REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
There has been some discussion on the tactics of the Jutland Battle,
and no doubt there will be more. I have endeavoured to give the facts,
so that future discussions may take place with adequate knowledge.
It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have seen
expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with the object of enticing
the enemy out to attack the weaker portion in order to provide the
opportunity for a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May
31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the southward of the
Battle Fleet in pursuance of the policy which had been frequently
carried out on previous occasions.
Many surmises have been made as to the object with which the High Sea
Fleet put to sea on this occasion. The view which I have always held
is that the frequent light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down
the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the Skagerrak during the
spring of 1916, may have induced the German Commander-in-Chief to send
out a force with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged
in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle Fleet to sea
in support of this force. There is no doubt that he did not expect to
meet the whole Grand Fleet. If confirmation of this were needed it is
supplied in the German account of the battle, in which it is stated
that “there was no reason for supposing that any enemy forces were
about, much less the entire British Fleet.”
Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of the whole
strategy and tactics of the War, leads naturally to the fresh problems
which the advent of new weapons had introduced. When I took command
of the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that of how to counter a
destroyer attack in a day action. It had excited more attention in the
two or three years before the War than any other question of tactics,
much attention was devoted to it during the War, and for that reason it
is desirable to discuss it fully.
It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what were then
known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions between Battle Fleets as
an exercise), that destroyer attacks were actually carried out in the
British Navy on a large scale.
During that year manœuvres took place between the 3rd and 4th Divisions
of the Home Fleets, commanded by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven,
and the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase of the
manœuvres of that year included some Battle Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,”
during which attacks by considerable forces of destroyers were carried
out. Before this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the
fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place without
destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented the matter from being
made the subject of thorough practical experiment on such a scale as to
give reliable guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into
greater prominence.
The Fleet manœuvres of 1912 did not throw further light on the
question, as no Fleet action took place in which destroyers were
engaged; and the subsequent Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as
I recollect, include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged.
During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 manœuvres most of the
destroyer attacks on the “Red” Fleet were made from towards the rear of
the “Blue” battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge from
them.
To turn from manœuvre experience; during the years 1911–14, covering
the period of Sir George Callaghan’s command of the Home Fleets,
destroyer attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that
were constantly being carried out, and officers were impressed with the
supreme importance of the whole matter.
This was the position when I took over the command of the Grand
Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the matter immediately engaged my
attention. The “counter” which had usually been favoured by flag
officers commanding Fleets up to the date named, had been the obvious
one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ torpedo craft on those
of the enemy, as the latter advanced to attack. It was difficult to
forecast how far such a “counter” would be successful in preventing the
destroyers from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the distance
the torpedo could be relied upon to run with accuracy, and on its
speed, both constantly increasing figures.
The great number of destroyers possessed by the enemy, the largely
increased range of torpedoes, the difficulty which our light cruisers
and flotillas might experience in reaching a favourable position
for meeting and disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter
could discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger attendant
on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low visibility, when a
destroyer attack could be instantly and effectively launched before
such a “counter” could take place, made it essential to consider other
means for dealing with the situation.
Some German documents which came into our possession early in the War
proved the importance which the enemy attached to this form of attack,
and emphasised the gravity of the question.
It was, of course, fully realised that the question had two sides, and
that if our own Battle Fleet was open to this form of attack, that of
the enemy was equally so, but as against this there were important
considerations to which it was necessary to devote attention.
The first was that the element of chance enters very largely into
torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla of destroyers attacking
a Battle Fleet at long range does so with the idea that a certain
percentage of the torpedoes fired will take effect on the ships, the
remainder passing between the ships.
Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards having a speed of
30 knots an hour, or, in other words, of 50 feet per second, is not
comparable to a projectile from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000
yards of say 2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly
straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course of the target
have been determined with considerable accuracy, the torpedo will not
hit. Let us assume that the target ship X at position A is steaming at
15 knots, and that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on
the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is discharged
on a line at right angles to the course of the target at a distance of
8,000 yards (_see_ diagram). The target ship will advance 4,000 yards
along the line A B whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the
line C D. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes.
It will be seen that if the course of the target ship has been
misjudged very slightly, or had been altered during the passage from
A to B, the torpedo will pass ahead or astern of it. In that case it
might hit instead a ship Z ahead or one Y astern of X.
There are no means available on board a destroyer for determining
with any real accuracy either the speed or the course of a ship at a
distance of four or five miles. Hence the difficulty, and the reason
why torpedoes are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in
expectation that _one_ of the ships in the line will be hit.
[Illustration]
The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the enemy, and the chances
of achieving this object are naturally proportional to the target
presented by a ship as compared with the space between adjacent ships.
In the case of a British line of eight battleships attacked “beam on,”
the chances of a hit for torpedoes which reach the British line may be
assessed roughly at seven to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600
feet, and the distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next
astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus giving a
total length of _ships_ of 4,800 feet, and the total of the _interval_
between them as 6,300 feet.
A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes, and at long ranges
one may calculate the chances of hits _on the above reasoning_ at
between three and four per destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are
correctly fired at such a range as to ensure that they reach the
British battle line, and provided that the British ships can take no
effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.[O]
[O] Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up
to the year 1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun
armament than their enemies.
It has been said that the element of chance is a large factor in
torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed. By this it is meant
that skill is not a factor that can produce a decisive effect when
dealing with torpedoes, as in the case of guns dealing with guns. It
is true that skilful manœuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo,
if sufficient warning of its approach is given, and if its position
with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly judged. When
experience at the Jutland Battle showed that under favourable weather
conditions the track of German torpedoes was visible for some distance,
great care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dispatches so
that future use could be made of the fact.
Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that our enemy was
almost certain to possess a very considerable superiority over us in
the number of destroyers likely to be present during a Fleet action.
This was a question which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the
then First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had discussed it on
more than one occasion when the destroyer building programme was being
considered.
Our fears were realised, particularly during the first two years of the
War.
The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect at different
periods is shown in the following table, so far as it is known to me:--
------------------+--------------+-------------+-----------------------
| British | German | Additional German
| destroyers | destroyers | destroyers, less than
| with the | probably | 12 years old, that
Date | Grand Fleet, | attached to | could join the High
| including | the High | Sea Fleet at Germany’s
| Flotilla | Sea Fleet | selected moment.
| Leaders[P] | |
------------------+--------------+-------------+-----------------------
August 4th, 1914 | 42 | 88 | 20
October 1st, 1914 | 42 | 88 | 20
January 1st, 1915 | 42 | 88 | 30
April 1st, 1915 | 58 | 88 | --
July 1st, 1915 | 65 | 88 | --
October 1st, 1915 | 65 | 88 | --
January 1st, 1916 | 66 | 88 | 50
April 1st, 1916 | 74 | 88 | --
May 31st, 1916 | 80 | 88 | 70[Q]
------------------+--------------+-------------+------------------------
[P] The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the
figures in column 2, since I never expected that it would
be able to concentrate with the Grand Fleet.
[Q] No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in
destroyers.
Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at the end of May,
1916, 70 were available to go to sea on May 30th (an unusually large
proportion). There happened, also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight
destroyers belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied the
battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which 47 were with
the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with the Battle Cruiser Fleet,
including the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had
88, a far larger proportion to each ship.
This superiority in numbers on the part of the Germans arose from three
causes:
(_a_) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and destroyer force
at Harwich, the presence of which force during a Fleet action was
very improbable, owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if
it took place, probably do so at Germany’s selected moment and
not at ours, and to the difficulty of concentration under such
circumstances.
(_b_) The necessity of utilising a large number of our destroyers for
patrol purposes in the Straits of Dover and elsewhere.
(_c_) We had not built an adequate number of destroyers in the
years before the War to meet the many needs that only this class
of vessel could fulfil, particularly as the enemy developed his
submarine warfare against merchant-ships.
The shipbuilding programmes of 1908–09, and following years up to
1912–13, included provision for twenty destroyers each year. Subsequent
to the latter date, the programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in
order to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we were
woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in the Estimates,
there was never sufficient money to meet all the Admiralty’s needs. It
was intimated that one or other of the requirements had to give way at
a time when the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and as
the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary than the
destroyers, the number of the latter class of vessel was reduced.
Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme initiated by
Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage of destroyers was most
seriously felt throughout the whole War, the conditions would probably
have been even worse had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been
sacrificed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard desired
by the Admiralty.
A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity
for _not leaving anything to chance in a Fleet action, because our
Fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of
the Empire_, as indeed to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside
the Battle Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster
befall it or even should its margin of superiority over the enemy be
eliminated.
The situation was in many respects different from that with which our
Navy was faced in the time of the old wars. In those days disaster
could only come about by reason of bad strategy or tactics owing to our
enemy being in overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force
better, and, apart from manœuvring, the action was invariably decided
by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried weapon.
During the recent War two entirely new features of the greatest
importance were introduced. First, the torpedo could be fired at very
long range, up to 15,000 yards, either from large ships or destroyers,
and at shorter range from submarines, and the mine had been developed;
the invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be known
when they were being employed.
The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious when dealing
with the attack of under-water weapons than with gun attack are the
greater damage which one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may
well be fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to
reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it is usually
different; a ship which is being heavily hit can--if her own offensive
powers will not save her by crushing the fire of the enemy--so manœuvre
as to derange temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein lies
the whole necessity for the exercise of care when dealing with the
underwater weapon.
These considerations led me to introduce measures for dealing with
destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet other than the counter of attack
by our light craft on the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a
turn on the part of the ships, either _towards_ the torpedoes or _away_
from them.
In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so that they would
present as small a target as possible to the torpedo, and incidentally
that the space between the ships should be correspondingly large. The
matter is very technical, and presents many interesting features, one
of which may be illustrated by an example:
[Illustration]
Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships to steer direct
for the attacking destroyers _if the moment at which the torpedoes are
fired can be ascertained_.
This course, although applicable to one attack, leads to difficulties
in the case of successive attacks, since further turns towards will
bring the battle line within effective range of torpedoes fired from
the enemy’s battleships; occasions will arise when this risk must be
accepted.
The accompanying diagram shows that the van and centre squadrons are
not so well safeguarded by a turn towards the attacking destroyers
as is the rear squadron, for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire
torpedoes from C (a threatening position to the van) and the van
squadron turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will
steer along the line A B.
If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron instead of the
van squadron as supposed, and their objective is the twentieth ship
in the line, they will run along the line C D, i.e., directly at the
fourth ship in the line.
The target presented is, however, small, and the chances of a flotilla
attacking the rear squadron when in a favourable position for attacking
the van are not great.
The important point in the case of a turn towards is, however, the
necessity for ascertaining the moment of discharge of the torpedoes.
In the second case, that of turning away, the object is to place
the ships at such a distance from the attacking destroyers that the
torpedoes will not cross their tracks, but if this object is not
achieved the ships are in a good position for avoiding the torpedoes if
their tracks are visible; the objection to this manœuvre is that the
range of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened.
It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or other of the
manœuvres should destroyer attacks take place under conditions which
prevented an effective “counter” by our own light craft; both manœuvres
were arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn by
divisions of four ships would delay the completion of the manœuvre to
too great an extent.
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great deal in the way of
discussion and instructions on the subject of torpedo attack in a Fleet
action. The duties of light cruisers and destroyers in this connection
were dealt with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the
supreme importance both of making early torpedo attacks on the enemy’s
line and of immediately countering such attacks, and it was pointed
out that an early attack by our own destroyers would not only tend to
stop an enemy attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best
position to meet a hostile attack.
The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroyers were so fixed
that they should be in the best positions to effect these two objects,
such positions being obviously in the van of the Fleet; in order to
provide against a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment
in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two flotillas,
according to the numbers available, and a light cruiser squadron, were
also stationed in the rear.
The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been a matter of almost
daily consideration, and all our experience and thought led to the same
conclusion, namely, that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer
attacks, would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for this
belief, and some of them were as follows:
1. On each occasion when German vessels were met, they had
immediately retired towards their bases.
2. The tactical advantages of such a move were obvious. They might
be enumerated thus:
(_a_) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of advantage
in regard to torpedo attack on the following fleet. The
retiring fleet also eliminates, to a large extent, danger of
torpedo attack by the following fleet.
(_b_) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of drawing its
opponent over a mine or submarine trap.
(_c_) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere with
the observation of gunfire by the following fleet.
(_d_) Considerations of moral effect will force the stronger
fleet to follow the weaker, and play into the hands of the
enemy.
We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these tactics that in
all the many exercises carried out by the Fleet during the War, it was
the invariable rule to indicate beforehand an _assumed_ position of
Heligoland, and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-Chief
of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always deployed his Fleet
in the direction of Heligoland and adopted retiring tactics. The
difficulties resulting from the employment of these retiring tactics
and the best method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore,
the subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the senior
officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very frequently discussed
and worked out on the tactical board.
The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if retiring tactics
are employed in conjunction with a free and skilful use of under-water
weapons.
When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st, 1916, these thoughts
were in my mind, and were no doubt present in the minds of all
Flag officers in the British Fleet. It has been mentioned that the
circumstances of the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with
any degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle Fleet,
and the deployment of our own Fleet took place under these conditions.
Even so, however, the course on deployment (that is, south-east by
east) was to a certain extent governed by the idea of getting between
the enemy and his base on the supposition that he would be making
towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef Channel.
The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a commanding position
on the bow of the enemy caused the enemy to make a large turn to
starboard, largely because this squadron--Rear-Admiral Hood’s--was
mistaken for the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have
already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that at
about 5.45 P.M. “dim shapes of enemy battleships are discerned in a
north-easterly direction.” These shapes were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle
Cruiser Squadron. The German account states that their battle cruisers
turned away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Battle Fleet
the chance of placing itself between the enemy and his base. Advantage
was taken of this opportunity, and the enemy was then forced to pursue
his retiring tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns
required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed in a position
of tactical disadvantage owing to the British Fleet working round on a
wide circle outside the enemy.
A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets will show this at
once.[R] The course of the British Fleet on deployment was south-east
by east. Successive turns to starboard brought the course through south
by west to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13
points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards apart, the
German Fleet moving on the inner of these two circles.
[R] _Cf._ diagram in the pocket at the end.
The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans erroneously
thought was in favour of the British Battle Fleet, but which was always
with the enemy, was accentuated, and the Grand Fleet was gradually
brought farther and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet,
placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in regard to
torpedo attack. This advantage was increased by the low visibility,
which rendered it difficult to see flotillas approaching to attack
until they were at fairly short range.
When the first attack by German destroyers took place and the first
of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be approaching on a bearing 30
degrees before the beam of the _Iron Duke_, and had reached a distance
of 9,000 yards or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was
essential. Our own flotillas had been using every endeavour to get to
the van, but the frequent turns to starboard and the movement of our
battle cruisers across the bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their
movement, and it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers
could prevent the attack from developing.
The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be determined with
sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards” and therefore the Battle Fleet
was “turned away,” in subdivisions.
Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, coincidentally
with the destroyer attack the enemy made a very large turn-away from
our Fleet, and thus opened the range much farther, disappearing
entirely from view even from our rear; this process was repeated on
each occasion of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was,
therefore, continually refusing action.
It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the whole line of
battle away for this attack, or whether the leading squadron could not
have held the original course. Such a movement was provided for in the
Battle Orders, but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000
yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the _Iron Duke_, the
leading ship of the centre battle squadron, and therefore the leading
Battle Squadron was as open to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or
rear squadron; indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to
attack the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle Squadron was
also not at the time clear of the van of the centre squadron, as the
turns that had been made had prevented line ahead being re-formed, and
the _Iron Duke’s_ Division could not turn unless the division ahead
also turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led me to make
the signal general to the Battle Fleet.
According to the reports of the captains of the ships of the Battle
Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed the line of our Battle
Fleet during the 7.10 P.M. destroyer attack alone, in spite of the
turn. The large majority of these were observed by the ships of the 1st
and 5th Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have crossed the
line _ahead_ of the _Iron Duke_, and at least six crossed the track
of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was moving out to attack the
enemy’s flotilla.
In the case of a long line of ships there is always danger of the
torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being forgotten or minimised by
ships that are in the van, owing to failure to realise how dangerous
the torpedo fire of ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to
vessels a long way in rear, although they themselves are quite immune
from this danger.
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable
decentralisation of command, and great stress was laid on this point in
the general instructions for “Battle Tactics.” The opening paragraphs
of this section of the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It
was pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would control the
movements of the whole Battle Fleet before and on deployment (except
in the extreme case of very low visibility rendering it necessary for
the Flag officer of a wing division to take immediate action), he could
not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel and other
smoke made both vision and communication difficult. The necessity for
wide decentralisation of command was then pointed out, combined with a
close watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which Flag
officers should generally conform.
The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since Trafalgar if
we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese War, and advantage was
naturally taken of the experience to make some changes in the Battle
Orders; but there were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and,
therefore, no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief of the
Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet engagement, “This is all
going according to expectation.” We did, however, obtain confirmation
of our views as to the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted
by the German fleet.
The principal changes that were made in the Battle Orders were in the
direction of laying still further emphasis on the discretionary power
which was vested in Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the
difficulty, always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jutland, which
the Commander-in-Chief would experience in controlling the movements of
the whole Fleet in the heat of action; also in defining still further
the different movements that might be adopted to deal with torpedo
attacks, whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships or from
destroyers.
A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo attacks in
action had been prepared by my Staff during the spring of 1916, and
a memorandum, with diagrams, had been written showing the various
situations that might arise and the effect of the different
counter-movements in each case. It is of interest to note that this
memorandum was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was
fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not actually been
issued.
The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in the memorandum before
it was finally issued to the Fleet.
The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and the “counter”
measures adopted have been dealt with at considerable length, since
this form of attack and its “counter” have been much discussed in the
Service since 1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely
to continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject of much
future experiment.
The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any great effect, and
their importance should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British
Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, but _it was not this
turn which led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy_. That
difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet made a very large
turn to the westward under cover of a smoke screen at the moment of
launching the earliest destroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers
in the van which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary
in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain touch until
8.20 P.M. because of the retirement of the enemy.
The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, in
regard to the ranges at which the opening phases of the action should
be fought, remained unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the
policy of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside
torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line _in ordinary circumstances_.
As is very frequently the case when naval actions do not result in
overwhelming material losses by one side or the other, or the capture
or destruction of a large part of the opposing Fleet, both sides at
the time claimed a victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped
to support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, besides
influencing neutral, and probably in particular American, opinion.
The Germans apparently based their claim on two grounds, the first
being that of having inflicted heavier losses than they received. In
order to make good this contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk
one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and five
destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British side; and they
concealed, until further concealment was impossible, the sinking of
the battle cruiser _Lutzow_ and the light cruiser _Rostock_, besides
omitting to mention that the _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to prevent
her sinking, thereby slurring over the point that the _Seydlitz_ would
undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own _Warrior_ did, had the
action been fought as far from German bases as it was from British
bases. They also said nothing of at least four German battleships being
torpedoed, and of several battleships and all their battle cruisers
being so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further
fighting for several months. The case was very different with the
British ships, as has been already stated. If these points are borne in
mind, the original German claim to victory falls to the ground, even on
the material side. After the surrender of the German ships in November,
1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed writer on naval
matters, stated in the _Berliner Tageblatt_ of November 18th that “our
Fleet’s losses were severe,” adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was
clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be,
the last one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so openly.”
But a victory is judged not merely by material losses and damage, but
by its results. It is profitable to examine the results of the Jutland
Battle. With the single exception of a cruise towards the English
coast on August 19th, 1916--undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the
High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show that it was still
capable of going to sea--the High Sea Fleet never again, up to the end
of 1917, ventured much outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even
on August 19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately for
home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts of the approach
of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the method of procedure that would
be adopted by a Fleet flushed with victory and belonging to a country
which was being strangled by the sea blockade.
Again, in the German account of the “victory” it is remarked that “as
the dawn coloured the eastern sky on the historic 1st of June, everyone
expected that the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed
in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation was not realised. As
far as the eye could reach the horizon was clear. Not until the late
morning did our airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce
that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was approaching from
the southern part of the North Sea at full speed on a northerly course.
To the great regret of all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to
overtake and attack theirs.”
What are the facts? We know now that as the sun rose, the High Sea
Fleet (except such portions as were escaping via the Skaw) was close
to the Horn Reef, steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for
home behind the shelter of the German minefields. And the Grand Fleet
was waiting for them to appear and searching the waters to the westward
and northward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained
the search during the forenoon of June 1st, and the airship, far from
sighting the Fleet _late in the morning_, as stated, did so, first at
3.30 A.M., and on several occasions subsequently during the forenoon.
And if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what an
opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate them! One
is forced to the conclusion that this victorious fleet did not consider
itself capable of engaging only twelve British battleships.
I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland Battle without
mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. From the second in command, Sir
Cecil Burney, to the youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell
in the _Chester_, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit and
determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and trusted friend, a
fine seaman who always handled his squadron--or, in my absence, the
Fleet--with marked skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a
high reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton Sturdee, the
victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer who had made a special study
of tactics; Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders,
including my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir Robert
Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose deaths the nation and Fleet
lost of their best--were all officers of proved ability, in whom not
myself only, but the Fleet, had absolute confidence.
In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed a leader who
throughout his Service career had shown fighting qualities of the
highest order, and he had imbued his force with his own indomitable
spirit.
The Flag officers second in command of squadrons had all led divisions
for a considerable period, and I was confident that they would handle
their divisions as well in action as they did during exercises, as
proved to be the case.
The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyer flotillas
had invariably fulfilled every expectation that I had formed of them. I
had always admired the manner in which the personnel of these vessels
had endured the conditions under which their work was so frequently
performed.
Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-Admiral Sir Charles
Madden (my righthand man throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its
chief members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag officers, and
with captains who had on countless occasions shown their skill, I was
indeed in a fortunate position.
To the above advantages I must add those obtained by the magnificence
of the personnel of the lower ranks. The officers and ships’ companies
were as keen as any Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait
had never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Officers and
men were day after day striving to perfect the fighting efficiency of
their ships, and well had they succeeded. The engine room staffs had
demonstrated early in the War that they would respond magnificently
to any demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it on the
occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and moral of the Fleet never
stood higher than at the time of the Battle of Jutland, and because
of that spirit I knew that the Fleet under my command was the most
formidable fighting machine in the world.
Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with proper restraint.
Whenever and wherever there was opportunity, officers and men displayed
courage and self-sacrifice of the highest order. There were innumerable
instances which proved that the personnel of the present Navy has
nothing to learn in this respect from its forefathers. The dead
died heroic deaths; the wounded behaved with marvellous fortitude.
Forty-four years passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith
in, and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket, but they
surpassed all my expectations, and so long as that spirit endures, this
country will be fortunate, and with adequate forces will be safe.
It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum issued to the Fleet
after the Jutland Battle:
_Iron Duke_,
June 4th, 1916.
H.F. 0022 349.
MEMORANDUM.
I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains, Officers and
Men of the Grand Fleet my very high appreciation of the manner in
which the ships were fought during the action on May 31st, 1916.
2. At this stage, when full information is not available, it is not
possible to enter into details, but quite sufficient is already
known to enable me to state definitely that the glorious traditions
handed down to us by generations of gallant seamen were most
worthily upheld.
3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable nature robbed the
Fleet of that complete victory which I know was expected by all
ranks, which is necessary for the safety of the Empire and which
will yet be ours.
4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most gallant comrades,
but, although it is very difficult to obtain accurate information
as to the enemy losses, I have no doubt that we shall find that
they are certainly not less than our own. Sufficient information
has already been received for me to make that statement with
confidence.
I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information on this
point at an early date, but do not wish to delay the issue of this
expression of my keen appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my
confidence in future complete victory.
5. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful spirit and
fortitude of the wounded has filled me with the greatest admiration.
I am more proud than ever to have the honour of commanding a fleet
manned by such officers and men.
J. R. JELLICOE.
Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.
The Flag Officers, Commodores and
Officers in command of H.M. ships
of the Grand Fleet.
My official despatch on the battle to the Board of Admiralty was
forwarded on June 19th, and the following letter was afterwards
promulgated to the Grand Fleet:--
ADMIRALTY,
July 4th, 1916.
SIR,--My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered
your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand
Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on the 31st
May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the
Battle Cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and
Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.
2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines
of the Grand Fleet on this, the first Fleet action which has
occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the
enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of
the 31st May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry and
devotion which characterised all who took part in the battle; the
ships of every class were handled with skill and determination;
their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid
testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff;
while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally
conspicuous.
3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of
the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems
with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to
account. The expectations of the country were high; they have been
well fulfilled.
4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your
proceedings on this occasion.
I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
W. GRAHAM GREENE.