THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL
The ships which had received damage in the Jutland Battle had to
be repaired without delay. The great majority of the repairs were
completed during June or by the first week in July, and, whilst under
repair, the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations
which experience gained in the action had shown to be desirable.
The _Marlborough_ was the only large ship whose repairs occupied
any considerable length of time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in
August, although the work upon her was handicapped to some extent by
being carried out in a floating dock moored in a somewhat inconvenient
position. The light cruiser _Chester_ was also detained at Hull until
July 29th, as her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a
great many alterations were carried out. The principal points affecting
_matériel_ to which attention was directed were:
(_a_) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent the flash of
cordite charges, ignited by the explosion of a shell in a turret
or in positions between the turret and the magazine, being
communicated to the magazine itself. It was probable that the loss
of one, if not two, of our battle cruisers was due to this cause,
after the armour had been pierced.
(_b_) Better measures were required to prevent the charges of small
guns from being ignited by bursting shell, and to localise any
fires due to this cause, in the case of guns of the secondary
battery in large ships, and the main armament in small ships.
(_c_) Increased deck armour protection in large ships had been shown
to be desirable in order that shell or fragments of shell might not
reach the magazines. This need was particularly felt in all our
earlier ships of the Dreadnought type, since their side armour was
not carried to the upper deck level. The long range at which most
modern sea actions are fought, and the consequent large angle of
descent of the projectiles made our ships very vulnerable in this
respect.
(_d_) The pressing need for a better armour-piercing projectile with
an improved fuze was also revealed.
(_e_) Improved arrangements for flooding magazines and drenching
exposed cartridges had to be made.
Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet to deal with all
questions of this nature, as well as the important matter of possible
developments in the fire-control system with a view to improving the
methods of correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled”
with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great gunnery
knowledge and experience of Captain F. C. Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were
of immense assistance, and he was most ably seconded by the numerous
highly skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers and
in the ships of the fleet.
The action taken in connection with these matters was prompt, with
the gratifying result that before I relinquished the command of the
Fleet, the great majority of the heavy ships had been provided with
additional deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings
for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work was carried out
while the ships were at their usual notice for steam, much of it being
actually done at Scapa Flow by the dockyard artificers berthed there on
board the _Victorious_: the work carried out by these artificers and by
the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with most commendable
rapidity.
Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty, as First Sea Lord,
and under the immediate direction of Captain Dreyer, then Director of
Naval Ordnance, a new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new
type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for guns of 12-inch
calibre and above, which certainly doubled their offensive power.
The investigation into the possibility of further development in
fire-correction methods, a subject to which constant attention had been
given throughout the War, was at first carried out by two independent
committees. Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee,
composed of the most experienced and most successful gunnery officers
in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as the result, drawn up and
passed for adoption in the Fleet; these had already produced a most
convincing and most satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of
fire before I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no exaggeration
to say that the average time taken to find the gun range of the enemy
with these new methods was about one half of that previously required.
Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders. The majority
had been installed in the Fleet before the great increases in the
range of opening effective fire had come about, as the result of
experience during the War. Our most modern ships at Jutland were
provided with range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of
the ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet long.
During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply range-finders up to
25 and 30 feet in length; a series of experiments with stereoscopic
range-finders was also instituted in the same year. It had become known
that the Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be stated,
in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that the developments
introduced in the fire-control arrangements of the Grand Fleet after
the Battle of Jutland did not affect the _instruments_ already in use,
which fully met our requirements, but the _methods_ of using those
instruments and particularly the system of correction of fire.
On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and Cruiser Squadrons were
re-organised as follows:--
BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON
_Lion_ (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet).
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
_Princess Royal_ (Flag), _New Zealand_, _Tiger_.
_2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
_Australia_ (Flag), _Indomitable_, _Inflexible_.
CRUISER SQUADRONS
_2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
_Minotaur_ (Flag), _Duke of Edinburgh_, _Cochrane_, _Shannon_,
_Achilles_, _Donegal_.
_3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
_Antrim_, _Roxburgh_, _Devonshire_.
On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived at Scapa _en route_
to Archangel. In the morning he crossed from Thurso in the _Oak_, and
came on board the _Iron Duke_ on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me,
and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him. Before lunch
we went round the ship. The officers and men naturally greeted him
with much respect, and he can have had no doubt of the admiration in
which he was held. During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming
trip, and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it as a
real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he confessed, had been
very great, adding that he had felt that he could not have gone on
without this break, which he welcomed very much. He was not, however,
very sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He mentioned the
difficulty which he experienced in dealing with questions discussed
in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by most soldiers and sailors, whose
training does not fit them to state or to argue a case, and who
frequently find great difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule,
accustomed to carry out their ideas without having first to bring
conviction to the minds of men who, although possessing great general
knowledge and administrative experience, have naturally but little
acquaintance with naval and military affairs which in themselves form a
lifelong study.
After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland action, and Lord
Kitchener evinced much interest in the tactics and the general story of
the action.
Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the idea that he was working
to a time-table, and that he felt that he had not a day to lose. He
mentioned three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed
astonishment at the programme which he had planned to carry out in the
restricted period. He was most anxious not to lose a moment on the sea
trip and asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest time
in which the passage could be made.
During the day the weather at Scapa, which had been bad in the
morning, gradually became worse, and by the afternoon it was blowing
a gale from the north-eastward. It had been originally intended that
the _Hampshire_ should take the route which passed up the eastern
side of the Orkneys, following the channel ordinarily searched by
mine-sweeping vessels as a routine measure; but as the north-easterly
gale was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweeping was out of
the question, and it was also obvious that the escorting destroyers
could not face the sea at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which
route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest, and finally
decided that the _Hampshire_ should pass close in shore, and not take
the alternative route passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry
Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this decision were:--
(_a_) With a north-easterly wind there would be less sea and,
therefore, more chance of the destroyers being able to keep up with
the _Hampshire_.
(_b_) It was practically impossible that this route could have
been mined by any surface mine-layer owing to the dark period in
Northern latitudes being confined to a couple of hours, during
which no ship could expect to approach the shore for mine-laying
without having first been sighted.
(_c_) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries, and was,
therefore, under frequent observation.
At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines had been confined
to water well to the southward of the Firth of Forth, presumably
because of their small radius of action. Danger from this source was,
therefore, considered to be very remote.
Finally the weather itself was a protection against submarine attack
which was at that time more to be feared than the danger from submarine
laid mines. Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not been
practicable for three or four days owing to the weather conditions.
At about 4 P.M. Lord Kitchener proceeded on board the _Hampshire_,
accompanied by his Staff comprising Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F.
Donaldson, Colonel FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr.
Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-Lieutenant McPherson,
Cameron Highlanders. The _Hampshire_ sailed at 5.30 P.M. escorted by
two destroyers. Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16
knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers back if
they could not maintain the _Hampshire’s_ speed. Experience had proved
that high speed was a valuable protection against submarines.
At about 7 P.M. Captain Savill, commanding the _Hampshire_, ordered the
two destroyers back to Scapa, as they were unable to face the heavy
seas at the speed of the _Hampshire_. Between 7.30 and 7.45 P.M. the
_Hampshire_ struck a mine about 1½ miles off shore, between the Brough
of Birsay and Marwick Head; she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The
incident was witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone message
was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands that the
cruiser was in difficulties. He at once ordered out patrol vessels and
informed me, with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene
immediately.
The evidence of the few survivors of the _Hampshire_ showed that Lord
Kitchener was below when the ship was mined, and that an officer
escorted him on deck. Captain Savill was heard to give directions from
the bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and his Staff,
and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently on deck, but was not seen
after the ship sank. The weather conditions prevented any boats being
hoisted out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the ship
sank.
The scene of the disaster was searched during the night by destroyers
and patrol craft, but the only survivors were twelve men who drifted
ashore on a Carley raft, although many bodies were picked up by the
searching vessels, and many drifted ashore.
The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.
At the time of the disaster the _Hampshire_ was steaming at 13½ knots,
the wind being north-north-west, with a force of 50 miles an hour.
The cold water and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest
swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which was north-east at 4
P.M. at Scapa, had become north-north-west by the time the _Hampshire_
was outside, and there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the
Orkneys, as had been anticipated.
The hours that passed after the receipt of the report of the
_Hampshire_ being in difficulties were most anxious ones. In spite
of the fact that the destroyers had been sent back, it seemed almost
incredible that the wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as
was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow were not so bad
as to indicate so extremely heavy a sea off the Brough of Birsay; and
even when it was reported that the _Hampshire_ had sunk (a report which
took some time to come through), there was hope that, at any rate, Lord
Kitchener and his mission would be saved by boat. As the hours passed
and no news was received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety
became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the certainty that
this great man, who had served his country so faithfully and well in
its greatest emergency, had met his death when under the care of the
Navy, the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord Kitchener had
inspired the Service with confidence and trust. The Navy had frequently
worked under him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been one of
the outstanding figures in the European War on the side of the Entente.
Everyone in the Grand Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had
fallen upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the feelings
of the Fleet generally were intensified in me, on whom lay the main
responsibility for his safe passage to Archangel, so far as such safety
could be ensured.
I have often wondered since that fatal day whether anything could have
been done that was not done, but short of postponing the departure of
the _Hampshire_ altogether, until weather conditions admitted of a
channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could have been done. Such a
decision would have resulted in two or three days’ delay in starting,
and would never have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover,
with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy mine-laying
possibilities, I did not consider the delay necessary as I should
not have hesitated, if need had arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to
sea on the same night and by the same route as that traversed by the
_Hampshire_.
My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming. There was, at first,
doubt in the minds of some people as to whether the loss of the
_Hampshire_ was due to a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were
set at rest by the sweeping operations which were undertaken as soon as
the weather admitted. They resulted in the discovery of moored mines of
the type laid in southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines being
easily distinguishable from those laid by surface vessels.
During the month of June cruisers were kept constantly patrolling the
route to Archangel to protect shipping against possible enemy raiders,
as the traffic was very heavy at this period. The _Donegal_, _Antrim_,
_Devonshire_ and _Roxburgh_ were the vessels employed. They visited the
Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Stadlandet, _en route_ to and from
patrol, with a view to intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick.
The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla were employed in watching
the waters in the Kattegat and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the
Norwegian coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft. A
regular submarine patrol was also begun off the Horn Reef, and was
continued up to the time of my relinquishing command of the Fleet. At
first two, and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol,
which was of great utility in giving information of the movements of
the few enemy surface vessels that ever ventured so far from their
base, and also proved of use for attacking enemy submarines. At
the commencement, the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and
look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with that of the German
submarines, by reason of their bad wireless equipment, which admitted
of a range of some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were attached
to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly the absolute necessity of
effecting an improvement in this particular, stating that I was quite
prepared to sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this be
necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install efficient wireless
apparatus in the only class of vessel that could carry out a watching
patrol in the vicinity of German bases. Eventually arrangements were
made to provide them with a wireless installation which gave a range of
300 to 400 miles.
When our submarines had been equipped in this way we were at once
able to establish an efficient chain of outposts off the Horn
Reef by the Grand Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the
northward the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the result that
in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult for the enemy to put
to sea unobserved and unreported. The comparative inefficiency of the
wireless installation in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our
destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had to face during
the first two years of War. It should be added that while patrolling
in the Kattegat, submarine G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside
territorial waters, the German steamship _Ems_, on passage from
Christiania to Lübeck with oil, zinc and copper. The crew were rescued.
The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the month, other than
the usual patrols, were as follows:--
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth on the
14th for the Naze, thence steered up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and
returned to Rosyth.
The _Comus_ and _Constance_ left Scapa on the 25th, swept down the
Norwegian coast and returned on the 27th.
The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers carried out a similar
sweep from Rosyth between the 29th June and July 1st.
On June 22nd the first mines from a British submarine mine-layer were
laid by E 41 in the German Bight.
His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with a visit on the
14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in the _Oak_, at 5 P.M., being
escorted by the destroyers of the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round
the Fleet in the _Oak_, His Majesty proceeded on board the _Iron Duke_,
where he spent the night. On the following day the King visited all
the flagships, on board of which a large percentage of officers and
men from the various squadrons were assembled, and left for Thurso in
the _Oak_ at 5 P.M., proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth,
honouring the squadrons at each of these bases with a visit.
His Majesty addressed a representative gathering of officers and men
from the ships at Scapa, who had been assembled on board the _Iron
Duke_ on the morning of the 15th in the following terms:--
“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand Fleet, you have
waited for nearly two years with most exemplary patience for the
opportunity of meeting and engaging the enemy’s fleet.
“I can well understand how trying has been this period, and how great
must have been the relief when you knew on May 31st that the enemy had
been sighted.
“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching darkness prevented
that complete result which you all expected, but you did all that was
possible in the circumstances. You drove the enemy into his harbours,
and inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet another page
to the glorious traditions of the British Navy.
“You could not do more, and for your splendid work I thank you.”
The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during June,
gave as the figures:--
No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No. sent in, 20; No. on
patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to a given patrol, 8; No.
on special service, 1.
A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during the
month--especially in the latter half--and this interfered somewhat with
the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. A very dense fog prevailed in
the Pentland Firth on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally
from the northward, were prevalent during the first portion of the
month, and a northerly gale occurred on the 5th.
No large Fleet movements took place during June, as it was known that
the greater part of the High Sea Fleet was under repair as the result
of the Jutland action.
During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only engaged in one cruise,
namely, from the 17th to the 20th. The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle
Squadrons, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
the _Campania_, with sea-planes, and destroyer flotillas left Scapa
between noon and 1.30 P.M. on the 17th, and proceeded to the northward
and eastward of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of carrying
out a series of battle exercises on the 18th and 19th; they were based
on the experience gained of enemy tactics during the Jutland action.
Some of the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise,
and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during the forenoon of
the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships approached the Pentland Firth,
making entry somewhat difficult.
Cruiser movements during the month comprised:--
(_a_) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by Grand Fleet Cruisers
to protect trade against raiders.
(_b_) The establishment on the 7th of a regular patrol of two
cruisers and two destroyers in an area well to the northward of the
Shetlands, this patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and
armed boarding-steamer which had been previously placed there.
(_c_) Extensive dispositions were made on the 9th to intercept a
German raider reported from neutral quarters, as about to leave
for the Atlantic. These dispositions included a close patrol by
two light cruiser squadrons and eight destroyers from Rosyth of an
area 80 to 100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which it was
expected the enemy would pass; a further patrol by the 4th Light
Cruiser Squadron and six destroyers was established farther north
to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; two cruisers
were ordered to patrol north of the Shetlands, local patrol
vessels being between these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half
flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island Channel.[S]
(_d_) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left Rosyth on the 12th
and swept up the Norwegian coast and back, returning on the 15th.
(_e_) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six destroyers repeated
the sweep, returning on the 20th.
(_f_) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth
and swept to the southward in the direction of the Horn Reef from a
position near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having sighted
anything.
(_g_) Two light cruisers and four destroyers repeated the sweep of
the Norwegian coast on the 24th.
(_h_) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left
Rosyth on the 26th, and proceeded to a position to the westward of
the Little Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to the Naze
on the look out for enemy raiders or Zeppelins, reports having
been received of the frequent presence of Zeppelins on this line;
the force turned to the northward from the Naze and swept along
the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceeding thence to Scapa. The
sweep was again uneventful.
[S] The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy
vessels being sighted; the report was probably incorrect.
The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla were active during
the month in the Kattegat and patrolling off the Horn Reef. They
reported on the 20th that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft
were visible.
The attacks by enemy submarines on warships reported during the month
were:
The mine-sweeping sloop _Rosemary_ of the Southern Force was torpedoed
on the 4th, but was towed into the Humber.
The light cruiser _Galatea_ was missed by a torpedo on the 12th, in
Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E.
The armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Cornwall_ was missed by two
torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged in boarding a ship south-east of
the Pentland Skerries.
The light cruiser _Yarmouth_ was missed by a torpedo on the 26th.
Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were sunk by the gunfire
of four enemy submarines, on the 11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11
E., their guns being entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which
the submarines are armed. This combined attack on the trawlers of the
Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the regrettable loss of the
three trawlers, was a great and well deserved tribute paid by the enemy
to the work of that patrol which had been uniformly successful, and had
proved a great annoyance to the German submarines.
Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy submarines on the 7th,
to the eastward of the Pentland Firth; on the 12th, two divisions
of destroyers were sent from Scapa to attack the submarine that had
fired at the _Duke of Cornwall_, the _Musketeer_ dropping a depth
charge close to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought
considerably damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-planes from
Scapa were sent after a submarine reported by the armed boarding
steamer _Dundee_ as sighted 10 miles east-south-east of the Pentland
Skerries, but she was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of
destroyers again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity, but
failed to do so.
Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered by the sweeping
trawlers in the southern channel in the Moray Firth on the 26th, and
were swept up by trawlers and fleet sweepers before any damage was done.
The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed:
No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No. sent in, 23; No. on
patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 10;
No. on special service, 0.
The armed merchant-steamer _Arlanza_, after temporary repairs at
Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July for refit.
The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist being experienced
at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd,
24th and 25th.
During the month of August the principal cruiser movements, apart from
those in connection with the Battle Fleet, were as follows:
(_a_) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an area well
to the northward of the Shetlands was continued.
(_b_) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-patrol seaward of the
Fleet bases was maintained.
(_c_) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route was continued.
(_d_) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as follows:
On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a
sweep down the Norwegian coast, returning on the 3rd, having sighted
nothing of interest; on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers
from Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30 N., Long.
5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th, without result. On the
12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Scapa
and proceeded towards Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of 10
British merchant-ships which had been brought out of the Baltic. These
vessels were escorted across the North Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy
arrived safely on the 14th.
On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers _Dundee_ and
_King Orry_, which had been disguised as merchant-ships, left Scapa
for operations off the Norwegian coast. It was hoped that they would
be able to close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband without
exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better chance of
capturing them than any vessel having the appearance of a warship. The
_Dundee_ operated between Udsire and Lister, and the _King Orry_ off
Stadlandet, both being localities in which ships were in the habit
of leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser _Constance_ and two
destroyers were sent to support the _Dundee_, keeping well to seaward
of her, as that ship was operating in waters in which enemy warships
might be found. The operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying
a cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being sent in.
On the 30th the _Abdiel_ left Scapa to lay mines in the vicinity of
the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation successfully, and without
being observed, on the night of the 31st–1st.
The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kattegat and in the
vicinity of the Horn Reef continued. The submarines, returning on the
17th, reported having been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the
Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to operate against this
vessel, but met with no success.
Casualties to war-vessels during the month included: The light cruiser
_Cleopatra_, of the Harwich force, which was mined on the 4th near
the Thornton Ridge off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be
repaired; the destroyer _Lassoo_, also of the Harwich force, was sunk
by mine or submarine near the Maas Lightship off the Dutch coast on
the 13th; the armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Albany_ was sunk by
a submarine on the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland
Skerries, with considerable loss of life, including Commander G. N.
Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-planes, and an airship were
sent out from Scapa at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of
her, although the armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Clarence_ which had
stood by the _Duke of Albany_ and rescued the survivors reported that
she had passed over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser
_Blonde_ went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland Firth, in thick
weather on the 10th, but was lightened and towed off on the 11th,
having sustained considerable injuries; the battleships _Warspite_ and
_Valiant_ collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the 24th, whilst,
respectively, returning from and proceeding to the night firing area,
both ships being considerably damaged, with the result that they had to
be docked.
On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by an enemy submarine,
and the departure of the _Marlborough_ from the Tyne was thereby
delayed; the coincidence that mines were frequently laid in this
neighbourhood when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs,
led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that locality. On
the 4th or 5th August a considerable number of mines of the submarine
type were also laid in the War channel in the White Sea by enemy
vessels.
On August 3rd four “C” class submarines left the Nore in tow of tugs
for Archangel, _en route_ by the canal system for service in the
Baltic. These submarines performed very useful work in those waters
during the year 1917.
The increase in mine-laying by German submarines gave rise to anxiety
that the movements of the Grand Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields
near the bases at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new
mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was strengthened
during July by withdrawing a certain number of trawlers from patrol
duty in order to form a mine-sweeping flotilla; during the latter
half of 1916 the Grand Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty
comprised two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as well as two
flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in addition one flotilla of
paddle mine-sweepers was based on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These
flotillas were all additional to the small local sweeping force of
trawlers at the various fleet bases.
On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for a sweep in southern
waters. The presence of an unusually large number of submarines in the
North Sea--a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before the
Jutland Battle--had suggested the possibility of movement on the part
of the enemy and a sweep appeared desirable. The _Iron Duke_, after
leaving Scapa Flow, proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle
Fleet screened by two destroyers to communicate with the _Royalist_,
and at 7.55 P.M., as the ships were about to communicate, a submarine
on the starboard bow, about 250 yards off, fired a torpedo, which
passed close astern of the screening destroyer _Onslaught_ on that
bow. Only one torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the
attack, and did not get into the position intended for attacking the
_Iron Duke_, which was proceeding at high speed, and zigzagging, and,
therefore, fired at the _Onslaught_ instead. Communication between the
_Iron Duke_ and _Royalist_ was deferred until after dark in consequence
of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal.
The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid the submarine, and
passed her without further incident, and the Battle Fleet and cruisers
concentrated at daylight on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long
Forties,” steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 knots.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a position 30 miles
ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 A.M. on the 19th the _Nottingham_,
one of the light cruiser screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst
zigzagging at 20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34
N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the torpedoes struck
the port side almost simultaneously. The first report indicated that
she had been hit by mines _or_ torpedoes, and, until it was clear that
a mine-field did not exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this
locality, and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascertained
that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this became clear the
southward course of the Fleet was shaped to pass to the eastward of the
submarine. Meanwhile the _Dublin_ cruised at high speed in the vicinity
of the _Nottingham_ for the purpose of keeping the submarine down
so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26 A.M. the _Nottingham_
was hit by a third torpedo, and it became evident that she could not
float much longer. Her boats were lowered, and the majority of the
ship’s company placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 A.M., just as the
destroyers _Penn_ and _Oracle_, which had been sent to her assistance,
arrived on the scene. These two destroyers picked up all the survivors,
except Captain Miller, one officer, and several men who remained on
board until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter from the
_Dublin_. Several torpedoes were fired at the _Dublin_ and the two
destroyers during their work of rescue, but all fortunately missed.
From 8.24 A.M. onwards Zeppelins were frequently in sight from both
the Battle Fleet, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at,
but they kept at too long a range for our fire to be effective. The
_Galatea_ sighted the first airship at 8.24 A.M., and the second was
seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 A.M.; at 10 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt,
who was at sea with the Harwich force, reported himself in position
Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E., and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He
stated later that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole
period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received from the
patrol trawler _Ramexo_ that she had two Zeppelins in sight in Lat. 57
N., Long. 1 E. It was evident that a very large force of airships was
out. A total of at least ten was identified by our directional wireless
stations and they appeared to stretch right across the North Sea.
At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine E 23, on patrol
in the Heligoland Bight, that she had sighted ships of the High Sea
Fleet steering west at 9.19 A.M.; the position as received in the
signal appeared incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20
N., Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional
wireless stations also led me to consider that a ship of the High Sea
Fleet was in the position named at 5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 A.M.
On the return of E 23 to Harwich, her captain reported that he had
attacked the battle cruiser _Derfflinger_ unsuccessfully at 3.13 A.M.
on the 20th. At 5 A.M., in spite of the strong enemy destroyer screen,
he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship of the first Battle
Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau” type. This ship turned for home on
being torpedoed, and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but
at 7.20 A.M. E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, and the captain
of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was sunk. Subsequent information,
however, showed that she reached port in a damaged condition; the
persistent action of the captain of E 23 in the face of great
opposition, was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our
submarine service.
On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our directional wireless
stations, speed was increased, and course shaped to a position at
which it was hoped the High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective
of that fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in the
neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention was to make for a
position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 E., where the Fleet would be
favourably placed either to engage the enemy before he closed the coast
or to cut him off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience
of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his objective
the bombardment would be carried out either shortly before dusk, or
at daylight, in order to facilitate escape afterwards, or approach
before, unobserved. In the possible alternative of the movement being
designed to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably placed
to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle Fleet was in position
Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering south-south-east. Submarines
were sighted by the cruiser _Minotaur_ at 1.23 P.M., and by the light
cruiser _Boadicea_ at 1.38 P.M.; both these ships were in the vicinity
of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary to avoid the
submarines; this caused some slight delay in the southward movement.
The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea in readiness to
meet the Fleet, if required, and during the forenoon of the 19th, was
directed to spread on a line running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0,
where the submarines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a
position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed towards our
coast north of Flamborough Head; in such an event the enemy would be
between the Fleet and the submarines.
The _Active_, with nine destroyers of the newly formed 4th Flotilla
in the Humber, which was also at sea, was directed to join the Battle
Fleet.
At 1.45 P.M. I received information by wireless that directional
wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 P.M. in a position
approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. 1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45
P.M. was in Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet
was well ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the same course
after 12.30 P.M. as it had steered between 5.30 A.M. and 12.30 P.M.,
which would take them to Hartlepool, it was evident that it might
be sighted at any moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance
between the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal was
therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High Sea Fleet might be
encountered at any moment. The meeting appeared to be so certain that
I arranged the distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the
assumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on meeting us,
I directed a concentration of fire of ships that would be ahead of
the _Iron Duke_ on deployment, of two ships on one, leaving the _Iron
Duke_ to deal with one ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate
firing at Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to us. The
weather was clear. There seemed to be a very good prospect that we
might, on gaining touch with the enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was
in a position to cut off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was
probable that we should be to the eastward, although farther north.
Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy elect to make
for our coast and try to escape to the northward, where he would have
found himself between the Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time
passed, however, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came in
from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High Sea Fleet had
turned back, probably owing to the fact that the Zeppelins had warned
the German Commander-in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this
assumption, at 2.35 P.M. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to steer for a
position to the north-westward of Terschelling, so that he might be
ready to deliver a night attack on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich
force.
It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would leave a trap behind
him in the shape of mines or submarines, or both; and, indeed, the
numerous submarines already sighted made it probable that the trap was
extensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters which he had
occupied unless there was a prospect of bringing the High Sea Fleet to
action.
It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight by 4 P.M., and if
he had turned for home, it would be impossible to bring him to action;
I therefore passed a visual signal out at 3.5 P.M. to Sir David Beatty
to the effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was in
sight by 4 P.M.
At 3.20 P.M., however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 3rd Light
Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine in sight, and I signalled to Sir
David Beatty to turn at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to
the submarines was correct.
At 3.40 P.M. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and the cruisers ahead
to turn. At this time I received information from our directional
wireless stations that enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0
E., at 2.45 P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning to
his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore turned the Battle
Fleet at 3.56 P.M., when in Lat. 54.40 N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the
course to pass up the searched channel so as to avoid mines.
At 4.52 P.M. the _Falmouth_ of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in Lat.
54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by two torpedoes, one right forward,
and one right aft. The ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the
time, and the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the
torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard bow after
she had been hit. The _Chester_, stationed astern of the _Falmouth_,
proceeded at full speed to zigzag in the vicinity with the object of
keeping the submarine submerged and preventing further attack. Another
torpedo was fired at the _Falmouth_ at 5.14 P.M., but missed.
At 5.20 P.M. the destroyers _Pasley_, _Pelican_, and _Negro_, detached
to assist the _Falmouth_, arrived on the scene and the _Falmouth_,
under their escort, proceeded towards the coast under her own steam,
the _Chester_ then leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward.
At 6.55 P.M. the _Pelican_ sighted a periscope, tried to ram the
submarine, but missed. She then dropped six depth charges and reported
that the submarine came to the surface almost immediately, and then
appeared to sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled, and
four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen the _Falmouth_,
which was proceeding at five knots. The ship eventually reached the
vicinity of Flamborough Head safely, and was there again hit by two
more torpedoes fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat, and
was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine destroyers until 8 P.M. on
the 20th, when she sank in Lat. 54 N., Long. 0.2 W.
At 2.30 P.M. on the 20th, the destroyer _Porpoise_ reported having
rammed a submarine that had attacked the _Falmouth_.
To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th. From 3.10 P.M.
onwards frequent reports were received of submarines being sighted. The
_Phaeton_, _Dublin_ (twice), and _Southampton_ all reported submarines
in sight between 3.10 and 4.52 P.M., the time at which the _Falmouth_
was torpedoed. At 6 P.M. Sir David Beatty reported that there was a
German submarine screen of several boats extending north-east for
some 25 miles from Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 P.M. Commodore
Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s force of heavy ships
steering east, accompanied by two Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving
the position of the Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved
to be unfavourable, and at 7.30 P.M. the Commodore reported that he had
abandoned the pursuit; he returned with his force to Harwich. At 6.20
P.M. reports received from our directional stations showed that enemy
ships were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 P.M., giving clear
evidence that the enemy was returning to his base.
During the passage up the searched channel a number of submarines
were sighted and frequent, and in some cases, large alterations of
course were necessary to avoid them; if all the reports were correct,
the locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines. Reports
of submarines being seen were received between 4 P.M. and dark,
from the _Galatea_, _Phaeton_, _Bellona_, _Dublin_, _Southampton_,
_Lion_, _Royal Sovereign_ (two submarines), _Queen Elizabeth_, and
_Inflexible_, the last ship reporting that two torpedoes had been fired
at her at 7.50 P.M., and that both had passed close astern; at this
time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in company.
Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by the _Chatham_,
_Galatea_, and _Lion_, and the trawlers _Sea Ranger_ and _Ramexo_; the
last-named reported having sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and
having scored two hits and caused a fire in the forward car.
During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was detached to Rosyth,
and the Battle Fleet continued to the northward. Reports of submarines
being sighted to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at
5 A.M. and 3.30 P.M. on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was therefore
taken well to the northward to avoid them, and approached the Pentland
Firth from a north-easterly direction, arriving without incident
between 6.30 and 8 P.M.
The experience of August 19th showed that light cruisers, proceeding
at even the highest speed unscreened by destroyers, ran considerable
danger from enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders were no
doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks, which we could afford to run
earlier in the War, were now unjustifiable. Representations were made
to the Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in future
light cruisers should be screened by at least one destroyer per ship;
the number of destroyers available for the Grand Fleet did not at the
time admit of this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number
intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached, destroyers
could be allotted to most of the light cruisers in the advanced line,
provided there were not many absent from the Fleet carrying out
extraneous services.
The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the Fleet
had been demonstrated on the 19th of August; what had constantly
puzzled me was that this had not been done very frequently at an
earlier stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted
and with some success, there seemed to be every reason to expect a
repetition of the operation, and it was clear that it was unwise to
take the Fleet far into southern waters unless an adequate destroyer
force was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. If the
circumstances were exceptional and the need very pressing, it would be
necessary to accept the risk. There was general agreement on this point
between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the Admiralty.
During the month of August the weekly average of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron showed:
No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112; No. sent in, 35; No.
on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrols,
10; No. on special service, 0.
The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was foggy and misty
during a great part of the month. Much mist or fog was experienced from
the 1st to the 6th, the 10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th.
During the month Grand Fleet submarines were exercised at Scapa Flow in
carrying out attacks on ships under way, and the destroyer flotillas
were similarly practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet
divisions being exercised in countering such attacks by turning
movements. These exercises were continued for the remainder of the
year, and much experience was obtained from them as to the different
methods of dealing with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet
action.