion you have
related the essential parts.
KALTENBRUNNER: These were not the only attempts, there were numerous
others.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to your relations with the President of the
Red Cross, Professor Burckhardt, and I ask you: Is it true that you had
a conference with Professor Burckhardt in 1945 with the aim that
camps—prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps—should be opened
to the Red Cross so that medical supplies could be taken into these
camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I tried for a long time to achieve this with
Burckhardt. I was helped by the fact that he himself had asked for a
meeting with Himmler. Himmler, however, did not get Hitler’s permission
for such a meeting because he was, at the time, the Commander-in-Chief
on the northern front of the Vistula River. A meeting with Burckhardt
could have taken place only there at the front. I tried, therefore, to
take it upon myself to arrange a meeting between Burckhardt and a
responsible personality in the Reich. After a lot of ado and in spite of
many difficulties I succeeded. A private meeting with Burckhardt was
held on 12 March.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come to an agreement, and within this agreement
was any help really given and in what manner?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, considerable help was given. An agreement was
reached, according to which all foreign civilian internees, with the
help of the Red Cross, were to be taken from all camps in the Reich and
released to their home countries. But in the first place, by granting
Burckhardt’s request during these discussions I achieved the aim that
the leading departments of the Reich were involved to such an extent
that they could no longer detach themselves from this agreement, and I
think that was my greatest success with Burckhardt.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that to get about 3,000 French and Belgian
civilian internees through the front line at that time, you got in touch
with General Kesselring’s headquarters?
KALTENBRUNNER: I sent a wireless message to the headquarters asking that
as soon as the Americans and British would agree to this, it should also
be allowed by the Germans that such internees go through the fighting
lines.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he said 12 March but he did not give the
year.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not understand—Yes, 12 March.
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
DR. KAUFFMANN: 1945.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What is the total number of people who,
due to your intervention reached their homeland?
KALTENBRUNNER: You must differentiate here between two different
periods: the first period before the private meeting on 12 March and the
period after that.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In my opinion you can give me a brief answer to that
question. The periods of time do not matter.
KALTENBRUNNER: At least 6,000 civilian internees coming from France and
Belgium and all the Eastern European States including the Balkan States
were included in these talks. At least 14,000 Jewish internees were
handed over to the Red Cross in the town of Gunskirchen for their
immediate care. This applies to the whole camp of Theresienstadt.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And finally is it correct—please answer very briefly
either in the affirmative or in the negative—that because of your
intervention, a special liaison department with the Red Cross was
installed at Konstanz for the purpose of facilitating and carrying out
this program further.
KALTENBRUNNER: A liaison department with the Red Cross was established
in Lindau and at Konstanz.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.
The Prosecution hold you responsible for a wireless message you are
alleged to have sent to Fegelein in which it says:
“Please report to the Reichsführer SS and inform the Führer,
that all measures regarding Jews, political and concentration
camp prisoners in the Protectorate, have been carried out by me
personally today.”
I ask you: Did you send such a wireless?
KALTENBRUNNER: It did not get sent because the technical connection was
not re-established.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I did not mention a number. It was not
presented in court but it is contained in the trial brief on Page 14.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is Document 2519-PS. It was presented to the
Court.
KALTENBRUNNER: The wireless message was planned—the text probably was
written by the adjutant who was accompanying me. I did not write it
personally and as I say, it could not be sent.
On 19 April 1945 I had been given authority to act independently in
accordance with the discussions with Burckhardt with reference to
foreign civilian internees and regarding the entering of all camps by
the Red Cross. On that occasion I stated in Hitler’s and Himmler’s
presence that my route would be via Prague and Linz to Innsbruck and
that I would pass by Theresienstadt. I said that there were not only
Jewish prisoners there who were to be looked after by the Red Cross but
also Czechoslovak political prisoners. I suggested that their release
should also be carried out. That is the explanation for that wireless
message. But not until 19 April at 6 o’clock in the evening was I given
full power in this connection.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But the Prosecution might assume from that statement, and
at first, rightly so, that you might also have had jurisdiction over
concentration camp questions. I ask you—and please answer this question
with “yes” or “no.” Is it true that the powers you have mentioned as
given to you on 19 April 1945 were the first powers in that sphere
altogether?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would not have needed a renewed authority at all
if I had had it up to that time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In a speech Himmler made on 3 October 1943 at Posen
before the Higher SS and Police Leaders, you are called Heydrich’s
successor. The Prosecution consider that this is a confirmation of the
entire executive power and your extraordinary powers in this sphere.
Does this formal expression, which was certainly used in this
connection, do justice to the situation or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I protest strongly—I have done so during all the
interrogations—against being called Heydrich’s successor. If in my
absence Himmler referred to me as such, or if earlier such a notice or
announcement coming from him was once published in the press then this
was done without my knowledge and without my wish. The first time, in
connection with that press notice, there was a violent reaction to
Himmler on my part. The day which you mentioned here I was ill in Berlin
with an inflammation of the veins and in plaster, and therefore I did
not join this discussion.
Neither the extent of my power nor outward appearance permitted the
slightest possibility of comparison with Heydrich. I want to say quite
briefly now that to the very last day of my activity I was paid 1,820
Reichsmark, which is the salary of a general of the police, and that
Heydrich’s income from his office was more than 30,000 Reichsmark, not
because he was paid for a higher rank but in recognition of his
completely different position. Any comparison is completely unjust.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, my next question: Is it correct that Himmler feared
Heydrich and this was because Heydrich had been given too much authority
from his point of view, and that for that reason he thought that by
appointing you he had found the very man who would be completely safe
for him, Himmler? In this connection the Prosecution have drawn a
parallel between you and Heydrich, and, as I have already just said,
they have described you as the second Heydrich.
KALTENBRUNNER: The relationship between Himmler and Heydrich can be
characterized shortly as follows: Heydrich was by far the more
intelligent of the two. He was at first an unusually docile and
obedient...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want to know anything about
Heydrich’s intelligence. The witness has said over and over again that
he was not his successor.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In that case I will repeat the question which I put
earlier, and which is the following: Did Himmler, by calling on you,
want a man who was completely safe for him, Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: He never again wanted to give away such executive power
out of his own hands to the extent that Heydrich had it. The moment
Heydrich was dead, Himmler took over the entire department and after
that never let the executive powers out of his hands. He had once had
the experience, in the person of Heydrich, of how dangerous a Chief of
the Security Police could become to him. He did not want to run that
risk a second time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, what you want to say, finally, is that
after Heydrich died, Himmler wanted to and did retain the whole
executive power in his hands?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, another question. You stated yesterday that you
learned of the conception of the so-called “final solution” only later
on. In effect, such instructions went from Himmler to Heydrich and to
Eichmann as early as 1941 or 1942. Is it true that you frequently met
Himmler? Were you a friend of Himmler’s?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is utterly wrong to call the relation between Himmler
and myself friendly. Just like every other official, I was treated by
him in an extremely cool and reserved manner. He was not a man who could
enter into personal relationship with anyone.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is natural to assume, if I place myself in the
position of the Prosecution, that you must have had knowledge of the
“final solution” and of that idea, if you met Himmler frequently. I
therefore ask you again: Did not Himmler at some time put to you clearly
what this “final solution” was?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not in this form. I said yesterday that on the basis
of all information which accumulated during the summer and autumn of
1943, including reports from enemy broadcasts and foreign news, I came
to the conviction that the statement regarding the destruction of Jews
was true, and that, thus convinced, I immediately went to see Hitler,
and the next day Himmler, and complained to both of them saying that I
could not for one single minute support any such action. Beginning with
that moment...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, well, you said so yesterday. You need not repeat it
again.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he told us that before and you told us
that you would finish in an hour; you have now been nearly an hour and a
half.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only two or three questions.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The trial brief of the Prosecution
contains a statement of Schellenberg, and it runs as follows: “What am I
going to do with Kaltenbrunner? He would have me completely under his
thumb in that case.”
This is stated by Schellenberg in an affidavit, and it is supposed to
have been said by Himmler. Please, will you give a very brief statement
regarding the fact whether you would consider such a statement by
Himmler at all probable?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not consider such a statement probable. If he did
say it, then it can have been only in connection with...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is a possible question
to put to the witness.
DR. KAUFFMANN: [_To the defendant._] In the trial brief a document of
this kind has been presented and charged against you but, if the
President does not wish that question, I shall be glad to withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be merely a matter of argument, and you
cannot criticize this affidavit, if the affidavit is in evidence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the last question. I ask you whether the
possibility existed that you, after you gradually became aware of
conditions within the Gestapo and concentration camps, _et cetera_,
could have brought about a change? If that possibility did exist, can
you say that by staying on in your position you achieved any alleviation
in this sphere and an improvement of conditions?
KALTENBRUNNER: I repeatedly asked to join troops at the front, but the
most burning question which I personally had to decide was: Will
conditions be thus improved, alleviated? Or will anything be changed? Or
is it my personal duty in this position to do everything necessary to
change all these sharply criticized conditions?
Upon repeated refusals to my request to be detailed to the front, I had
no other alternative than to try myself to alter a system, the
ideological and legal basis of which could not be altered by me, as had
been proved by all the orders issued before my time and offered in
evidence here. All that I could do was to try to modify these methods
while striving to have them abolished altogether.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did your conscience permit you to remain in office in
spite of it?
KALTENBRUNNER: When I considered the possibility of exerting again and
again influence on Hitler and Himmler and other persons, my conscience
would not allow me to leave my position. I thought it my duty to take,
personally, a stand against wrong.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions of the defendant?
DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that Schacht, before he was taken into
custody by the Allied Forces, had been in a concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. DIX: How long have you known that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Since his wife wrote me a letter; and I believe that she
requested me to present a petition so that she might get her husband
out.
DR. DIX: And about when was that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I assume around Christmas 1944.
DR. DIX: Do you know or have you any idea at whose suggestion Schacht
was interned in a concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that on the very same day I sent this letter
from Herr Schacht’s wife by courier to the office of Hitler’s adjutant,
and I believe I received word through Fegelein or one of Hitler’s
adjutants, that Hitler was to be consulted in this matter. Some time
later I learned that Schacht had been interned on Hitler’s order,
because he was suspected of working together with Goerdeler or in any
case was one of the instigators of the high treason plan and of the
assassination attempted on Hitler on 20 July 1944.
DR. DIX: I have a letter I received a short time ago, written by a
former concentration camp inmate, who was told by Obersturmbannführer
Stawitzky—Do you know him?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. DIX: He was the last commander of the concentration camp at
Flossenbürg. In this letter I am told that this Stawitzky had told him
that he had been ordered to murder Schacht along with the other special
internees like Canaris, _et cetera_. Do you know anything about an order
for the murder of Schacht?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. DIX: Do you consider it possible that Stawitzky might have decided
on such a step through his own authority?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. DIX: If I interpret your answer correctly, such an instruction could
have come only from the highest level, that is, either from Hitler or
Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, you may assume that. As far as Schacht is concerned,
it could only have been an order from Hitler himself.
DR. DIX: Thank you.
DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): I have some questions to put to
the witness.
Witness, the Indictment contends that the Secret State Police in the
years 1943 to 1945 had about 40,000 to 50,000 members. What can you
remember about this?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that this figure is slightly too high.
DR. MERKEL: What do you estimate the figure was?
KALTENBRUNNER: I would rather assume 35,000 to 40,000.
DR. MERKEL: Approximately how many Gestapo officials were active in the
occupied countries?
KALTENBRUNNER: That I cannot tell you even approximately, but I believe
I have heard a figure of 800 people, for example, for the occupied
region in France.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know to whom these officials in the occupied
countries were subordinate?
KALTENBRUNNER: In the occupied countries, to the commander of the
Security Police, who in turn was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police
Leader of the occupied territory.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all whether in the offices of the commanders
of the Sipo and SD, Kripo officials, that is, officials of the Criminal
Police, were carrying out tasks of a state political nature?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is possible.
DR. MERKEL: What approximately was the number of the Gestapo officials
assigned in the East to the Einsatzgruppen A to G?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know.
DR. MERKEL: Can you tell me whether these officials, when assigned to
the Einsatzgruppen, were released from the authority of the State Police
and were acting as a special body in the Einsatzgruppen engaged in tasks
with which the State Police themselves had no more to do?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe one can assume that. Personnel affairs were
still attended to, that is, their salaries were paid as usual, but the
powers to issue orders, the authority to give orders was certainly
different.
DR. MERKEL: Approximately how were the members of the State Police
organized, that is, proportionally according to their functions? First,
officials who had purely administrative functions?
KALTENBRUNNER: At least 20 percent.
DR. MERKEL: Officials with purely Security Police functions?
KALTENBRUNNER: The same number; for the greater part were in any case
the subordinate personnel, that is, the technical personnel...
DR. MERKEL: This is what I intended to ask you.
The technical personnel, that is radio men, teletypists, drivers, and
office personnel, how many were they altogether?
KALTENBRUNNER: The first group is 20 percent, that is the administrative
group, and the so-called executive personnel is 20 percent, then the
remaining 60 per cent fall into two equally large groups of 30 percent
each, the technical auxiliary personnel and the office personnel.
DR. MERKEL: Tell me in one brief sentence the aims and tasks of the
State Police.
KALTENBRUNNER: They have been explained here repeatedly. The State
Police had for their main function, as in every other country, the
protection of the State from any attack coming from within.
DR. MERKEL: The Prosecution contend that the membership in the State
Police was voluntary. What can you say to that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that contention can in no way be maintained nor
proved. I would like to say that obviously the official staff in
existence in 1933 could be made up only of officials who already had
been police officials at that time.
DR. MERKEL: In what way did they come to the State Police?
KALTENBRUNNER: They were ordered.
DR. MERKEL: Ordered or transferred?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was a State Police in existence prior to that time;
to be sure, they were not called the State Police at that time, but the
Political Police Department.
DR. MERKEL: Then the personnel of the State Police was later on
apparently completed, just like the personnel of every other State
office, in conformity with the principles of the German Government
Employees Law?
KALTENBRUNNER: Absolutely, yes.
DR. MERKEL: Did the Führer Decree Number 1 regarding secrecy apply to
the service in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt? You certainly know
it—that no one was to know more about a matter than absolutely
necessary for his job? Did this rule also apply in the office of the
Gestapo?
KALTENBRUNNER: This decree applied not only to the Wehrmacht but also to
the entire internal executive power, for all administrative offices, and
it was posted in every office throughout the Reich. So, of course, we
were especially strict in observing this order in the Police.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the 1 October 1944 decree,
according to which the entire Customs and Border Protection, which had
been under the Reich Finance Office until that time, was transferred to
Amt IV, that is, the Gestapo, of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: The Customs and Border Protection was transferred to
Himmler and taken out of the sphere of the Reich Finance Ministry—I
believe in September—by order of Hitler in the fall of 1944.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know about how much personnel was involved in that
transfer?
KALTENBRUNNER: In the beginning the Customs and Border Protection
comprised 50,000 people. At this time I think there must have been at
least 10,000 people less, because recruiting by the Wehrmacht had taken
place several times, that is, younger men were put into the fighting
forces.
DR. MERKEL: Can you sum up in one sentence the function of the Customs
and Border Protection?
KALTENBRUNNER: As the name implies, the Customs and Border Protection
had to guarantee the financial sovereignty of the Reich through border
security measures.
DR. MERKEL: Can one say at all that these estimated 40,000 officials
joined the Gestapo voluntarily?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, by order.
DR. MERKEL: The Border Police (Grenzpolizei) is different from the
Customs and Border Protection (Zollgrenzschutz). Do you know that as
early as 1935 it already formed part of the State Police?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. Müller was General Border Inspector of the Reich.
DR. MERKEL: Sum up in one sentence the tasks of the Border Police.
KALTENBRUNNER: The Border Police checked passports at borders, airports,
railways, highways. It was entrusted with the entire normal border
control.
DR. MERKEL: Was this task different from what it was in the years before
1933; had anything changed?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. MERKEL: Did it vary from the tasks of the Border Police in other
countries?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not true.
DR. MERKEL: How were the relations between the members of the State
Police, their officials and employees, and the SS; did they mostly enter
the SS voluntarily or was it on the basis of an order?
KALTENBRUNNER: Voluntary enlistments must have been comparatively few. I
know that later Himmler, as far as promotions were concerned, was more
hesitant if the official did not belong to the SS, so for that reason
enlistments occurred, if not from inner conviction, at least from a
desire to be promoted.
DR. MERKEL: Thus, the larger part then joined because of this.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it was based on Himmler’s promotional system.
DR. MERKEL: Did the members of the State Police, particularly the
officials, have any possibility of leaving their posts when they wanted
to?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
DR. MERKEL: A large part of the members of the State Police were
so-called “Notdienstverpflichtete.” Will you very briefly explain the
term to the Tribunal?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is not true of those officials who had executive
standing. As far as the other personnel were concerned there were more
of that kind among them, especially as the war went along, because
losses ran very high, as of course, in all branches of the Police and
Wehrmacht. Thus towards the end, the personnel could be kept up only by
recruiting Notdienstverpflichtete. That is true in any case of the
technical and office personnel.
DR. MERKEL: Did those Notdienstverpflichtete join the State Police
voluntarily?
KALTENBRUNNER: They had nothing to say in the matter. After
consultations with the competent labor offices they were put into the
Notdienst positions wherever the Reich ordered it.
DR. MERKEL: What happened to the members of the State Police who at
interrogations committed excesses or trespassed on foreign property?
KALTENBRUNNER: The same rules were followed which applied to all
organizations subordinate to Himmler. They had their own SS and Police
courts. In one sentence I may characterize this system by stating that
the penalties were much more severe than in a civil court.
DR. MERKEL: A certain man has asserted that for an offense of taking
away a few unimportant things from a prisoner, he had to serve a long
period in the penitentiary. Was that the ordinarily normal and just
punishment?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know who was taken to the SS Concentration Camp
Danzig-Matzkau?
KALTENBRUNNER: Anyone who had been sentenced to imprisonment by SS and
Police courts was put into the Danzig-Matzkau SS Concentration Camp,
which was called an SS punishment camp rather than a concentration camp.
DR. MERKEL: Could a Gestapo member, especially of a higher rank, visit a
concentration camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Only with the express approval of Pohl or Glücks.
DR. MERKEL: Is that also true of the Higher SS and Police Leaders for
the camps which were situated within their districts?
KALTENBRUNNER: I could not say that with certainty. In any case, I
assume they also applied or had to apply to make these visits.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know of the so-called “severe interrogations?” Are
these in force in other countries, too?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was President of the International Criminal Police
Commission, and in this capacity I had the opportunity to speak about
this topic at a meeting in the autumn of 1943. From this conference and
also from my reading of the foreign press over a number of years I
gathered that the police system of each state also makes use of rather
severe measures of interrogation.
DR. MERKEL: Could a State Police official...
THE PRESIDENT: What happened at some international police commission
does not seem to be relevant to anything in this case.
DR. MERKEL: I only wanted to question him as to whether these “severe
interrogations” were applied not only in Germany but also in other
states.
THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with that.
DR. MERKEL: However, the severe measures of interrogation are used as a
charge in the trial brief against the State Police, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Could a State Police officer, when
executing a protective custody order of limited duration, consider
corporal punishment or even the putting to death of the prisoner upon
his commitment into the camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: Emphatically no when a custody of limited duration was
concerned.
DR. MERKEL: Did a so-called proceedings for investigating the reasons
for imprisonment apply also to the inmates of the concentration camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Every case of protective custody underwent investigation;
in time of war twice, in time of peace, of course, more often...
DR. MERKEL: One last problem...
KALTENBRUNNER: ...but this investigation was not just a matter of the
State Police. It had to be made by the camp commander, who had to report
on the behavior of the prisoner. This report had to be given by the camp
commander to the Inspector of the Concentration Camps. Then the State
Police had to decide on the matter.
DR. MERKEL: The Prosecution have put in evidence a considerable amount
about ill-treatment and torture during the questionings which took place
in occupied Western countries, especially France, Holland, Belgium,
Norway. Were there any instructions from the RSHA in this connection to
use torture?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not.
DR. MERKEL: How do you explain the fact of this ill-treatment?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have heard nothing about such ill-treatment with which
the State Police is charged. In my opinion it concerns only excesses of
individuals. A decree to that effect certainly was never issued.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know that in the occupied countries members of the
resistance movement and also criminal elements masqueraded as members of
the German State Police in order to facilitate their tasks?
KALTENBRUNNER: That has been repeatedly stated, but I also cannot
remember in detail having seen any exact records about that.
DR. MERKEL: Thank you, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS): Witness, in the year 1932 you
joined the Austrian SS, according to your testimony.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: Was there a difference between the Austrian SS and the
German SS, or was it a similar group?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was a certain organizational similarity, which took
effect only after the Anschluss. Up to the time of the Anschluss, the SS
in Austria could hardly be differentiated from the Party or from the SA
itself.
DR. HAENSEL: Sum up with a number the strength of the Austrian SS, to
which you belonged; first of all, before the Austrian Anschluss in 1938
and then at the time when you joined. How did the development take place
approximately, expressed in figures?
THE PRESIDENT: Too fast.
DR. HAENSEL: Did the development of the Austrian SS, to which you
belonged, take place in 1938 as in 1932?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that at the time of the Austrian Anschluss, the
maximum membership was perhaps 7,500.
DR. HAENSEL: Did that group play the role of a Fifth Column in Austria?
Is “Fifth Column” a concept at all as far as you are concerned?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, “Fifth Column” became a concept to me through the
statements of the enemy, but to term the Austrian SS a Fifth Column is
entirely wrong. The Austrian SS never had the task of being an
intelligence unit or a sabotage unit or anything like that.
DR. HAENSEL: Did there exist in the Austrian SS, to which you belonged,
the slightest intention to bring through force the annexation of Austria
to Germany or was this to be brought about through a plebiscite, through
legal measures?
KALTENBRUNNER: There was by the SS neither such a plan of annexation by
force nor do the facts of the political development comply with this.
There was never any necessity for any such step, for the Anschluss
Movement, without any such outside urge, was conclusively strong enough
in itself.
DR. HAENSEL: It has been asserted that the SS Standarte 86—That must
have been the one at Vienna...
KALTENBRUNNER: You are thinking of the Dollfuss Putsch?
DR. HAENSEL: Right. Can you tell me something about that? Did the work
of this corps have any connection with the assassination of the Austrian
Chancellor?
KALTENBRUNNER: I consider that incorrect. I must say that this corps
later on did not have the number 86 but 89. In addition the group which
had entered the Chancellery on 25 July 1934 was not a group of the SS,
but a group of former members of the Austrian Army who, because of
National Socialist activity, had been discharged from the Army.
I do not know the matter in detail. However, the chief of the Austrian
Police at that time, Dr. Skubl, who as far as I know is demanded here as
a witness in another case, should be able to give you exact information
about that. I ask that you question him about this matter.
DR. HAENSEL: Try to remember the entry of the troops on the night of 11
March 1938. What kind of troops marched in, according to your
recollection? I ask: Were they SS units or were they other units? Were
they Army units? Were there SS Verfügungstruppen? What is your
recollection?
KALTENBRUNNER: My recollection is that, first of all, there were
Wehrmacht units, the Luftwaffe of course, and there was one regiment of
the Waffen-SS—I cannot recall which one, probably the Standarte
Deutschland—participating in the entry.
DR. HAENSEL: Can you compare the size of the Wehrmacht and the Standarte
Deutschland approximately?
KALTENBRUNNER: The Standarte Deutschland at that time had 2,800 men
perhaps. So far as the Wehrmacht is concerned, I do not know how many
units took part.
DR. HAENSEL: In order to establish the relationship and according to
your idea, what is the entire number of SS men? I would like to make it
a little easier for you. I have seen a communication in which it is
stated that, in all and in the course of time, 750,000 to 1 million men
have passed through the SS. Is such a figure correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: One million certainly is too high. All branches of the SS
taken together, including the General SS and the Waffen-SS and including
the SS members in the various police activities, I believe add up to
720,000 to 750,000 men. Out of that number at least 320,000 to 350,000
men died in action. These losses might even be a little higher than what
I just stated, but I believe a more precise figure might be obtained
from one of the defendants who belonged to the Wehrmacht. I do not know
it exactly.
DR. HAENSEL: According to your knowledge how many men of this entire
number do you believe were connected with concentration camps, that is,
with the supervision, administration, and so forth? Can you give me any
figure as to just how many were so connected?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is a rather surprising question to me, which I
cannot answer immediately. I would have to have pencil and paper in
order to make calculations.
DR. HAENSEL: Could you, through your own knowledge...
KALTENBRUNNER: Of course, it is only a fraction, a very small fraction
of the entire figure.
DR. HAENSEL: Did those SS members, no matter how many or how few they
were, who were not connected with the administration of concentration
camps have any insight into these conditions or in this administration
and the things that took place in the camps?
KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not.
DR. HAENSEL: How can you tell me that with such certainty?
KALTENBRUNNER: From my own personal knowledge that Himmler and his
organization kept the concentration camps behind an iron curtain.
DR. HAENSEL: Were the officials of the office which you headed, for
example the Main Security Office, recruited only from the SS or mostly
from the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, not at all. The proportion of the SS members to those
who did not belong to the SS was 5 percent if I consider only the
confidence men and the staff of the SD inside Germany.
DR. HAENSEL: Therefore, for 100 officials, there were 5 who had gone
through the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: According to your knowledge were there regulations
prohibiting the physical ill-treatment of concentration camp inmates and
were these regulations known in the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: They were issued in print: that is, contained in nearly
every gazette of the Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German Police.
Every SS man knew these regulations were laws, and they were punished
heavily if ill-treatment was reported or became evident.
I do not know to what extent and in what state the SS Punishment Camp
Danzig-Matzkau fell into the hands of the enemy, but I am convinced that
all those who underwent a term of imprisonment there will give
information about this severe punishment in connection with any
ill-treatment which may have occurred.
DR. HAENSEL: I have finished, Your Honors.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
COL. AMEN: Defendant, in order to shorten as much as possible the time
of this cross-examination, I want to be sure that we understand each
other as to just what your position is as to several specific items.
Now, first, you concede that you held the title of Chief of the RSHA and
Chief of the Security Police and SD from the end of January 1943 up to
and including the end of the war. Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it applies with those limitations which I enumerated
yesterday with regard to my authority in the State and Criminal Police.
COL. AMEN: And when you speak of those limitations, you are referring to
this supposed understanding with Himmler? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It was not a supposed understanding with Himmler but a
well-established fact which existed from the very first day, that I had
the task of establishing a centralized intelligence service in the Reich
and that he would retain command in the other sectors.
COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, you concede that you held that title, but
you deny that you exercised some of the powers? Correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And this title which you held was the same title which was
previously held by Heydrich, who had died on 4 June 1942? Is that
correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: There was no change in title?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: And you testified that you assume responsibility for all of
the things which you did personally or knew about personally. That is
correct, is it not?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I could add one thing, that my title was extended on
14 February 1944, when the Military Intelligence Service of the OKW, Amt
Abwehr, was transferred to Himmler by Hitler. Then my title as Chief of
the entire Reich Central Intelligence Service became known in other
departments.
And I might add also, perhaps, that the capacity of a man or his duties
in an intelligence service which not only comprised a big country like
the Reich but also extended to foreign countries were not made public. I
might refer to England, where the Chief of the Secret Service over
other...
COL. AMEN: Defendant, will you please try to confine yourself to
answering my questions “yes” or “no” whenever possible, and making only
a brief explanation, because we will come to all these other things in
due time. Will you try to do that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, very well.
COL. AMEN: Did you have any personal knowledge or anything personal to
do with any of the atrocities which occurred in concentration camps
during the war?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: And therefore you assume no responsibility before this
Tribunal for any such atrocities? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not assume any responsibility in that regard.
COL. AMEN: And, in that connection, such testimony as has been given
here, by Höllriegel for example, to the effect that you witnessed
executions at Mauthausen, you deny? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was already told yesterday of the testimony of
Höllriegel. I consider the statement that I ever saw a gas chamber,
either in operation or at any other time, wrong and incorrect.
COL. AMEN: Very good. You had no personal knowledge of and did nothing
personal about the program for the extermination of Jews; is that
correct—except to oppose them?
KALTENBRUNNER: No—except that I was against it. From the moment I knew
of this as facts and had convinced myself of it, I raised objections
with Hitler and Himmler, and the final result was that they were
stopped.
COL. AMEN: And therefore you assume no responsibility for anything done
in connection with the program for the extermination of the Jews, right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And does the same thing apply to the program for forced
labor?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies, does it not, to the razing of the
Warsaw Ghetto?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies to the execution of 50 fliers in
connection with Stalag Luft III?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies to the various orders with respect
to the killing of enemy fliers, correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And, as a matters of fact, you made all these same denials in
the course of your interrogations before this Trial, correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you still make them today?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. But as far as the preliminary interrogations are
concerned, may I make a statement again in the course of the
cross-examination?
COL. AMEN: Well, when we come to the proper place let us know.
Is it or is it not a fact that the Gestapo, Amt IV, RSHA, prepared
reports on concentration camps which were submitted to you for signature
and then passed on to Himmler?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I do not recall any such reports. The normal channel
was that Müller reported to Himmler directly.
COL. AMEN: Do you likewise deny...
KALTENBRUNNER: I would like to add that of course certain matters
existed of which I had to be informed for several reasons, for instance
the great domestic political event, the plot of 20 July 1944 of course;
I was informed in such cases, not through Amt IV but through...
COL. AMEN: I am speaking of the general course of activity and not of
any special exceptions, you understand.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You likewise deny that Müller, as chief of Amt IV, always
conferred with you with respect to any important documents?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I not only deny it but the facts speak against it.
He had direct authority from Himmler. He had no reason to discuss this
matter with me beforehand.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown a document, L-50, which
will become Exhibit Number USA-793.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been put in before?
COL. AMEN: No, Your Lordship, I am told it has not.
[_Turning to the defendant._] By the way, were you acquainted with Kurt
Lindow, who makes this affidavit dated 2 August 1945?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Although he was an official in the RSHA until 1944? Let us
read together Paragraphs 2 and 4 only. I won’t take the time of the
Tribunal to read Paragraphs 1 and 3. 2, you will note, reads as follows:
“On the basis of general experience as well as individual cases
I can confirm that the Gestapo (Amt IV) wrote reports about
practices of the administrative authorities in the concentration
camps and that these were given by the Chief of Amt IV to the
Chief of the Security Police who submitted them for signature to
Reichsführer Himmler.”
KALTENBRUNNER: May I reply to that immediately? It might be important
perhaps to read Paragraph 1, too.
COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.
KALTENBRUNNER: Paragraph 1 seems to be important to read, for in
Paragraph 1 it is said that the witness Lindow, from 1938 until 1940,
was in the section in which such reports were written. From 1940 to 1941
he was in counterespionage; in 1942 and 1943 he was in the section for
combating of Communism; and later he was in the section for educational
matters. I believe, therefore, that his testimony in Paragraph 2—that
he knew of the custom of the State Police, that is that via the Chief of
Department IV, through the Chief of the Security Police, reports were
sent to Himmler about happenings in concentration camps—holds true only
for the period 1938 to 1940. Judging from his own testimony, he has no
personal experience about the later periods.
COL. AMEN: Well, in other words he is not telling the truth as it was at
the time when you were active in RSHA; correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not read anything about that. He maintains that...
COL. AMEN: I am calling your attention to two paragraphs. We have
already covered 2, and now we will read 4:
“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of
the RSHA authorized to sign had the right to sign in any
fundamental affairs of particular political significance without
consent of the Chief of the Security Police, not even during his
temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore
declare that particularly the Chief of Office IV, Müller, was
very cautious in signing documents concerning questions of a
general nature of possibly greater importance, and that he put
aside documents of such nature in most cases for the return of
the Chief of the Security Police, whereby, alas, often much time
was lost.”—Signed—“Kurt Lindow.”
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would like to make two statements: First, this
assertion is completely contrary to the testimony of several witnesses
who spoke of the extraordinary authority and independence exercised by
Müller and testified to it.
Secondly, the description of Lindow is applicable to that period of time
in which Heydrich was active, that is, the time between 1938 and 1940,
in which Lindow could obtain experience. But this does not apply to the
period in which Himmler gave direct orders to Müller. That was Himmler’s
prerogative, for my tasks were of such scope that it was almost
impossible for one man to handle the work that I did.
COL. AMEN: I don’t want to spend too much time on it now, Defendant, but
the paragraphs which I read you conform to the testimony of Ohlendorf
before this Tribunal, do they not?
KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony as given by Ohlendorf was shown to me
yesterday by my counsel. But also the testimony as given by Ohlendorf, I
believe, leads us clearly to see that any executive order, even for
protective custody—and he used the term “down to the last
washerwoman”—needed the direct consent of Himmler, who could delegate
this authority only to Müller. He did add, however, that he did not know
whether my authority suffered any such restrictions and whether,
perhaps, I might not have had such powers, but he could not state that
with certainty. And the rest of his testimony contradicts the assumption
that I had such broad authority.
COL. AMEN: We all know what Ohlendorf’s testimony was. I merely want to
ask you if you accept the testimony of Ohlendorf. You told us in the
course of interrogations that you had the most contact with Ohlendorf
and that you would trust him to tell the truth before any of your other
associates; is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not recall the last statement. The first statement,
that he was one of my chief collaborators, is justified and is proved by
the fact that he was chief of the Intelligence within Germany, which
became a part of my Intelligence Service. All domestic political
reports, reports about all German spheres of life, I received mostly
from this Amt III, in addition to the news from the other departments
which I organized myself.
COL. AMEN: Shortly after Easter 1934 you were under arrest in the
Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: What year did you say, please?
COL. AMEN: 1934.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, from 14 January until the beginning of May.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever, in company with other SS functionaries, make an
inspection of the Mauthausen Camp?
KALTENBRUNNER: With other SS officials, no. To my recollection I went
there alone and had to report there to Himmler, who, as I stated
yesterday, was conducting an inspection tour through southern Germany.
COL. AMEN: And you went only in the quarry? Right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Karwinsky, the State Secretary in
the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg Cabinets from September 1933 to October
1935—Karwinsky?
KALTENBRUNNER: I saw Karwinsky once. I believe he visited us in the
Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp at that time during our hunger strike.
Otherwise I never saw him. It might be that one of his representatives
visited us. That I cannot say.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3843-PS,
which will be Exhibit Number USA-794. I would like to say to the
Tribunal that there is rather objectionable language in this exhibit but
I do feel that in view of the charges against the defendant, I do feel
it is my duty to read it nonetheless.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
If you will turn to Page 3, defendant.
KALTENBRUNNER: On Page 3 there are just a few lines. May I read the
entire document first, please?
COL. AMEN: It would take much too much time, Defendant. I am only
interested in the paragraph which is on Page 3 of the English text, and
commences, “Shortly after Easter...” Do you have it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “Shortly after Easter 1934 I received the news that
the prisoners in the Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp had gone on
hunger strike. Thereupon I went there myself, in order to inform
myself about the situation. While comparative calm and
discipline prevailed in most of the barracks, one barrack was
very disorderly. I noticed that one tall man seemed to be the
obvious leader of the resistance. This was Kaltenbrunner, at
that time a candidate for attorney-at-law, who was under arrest
because of his illegal activity in Upper Austria. While all the
other barracks gave up their hunger strike after a talk which I
had with representatives of the prisoners, the barracks under
Kaltenbrunner persisted in the strike.
“I saw Kaltenbrunner again in the Mauthausen Camp, when I was
severely ill and lying on rotten straw with several hundred
other seriously ill persons, many of them dying. The prisoners,
suffering from hunger oedemata and from the most serious
intestinal sicknesses, were lying in unheated barracks in the
dead of winter. The most primitive sanitary facilities were
lacking. The toilets and the washrooms were unusable for months.
The severely ill persons had to relieve themselves in little
marmalade buckets. The soiled straw was not renewed for weeks,
so that a stinking liquid was formed, in which worms and maggots
crawled around. There was no medical attendance or medicines.
Conditions were such that 10 to 20 persons died every night.
Kaltenbrunner walked through the barracks with a brilliant suite
of high SS functionaries, saw everything, must have seen
everything. We were under the illusion that these inhuman
conditions would now be changed, but they apparently met with
Kaltenbrunner’s approval for nothing happened thereafter.”
Is that true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: I can refute this document, evidently presented in order
to surprise me, in every point.
COL. AMEN: I ask you—first, I ask you to state whether it is true or
false?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not true and I can refute each detail.
COL. AMEN: Make it as brief as possible.
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not possible to me to take less time in refuting
it, Mr. Prosecutor, than you took in reading it. I have to refute each
word which is incriminating me. Here Karwinsky maintains...
COL. AMEN: Just a moment. Perhaps you will wait until I have read to you
two more exhibits I have along the same line. Then perhaps you can make
your explanation of all three at the same time. Is that satisfactory to
you?
KALTENBRUNNER: As you wish.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3845-PS,
which will become Exhibit Number USA-795.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
You have already denied, I believe, having visited or going through the
crematorium at Mauthausen; correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you know Tiefenbacher, Albert Tiefenbacher?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: If you have the document you will note that he was at
Mauthausen Concentration Camp from 1938 until 1 May 1945 and that he was
employed in the crematorium at Mauthausen for 3 years as carrier of dead
bodies. You note that?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, passing to the lower half of the first page, you will
find the question:
“Do you remember Eigruber?
“Answer: Eigruber and Kaltenbrunner were from Linz.
“Question: Did you ever see them in Mauthausen?
“Answer: I saw Kaltenbrunner very often.
“Question: How many times?
“Answer: He came from time to time and went through the
crematorium.
“Question: About how many times?
“Answer: Three or four times.
“Question: On any occasion when he came through, did you hear
him say anything to anybody?
“Answer: When Kaltenbrunner arrived most prisoners had to
disappear. Only certain people were introduced to him.”
Is that true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is completely incorrect.
COL. AMEN: Now I will show you the third document and then you can make
a brief explanation. I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number
3846-PS which will become Exhibit Number USA-796.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
I might ask you, Witness, do you remember ever having witnessed a
demonstration of three different kinds of executions at Mauthausen at
the same time? Three different kinds of execution?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not true.
COL. AMEN: Are you acquainted with Johann Kanduth who makes this
affidavit?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: You will note, from the affidavit, that he lived in Linz;
that he was an inmate of the concentration camp at Mauthausen from 21
March 1939 until 5 May 1945; that besides the work in the kitchen he
also worked in the crematorium from 9 May, and he worked the heating for
the cremation of the bodies. Now, if you will turn to the second page,
at the top:
“Question: Have you ever seen Kaltenbrunner at Mauthausen on a
visit at any time?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question: Do you remember when it was?
“Answer: In 1942 and 1943.
“Question: Can you give it more exactly, maybe the month?
“Answer: I do not know the date.
“Question: Do you remember only this one visit in the year 1942
or 1943?
“Answer: I remember that Kaltenbrunner was there three times.
“Question: What year?
“Answer: Between 1942 and 1943.
“Question: Tell us, in short, what did you think about these
visits of Kaltenbrunner which you described? That is, what did
you see, what did you do, and when did you see that he was or
was not present at such executions?
“Answer: Kaltenbrunner was accompanied by Eigruber, Schulz,
Ziereis, Bachmeyer, Streitwieser, and some other people.
Kaltenbrunner went laughing into the gas chamber. Then the
people were brought from the bunker to be executed, and then all
three kinds of executions: hanging, shooting in the back of the
neck and gassing, were demonstrated. After the dust had
disappeared we had to take away the bodies.
“Question: When did you see the three different kinds of
executions? Were these just demonstrations or regular
executions?
“Answer: I do not know if they were regular executions, or just
demonstrations. During these executions, besides Kaltenbrunner,
the bunker leaders, Hauptscharführer Seidl and Duessen, were
also present. The last named then led the people downstairs.
“Question: Do you know whether these executions were announced
for this day or if they were just demonstrations or if the
executions were staged just for pleasure of the visitors?
“Answer: Yes, these executions were announced for this day.
“Question: How do you know that they were set for this day? Did
somebody tell you about these announced executions?
“Answer: Hauptscharführer Roth, the leader of the crematorium,
always had me called to his room and said to me, ‘Kaltenbrunner
will come today and we have to prepare everything for the
execution in his presence.’ Then we were obliged to heat and to
clean the stoves.”
KALTENBRUNNER: May I answer?
COL. AMEN: Is that true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Under my oath, I wish to state solemnly that not a single
word of these statements is true. I might start with the first document.
COL. AMEN: Could you note, Defendant, that none of these affidavits were
taken in Nuremberg, but that they all appeared to have been taken
outside of Nuremberg in connection with an entirely different proceeding
or investigation. Did you note that?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, but it is irrelevant as far as the testimony itself
is concerned. May I now start to talk about this document?
COL. AMEN: Yes, go ahead.
KALTENBRUNNER: The Witness Karwinsky states having seen me in the year
1934 in connection with the hunger strike in the Kaisersteinbruch
Detention Camp. He singles out the barracks in which disorders were
taking place at which a tall man, meaning myself, was present. According
to him, I was interned there because of my illegal activity in Austria.
As far as these statements are concerned, up to now, they are completely
wrong.
First of all, I was not interned there because of National Socialist
activities. The note of imprisonment we had received in writing, which
must have been known to Herr Karwinsky, who was then Austrian State
Secretary for Security, stated literally that we were arrested to
prevent us from performing National Socialist activities. So there was
no prohibited activity at this time charged against me. Then, further,
when Karwinsky came, the hunger strike was in its ninth day. We had
not...
COL. AMEN: May I interrupt you just a moment, Defendant. I am perfectly
satisfied if you testify that these statements are false. If you are
satisfied, I am perfectly satisfied with that answer. I do not need an
explanation of all of these paragraphs when we have no way of verifying
what you say.
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot be satisfied if the High
Tribunal and the whole world is presented with testimony and documents
which are pages long and which you contend are the truth, and which
incriminate me in the gravest manner. I must certainly have the
opportunity to answer with more than “yes” or “no.” I simply cannot just
like some callous criminal only...
THE PRESIDENT: You’d better let him go on. We do not want to argue about
it. Go on, make your comments on the document.
KALTENBRUNNER: Karwinsky arrived on the eighth day of the hunger strike.
He did not come into our barracks, but we were brought on stretchers
into the administrative building of this Austrian detention camp. None
of us were even able to walk any more. And for this fact, there are a
great many more witnesses—490 internees who had been confined in this
camp with me. Karwinsky talked with us in this administration building
and stated that if the hunger strike were to stop the Government would
be willing to consider a dismissal of all internees. We had been
interned without having committed any offense at all, and prior to that
the Government had already given their promise three times to release us
but had never kept these promises.
Therefore, we requested a written statement from Karwinsky, either
signed by him or signed by the Federal Chancellor. We wanted this
statement so that we could believe the promise, then we would
immediately end the strike. He refused. The hunger strike went on and we
were taken to a hospital in Vienna. On the 11th day, the hunger strike
stopped because even the giving of water was prohibited on that day.
These were the facts, and not that we created disorder.
THE PRESIDENT: When I said you could make your comments, I did not mean
you could go on giving the details of the hunger strike.
KALTENBRUNNER: My Lord, I just wanted to point out that what has been
testified by the witness is incorrect—that I was the leader in the
resistance and that I was still in my barracks. I had to be carried on a
stretcher all through the camp; none of us could walk any more at that
time.
Point 2; I talked with the cousin of Karwinsky again and again later on.
His cousin was in charge of the social insurance department at Linz. He
told me that his cousin, that is the witness mentioned here, never had
been at Mauthausen, that he was at Dachau from the first day of his
detention. There is a difference whether it is Mauthausen or Dachau, for
he was sent there as a former member of the Austrian Government who had
committed crimes against National Socialists. He was arrested by the
RSHA, which already existed, I believe by Heydrich in Berlin, and not by
some Austrian office. I also never saw this man afterwards. I also never
visited Dachau. It should, therefore, be easy to ascertain whether this
man was in Dachau from the beginning of his detention or in Mauthausen.
If he was in Dachau, as I am charging, then everything is a lie. If he
were in Mauthausen, it must be first proved whether he does not confuse
me with another man. This first proof, whether he has erred in the
person, is not up to me. If the Prosecution endeavor to find out whether
he was in Dachau from the very beginning—for I know he was in Dachau;
he was arrested in Innsbruck when trying to escape to Switzerland, his
cousin had let me know that when asking me to intervene on his behalf. I
could not intervene because the man was transported to Dachau directly
via Innsbruck-Mittenwald. Thus, he was completely out of my sphere and
power as the then State Secretary for Security of the Austrian
Government.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I suppose the defendant wants to say
something about these other documents. He had answered the one, had he
not?
COL. AMEN: I do not know whether he had finished, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to the defendant._] Had you finished with the
affidavit or the statement of Karwinsky?
KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, not quite.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on then.
KALTENBRUNNER: I have no longer the document before me and I request
that it be given back to me. May I please ask you to return the document
to me?
COL. AMEN: Yes, it is coming.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
KALTENBRUNNER: This document has not been shown to me during previous
interrogations before the Trial. Otherwise, I would have immediately
answered with a request that the cousin of the witness Karwinsky, who
was chief of the Social Insurance Department at Linz and who bears the
same name, be called as a witness and be asked whether it is correct
that he expressly told me that this Karwinsky was detained at Dachau and
never at Mauthausen. May I add that the witness Dr. Skubl, who will
appear before the Tribunal in another matter, can probably make a
statement on the same matter, particularly regarding the fact that this
witness Karwinsky was arrested near the Swiss border when he escaped
after the Anschluss and that he was taken from there to Dachau.
The reason he was taken to Dachau is not exactly known to me, but Dr.
Skubl will be able to give information on that subject, presumably to
the effect that the intention was to prevent any intervention from
Austria in connection with this former member of the Austrian
Government, since Himmler was of the opinion that something might be
attempted by the new Austrian Government in favor of Karwinsky.
THE PRESIDENT: Your counsel can apply to call any witnesses that you
want in rebuttal. He can make application for that request. It is not
necessary to go into that now.
KALTENBRUNNER: Very good, Your Lordship. I should like to make the
following statement regarding the other two documents. I declare their
entire contents to be untrue and incorrect. Had they been put before me
in the interrogations, then, as I did in other cases—I refer to the
testimony of the witness Zutter—I would have made an urgent request
that this witness be brought face to face with me. Regarding the witness
Zutter, at least twice I have asked the prosecutor, who holds the rank
of major and is sitting at the table over there next to Colonel Amen,
that this witness who is making such serious statements against me be
brought face to face with me. Today Prosecutor Colonel Amen was also
present when I made that request at the time the question of Mauthausen
was discussed. These gentlemen retired to consult with a third officer
and discussed in English whether or not Ziereis and Zutter could be
called in. Both are in this prison. All this was untrue.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that your counsel can apply to
call any witnesses that you wish in rebuttal.
KALTENBRUNNER: I shall ask my counsel to apply for the calling of those
two witnesses.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, who was responsible for the order to kill all
inmates at Mauthausen Concentration Camp shortly before the end of the
war?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words in connection with
these two documents? Only now have they been introduced into the Trial
for the first time, and only now is it possible for me to discuss these
serious accusations with the defendant. He also said to me that he
denies the truth of these statements. I think I should be neglecting my
duty as a defense counsel if I did not ask immediately that these
witnesses be heard. It might be that the Prosecution later on...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, what is the point of delaying the Trial? I
have just said that you might make application and you know perfectly
well that application has to be made in writing.
I have said twice to the witness that you, Dr. Kauffmann, his counsel,
can apply for the calling of any witnesses you like in rebuttal. What is
the good of delaying the Trial by getting up and making your application
verbally now?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Far be it from me to cause delay, but I wanted to state
here and now that I want to call these witnesses and I shall certainly
make application in writing.
COL. AMEN: Did you understand the question, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. You asked me who had given the order for the killing
of the inmates at Mauthausen at the end of the war, and to that I reply
that such an order is unknown to me. I gave only one order with regard
to Mauthausen and that was to the effect that the entire camp and all
internees were to be surrendered to the enemy without any ill-treatment.
This order was dictated by me in the presence of the witness Dr. Höttl,
and taken to Mauthausen by a courier-officer. I draw your attention to
the statement of Dr. Höttl in which he confirms that fact. A
questionnaire has been sent to a second person by my Defense Counsel. I
requested a similar statement from him, but it is still unanswered.
COL. AMEN: I did not ask you about that order. I asked you about an
order to kill all inmates at Mauthausen Concentration Camp shortly
before the end of the war. Who was responsible for that order? Were you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: You are acquainted with the person who tells the story,
Ziereis?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I knew Ziereis.
COL. AMEN: And you had your picture taken with him and with Himmler, and
this is now in evidence before this Tribunal. Do you recall that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not seen the picture. It was handed to the
Tribunal while I was in the hospital.
COL. AMEN: Well, never mind the picture then.
I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3870-PS, which will be
Exhibit Number USA-797.
Now, if the Tribunal pleases, this is a fairly long document which I do
not propose to read at length, but it is one of the more important
documents in the case, and so I hope that the Tribunal will read the
entire statement, even though I do not bring it all out today in the
interest of saving time.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a new document?
COL. AMEN: A new document, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in German?
COL. AMEN: Yes.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
This, you will note, Defendant, refers to a dying confession of Ziereis,
as reported to the individual making the affidavit, and I call your
attention first to the last two paragraphs on the first page, which we
will read together:
“There was one SS man for 10 prisoners. The highest number of
prisoners was about 17,000, not including the branch camps. The
highest number in Mauthausen Camp, the branch camps included,
was about 95,000. The total number of prisoners who died was
65,000. The complement was made up of Totenkopf units numbering
5,000 men, comprising guards and the command staff.”
And, now, at the middle of the next page, the paragraph begins:
“According to an order by Reichsführer Himmler, I was to
liquidate all prisoners on the instructions of SS
Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the prisoners were to be
led into the tunnels of the Bergkristall works of Gusen and only
one entrance was to be left open.”
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not yet found the passage.
COL. AMEN: It is in the middle of Page 2. Have you got it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, sir.
COL. AMEN: “Then I was to blow up this entrance to the tunnels
with some explosive and thus cause the death of the prisoners. I
refused to carry out this order. This meant the extermination of
the prisoners in the so-called ‘mother camp’ Mauthausen, and in
the camps Gusen I and Gusen II. Details of this are known to
Herr Wolfram and to SS Obersturmführer Eckermann.
“A gas chamber camouflaged as a bathroom was built in Mauthausen
Concentration Camp by order of the former garrison doctor, Dr.
Krebsbach. Prisoners were gassed in this camouflaged bathroom.
In addition to that, there ran, between Mauthausen and Gusen, a
specially built automobile in which prisoners were gassed during
the journey. The idea for the construction of this automobile
was Dr. Wasiczki’s, SS Untersturmführer and pharmacist. I,
myself, never put any gas into this automobile; I only drove it.
But I knew that prisoners were being gassed. The gassing of the
prisoners was done at the request of the physician, SS
Hauptsturmführer Dr. Krebsbach.
“Everything that we carried out was ordered by the Reich
Security Main Office, Himmler or Heydrich, also by SS
Obergruppenführer Müller or Dr. Kaltenbrunner, the latter being
Chief of the Security Police.”
Then, passing on to Page 5, just below the center of the page, the
paragraph commencing, “In the early summer of 1943...” Have you the
place?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “In the early summer of 1943, SS Obergruppenführer
Dr. Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Camp
Commandant Ziereis, Gauleiter Eigruber, Chief of the Detention
Camp Bachmeyer, and several others accompanied Dr.
Kaltenbrunner. I saw Dr. Kaltenbrunner and the people who
accompanied him with my own eyes. According to the testimony of
the ‘corpse carriers’ at that time, the former prisoners Albert
Tiefenbacher”—whose affidavit has been read—“present address
Salzburg; and Johann Polster, present address Pottendorf near
Wiener-Neustadt, Austria, about 15 prisoners under detention
were selected by the detention chief, Unterscharführer Winkler,
in order to show Dr. Kaltenbrunner three ways of extermination;
by a shot in the neck, hanging, and gassing. Women whose hair
had been shorn were among those executed and they were killed by
shots in the neck. The above-mentioned ‘corpse carriers’ were
present at the execution and had to carry the corpses to the
crematorium. Dr. Kaltenbrunner went to the crematorium after the
execution and later he went into the quarry.
“Baldur von Schirach visited the Mauthausen Concentration Camp
in the autumn of 1944. He, too, went to the detention building
and also to the crematorium.”
Do you still say that you had nothing to do with the order referred to
or the matters set forth in the affidavit?
KALTENBRUNNER: I maintain that most emphatically, and I want to draw
your attention to the fact that you, sir, have said that this statement
was taken when Ziereis was on his deathbed, but you did not say that
what you read from Pages 7 and 8 does not come from Ziereis, but from
Hans Marsalek, who is responsible for these statements. This Hans
Marsalek whom, of course, I have never seen in my life, had been an
internee in Mauthausen as were the two other witnesses. I have briefly
expressed my views as to the value of a statement concerning me from a
former concentration camp internee and my inability to speak face to
face with this witness who now confronts me, and my application will be
made through my counsel. I must ask here to be confronted with Marsalek.
Marsalek cannot know of any such order. In spite of that he states that
he did.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, Marsalek is merely the individual who took the
dying confession from Ziereis. Do you understand that?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not, because thus far it is new to me that the
Prosecution were using internees from concentration camps for the
interrogation of Ziereis, who had been shot in the stomach three times
and was dying. I thought that such interrogations would have been
carried out by a man who was legally trained and who would be in a
position to attach the right value to such statements.
COL. AMEN: Well, perhaps, Defendant, if you were conducting the
Prosecution, you would do it differently; but, in any event, your
testimony is that everything in that affidavit which was read to you is
false; is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is false. I have never given an order to the
Mauthausen Camp with the exception of that one order which I was
entitled to do on the strength of special powers and for the contents
and transmission of which I have offered sufficient evidence. Mauthausen
was never under my jurisdiction in any other way, and I could not issue
any such orders. The Prosecution know perfectly well, and it must have
been proved to them by dozens of testimonies, that I had never had any
authority over Mauthausen.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you do not seem to understand what this
document is. It is an affidavit of Hans Marsalek, and Paragraph 2 shows
the fact that he made the interrogation of Ziereis, who was about to
die, in the presence of the commander of an armored division; and he
then sets out what Ziereis said, and then he goes on to declare, in
addition, what is contained in Paragraph 3; and it is perfectly obvious
to the Tribunal that what is said in Paragraph 3 is not what Ziereis
said, but what Marsalek said—the person who was making the affidavit.
KALTENBRUNNER: My Lord, may I say in reply that Marsalek, as an internee
in the camp, was of course not in a position to know that Ziereis was
never under my command. For that reason alone, it appears likely that
Marsalek, when he questioned Ziereis, could not possibly know the facts
of the case. I have proved to the Tribunal, and proved it to the
Prosecutor, that authority was not given to me until 9 April.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; that is only a matter of argument. I was
only drawing your attention to the fact that it is perfectly obvious
from the document itself that what Colonel Amen was reading was a
statement of Marsalek and not a statement of Ziereis, which was the
point you were making.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you recall having given an order to the
commandant of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp on the 27th of April
1945, that at least 1,000 persons should be killed at Mauthausen each
day? Is that true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have never given such an order. You know...
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with SS Colonel Ziereis, the same person
we have just been speaking of?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And were you acquainted with Kurt Becher or Becker, a former
colonel in the SS?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3762-PS,
which will become Exhibit Number USA-798.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
KALTENBRUNNER: You asked, sir, whether I knew an SS Colonel Becker, and
I answered, “No”; but the man is Kurt Becher.
COL. AMEN: That is all the better. You do know him then, do you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I know him, yes.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, have these documents been translated into
all languages?
COL. AMEN: I believe they have, every one of them, yes. No, I am told
that all of them have not; some of them have. This one is in English and
German, Your Lordship. We did not have time to get them translated into
the Russian and French, although it is now in process.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then it will be done?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir; it is being done, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
KALTENBRUNNER: May I reply to it?
THE PRESIDENT: In order that the record should be properly complete, the
Tribunal would like the Prosecution to state when the translation has
been done, so that the matter should be thoroughly in order.
COL. AMEN: Precisely.
Defendant, we will now read this document together:
“I, Kurt Becher, former SS Standartenführer, born 12 September
1909, at Hamburg, declare the following under oath:
“1. Between the middle of September and the middle of October
1944 I caused the Reichsführer SS Himmler to issue the following
order, which I received in two originals, one each for SS
Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and Pohl, and a copy for myself:
“‘By this order, which becomes immediately effective, I forbid
any extermination of Jews and order that, on the contrary, care
should be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you—and here
Kaltenbrunner and Pohl were meant—‘personally responsible even
if this order should not be strictly adhered to by subordinate
offices.’
“I personally took Pohl’s copy to him at his offices in Berlin
and left the copy for Kaltenbrunner at his office in Berlin.
Therefore, in my opinion Kaltenbrunner and Pohl bear the
responsibility after this date for any further killings of
Jewish prisoners.
“2. When visiting Mauthausen Concentration Camp on 27 April 1945
at 0900 hours, I was told in the strictest secrecy by the camp
commandant, SS Standartenführer Ziereis, that ‘Kaltenbrunner
gave me the order that at least a thousand persons would still
have to die at Mauthausen each day.’
“The facts mentioned above are true. These statements are made
by me voluntarily and without any coercion. I have read them
through, signed them, and confirmed them with my oath.”
Is that true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: In part it is correct and in part it is not. I shall
explain it sentence by sentence.
COL. AMEN: No, suppose you simply tell us what you claim to be false,
because we must get on with this.
KALTENBRUNNER: I quite believe that you want to save time, but this is a
question of establishing my guilt or my innocence and to do that I must
be given an opportunity to make a statement in detail. Otherwise neither
you nor the Tribunal would know the truth; and that is what we want
here, I hope. I am glad that this witness, Becher, was found and that
this statement is available, because it proves, first that in September
or October 1944 Himmler was forced to issue this order—that same
Himmler about whom it has been definitely established that since 1939 or
1940 he had become guilty of the crime of killing Jews on the largest
scale.
And now we must find out why in September or October Himmler had given
such an order. Before I had seen this document I stated yesterday and
today that this order was issued by Hitler on my representations, and
obviously this order from Himmler is based on another order which he
received from Hitler.
Secondly, it is clear to me that Himmler gave such an order to Pohl as
the person responsible for those concentration camps in which Jews were
kept; and thirdly, that he has informed me, Kaltenbrunner, of this as
the person who opposed Himmler. As to Becher, I have to go farther back.
Through this man Becher Himmler did the worst things which could
possibly be done and brought to light here. Through Becher and the Joint
Committee in Hungary and Switzerland he released Jews in exchange,
first, for war equipment, then secondly, for raw material, and thirdly,
for foreign currency. I heard about this through the intelligence
service and immediately attempted to stop this, not through Himmler
because I would have failed but through Hitler. At that moment any
personal credit of Himmler with Hitler was undermined, for this action
might have changed the reputation of the Reich abroad in the most
serious manner.
At the same time my efforts in connection with Burckhardt had already
been going on, and now you understand why the witness Schellenberg
stated that Himmler had said to him, “I am alarmed; now Kaltenbrunner
has got me under his thumb.” This means that Kaltenbrunner had
completely revealed all the things Himmler was doing in Hungary and had
told Hitler about it.
By this order Himmler attempted to camouflage it and to get out of the
whole thing by pretending that the responsibility rested on
Kaltenbrunner and Pohl anyhow. Even according to this document the
responsibility rested on Himmler and Pohl, but Kaltenbrunner had to be
included and be told about it because otherwise he might bring the
subject up with Hitler any day. That is the sense of the document.
This witness, Becher, is now in Nuremberg. I beg absolutely to be
confronted with him here. I am quite able to prove to the public with
the help of this witness how, starting with the transfer of the
so-called Weiss A.G. in Hungary up to that day, Himmler, with Pohl and
Becher and the two committees in Hungary and Switzerland were running
this business. And I can prove how I fought against it.
There is yet another accusation in this document, that on 27 April I am
supposed to have given a strictly secret order to Ziereis that 1,000
Jews had to be exterminated in Mauthausen every day. I ask you to have
the witness Höttl, who is also here, called in immediately, so that I
may ask him on what day I dictated and sent by courier-officer to
Mauthausen the order that the entire camp with all its inmates be
surrendered to the enemy. This witness will confirm to you that this
order was given several days before 27 April and that I could not have
given orders to the contrary on 27 April.
I ask you, sir, not to take me unawares and maneuver me into a position
where I might go to pieces. I shall not break down. I swear to you and I
have sworn that I want to help you establish the truth.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, you have heard evidence at this Trial with respect
to the meaning of the phrase “special treatment,” have you not? Have you
heard that in this courtroom?
KALTENBRUNNER: The expression “special treatment” has been used by my
interrogators several times every day, yes.
COL. AMEN: You know what it means?
KALTENBRUNNER: It can only be assumed, although I cannot give an
accurate explanation, that this was a death sentence, not imposed by a
public court but by an order of Himmler’s.
COL. AMEN: Well, the Defendant Keitel testified that, I think, it was a
matter of common knowledge. Have you not at all times known what was
meant by “special treatment”? “Yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I have told you; an order from Himmler—I am
referring to Hitler’s order of 1941, therefore also an order from
Hitler—that executions should be carried out without legal procedure.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever discuss with Gruppenführer Müller of Amt IV the
application of “special treatment” to certain individuals? “Yes” or
“no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: No; I know that the witness Schellenberg said...
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3839-PS
which will become Exhibit Number USA-799. By the way, were you
acquainted with Joseph Spacil?
THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Joseph Spacil?
KALTENBRUNNER: Spassel? No.
COL. AMEN: He is the person who makes the affidavit now before you.
KALTENBRUNNER: The name which is mentioned here is Joseph Spacil, and
that man I know, yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you look at the center of the first page, a
paragraph commencing “In regard to ‘special treatment’...” Have you the
place?
KALTENBRUNNER: Not yet, no. In order to understand the document I shall
have to read all of it.
COL. AMEN: Well, if you have to read all of these documents, Defendant,
we would never get through, because the first part has nothing to do
with the part which I am interested in or with you.
KALTENBRUNNER: I beg your pardon, sir, I am sure that you are interested
in expediting the procedure as far as possible as we defendants are
anxious not to delay the proceedings; but it is necessary for my defense
that I should at least be allowed to read a document on which I have to
make a statement.
COL. AMEN: But, Defendant, your lawyer is receiving copies of all these
documents, and I am sure that whatever is there, which should be brought
out on your behalf, he will see to it that it will be brought out at the
proper time, which will be after I get through asking you these
questions. Is that not satisfactory?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not enough for me. I must know, at any rate,
what is contained in that document, since you are asking me to make a
statement on it now.
COL. AMEN: Well, go ahead and read it then.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, not only your own counsel will look after your
interests, but the Tribunal will look after your interests; and you must
answer the question, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Very well. Now let us read along in the center of the page,
commencing with:
“In regard to ‘special treatment’ I have the following
knowledge:
“On occasion of meetings of the office chiefs, Gruppenführer
Müller frequently consulted Kaltenbrunner as to whether this or
that case should be specially treated or if ‘special treatment’
was to be considered. The following is an example of how the
conversation went:
“Müller: Case Obergruppenführer B, please, ‘special treatment’
or not?
“Kaltenbrunner: Yes, or submit it to the Reichsführer SS for
decision.
“Or:
“Müller: Obergruppenführer, no answer has arrived from the
Reichsführer SS in regard to ‘special treatment’ for Case A.
“Kaltenbrunner: Ask once more.
“Or:
“Müller handed a paper to Kaltenbrunner and asked for
instructions, as described above.
“When Müller had such a conversation with Kaltenbrunner, he only
mentioned the initials, so that the persons present at the table
never knew who was involved.”
And then the last two paragraphs:
“Both Müller and Kaltenbrunner proposed in my presence ‘special
treatment’ or submission to the Reichsführer SS for approval of
‘special treatment’ for certain cases which I cannot specify in
detail. I estimate that in approximately 50 percent of the cases
‘special treatment’ was approved.”
Are the contents of that affidavit true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: The contents are not correct, when given the
interpretation you are giving to the document. You will see immediately
that the tragic expression “special treatment” is given here an
absolutely humorous turn. Do you know the meaning of Winzerstube in
Godesberg, and of Walsertraum in the Walsertal, and their relation to
the term “Sonderbehandlung”? Walsertraum is the smartest and most
fashionable Alpine hotel of the whole German Reich, and the Winzerstube
is a very famous hotel in Godesberg in which many international meetings
were held. Especially qualified and distinguished personalities were
accommodated there—I would mention M. Poncet and M. Herriot and many
more. They had three times the normal ration for diplomats, which is
nine times the ration of the ordinary German during the war. They were
daily given a bottle of champagne. They were allowed to correspond
freely with their families in France and to receive parcels. These
internees were allowed to receive visits on several occasions, their
wishes were cared for wherever they were. That is what is meant here by
“special treatment.”
I can only state here that it may well be that Müller may have talked
about this to me, since I was extremely anxious from the point of view
of foreign policy and intelligence that the Reich should now follow my
suggestion and treat foreign persons in a more humane manner. It is in
this connection that Müller may have spoken to me, but Winzerstube and
Godesberg, these two final achievements of this so-called “special
treatment,” were the places where political internees upon parole were
accommodated and received preferential treatment.
COL. AMEN: Did you have frequent meetings with your section heads,
including Müller, as indicated in this document?
KALTENBRUNNER: I stated yesterday and today that, of course, I met
Müller when we were lunching together, which we had to do because all
our 38 buildings in Berlin had been destroyed or damaged by bombs, but I
did not talk to him about official matters concerning Amt IV.
This document makes it clear that these were matters of extreme interest
to me as Chief of Intelligence.
May I ask you not to leave this document just yet. It must be put on
record before this Tribunal that these two establishments are used as I
wished for the preferential and better treatment than that enjoyed by
the Germans. That is of great importance to me for my defense, and I am
asking you—I shall ask you through my counsel—that you make detailed
inquiries about these two hotels, and I also request that you ask M.
Poncet, as the leader of the French detainees, about the treatment he
received there. He had such a good time there that he gave French
lessons to the wife of a criminal investigation official, and taught her
French when they went for walks for hours without being guarded at all.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, did you or did you not issue instructions to
Müller, as Section Chief IV, as to whether certain individuals who were
in confinement at Berlin should be transported to southern Germany or be
shot? And for your assistance, I will suggest to you that it was in
February 1945 when the Russian armies were closing in on Berlin. “Yes”
or “no”, if you can.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, the Russian Army was not very near Berlin in February
1945. I think military persons here would be able to give you more
precise information as to where the fighting was going on at the time. I
do not believe that there was a reason for the evacuation of any camps
to the south at that time.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Martin Sandberger, Group Leader VI A
of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. He was the first assistant of this Schellenberg who
has been mentioned several times, and he acted as intermediary with
regard to intelligence news between Himmler and Schellenberg.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown the Document 3838-PS, which
will become Exhibit USA-800.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
I call your attention only to the first two paragraphs of that
affidavit:
“In my capacity as Group Leader VI A at the RSHA, the following
became known to me:
“In February 1945 I was told by Group Leader VI B, SS
Standartenführer Steimle, that he had to represent Schellenberg
at the daily office chief meetings. On that occasion, Müller,
Chief of Amt IV, presented to Kaltenbrunner a list of persons
who were in confinement in or close to Berlin, for Kaltenbrunner
to decide whether they were to be transported to southern
Germany or whether they were to be shot, because the Russian
armies were closing in on Berlin. Steimle did not know who these
people were. Kaltenbrunner made his decisions in an extremely
hasty and superficial manner and Steimle expressed his
indignation to me about the frivolity of this procedure. From
this I inferred that Kaltenbrunner had ordered a number of
shootings, because if evacuation had been ordered there would
have been no talk about the frivolity of the procedure.”
Is that affidavit true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is not correct, and although it surprises
me I can immediately refute it. Perhaps I may draw attention to the
following points:
First, the document was prepared at Oberursel on 19 November 1945 by the
witness Sandberger. In the second half of the first paragraph he states
that he had been in England together with Schellenberg. I beg your
pardon; he states this in the second paragraph. “As I was informed by
Schellenberg at an internment camp in England when taking a walk....”
You can gather from the second part that he, together with Schellenberg,
was in an interrogation camp near London, in which I also was kept for
10 weeks, where they had detailed discussions. Therefore it is
important, because something more will have to be said about this man
Schellenberg, to know whether Sandberger received this information from
Steimle before February 1945, or whether he got it through Schellenberg
in London when they were interned together. That can be ascertained only
by having Sandberger questioned here directly through my defense
counsel. Until then, I must refute this statement altogether.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Sir; I have by no means finished what I have to say.
Secondly, Sandberger states that he had heard from Steimle what Steimle
had heard. Personally I would not attach too much credit to any
information at third or fourth hand, and I would strongly challenge a
statement such as Steimle has made. I had not the authority to make such
decisions; nor could Steimle, Sandberger, or Schellenberg ever have had
any doubt of the fact that only Himmler could have made such decisions.
Thirdly, only once did I hear of such treatment of witnesses. I
personally intervened and made that known here. This was in the case of
Schuschnigg, who was in one such camp which was threatened by the
Russians. On 1 February 1945—I remember this date very well and it can
be confirmed by another defendant here—I replied to this other
defendant when he asked, “Could we not do something for Schuschnigg so
that he will not fall into the hands of the Russians? Will you or shall
I make the suggestion to the Führer to have him released from detention
or at least to take him somewhere where he will not fall into the hands
of the Russians but rather into American hands?” Whereupon, one of us—I
cannot remember who, possibly both of us—took this proposal to Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely you are going very far afield. The Tribunal quite
understands that you point out, which is obvious, that this is hearsay
evidence. The only question for you is whether Müller did on this
occasion present a list of names to you, and we understand that you say
he did not. We do not want to hear argument about it.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Your Lordship, Müller did not submit such a list to
me, but I must define in some way my attitude to this document which has
just been shown to me for the first time. I do not want it to appear to
the Tribunal that I can defend myself only after I have been in
consultation with my lawyer for hours. I want to tell the prosecutor to
his face that this is not true. And I do; somehow I must defend my
veracity. I cannot give an answer straight away and I cannot make it
easier for the prosecutor except by requesting him to bring this
witness, Sandberger, into court; he can discuss with him at length in
the meantime, so as to tell him why I do not consider it credible. I
must tell the Tribunal beforehand why these things are untrue.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, are you familiar with the so-called “bullet” order
that was directed to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp? “Yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: I made a detailed statement on this bullet order
yesterday and I stated that I did not know of that order.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever issue any oral orders supplementing the
so-called “bullet” order—you yourself; did you ever issue any such?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document 3844-PS, which
will become Exhibit USA-801.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
Were you acquainted with Josef Niedermeyer, Defendant? Josef
Niedermeyer?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not recollect having known him.
COL. AMEN: Well, perhaps this will bring it back to you—Paragraph 1:
“From the autumn of 1942 until May 1945 the so-called
call-barracks of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp were under my
supervision.
“2. At the beginning of December 1944 the so-called ‘bullet’
orders were shown to me in the political department of the
Mauthausen Concentration Camp. These were two orders, each of
which bore the signature of Kaltenbrunner. I saw both of these
signatures myself. One of these orders stated that foreign
civilian workers who had repeatedly escaped from labor camps
were, when recaptured, to be sent to the Mauthausen
Concentration Camp under the ‘bullet’ action.
“The second order stated that the same procedure was to be
followed with officers and noncommissioned officers who were
prisoners of war, with the exception of British and Americans,
if they repeatedly escaped from prisoner-of-war camps. These
prisoners of war were also to be brought to the Mauthausen
Concentration Camp.
“3. On the strength of the ‘bullet’ orders and the oral
instructions of Kaltenbrunner which accompanied them, 1,300
foreign civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers
were brought to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. There they
were lodged in Block 20 and fed so badly, according to orders,
that they had to starve. Eight hundred of them died from hunger
and illness. The bad food and the lack of medical care were the
result of the personal oral orders of Kaltenbrunner.”
Is that statement true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, sir, that is not correct. I believe that I can
invalidate this document right now. May I draw your attention to Page 2.
On Page 2, Paragraph 3, it says in the third lines “1,300 foreign
civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers were
brought....” From the words “civilian workers”...
COL. AMEN: Defendant, I am primarily interested in Paragraph 2, which
has to do with the fact that the person who makes the affidavit saw two
“bullet” orders bearing your signature. Is that, so far as you know,
true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: No; I said yesterday, and I repeat it today under oath
that these bullet orders were not known to me. To dispute the veracity
of the witness and the evidential value of the document, I must be able
personally to raise my arguments on those points where it is
particularly obvious that the Prosecution is wrong, that is, in the
third line of Paragraph 3. Here the witness—whose signature differs
completely from the writing of the statement, and this is a fact to
which I would like to invite the attention of the Tribunal—the witness
completely forgot that the bullet orders, the text of which has been
read here repeatedly, referred to officers and noncommissioned officers,
but not to civilian workers. How, on the basis of a false order, could
such a thing happen at all? I cannot pass the death sentence for murder
on the strength of a civilian paragraph such as 820 of BGB (Code of
Civil Law), nor can I on the strength of the bullet orders lock civilian
workers up in a camp. The witness, in his haste and anxiety to oblige,
had forgotten these details.
Nor do I believe that this man has ever seen a document which bears my
signature. Such a document was never submitted to me either.
Once again, I must ask that this witness—and I am sure there will be
others on the Mauthausen question—that this witness and all the others
should be brought here and questioned as to how their statements came to
be made.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you recall the testimony of the witness
Wisliceny with respect to your participation in the forced labor program
on the defenses below Vienna?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not quite finished answering your last questions.
Excuse me, but I still have something vital to say on this matter.
COL. AMEN: I thought you were through with that.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I thought so, too, but I have just remembered
something important.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: It is very relevant that I should refer you to what I
said about the bullet orders yesterday. I stated that it became known to
me in December or January 1944-45, and what my reaction was, and how I
opposed it. These circumstances, too, explain the fact that I could not,
shortly before that, have signed the order myself.
Apart from that, it is totally impossible for a Kaltenbrunner to sign a
bullet order, when it is clear to the Prosecution here that it was
signed already in 1941 by Hitler. This is why I wanted to make that
final remark about the document.
Now, will you please be good enough to repeat the next question?
COL. AMEN: I want to call your attention to the testimony of Wisliceny
with respect to your participation in the forced labor program on the
defenses below Vienna. Are you familiar with what he said in this court?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read it to you. It is very short:
“Question: With reference to the Jews who were left in Budapest,
what happened to them?
“Answer: In October-November 1944 about 30,000, perhaps a few
thousand more, were taken out and brought to Germany. They were
to be used for work on the defenses in Vienna. They were mostly
women. A large number of these people were put into the labor
camps on the lower Danube, and they died there from sheer
exhaustion. A small percentage, perhaps 12,000, were taken to
Vienna, the western boundary, and about 3,000 were taken to
Bergen and Belsen and then to Switzerland. Those were Jews that
had come from Germany.”
Now, Defendant, do you recall having had any correspondence with the
Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna with respect to the assignment of
this forced labor in the city of Vienna?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have never written a single letter to the Bürgermeister
of Budapest, and I should very much like to ask you to show me any such
letter.
COL. AMEN: I did not say Budapest; I said the Bürgermeister of the city
of Vienna, or I intended to, if I did not.
KALTENBRUNNER: The Bürgermeister of Vienna? I cannot remember having had
any correspondence with him either. I think perhaps I can explain the
matter to you by saying that these frontier fortifications which must be
meant here did not come under the city of Vienna, but under the Gau of
the lower Danube. I did not know that Vienna had a joint frontier with
Hungary.
COL. AMEN: Well, you have already testified that you had nothing to do
with participating in this forced labor program; is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: All right.
I ask to have the defendant shown Document 3803-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-802.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
I call your attention to the first three paragraphs. You will note that
the letter comes from yourself, and reads as follows:
“To the Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna, SS Brigadeführer
Blaschke.
“Subject: Assignment of labor to essential war work in the city
of Vienna.
“Re: Your letter of 7 June 1944.
“Dear Blaschke: For the special reasons cited by you I have in
the meantime given orders to direct several evacuation
transports to Vienna-Strasshof. SS Brigadeführer Dr. Dellbruegge
had, as a matter of fact, already written to me concerning the
same matter. At the moment it is a question of four transports
with approximately 12,000 Jews. They will reach Vienna within
the next few days.
“According to previous experience it is estimated that 30
percent of the transport will consist of Jews able to work,
approximately 3,600 in this case, who can be utilized for the
work in question, it being understood that they are subject to
removal at any time. It is obvious that these people must be
assigned to work in large, well-guarded groups, and accommodated
in secured camps, and this is an absolute prerequisite for
making these Jews available.
“The women and children of these Jews who were unable to work,
and who are all being kept in readiness for a special action and
therefore one day will be removed again, must stay in the
guarded camp also during the day.
“Please discuss further details with the State Police head
office in Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner and SS
Obersturmbannführer Krumey of the Sondereinsatzkommando Hungary,
who at present is in Vienna.
“I hope these transports will be of help to you in carrying out
the urgent work you have in view.
“Heil Hitler. Yours, Kaltenbrunner.”
Now do you recall that communication?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having written that letter?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Well, I think, Defendant, that this time your signature is
affixed to the original of this letter. Have you the original?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is that not your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not my signature. It is a signature either in
ink or it is a facsimile, but it is not mine.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, I want to show you samples of your signature which
you gave in the course of your interrogations, and I ask you to tell me
whether or not these are your signatures.
[_Documents were submitted to the defendant._]
KALTENBRUNNER: I have already made hundreds of such signatures, and they
are probably right. The one in pencil, the document signed in pencil,
has been signed by me.
COL. AMEN: Well, will you indicate them in some way, so that the
Tribunal can look at the signatures which you admit are your own, and
compare them with the signature on this Document 3803-PS, Exhibit
USA-802?
KALTENBRUNNER: The signatures on these papers which are written in
pencil are mine; they are my own.
COL. AMEN: All of them?
KALTENBRUNNER: All three.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: But not those in ink.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
[_The documents were submitted to the Tribunal._]
Shall I continue, Your Lordship?
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please.
Go on, Colonel Amen.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, you have heard the evidence with respect to the
establishment of the Warsaw Ghetto and the clearing of the ghetto.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from this document?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE TRIBUNAL: We had better adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I have to begin submitting my evidence in the
next few days, and I do not know yet whether my Document Book 1 is
admissible. Will you please also tell me on what day and at what time
this can be discussed.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal think that, subject to anything
you have to say, half past 12 tomorrow—that is Saturday morning—would
be a good time at which we could decide the admissibility of your
documents.
DR. THOMA: Thank you very much indeed.
COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal please, I want to revert for a moment to
Document 3803-PS with the signature.
Defendant, have you the original of that exhibit before you?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you look at the signature and tell me whether you do not
find, written by hand just above the signature, the letters D-e-i-n?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And as I understand it, that word means “yours”; in other
words, it is an intimate expression used only between close personal
friends, is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: In German there are only two forms of concluding a
letter: either “Ihr,” I-h-r, or “Dein,” D-e-i-n. We use the latter,
“Dein,” if we are on close terms, friendly terms. Blaschke, the Mayor of
Vienna, is a friend of mine and apparently...
COL. AMEN: Now, would it not be an absolutely ridiculous and unthinkable
thing that a stamp or facsimile would be made up which contained not
only a signature but the expression “Dein” above the signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: That would be nonsensical, I wholly agree with that; but
I did not say that it must be a facsimile signature. I just said that it
is not my signature.
It is either a facsimile or it has been put underneath with another
signature. The author of this letter—you did not allow me to finish
before—as it can be seen from the code in the upper left-hand corner,
is to be found in Section IV A and B. Everyone in the department and the
entire German Reich knew that the Mayor of Vienna, Blaschke, and myself
had been close personal friends since our common political activity in
Vienna, that is for about 10 years, and had used the familiar form of
address, “Du.” Therefore, if, for instance, I had been absent from
Berlin, and the letter was urgent—as I assume to be the case from the
contents—the official might have considered it justifiable to write in
this form. I did not authorize him and, of course, it is quite
impossible, but that is the only way I can explain it.
COL. AMEN: Then, Defendant, at least you agree that it is not a
facsimile signature, is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: It would be most unusual to have made a stamp with the
words, “Dein.” It would be entirely out of the question. Therefore, the
official himself must have written the signature. Everybody knew that I
was on familiar terms with Blaschke and therefore the word “Dein” had to
appear, if he used my signature at all.
Please look also at the figure 30 on the top. From many samples of my
writing you can see that I do not write like that at all.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, is it not equally ridiculous to think that a
person, or an official, as you term him, in signing such a letter on
your behalf would try to imitate your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: Quite right, but, sir, it would be a matter of course,
when writing to the Mayor of Vienna, a man with whom the official
perhaps knew quite well that I was on familiar terms, to put my name
typewritten under a personal letter. That would be impossible as well.
If I were not in Berlin he had only two possibilities open to him:
either to type it in or to make it seem as though I, Kaltenbrunner, were
actually there.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that you are simply lying about your
signature on this letter, in the same way that you are lying to this
Tribunal about almost everything else you have given testimony about? Is
not that a fact?
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, for a whole year I have had to submit to
this insult of being called a liar. For a whole year I have been
interrogated hundreds of times both here and in London, and I have been
insulted in this way and even much worse. My mother, who died in 1943,
was called a whore, and many other similar things were hurled at me.
This term is not new to me but I should like to state that in a matter
of this kind I certainly would not tell an untruth, when I claim to be
believed by this Tribunal in far more important matters.
COL. AMEN: I am suggesting, Defendant, that when your testimony is so
directly contrary to that of 20 or 30 other witnesses and even more
documents, it is almost an incredible thing you should be telling the
truth and that every witness and every document should be false. Do you
not agree to that proposition?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. I cannot admit that because I have had the feeling
each time a document has been submitted to me today, that it could at
first glance be immediately refuted by me in its most vital points. I
ask, and I hope that the Tribunal will allow me, to refer to single
points and to come into closer contact with individual witnesses, so
that I may defend myself to the last. Throughout the preliminary
interrogations your colleague has always adopted the attitude unjustly
that I was refuting and opposing insignificant points. The conception of
expeditious trial proceedings has been unknown to me in this form. Had
he talked to me in broad lines about the ways to find out the real
truth, I believe he would have sooner arrived at considerably larger and
more important issues. I am perhaps the only defendant who, on receiving
the Indictment and being asked, “Are you ready to make any further
statements to the Prosecution,” stated “Immediately,” and I signed
it—please produce the signature—“from today on after receiving the
Indictment I am at the disposal of the Prosecution for any information.”
Is it not so? Please confirm it. That gentleman [_pointing to an
interpreter_] interrogated me. I have always been ready, that is, during
the last 5 months, to give information on any question, but I have not
been asked any more.
THE PRESIDENT: You must try to restrain yourself. And when you see the
light, speak slower. You know about the light, do you not?
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact, Defendant, that on the occasion of your
last interrogation you stated that you did not wish to be interrogated
any more because the questions seemed to be designed to help the
Prosecution rather than to help your case, and that you were told that
in that event you would not be questioned any more; that you were also
informed that there were other documents and other material with which
you had not been confronted and that if you desired at any time to come
back and be interrogated with respect to those matters, you should tell
your lawyers so and send a note and that the interrogator would be very
happy to continue interrogating you? Is that not a fact, “yes” or “no”?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, sir, that was not the case. I made that statement
repeatedly when I was being interrogated on points of detail. It was in
the evening and it was getting very late. I believe it was about 2000
hours; I can remember the room very well. I was led out of the room.
This interpreter, whom I saw here this morning, I believe, was sitting
at a long table with two or three other officials. They said, “You have
received the Indictment today,” and I said, “Yes, I have.” They said,
“Are you aware that from now on you will have to speak with the General
Secretary about your defense? Do you wish to be interrogated further?”
To which I said, “Yes, certainly I am at your disposal at any time.”
Whereupon this officer here looked at me in a very startled manner, for
he did not expect that answer from me; obviously all the others appeared
to have said, “No, we are glad that these interrogations have come to an
end and we can work now on our defense.”
COL. AMEN: Now, Defendant, I want to read to you from your last
interrogation. After a question as to whether the testimony was being
helpful to you sufficiently so that you wanted to continue, you spoke as
follows:
“This would at least be as important for my defense as the
material which is helping the Prosecutor’s case and about which
the Interrogator has asked me repeatedly; therefore, I have the
feeling that I am still in the hands of the Prosecutor and not
in the hands of a judge in charge of a preliminary hearing. As
the Indictment has been served, I find myself now in a position
where I can prepare my own defense, and I therefore do not find
it proper that you continue to look for material which would
incriminate me. Please do not regard this as any criticism or
rebuttal, because I have never been informed about the procedure
to be followed in these hearings and I do not know about it; but
according to my knowledge of legal procedure this is incorrect.
I have never been given the possibility of confronting other
witnesses and of reminding them that this or that did not happen
in this or that way, _et cetera_.
“Question: Is your statement made in the form of an objection to
further questioning?
“Answer: If, as I stated it now, there is a possibility of my
being confronted with witnesses and to do something about
testimony in my favor, I would be very glad to continue, but
even so I have the feeling that it would be better to do this
during the evidence at the Trial itself. I believe I should
discuss this first with my defense counsel.
“Question: Well, if there is any question in your mind about
whether you should go further in any interrogation by the Office
of Chief of Counsel, or the U.S. representative to the
International Military Tribunal, I think you should talk to your
counsel, too. You have never been under any compulsion to answer
either before or since this Indictment was served. I think you
will agree your treatment has been fair in all circumstances.”
Is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, it confirms exactly what I have been
telling you. The material that you just read states that I did not agree
that interrogations and discussions should be broken off suddenly. I
said that I had never had any opportunity of speaking with the witnesses
with whom I was confronted. It confirms that I have asked you to bring
me face to face with the witnesses, so that I might talk with them. I do
not deny at all that I also said that I was glad that now I could start
preparing my defense. Actually, that is so. But I did not say in the
course of such a lengthy statement—it has not been read to me—and
worded as no other interrogation has been worded with the exception of
perhaps two or three, that I no longer place myself at the disposal of
the interrogator. I stated just the opposite and you read that, too,
that I am at the disposal of the interrogator.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, let us get to the Warsaw Ghetto. Do you recall
from the evidence before this Tribunal that some 400,000 Jews were first
put into the ghetto and then in the final action SS troops cleared out
about 56,000, of which more than 14,000 were killed. Do you recall that
evidence?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not recall any details of this statement; what I
know about this matter, I have already stated today.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that substantially all of these 400,000 Jews
were murdered at the extermination plant at Treblinka? Did you know
that?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: What did you have to do with the final razing of the Warsaw
Ghetto, nothing as usual?
KALTENBRUNNER: I had nothing to do with it, as I already stated.
COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3840-PS,
which will become Exhibit Number USA-803.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
Were you acquainted with Karl Kaleske?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, that name is not known to me.
COL. AMEN: Does it help you to remember if I suggest to you that he was
the adjutant of General Stroop?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know the adjutant of General Stroop; the name
which you just mentioned to me, “Kaleske,” I do not know either.
COL. AMEN: Let us get to his affidavit. Have you got it before you now?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “My name is Karl Kaleske. I was adjutant to Dr. Von
Sammern-Frankenegg from November 1942 until April 1943, while he
was SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw. I then became adjutant to SS
and Polizeiführer Stroop until August 1943. The action against
the Warsaw Ghetto was planned while Von Sammern-Frankenegg was
SS and Polizeiführer. General Stroop took over the command on
the day of the commencement of the action. The function of the
Security Police during the action against the Warsaw Ghetto was
to accompany the SS troops. A certain number of SS troops were
assigned to the task to clear a certain street. With every SS
group there were from four to six Security Policemen, because
they knew the Ghetto very well. These Security Policemen were
under Dr. Hahn, Commander of the Security Police of Warsaw. Hahn
received his orders not from the SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw,
but directly from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. This applies not only
to the Ghetto action but to all matters. Dr. Hahn frequently
came to our office and told the SS and Polizeiführer that he had
received such and such an order from Kaltenbrunner, about the
contents of which he wanted to inform the SS and Polizeiführer
only. He would not do this for every order but only for certain
ones.
“I remember the case of 300 foreign Jews who had been collected
in the Polski Hotel by the Security Police. At the end of the
Ghetto action Kaltenbrunner ordered the Security Police to
transport these people. During my time in Warsaw the Security
Police were in charge of matters concerning the underground
movement. The Security Police handled these matters
independently of the SS and Polizeiführer, and received their
orders from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. When the leader of the
underground movement in Warsaw was captured, in June or July
1943, he was flown directly to Kaltenbrunner in Berlin.”
Are these statements true or false, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: These statements are, without exception, wrong. I will...
COL. AMEN: Just like all the other statements of all the other persons
that have been read to you today? Is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: This statement is not correct. It is not true and can be
refuted.
COL. AMEN: That is what you have said about all the other statements I
read to you today, is that not so?
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I must...
COL. AMEN: Is that so?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. If you bring false accusations against me I must
declare them to be false. I cannot say “yes” to everything of which you
accuse me just because the Prosecution is wrong in determining who is
Himmler’s representative here.
COL. AMEN: All right, go ahead and say whatever you want.
KALTENBRUNNER: I ask you to bear in mind what I have said about the
competency and rules regarding subordination of all Higher SS and Police
Leaders in the occupied territories. All of them were directly
subordinated to Himmler. The SS and Police Leaders of a smaller
territory were subordinated to the Higher SS and the Police Leader. The
branches of the Order Police and of the Security Police were assigned to
these SS and Police Leaders, who had the exclusive right to give them
orders. The entire organization which thus operated in the occupied
territories was excluded from the command jurisdiction of the central
office of the Reich.
There are men here who can testify to the truth of what I have said.
Bach-Zelewski, who was questioned here, was only in the occupied
territories and knows conditions there. There is also the Defendant
Frank who had to work with such a Higher SS and Police Leader who later
became his State Secretary.
COL. AMEN: Your lawyer can call these people. All I am asking you is
whether or not this document is true or false and then asking you to
make any brief pertinent explanation that you might wish to.
KALTENBRUNNER: This document is not correct...
COL. AMEN: We know about potential witnesses all over Germany, and we
know all these defendants in the box have knowledge about most of these
affairs, but that is not what I am asking you about.
I am merely asking you whether what was in that paper was true or false
and you have said it is false; now, is there anything else you feel you
have to say about it?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not correct and this witness does not know...
COL. AMEN: Well, you said that six times.
KALTENBRUNNER: ...does not know the conditions.
COL. AMEN: Well, how about General Stroop? Did he know anything about
it?
KALTENBRUNNER: If he was SS and Police Leader of Warsaw—and you have
also shown me his diary and his film-report—then, of course, yes.
Stroop was subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leader of this
place. Stroop had to carry out the action on the order coming from
Himmler via the Higher SS and Police Leader.
COL. AMEN: Stroop was a pretty good friend of yours, was he not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I probably have not seen Stroop more than two or three
times in my life, at Reichsführer Himmler’s.
COL. AMEN: Well, if Stroop were here he at least would be in a position
to tell the truth, would he not, about this Warsaw Ghetto affair?
KALTENBRUNNER: He would have to confirm my statement at least that he
was subordinated to the Supreme SS and Police Leader in the Government
General and that he was not subordinated to me. I should be very glad if
he could confirm that immediately. From your words I must assume that he
is in custody here.
COL. AMEN: Well, he is not in custody here, but fortunately we have an
affidavit from him on exactly these matters about which I have been
questioning you.
I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3841-PS, which will
become Exhibit USA-804.
We will find out whether Stroop confirmed what you are trying to tell
the Tribunal. You will accept what Stroop says, will you, Witness?
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not read the document.
COL. AMEN: No; but I say, knowing Stroop and knowing the position which
he held, you do not question but what he would tell the truth about the
happenings in the Warsaw Ghetto, is that not what you have just said, in
effect?
KALTENBRUNNER: The truth of a witness’ testimony has been questioned
before and rightly so. But as I do not know the document I cannot define
my position as to Stroop’s statement.
COL. AMEN: All right, we will read it:
“My name is Jürgen Stroop. I was SS and Polizeiführer of the
Warsaw District from 17 or 18 April 1943, until the end of
August 1943. The action against the Warsaw Ghetto was planned by
my predecessor, SS Oberführer Dr. Von Sammern-Frankenegg. On the
day when this action started I took over the command and Von
Sammern-Frankenegg explained to me what was to be done. He had
the order from Himmler before him, and in addition I received a
teletype from Himmler which ordered me to evacuate the Warsaw
Ghetto and raze it to the ground. To carry this out, I had 2
battalions of Waffen-SS, 100 soldiers of the Wehrmacht, units of
the Order Police and 75 to 100 men of the Security Police. The
Security Police had been active in the Warsaw Ghetto for some
time, and during this program it was their function to accompany
SS units in groups of six or eight, as guides and experts in
Ghetto matters. Obersturmbannführer Dr. Hahn was Commander of
the Security Police of Warsaw at that time. Hahn gave the
Security Police their orders concerning their tasks in this
action. These orders were not given to Hahn by me, but came from
Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. As SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw I
gave no orders to the Security Police. All orders came to Hahn
from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. For example, in June or July of
the same year, I was together with Hahn in Kaltenbrunner’s
office and Kaltenbrunner told me that while Hahn and I must work
together, all basic orders to the Security Police must come from
him in Berlin.
“After the people had been taken out of the Ghetto—they
numbered between 50,000 and 60,000—they were brought to the
railway station. The Security Police had complete supervision of
these people and were in charge of the transport of these people
to Lublin.
“Immediately after the Ghetto action had been completed, about
300 foreign Jews were collected at the Polski Hotel. Some of
these people were already there before the action, and some were
brought there during the action. Kaltenbrunner ordered Hahn to
transport these people away. Hahn himself told me that he had
received this order from Kaltenbrunner.
“All executions were ordered by the Reich Main Security Office,
Kaltenbrunner.
“I have read this statement and I have understood it completely.
I have made the statement freely and without compulsion. I swear
before God that this is the full truth.”—Signed—“Jürgen
Stroop.”
Do you say that that statement of Stroop is true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is untrue and I request that Stroop be brought here.
COL. AMEN: You will find that instead of its bearing out your story it
confirms in substantially every detail the story told by Kaleske, who
was Stroop’s adjutant at the time. Is that not true, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not true, insofar as witness Stroop is one step
closer to my story, for on Page 1 he declares he had received the orders
regarding the Warsaw Ghetto from Himmler and this is something which
Kaleske has never said anywhere.
COL. AMEN: I will accept that, Defendant.
KALTENBRUNNER: An interrogation of General Stroop will clarify this
point completely, also that Hahn had, of course, received orders from
the Gestapo in Berlin; whether in this matter, too, I do not know, since
as a matter of course the offices of the Security Police had also to be
at the disposal of Amt IV, particularly as far as support in legal
proceedings was concerned. But what matters here, in an action taking
place in the Government General and in Warsaw, is the question of what
organizations were involved in this action and all witnesses versed in
these matters will have to agree that this was within the jurisdiction
of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Government General, not to the
Reich Security Main Office. It is completely incorrect that these
Security Police forces in Warsaw and officials such as Hahn were not
subordinate to the SS and Police Leader.
It can be testified to and ascertained that all Security Police offices,
especially where an action of this kind was involved, could have only
one leader and that was the local leader. But if, Mr. Prosecutor, you
would give me again the opportunity of defining my position to these
witnesses’ statements more comprehensively through my defense counsel I
could come back to this matter properly.
COL. AMEN: And now, Defendant, I want to refer you to Document 3819-PS,
which is already in evidence as GB-306, which are notes of a conference
in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July 1944, signed by Lammers and the
subject of testimony before this Tribunal the other day. You recall
having attended that meeting I presume.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know yet. I do not know the purpose of that
meeting.
COL. AMEN: You do not deny that you were there, do you?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know. This is the first time I have seen this
document.
COL. AMEN: Now, look at Page 12, in the middle of the page, the sentence
there, “In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered...”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I ask for clarification of the
question, whether it might have been more appropriate and correct if the
Prosecution had questioned Lammers about this matter when Lammers was
here on the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Was this put to Lammers?
COL. AMEN: Frankly, Your Lordship, I do not know. The document was
introduced and identified, and I am not sure whether he was asked about
it or not. Sir David says that he introduced the document with Keitel,
at the foot of Page 9.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
COL. AMEN: Have you found the place, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have found the place.
COL. AMEN: “In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered, 100,000 to
200,000 workers could be recruited. In this connection...”
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Mr. Prosecutor, I have not found the place.
COL. AMEN: Well, it is just above the paragraph which commences, “The
Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” Can you find that
spot?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have it now.
COL. AMEN: Well, passing to that sentence:
“The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, declared
himself willing, when asked by the Plenipotentiary General for
the Allocation of Labor, to place the Security Police at his
disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical
weakness. For the whole of France he had only 2,400 men
available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could
be recruited with these weak forces. In his opinion, the Foreign
Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign
governments.”
Is that a true reflection of what took place at that meeting, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot say that concerning the wording of the document,
but I might say in explanation that according to the introduction on
Page 1 it was a “Chefbesprechung” (discussion of chiefs), and that does
not mean me, for I was Chief of the Reich Security Main Office.
“Chefbesprechung” means the ministries and the chief Reich departments.
By questioning the witness Lammers it would have to be determined
whether I was there on the orders of the Ministry of the Interior and
Chief of the German Police, Himmler. That would have been possible. That
I was there on the instruction of Himmler seems to become evident for me
from the number mentioned. It mentions here that only 2,400 men were at
our disposal. Neither the Security Police nor the SD, nor both together,
ever had any number like that at their disposal. It must have included
all the forces, even the Order Police and other small organizations,
which were subordinate to Himmler.
Therefore, one thing, at least, is missing in this document; that is the
explanation that Kaltenbrunner, on orders of Himmler, was giving
Himmler’s views; that at least is missing. But by questioning the
witness Dr. Lammers, I am sure we can clarify this matter.
In any case, I would like to point out that it was my opinion that I
could not be helpful in this matter because, first of all, negotiations
between the Foreign Office and the competent foreign—that is, the
French Government, were necessary. Measures to be taken there could not
be introduced without the consent of the French Government.
COL. AMEN: All right, Defendant. Now, do you recall evidence given
before this Tribunal about efforts made by Germany to incite the Slovaks
to revolt against Czechoslovakia and that Hitler used the insurgency of
the Slovakians as one of the excuses for occupying Czechoslovakia in
March of 1939?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know who testified to that.
COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, during the year 1938 to 1939 it is a
fact, is it not, that you were the State Secretary for Security in
Austria? Is that right?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I was not State Secretary for the Security Police. I
was State Secretary for the security system of the Austrian Government
at Vienna, and there is an essential difference, because the Security
Police in Austria was instituted and directed from Berlin.
COL. AMEN: Well, all right.
KALTENBRUNNER: And in Austria I had not the slightest influence—nor
even my Minister—on the Security Police.
COL. AMEN: When did you become Supreme SS and Police Leader for Upper
Austria with your headquarters in Germany?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is a complete misstatement. In Upper Austria there
was no Supreme SS and Police Leader, only in Austria.
COL. AMEN: Well, when was it?
KALTENBRUNNER: That was after the liquidation of the Austrian Government
and after its affairs had been settled; that can be verified exactly
from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. It was probably in the summer of 1941.
COL. AMEN: And is it not a fact that you, yourself, directed the
activity of the Slovakian rebels and assisted them with explosives and
ammunition? Answer that “yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall having participated in any conference with
respect to a plan for instigating this revolt of Slovakia?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is not correct; I did not participate in instigating
anything like that in Slovakia. I did take part in the first Government
conferences in Slovakia and in the presence of the Delegate of the
German Reich.
COL. AMEN: Did your friend Spacil assist you in carrying out these
plans?
KALTENBRUNNER: That I cannot recall today. In any case, they were not
German plans. If you investigate the political situation in Slovakia at
that time, you will clearly see that it did not need any instigation on
the part of the German Reich. The Hlinka movement then under the
leadership of Dr. Tuka and also of Dr. Tiso, I believe, had made this
decision a long time ago.
COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Obersturmbannführer Fritz Mundhenke?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not quite catch the name.
COL. AMEN: Well, you will see it on this exhibit which I ask you to be
shown now, Document Number 3942-PS, which will become Exhibit Number
USA-805.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
Defendant, this is a fairly long exhibit, which I do not want to go
through in detail; but I first call your attention to the opening lines:
“With respect to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, I recall that
there were two different actions taken: the first one for the
occupation of the Sudetenland and the border districts inhabited
by German nationals; the second one for the occupation of
Czechoslovakia proper....”
And the following lines:
“Some time before the second action, officers of Hlinka Guard
(the illegal organization resembling the SS in the Slovakian
part of Czechoslovakia) came to the office of SS Corps Area
Danube, which at the time may still have had its original name
of SS Oberabschnitt Österreich.”
Then follow the details of the plans for inciting this revolt. Then,
coming to the end of the first paragraph, you will find the following:
“There were secret meetings to which I was not invited. I felt
that I was not fully trusted. I saw the gentlemen only in
Kaltenbrunner’s anteroom and, as far as I can remember, in the
dining room. I was told nothing about the object of the
discussions which referred, without doubt, to the imminent
action.”
Then he gives his reasons. And, passing to the second page, in the
center, you will find the following:
“Kaltenbrunner alone was responsible for this action. In charge
of the action was SS Standartenführer Spacil (nicknamed Spatz)
as far as the General SS is concerned. He was chief of the
administration of SS Corps Area Danube and was called later on
by Kaltenbrunner to Berlin and made administration chief at the
Reich Security Main Office. Spacil was one of Kaltenbrunner’s
most intimate friends.”
Then, at the close, Paragraph 1 and 2, and subdivisions:
“I have made this statement:
“(1) Not from a feeling of revenge or because I want to be an
informer, but in the knowledge that in so doing I can serve in
detecting crimes which I, as a German, am ashamed of;
“(2) With the full consciousness that because of my statements I
will be slandered by the other side. I know the men who for
years have been after me. But this shall not deter me from
helping the spirit of justice to a victorious end.”
I ask you whether the substance of that document, as I have given it to
you, is true or false?
KALTENBRUNNER: Neither true or false; it is ridiculous and consequently
untrue. The document can best be characterized by drawing attention to
the fact that on the first page in the introduction it says:
“...the second one for the occupation of Czechoslovakia proper
(called afterwards the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and the
Slovakian State).”
The fact that the Republic of Slovakia has never, in the course of
history, been occupied by the German Reich is sufficient to reveal the
ignorance of this witness, Mundhenke, who comes from North Germany and
knows nothing about history or about politics. But this document
contains so many details which can be clarified almost humorously that
it becomes utterly worthless.
I would like to call your attention to Page 3 of the German text and
explain to you who were the men responsible for the individual big
political actions which led to the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
The first is a Franz Kourik who was a chauffeur. The second is Karl
Spitt also a chauffeur. The third is an SS man whose name is Apfelbeck,
son of an innkeeper and a butcher by trade, and who worked as an
assistant official in the administration after he had suffered a grave
skull injury in a motor accident. Stadler, a small bookkeeper, and the
man Petenka are unknown to me.
These men are supposed to have prepared, with me, the occupation of
Slovakia by the Reich. That is utter nonsense. Excuse me for calling it
so, Mr. Prosecutor, but it is and remains...
COL. AMEN: Very good, Defendant. All right. That is nonsense.
KALTENBRUNNER: One thing is true in this document and I want to come to
that. I was with members of the Hlinka Guard in this house in Vienna,
Park Ring 8, and I did hold a conference with them. This dealt with the
union of the group of racial Germans in Slovakia and the Hlinka Guard,
with a view to nominating joint candidates in the Slovakian Government.
Documents prove it and files, in Pressburg at least, where my name was
sufficiently known. Everybody knows, it there and can confirm it,
including this man Mundhenke, the leader of the racial group. But as an
occupation of Slovakia never took place at all, in my opinion there is
no need for me to defend myself against this accusation.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, in the course of this Trial the order of Himmler
to the effect that the civilian population should not be punished for
lynching Allied airmen has been introduced in evidence, and you have
heard the sworn statement of Schellenberg and Gerdes to the effect that
you, in your capacity as Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued
such instructions to your subordinates. Do you deny these statements?
“Yes” or “no,” please.
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not wish to deny them, but I emphatically state that
I never gave any such instructions, and I ask the Tribunal to allow my
counsel to read the paper which I gave to him at the beginning of the
session. This contains literally the testimony of the witness Koller,
the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, defining my general attitude
towards this problem—that even in the presence of Hitler I declared, “I
will not obey such an order.” That took place somewhat later, but it
shows my own personal feelings about the matter. I made a statement to
my counsel already yesterday about this question.
COL. AMEN: All right, Defendant; now take a look at Document Number
3855-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-806. This bears your own
name at the bottom, whether it be a signature, facsimile, or anything
else you choose to call it. Have you the document before you?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You will note that it comes from the Chief of the Security
Police and of the SD, and according to the notes in the upper left-hand
portion was prepared for your signature by Amt IV A 2 B, Number 220/44 g
RS.
KALTENBRUNNER: That is, Mr. Prosecutor, the first and a very grave
mistake.
COL. AMEN: All right.
“a) To all commanders and inspectors of the Security Police and
the SD (for oral communication to the subordinated offices);
“b) To Groups IV A and IV B, Sections IV A 1, IV A 3, IV A 4 -
IV A 6, IV B 1 - IV B 4;
“c) To Office V, Reich Criminal Police Office, for information
to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, to the Chief of the Under
Police;
“d) To Chiefs of Offices I-III and IV of the Reich Security Main
Office.
“Subject: Treatment of enemy airmen who have bailed out.
“Reference: none.
“A series of questions dealing with the treatment of enemy
airmen who have been shot down needs clarification:
“I. As a general rule captured enemy airmen are to be shackled.
This measure is necessary and is made with the full consent of
the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; a) in order
to prevent frequent escapes, and b) in view of the severe
shortage of personnel at the collecting stations.
“II. Enemy air crews, who a) offer resistance when captured, or
b) wear civilian clothes under their uniforms are to be shot at
once when captured.
“III. Most enemy airmen, especially of the Anglo-American air
forces, carry with them escape bags filled with daggers, various
kinds of maps, ration coupons, tools for escape, _et cetera_.
“It is absolutely necessary that escape bags be secured by the
Police, as they are of the greatest assistance when making a
search. They must be given to the Luftwaffe.
“IV. The order of the Reichsführer SS of 10 August 1943”—which
I believe you also testified you know nothing about—“is not
being carried out in full, as it has probably not been passed on
orally, as ordered, to the subordinate police offices.
“It is therefore repeated: It is not the duty of the police to
interfere in conflicts between the Germans and English and
American ‘terror-fliers’ who have bailed out.
“V. Near the body of an English airman who had been shot down a
brassard with the inscription ‘Deutsche Wehrmacht’ and an
official stamp was found. This brassard is only worn by combat
troops, and it gives the bearer access to all military and
strategically important points in the various operation zones.
Parachuted enemy agents will probably make use of this new means
of camouflage.
“VI. During the past months individual cases have shown that the
German population does seize enemy airmen but afterwards, while
waiting for them to be handed over to the police or the Armed
Forces, it does not use the proper restraint. Too strict
measures on the part of the State Police against these citizens
would keep them from seizing enemy airmen without restraint,
since these cases must not be confused with the criminal act of
helping escaped enemy airmen.
“Reichsführer SS has ordered the following measures to be
applied to citizens who conduct themselves in a dishonorable
manner towards captured enemy airmen either out of bad
intentions or misunderstood pity:
“1) In especially severe cases, transfer to a concentration
camp; announcement in the newspapers of the district.
“2) In less severe cases, protective custody for not less than
14 days at the competent State Police office; employment in the
clearing of damaged areas. Should there be no damaged area
affording such employment within the jurisdiction of one State
Police office, the short-term protective custody sentence is to
be served at the nearest State Police office, _et cetera_.
“The Reichsführer SS has contacted Reichsleiter Bormann in this
matter and has pointed out that it is the duty of the Party
officials to instruct the population to observe absolutely
necessary restraint towards enemy airmen.
“3) I leave it to the commanders and inspectors of the Security
Police, and the SD to notify in writing the subordinated offices
of Sections V and VI of the above decree.
“Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner; Certified: Rose, office clerk.”
Do you deny having had anything to do with the issuance of that
document? Do you deny that you signed it?
KALTENBRUNNER: This order was never submitted to me. I refer you to what
I said yesterday concerning questions of direction and issuing of orders
in the Secret Police office, Amt IV A which appears at the head of the
letter indicating that it formulated it. In these matters this Amt was
directly subordinated to Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: I have not heard the answer to the question. Did you sign
it?
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
COL. AMEN: You deny your signature and you deny knowing anything about
this document bearing your name, is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I have...
COL. AMEN: Will you answer that, Defendant? You deny this document just
like you have denied every other document that has been shown to you
today, is that correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I already stated yesterday, and also told my defense
counsel, that these documents were never submitted to me. I should know
it today. To a certain degree I am to blame for not having paid more
attention as to whether such orders were issued in my name. I never
denied yesterday that I was partly to blame in this respect but my
position to this question can be clearly seen from Koller’s testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not understand. Are you saying that the signature on
the document is not yours, or that you may have signed it without
looking at the decree? Which are you saying?
KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, this document and this decree were never
submitted to me. To sign such a document would have been completely
against my inner attitude towards the entire problem. My attitude in
this matter can be seen from Koller’s testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not asking you what your inner attitude is. I am
asking you whether the name on it is written by your hand.
KALTENBRUNNER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document.
COL. AMEN: It is a typewritten signature, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; let us look at the document.
Defendant, who is Rose?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, can you give any idea how long you will be
with your cross-examination?
COL. AMEN: Perhaps half an hour, depending on the answers of the
defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will adjourn. We will sit
tomorrow at 10 o’clock to continue this part of the case, and will
adjourn at half past 12 in order to hear Dr. Thoma and the Prosecution
upon his documents.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH DAY
Saturday, 13 April 1946
_Morning Session_
COL. AMEN: Defendant, as I recall, you have testified that you had no
knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October ’42 until some time
in 1945. Is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not think that I said so. I believe that concerns
the order...
COL. AMEN: Well, that was your testimony yesterday, according to the
record, that you had no knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8
October ’42 until some time in the year 1945. Is that not correct? Is
that not now your position?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not believe that I made such an answer. The order
is...
COL. AMEN: Well, what is the fact? When did you first have knowledge of
the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October 1942? I am speaking of the order
of 18 October ’42, not 8. When did you first have knowledge of that?
KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot tell you that now, exactly.
COL. AMEN: All right.
KALTENBRUNNER: In any case, this order, if it were read to me, would
probably be the same one which appeared in a Wehrmacht report or in the
press.
COL. AMEN: All right. And you have also denied the testimony of your own
witness, Mildner, concerning the existence of a decree issued in July or
August ’44, under which the Security Police were to execute members of
Allied commando groups after questioning them. That is correct, is it
not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I was never asked about that.
COL. AMEN: Well, I beg your pardon; but never mind, anyway. I will show
you Document Number 535-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-807; and,
before anything else, I want to ask you whether it is your own
signature, in your own handwriting, that appears at the bottom of that
document.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. That is my signature.
COL. AMEN: Oh, it is your signature, is it?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You admit that? Is that right?
KALTENBRUNNER: That is my signature, yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, when you were interrogated before this Trial, you denied
that that was your signature, did you not?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not believe so.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read you your testimony on that point, to see
whether that helps you to remember whether you denied it or not.
“Answer: ‘From that it can only be seen that the Wehrmacht
intended to write a letter to me; whether rightly or wrongly,
and whether I was the right authority to write to is very
questionable. In any case, the Wehrmacht wanted to get in touch
with the Gestapo, as can be seen from this exchange of letters,
and I am convinced that an officer of the Gestapo, namely, the
one mentioned at the beginning of the letter, is the one who
wrote this document.’
“Question: ‘Well, this is the letter that you know nothing
about, but which, nevertheless, established just how you
accomplished your desires by writing to the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces. That is very clear.’
“Answer: ‘But I deny that I wrote this letter.’
“Question: ‘Just a moment ago, you didn’t know about it, but now
you deny it?’
“Answer: ‘I not only did not know about the Hitler Order, but I
also knew nothing about this letter.’
“Question: ‘But you acknowledged your signature?’
“Answer: ‘I did not say that this is my signature. I only said
it resembles my signature; and I also said it is possible that
it is only a facsimile. I cannot recall a letter of such
contents signed by me.’
“Question: ‘Would it be any more convincing to you if you saw
the original letter, signed in ink?’
“Answer: ‘It would certainly be more convincing, but it still
would not prove that I signed in ink.’”
Did you make those answers to those questions, Defendant?
KALTENBRUNNER: Naturally, I do not remember whether I made these answers
literally. But, I would like to make the following remarks to you.
Questions concerning my signature have naturally always been put to me
hundreds of times during interrogations, especially to confuse me.
Today—I believe this is the first time I have seen this document—I
immediately declared, “Yes, this is my signature.” I certainly know my
own signature; I can recognize it. However, you have also shown me
signatures which certainly were not mine.
Besides, you can see from the date of the letter, 23 January 1945, that
it is correct that I learned about it in 1945, as you have already
stated. I could not have the faintest notion of a Hitler order issued in
the year ’42. And if, in your interrogation which you just read to me, I
stated that I did not write this letter, then this is confirmed by the
very figures which appear on top, where you read IV A 2 a, plus numerals
and letters which obviously indicates that the letter was written in a
section which was in charge of these matters.
That is what I mean when I say that I did not write this letter. That it
may have been submitted to me for my signature among thousands of other
papers which I might have had to look into possibly in the course of one
day, I cannot, of course, deny. From this, however, you cannot draw the
conclusion that I undoubtedly knew about the matter. You cannot imagine
the extent of the official functions which I took over in complete
ignorance of police background, without instructions for carrying out
police functions, but rather for organizing and directing the vast
intelligence service.
THE PRESIDENT: Answer questions and do not make speeches.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, is not the signature on that document before you,
Document Number 535-PS, USA-807, precisely the same and identical with
your signature as it appears on Document Number 3803-PS, USA-802? Just
look at the two signatures, and tell the Tribunal if they are not
identical.
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I never signed in that way. I always signed, “Dr.
K.,” as on this document, even in informal letters.
COL. AMEN: How about the handwriting? Does that look the same to you,
Defendant, or does it look different?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, certainly there is a kind of resemblance, but I
think it has happened to every person in this courtroom that in his
absence any one of his assistants at times signed a particularly urgent
letter using his name.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal will be able to see the
signatures and judge for themselves.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir.
Now, do you have the exhibit before you, 535-PS?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You will note that that emanates from IV A 2 a, as appears in
the upper corner under Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, and at the beginning you said the letter was written
by me.
COL. AMEN: That it is addressed to the High Command of the Armed Forces,
right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And that it refers to the Führer Order of 18 October ’42, as
well as to the other Führer orders referred to in the testimony of
Mildner, namely, the Führer orders of 18 August ’44 and 30 July ’44,
correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know that Mildner testified on this point. Such
a statement is not known to me, nor has it been submitted to me. But, I
believe, it proves...
COL. AMEN: All right. Do you note that this document refers to the
Führer decrees of 18 October ’42, 18 August ’44, and 30 July ’44. Yes or
no, please.
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. It says so here.
COL. AMEN: So that on 23 January ’45 when you wrote this letter, you
obviously had knowledge of those decrees, right? I mean...
KALTENBRUNNER: That is incorrect inasmuch as, in my opinion, the most
important item in this letter is contained in the sixth, fifth, and
fourth lines from the end: Here it says that they can make no claim upon
the allowances for prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva
Convention. If, then, under the pressure of work this letter was
submitted to me, it is evident that my eyes would first fall on the spot
where I had to sign and also on the last lines. Here...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The
question was whether you knew the order of the 18th of October ’42, of
30 July ’44, and 18 August ’44, when you wrote this letter. Did you
know?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not know of these orders, Mr. President.
COL. AMEN: All right...
KALTENBRUNNER: But please, would you let me defend myself on this point.
It was clear to me that this dealt with the treatment of agents to whom
the provisions of the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war are not
applicable; and you cannot deny a power at war the right to let its
security police take in hand those men who do not come under the
regulations of the Geneva War Convention. That is the perfect right of
any power at war. There were also German agents who were engaged in
hostile activity in England and other countries.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you are not here to argue your case now; you
are here to answer questions.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, you testified, did you not, that you first
acquired knowledge of the case of the British fliers who escaped from
Stalag Luft III in March of 1944, some 6 weeks after the escape
occurred; is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, now I assume it was about 6 weeks afterwards; at any
rate, it was just when, in consequence of the speech in the House of
Commons, the Foreign Office took a stand. The department chiefs turned
to me, but I in turn sent them to Himmler.
COL. AMEN: But when you were interrogated about this matter before the
Trial, you testified as follows, did you not?
“Question: ‘You remember the case of the 80 British fliers who
escaped from Stalag Luft III, which took place in March ’44?’
“Answer: ‘That case is unknown to me.’
“Question: ‘General Westhoff attempted to find out from the
Gestapo what had happened to these men.’
“Answer: ‘If he had negotiations with the Gestapo, he did not
negotiate with me.’
“Question: ‘What do you say about the general proposition that
escaped prisoners were turned over to the Gestapo?’
“Answer: ‘Such cases are not known to me.’”
Did you make those answers, yes or no?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is possible that I did; but I wish to point out to you
that naturally I was completely confused by the manner in which these
questions were put. I never really heard of 80 escaped airmen. Here,
too, mention was made of 50 only.
COL. AMEN: For your information, 80 escaped and 50 were killed.
KALTENBRUNNER: And in addition, General Westhoff stated here that he did
not discuss the Sagan case with me, but that he tried to obtain
information from the State Police, that he spoke to me about the
transfer of prisoner-of-war affairs to Himmler, who was the Commander of
the Reserve Army, and that Sagan was referred to on this occasion.
COL. AMEN: Now, Defendant, you testified that you had no knowledge
whatever of the fact that Einsatz groups of the Security Police and SD
were operating in the U.S.S.R. until long after you had become Chief of
the RSHA in January ’43, is that not correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you still say that that is correct?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: You deny that you ever knew that these Einsatz groups carried
out the extermination of Jews in the U.S.S.R. until long after you had
become Chief of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: I only discovered this during the arguments I had with
Himmler and Hitler—I believe later in 1943—probably in November.
COL. AMEN: And you admit, I take it, that you were a Higher SS and
Police Leader in Austria in 1942, right?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And Schirach was a Reich Defense Commissioner in Vienna at
that time, was he not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know when he was appointed, but I must point out
that the Higher SS and Police Leaders received those powers with which
they finally were invested in three different stages. In 1941, when I
became Higher SS and Police Leader, the authority of such a leader was
considerably less than it was at the end of the war.
COL. AMEN: Now, if the Tribunal please, I have a document which arrived
by airplane yesterday, of which there is only one original copy and
which, therefore, we have not been able to get translated. So I have
arranged, if it is satisfactory to the Tribunal, for the interpreter to
read the excerpts from that original document, which was taken from
Schirach’s personal files in Vienna, and then submit the original
document to the Court and have it processed just as quickly as we are
able to do so. Or perhaps the Tribunal would like to see the document
first. It is an original document.
THE PRESIDENT: You will read it so that it will go through into German?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. AMEN: This is Document Number 3876-PS. It is a report issued by
Heydrich to all the Higher SS and Police Leaders and Reich Defense
Commissioners on the activities of the Einsatz groups in the U.S.S.R.
during the month of January 1942, and on the distribution list appears
the name of this defendant.
Will you read the Exhibit USA-808?
THE INTERPRETER: The right-hand side of the document bears the initials
in ink, “Sch,” and then several symbols, “Z-RV-K 4030-519/41 g,” and
below that, “1320-C.” At the left on top:
“The Higher SS and Police Leader attached to the
Reichsstatthalter in Vienna and in Upper and Lower Danube,
within Wehrkreis XVII; the Inspector of the Order Police.”
Below that there are several file numbers. The document bears the
heading, “Secret.” It is dated, “Vienna, 14 October 1941... Subject:
Technical report on the battles in the East.”
THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, 14 October 1941?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, 14 October 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: The previous date that was given was January 1942. What
is the explanation of that?
COL. AMEN: It covers the month—I think there are two different
documents there. You are giving the date on one. There is a different
date on the other. Is that not correct?
THE INTERPRETER: That is correct.
COL. AMEN: Well, give us the date on the other document so the record
will be clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, we shall be able to understand when we see
the document.
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. [_Turning to the interpreter._] Go right
ahead.
THE INTERPRETER: The date of the other document is April 23, 1942.
COL. AMEN: Go ahead.
THE INTERPRETER: I continue:
“Subject: Technical report on the battles in the East.
Reference...”—and then come series of file numbers—
“The above decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German
Police in the Ministry of the Interior, and also one copy each
of the technical reports of the Army Command North and the SS
Police Division, are herewith forwarded to you for your
information and use.”
The order is signed “Miegel.”
COL. AMEN: Now, will you just go on to the distribution list and read,
if you find it on the list, this defendant’s name.
THE INTERPRETER: The name of the defendant is not on this distribution.
I am coming to the next document.
COL. AMEN: Well, it is!
THE INTERPRETER: No, it is not contained in this document, and I am now
reading the second document:
“Berlin, 27 February 1942. The Chief of the Security Police and
the SD, IV A 1 ...”—and then several different file
references—
“Top secret. Subject: Activity and situation report Number 9 of
the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD in the
U.S.S.R. Attached hereto...”
COL. AMEN: Just a minute. He is reading the wrong document, Your
Lordship. We will have it straight in a minute.
THE INTERPRETER: I am told I am reading the right document. It is the
right document, I continue:
“Herewith attached, I submit to you the ninth comprehensive
report regarding the activities of the Einsatzgruppen of the
Security Police and of the SD in the U.S.S.R. In future these
reports will be sent to you currently as they appear. Signed,
Heydrich.”
Then there is a stamp, “The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Wehrkreis
XVII, received 5 March 1942;” and then follows the distribution, of
which Number 13 reads, “To the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS
Gruppenführer, Dr. Kaltenbrunner.”
COL. AMEN: His name is on the list, is it not? Now, if you will skip to
“C” on that document.
THE INTERPRETER: I now read from Page 9 of the document, an extract
under the heading “C. Jews:”
“The attitude of the Jews towards the Germans is still clearly
hostile and criminal. It is our aim to cleanse the Eastern
countries of Jews as completely as possible. Everywhere the
executions are to be carried out in such a manner that they will
hardly be noticed by the public. Among the population, and even
among the remaining Jews, the conviction is widespread that the
Jews have merely been resettled. Estonia has already been
cleared of Jews. In Latvia the 29,500 Jews who remained in Riga
have been reduced to 2,500. In Dünaburg there still live 962
Jews who are urgently needed for work.”
I am now skipping several paragraphs and I continue:
“In Lithuania there are now in Kaunas still 15,000 Jews, in
Schaulen 4,500, and in Vilna another 15,000 who are also needed
for work. In White Ruthenia the Jews are being cleared out. The
number of Jews in the part of the country which has so far been
turned over to the civilian administration amounts to 139,000.
In the meantime 33,210 Jews have been shot by the Einsatzgruppen
of the Security Police and the SD.”
I now skip the rest of this extract and continue by reading another
document. This is dated, “Berlin, 23 April 1942,” and shows an illegible
initial in ink. It bears the heading, “The Chief of the Security Police
and the SD, IV A 1,” and several file numbers. It bears the designation,
“Top secret.” This document, which is signed by Heydrich and which shows
as the date of receipt 28 April 1942, lists in the distribution in the
14th place, “To the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS Gruppenführer, Dr.
Kaltenbrunner, Vienna.”
I now read from Page 11 of the report, and I read an extract headed “C.
Jews”:
“Different methods were used in solving the Jewish problem in
the various front sectors. Since the greater part of the Eastern
territory is free of Jews, and since the few remaining Jews, who
are required for most urgent work, have been put into ghettos,
it was the task of the Security Police and the SD to round up
those Jews who were hiding mainly in the country. Many times
Jews who had left the ghetto without permission or who were not
wearing the Jewish Star have been arrested. Among others, three
Jews who had been sent from the Reich to the ghetto in Riga and
who had escaped, were captured and publicly hanged in the
ghetto. During large-scale anti-Jewish operations 3,412 Jews in
Minsk, 302 in Vileika, and 2,007 in Baranowicze were shot.”
I now skip three paragraphs and continue:
“In addition to taking action against individual Jews who were
known for their political or criminal activity, it was the task
of the Security Police and the SD, to clean up generally the
larger towns in the remaining territories of the Eastern Front.
Thus, in Rakow alone 15,000, and in Artenowsk 1,224 Jews were
shot, so that now there are no more Jews there. In the Crimea
1,000 Jews and Gypsies were executed.”
That is all.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you still have the temerity to tell this
Tribunal that you knew nothing about the operations of these Einsatz
groups until after you took over as Chief of the RSHA?
KALTENBRUNNER: At the top left hand corner of the document can clearly
be read, “The Higher SS and Police Leader...”
THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question and then you can look at the document
afterwards. Do you still say that you knew nothing about these
Einsatzgruppen?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have no knowledge of the contents of this document. I
want to point out that the Office of the Inspector of the Public Police
dispatched this letter on 22 October 1941. Technical reports on the
fighting on the Eastern Front and on the operations of the Security
Police and SD, which were drafted at that time, are based on orders
issued by Himmler or Heydrich and not on my orders. In no way can this
document show how I regarded the entire question. If the distribution
lists all the Higher SS and Police Leaders and all the offices to which
these technical reports were sent, I do not regard that as proof that
these offices, that is to say all the men who were working in these
offices—must necessarily have known of it. You cannot assume that
cognizance was actually taken of reports concerning territories over
which the official in question had no jurisdiction or influence
whatsoever. There is no doubt at all today that these crimes were
committed in the East. But it is to be proved whether they are in any
way due to my influence, either intellectually, legislatively, or
administratively, and whether I approved of them, and whether I could
have stopped them; all this I must absolutely deny.
COL. AMEN: Defendant, that was just one of a regular series of monthly
reports, a copy of which went to you every single month. Is that not a
fact, yes or no?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know how often such reports came. I see this
report today for the first time. Of course, it cannot be denied that
such technical reports from all battle zones concerning either the
Security Police, or the Order Police operations, or the experiences of
the Wehrmacht were issued and distributed all over the Reich.
COL. AMEN: All right, that is enough for me. Did you know about a letter
written by your attorney, seeking evidence on your behalf at this Trial?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not yet discussed such a letter with my Defense
Counsel. Please ask him if he has informed me of this letter.
COL. AMEN: Well, are you not familiar with the fact that he wrote a
letter to the Mayor’s office in Oranienburg near Berlin and received a
reply to that letter to be used on your behalf?
KALTENBRUNNER: No. Please ask him. He has not told me anything about it.
COL. AMEN: Now, then I will refer you to document number...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are you entitled to go into professional
matters between the defendant and his counsel?
COL. AMEN: I believe so in this instance, Your Lordship, because the
letter was sent to us directly by the recipient of the letter, with the
expectation that it would be used by us. This is no confidential
communication. It was a letter...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you let the Tribunal see the letter?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, this is the first time that I have heard
of this matter. If the document is addressed to me, may I perhaps have a
look at it before it becomes an item in this Trial?
COL. AMEN: Sure.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, let him look at it first.
COL. AMEN: If Your Lordship pleases...
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I explain it, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better hear from Colonel Amen first because
he wants to introduce the document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I say something first?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann, what do you want to say now?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps the Tribunal has already noticed that I...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not seen the document.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have seen the document.
THE PRESIDENT: I said we have not seen it yet. We have allowed you to
see it first in order that you can make any objection to it that you
want to make before we see it, and then we will look at it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I see. Mr. President, I am of the opinion that this
is an unfair infringement on the rights and duties of the German
Defense. The whole world may read this document. It is an inquiry which
is addressed to the Mayor’s office at Oranienburg. Oranienburg was a
large concentration camp. Since, according to an agreement with my
colleagues, I had the task of clarifying the question of the “awareness
of the German people,” I sent this letter containing questions which
everybody may read to the Mayor’s office and requested that these
questions be answered. It was my intention to submit these answers, if
the occasion arose, to the Tribunal. The same questions have been sent
out to other towns, and I have already submitted these documents for
translation and shall later submit them to the Tribunal. But it is an
impossible state of affairs that a letter of a defense counsel and the
reply given to that defense counsel should be disclosed here by the
Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Kauffmann. But the document that
Colonel Amen was offering in evidence was not your letter to the Mayor
of Oranienburg nor his answer to you.
COL. AMEN: Yes, it was.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, I thought you said it was a letter
that has been sent to the Prosecution.
COL. AMEN: I said that a copy was sent to the Prosecution. As I
understand it, not only by the person who received it—there was no
covering letter—but also turned over to the British Prosecution in a
letter dated 2 April ’46 from Major Wurmser.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand now. I do not think you said before it was a
copy. What I understood was it might have been sent to you by mistake.
If it were a copy of a letter which was sent to Dr. Kauffmann, then the
position is clear as to what it was.
COL. AMEN: That is my understanding of it, Sir. And, of course, it is a
copy of his letter but I know of no privilege whatsoever of a
confidential...
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “a copy of his letter”? A copy of the
letter sent to Dr. Kauffmann?
COL. AMEN: Sent by Dr. Kauffmann to the Mayor of Oranienburg and a copy
of the reply made by the Mayor to Dr. Kauffmann; and I think you will
see, if Your Lordship reads the reply, how it is that it came directly
to our attention.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add one more thing, only two or three sentences,
please? I consider the presentation of these two documents a
particularly severe infringement of the rights of the Defense. The
Defense has had no opportunity to look at the documents of the
Prosecution, and it would never have occurred to us to submit to the
Tribunal documents of the Prosecution which are to our advantage. This
is exclusively a matter between me, the sender of the letter, and the
office answering it; how is it possible for the Prosecution to be
allowed to interfere in such entirely personal matters? I do not think
that is fair.
COL. AMEN: Now, if Your Lordship pleases, I think I can clear the whole
thing up. This is a letter dated 2 April ’46 from Major Wurmser to the
British Prosecution, and it reads as follows:
“Attached please find the original correspondence regarding
Oranienburg. In accordance with your request, I have ascertained
that this correspondence was received in the following way. It
came addressed to the Prosecution and was delivered to the
General Secretary. The original was apparently sent directly to
Dr. Kauffmann and the sender, the Mayor of Oranienburg, a Mr.
Klaussmann, dispatched at the same time a carbon copy to the
Prosecution which not only consisted of his answer but also of
the letter which was sent to him by Dr. Kauffmann.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we understand the circumstances now.
COL. AMEN: So I think it was sent to the Prosecution for the very
purpose for which I am now endeavoring to utilize it.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, apart altogether from the question of
privilege between counsel and his client, how do you say that this
document, which is a letter apparently from a private individual
addressed to Dr. Kauffmann, copy of which is sent to you, is evidence at
all?
COL. AMEN: Because, Your Lordship, there is included in this defendant’s
document book a letter which is on precisely this same point. In other
words, this defendant has raised this point in his own defense. He did
not read the letter.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not quite the point. This letter to Dr.
Kauffmann, of which you have a copy, is not as I understand a sworn
statement.
COL. AMEN: It is not sworn; no, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: How does it become evidence then? The witness is not
here.
COL. AMEN: It has the same probative value that many letters introduced
here in evidence have. In fact, I think it has considerably more than
many of them, because it is a letter from an official, from the mayor
who has conducted an inquiry and has ascertained what I consider to be
one of the most important matters in the case—namely, whether...
THE PRESIDENT: No, I do not want to hear at the moment what is in the
letter.
COL. AMEN: I cannot think of a thing that was more pertinent than this
letter, or more important, to be brought out at this Trial, particularly
when it—well, you do not want me to go into that—particularly when it
is something which the defendant has sought to interpose as his own
defense, and which now turns out...
THE PRESIDENT: But he has not sought to introduce it for his own
defense.
COL. AMEN: Well, I say he has sought to introduce that issue by the
letter in his document book so that, even were it not otherwise perhaps
relevant, it surely becomes so when the defendant has raised that
precise issue in his own documents. But even aside from that, it seems
to me that it is one of the most important issues in this case.
I will not characterize it in words since Your Lordship does not wish me
to, but I can hardly think of anything more pertinent than the matter
set forth there in the form of an official communication.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen the only question I was asking you was how
the particular document, which is an unsworn document, came to be
competent evidence. Has it been seen by the witness who is under
cross-examination?
COL. AMEN: Well, as an official communication, Sir, to his counsel. In
the course of the discharge of his official duties as a mayor—it is a
part of his job.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not wish to speak now about the
question of procedure. I merely want to mention that this letter...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not want to deal at great length with the question
of procedure which we touched upon just now, but I wish to emphasize
that these two documents have nothing to do with the case of
Kaltenbrunner as such. As I have just said, anyone may look at the
document; but, since this document has nothing to do with Kaltenbrunner,
it has from the very outset no value as evidence.
COL. AMEN: Well, it has even further probative value, Your Lordship, in
that, if the matters referred to in this letter were known, as described
in the letter to the people in Oranienburg, surely the person who
occupies the position as Chief of the RSHA in Germany must certainly
have the knowledge which the smallest local civilian appears to have.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the document is inadmissible.
COL. AMEN: That was to have been my last document, Your Lordship; so
that concludes the cross-examination, except for one point. There is a
witness named Hoess, who is called on behalf of the defendant, and
through whom I would like to introduce two exhibits. If he is not to be
called, however, then I would like to introduce those exhibits through
the defendant. So I am wondering whether we could obtain a definite
statement as to whether or not the witness Hoess is actually to be
called by the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, are you proposing to call Hoess?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I did not hear what you said, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat. Wait a minute,
wait a minute!
CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): Just a minute—stay! Mr. President, we have a few questions
to put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, we understood the other day that the
Counsel for the Prosecution had agreed that there should be only one
cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We wish to request the Tribunal to allow us to
put to the defendant a few questions, which will not take very long but
which are quite indispensable for further questioning.
THE PRESIDENT: In the opinion of the Tribunal, I think you know counsel
ought to settle beforehand what questions are indispensable and then
have them put by the counsel who cross-examines. That is the whole
object of the scheme.
Sir David, when we saw you on this subject, did you not tell us that all
the prosecutors had agreed that so far as this defendant was concerned
he should only be cross-examined by one?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that was the position. I understand
that the Soviet Delegation have some special points, and they were going
to ask, as a matter of grace of the Tribunal, whether they could put
them. That is what my Soviet colleagues have informed me.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost?
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): My
explanation will be very brief, Mr. President. In principle, the
Prosecution entrusts one man to ask all these questions. It is
impossible, however, for the entire investigation and examination to be
carried out by one member of the Prosecution only because we do
represent four different nations which have not divergent but certainly
individual interests. The only person qualified to speak in the
interests of a nation is the representative of that nation. I think,
therefore, that the Tribunal should permit us to ask questions from time
to time when we ask to be allowed to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not applying now, are you, for leave
to have a third cross-examination; you are just speaking on general
principles?
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a question of principle. The Prosecution
has limited itself in order to economize on time, but it requests the
Tribunal for authorization to intercede when it is necessary to do so in
order to represent the interests of a country.
I will not ask any questions which might have occurred to me following
the interrogation by my colleague of the United States; I do not wish to
retard the proceedings. I think, however, that the Tribunal could tell
us that in principle we remain free to ask questions which concern our
countries, especially since we alone are competent to represent the
interests of our countries and cannot transfer this competency to one of
our colleagues.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, could you inform the Tribunal upon what
questions, what points you want to cross-examine?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yesterday, when the defendant was replying to
Colonel Amen’s questions and denying his participation in the
extermination of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto, he stressed that the
Chief of Police in occupied Poland, Krüger, was allegedly directly
subordinated to Himmler and had no connection with Kaltenbrunner at all.
In the Polish documents which have just reached me, and in connection
with which the Soviet Delegation has changed the order which it has
primarily intended to observe, in these Polish documents there is...
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that point. Are there any other points?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The second point refers to another document
already submitted by the Soviet Delegation, and this point has not been
covered by the preceding question; but it is of intense interest from
the viewpoint of the documents previously presented. It is in regard to
these two questions that I wish to examine the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: You are aware that we are going to adjourn at half past
12 for the purpose of dealing with the documents of the Defendant
Rosenberg, but you may certainly cross-examine upon these points if you
will do it as shortly as you can.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe, Mr. President, that we shall be able
to finish the cross-examination in 15 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, Colonel Amen yesterday submitted to the
Tribunal a document which disclosed your active participation in the
liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto. Perhaps you can tell us under whose
orders the police were. Rebutting this document you dwelt at great
length on the fact that the Police Chiefs in the occupied territories
were directly subordinated to Reichsführer SS Himmler and had nothing to
do with you.
Do you stick to this statement?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but it should be supplemented. I also said yesterday
that the Higher SS and Police Chief in the Government General was
subordinate to Himmler and that, in turn, the SS and Police Leaders of
the smaller districts were subordinate to him.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can tell us to whom the police
officials were subordinate?
KALTENBRUNNER: The commanders of the Security Police, the Order Police,
and the Waffen-SS were subordinate to the Higher SS and to the Chief of
Police. They were also subordinated to the Chiefs of Police and SS in
the smaller districts.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can remember your second statement
as well, when you declared yourself opposed to Krüger’s extreme
tendencies towards the Polish Jews, and that you had even attempted to
restrain him?
KALTENBRUNNER: I have stated that I agreed with Frank in favoring the
release of Krüger—that is, his transfer from the Government General.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to hand Frank’s diary to the
defendant.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
Let him turn to Page 13, where Krüger is mentioned, and then to Page 16.
From this Page 16, I shall read three paragraphs. Read and follow if it
has been carefully translated, “There is no doubt”—says Krüger—“that
the removal of the Jews has had a favorable effect on pacification...”
KALTENBRUNNER: That passage has not been submitted to me here. I have
Page 13 of the document in my hand.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, we shall show you Page 16, beginning
with the words “There is no doubt...” I begin again:
“There is no doubt but that the removal of the Jews has also had
a favorable effect on pacification. It was for the police one of
their gravest and most unpleasant tasks; but it had to be
carried out by order of the Führer, since it was necessary in
the interests of Europe.”
I omit one paragraph and would ask you to do the same:
“One was forced to remove the Jews from the armament industries
and from all industries and factories of military and economic
interest unless they are exclusively employed on important war
work. In such cases the Jews were collected in the large camps
and from there sent by day to the munition factories. The
Reichsführer SS, however, desires that the employment of these
Jews stop, too. He had a long conversation on this subject with
Lieutenant General Schindler and is of opinion that this wish of
the Reichsführer SS cannot be carried out in full. There are
among the Jewish workers specialists, skilled mechanics, and
other qualified artisans who cannot at present be replaced by
Poles.”
I draw your attention to the next sentence:
“He therefore requests the SS Obergruppenführer, Dr.
Kaltenbrunner, to describe the situation to the Reichsführer SS
and to request him to refrain from removing these skilled Jewish
workers. The physically best-conditioned of the Jews had been
retrained by the industries, the so-called ‘Maccabeans,’ who
worked magnificently, as well as female workers who had proved
physically stronger than the male Jews. We experienced the same
conditions in the clearing of the Warsaw Ghetto. By the way,
this task had been very difficult.”
I omit a sentence and quote the following:
“It has been proved that here, too, the Jewesses, arms in hand,
had fought the men of the Waffen-SS and the police to the end.”
Do these passages not prove that Krüger considered you as his commanding
officer, and that when the majority of Jews had already been murdered in
Poland and only a very small number of good specialists were left,
Krüger appealed to Himmler—through you, as his chief—to allow these
Jews to live? Does this not bear witness to the fact that Krüger
considered you as his chief and acted through you?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, Mr. Prosecutor. This document, on the contrary,
proves something quite different. In the first place, he himself says
here that the evacuation of the Warsaw Ghetto had previously taken
place; in the second place, he says that he begs me to go to Himmler and
to remonstrate with him. What I said to Himmler is not contained in the
document; and the fact that, on that occasion, I told Himmler for the
first time, “Now I know what is going on,” and protested against it,
does not appear in this document. But surely I must be given the
opportunity to declare and prove here that I took steps against this
action; and if you cross-examine Frank or the witnesses...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment, you have already mentioned this,
Defendant.
KALTENBRUNNER: I have not finished. I have not yet finished this point.
If you question the witnesses on the subject of “Government General,”
you will discover exactly how, on that occasion, I paid my first and
only visit to the Government General, and that what I experienced and
learned there became the subject of a discussion with Himmler. You
cannot accuse me, on the one hand, of knowing of all these things
without giving me, on the other hand, the opportunity to describe what
were my reactions. In the last 2 years of the war, circumstances placed
me in a position where I was able to see what was happening in the Reich
and later on, near the end, in the Government General as well. But you
are not giving me an opportunity to explain how I reacted, I the man who
had the misfortune to get such a position at the end of the war.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One little moment. But why did Krüger act
through you?
KALTENBRUNNER: And further, this document does not indicate in any way
in what capacity I was there; not once does he mention that I was there
as his police superior. He knows only that naturally, as Chief of the
Intelligence Service, I had to report very often to Himmler. So he asked
me on this occasion to make these reports. But Krüger was—as it surely
appears in the document—State Secretary for the security system in the
Government General. He was State Secretary there, and as State Secretary
he was subordinate to the Governor General, and as State Secretary...
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast, and you are making far too much
of a speech.
KALTENBRUNNER: ...and as State Secretary for police matters in the
Government General, he was, of course, immediately subordinate to
Himmler. That must be...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg you to answer briefly: Did Krüger ask you
to report to Himmler on this subject or not? That is the only thing I am
asking you.
KALTENBRUNNER: As far as I know, this meeting was a large meeting of
administrative officials and everyone asked all those who were closest
to the Führer or Himmler...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, “yes” or “no”: Did he ask you to
report, or not?
KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know that.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you do not know. Then I will ask you a second
question.
KALTENBRUNNER: From the wording I can only take...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment.
KALTENBRUNNER: You are not allowing me to finish.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say to the last question? Was not the
question, “Did you go there?” Colonel Smirnov?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I had another question to put, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you what your last question was.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked the following question, Mr. President:
Did Krüger report to Himmler through Kaltenbrunner? I was asking the
defendant to answer “yes” or “no” and to abstain from making speeches.
THE PRESIDENT: What was your last question?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Krüger ask Kaltenbrunner to report to
Himmler on this subject. My second question—Mr. President, are you
asking about my second question?
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted him to answer your question. Will you tell him
what question you want him to answer. Don’t ask him two; ask him one
question. Can’t you hear what I said?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him one question, and see whether you can try and get
him to answer it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Krüger ask for this to be reported to
Himmler, and what did he say?
KALTENBRUNNER: It is possible that he did ask me but not as a superior.
You must realize what type of assembly it was; that must also become
apparent from the diary. I did not go there as the Chief of the Security
Police, or as Krüger’s superior; but Krüger, like dozens of other
people, reported on the food situation, the administrative system...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to refrain from further
explanations. You answered my question, and it is not worth continuing
on the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, a quotation from Frank’s diary has been read
to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Frank’s diary consists of 42 volumes and
I should like to suggest that the prosecutor give the place and the
volume and the date of the entry, so that one can determine in what
connection that occurred.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Here we have a precise indication: This is a
conference of 31 May 1943 in Kraków. There it is headed “Technical
Conference...” The document is registered as Exhibit Number USA-613,
Document 2233(aa)-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: This diary presumably got a date.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is correct. This conference took place on
31 May 1943; there is the date.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what Dr. Seidl wants to know.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have a second question to put to the
defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If, as the defendant says, he was exclusively
employed on intelligence work and with nothing else, then did he
consider the buying over of the Iran elections and the receipt from
Ribbentrop of 1 million tomans to send to agents as entering purely
within the scope of intelligence work?
KALTENBRUNNER: I certainly had nothing to do with the buying of votes in
Iran; but I admit, of course, that agents of my Intelligence Service did
work in Iran.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You did not ask Ribbentrop for 1 million tomans
for bribery?
KALTENBRUNNER: No, I had sufficient means to pay my agents myself.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This letter bearing Kaltenbrunner’s signature
has already been submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178,
during Ribbentrop’s cross-examination. Mention is made in this letter of
the allocation of 1 million tomans. Does the defendant deny this
evidence which Ribbentrop, himself, has admitted?
KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that I did not demand any money from Ribbentrop
because I had enough money. Show me this letter. It might be quite
possible. I had sufficient funds at my disposal for the intelligence
service.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The original of this letter has already been
submitted to the Tribunal during Ribbentrop’s interrogatory. We have
only the copy but the original, of course, can be brought immediately
from the document room. It is said here that:
“In order to exert a decisive influence on the election results,
400,000 tomans would be needed for bribes in Teheran and at
least 600,000 tomans for the rest of Iran.”
The letter ends as follows:
“I request you to tell me briefly if it would be possible to
obtain 1 million tomans from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It would be possible to transfer this money by people whom we
are sending there by airplane.
“Heil Hitler. Your devoted Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenführer.”
The contents of this letter are quite definite. Ribbentrop acknowledged
the letter. Are you denying Ribbentrop’s evidence?
KALTENBRUNNER: Not in the least, but I would like to add the following
as far as this document is concerned. I cannot remember it easily
because it was written in Office VI. I do not know the contents—did not
know them until now. I am absolutely sure that I signed it, because it
is a letter to a Minister of the Reich which, of course, for reasons of
tact, I had to sign personally. As to the subject itself, I am grateful
that the last question in this cross-examination is a question which
actually refers to my sphere of activities proper. You are the first
prosecutor to whom I must be grateful on that account, and who at last
can no longer conceal the fact that my agents and my activities extended
as far as Iran.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Is that your signature?
KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this
defendant, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: What document is that you put to him then?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This is Exhibit Number USSR-178, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: 178?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is Kaltenbrunner’s letter addressed to Von
Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you. Now, the Tribunal will deal with
Dr. Thoma’s documents for Rosenberg. Is the Prosecution ready? Are you
ready, Mr. Dodd?
MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient for Mr. Dodd to tell us how the
position stands? Would it be agreeable to you, Dr. Thoma, if Mr. Dodd
tells us how the position stands?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
MR. DODD: Dr. Thoma has prepared three document books, and there are two
volumes to the first book—two parts, two volumes—and I should like to
take up first, Volumes I and II of the first document book. In the
first, Volume I...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already looked at these volumes.
MR. DODD: Well, there is contained in the book that has been submitted
to us a number of authorities, starting with that first document by
Falckenberg, _The History of Modern Philosophy_, and running down to the
_Introduction into the Psychology of the Nations_, by Hellpach; and
really, as we understand the ruling of the Court, on the 8th of March,
it stated that these books could be used so far as appropriate for the
purpose of argument, and to this end they should be produced and made
available to Defense Counsel; and the Court went on to say that any
particular passage which Counsel for the Defense wish to quote should be
incorporated in the document book for translation.
We object to all of these excerpts and for mostly the same reasons, and
I think I can discuss them as a group rather than individually.
THE PRESIDENT: We have all read them, and we wish only to hear any
arguments which Dr. Thoma desires to make comments upon.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to stress that only the legal
points of view prompt me to offer writings of contemporary historians as
evidence in this Trial. The Tribunal has to decide whether there is a
connection between Rosenberg’s ideology and the war crimes and crimes
against Jews.
I assert that, in addition to that ideology, other factors—so-called
preliminary conditions, that is, the entire contemporary situation, the
philosophical and mental outlook—contributed their part; but the main
question is this: Did Rosenberg culpably anticipate the dangerous
possibilities of his ideas and nevertheless promulgate them? In what
manner can he be considered guilty if Rosenberg was convinced that his
ideas were right, and if he was unaware of their dangerous development?
I shall therefore indicate facts about the mental outlook of the time
which prove that his ideas were perceived, and even partly championed by
exact science. I will show that other countries introduced certain
National Socialist measures, such as suppressing births of children
unfit for life, even before Rosenberg’s books were written. Further, I
shall allude to the results of the investigations of natural science on
the natural basis for the existence of man and the ensuing limitation of
man’s freedom. I shall point to the effects and consequences of a
technical age; and I want to refer to the fact that irrational ideas and
conceptions have been taken seriously even by rational empirical
science; and I want to show how laws govern the development of
philosophical concepts and political movements which are often
inevitable. On the basis of these scientific conclusions, it is possible
that Rosenberg underestimated or overlooked the dangerous side of his
ideology—to wit, that all ideas and conceptions degenerate according to
the laws governing the human mind. The question of guilt, therefore,
must be regarded in a new light and, in my opinion, also the question of
carelessness should be examined. These theses will be extracted from
works on natural science by Von Eickstedt, Mühlmann, Scheidt, Keiter,
and from the philosophical works of Hellpach, Messer, Tillich, Buber _et
cetera_.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the belief that a philosophy of the
irrational might be applied to politics may sound ridiculous, but I
would mention that only 15 years ago in Germany it was preached that a
policy based on Christian ethics was nonsensical, because Christian
ethics could not be applied in the political sphere. Today we know that
this is possible, and, therefore, I am pleading before a Tribunal who,
to my conviction, receive their authority from these ethical motives.
That is only one example for the importance of the irrational in
politics. The belief in the power of the ideal and the moral is, after
all, irrational, too.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the question of the causal connection between
Rosenberg’s ideology and the war crimes must not, or rather should not,
be confused with the charge of Rosenberg’s actual participation in the
murder of the Jews and the crimes in the East. This has another
connection. I will have to try to refute the actual participation of
Rosenberg in these matters separately.
I would like to draw your attention to one more important viewpoint.
Organizations, whose members formerly had in part been under the
influence of Christianity and the so-called youth movement, and who let
themselves be won over to National Socialism because they believed that
by it their Christian and idealistic interests could be realized, are
also indicated. They are now left helpless in their camps, disappointed
in this world. They, too, have the right to ask that the Tribunal be
told what they believed in and what they had been taught. I believe that
I have made it clear that I am not trying to deliver a lecture on
aesthetics but that these are very important legal problems.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if any of the authors are unsuitable, then I
shall forego quoting them. Perhaps Lapouge may not be suitable at all. I
withdraw his work, although it is precisely Lapouge who points out that
certain biological laws have also been applied in the legislation of
other states. But Mr. Justice Jackson objected to a passage from
Lapouge, and I withdraw it herewith. There are also one or two works of
Martin Buber which I am willing to withdraw. But I particularly wanted
to use Martin Buber to prove that we are concerned here with principles
which have nothing whatsoever to do with anti-Semitism but merely
represent a philosophy which is as justified as the philosophy of
rationalism during the last centuries. But I ask the Tribunal that,
during the presentation of evidence, cognizance be taken only of actual
philosophical-historical proofs and facts. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if
I presented these facts in my address, I would run the risk of
presenting only my own knowledge. That is why I need these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we understand that you object to all up to that
book of Hellpach’s. Then, with reference to the other volumes, the
others are all Rosenberg’s own documents, are they not?
MR. DODD: Except the two last.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the two last are in the same category, I suppose, as
the ones down to Hellpach, are they not?
MR. DODD: Yes, there are also some quotations from newspapers contained
in the document books, on Pages 182 to 185. We also made objection to
them.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they in Volume II?
MR. DODD: Yes, they are in Volume II of Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: I was dealing, at the moment, with Volume I of Document
Book 1.
MR. DODD: That was the objection in Volume I.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, you are not objecting to his other books?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, we are not.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, in Book 2 there is not an index, is there?
MR. DODD: We have no objection to anything that is contained in Book 2.
THE PRESIDENT: In Volume II to Book 1?
MR. DODD: We were talking about Volume II, Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; yes, I see. Then in Book 2—you do not object
to Book 2?
MR. DODD: No, we do not.
THE PRESIDENT: Nor Book 3?
MR. DODD: No, we have no objection to Book 3. I think our Russian
colleagues have an objection to the affidavit of Dr. Dencker. I would
prefer, however, that they address the Tribunal on that subject
themselves.
THE PRESIDENT: And then, is there a fourth book?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, there is not, but we have not talked about the
second part of the first book.
THE PRESIDENT: I was told that you had.
MR. DODD: No, I think not. I did mention the newspaper articles.
THE PRESIDENT: Where are these documents that you are referring to, in
the second volume of the first book?
MR. DODD: The first one will be found beginning on Page 182 of that
second volume of the first book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, those are the last two in the index.
MR. DODD: Yes, they are.
THE PRESIDENT: We understand that you are objecting to them.
MR. DODD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But the index in the first volume of the first book is
the index for both the volumes.
MR. DODD: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: And what you are objecting to is all documents up to
Hellpach and the last two?
MR. DODD: Yes, that is exactly right.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand. Then, with reference to Books 2 and 3 you
do not object, but the Soviet Union wishes to offer an objection to this
affidavit by Professor Dencker.
MR. DODD: That is exactly right, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear what the Soviets say about
that.
STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): I invite the Tribunal’s attention to Document Rosenberg-38.
This is in the third document book, Page 29. This document is a letter,
dated 24 August 1931.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, is it not an affidavit?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No. I am referring to two documents, Mr.
President, Document Rosenberg-38 and the second one dealing with
Dencker’s affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Yes, I got Page 21. We will deal with Document
38 first, that is Page 29.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This document is the letter of an unknown wine
merchant, addressed to Rosenberg, concerning some sort of newspaper
paragraph. We do not know this newspaper paragraph since defense
counsel, Dr. Thoma, has not submitted it; and, therefore, we believe it
is not relevant to the matter and all the more so since in none of his
claims and in none of his explanations did Dr. Thoma explain what this
document was supposed to prove nor what this letter was about.
I would then like to mention a few considerations regarding the second
document, concerning Dencker’s affidavit presented by defense counsel
Dr. Thoma. This affidavit is also in the third document book, Pages
8-11, and is registered as Rosenberg Number 35. Judging by the contents,
Dencker, a former member of Economic Staff East, participated in the
perpetration of war crimes in the territories occupied by the German
troops. This Dencker took part in the looting of the occupied
territories of the Soviet Union.
I wish to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that defense
counsel, Dr. Thoma, on 6 April of this year, requested the Tribunal to
allow the admission of this document, and the General Secretary of the
Tribunal got the opinion of the Prosecution. However, before the
Tribunal had made up its mind, before the Prosecution had come to a
conclusion, Dencker’s affidavit was included in the document book,
mimeographed and distributed to everybody. What, may I ask, is this
affidavit? We consider, and it is very easy to prove, that the
information contained in this affidavit throws a false light on the
factual state of affairs. It contains a number of slanderous and
incorrect statements which have already been refuted by various
documents submitted to the Tribunal and read into the record. Therefore,
inasmuch as Dencker has not been summoned before the Tribunal as a
witness and we are deprived of the possibility of exposing the mendacity
of his evidence under cross-examination, we consider that these
documents should not be admitted by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Gentlemen, I agree that Professor Dr. Dencker, who states
that 180 million Reichsmark worth of tractors and other agricultural
machinery was taken to the Ukraine, should be called as a witness. But
this document is striking evidence of the fact that reconstruction was
in process in the Ukraine, that an efficient administration was
intended, that the land was not to be stupidly exploited, but that
long-term plans were made in the interest of the country and the
population. I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to admit this affidavit in
evidence. If necessary, I shall make an application that Professor
Dencker—in Bonn—be called as a witness, in case the Tribunal should be
impressed with the statement of the Soviet Prosecutor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. THOMA: And also, Mr. President, I beg your pardon, but I did not
understand the previous objection regarding Document Book Number 3. I do
not have my Document Book Number 3 with me, and I do not know what the
objection was.
THE PRESIDENT: On Page 29 is a letter addressed to Rosenberg by somebody
without signature. It is Rosenberg-38.
DR. THOMA: Oh, yes; but that document has been admitted by the Tribunal,
and the signature is “Adolf Hitler.” Apparently, the typist was not able
to read that.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a letter, is it?
DR. THOMA: Yes, Sir; it has already been approved. It has been approved,
Gentlemen. But, I beg to apologize; I still do not quite understand. Is
Hellpach the only one of my entire document book who has been approved?
Is it Sir David’s or Mr. Dodd’s wish that only Hellpach should be quoted
and nobody else? In that case I should like to have an opportunity to go
a little into detail on what the other authors were intended to prove.
For instance, I...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not made any decision yet.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We thought that you had given us the reasons in support
of the documents in Book 1, Volumes I and II.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have given us the reasons, it is not necessary for
you to say anything further.
DR. THOMA: Yes, Mr. President; but I thought that, with reference to the
different books, I might state very briefly what I wished to prove.
With Messer, Tillich, Leeuw, and Bergson, I am trying to prove that
neoromanticism—that is, the philosophy of the irrational, whose
forerunner was Rousseau—invaded Germany with elementary force and was
at the same time influenced by French, English, and American
philosophers.
Secondly, through Martin Buber I wish to prove that this philosophy is
not anti-Semitic, but that, on the contrary, Martin Buber not only
preached this philosophy but also recommended its application in
practice; it is precisely Martin Buber’s work wherein we find those
vital terms and expressions, which have acquired such importance in this
Trial, such as the significance of blood, the myth of blood, the
relation between national character and living space, of intuition, of
the concepts of movement, of the character of inheritage, and so forth.
And further, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in connection with these
quotations from Eickstedt, Mühlmann, Scheidt, Keiter, I wish to state
that these authors are not National Socialists, but that, in fact, they
were partly opposed to Rosenberg’s ideology; but they are proof of the
fact that the concepts of race, people, nation, blood, and soil, _et
cetera_, are recognized by natural science experts. And Hellpach, in his
_Introduction to the Psychology of Nations_, made the extremely
important statement—and Hellpach is a very famous name in German
philosophic literature—that every thesis leads to a synthesis and
eventually breaks down.
Gentlemen, I have only one brief concluding remark to make. In the last
number of _Die Neue Zeitung_ there was an article to the effect that in
the French Constituent Assembly a few days ago a discussion on one of
the most important and basic issues of our times had begun, a discussion
on the rights of man—during which the inner attitude of the members of
the resistance was examined and definite theses were set up regarding
liberty and the crises liable to affect the rights of man, and various
contradictions were pointed out.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. THOMA: And, Gentlemen, the following was established: There is a
contradiction between the preaching of liberty and the ever greater
enslavement by the machine. That is exactly what we assert. Secondly,
there is a contradiction between the increase of material wealth and the
decrease of spiritual values. Thirdly, contradiction is involved in
every type of progress, in that every improvement is counterbalanced by
corresponding decadence. Fourthly, there is an opposition between the
ideals of humanism of the 18th century and the discoveries of the
science of the human being—biology and psychoanalysis—which
demonstrate that man is subject to the laws of nature.
Fifthly, contradiction between the broad masses of people who are
“enlightened” by such superficial means as newspapers, radio, motion
pictures, and all types of propaganda, and the disappearance of a
thinking and cultured elite.
That was the subject of debate in the Constituent Assembly of the
present French Parliament, and that is why I suggest, Gentlemen, that
such questions also have a place in this Trial, since they are
indicative of the political and mental attitude of the people, because
highly ethical consideration may be derived from the concept of
nationality. The fact that they have deteriorated is due to
philosophical and biological process and partly to training, but only in
part.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Thoma? Have you finished what you
wanted to say?
DR. THOMA: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, has not made its decision yet,
and it will consider your arguments. But I am bound to point out to you
that there is no charge in the Indictment or in this case against the
Defendant Rosenberg either that he invented his philosophy, or that he
held certain philosophical ideas. The charge against him is that he made
a certain use of his philosophical ideas. That is all I have to say.
The only other matter which I want to mention to you is an application
you made for calling Rosenberg, not first, but at some other point in
the course of his case; and as to that, if the Tribunal should come to
the conclusion that these other philosophical works are not matters
which ought to be considered, is it not really unnecessary to put off
the calling of the Defendant Rosenberg to some later stage? Would it not
be in the interests of expedition that he should be called first?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, there are two things I might say to that. I
was under the erroneous impression that any evidence that is taken must
begin with the hearing of the accused. I assumed that documents could
not be read prior to that, and that is why I asked that I be allowed to
produce some introductory documents first, so that the examination of
the Defendant Rosenberg could proceed more smoothly, because in my
opinion the Tribunal would become acquainted with the facts much more
quickly through the documents. Furthermore, I asked for the Witness
Riecke, who could also quickly acquaint you with the Eastern problems
and particularly with the food problem and who would expedite matters if
he were heard before Rosenberg. That is how I planned it. I would like
to read in the first sequence the most important documents first—not
only the ideological ones, but all those concerning the Einsatzstab and
the administration of the East; then I would like to call the witness
Riecke, and after that the Defendant Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has already indicated that in its
opinion, in every ordinary case, it tends to expedition if the defendant
is called first; and, of course, any document which is material can be
put to the defendant in the course of his evidence for any explanation
which he may have to give upon it.
DR. THOMA: I believe, Your Honor, that if I were to make very brief
remarks concerning the documents, it would take less time than if
Rosenberg dealt with the individual documents. That is why I thought I
might read some of the documents at the start, only to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, in order that you should be prepared and able to go
on on Monday morning, the Tribunal, having considered this matter, rules
that Rosenberg should be called first. That is the ruling of the
Tribunal.
As to the documents, we will consider what our judgment shall be with
reference to the documents which are objected to.
I said Monday morning. I beg your pardon. I meant at the end of the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s case.
DR. THOMA: Your Honors, I merely wish to say a few words with reference
to Rosenberg’s ideology. I am asking the Tribunal to read the speech by
M. De Menthon, who states that this ideology was in itself criminal
since it was related to his activity as editor and publisher of the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ and as author of the _Myth_ and other writings.
He says that in this way he psychologically prepared the German nation
for an offensive war.
THE PRESIDENT: I said that it was not a question of what was the origin
of his philosophy or the mere holding of the philosophical ideas, but
the use to which he puts these philosophical ideas. Well, the Tribunal
will consider it.
MR. DODD: If Your Honor please, I want to make it clear that we do
object to the works of Hellpach. I rather gather that Dr. Dix had asked
me to request that his documents be heard today.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is too late now, but we will consider them
shortly if Dr. Dix wishes it. We will consider them very soon.
DR. DIX: I would appreciate that. We discussed it first with Sir David,
and then I discussed it with Dr. Dodd and Mr. Albrecht, and these
gentlemen have raised objections which should be brought before the
Court. But translations have not yet been made, and a decision ought to
be made soon, or else the document book will not be ready. I would
appreciate it if we could briefly discuss that on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: We will try to do it on Monday.
DR. DIX: On Monday?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 15 April 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal: The report is made that the
Defendant Ribbentrop is absent from this session of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents of the
Defendant Rosenberg.
The Tribunal rules that all the documents in Book 1, Volume I and Volume
II, should be denied, up to and including the book by Hellpach, that is
to say, Exhibits 1 to 6 and also Exhibit 7(e) and Exhibit 8.
Secondly, the Tribunal rules that it will take judicial notice of
Exhibits 7(a) to 7(d); but it rules that those exhibits, 7 to 7(d), are
not to be read at the present stage but may be quoted by counsel in his
final speech.
Thirdly, the Tribunal allows Books 2 and 3.
And fourthly, the Tribunal rules that the Defendant Rosenberg shall be
called first and any documents which have been allowed may be put to him
in the course of his examination.
That is all.
Now, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With the agreement of the Tribunal, I now call the
witness Hoess.
[_The witness Hoess took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Stand up. Will you state your name?
RUDOLF FRANZ FERDINAND HOESS (Witness): Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, your statements will have far-reaching
significance. You are perhaps the only one who can throw some light upon
certain hidden aspects, and who can tell which people gave the orders
for the destruction of European Jewry, and can further state how this
order was carried out and to what degree the execution was kept a
secret.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, will you kindly put questions to the
witness.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] From 1940 to 1943, you were the Commander of
the camp at Auschwitz. Is that true?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And during that time, hundreds of thousands of human
beings were sent to their death there. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, yourself, have made no exact notes
regarding the figures of the number of those victims because you were
forbidden to make them?
HOESS: Yes, that is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore correct that exclusively one man by the
name of Eichmann had notes about this, the man who had the task of
organizing and assembling these people?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore true that Eichmann stated to you that
in Auschwitz a total sum of more than 2 million Jews had been destroyed?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Men, women, and children?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You were a participant in the World War?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then in 1922, you entered the Party?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you a member of the SS?
HOESS: Since 1934.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, in the year 1924, were sentenced to
a lengthy term of hard labor because you participated in a so-called
political murder?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then at the end of 1934, you went to the
concentration camp of Dachau?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What task did you receive?
HOESS: At first, I was the leader of a block of prisoners and then I
became clerk and finally, the administrator of the property of
prisoners.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And how long did you stay there?
HOESS: Until 1938.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What job did you have from 1938 on and where were you
then?
HOESS: In 1938 I went to the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen where,
to begin with, I was adjutant to the commander and later on I became the
head of the protective custody camp.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When were you commander at Auschwitz?
HOESS: I was commander at Auschwitz from May 1940 until December 1943.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the highest number of human beings, prisoners,
ever held at one time at Auschwitz?
HOESS: The highest number of internees held at one time at Auschwitz,
was about 140,000 men and women.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that in 1941 you were ordered to Berlin to see
Himmler? Please state briefly what was discussed.
HOESS: Yes. In the summer of 1941 I was summoned to Berlin to
Reichsführer SS Himmler to receive personal orders. He told me something
to the effect—I do not remember the exact words—that the Führer had
given the order for a final solution of the Jewish question. We, the SS,
must carry out that order. If it is not carried out now then the Jews
will later on destroy the German people. He had chosen Auschwitz on
account of its easy access by rail and also because the extensive site
offered space for measures ensuring isolation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference did Himmler tell you that this
planned action had to be treated as a secret Reich matter?
HOESS: Yes. He stressed that point. He told me that I was not even
allowed to say anything about it to my immediate superior Gruppenführer
Glücks. This conference concerned the two of us only and I was to
observe the strictest secrecy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the position held by Glücks whom you have just
mentioned?
HOESS: Gruppenführer Glücks was, so to speak, the inspector of
concentration camps at that time and he was immediately subordinate to
the Reichsführer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the expression “secret Reich matter” mean that no
one was permitted to make even the slightest allusion to outsiders
without endangering his own life?
HOESS: Yes, “secret Reich matter” means that no one was allowed to speak
about these matters with any person and that everyone promised upon his
life to keep the utmost secrecy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you happen to break that promise?
HOESS: No, not until the end of 1942.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Why do you mention that date? Did you talk to outsiders
after that date?
HOESS: At the end of 1942 my wife’s curiosity was aroused by remarks
made by the then Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, regarding happenings in my
camp. She asked me whether this was the truth and I admitted that it
was. That was my only breach of the promise I had given to the
Reichsführer. Otherwise I have never talked about it to anyone else.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you meet Eichmann?
HOESS: I met Eichmann about 4 weeks after having received that order
from the Reichsführer. He came to Auschwitz to discuss the details with
me on the carrying out of the given order. As the Reichsführer had told
me during our discussion, he had instructed Eichmann to discuss the
carrying out of the order with me and I was to receive all further
instructions from him.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly tell whether it is correct that the camp
of Auschwitz was completely isolated, describing the measures taken to
insure as far as possible the secrecy of carrying out of the task given
to you.
HOESS: The Auschwitz camp as such was about 3 kilometers away from the
town. About 20,000 acres of the surrounding country had been cleared of
all former inhabitants, and the entire area could be entered only by SS
men or civilian employees who had special passes. The actual compound
called “Birkenau,” where later on the extermination camp was
constructed, was situated 2 kilometers from the Auschwitz camp. The camp
installations themselves, that is to say, the provisional installations
used at first were deep in the woods and could from nowhere be detected
by the eye. In addition to that, this area had been declared a
prohibited area and even members of the SS who did not have a special
pass could not enter it. Thus, as far as one could judge, it was
impossible for anyone except authorized persons to enter that area.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then the railway transports arrived. During what
period did these transports arrive and about how many people, roughly,
were in such a transport?
HOESS: During the whole period up until 1944 certain operations were
carried out at irregular intervals in the different countries, so that
one cannot speak of a continuous flow of incoming transports. It was
always a matter of 4 to 6 weeks. During those 4 to 6 weeks two to three
trains, containing about 2,000 persons each, arrived daily. These trains
were first of all shunted to a siding in the Birkenau region and the
locomotives then went back. The guards who had accompanied the transport
had to leave the area at once and the persons who had been brought in
were taken over by guards belonging to the camp.
They were there examined by two SS medical officers as to their fitness
for work. The internees capable of work at once marched to Auschwitz or
to the camp at Birkenau and those incapable of work were at first taken
to the provisional installations, then later to the newly constructed
crematoria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During an interrogation I had with you the other day you
told me that about 60 men were designated to receive these transports,
and that these 60 persons, too, had been bound to the same secrecy
described before. Do you still maintain that today?
HOESS: Yes, these 60 men were always on hand to take the internees not
capable of work to these provisional installations and later on to the
other ones. This group, consisting of about ten leaders and subleaders,
as well as doctors and medical personnel, had repeatedly been told, both
in writing and verbally, that they were bound to the strictest secrecy
as to all that went on in the camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any signs that might show an outsider who saw
these transports arrive, that they would be destroyed or was that
possibility so small because there was in Auschwitz an unusually large
number of incoming transports, shipments of goods and so forth?
HOESS: Yes, an observer who did not make special notes for that purpose
could obtain no idea about that because to begin with not only
transports arrived which were destined to be destroyed but also other
transports arrived continuously, containing new internees who were
needed in the camp. Furthermore, transports likewise left the camp in
sufficiently large numbers with internees fit for work or exchanged
prisoners.
The trains themselves were closed, that is to say, the doors of the
freight cars were closed so that it was not possible, from the outside,
to get a glimpse of the people inside. In addition to that, up to 100
cars of materials, rations, _et cetera_, were daily rolled into the camp
or continuously left the workshops of the camp in which war material was
being made.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And after the arrival of the transports were the victims
stripped of everything they had? Did they have to undress completely;
did they have to surrender their valuables? Is that true?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then they immediately went to their death?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, according to your knowledge, did these people
know what was in store for them?
HOESS: The majority of them did not, for steps were taken to keep them
in doubt about it and suspicion would not arise that they were to go to
their death. For instance, all doors and all walls bore inscriptions to
the effect that they were going to undergo a delousing operation or take
a shower. This was made known in several languages to the internees by
other internees who had come in with earlier transports and who were
being used as auxiliary crews during the whole action.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then, you told me the other day, that death by
gassing set in within a period of 3 to 15 minutes. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You also told me that even before death finally set in,
the victims fell into a state of unconsciousness?
HOESS: Yes. From what I was able to find out myself or from what was
told me by medical officers, the time necessary for reaching
unconsciousness or death varied according to the temperature and the
number of people present in the chambers. Loss of consciousness took
place within a few seconds or a few minutes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you yourself ever feel pity with the victims,
thinking of your own family and children?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How was it possible for you to carry out these actions in
spite of this?
HOESS: In view of all these doubts which I had, the only one and
decisive argument was the strict order and the reason given for it by
the Reichsführer Himmler.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you whether Himmler inspected the camp and
convinced himself, too, of the process of annihilation?
HOESS: Yes. Himmler visited the camp in 1942 and he watched in detail
one processing from beginning to end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the same apply to Eichmann?
HOESS: Eichmann came repeatedly to Auschwitz and was intimately
acquainted with the proceedings.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the Defendant Kaltenbrunner ever inspect the camp?
HOESS: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever talk with Kaltenbrunner with reference to
your task?
HOESS: No, never. I was with Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner on only one
single occasion.
DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?
HOESS: That was one day after his birthday in the year 1944.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What position did you hold in the year 1944?
HOESS: In the year 1944 I was the head of Department E-1 in the Main
Economic and Administrative Office in Berlin. My office was the former
Inspectorate of Concentration Camps at Oranienburg.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And what was the subject of that conference which you
have just mentioned?
HOESS: It concerned a report from the camp at Mauthausen on the
so-called nameless internees and their engagement in armament industry.
Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner was to make a decision on the matter.
For that reason I came to him with the report from the commander at
Mauthausen but he did not make a decision telling me he would do so
later.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the location of Mauthausen, will you please
state in which district Mauthausen is situated. Is that Upper Silesia or
is it the Government General?
HOESS: Mauthausen...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Auschwitz, I beg your pardon, I made a mistake. I mean
Auschwitz.
HOESS: Auschwitz is situated in the former state of Poland. Later, after
1939, it was incorporated in the province of Upper Silesia.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right for me to assume that administration and
feeding of concentration camps were exclusively under the control of the
Main Economic and Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: A department which is completely separated from the RSHA?
HOESS: Quite correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then from 1943 until the end of the war, you were one
of the chiefs in the Inspectorate of the Main Economic and
Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes, that is correctly stated.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean by that, that you are particularly well
informed on everything occurring in concentration camps regarding the
treatment and the methods applied?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, therefore, first of all, whether you have any
knowledge regarding the treatment of internees, whether certain methods
became known to you according to which they were tortured and cruelly
treated? Please formulate your statement according to periods, up to
1939 and after 1939.
HOESS: Until the outbreak of war in 1939, the situation in the camps
regarding feeding, accommodations, and treatment of internees, was the
same as in any other prison or penitentiary in the Reich. The internees
were treated severely, but methodical beatings or ill-treatments were
out of the question. The Reichsführer gave frequent orders that every SS
man who laid violent hands on an internee would be punished; and several
times SS men who did ill-treat internees were punished.
Feeding and billeting at that time were on the same basis as those of
other prisoners under legal administration.
The accommodations in the camps during those years were still normal
because the mass influxes at the outbreak of the war and during the war
had not yet taken place. When the war started and when mass deliveries
of political internees arrived, and, later on, when prisoners who were
members of the resistance movements arrived from the occupied
territories, the construction of buildings and the extensions of the
camps could no longer keep pace with the number of incoming internees.
During the first years of the war this problem could still be overcome
by improvising measures; but later, due to the exigencies of the war,
this was no longer possible since there were practically no building
materials any more at our disposal. And, furthermore, rations for the
internees were again and again severely curtailed by the provincial
economic administration offices.
This then led to a situation where internees in the camps no longer had
the staying power to resist the now gradually growing epidemics.
The main reason why the prisoners were in such bad condition towards the
end of the war, why so many thousands of them were found sick and
emaciated in the camps, was that every internee had to be employed in
the armament industry to the extreme limit of his forces. The
Reichsführer constantly and on every occasion kept this goal before our
eyes, and also proclaimed it through the Chief of the Main Economic and
Administrative Office, Obergruppenführer Pohl, to the concentration camp
commanders and administrative leaders during the so-called commanders’
meetings.
Every commander was told to make every effort to achieve this. The aim
was not to have as many dead as possible or to destroy as many internees
as possible; the Reichsführer was constantly concerned with being able
to engage all forces available in the armament industry.
DR. KAUFFMANN: There is no doubt that the longer the war lasted, the
larger became the number of the ill-treated and tortured inmates.
Whenever you inspected the concentration camps did you not learn
something of this state of affairs through complaints, _et cetera_, or
do you consider that the conditions which have been described are more
or less due to excesses?
HOESS: These so-called ill-treatments and this torturing in
concentration camps, stories of which were spread everywhere among the
people, and later by the prisoners that were liberated by the occupying
armies, were not, as assumed, inflicted methodically, but were excesses
committed by individual leaders, subleaders, and men who laid violent
hands on internees.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean you never took cognizance of these matters?
HOESS: If in any way such a case came to be known, then the perpetrator
was, of course, immediately relieved of his post or transferred
somewhere else. So that, even if he were not punished for lack of
evidence to prove his guilt, even then, he was taken away from the
internees and given another position.
DR. KAUFFMANN: To what do you attribute the particularly bad and
shameful conditions, which were ascertained by the entering Allied
troops, and which to a certain extent were photographed and filmed?
HOESS: The catastrophic situation at the end of the war was due to the
fact that, as a result of the destruction of the railway network and of
the continuous bombing of the industrial plants, care for these
masses—I am thinking of Auschwitz with its 140,000 internees—could no
longer be assured. Improvised measures, truck columns, and everything
else tried by the commanders to improve the situation were of little or
no avail; it was no longer possible. The number of the sick became
immense. There were next to no medical supplies; epidemics raged
everywhere. Internees who were capable of work were used over and over
again. By order of the Reichsführer, even half-sick people had to be
used wherever possible in industry. As a result every bit of space in
the concentration camps which could possibly be used for lodging was
overcrowded with sick and dying prisoners.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now asking you to look at the map which is mounted
behind you. The red dots represent concentration camps. I will first ask
you how many concentration camps as such existed at the end of the war?
HOESS: At the end of the war there were still 13 concentration camps.
All the other points which are marked here on the map mean so-called
labor camps attached to the armament industry situated there. The
concentration camps, of which there are 13 as I have already said, were
the center and the central point of some district, such as the camp at
Dachau in Bavaria, or the camp of Mauthausen in Austria; and all the
labor camps in that district were under the control of the concentration
camp. That camp had then to supply these outside camps, that is to say,
they had to supply them with workers, exchange the sick inmates and
furnish clothing; the guards, too, were supplied by the concentration
camp.
From 1944 on, the supplying of food was almost exclusively a matter of
the individual armament industries in order to give the prisoners the
benefit of the wartime supplementary rations.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What became known to you about so-called medical
experiments on living internees?
HOESS: Medical experiments were carried out in several camps. For
instance, in Auschwitz there were experiments on sterilization carried
out by Professor Klaubert and Dr. Schumann; also experiments on twins by
SS medical officer Dr. Mengele.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the medical officer Dr. Rascher?
HOESS: In Dachau he was a medical officer of the Luftwaffe who carried
out experiments, on internees who had been sentenced to death, about the
resistance of the human body to cold and in high pressure chambers.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Can you tell whether such experiments carried out within
the camp were known to a large circle?
HOESS: Such experiments, just like all other matters, were, of course,
called “secret Reich matters.” However, it could not be avoided that the
experiments became known since they were carried out in a large camp and
must have been seen in some way by the inmates. I cannot say, however,
to what extent the outside world learned about these experiments.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You explained to me that orders for executions were
received in the camp at Auschwitz, and you told me that until the
outbreak of war such orders were few, but that later on they became more
numerous. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes. There were hardly any executions until the beginning of the
war—only in particularly serious cases. I remember one case in
Buchenwald where an SS man had been attacked and beaten to death by
internees, and the internees were later hanged.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But during the war—and that you will admit—the number
of executions increased, and not inconsiderably.
HOESS: That had already started with the beginning of the war.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the basis for these execution orders in many cases a
legal sentence of German courts?
HOESS: No. Orders for the executions carried out in the camps came from
the RSHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Who signed the orders for executions which you received?
Is it correct that occasionally you received orders for executions which
bore the signature “Kaltenbrunner,” and that these were not the
originals but were teleprints which therefore had the signature in
typewritten letters?
HOESS: It is correct. The originals of execution orders never came to
the camps. The original of these orders either arrived at the
Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, from where they were
transmitted by teletype to the camps concerned, or, in urgent cases, the
RSHA sent the orders directly to the camps concerned, and the
Inspectorate was then only informed, so that the signatures in the camps
were always only in teletype.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So as to again determine the signatures, will you tell
the Tribunal whether the overwhelming majority of all execution orders
either bore the signature of Himmler or that of Müller in the years
before the war and until the end of the war.
HOESS: Only very few teletypes which I have ever seen came from the
Reichsführer and still fewer from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Most of
them, I could say practically all, were signed “Signed Müller.”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that the Müller with whom you repeatedly talked about
such matters as you stated earlier?
HOESS: Gruppenführer Müller was the Chief of Department IV in the RSHA.
He had to negotiate with the Inspectorate about all matters connected
with concentration camps.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you say that you went to see the Gestapo Chief
Müller because you, on the strength of your experience, were of the
opinion that this man because of his years of activities was acting
almost independently?
HOESS: That is quite right. I had to negotiate all matters regarding
concentration camps with Gruppenführer Müller. He was informed on all
these matters, and in most cases he would make an immediate decision.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, so as to have a clear picture, did you ever
negotiate these matters with the defendant?
HOESS: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you learn that towards the end of the war
concentration camps were evacuated? And, if so, who gave the orders?
HOESS: Let me explain. Originally there was an order from the
Reichsführer, according to which camps, in the event of the approach of
the enemy or in case of air attacks, were to be surrendered to the
enemy. Later on, due to the case of Buchenwald, which had been reported
to the Führer, there was—no, at the beginning of 1945, when various
camps came within the operational sphere of the enemy, this order was
withdrawn. The Reichsführer ordered the Higher SS and Police Leaders,
who in an emergency case were responsible for the security and safety of
the camps, to decide themselves whether an evacuation or a surrender was
appropriate.
Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen were evacuated. Buchenwald was also to be
evacuated, but then the order from the Reichsführer came through to the
effect that on principle no more camps were to be evacuated. Only
prominent inmates and inmates who were not to fall into Allied hands
under any circumstances were to be taken away to other camps. This also
happened in the case of Buchenwald. After Buchenwald had been occupied,
it was reported to the Führer that internees had armed themselves and
were carrying out plunderings in the town of Weimar. This caused the
Führer to give the strictest order to Himmler to the effect that in the
future no more camps were to fall into the hands of the enemy, and that
no internees capable of marching would be left behind in any camp.
This was shortly before the end of the war, and shortly before northern
and southern Germany were cut. I shall speak about the Sachsenhausen
camp. The Gestapo chief, Gruppenführer Müller, called me in the evening
and told me that the Reichsführer had ordered that the camp at
Sachsenhausen was to be evacuated at once. I pointed out to
Gruppenführer Müller what that would mean. Sachsenhausen could no longer
fall back on any other camp except perhaps on a few labor camps attached
to the armament works that were almost filled up anyway. Most of the
internees would have to be sheltered in the woods somewhere. This would
mean countless thousands of deaths and, above all, it would be
impossible to feed these masses of people. He promised me that he would
again discuss these measures with the Reichsführer. He called me back
and told me that the Reichsführer had refused and was demanding that the
commanders carry out his orders immediately.
At the same time Ravensbrück was also to be evacuated in the same manner
but it could no longer be done. I do not know to what extent camps in
southern Germany were cleared, since we, the Inspectorate, no longer had
any connections with southern Germany.
DR. KAUFFMANN: It has been maintained here—and this is my last
question—that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner gave the order that Dachau
and two auxiliary camps were to be destroyed by bombing or with poison.
I ask you, did you hear anything about this; if not, would you consider
such an order possible?
HOESS: I have never heard anything about this, and I do not know
anything either about an order to evacuate any camps in southern
Germany, as I have already mentioned. Apart from that, I consider it
quite impossible that a camp could be destroyed by this method.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. MERKEL: Witness, did the State Police, as an authority of the Reich,
have anything to do with the destruction of Jews in Auschwitz?
HOESS: Yes, insofar as I received all my orders as to the carrying out
of that action from the Obersturmführer Eichmann.
DR. MERKEL: Was the administration of concentration camps under the
control of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: You said already that you had nothing to do with the RSHA.
HOESS: No.
DR. MERKEL: Please, will you emphasize, therefore, that the Gestapo as
such had nothing to do with the administration of the camps or the
accommodation, feeding, and treatment of the internees, but that this
was exclusively a matter for the Main Economic and Administrative
Office?
HOESS: Yes, that is quite correct.
DR. MERKEL: How do you explain it then that you, nevertheless, discussed
different questions concerning concentration camps with Müller?
HOESS: The RSHA, or rather Amt IV, had the executive power for the
directing of all internees into camps, classification into the camp
grades 1, 2, 3, and furthermore, the punishments which were to be
carried out on the part of the RSHA. Executions, the accommodation of
special internees, and all questions which might ensue therefrom were
also taken care of by the RSHA or Amt IV.
DR. MERKEL: When was this Main Economic and Administrative Office
created?
HOESS: The Main Economic and Administrative Office existed since 1933
under various names. The Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was,
however, subordinated only to this Main Economic and Administrative
Office since the year 1941.
DR. MERKEL: Then these concentration camps were from the very beginning
under the control of this Main Economic and Administrative Office, that
is to say the SS and not the State Police.
HOESS: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: You mentioned the name of Dr. Rascher a while ago. Do you
know this doctor personally?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know that Dr. Rascher before beginning his work at
Dachau had become a member of the SS?
HOESS: No, I know nothing about that. I only know that later he—I still
saw him in the uniform of an Air Force medical officer. Later he was
supposed to have been taken over into the SS, but I did not see him
again.
DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.
HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, at the beginning of your
examination you stated that when you were ordered to the Reichsführer SS
Himmler, he told you that the carrying out of this order of the Führer
was to be left to the SS and that the SS had been ordered to do it. What
is to be understood under this general title SS?
HOESS: According to the explanations of the Reichsführer, this could
only mean the men guarding the concentration camps. According to the
nature of the order only concentration camp crews and not the Waffen-SS
could be concerned with the carrying out of this task.
HERR BABEL: How many members of the SS were assigned to concentration
camps, and which units did they belong to?
HOESS: Toward the end of the war there were approximately 35,000 SS men
and in my estimation approximately 10,000 men from the Army, Air Force,
and the Navy detailed to the labor camps for guard duties.
HERR BABEL: What were the tasks of these guards? As far as I know, the
duties varied. First, there was the actual guarding and then there was a
certain amount of administrative work within the camp.
HOESS: Yes, that is correct.
HERR BABEL: How many guards were there within the camps for, let us say,
1,000 internees?
HOESS: You cannot estimate it in that way. According to my observations
about 10 percent of the total number of guarding personnel were used for
internal duties, that is to say, administration and supervision of
internees within the camp, including the medical personnel of the camp.
HERR BABEL: So that 90 percent were therefore used for the exterior
guarding, that is to say, for watching the camp from watch towers and
for escorting the internees on work assignments.
HOESS: Yes.
HERR BABEL: Did you make any observations as to whether there was any
ill-treatment of prisoners to a greater or lesser degree on the part of
those guards, or whether the ill-treatment was mainly to be traced back
to the so-called Kapos?
HOESS: If any ill-treatment of prisoners by guards occurred—I myself
have never observed any—then this was possible only to a very small
degree since all offices in charge of the camps took care that as few SS
men as possible had direct contact with the inmates, because in the
course of the years the guard personnel had deteriorated to such an
extent that the standards formerly demanded could no longer be
maintained.
We had thousands of guards who could hardly speak German, who came from
all lands as volunteers and joined these units, or we had older men,
between 50 and 60, who lacked all interest in their work, so that a camp
commander had to watch constantly that these men fulfilled even the
lowest requirements of their duties. It is obvious that there were
elements among them who would ill-treat internees, but this
ill-treatment was never tolerated.
Besides, it was impossible to have these masses of people directed at
work or when in the camp by SS men only; therefore, inmates had to be
assigned everywhere to direct the other prisoners and set them to work.
The internal administration of the camp was almost completely in their
hands. Of course a great deal of ill-treatment occurred which could not
be avoided because at night there were hardly any members of the SS in
the camps. Only in specific cases were SS men allowed to enter the camp,
so that the internees were more or less exposed to these Kapos.
HERR BABEL: You have already mentioned regulations which existed for the
guards, but there was also a standing order in each camp. In this camp
order certainly punishment was provided for internees who violated the
camp rules. What punishment was provided?
HOESS: First of all, transfer to a penal company (Strafkompanie), that
is to say, harder work and restricted accommodations; next, detention in
the cell block, detention in a dark cell; and in very serious cases,
chaining or strapping. Punishment by strapping was prohibited in the
year 1942 or 1943—I cannot say exactly when—by the Reichsführer. Then
there was the punishment of standing at the camp gate over a rather long
period, and finally corporal punishment.
However, no commander could decree this corporal punishment on his own
authority. He could only apply for it. In the case of men, the decision
came from the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Gruppenführer Schmidt,
and where women were concerned, the Reichsführer reserved the decision
exclusively for himself.
HERR BABEL: It may also be known to you that for members of the SS, too,
there were two penal camps which sometimes were called concentration
camps, namely, Dachau and Danzig-Matzkau.
HOESS: That is right.
HERR BABEL: Were the existing camp regulations and the treatment of
members of the SS who were put in such camps different from the
regulations applying to the other concentration camps?
HOESS: Yes; these two detention camps were not under the Inspectorate
for Concentration Camps, but they were under an SS and Police court. I
myself have neither inspected nor seen these two camps.
HERR BABEL: So that you know nothing about the standing orders relating
to those camps?
HOESS: I know nothing about them.
HERR BABEL: I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. HAENSEL: I have a question that I would like to ask the High
Tribunal. A second defense counsel has been requested for the SS. Is it
permitted that several questions be put for the second defense counsel?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ruled a long time ago that only one counsel
could be heard.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Witness,
you just mentioned that members of the Navy were detailed to guard
concentration camps.
HOESS: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these concentration, camps, or were
they labor camps?
HOESS: They were labor camps.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are labor camps barracks camps of the
armament industries?
HOESS: Yes, if they were not accommodated in the actual factories
themselves.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have been informed that soldiers who were
to be assigned for guard duty at labor camps were given over to the SS.
HOESS: That is only partially correct. A part of these men—I do not
recall the figures—was taken over into the SS. A part was returned to
the original unit, or exchanged. Exchanges were continually taking
place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.
COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal pleases, first I would like to submit, on
behalf of our British Allies, a series of exhibits pertaining to the
Waffen-SS, without reading them. It is merely statistical information
with respect to the number of Waffen-SS guards used at the concentration
camps.
I ask that the witness be shown Documents D-745(a-b), D-746(a-b), D-747,
D-748, D-749(b), and D-750, one of them being a statement of this
witness.
[_The documents were submitted to the witness._]
Witness, you made the statement, D-749(b), which has been handed to you?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you are familiar with the content of the others?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you testify that those figures are true and correct?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Very good. Those will become Exhibit Number USA-810.
Witness, from time to time did any high Nazi officials or functionaries
visit the camp at Mauthausen or Dachau while you were there?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you state the names of such persons to the Tribunal
please?
HOESS: I remember that in 1935 all the Gauleiter inspected Dachau guided
by Reichsführer Himmler. I do not remember them individually.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall any of the ministers having visited either of
those camps while you were there?
HOESS: Do you mean by this the inspection tour of 1935?
COL. AMEN: At any time while you were at either of those concentration
camps.
HOESS: In 1938 Minister Frick was at Sachsenhausen with the
Regierungspräsident.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other ministers who were there at any time?
HOESS: Not at Sachsenhausen, but at Auschwitz, the Minister of Justice.
COL. AMEN: Who was he?
HOESS: Thierack.
COL. AMEN: And who else? Do you recall any others?
HOESS: Yes, but I do not remember the name for the moment.
COL. AMEN: Well, who?
HOESS: I have already stated that in the record, but at the moment I
cannot recall the name.
COL. AMEN: All right. You have testified that many of the execution
orders were signed by Müller. Is that correct?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of those execution orders to which
you testified were signed by...
DR. STEINBAUER: Pardon me, Mr. President, documents have been submitted
and the witness is being questioned about the contents. The Defense is
not in a position to follow the Prosecution because we do not know the
contents of these documents. I request that we receive copies of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t copies of these documents been handed to the
defendants?
COL. AMEN: Yes, so I understood. We have copies here. However, five
German copies have been distributed.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the matter can be looked into.
COL. AMEN: Witness, I was asking you about these execution orders which
you testify were signed by Müller. Do you understand?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of these execution orders which you
testify were signed by Müller were also signed by order of, or as
representative of, the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner?
HOESS: Yes. That was on the copies that I had in the originals.
Afterwards, when I was employed at Oranienburg, it said underneath, “I.
V. Müller”—“in Vertretung Müller” (as representative, Müller).
COL. AMEN: In other words Müller was merely signing as the
representative of the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner? Is that not
correct?
HOESS: I must assume so.
COL. AMEN: And, of course, you know that Müller was a subordinate of the
Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner.
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Witness, you made an affidavit, did you not, at the request
of the Prosecution?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: I ask that the witness be shown Document 3868-PS, which will
become Exhibit USA-819.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
COL. AMEN: You signed that affidavit voluntarily, Witness?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And the affidavit is true in all respects?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: This, if the Tribunal pleases, we have in four languages.
[_Turning to the witness._] Some of the matters covered in this
affidavit you have already told us about in part, so I will omit some
parts of the affidavit. If you will follow along with me as I read,
please. Do you have a copy of the affidavit before you?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: I will omit the first paragraph and start with Paragraph 2:
“I have been constantly associated with the administration of
concentration camps since 1934, serving at Dachau until 1938;
then as Adjutant in Sachsenhausen from 1938 to 1 May 1940, when
I was appointed Commandant of Auschwitz. I commanded Auschwitz
until 1 December 1943, and estimate that at least 2,500,000
victims were executed and exterminated there by gassing and
burning, and at least another half million succumbed to
starvation and disease making a total dead of about 3,000,000.
This figure represents about 70 or 80 percent of all persons
sent to Auschwitz as prisoners, the remainder having been
selected and used for slave labor in the concentration camp
industries; included among the executed and burned were
approximately 20,000 Russian prisoners of war (previously
screened out of prisoner-of-war cages by the Gestapo) who were
delivered at Auschwitz in Wehrmacht transports operated by
regular Wehrmacht officers and men. The remainder of the total
number of victims included about 100,000 German Jews, and great
numbers of citizens, mostly Jewish, from Holland, France,
Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, or other
countries. We executed about 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at
Auschwitz in the summer of 1944.”
That is all true, Witness?
HOESS: Yes, it is.
COL. AMEN: Now I omit the first few lines of Paragraph 3 and start in
the middle of Paragraph 3:
“...prior to establishment of the RSHA, the Secret State Police
Office (Gestapo) and the Reich Office of Criminal Police were
responsible for arrests, commitments to concentration camps,
punishments and executions therein. After organization of the
RSHA all of these functions were carried on as before, but
pursuant to orders signed by Heydrich as Chief of the RSHA.
While Kaltenbrunner was Chief of RSHA orders for protective
custody, commitments, punishment, and individual executions were
signed by Kaltenbrunner or by Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, as
Kaltenbrunner’s deputy.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just for the sake of accuracy, the last date in Paragraph
2, is that 1943 or 1944?
COL. AMEN: 1944, I believe. Is that date correct, Witness, at the close
of Paragraph 2, namely, that the 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at
Auschwitz in the summer of 1944 were executed? Is that 1944 or 1943?
HOESS: 1944. Part of that figure also goes back to 1943; only a part. I
cannot give the exact figure; the end was 1944, autumn of 1944.
COL. AMEN: Right.
“4. Mass executions by gassing commenced during the summer of
1941 and continued until fall 1944. I personally supervised
executions at Auschwitz until first of December 1943 and know by
reason of my continued duties in the Inspectorate of
Concentration Camps, WVHA, that these mass executions continued
as stated above. All mass executions by gassing took place under
the direct order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I
received all orders for carrying out these mass executions
directly from RSHA.”
Are those statements true and correct, Witness?
HOESS: Yes, they are.
COL. AMEN: “5. On 1 December 1943 I became Chief of Amt I in Amt
Group D of the WVHA, and in that office was responsible for
co-ordinating all matters arising between RSHA and concentration
camps under the administration of WVHA. I held this position
until the end of the war. Pohl, as Chief of WVHA, and
Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of RSHA, often conferred personally and
frequently communicated orally and in writing concerning
concentration camps....”
You have already told us about the lengthy report which you took to
Kaltenbrunner in Berlin, so I will omit the remainder of Paragraph 5.
“6. The ‘final solution’ of the Jewish question meant the
complete extermination of all Jews in Europe. I was ordered to
establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At
that time, there were already in the General Government three
other extermination camps: Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek. These
camps were under the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and
SD. I visited Treblinka to find out how they carried out their
exterminations. The camp commandant at Treblinka told me that he
had liquidated 80,000 in the course of one-half year. He was
principally concerned with liquidating all the Jews from the
Warsaw Ghetto. He used monoxide gas, and I did not think that
his methods were very efficient. So when I set up the
extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyklon B, which was
a crystallized prussic acid which we dropped into the death
chamber from a small opening. It took from 3 to 15 minutes to
kill the people in the death chamber, depending upon climatic
conditions. We knew when the people were dead because their
screaming stopped. We usually waited about one-half hour before
we opened the doors and removed the bodies. After the bodies
were removed our special Kommandos took off the rings and
extracted the gold from the teeth of the corpses.”
Is that all true and correct, Witness?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Incidentally, what was done with the gold which was taken
from the teeth of the corpses, do you know?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal?
HOESS: This gold was melted down and brought to the Chief Medical Office
of the SS at Berlin.
COL. AMEN:
“7. Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that we built
our gas chamber to accommodate 2,000 people at one time whereas
at Treblinka their 10 gas chambers only accommodated 200 people
each. The way we selected our victims was as follows: We had two
SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the incoming
transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched by one
of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they walked by.
Those who were fit for work were sent into the camp. Others were
sent immediately to the extermination plants. Children of tender
years were invariably exterminated since by reason of their
youth they were unable to work. Still another improvement we
made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the victims almost
always knew that they were to be exterminated and at Auschwitz
we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking that they were
to go through a delousing process. Of course, frequently they
realized our true intentions and we sometimes had riots and
difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently women would hide
their children under the clothes, but of course when we found
them we would send the children in to be exterminated. We were
required to carry out these exterminations in secrecy but of
course the foul and nauseating stench from the continuous
burning of bodies permeated the entire area and all of the
people living in the surrounding communities knew that
exterminations were going on at Auschwitz.”
Is that all true and correct, Witness?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, I will omit Paragraphs 8 and 9, which have to do with
the medical experiments as to which you have already testified.
“10. Rudolf Mildner was the chief of the Gestapo at Katowice
...from approximately March 1941 until September 1943. As such,
he frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz for incarceration or
execution. He visited Auschwitz on several occasions. The
Gestapo court, the SS Standgericht, which tried persons accused
of various crimes, such as escaping prisoners of war, _et
cetera_, frequently met within Auschwitz, and Mildner often
attended the trial of such persons, who usually were executed in
Auschwitz following their sentence. I showed Mildner through the
extermination plant at Auschwitz and he was directly interested
in it since he had to send the Jews from his territory for
execution at Auschwitz.
“I understand English as it is written above. The above
statements are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily
and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have
signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, Germany, on the fifth
day of April 1946.”
Now I ask you, Witness, is everything which I have read to you true to
your own knowledge?
HOESS: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That concludes my cross-examination, except for one exhibit
that our British allies would like to have in, which is a summary sheet
of the exhibits which I introduced at the commencement of the
cross-examination. That will be Exhibit Number USA-810. It is a summary
of the earlier exhibits that I put in with respect to the Waffen-SS at
the commencement of my cross-examination.
Now, I understand, Your Lordship, that both the Soviet and the French
delegations have one or two questions which they consider peculiar to
their country which they would like to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you will remember that the Tribunal was
assured by Counsel for the Prosecution that, so far as witnesses were
concerned, with the exception of one or two particular defendants, the
Prosecution would have only one cross-examination and now, since that
assurance was given, this is the second instance when the Prosecution
have desired to have more than one cross-examination.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is correct, Mr. President, that the Prosecution did
make that statement; however, the Prosecution reserved the right to do
otherwise on certain occasions when deemed necessary. Since, in this
case, the Prosecution represent four different states, occasions do
arise when each of the prosecutors feels that he has the right to ask
the defendant or witnesses individual questions particularly interesting
to his own country.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you indicate the nature of the questions which the
Soviet Prosecution desire to put? I mean the subjects upon which they
are. I don’t mean the exact questions but the subject.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. Colonel Pokrovsky, who intends to ask
the questions, will report on the subject to the Tribunal.
COL. POKROVSKY: May I report to you, Mr. President, that the questions
of interest to the Soviet Prosecution are those dealing specifically
with the annihilation of millions of Soviet citizens and some details
connected with that annihilation. At the request of the French
Prosecution, and in order to clarify the contents I would also like to
ask two or three questions connected with the documents which in due
course were submitted as Document F-709(a) to the Tribunal by the French
Prosecution. This is really all there is; however, these questions do
have great importance for us.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal, as has just been stated,
made the rule, with the assent of the Prosecutors, that in the case of
the witnesses there should be one cross-examination. There is nothing in
the Charter which expressly gives to the Prosecution the right for each
prosecutor to cross-examine and there is, on the other hand, Article 18
which directs the Tribunal to take strict measures to prevent any action
which will cause unreasonable delay, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal
in the present case, the subject has been fully covered and the Tribunal
therefore think it right to adhere to the rules which they have laid
down in this case. They will therefore not hear any further
cross-examination.
Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Kauffmann?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I will be very brief.
Witness, in the affidavit which was just read, you said under Point 2
that “at least an additional half million died through starvation and
disease.” I ask you, when did this take place? Was it towards the end of
the war or was this fact observed by you already at an earlier period?
HOESS: No, it all goes back to the last years of the war, that is
beginning with the end of 1942.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 3—do you still have the affidavit before
you?
HOESS: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask that it be given to the witness again?
[_The document was returned to the witness._]
Under Point 3, at the end you state that orders for protective custody,
commitments, punishments, and special executions were signed by
Kaltenbrunner or Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner’s
deputy. Thus, do you wish to contradict what you stated previously?
HOESS: No, this only completes what I said over and again. I read only a
few decrees signed by Kaltenbrunner; most of them were signed by Müller.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 4, at the end, you state:
“All mass executions through gassing took place under the direct
order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all
orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from
RSHA.”
According to the statements which you previously made to the Tribunal,
this entire action came to you directly from Himmler through Eichmann,
who had been personally delegated. Do you maintain that now as before?
HOESS: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: With this last sentence under Point 4, do you wish to
contradict what you testified before?
HOESS: No. I always mean regarding mass executions, Obersturmbannführer
Eichmann in connection with the RSHA.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 7, at the end, you state—I am not going to
read it—you were saying that even though exterminations took place
secretly, the population in the surrounding area noticed something of
the extermination of people. Did not, at an earlier period of time—that
is, before the beginning of this special extermination action—something
of this nature take place to remove people who had died in a normal
manner in Auschwitz?
HOESS: Yes, when the crematoria had not yet been built we burned in
large pits a large part of those who had died and who could not be
cremated in the provisional crematoria of the camp; a large number—I do
not recall the figure anymore—were placed in mass graves and later also
cremated in these graves. That was before the mass executions of Jews
began.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you agree with me if I were to say that from the
described facts alone, one could not conclusively prove that this was
concerned with the extermination of Jews?
HOESS: No, this could in no way be concluded from that. The
population...
THE PRESIDENT: What was your question about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: My question was whether one could assume from the
established facts—at the end of Paragraph 7—that this concerned the
so-called extermination of Jews. I tied this question to the previous
answer of the witness. It is my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence of Paragraph 7 is with reference to the
foul and nauseating stench. What is your question about that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether the population could gather from these things
that an extermination of Jews was taking place.
THE PRESIDENT: That really is too obvious a question, isn’t it? They
could not possibly know who it was being exterminated.
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough for me. I have no further questions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I ask the Tribunal’s permission to ask a few
supplementary questions, for during cross-examination the witness stated
that the Defendant Frick had visited the concentration camps
Sachsenhausen and Oranienburg in 1938.
Witness, when an inspection of the concentration camp of Oranienburg
took place at that time, 1937-38, was there any evidence at all of
atrocities?
HOESS: No.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Why not?
HOESS: Because there was no question of atrocities at that time.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that at that period of time the
concentration camp at Oranienburg was still a model of order and that
agricultural labor was the main occupation?
HOESS: Yes, that is right. However, work was mainly done in workshops,
in wood-finishing workshops.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you give me any details as to what was shown at
that time at such an official visit?
HOESS: Yes. The visiting party was shown through the prisoners’ camp
proper, inspected the quarters, the kitchen, the hospital, and then all
the administrative buildings; above all the workshops, where the inmates
were employed.
DR. PANNENBECKER: At that time were the quarters and the hospitals
already overcrowded?
HOESS: No, at that time they were normally filled.
DR. PANNENBECKER: How did these quarters look?
HOESS: At that period of time, living quarters looked the same as the
barracks of a training ground. The internees still had bed-clothing and
all necessary hygienic facilities. Everything was yet in the best of
order.
DR. PANNENBECKER: That is all. I have no further questions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States):
Witness, what was the greatest number of labor camps existing at any one
time?
HOESS: I cannot give the exact figure but in my estimation there were
approximately 900.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the population of these 900?
HOESS: I am not able to say that either; the population varied. There
were camps with 100 internees and camps with 10,000 internees.
Therefore, I cannot give any figure of the total number of people who
were in these labor camps.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Under whose administration were the labor
camps—under what offices?
HOESS: These labor camps, as far as the guarding, direction, and
clothing were concerned, were under the control of the Economic and
Administration Main Office. All matters dealing with labor output and
the supplying of food were attended to by the armament industries which
employed these internees.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And at the end of the war were the conditions
in those labor camps similar to those existing in the concentration
camps as you described them before?
HOESS: Yes. Since there no longer was any possibility of bringing ill
internees to the main camps, there was much overcrowding in these labor
camps and the death rate very high.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
Dr. Kauffmann, does that close your case?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I wish to call another witness with the
permission of the Court, the witness Neubacher.